Political Legitimacy

In at least twelve kingdoms between the 12th and the 16th centuries medieval kings were compared to the biblical Magi. This type of comparison brings in various important issues related to the royal authority and the perception of the king in the medieval society. Herein we will focus only on the means of accommodating the idea of unique authority of the king with the particular setting of three crowned characters. How can a king be perceived as the ultimate figure of authority in a kingdom, while being depicted as a Magus, that is among at least two other Magi and in the presence of the Virgin and Child? How can his unique authority be put forward when seen among three or even four crowned figures? And is that the only purpose of all medieval authors and commissioners who created this association between kings and Magi, or other conceptions on royal authority can be expressed through this means?
By examining written and iconographic documents, this article reveals the elements that permitted the use of the identification of kings with the Magi as a means of expressing different - sometimes contradictory - conceptions on royal authority.

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

A construção da moeda única apresenta falhas ao nível dos mecanismos que deveriam garantir a convergência macroeconómica entre os países membros da União Europeia. Menos conhecidas e analisadas são as falhas na construção política, ou seja, na estrutura de gestão e tomada de decisões: uma estrutura cujo sistema de incentivos faz para que não exista um interesse comum na estabilização dos desequilíbrios macroeconómicos entre os Estados-membros, e que por isso põe em risco a estabilidade a médio prazo da zona euro. Duas são as possíveis soluções ao nível da estrutura política: uma "união política", isto é, uma maior integração que inclua mecanismos supranacionais de legitimidade democrática, ou uma diferente estrutura de regras no contexto da governança atual, que crie um interesse comum na estabilização da moeda única. O artigo expõe estas duas opções, analisa as propostas da Comissão perante estas duas perspetivas, e avalia os obstáculos no caminho das reformas de um ponto de vista das preferências dos governos dos mais influentes países membros..pt † A pesquisa que está na base do presente artigo foi financiada pela FCT-Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (UID/FIL/00183/2013).

The fiscal architecture of the common currency was flawed in several respects from the very start. Less well known are the flaws in the political architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union. This is characterised by a system of incentives that thwarts all efforts towards an overall macroeconomic stabilisation of the Eurozone. There are two possible solutions to this problem: one is the political union, to be brought about by means of an additional transfer of economic and fiscal sovereignty and a corresponding mechanism of political legitimacy, or different fiscal rules within the current structure of political governance. The essay expounds upon these two options while taking into account the European Commission's most recent reform proposals. It furthermore assesses the hurdles that the latter will have to overcome against the background of the preferences of the most influential Member States.

Functionalist theories of political authority are commonly challenged on the grounds that such theories cannot explain the boundaries of state of authority. If all that matters for political authority is whether a state is sufficiently just, then one will have some difficulty explaining why persons have political obligations to the particular state they reside in, why unilateral annexation by reasonably just states does not create political obligations on the part of the annexed, and why a reasonably just state may lack political authority because of past wrongdoing. In this paper, I develop a hybrid theory of political authority which combines fair play and functionalist criteria. I go on to show that fair play functionalism can resolve all three of the particularity problem, the problem of unilateral annexation, and the problem of historical injustice while maintaining a commitment to basic functionalist intuitions.

Emerging with increased intensity since the 1990s, peace-building and reconstruction of post-conflict and war-torn societies have become central to today's international relations and assistance agendas. When we are talking about reconstruction of collapsed states, we have to keep in mind two models: an external model which rests on building institutions which promote stability through checking the exercise of power, and an internal model where domestic actors produce change and which hinges on re-establishing power.

[Resumen] Los fundamentos de la política moderna han cambiado desde las visiones de la Grecia clásica, centrados en una visión más expansiva del ser humano como un ser político, hasta las visiones modernas, basadas en la teoría del contrato social, el consentimiento político y la creación de instituciones representativas. Hay dos conceptos clave que articulan los fundamentos de la política moderna. Por un lado, el concepto de Poder. En este capítulo se analizan distintas teorías sobre cómo funciona, cómo se organiza y cómo se estudia el poder político en las sociedades modernas. Por otro lado, el concepto de Legitimidad. En el texto se describe cómo la Legimitidad es un mecanismo normativo y práctico que ha servido para intentar superar las limitaciones del concepto de Legalidad política propio de los clásicos Estados de Derecho.

Resumen: En México no queda claro cuál debe ser el papel de la educación pública después de la transición. ¿Debe continuar el proyecto de construcción nacional iniciado por el régimen priísta o debe abandonar todo contenido ideológico? Este trabajo comienza por preguntarse si para una democracia liberal como México es permisible inculcar contenidos ideológicos a través de la educación pública. A manera de simplificación me concentro en el caso de la enseñanza de la historia patria articulada mediante la ideología del nacionalismo revolucionario a través del libro de texto gratuito. Argumento que para una democracia liberal no es permisible inculcar el perfeccionismo cultural que parece implicar la enseñanza de la historia patria. Sin embargo espero que el argumenta pueda extenderse a otros casos similares de adoctrinamiento infantil. Abstract: After Mexican political transition, it is not clear what should be the role of public education. Should public education continue with the nation building process first conducted by the PRI's regime? Or should it instead abandon any ideological endeavor? This paper begins by asking if it is morally permissible for a liberal democracy like Mexico, to indoctrinate children using the schooling governmental apparatus. As a means of simplification I discuss only the case of history free text books where Mexican history seems to be still constructed around the ideology of the revolution-nationalism. I argue that it is not permissible for a liberal democracy to indoctrinate children with the kind of cultural perfectionism entrenched in the patriotic doctrinal history books. The hope is to extend my argument to similar cases of children endoctrination.

How can we explain the dynamics of nonconventional struggles such as the Gaza flotilla case of May 2010? Most international relations scholars analyze international disputes using a “chess logic,” according to which the actors seek to outmaneuver their opponents on the battleground. However, an increasing number of clashes are guided by a “performance logic”: although the players interact with one another, their real targets are audiences. The present study aims to bridge this gap, proposing a phenomenological framework for analyzing this particular kind of performative contest over legitimation and delegitimation in contemporary conflicts. It expands upon the idea that current anarchical global politics increasingly lead contending actors to engage in “pure” legitimation struggles—“battles for legitimacy”—seeking to persuade international audiences that they deserve political support. After providing guidelines for the identification of these phenomena, this article presents a model for the methodical examination of their interactive dynamics based on three legitimation functions (appropriateness, consensus, empathy). This model is applied to the flotilla case by mapping the protagonists’ framing contests across “legitimation (battle)fields.” The findings of this study, which emphasize the strong interplay between normative, political, and emotional mechanisms for empowering (de)legitimation strategies, can contribute to expanding the research program concerning international legitimacy.

This paper responds to Jason Brennan’s prominent critique of democracy. Brennan argues that the average citizen is ignorant and irrational, and votes incompetently, exercising illegitimate authority over her neighbors, thereby violating their right against subjection to incompetent government. He concludes that society should replace democracy with epistocracy; the rule of the educated. After clarifying the requirements of Brennan’s proposal, I present two lines of defense for democratic theorists, both compatible with the competence principle at the heart of Brennan’s argument. First, democracy can satisfy the standards of competence proposed by Brennan through institutional changes. And second, epistocracy falls short of its own epistemic standards by excluding voters, despite the place of voters in the division of political labor. I conclude that Brennan’s argument does not undermine democracy’s legitimacy, and in fact speaks against his epistocratic alternative.

Debates about how to incorporate the severely cognitively disabled into liberal theory typically focus on John Rawls’s assumption that citizens choosing the principles of justice should be understood as full social cooperators. In this paper, we argue that social cooperation is not the fundamental barrier to the inclusion of the severely cognitively disabled. We argue that these persons are excluded from the entire project of liberal legitimacy in virtue of the apparent inability of a severely cognitively disabled person to understand and evaluate the legitimacy of political principles for herself. Severely cognitively disabled persons lack a kind of access to political principles that is crucial, according to liberal theory, for political principles to be legitimate to someone, and not simply for someone.

Political legitimacy has become a scarce resource in Russia and other post-Soviet states in Eurasia. Their capacity to deliver prosperity has suffered from economic crisis, the conflict in Ukraine and the ensuing confrontation with the West. Will nationalism and repression enable political regimes to survive? This book investigates the politics of legitimation in post-Soviet countries, focusing on how political and intellectual elites exploit different modes of legitimation. Its chapters combine cross-national comparisons and country case studies, covering state-economy relations, pro-presidential parties, courts, ideas of nationhood, historical and literary narratives. The main conclusions are that weak economic performance, evidence of electoral fraud, unresponsive government and the waning authority of presidents continue to jeopardize institutional legitimacy. Incumbent elites have been able to shift between legitimation modes, but shifts towards nationalism, artificial charisma and traditionalism will not be sufficient in the long term to keep elites in power.

I propose a set of distinctions that demarcate the structure
that I consider appropriate for the examination of the thesis
of conceptual incompatibility between authority and autonomy.
I begin with an analysis of the standard conception of authority,
i.e., the practical difference thesis (correlativism). I distinguish two versions: the epistemic and the voluntarist. Then I offer an analysis of two conceptions of moral autonomy: self-legislation and self-judgment. I conclude by remarking that we should distinguish two different versions of the conceptual incompatibility thesis: a) The conflict is unsolvable because autonomy requires that we always be the authors of the rules we have to obey while the authority claims that her will is the source of such standards. b) The conflict is unsolvable
because autonomy requires that we always act based on our
own moral judgment on what categorical reasons should guide our actions while the authority pretends that we have to give up acting as that judgment requires.

2021 ausgezeichnet mit dem Hedwig Hintze Preis des Verbandes der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands (VHD)

Legitimation über wirtschaftlichen Erfolg: Das Francoregime als technokratische Verwaltungs- und Entwicklungsdiktatur.

Die Francodiktatur (1936/39-1975) war sowohl eine der am längsten währenden als auch eine der stabilsten Diktaturen in der europäischen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Anna Catharina Hofmann zeigt, dass sich diese Besonderheit aus der »Neuerfindung« des Regimes als Entwicklungsdiktatur ab den 1950er Jahren erklärt: Am französischen Modell der planification orientiert, sollte das Land in kürzester Zeit ins Industriezeitalter katapultiert werden. Mit dem - wenig bekannten - franquistischen Planungskommissar Laureano López Rodó (1920-2000) rückt die Autorin den Architekten dieser neuen
Legitimationsstrategie in den Mittelpunkt. Er prägte wesentlich den Versuch, das Regime über administrative Effizienz, wirtschaftlichen Erfolg und die Einbindung in den Westen zu stabilisieren. Paradoxerweise legte seine Politik damit zugleich die Grundlagen für die Erosion der Diktatur. Denn sie verschärfte die Machtkämpfe in der franquistischen Herrschaftselite und wurde zum Einfallstor für Regimekritik. Auf diese Weise entwickelt die Autorin eine neue Interpretation der spanischen Diktaturgeschichte.

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Galardonado con el premio "Hedwig Hintze" de la Asociación de Historiadores e Historiadoras Alemanes (VHD) en 2021

Legitimación tecnocrática: El régimen de Franco como dictadura administrativa y desarrollista

El régimen de Franco (1936/39-1975) no sólo fue una de las dictaduras más longevas en la historia europea del siglo XX sino también una de las más estables. Anna Catharina Hofmann demuestra que esta singularidad se explica por la «reinvención» del régimen como dictadura desarrollista a partir de los años 50 con el objetivo de catapultar al país lo antes posible a la era industrial imitando el modelo de la planification francesa. La autora se centra en el principal arquitecto de esta estrategia de legitimación, Laureano López Rodó (1920-2000), quien fuera Comisario del Plan de Desarrollo entre 1962 y 1973. Suyo fue el impulso para intentar estabilizar el régimen a través de  la eficacia administrativa, del éxito económico y de la integración en Occidente. Paradójicamente, su política acabó sentando las bases para la erosión de la dictadura porque contribuyó a agudizar las luchas de poder en la élite franquista y expuso el régimen a la crítica. De esta manera, la autora logra desarrollar una nueva interpretación del segundo franquismo.

Analizira se razvoj odnosa građana i uprave od vremena nastanka moderne uprave do danas, kao refleks društvenog, gospodarskog i političkog razvoja. U radu se analizira šest glavnih uloga građana u odnosu prema javnoj upravi: podanik, izvor i nadzornik vlasti, suradnik, korisnik, potrošač i poduzetnik. Nadalje, u tom razvoju razlikuju se stari i novi koncepti. Klasični su koncepti pokušavali odnos građana i uprave razriješiti na sustavnoj razini, uvođenjem sustavnih, organizacijskih, institucionalnih i pravnih rješenja koja djeluju na neosobnoj razini. Razvijali su se na političkom i pravnom području, traženjem prikladnih političko-upravnih i pravno-institucionalnih rješenja. Posebno se analizira značenje koncepata demokracije i decentralizacije. Moderni koncepti u odnosu građana i uprave baziraju se na općoj humanizaciji, individualizaciji i osobnom odnosima građana te nositelja vlasti i profesionalnih javnih službenika. U pozadini modernih koncepata su oblici mrežne i horizontalne vladavine. Posebno se analiziraju koncepti povjerenja građana te ponosa javnih službenika i upravljača. 1. Uvod U nekoliko zadnjih stoljeća društvo i država su se temeljito promijenili. U doba stvaranja moderne (profesionalne) uprave društva su bila piramidalno stratificirana, a političko se uređenje oslanjalo na monarhijski model. Tadašnje su se monarhije razvijale prema apsolutističkoj fazi, s vrlo snažnom pozicijom nasljednog vladara (apsolutističke monarhije). Monarh je mogao monopolizirati političku moć samo temeljem stvaranja velike, dobro organizirane, profesionalne državne uprave čiji su resursi bili s jedne strane gruba i nad svima nadmoćna sila a s druge znanje o načinima upravljanja državom. Na donjem polu društvene ljestvice bile su različite manje-više obespravljene društvene skupine, poput ovisnih seljaka, malih obrtnika i trgovaca, i drugih. Monarh je imao monopol postavljanja državnih i društvenih ciljeva te je zapovijedao organizacijama upravnih profesionalaca koje su koncentrirale silu i znanje. Upravni profesionalci su imali elitni društveni položaj. Svi ostali stanovnici bili su bez političkih i drugih prava spram vlasti i državne uprave, a raspolagali su znanjima koja nisu mogla konkurirati profesionalnim državnim upravljačima. Sva najbolja tehnička sredstva bila su u rukama države, a proizvodnih, socijalnih i civilnih organizacija u današnjem smislu nije uopće bilo. Organizacija kao posebni tip kooperativne strukture među članovima koji zajedno rade postojala je samo u državnoj upravi. U takvim uvjetima postojao je potpuno vertikalni, hijerarhijski odnos u društvu u kojem je na vrhu bio monarh. Ispod njega bila je državna uprava, dok su svi ostali bili u širokoj bazi obespravljenih stanovnika (Slika 1.).

This paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit views of judgment. Three claims are advanced. First, the salient opposition among approaches to legitimacy is not between "moralism" and "realism." Recent realist proposals for rethinking legitimacy share with moralist views a distinctive form, called "normativism": a quest for knowledge of principles that solve the question of legitimacy. This assumes that judging legitimacy is a matter of applying such principles to a case at hand. Second, neither Rawls nor Habermas is a normativist about political legitimacy. The principles of legitimacy they proffer claim to express rather than adjudicate the legitimacy of a liberal-democratic regime, and thus cannot solve the question of legitimacy at a fundamental level. But perhaps we should question the normativist aspiration to theoretically resolving the problem to begin with. My third claim is that a "pragmatist" approach enables us to rethink political legitimacy more deeply by shifting focus from the articulation of principles to the activity of judging. Implicit in Rawls and Habermas's theories I then find clues towards an alternative account of judgment, in which the question of legitimacy calls not for theoretical resolution but for ongoing practical engagement.

How could a state have the moral authority to promulgate and enforce laws that citizens are thereby obliged to obey? That is the problem of political authority. The Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority contends that great social benefits depend upon there being a state with political authority. In his book, 'The Problem of Political Authority,' Michael Huemer considers different types of explanation of political authority and he rejects them all. I show that the objections he raises to consequentialist accounts are confused and that they fail to connect with the Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority. Huemer argues that anarchy of a particular kind would be better than the states that exist in current Western societies. I explain why that argument, if it were successful, would be an effective objection to the Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority.

This book examines how the Zionist movement, and later the state of Israel, have dealt with various longstanding efforts to delegitimize Israel’s standing in the international community, including by the Arab League Boycott, the United Nations, and the Boycott, Divest and Sanctions (BDS) movement.

Through historical and archival research, as well as discourse analysis
of legal and governmental documents, public statements of Israeli officials, and interviews with Israeli policy makers, this book argues that Israel has constructed perceived and real challenges to its legitimacy as ontological threats that undermine its national security, and has securitized its Jewish identity in response to these threats. As a result, the state has adopted extraordinary measures, often marked by illiberalism. Rather than enhance Israel’s international legitimacy, these measures have undermined it further, especially among liberal audiences in the West, whose support is critical for Israel’s continued international legitimacy. Therefore, Israel is locked in a securitization dilemma—where actions taken to enhance its security through increased legitimacy result in further delegitimization. Highlighting the ways this securitization dilemma is at the heart of Israeli policymaking today—particularly in the context of the recent BDS movement—this book brings into focus key problems that Israel faces as it attempts to combat delegitimization movements against its self-constructed identity as a Jewish state.

This book will be of great interest to students, scholars, and policy makers engaged with critical security studies and delegitimization, Israeli studies and Jewish identity, and policymaking in the Middle East.

Before youth can be accepted as important players in school decision making, the concept of “student voice must gain acceptance among powerful stakeholders in the school. Using social movement theory as a lens, the paper examines the consequences of positioning a student voice effort inside or outside of school walls. The paper finds that positioning influences the legitimacy, sustainability, and scope of changes that a student voice initiative can pursue.

In this article, I make a philosophical case for the state to fund religious schools. Ultimately, I shall argue that the state has an obligation to fund and provide oversight of all schools irrespective of their religious or non-religious character. The education of children is in the public interest and therefore the state must assume its responsibility to its future citizens to ensure that they receive a quality education. Still, while both religious schools and the polity have much to be gained from direct funding, I will show that parents and administrators of these schools may have reasons to be diffident toward the state and its hypothetical interference. While the focus of the paper is primarily on the American educational context, the philosophical questions related to state funding and oversight of religious schools transcend any one national context.
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Conclusion générale d’un ouvrage collectif, ce chapitre fait la synthèse des enjeux et des problèmes soulevés par la notion de charisme en sciences sociales. Il revient à la fois sur les difficultés de la conceptualisation du charisme chez Weber lui-même et sur les usages extensifs qui ont pu être faits par la suite de cette notion, au point de la banaliser. Le charisme apparaît en définitive comme un concept provisoire dont l’ « utilité scientifique marginale » est aujourd’hui négative ; qui illustre les risques plus généraux pesant sur la méthode idéaltypique ; et qu’il faut donc oser abandonner au profit de concepts plus relationnels, comme « capital symbolique » et « saillance situationnelle ».

This paper explores the process of legitimation involved in the struggle for secession in Telangana, India.  It argues that this was focussed on the securing of justice in a) gaining access to resources (the legitimation of risk) and b) the exercise of political power (the legitimation of democracy). The plight of Telangana demonstrates the historical and contextual nature of legitimacy. The paper asserts that the ongoing struggle to legitimate risk and democracy will be constitutive of the norms and values of the new state, influencing the way in which exposure to risk is differentiated, and democratic legitimacy defined.  It suggests that, although contextualized, local struggles to legitimate risk and democracy represent a microcosm of a wider global legitimation process which is constitutive of world society and the search for justice in a world at risk.

Issues regarding coup d’etat are of interest to many academic disciplines and are subject of studies in both political and legal sciences (history of the law and state, constitutional law, criminal law and criminal proceedings). The following article focuses on the concept of coup d’etat as one form of questioning the legitimacy of the law. The author considers the broad scope of coup d’etat, and includes its various forms such as the right to resistance, civil disobedience and revolution from the historical and normative perspectives.

This article explores public attitudes relating to the extent to which municipalities live up to the Batho Pele ("People First") principles in providing household services. The principles represent the inner core of the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Notice No. 1459 of 1997) and serve as the framework for a service delivery ethic in the public sector consistent with the nation’s constitutional ideals of an efficient, economic and effective use of public resources in a manner that is development-oriented and responsive to peoples’ needs. It goes on to offer a preliminary examination of some of the geographic, socio-economic and service delivery correlates of such assessments. It then proceeds to investigate the impact that perceived good or poor performance has on political values and behaviour by focusing on three fundamental sets of outcome variables, namely institutional trust; conventional and unconventional forms of political participation; and satisfaction with democracy and future expectations. The concluding section offers some reflections of the importance of the findings for public policy.

Charakterystyczne dla wszystkich bardziej skomplikowanych porządków społecznych relacje władzy i dominacji domagają się wyjaśnień posługujących się kategorią legitymizacji. Dominujący korzystają z publicznych dyskursów normatywnych, by uzasadnić swoją pozycję, a zdominowani uznają takie uzasadnienia za wystarczająco przekonujące, by owej relacji nie podważać. Celem artykułu jest analiza propozycji badania legitymizacji władzy rozwijanych na obszarze współczesnych badań nad dyskursem. W centrum zainteresowania znajdzie się siatka analityczna zaproponowana przez Theo van Leeuwena obejmująca cztery strategie legitymizacyjne: odniesienie do autorytetu, ocenę moralną, racjonalizację oraz mythopoesis. Materiałem empirycznym dobranym celowo dla egzemplifikacji wybranych strategii legitymizacyjnych będą wypowiedzi polskich polityków podczas debaty parlamentarnej z 9 marca 2006 r. nad projektami ustaw dotyczących pracy i współpracy z organami bezpieczeństwa PRL przygotowanych przez Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Platformę Obywatelską oraz Ligę Polskich Rodzin.

RESUMEN La práctica totalidad del pensamiento militar contemporáneo coincide en el carácter sistémico y complejo de la guerra. Las divergencias surgen a la hora de interpretar esa complejidad que, a su vez, constituye el cauce para concepciones diversas, e incluso opuestas, sobre la conducción operacional.
En este trabajo propongo agrupar todas esas concepciones en dos categorías fundamentales, en este trabajo bautizadas como gramáticas bélicas, según cifren la raíz de esa complejidad en el carácter estructural o interactivo de la realidad. Para los conflictos más actuales sugiero un nuevo tipo de complejidad, la “caótica”, y señalo algunas notas de la concepción operacional propuesta por el ejército estadounidense para afrontarla.
Esta agrupación-clasificación me servirá para presentar las claves constitutivas de esos cauces por los que fluyen infinidad de teorías sobre la conducción operacional. Además, esas claves serán útiles a la hora de calibrar el alcance de lo operacional, estrechamente vinculado con la potestad del comandante del teatro.
ABSTRACT: Virtually all of contemporary military thinking agrees in the systemic and complex nature of war. The differences arise in interpreting that complexity which, in turn, is the channel for different, and even opposing, views about operational warfare.
In this paper I propose to group all these views into two basic categories, in this job referred to as war grammars, pending on the opinion that such complexity is based on structural or interactive character of reality. For the ongoing conflicts I suggest a new type of complexity, the “chaotic”. I point out some notes about the operational concept proposed by the US Army to deal with it.
This group-classification will help me to introduce the constituent keys of these channels through which flow countless theories about operational warfare. In addition, those keys will be useful in order to appreciate the full scope of the operational level of war, closely linked to the power of the theatre commander.

In 1915, during World War I, the declining Ottoman Empire carried out an extended campaign of genocide against the Ottoman Armenians. From massacres to death marches, 1.5 million of the Armenian population were exterminated. The Holocaust, in which six million European Jews were exterminated as part of what the Nazis called the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question,’ was perpetrated during World War II. Over the last forty years, the memorialisation of the Holocaust has become a distinct aspect of Western culture, encompassing reparations, museums, memorials and documentaries, and even legislation criminalising its denial. Education about the Holocaust, and its continued memorialisation is led by, among others, powerful transnational organisations such as The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and by national research institutions such as Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). However, there is no comparable culture of memorialisation of the Armenian genocide. In fact, that genocide has been subjected to a vigorous campaign of denial led by the Republic of Turkey, and by a marked reluctance of worldwide governments and parliaments to recognise its existence formally. Only recently (from 2016–2019), have parliaments in the US, the Netherlands and Germany recognised the Armenian genocide, yet others, such as those of Israel and the UK, continue to reject such recognition. What drives these divergent trends in Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory? Why is there a significant difference in the way in which these two genocides have been represented in the public, political and international arenas by the perpetrators, victims and third-party countries? This report aims at finding answers to these key questions by assessing the perpetrator states’ trajectories of Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory from the early years of the Cold War into the post-Cold War world order. In doing so, the report will highlight some of the most important milestones, actors and patterns that shaped the memory (politics) of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. Finally, conclusions are drawn for current domestic and foreign policy realms.

In seeking to understand why the annexation of Crimea and the renewal of anti-western sentiments in 2014 has enabled Putin to attain such popularity within Russia, this dissertation applies Max Weber’s theory of legitimation types to the recent events in Ukraine, revealing a shift in legitimation structure for Putin’s regime. Analysing Russian history and identifying the legacies that continue to form the foundations of Russian society, the power of the traditional references Putin has made since the annexation becomes apparent. The dissertation discusses the implications of the legitimation shift for the Russian World Putin pledged to protect concluding that given the strength of the rhetoric, Putin is in danger of entering a legitimacy trap from which the projection of Russia’s image as a great power has become the formula for the maintenance of his popularity and survival as the Russian leader.

Honorable Mention, 2012 Early Slavic Studies Association Distinguished Scholarship Award
A pivotal period in Russian history, the "Time of Troubles" of the early 17th century has taken on new resonances in post-Soviet Russia. Current national narratives glorify the role of the Russian Orthodox Church during that torturous span of famine, war, and disintegration. But what was the actual history of the Church and of Orthodox Christian religion in crisis? For the first time, and just prior to the 400th anniversary of the end of the Time of Troubles, this book attempts to give a comprehensive picture of the topic on the basis of archival and other evidence. Beginning with Russia's posited status as "New Israel" and continuing to examine the business activities of monasteries, Gruber discovers the motivations behind key political and religious innovations of the period. New "voices" attributed to women and the people marked this as a unique epoch in the troubled history of one of the world's most enigmatic and influential countries. Both accessibly written and deeply scholarly, this book will appeal to a wide readership interested in history, religion, and culture.

The article focuses on the justification of taxation, in other words the principled rather than the technical aspect of taxation. We first show how, on the one hand, democracy is required for taxation to be legitimate, and how on the other hand democratic communities are dependent on taxation, and argue that this does not constitute a vicious circle. We then present a typology of ways of justifying taxation , according to which taxation can base its legitimacy on (1) meeting basic needs, (2) financing public goods, (3) redistribution, or (4) (dis)incentivising certain types of conduct. We then discuss the applicability of each of these types of justification, arguing that all of them do apply at a global level. The article further concludes that different normative justifications guide us towards different designs of taxation in practice, so the background justification has to be made clear, especially when designing new taxation systems. The growing interest in global taxation reflects the observation that a worldwide economic system, which transcends the borders of any single political community the traditional site of handling public finances-seems to have evolved. To put it crudely, economy is global, while political government, as it stands, is not. In addition , while within welfare states certain kinds of voluntary charitable activity are made almost redundant by institutions of social security, in the global setting moral

Most analysis of democratic backsliding focuses on the elite or party level. This article takes a bottom-up approach. In Turkey, popular support for a strong, undemocratic leader developed independently of Erdoğan and the AKP, but later consolidated behind the party. Analysis of longitudinal public opinion data reveals that the 2000-2001 economic crisis undermined the democratic consensus, but that economic prosperity-far from restoring faith in democracyreinforced support for a strongman leader as an alternative to liberal democracy among populations that benefited the most economically: the middle class and economic elites. Additionally, individuals who identify strongly with politically predominant social groups tend to support undemocratic leaders. This analysis improves our understanding of mass-level support for authoritarian leaders in democracies.

The concept of legitimation has been used in the organizational analysis literature to refer either to processes by which power relations are mystified through the manipulation of symbols or to processes by which organizations conform to consensually defined standards of evaluation. This article traces the intellectual lineage of these approaches in the management literature and current and classic literature of the social sciences, and demonstrates the complementarity of their strengths and weaknesses. An integrative theory of legitimation, based on semiotics, is then presented which identifies the articulation of these approaches and allows a richer basis for the analysis of legitimation phenomena.

Legitimacy claims can only be made and processes of legitimation can only unfold in a specified context. This essay uses Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the social field to name this context and to analyze the construction of the bureaucratic or public administrative field in the United States. “Field” is meant in a triple sense—public administration as a general, institutionalized field in the structure of government, public administration as a professional field, and public administration as an academic field of study. Thus rather than the bureaucratic field, the relationship of these bureaucratic fields or an “ensemble of fields” is analyzed to consider how each field both bounds its own legitimation struggles and draws from other fields for symbolic resources—what Bourdieu calls symbolic capital—to establish its legitimacy and position. The multi-field quality of public administration is used to show how the nature of the general bureaucratic field is distinct from other fields insofar as it purports to represent a universal, general interest. This difference is used to theorize a distinction between “general” and “specific” legitimation processes.

One of the great maxims of history is that it is written by the victors, and nowhere does this find greater support than in the later Roman Empire. Between 284 and 395 AD, no fewer than 37 men claimed imperial power, though today we recognize barely half of these men as 'legitimate' rulers and more than two thirds died at their subjects' hands. Once established in power, a new ruler needed to publicly legitimate himself and to discredit his predecessor: overt criticism of the new regime became high treason, with historians supressing their accounts for fear of reprisals and the very names of defeated emperors chiselled from public inscriptions and deleted from official records. In a period of such chaos, how can we ever hope to record in any fair or objective way the history of the Roman state?

Emperors and Usurpers in the Later Roman Empire is the first history of civil war in the later Roman Empire to be written in English and aims to address this question by focusing on the various ways in which successive imperial dynasties attempted to legitimate themselves and to counter the threat of almost perpetual internal challenge to their rule. Panegyric in particular emerges as a crucial tool for understanding the rapidly changing political world of the third and fourth centuries, providing direct evidence of how, in the wake of civil wars, emperors attempted to publish their legitimacy and to delegitimize their enemies. The ceremony and oratory surrounding imperial courts too was of great significance: used aggressively to dramatize and constantly recall the events of recent civil wars, the narratives produced by the court in this context also went on to have enormous influence on the messages and narratives found within contemporary historical texts. In its exploration of the ways in which successive imperial courts sought to communicate with their subjects, this volume offers a thoroughly original reworking of late Roman domestic politics, and demonstrates not only how history could be erased, rewritten, and repurposed, but also how civil war, and indeed usurpation, became endemic to the later Empire.


CONTENTS:
Frontmatter
List of Figures
List of Abbreviations
Typographical Note
PART I
I: Usurpation, Legitimacy, and the Roman Empire
I.1: Why usurpation?: the problem of the imperial succession
I.2: 'This litany of manifest usurpers and rebellious generals': why had the imperial succession become so unstable by the third century?
I.3: 'The difference between a tyrant and a king is one of deeds, not of name': how was usurpation understood in the late Roman Empire?
I.4: 'Let these things go unspoken': usurpation and modern research
II: Usurpation, Legitimacy, and Panegyric
II.1: Known unknowns, and unknown unknowns: how to use panegyric as a source
II.2: 'In which I would tell many lies': who dictated the content of panegyric?
II.3: 'And would be viewed with favour by those who knew them to be such': panegyric, audience, and influence
II.4: Propaganda and power
PART II
III: A House Divided Against Itself
IV: 'At last Roman, at last restored to the true light of Empire': Dyarchy, Tetrarchy, and the Fall of the British Empire of Carausius
IV.1: Birthing the late Roman state: dyarchs, tetrarchs, and a new language of power
IV.2: Emperors and bandits: the British Empire under Carausius and Allectus
V: Tyranny and Betrayal: Constantine, Maximian, Maxentius, and Licinius
V.1: Constantine's usurpation: Constantine, Galerius, and Maximian
V.2: The tyrannus: Maxentius and the rewards of civil war
V.3: Notable by his absence: Licinius and the rise of the Constantinian dynasty
VI: Tyranny and Blood: Constantius, Constans, Magnentius, and Vetranio
VI.1: Smiling for the cameras: the sons of Constantine, 337-50
VI.2: The son of the father: Constantius the tyrant-slayer
VII: Usurper, Propaganda, History: The Emperor Julian
VII.1: The voice of a usurper: Julian's rise to power
VII.2: Bleaching the stains: Julian's sole rule
VIII: Panegyric and Apology: The Accession of Jovian and the Usurpation of Procopius
VIII.1: The need for victory: Jovian and the demands of imperial rhetoric
VIII.2: The enemy inside: Valentinian, Valens, and Procopius
VIII.3: 'He who sought rule for himself behind the cloak of a little boy': the usurpation of Valentinian II
IX: Dismembering the House of Valentinian: The Usurpation of Theodosius and the War with Magnus Maximus
IX.1: 'And nobly he made the vote his own': the usurpation of Theodosius
IX.2: Divided loyalties: the usurpation of Magnus Maximus
X: Crisis and Transformation: Imperial Power in the Fifth Century
XI: Conclusion: Those Made Tyrants by the Victory of Others
Appendix I: The Panegyrics
Appendix II: Quantifying Usurpation: Notes to Accompany Figure I.2
Endmatter
Bibliography
Index

Ce texte a été initialement publié à l'entrée «Machiavel» du Dictionnaire du vote, édité sous la direction de Pascal Perrineau et Dominique Reynié, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, pp. 593-596 Les réflexions de Machiavel qui éclairent la question du vote ont pour point de départ le problème de l'obéissance des gouvernés et des moyens de la produire. La première réponse à cette interrogation est exprimée dans Le Prince. Le fondement de l'État réside dans sa capacité ultime à contraindre les sujets par une politique de la crainte. Mais le résultat d'une telle politique est une obéissance sans consentement. En cela, la politique de la crainte est jugée intenable. Le chapitre XVII du Prince formalise l'aporie : routinisée, la crainte faiblit ; mais réactivée, elle peut devenir insupportable, au point de féconder la haine du peuple pour le prince que les ennemis du souverain auront beau jeu d'utiliser. La nature aporétique d'une politique de la crainte oriente la solution du problème de l'obéissance vers l'adhésion des sujets. Il n'apparaît plus possible de donner à l'État un autre fondement que le peuple lui-même. C'est ainsi que dans le chapitre consacré à la « Principauté civile », Machiavel récuse le « commun proverbe », affirmant « qui fonde sur le peuple fonde sur la fange » (Le Prince, IX). Au contraire, Machiavel soutient que celui qui s'appuie sur le peuple « verra bien qu'il a assis de bons fondements » (Le Prince, IX). La question de l'obéissance conduit Machiavel à poser