Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2007
Should the State Fund Religious Schools?
Journal
0264-3758
Original
XXX
© Society
of
Articles
for
Applied
Applied
Philosophy
Philosophy,
2007
Should
Michael
the
S.
Merry
State
Fund
Religious Schools?
JAPP
Blackwell
Oxford,
UK
Publishing
Ltd
MICHAEL S. MERRY
In this article, I make a philosophical case for the state to fund religious schools.
Ultimately, I shall argue that the state has an obligation to fund and provide oversight of all
schools irrespective of their religious or non-religious character. The education of children is in
the public interest and therefore the state must assume its responsibility to its future citizens to
ensure that they receive a quality education. Still, while both religious schools and the polity
have much to be gained from direct funding, I will show that parents and administrators of
these schools may have reasons to be diffident toward the state and its hypothetical interference.
While the focus of the paper is primarily on the American educational context, the philosophical
questions related to state funding and oversight of religious schools transcend any one national
context.
ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding a broad coalition of choice advocates in American education, political
appeals to state funding for religious schools generally meet an icy reception.
Constitutional matters are only the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Should we not expect
that funding and its corresponding oversight will alter the character of religious schools?
Assuming changes may occur, are they attributable to funding or are there other
pertinent factors that might explain them? Need one worry about the state sanctioning
various forms of unjustifiable discrimination when one considers that religious
schools routinely make hiring decisions on the basis of doctrinal beliefs? Finally, are
not religious schools in the United States already subject to state oversight, thus
rendering the concern extraneous?
It is true that religious schools are already accountable in most American states in
important ways. The legal basis for this minimal oversight begins with the Pierce decision,1
an Oregon Supreme Court case that upheld the Fourteenth Amendment in guaranteeing
equal protection and opportunity to parents in making discretionary choices regarding
the type of school their children ought to attend. Pierce’s ruling repudiated 1922 legislation
that demanded compulsory public schooling of all Oregon children of school-attending
age and countered that ‘the child is not the mere creature of the State’. However, Pierce
did not give parents carte blanche in directing their children’s education. Indeed, its
signers argued, ‘Liberty of all is subject to reasonable conditions deemed essential by
the governing body to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community’.
The decision further stipulated that the state reserves the right to mandate some
schooling and to regulate schools to ensure that children are provided an adequate
service. Even so, the boldness of Pierce had been attenuated within a few years2 and
today its import is widely understood to mean simply that the state does not have
a monopoly in socializing the young to citizenship. Accordingly, state oversight of
religious schools has been minimal in most of the eighty years since. Specifically,
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Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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oversight has largely been limited to: mandatory attendance, health and safety adherence,
financial reporting requirements, and compliance with non-discrimination laws. Many
states also impose requirements on the length of the school year, teacher qualification
and curriculum content.
Yet, beyond the few aforementioned items, there is virtually no state interference in
private education unless the school actively seeks accreditation (and this, as in other
matters — e.g. credentialing teachers, determining completion criteria, reporting
performance data — falls entirely to individual states). This is because academic
compliance is typically voluntary and self-reported. Thus while the majority of religious
schools use textbooks widely in circulation in public schools and endeavour to maintain
rigorous academic standards (knowing that parents may opt to put their children in
other schools), there is no hard and fast rule requiring it. The analogy is imperfect but
one could say that private schools operate rather like large corporations which announce
that they will maintain environmentally responsible practices without pressure or
sanction from citizen action groups and the Occupational Safety and Hazard
Administration (OSHA). Many will, but we may also safely assume that others will not.
Conversely, state funding and oversight of religious schools is normal in Europe.
This does not, however, mean there is a consensus concerning the defensibility of such
funding. Indeed, some religious schools (often but not always Islamic ones) are singled
out as just the type of school the state ought not to support. Nevertheless, in most
Western countries the state takes a central role in governing and funding religious
schools. In some countries education is highly centralized (e.g. the Netherlands),
regionalized (e.g. Belgium) or reflects the requirements of both local and national
authorities (e.g. Britain). In these same countries, some religious schools have been
historically privileged. Yet as the reach of state funding has slowly extended to include
Christian minority (e.g. Greek Orthodox, Adventist) and non-Christian groups (e.g.
Sikh, Hindu), many of their religious schools receive varying amounts of state funding
and oversight (a) as a matter of constitutional even-handedness and (b) on the understanding that religious schools are an important means of recognizing parental choice
in education.
So the United States is an exception. Each state government funds its own schools
according to its constitutional standards. The federal government assumes a tiny fraction
of the financial burden of public schooling and none, strictly speaking, of the burden
of religious schooling. However, as I will argue, there are strong reasons for the state3
to take a more central role in funding education in keeping with the democratic
educational ideal of equal opportunity. The central question I am asking in this article
is whether, in light of certain philosophical and ethical considerations, the state ought
to fund religious schools in the United States in light of some reflections on the
experience of other countries.
There are many arguments for funding religious schools. Here are two: pluralism,
which allows for the exercise of one’s conscience, must also allow parents the prerogative
to choose the type of school their child attends provided these choices enhance the
interests of children. Yet while intuitively plausible, the claim overlooks the facts that
many parents, and a fortiori many schools, do not do well by their children and their
interests are not enhanced. The second argues from empirical research showing that
some religious schools have produced impressive academic success and civic preparedness
in their students compared to some public schools. To these arguments we might add
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the important judicial precedents and constitutional guarantees that allow religious
schools to exist and for parents to send their children there. For the purposes of my
argument, I will accept both arguments as well as the judicial basis for religious
schools. I will argue that:
• The refusal of the state to provide funding and oversight is to beg the question
concerning why it is allowable for parents to choose these schools for their children
in the first place, particularly if some of them fail to educate children adequately or
militate against the public good (e.g. through indoctrination or decidedly anti-civic
commitments).
• Second, the education of all children is in the public interest4 and therefore the state
must assume its responsibility to its future citizens to ensure that they receive a
quality education. Quality education goes beyond the three R’s and a capacity for
economic self-reliance; it also entails facilitating a capacity for reasonableness and
autonomy.
Reasonableness describes those inclined to be fair, sensible and proportionate in their
exercise of rationality. The absence of reasonableness signals the collapse of dialogue
and the conditions necessary for most meaningful forms of social cooperation. Therefore,
reasonableness is necessary in order to ensure legitimacy. Autonomy matters because
it describes individuals able to reflect upon freely chosen commitments and the actions
that derive from them. Moreover, autonomous selves are those who possess the capacity
to make evaluative judgments in light of counterfactual evidence and are capable of
revising their views if and when there is warrant for doing so. Let me be clear: autonomy
per se is not the ultimate aim. Yet one need not personally value autonomy as an end
in itself for it to have important instrumental value conducive to human flourishing
and identifying with a way of life from the inside.5
In what follows, I will argue that the state has an obligation to fund and provide
oversight of all schools that are allowed to operate, irrespective of their religious or nonreligious character. Equal educational opportunities cannot be left to private interests or
charitable good will. A state concerned with fairness and equity must, in the final
analysis, act as guarantor of these provisions if the children of the less advantaged or
the inordinately doctrinaire are to have access to both competitive (e.g. jobs) and noncompetitive (e.g. satisfying pursuits of various kinds) goods. The state has these
responsibilities because, as Harry Brighouse notes:
Morally, the state is an agent for all members of society. Above all, it delivers
on the obligations we all have toward each other, especially toward strangers.
The state structures our interactions with one another, and a just state
structures them justly.6
Contestable legal constraints in no way absolve the state of its ethical responsibilities.
(I will leave to more qualified persons the constitutional analysis in order to focus
exclusively on normative claims.)
While my arguments call for the funding and oversight of religious schools, this will
depend in no small way on a more equitable method of funding public schools. Further,
though I will argue in favour of state funding and oversight of religious schools, I will
take care to show how the feasibility of my proposals depends on a number of relevant
empirical realities. For example, parents and administrators of religious schools may
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have reasons to be diffident toward the state and its hypothetical oversight. Because
certain conditions may fluctuate or hinder their implementation, my conclusions — for
the moment — must be a kind of thought experiment, though they are not as farfetched as some would like to think.
Finally, while my arguments have particular salience for the United States and its
almost unique conception of church and state separation, my conclusions have universal
relevance and applicability. Thus, the philosophical questions related to state funding
and oversight of religious schools transcend any one national context.
Why the State Should Fund Religious Schools
Perhaps the most common moral argument to be made for state funding of religious
schools is that freedom of conscience requires it. The fact is that many parents want
their children to enjoy an education with a religious or spiritual dimension. If parents
are to have the liberty to choose religious schooling for their children (on the assumption
that basic civic requirements are met), the justification for the exercise of this liberty
rests, at least in part, on the great importance attached to freedom of conscience and
the interest that parents have in transmitting their most fervently held values to their
children. The capacity to exercise one’s liberty to send a child to a religious school
should not turn on something morally arbitrary from the standpoint of freedom of
conscience, viz., whether parents have the money to afford it. Dictates of conscience
should not hang on the size of one’s pocketbook.
Now if accountability of schools were principally about the educational opportunities
of the parents, this argument would wield greater force. Yet what is at issue here is the
quality of education that children deserve, not the appeasement of parental preferences.
Placating parents will be particularly contentious when schools are chosen in order to
reinforce the values of the parent, as is often the case with selection of religious
schools. My concern, however, lies with equity not for the benefit of the parent but for
the welfare of the child.7 The interests of children are not always best served by the
convictions parents espouse or the choices that derive from them. We must look
elsewhere for more compelling arguments.
As I see it, funding and oversight ought to be extended to religious schools for the
following reasons. First, education supplies intrinsic benefits, among which is the
capacity for autonomy whereby one may freely form or adopt a conception of the good,
thereby contributing to personal wellbeing. Second, education, like health, is vital to
seizing worthwhile life opportunities.8 These are its instrumental benefits. Yet opportunities
are unevenly distributed among society’s members owing to disparities in ability, effort,
prejudice and wealth. Therefore, educational justice requires that the state provide
basic educational opportunities to all children irrespective of social class background
or ability, knowing that opportunities are normally contingent on the enabling effects
education typically affords. Thus with a sufficient amount and quality of education one
may take up meaningful vocational pursuits and forms of leisure as well as the relationships
that derive from these. Third, education is also a prerequisite to achieving an enlightened
public, and such a public is infinitely better equipped to sustain the democratic
arrangements a free society affords. Hence, education supplies individuals with the
capacity to meet the various minimal demands that citizenship requires.
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Should the state provide funding and oversight of religious schools there would likely
be several effects. First, the availability of sectarian schools known for their decidedly
intolerant views and indoctrinatory practices would be dramatically reduced. Second,
it is not inconceivable that more non-religious parents interested in their children’s
autonomy (for the purpose of interacting with those of different perspectives) may be
interested to use religious schools, thereby diversifying the student body.9 The result is
likely to be more interaction between children of different backgrounds, though of
course the quality of that interaction will matter infinitely more than interaction tout
court. More opportunities for religious and non-religious children to interact may or
may not foster higher rates of autonomy, reasonableness and tolerance, but such an
arrangement is certainly more likely to result in the breakdown of stereotypes and
misunderstandings that may lead to mistrust, religious segregation or conflict.10
Third, equitable state involvement (which includes correcting the vastly unequal
funding problem in American public schools) is likely to stabilize and more equally
distribute the quality of education in schools. This cannot be left solely to the individual
states to resolve. The federal government, which funds a paltry 7% of American education,
can not simply issue achievement mandates through inducement schemes of some kind.
Further, the state has an obligation to do more than merely tighten the monitoring
procedures for overseeing the allocation of school funds.11 Of course, equitable funding,
while it is a necessary start, does not guarantee comparable outcomes. Well-trained and
committed staff, state-of-the-art facilities, and curricular materials will not ensure positive
educational results. Too many other factors come into play, notably racial stratification
in society (too often reflected in the schools themselves), poverty (thus influencing
preference adaptation and social aspirations) and the low educational attainment (thus
affecting parenting styles and employment prospects) of parents and their children.
Nevertheless, the state must demonstrate that it has the best interests of all children
at heart, and, in light of the above, the state shirks its responsibility to children in
religious schools if these schools enjoy a bona fide legal status without corresponding
oversight. To not hold schools accountable that the state permits its children to attend
is to show unmistakable disregard for the academic and socialization outcomes these
schools provide. Religious schools can both be funded as a matter of equity and be held
to reasonable requirements which ensure that as few schools as possible are retreating
from their responsibilities to educate future citizens for autonomy and reasonableness
but also economic self-reliance.
Legitimacy and Oversight
In order for state oversight to have any teeth, the United States must first have a
satisfactory system of school funding and regulation, one that has oversight in curricular and pedagogical matters but also that honours the basic requirements of legitimacy. Let me explain what I mean by these.
Legitimacy
By legitimacy I mean soliciting the willing participation of a society’s reasonable
members. Reasonable persons would be those who are amenable to the burdens of
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judgment and reciprocity, which means they are ‘disposed to propose fair terms of
cooperation to others, to settle differences in mutually acceptable ways, and to abide
by agreed terms of cooperation so long as others are prepared to do likewise’.12 Obviously
a state eager to win the approval of its constitutional norms and policies will do more
than simply avoid coercive action; an absence of coercion describes only a minimalist
conception of legitimacy. Particularly if the state is to hold religious schools to account
for evidence of reasonableness and autonomy, it must provide publicly acceptable
reasons for doing so. Religious or not, reasonable persons deserve nothing less. If the
state meets the demands of legitimacy (and this need not require a consensus, but
merely compelling reasons to which the majority assent),13 its intervening role will be
justified in the maintenance of schools in ways that do not usurp the duties and
prerogatives of parents. Legitimacy thus secured, the state must fund religious schools
directly and provide the corresponding oversight needed to ensure that certain educational
goals are being met.
Oversight
By oversight I mean a system of accountability that would equitably allocate the funds
and governance for staffing and maintaining the general mechanisms necessary for
safety, quality of learning and self-reliance. Quality of learning and self-reliance naturally
imply developing a capacity for autonomy and reasonableness.
As I see it, oversight has two different dimensions. The first concerns both the hiring
procedures and the certification requirements that schools must adhere to if they are
to receive state money directly. At first glance it appears rather straightforward that the
government would be able to carefully regulate the terms under which religious schools
could hire and terminate employees. Cases such as Bob Jones University v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) have set important precedents that uphold Civil Rights legislation,
prohibiting overt discrimination that obstructs equal opportunity. Indeed, the state’s
interest in eradicating discrimination in employment may override free exercise claims.14
Religiously based employment requirements, like all other employment requirements,
which function as a means of carrying out status discrimination are forbidden,15 and
religious schools can be held to this.16 Constitutional protections are only one of the
considerations one must take under advisement. Other interests must be balanced
as well, including the duty-prerogative that parents have to guide their children’s
education, and, to my immediate purposes here, the compelling educational interests
of the state, which include a well-informed and reasonable public.
More controversially, the second dimension of oversight concerns the need for the
state to regulate and control the actual operation of religious schools, including in most
classroom subjects the number of hours and precise content of its instruction. (The
state need not regulate religious content except where such instruction is found to
promote bigotry, sedition or barefaced intolerance or where evidence points to physical
or psychological harms or violations of the free exercise of individual conscience. In
these cases, the state must follow the dictates of judicial precedent and civil rights
legislation in seeking tolerance, equal protection and equal opportunity17 although in
some cases it may be necessary to close the school.)18 Private schools have interests
that generally coincide with the interests of parents, and it seems accurate to say that
the individual interests of parents acting on behalf of their own children will not always
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suffice to meet broader societal interests. What are these interests exactly? Walter
Feinberg summarizes what some of these are:
Public schools are engaged in shaping and reshaping the citizen base of the
nation. They are responsible in a way that parents are not19 in passing on the
basic outlooks, values, and skills required to function in a self-forming
democratic community, and democracy requires that the agents of this
reproduction ultimately be accountable to a representative citizen body.20
To the extent that society is committed to providing its future leaders with the tools
to appropriately engage with democratic values, philosophical liberals maintain that
public schools are the locus where these responsibilities are best fostered. The trouble
with this description is that it describes not a reality but an ideal.
Now ideals serve an important regulative function. They describe goods and aims to
which we may reasonably aspire. Therefore, I am not suggesting that ideals are not
important, or that we ought to be constrained by less-than-ideal realities. Yet, the
idealized portrait of public schools assumes three things: (a) all children in public
schools receive an autonomy-facilitating education equally or to a comparable degree;
(b) public schools are better equipped than private religious schools to offer children
the resources for thinking rationally and making comparative judgments; (c) finally,
there is the (corresponding) assumption that, in contrast, religious schools do not, or
cannot, facilitate autonomy-friendly objectives. I am arguing (1) that these are
contestable claims, and (2) that very little is illuminated by comparing idealized
public schools with non-idealized private ones. It is perhaps true to say that public
schools are more likely to provide students with the ‘intellectual resources to see
beyond the horizons set by immediate family, community, and religious circumstances
and to take on the attachments and concerns of the larger national community,’21
but this is by no means obvious.
Accountability and Public Support
Beyond the arguments I have made, public opinion in some measure even appears to
support the allocation of federal dollars to religious organizations that provide important
social services.22 Yet, while opinion polls often reveal that the public is generally
sympathetic to state monies allocated for religious organizations that provide housing,
job training and drug counselling, these same polls reveal widespread disapproval
of funding for more marginal religious groups (e.g. Scientology, Hare Krishna
Movement, Children of God). If the state is not to discriminate in favour of certain
religious organizations, deciding thereby which is more ‘orthodox’ or ‘appropriate,’ it
must be willing to fund equally and without prejudice. Yet this is where the difficulty
emerges. Laura Underkuffler observes:
Most citizens in the United States would probably not feel a tremendous
violation of conscience or other anxiety if they were compelled, through
taxation, to fund mainstream Christian, Jewish, or Islamic schools, as long as
those institutions adhere to the mainstream values which the majority of
citizens believe are critical to the formation of future citizens and with which
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they feel culturally comfortable. . . . What if — instead — recipient institutions
adhere to the tenets of radical sects, or reject the idea of civil authority, or
teach ideas of religious hatred or racial bigotry? Would the funding of such
schools be viewed so benignly?23
Of course governments at all levels attach conditions to the allocation of funds, yet it
would appear difficult to refuse some groups and not others if the Establishment
Clause is breached and the door is opened to direct aid for religious groups. Underkuffler
continues, ‘It is difficult to justify greater opprobrium for “sectarian” belief than for
“theistic” belief or belief of another description.’24 Difficult indeed. Resistance to state
monies going directly to religious organizations of any kind has come from many
different quarters, including from religious organizations themselves. In fact, some
politically dominant religious groups eager to enjoy state largesse in order to advance
their own schools and faith-based agendas on occasion have been incensed to discover
that other religions are equally eligible for funding on the basis of equal treatment
under the First Amendment.
In the final analysis, the fact that some conservative religious groups view equal
treatment of other religious groups unfavourably is not sufficient warrant to exclude
them. Moreover, politically dominant religious groups that aim to discriminate against
other religious groups reveal an egregious double standard, for it can be easily shown
that many of the historically privileged groups which are likely to oppose equal
treatment of other religions have, even in the recent past, publicly and systematically
opposed equal rights for racial and ethnic minorities, women, and gays and lesbians.
Thus, the moral and legal onus will be on the religiously dominant groups to demonstrate
why their eligibility for state funding merits less scrutiny than religious communions
with which they see themselves in opposition.
What Must Accountability Entail?
Accountability assumes many guises. Here are three. First, one could simply separate
funding and public accountability. In other words, the state could demand that religious
schools comply with certain educational norms even in the absence of funding, just as
it does with safety requirements. For example, private schools must abide by fire codes
and zoning restrictions quite apart from any funds they may or may not receive,
including tax exemption. Similarly, the state reserves the right to intervene in cases
involving harm or neglect of children. As previously mentioned in the Bob Jones case,
the state has justified such moves in terms of pursuing an overriding good, viz., to counter
racist attitudes and dispositions. If a good and just state were to hang its argument
for holding religious schools accountable on the need to ensure equal education
opportunities, I have little doubt that it would enjoy strong public support. Nevertheless,
if in so doing the state employs political strategies that both alienate citizens and
lessens the chances of fostering reasonableness and autonomy, institutional policies are
less likely to be legitimate than those which do.
A second approach to accountability would be to deny funding to religious schools of a
‘fissiparous’ and ‘unpredictable character’. Pondering the challenges that some nonChristian schools pose in the United Kingdom, Harry Judge avers the following:
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And if it is concluded that, as matter of public policy, [that state arrangements
rooted in historical compromise, which fund religious schools] should not be
extended [to other kinds of schools], it follows that a contraction of the
present arrangements is to be preferred to any measures having the effect of
diverting additional funds from publicly maintained and managed schools to
those schools attached to particular faiths or denominations.25
This position has a number of strengths. In particular, funding religious schools
that do well by their students in promoting tolerance and facilitating reasonableness
and autonomy is a strategy likely to promote the civic virtues a democracy has
reason to value. But Judge’s diagnosis confuses things. In the first place, he argues
without evidence that continued funding for religious schools will provoke dangerous
tensions that are incongruous with ‘integration’. Further, he believes that continued
funding of religious schools will result in problems that are ‘occluded by the cloudy
and fashionable belief that “public” has failed and that “private” will resolve all
difficulties’.26 This seems, however, to needlessly overstate the point. First, Judge
assumes that nurturing cultural identities is hopelessly incompatible with whatever
‘an orderly process of integration’ is supposed to mean. Yet such incompatibility is
hardly obvious to lots of people who navigate quite successfully across and between
cultural borders. Second, while I would agree that favouring the private over the
public augurs badly for democracy and for civic responsibility, there are ways to tame
the private.27
A third approach would be to fund religious schools and to regulate what they do.
If the concern is with objectionable content or methods of instruction, particularly
where an individual’s capacity to reflect critically upon her commitments is being
intentionally impaired, or curricula are used to incite hatred or sedition, the existence
of some schools, as I argued above, could well be deemed impermissible. Yet a responsible
state will be concerned with the welfare of its citizens, and, guided by the axioms of
equality of opportunity, fairness and tolerance, must aim to protect their compelling
educational interests. As the guarantor of last resort the state must ensure that children
receive ‘a basic education sufficient to allow them to become adults capable of
independent functioning’.28 But the state has its own compelling educational interests
as well. Indeed, an education that facilitates reasonableness and autonomy will have a
direct impact on the deliberative processes necessary to sustain a healthy democracy.
In other words, the state will have compelling interests in educating children toward
ends designed to serve the common good. This necessarily includes the capacity to
engage with those with whom one does not agree and to show oneself capable of
deliberating about those differences.
State interference will not eliminate all inequalities or ensure equal outcomes; yet
this is no argument against attempts to alleviate unnecessary inequities. The fact that
some inequities ‘cannot be eliminated never justifies abandoning attempts to mitigate
[them]’.29 The state must play the role of guarantor of last resort not because parents’
wishes for their children are somehow intrinsically untrustworthy, but simply because
all children are entitled to have a quality education. And, since most education occurs
within schools,30 it falls to the state not only to ensure that the education on offer is
up to par, but that the conditions of learning are conducive to the facilitation of
autonomy and reasonableness.
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A Hypothetical Accountability Scheme
Whether motivated by the educational goals of fairness and equality of opportunity or
just plan prejudice, philosophical liberals routinely rail against the potential dangers
(e.g. indoctrination, sectarianism) of religious schooling. I happen to share many of
the same concerns with those who criticize religious education that distils all learning
through an extremely narrow ideological framework or which encourages children
being raised exclusively within an ‘all encompassing moral community’.31 I am even
inclined to agree that a school which places an immoderate emphasis on ‘nontransferable goods’ (e.g. scripture study, prayer, ritual observances) is potentially
detrimental to the intellectual development of children. Moreover, what may be said
of extremely insular community environments may also be said of certain forms of
home-schooling that are hostile to difference or which aim to control the exposure of
children to different perspectives.32 Indeed, an education of this kind may actively
neglect the facilitation of autonomy and reasonableness in children by undervaluing
rational, critical reflection, while choosing instead to rely on inerrant doctrine and nonrational means of persuasion.
Be that as it may, philosophers of education and policy makers need to imagine a
different approach to religious schools, one mostly (but not entirely) unconcerned with
how well religious schools measure up to public schools. In other words, what is most
important is not the public or private (or, religious or non-religious) status of a school;
nor is the academic success or ‘civic preparedness’ of religious school students
paramount.33 Rather, what is crucially important are the regulatory features of schools or
the lack thereof. So what is distinctive about a specific private school need not be
removed or radically altered to mirror the ethos of a public school. Instead, I would
argue that what matters is the contribution religious schools might be expected to
make to a broader accountability system in which they participate. If one looks to
Europe, for example, it is implausible to say that religious schools, simply because they
have a religious orientation, are less likely to promote the best interests of children. If
this were so, it would certainly be the case that a majority of Dutch or English children
would be the worse for it.
In order to move beyond the public-private rift that currently describes American
education, I want to develop a conceptual framework that incorporates both public and
private schools into its ambit.34 At the risk of oversimplifying what are at best conjectural
outcomes, an accountability scheme might look something like this. The state,
interested to enjoy the consent of as many of its citizens as possible, will seek to work
in concert with reasonable participants in public debate, including, but not limited to,
the education of the citizenry. The underlying purpose of education will be to promote
autonomous and reasonable citizens, and the citizenry has a stake in these aims
irrespective of where children attend school.
This accountability scheme will include religious schools to preclude certain highly
variable yet likely outcomes. Specifically, one can expect that at least some children
educated in some religious schools will be less likely to become autonomous citizens,
i.e. holding their views freely and without coercion, or to articulate their views in the
vernacular of reason before the critical judgment of others. In such an arrangement,
exclusion of religious schools will make some views more dangerous by lessening the
possibilities that certain beliefs are ever held up to public scrutiny.
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But even where religious schools succeed fairly well in fostering autonomy and
reasonableness in their students, a system of accountability will lessen the chances that
public schools will be compromised by the successes of some religious schools. This is
so because non-religious children have as much to gain from learning about religious
ways of life, particularly from those who hold their beliefs autonomously (i.e. after
seriously considering alternatives), as religious children are likely to in being exposed
to secular alternatives. This accountability scheme is not meant to discriminate against
those who hold religious beliefs. On the contrary, such a system would implicitly
respect the rights of citizens to have these beliefs but would call upon believers — with
appropriately designed incentives to that end — to dissolve boundaries between
themselves and the wider culture. In doing so, the hope is that reciprocity will occur
benefiting both religious and non-religious persons. Mutually beneficial effects will
likely result by exhibiting different points of view — including religious ones — fairly
and reasonably. Exhibiting different points of view will be most effectively done, I
would argue, when students have the opportunity to interact with others who genuinely
espouse different points of view and can articulate the significance of those views
to others. Naturally this would mean avoiding tokenistic gestures and stereotypes,
preferring instead to engage one another on terms of mutual respect.
Now it follows from the above that boundaries between the public and the private,
or between the secular and the religious, are more likely to dissolve if the state funds
religious schools. One cannot operate on the prejudice that only public schools are
capable of promoting autonomous and reasonable citizens. Nor is it tenable to fund
public schools while merely allowing private schools, as is presently the arrangement in
the United States. To do so is to ensure the effect of undervaluing the importance of
an education that promotes autonomy and reasonableness irrespective of the type of
school a child attends. The state surely is capable of harming children just as much
when it does little or nothing as when it pays attention to them. Obviously, accountability
measures will need to be equally applied if they are to have legitimacy, and, faithful to
at least one reading of the Establishment Clause, no religious group will be able to
enjoy state funding more than another. Yet given that many religious schools are likely
to fail to promote autonomy and reasonableness in their students, accountability
regarding the content or the method of instruction is not likely to materialize if funding
is not provided.
There would be practical ramifications of this accountability scheme as well. It
would, for instance, entail not only that religious schools be more open to nonreligious students among its school members, but also that public schools be more
accommodating to the perspectives offered by religious persons. (Multicultural education
has a ways to go in this regard.) Discussing views openly and honestly, provided it is
done in the appropriate forum and there is an insistence on respectful dialogue, is
more desirable than not doing so. This is because a more diverse student population,
coupled with a curriculum design and committed staff that would facilitate authentic
engagement with student differences, is more likely to provide opportunities to be
better informed about the outside world owing to the assortment of beliefs and varied
opinions of students. Put another way, exposure to more diverse opinions better disposes children not only to consider the views of others whose ideas, habits and beliefs
may differ strikingly from one’s own, but also better facilitates the critical — though
not necessarily detached — examination of one’s own ideas, habits and beliefs in light
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of this new information. This, in turn, will likely conduce to autonomously held views
resulting from greater awareness and the freedom (but not compulsion) to change
one’s mind that ought to logically coincide with it. On this view, what may mitigate
the parental demand that children have the right to attend a school that reflects the
family’s values is the fact that religious schools will have become a public resource.
Indeed, religious schools will simply become one of several ways of contributing to the
common good because it has fallen to the state to guarantee that all of its children
receive an education that facilitates autonomy and reasonableness.
If this argument holds, this framework, which essentially advances a social justice
claim, does much to fortify the argument that religious schools ought to be funded on
the grounds that pluralism and limited parental prerogative claims merely allow for
them. This is so because the state must justify in some way why it is that it simultaneously
allows schools over which it provides minimal oversight to operate, only to consign
some children, following the wishes of their parents, to an education that may
potentially fail them. First, however, the state must justify why it consigns tens of
thousands of children to a public education that in many instances decidedly fails
them, an education over which individual states and school districts already allegedly
provide oversight. Of course, funding will not solve all of the difficulties schools
face. Indeed, even in countries where generous funding is provided to poorer school
districts, an alarming achievement gap persists. Nevertheless, where the state is able to
redress inequities, it must.
Objections
An accountability scheme that funds religious schools and provides an appropriate
amount of oversight, is one that I think bodes well for society generally though it clearly
has implications for the governance of many public schools as well. Nevertheless, my
conceptual framework is likely to be strenuously resisted owing to certain empirical
realities. There are a number of objections one might make, but I want to briefly
consider two. I will call these the opt-out objection and the heavy-handedness objection.
The opt-out objection is this: both parents and schools are well aware that a great
many requirements come attached to funding that will, ultimately, alter the character
of the school in some elemental way. Provided that religious schools have a critical
mass necessary to staff and matriculate, many may simply choose to opt out of such a
system as a small number of private schools already have in the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, where government controls are among the strictest. Opting out of a
system of funding and oversight is a threat of considerable strength in the United
States, where there has not been a long history of direct funding of private education
and accordingly where private religious schools have become accustomed to making
do without state assistance.
But consider the following. First, a majority of private religious schools already
submit themselves to state oversight when voluntarily seeking accreditation. Private
schools know that they stand to gain at least as much as they think they lose when
raising their standards to meet state requirements. In the United States, where most
fledgling private schools anxiously seek out state accreditation, it seems a small stretch
to make certain educational norms compulsory for all schools. Second, I believe we
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can consider the state funding and minimal governance in Cleveland and Milwaukee,
where means-tested vouchers are given to poor parents that enable them to attend
schools of their choice. Many, but not all, voucher recipients choose to enrol their
children in private religious schools. Participating schools are not allowed to discriminate
on the basis of civil rights laws and the fundamental character of participating schools
changes very little if at all. While state oversight in these schools is quite minimal, I
believe that these highly imperfect experiments hint at possible outcomes if greater
state oversight was the norm. Restrictions on what private religious schools can do
would probably increase, yet many changes would require only minimal compliance,
such as allowing opt-out provisions for religious activity participation.
On the objection of state heavy-handedness, the United States would do well to
consider cases of state governance from abroad.35 Sometimes these cases demonstrate
that multiple levels of bureaucratic governance capriciously change with the politics of
the time — thereby creating greater instability in the process.36 What is more, greater
government oversight, for all that it offers in the way of seeking to ensure just outcomes
for all children, may nevertheless exercise this oversight in highly discriminatory ways.
Because one does not need to look far to document abuses of power unduly concentrated
in the state, a system of checks and balances will need to be built into the exercise of
public authority in order to avert discriminatory action and heavy handedness. To the
abiding American concern about local initiative and control of schools and the fear of
monopolization I can say the following. First, state governance does not mean that
options become fewer or that local variation will become stifled. Vast panoply of
educational options will continue to exist, albeit circumscribed by an inclusive
accountability scheme with expectations for all schools. Second, living as we do in the
age of Guantanamo, the fear of too much government control need surely give us
pause. Yet, in education and health care (and there may be other crucial areas), I sense
a much greater threat in concentrating power in private hands, accountable to no one
but parents and investors.
Conclusions
In this article, I have argued that the education of all children is in the public interest
and therefore it is the state’s responsibility to ensure that its children receive a quality
education. I have called for funding and oversight of religious schools on the grounds
that the state does as much potential harm to children by refusing to monitor what
schools do. This is because some parents and schools actively work against the promotion of autonomy and reasonableness in children. I have also attempted to provide a
conceptual framework for understanding the benefits that are likely to accrue to children regardless of the type of school they attend.
Even so, I am aware that many will have reason to argue against both the feasibility
and, for many parents, the desirability of such state oversight for several reasons. These
range from: a perhaps radically altered school character (e.g. the ‘distinctive mission’
crisis of the modern Catholic school37); to parental choice (which often regrettably
takes the form of its crudest expression, ‘white flight’); to stubborn local control
(teachers’ unions often being the most resistant to change the status quo).38 Finally, if
we are serious about the role that public schools ought to play, we shall have to
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appraise the accountability mechanisms themselves before we apply them broadly to
religious schools. If the state is structured in such a way as to lend itself to unfairness
and inconsistently applied accountability measures, advocates for religious schools would
want to be doubly cautious about seeing that system extended onto their own schools,
which may struggle financially but nevertheless enjoy relative administrative autonomy.
Many will object to my arguments, claiming, for instance, that the solution is not to
fund religious schools but to uncouple the public school from local property taxes or
to raise the accountability expectations on ‘failing’ school performance. I unreservedly
support these proposals. From all that I have argued, I fully endorse a move toward
national accountability of all state supported schools. Yet given the reality of many
public schools in the United States, an idealized view of public schools seems at the
very least naïve. Public schools certainly play a special role in fostering democratic
forms of expression, but one must not conflate an idealized liberal education with what
is unevenly on offer in actual public schools.
All indications are that the current schooling structures in the United States are
unlikely to change in the near future. In the meantime, some parents will insist not
only that they have a duty to educate their children but also that they have a prerogative
to do so in religious schools. Such claims are buttressed by appeals to pluralism and
judicial decisions favouring parental prerogatives. Many of these parents are also
arguing that the state ought to assist in funding these schools as a matter of fairness.
I am arguing (a) because not all religious schools can be counted upon to cultivate a
capacity for reasonableness and autonomy, and (b) because parents do not unfailingly
choose what is best for their children, state oversight is necessary.39
Michael S. Merry, Visiting Professor of Education at Beloit College, Wisconsin, USA.
merrym@beloit.edu
NOTES
1 Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The case was brought before the Oregon Supreme Court
by a religious organization, the Society of Sisters, devoted to the education and care of orphaned children
in response to the Compulsory Education Act of 1922. The Act had been promoted by reactionary groups
opposed to immigration and non-Protestant minorities on the grounds that sectarianism would abound and
disrupt the assimilation process. While the Court unanimously struck down the Act, it nevertheless shared
with the framers of the Act a broadly assimilationist ethic and took a dim view of non-naturalized persons,
making various references to ‘poor, ignorant foreigners’.
2 This attenuation would lead to the First Amendment ban on governmental interference with respect to the
free exercise of religion.
3 A strong federalist position is implied here, but I am not committed absolutely to this. For example, I can envision
a coalition of federal and individual state oversight, with individual states playing the central regulatory role.
4 I do not mean to say that every subject taught in school is necessarily in the public interest. This might
include some religion classes, but it may also include many other subjects as well.
5 I acknowledge that there are other values by which one may decide to live; and, certainly a generous
conception of human flourishing must include ways of life that do not value autonomy and reasonableness.
Nevertheless, autonomy plays an important enabling role in facilitating lives that matter to persons
according to different conceptions of the good. That is, autonomy either enables one to identify in
important ways with interests and pursuits central to a meaningful and flourishing life or to quit those
pursuits and choose another one should it come to that. Thus, while autonomy per se may be of little
apparent use to some individuals, the capacity for autonomy seems to me to be a sufficiently important aim
to warrant its place at the center of my argument vis-à-vis desirable educational aims.
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6 H. Brighouse, ‘Why Should States Fund Schools?’ British Journal of Educational Studies 46, 2 (1998): 145.
7 See chapter 5 in M. Merry, Culture, Identity and Islamic Schooling: A Philosophical Approach (New York:
Palgrave, 2007), where I develop these ideas in a more robust way.
8 This assumes, of course, that worthwhile opportunities are available in the first place. However, what
counts as worthwhile will vary considerably according to time and place. Determining what counts as a
worthwhile pursuit will not be ‘obvious’ in the same way as determining what counts as robust health.
9 If public schools did a better job at including discussions on religious points of view (with the aim to
inform and not persuade), I would wager that fewer religious parents would be inclined to exit public
schools.
10 See B. Subedi, M. Merryfield, K. Bashir-Ali & E. Funel, ‘Teachers’ and Students’ Experiences Working
with Religious Issues in U.S. Schools’, In Religion and Multicultural Education vol. 4 in series F. Salili &
R. Hoosain (eds.) Research in Multicultural Education and International Perspectives (Greenwich, CT:
Information Age Publishing, 2006), pp. 215–238.
11 See K. McDermott, ‘Dubious Sovereignty: Federal Conditions of Aid and the No Child Left Behind Act’.
Peabody Journal of Education 80, 2 (2005): 39–56; L. McDonnell, ‘No Child Left Behind and the Federal
Role in Education: Evolution or Revolution?’ Peabody Journal of Education 80, 2 (2005): 19–38.
12 E. Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press:
1997), p. 175.
13 Indeed, a complete consensus is the stuff of utopia. Some groups implacably opposed to interference,
will remain unreasonable, opposing any reasons on offer and inveighing against the godless state and its
dominions.
14 Here the state threatened to rescind the tax-exempt status of the school if it did not change its policy on
not admitting black students, but also its dating policy, which forbade interracial relationships on ‘biblical
grounds’. In cases like these, the state is able to demonstrate a ‘compelling government interest’ to impose
its anti-segregationist agenda on a school set against it.
15 L. Underkuffler, ‘Discrimination on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality
in Employment’, William and Mary Law Review 36 (1989): 620.
16 I am aware that matters quickly become complicated when it is recognized that religious institutions may
enjoy important exemptions from religious discrimination claims under civil rights laws. The relevant
passage (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(e)[2]) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows an employer
to discriminate on religious grounds if the educational institution ‘in whole or in substantial part, [is]
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or a particular religious organization,
or if the curriculum of the institution is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion’.
17 Of course this will not remove the problem of principled objection to certain beliefs or behaviors. Each
incident must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
18 This has happened in the United Kingdom, for instance, where certain all-girl Islamic schools were shown
to be offering a horribly substandard education and girls were being taught to expect only a life of
mothering.
19 It is unclear to me why parents would be less suited to pass along these basic outlooks.
20 W. Feinberg, ‘On Public Support for Religious Schools’, Teachers College Record 102, 4 (2000): 850.
21 Ibid., p. 851.
22 66% of those polled responded affirmatively to a New York Times/CBS News poll on the role of the federal
government in providing direct aid to religious organizations that provide important social services. The
figure fell sharply to 29% when more marginal religious groups were included in the provisions. Cited in
L. Underkuffler, ‘Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficulties and Dangers in a Pluralistic Society’,
Oxford Review of Education 27, 4 (2001): 585.
23 Ibid.
24 L. Underkuffler, ‘The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First
Amendment Theory’, William and Mary Law Review 36, 3 (1995): 978.
25 H. Judge, ‘Faith-based Schools and State Funding: a partial argument’, Oxford Review of Education 27, 4
(2001): p. 469.
26 Ibid.
27 Briefly, there are at least two problems with the private/public distinction. One is to see them as
irremediably opposed. I believe this distinction is unnatural for it supposes that public agencies are in the
business of providing services (e.g. job training, child care, drug counseling, etc) that the private sector is
not. The other mistake is to suppose that the private is invariably an improvement on the public. The latter
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28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
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view is erroneous because often — but not always — privatization schemes (and the efficiency arguments
invoked to defend them) are tilted in favor of those able to pay. Indeed, to privatize education (or health
care, social security, water provision and dozens of other basic services) is to sanction the widening gap
between rich and poor and to countenance the dastardly result of tens of millions already going without
an education. Furthermore, efficiency does not trump educational concerns for fairness and equal
opportunity.
R. Reich, Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002) p. 152.
Brighouse, ‘Why Should States Fund Schools?’ op. cit., p. 146.
At first glance it may appear that homeschooling falls outside of this argument. Yet this does not follow.
For if states license parents to educate their children at home, this is no argument for abdicating on its
responsibility to ensure a quality education. Rather, it is further justification for regulating what
homeschoolers are allowed to do.
See M. Hand, ‘The Problem with Faith Schools’, Theory and Research in Education 2, 3 (2004): 343–353;
G. Walford, ‘Classification and Framing of the Curriculum in Evangelical Christian and Muslim Schools
in England and the Netherlands’, Educational Studies 28, 4 (2002): 403 –419; M. Apple, Educating the
‘Right’ Way: Markets, Standards, God and Inequality (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2001); S. Rose, Keeping
Them Out of the Hands of Satan: Evangelical Schooling in America (New York: Routledge, 1988); A. Peskin,
God’s Choice: The Total World of a Fundamentalist Christian School (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986).
See J. Spinner-Halev, Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 2000); Reich op. cit.; B. Barry, Culture and Inequality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Whether public schools do a better job in fostering autonomy-facilitating objectives is an empirical matter
that, in any case, has been contested by many researchers. See M. Chaves & P. S. Gorski, ‘Religious
Pluralism and Religious Participation’, Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 261–281; R. Putnam,
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Harvard University Press,
2000); G. Short, ‘Faith-Based Schools: A Threat to Social Cohesion?’ Journal of Philosophy of Education
36, 4 (2002): 559–572; G. Grace, Catholic Schools and the Common Good: What this Means in Educational
Practice (London: Routledge, 2000).
Also see H. Brighouse, ‘Religious Beliefs, Religious Schools and the Demands of Reciprocity’, in D.
Kahane & D. Weinstock (eds) Deliberative Democracy: Theory and Practice (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 2007) for a somewhat different articulation, and A. Gutmann, Democratic Education 2nd
edn. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 117–121 for an illuminating discussion on a
‘mixed system’ that accommodates religious schools (thus requiring that the state show some restraint)
yet holds them to educational standards that develop democratic character.
See chapters 2 & 6 in Merry op. cit.
G. Walford, ‘Funding for Religious Schools in England and the Netherlands: Can the Piper Call the Tune?’
Research Papers in Education 16, 4 (2001): 359–380; also, chapter 2 in Merry op. cit.
See G. Grace, Catholic Schools: Mission, Market and Morality (London: Routledge, 2000).
See T. Loveless, Conflicting Missions? Teacher’s Unions and Educational Reform (Washington DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000).
I would like to thank Harry Brighouse, Ann Davies, Jon Dolle, Walter Feinberg, Katariina Holma, Heath
Massey and Adam Nelson for comments on earlier drafts.
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