The concept of ability is immensely important to educational theory and practice and permeates ma... more The concept of ability is immensely important to educational theory and practice and permeates many of the fundamental philosophical discussions in the field. The definition of education (and learning), as well as the goals of education, almost always involve the development of certain abilities, and discussions of education policy and educational evaluation also build on the concept of ability and the ways in which ability can be developed. Ability is also an elementary concept in educational justice and plays a role in determining the allocation of resources and evaluation of education policy. While ability is one of the key concepts of education, it also suffers from chronic ambiguity. For example, although people possess many kinds of learning-related abilities, the complexity of cognitive, behavioral, and social abilities that are instrumental in academic success are rarely appreciated. Discussions of student ability in the educational philosophy scholarship usually refer only to a narrow set of cognitive abilities. Confusion regarding the concept of ability is caused also by the fact that ‘ability’ is sometimes used interchangeably with other terms, including intelligence, IQ, talent, aptitude, potential, capabilities, skills, knowledge, proficiency, and more. All of these terms have slightly different meanings in different contexts. Additionally, there are often discrepancies between the various meanings of ‘ability’ we use when theorizing about education and the possibility of measuring (or affecting) them, creating discord between theoretical discourse and educational practice. A further source of confusion is that ‘student ability’ is both a precondition for learning and the end product of education, and abilities acquired through education are themselves preconditions for developing still further abilities (Bailey & Bridges 1983; McGeer 2018; Ryle 1949). When discussing ability, therefore, careful work is required to delineate the various meanings of ‘ability’ and define the meaning of ‘ability’ used in each specific context. This chapter offers a discussion of student ability through an examination of one, prevalent educational practice—ability grouping. In this chapter I examine two ways to understand the term ‘ability’ and question whether either of them is suitable as a criterion for student assignment, concluding that neither of them supports the robust forms of ability grouping common in contemporary education systems. The conceptual analysis of ‘ability’ thereby contributes a novel perspective on the debate surrounding ability grouping. The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I introduce the practice of ability grouping and rehearse the main arguments in the traditional debate surrounding it. I then move on to distinguish two possible categories of ability: performative ability, and ability as a property of an agent. I argue that neither of these constitutes a suitable criterion for student assignment in most cases; they can support only limited cases of ability grouping.
הפרדה של ילדים על בסיס גזע היא אחת הדוגמאות הפרדיגמטיות ביותר להפליה פסולה. פסק הדין המונומנטלי ש... more הפרדה של ילדים על בסיס גזע היא אחת הדוגמאות הפרדיגמטיות ביותר להפליה פסולה. פסק הדין המונומנטלי של בית המשפט העליון האמריקאי בעניין Brown v. Board קבע שהפרדה בחינוך מהווה, בהכרח, הפליה, גם אם השירות החינוכי והמשאבים החינוכיים לכאורה שווים, שכן הפרדה משדרת מסר של נחיתות הפוגעת בכבוד ובערך המוסרי השווה של כל בני האדם. קביעותיו בעניין הפליה (בחינוך ובכלל) הפכו מאז למושכלות יסוד שעל בסיסן התפתחו דוקטרינות איסור ההפליה במדינות רבות, ובכלל זה בישראל. אך מי שיבקר במוסדות החינוך בדרום תל אביב (וברשויות מקומיות נוספות), ימצא הפרדה כמעט מוחלטת בין ילדים של מבקשי מקלט, בעיקר מאריתריאה וסודן, ובין ילדים של אזרחים ישראלים ותיקים. מדיניות זו של הפרדה חינוכית קיבלה לאחרונה אישור בפסק דין בעתירה מנהלית שהוגשה על ידי מאות עותרים אשר יוצגו על ידי הקליניקה למשפט ומדיניות חינוך באוניברסיטת חיפה והאגודה לזכויות האזרח. רשימה זו תציע ניתוח ביקורתי של פסק הדין.
In a recent case, Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld two regulations issued by the Ministry of... more In a recent case, Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld two regulations issued by the Ministry of Education that allow charging payment from parents of students in public schools as a condition for their children’s participation in educational programs, courses and schools. In its decision, the HCJ rejected the arguments brought forward against the regulations, and while stressing their concern regarding the possible inequality the regulations may cause, the court ultimately decided that the regulations did not constitute an infringement on educational equality or the right to a free education. The court also found that when issuing the regulations, the Ministry of Education was acting within its authority and was not unreasonable. This article argues that public schools should not be allowed to charge payments for educational services. A critique of the HCJ’s decision is the starting point of this discussion, however the article goes beyond the analysis of the specific decision, and performs a thorough analysis of the legal, factual and normative arguments involved in the debate concerning parental payments in public education. בפסק הדין בעניין ג׳קלין שמשון ואח׳ נ׳ משרד החינוך דחה בג״ץ שתי עתירות שאוחדו בנושא תשלומי ההורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית. העתירות תקפו שני חוזרי מנכ״ל אשר התירו גבייה של תשלומי הורים בסך אלפי שקלים בטענה כי הם פוגעים בשוויון החינוכי ובזכות לחינוך חינם, כי הם מאפשרים הפליה על רקע מעמד כלכלי חברתי, בניגוד להוראות חוק זכויות התלמיד, ושהם התקבלו ללא הסמכה חוקית. אף שדעתו של בית המשפט, כפי שעולה מפסק הדין, אינה נוחה מתשלומי ההורים, הרי שבסופו של יום, הוא דוחה את העתירות ומותיר את חוזרי המנכ״ל על כנם. מאמר זה מציע בחינה יסודית של סוגיית תשלומי ההורים בבתי הספר הממלכתיים בישראל. ניתוח ביקורתי של פסק הדין בעניין שמשון מהווה נקודת הפתיחה לדיון, אך המאמר דן בטענות המשפטיות, החינוכיות-אמפיריות והנורמטיביות העיקריות המושמעות בדיונים המשפטיים והמקצועיים והציבוריים בנושא. המסקנה העולה מן הניתוח הוא שראוי לאסור על תשלומי הורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית, ולפיכך שגה בית המשפט כאשר דחה את העתירות בענין שמשון.
This Article focuses on the practice of assigning students to separate schools, tracks, and cours... more This Article focuses on the practice of assigning students to separate schools, tracks, and courses according to their academic ability, a practice I call ability segregation. Starting with the recent New York City controversy over the elimination of selective programs in the city’s public schools, the Article discusses ability segregation’s role in reinforcing racial segregation. However unlike most scholarship and previous legal challenges to ability segregation, which take issue almost exclusively with the racial imbalance it creates, the article argues that ability segregation is discriminatory even when it does not result in racial segregation. The article offers three legal frameworks for analyzing ability segregation and ultimately argues that it should be prohibited. First, I argue that ability segregation can be challenged according to the disparate impact doctrine. The dismal NYC statistics vividly illustrate the prevalent reality of racial exclusion caused by selective admission policies, a phenomenon well documented in the literature. The disparate impact created by ability segregation cannot be redeemed by appeal to an educational necessity, since it does not create educational benefits for children of low ability, and is not indispensable for developing excellence. The second framework for challenging ability segregation suggested in the article is disability discrimination doctrine, which includes the right of students with disabilities to receive reasonable accommodations for ensuring successful inclusion. Disability discrimination doctrine should be applied to non-disabled children with low ability, thus providing accommodations according to a pragmatic determination of need (and potential benefit) rather than diagnosis. Finally, and most fundamentally, the article argues that ability constitutes a discriminatory classification in itself (at least in the educational domain). To substantiate this claim, the article analyzes the various theories that explain the moral wrongness of discrimination, and argues that these apply to academic ability. Examining the three legal frameworks, the article concludes that although separating students according to their ability is embedded in our K-12 education system, the practice is, in fact, discriminatory.
Growing up in today’s world involves an increasing amount of interaction with technology. The ris... more Growing up in today’s world involves an increasing amount of interaction with technology. The rise in availability, accessibility, and use of the internet, along with social norms that encourage in- ternet connection, make it nearly impossible for children to avoid online engagement. The internet undoubtedly benefits children so- cially and academically and mastering technological tools at a young age is indispensable for opening doors to valuable opportu- nities. However, the internet is risky for children in myriad ways. Parents and lawmakers are especially concerned with the tension between important advantages and risks technology bestows on children. New technological developments in artificial intelligence are beginning to alter the ways parents might choose to safeguard their children from online risks. Recently, emerging AI-based devices and services can automatically detect when a child’s online behavior indicates that their well-being might be compromised or when they are engaging in inappropriate online communication. This technology can notify parents or immediately block harmful content in extreme cases. Referred to as algorithmic parenting in this Article, this new form of parental control has the potential to cheaply and effectively protect children against digital harms. If designed properly, algorithmic parenting would also ensure children’s liberties by neither excessively infringing their privacy nor limiting their free- dom of speech and access to information. This Article offers a balanced solution to the parenting dilemma that allows parents and children to maintain a relationship grounded in trust and respect, while simultaneously providing a safety net in extreme cases of risk. In doing so, it addresses the fol- lowing questions: What laws should govern platforms with respect to algorithms and data aggregation? Who, if anyone, should be liable when risky behavior goes undetected? Perhaps most fundamentally, relative to the physical world, do parents have a duty to protect their children from online harm? Finally, assuming that algorithmic parenting is a beneficial measure for protecting children from online risks, should legislators and policymakers use laws and regulations to encourage or even mandate the use of such algorithms to protect children? This Article offers a taxonomy of current online threats to children, an examination of the potential shift toward algorithmic parenting, and a regulatory toolkit to guide policymakers in making such a transition.
This article studies the privatization of education in Israel in the past ten years, focusing on... more This article studies the privatization of education in Israel in the past ten years, focusing on three important processes that have not been sufficiently addressed in the legal and educational literature: the incorporation of private schools into the public education system; publicization of Ultra-orthodox schools; and delegation of the management and operation of public schools from local authorities to private education networks.The examination of these processes show that Israel’s education policy in the past ten years does not comply with the typical characteristics of privatization. In fact, some of these even constitute, officially at least, a retreat from privatization, by widening the public sector’s involvement in education. However, these processes do not contribute to the realization of the goals of public education in a democratic state, including promoting equal opportunity, providing civic education and ensuring all students receive an adequate education. Instead, the processes have eroded the distinction between public and private education, which is no longer a helpful indicator for the strength of the public education system in Israel.
המאמר עוסק בהפרטת מערכת החינוך בישראל ומתמקד בניתוח התהליכים שהתרחשו בעשר השנים האחרונות. המאמר מנתח שלושה מקרי בוחן חשובים מהשנים האחרונות שטרם זכו לליבון מספק בספרות המשפטית וחלקם גם לא בספרות המחקר החינוכי: הטמעת מרבית בתי הספר המוכרים שאינם רשמיים בתוך מערכת החינוך הממלכתית; הצברה של החינוך החרדי; וניהול בתי ספר ממלכתיים והפעלתם על ידי גופים פרטיים. הניתוח מראה שמדיניות החינוך בישראל בעשור האחרון אינה מתנהלת על פי המאפיינים הטיפוסיים של הפרטה כפי שהיה בעבר, וחלק מן התהליכים אף מהווים, פורמלית, נסיגה מהפרטה והגדלת הסקטור הציבורי-ממלכתי בחינוך. יחד עם זאת, מבחינה מהותית תהליכים אלה אינם תורמים להגשמת המטרות החברתיות של חינוך ציבורי במדינה דמוקרטית, ובכלל זה שוויון הזדמנויות, חינוך לערכים דמוקרטיים, והבטחת חינוך איכותי לכלל התלמידים. תהליכים אלו שחקו את ההבחנה בין חינוך ציבורי ובין חינוך פרטי כך שהיא אינה מועילה עוד לשם הערכת חוסנו של החינוך הציבורי בישראל.
תקציר בעברית: הדילמה בדבר מעורבותה של המדינה במוסדות החינוך של הציבור החרדי ממלאת מקום חשוב בשיח ... more תקציר בעברית: הדילמה בדבר מעורבותה של המדינה במוסדות החינוך של הציבור החרדי ממלאת מקום חשוב בשיח הציבורי והמשפטי בישראל זה שנים רבות. לאחרונה חוקק חוק מוסדות חינוך תרבותיים ייחודיים, הקובע כי בתי ספר של העדה החרדית אשר יוכרו כמוסדות חינוך תרבותיים ייחודיים יקבלו מימון מאת המדינה, גם ללא לימוד ״תכנית הליבה״, ובלבד שתוכנית הלימודים או אורח החיים בבית הספר לא יהיו מנוגדים לערכיה של מדינת-ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית. במאמר זה אטען כי החוק מעניק אוטונומיה רחבה מדי לאוכלוסיה החרדית על חינוך ילדיה מבלי לספק מנגנוני הגנה לאינטרס הציבורי בחינוך, ובעיקר לאינטרס שהתלמידים יגדלו להיות אזרחים סובלניים ועצמאיים כלכלית. נוסף על כך, הסדר זה עלול לפגוע בזכותם של ילדים בני העדה החרדית לקבל חינוך שיאפשר להם לבחור בעתיד לעזוב את הקהילה. בתחילה אנתח את הדילמה המתעוררת במדינות ליברליות רבות ביחס לחינוכם של ילדים בני קבוצות מיעוט לא-ליברליות. לאחר מכן אציג שתי גישות פרדיגמטיות להתמודדות עם הדילמה, ואראה כיצד כל גישה מאמצת איזון המאפשר לקבוצות מיעוט לחנך את ילדיהן על-פי דרכן, תוך ייצור מנגנוני הגנה כמותי...
Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standi... more Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standing compared to others. Think, for example, about votes for presidential candidates. What matters, in terms of winning the election, is the relative position of the different candidates. A candidate may have a large (absolute) amount of votes, but if someone else has more than she does, she loses. Think, also, of the educational credentials of candidates competing for a job. A local college graduate is far more likely to get the job when the other candidates didn’t attend college at all, than when his opponent has an Ivy League college on his CV. We call these positional goods. The developing literature regarding the philosophical dimensions of positional goods, offers, roughly speaking, two approaches to contend with this unique trait of positional goods. According to the first approach, positional goods’ relative nature entails
This Article examines whether incorporating data mining technologies in education can promote equ... more This Article examines whether incorporating data mining technologies in education can promote equality. Following many other spheres in life, big data technologies that include creating, collecting, and analyzing vast amounts of data about individuals are increasingly being used in schools. This process has already elicited widespread interest among scholars, parents, and the public at large. However, this attention has largely focused on aspects of student privacy and data protection, and has overlooked the profound effects data mining may have on educational equality. This Article analyses the effects of data mining on education equality by focusing on one educational practice – ability grouping – that is already being transformed by educational data mining. Ability grouping is the practice of separating students into classes or tracks according to their perceived academic abilities. While some educators support the practice, arguing that it helps teachers adjust to the needs of t...
Hebrew Abstract: מאמר זה עוסק בשאלת ההצדקה של "השוואה כלפי מטה" בחינוך. השוואה כלפי מטה... more Hebrew Abstract: מאמר זה עוסק בשאלת ההצדקה של "השוואה כלפי מטה" בחינוך. השוואה כלפי מטה מתרחשת כאשר שוויון מושג על-ידי החלשתם של החזקים והורדתם לדרגתם של החלשים. על פניו, השוואה כלפי מטה נראית בלתי יעילה, בלתי רציונלית ובלתי מוסרית, כזו המונעת מקנאה גרידא. במאמר זה אטען כי בניגוד לאינטואיציה ראשונית זו, ישנם מקרים בהם השוואה כלפי מטה הינה מוצדקת ואף הכרחית לשם השגת צדק, וחינוך הוא אחד מהם. הטיעון במאמר מתחלק לשניים: טיעון פילוסופי נורמטיבי, וטיעון משפטי. הטיעון בחלקו הראשון של המאמר מתבסס על הדיון הפילוסופי העכשווי העוסק בצדק חלוקתי בחינוך, ועיקרו שבשל היותו של חינוך "טובין מדרגי", כלומר כזה שערכו נקבע באופן יחסי למצם של אחרים, אין די בשיפור מצבם של החלשים על מנת לקדם צדק, ופעמים רבות הגבלת היכולת לרכוש יתרון היא הכרחית לשם כך. חלקו השני של המאמר, ושם מצוי עיקר תרומתו, עוסק בניתוח ההיבטים המשפטיים של הגבלת יתרון בחינוך. הניתוח מתמקד בשני תחומים מרכזיים, שלשניהם השפעה מכרעת על צדק חלוקתי בחינוך, ובשניהם עוסק המשפט באופן מקיף ותדיר: הקצאת משאבי חינוך ושיבוץ תלמידים...
Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standi... more Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standing compared to others. Think, for example, about votes for presidential candidates. What matters, in terms of winning the election, is the relative position of the different candidates. A candidate may have a large (absolute) amount of votes, but if someone else has more than she does, she loses. Think, also, of the educational credentials of candidates competing for a job. A local college graduate is far more likely to get the job when the other candidates didn’t attend college at all, than when his opponent has an Ivy League college on his CV. We call these positional goods. The developing literature regarding the philosophical dimensions of positional goods, offers, roughly speaking, two approaches to contend with this unique trait of positional goods. According to the first approach, positional goods’ relative nature entails distributing them equally, even at the cost of leveling down. The second response to positional goods consists in preventing or minimizing the competitive element in their distribution. Both approaches respond to positional goods’ relative nature, assuming, by and large, that all positional goods are similar and that the normative rules that apply to them are therefore the same. In this paper, I argue that treating all positional goods alike misses some interesting differences within this category of goods and highlight one such difference, namely the difference between different positional goods in their sensitivity to the size of inequality.
Possessing high cognitive ability has obvious instrumental value for both individuals and society... more Possessing high cognitive ability has obvious instrumental value for both individuals and society. Some, however, intuitively feel that excellent ability is also valuable for its own sake. This intuition, which I call this “the perfectionist intuition” is so embedded in our thinking about education that it has become an unstated desideratum of principles of educational justice, making theories that do not ensure the full realization of potential unattractive. The perfectionist intuition also justifies educational practices that promote those already better off (such as gifted education), and limits what we owe the worst off. This paper attempts to undermine the perfectionist intuition, thereby offering support to some of the more radical theories of justice. Three different arguments are put forward. First, I try to “explain away” the intuition, in other words to trace alternative explanations as to why we intuit that high ability has intrinsic value when, in fact, it does not; Second, I demonstrate that the perfectionist intuition does not necessarily follow from perfectionist theories of the good life, and third I argue that developing excellence should not outweigh the instrumental benefits of developing ability for individuals at the lower end of the ability spectrum.
In her groundbreaking paper “Having too much” Ingrid Robeyns introduces “limitarianism”, arguing ... more In her groundbreaking paper “Having too much” Ingrid Robeyns introduces “limitarianism”, arguing that it is morally impermissible to have more resources than needed for a maximally flourishing life. Since, limitarianism is gaining attention from supporters and critics. This paper focuses on one component of Robeyns’ limitarian theory, namely the nature of the riches threshold, the point above which limitarian restrictions kick in. The threshold, according to Robeyns, is located at the point in which human flourishing is satiated; above this threshold, surplus resources do not have any moral weight. This paper suggests an alternative riches threshold: a relative, resource-based threshold, which is better attuned to limitarianism’s justifications, is not susceptible to the incentives objection, is suitable for a partial principle of justice that should be applied in tandem with other principles of justice, and is more compatible with the intuition underlying limitarianism. Since the riches threshold should fit the justification offered for limitarianism, different justifications for the principle result in different thresholds. Therefore, I also argue that limitarianism is best understood as a set of principles, each with its own threshold, justifications, and conditions for operation.
The meritocratic principle of educational justice maintains that it is unfair that individuals wi... more The meritocratic principle of educational justice maintains that it is unfair that individuals with similar ability who invest equal effort, have unequal educational prospects. In this paper I argue that the conception of ability that meritocracy assumes, namely as an innate trait, is critically flawed. Absent a coherent conception of ability, meritocracy loses its ability to morally evaluate educational practices and policies, rendering it an unworkable principle of educational justice. Replacing innate ability with an alternative conception of ability is, therefore, crucial for meritocratic educational justice. I propose incorporating an alternative conception of ability into meritocracy—as the ″current limits of student ability″. The account of meritocracy that follows entails that unequal educational prospects are fair only when they result from the constraints of individual potential (or from differential effort). I argue that this potential-based account of meritocracy, though demanding, is a plausible and attractive account of educational justice.
Recent decades have seen a dramatic expansion in higher education. Americans are accessing higher... more Recent decades have seen a dramatic expansion in higher education. Americans are accessing higher education at growing rates, at the undergraduate level and beyond. While this process is widely celebrated, this Article argues that the proliferation of higher education has, also, a dark side. Through a myriad of empirical evidence, we show that American higher education is plagued by an 'arms race'. Individuals acquire more education than is needed for performing their job or for personal growth, in order to gain an edge in a competitive job market. As people gain more education, employers become more selective, further fueling the educational arms-race. The Article argues that this arms-race is both socially wasteful and unjust. It is wasteful because enormous resources are invested by individuals and the public on higher education, without increasing work productivity or contributing to economic growth. It is unjust because it benefits those who can afford to study, while others are either forced to incur huge debt to fund education, or are left with low-paying menial jobs. The article then discusses several legal solutions aimed at mitigating the educational arms-race. The suggestions are designed to target only cases in which the expansion in higher education is indeed inefficient and unjust, rather than to restrict higher education generally. The first suggestion involves “banning the higher education box”, namely considering higher education requirements discriminatory when they are unjustified by a business necessity and cause racial disparity. Second, we offer imposing a “Signaling Fee” on employers upon hiring overeducated workers; and third we propose encouraging practices of lifelong learning and on-the-job-training. Adopting these (and perhaps other) measures is crucial for reversing the educational arms race and safeguarding higher education as the socially beneficial institution it should be.
In November 2016, Britain's High Court ruled that sex segregation in religious schools is not dis... more In November 2016, Britain's High Court ruled that sex segregation in religious schools is not discriminatory per se and is allowed as long as girls and boys receive education of equal quality. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CoA) in October 2017. We critique both courts' position on a number of fronts. The High Court was quick to reject, and the CoA quick to dismiss as irrelevant, the similarities between race segregation (deemed inherently unequal) and sex segregation (which is not). The courts were also wrong to dismiss the claim that sex segregation constitutes expressive harm to women in general. We examine whether religious or pedagogical considerations may override the argument against gender segregation, and whether institutional questions (e.g. if the school is private or public or if it is publicly funded) make a difference in this respect, issues not addressed by the courts.
The concept of ability is immensely important to educational theory and practice and permeates ma... more The concept of ability is immensely important to educational theory and practice and permeates many of the fundamental philosophical discussions in the field. The definition of education (and learning), as well as the goals of education, almost always involve the development of certain abilities, and discussions of education policy and educational evaluation also build on the concept of ability and the ways in which ability can be developed. Ability is also an elementary concept in educational justice and plays a role in determining the allocation of resources and evaluation of education policy. While ability is one of the key concepts of education, it also suffers from chronic ambiguity. For example, although people possess many kinds of learning-related abilities, the complexity of cognitive, behavioral, and social abilities that are instrumental in academic success are rarely appreciated. Discussions of student ability in the educational philosophy scholarship usually refer only to a narrow set of cognitive abilities. Confusion regarding the concept of ability is caused also by the fact that ‘ability’ is sometimes used interchangeably with other terms, including intelligence, IQ, talent, aptitude, potential, capabilities, skills, knowledge, proficiency, and more. All of these terms have slightly different meanings in different contexts. Additionally, there are often discrepancies between the various meanings of ‘ability’ we use when theorizing about education and the possibility of measuring (or affecting) them, creating discord between theoretical discourse and educational practice. A further source of confusion is that ‘student ability’ is both a precondition for learning and the end product of education, and abilities acquired through education are themselves preconditions for developing still further abilities (Bailey & Bridges 1983; McGeer 2018; Ryle 1949). When discussing ability, therefore, careful work is required to delineate the various meanings of ‘ability’ and define the meaning of ‘ability’ used in each specific context. This chapter offers a discussion of student ability through an examination of one, prevalent educational practice—ability grouping. In this chapter I examine two ways to understand the term ‘ability’ and question whether either of them is suitable as a criterion for student assignment, concluding that neither of them supports the robust forms of ability grouping common in contemporary education systems. The conceptual analysis of ‘ability’ thereby contributes a novel perspective on the debate surrounding ability grouping. The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I introduce the practice of ability grouping and rehearse the main arguments in the traditional debate surrounding it. I then move on to distinguish two possible categories of ability: performative ability, and ability as a property of an agent. I argue that neither of these constitutes a suitable criterion for student assignment in most cases; they can support only limited cases of ability grouping.
הפרדה של ילדים על בסיס גזע היא אחת הדוגמאות הפרדיגמטיות ביותר להפליה פסולה. פסק הדין המונומנטלי ש... more הפרדה של ילדים על בסיס גזע היא אחת הדוגמאות הפרדיגמטיות ביותר להפליה פסולה. פסק הדין המונומנטלי של בית המשפט העליון האמריקאי בעניין Brown v. Board קבע שהפרדה בחינוך מהווה, בהכרח, הפליה, גם אם השירות החינוכי והמשאבים החינוכיים לכאורה שווים, שכן הפרדה משדרת מסר של נחיתות הפוגעת בכבוד ובערך המוסרי השווה של כל בני האדם. קביעותיו בעניין הפליה (בחינוך ובכלל) הפכו מאז למושכלות יסוד שעל בסיסן התפתחו דוקטרינות איסור ההפליה במדינות רבות, ובכלל זה בישראל. אך מי שיבקר במוסדות החינוך בדרום תל אביב (וברשויות מקומיות נוספות), ימצא הפרדה כמעט מוחלטת בין ילדים של מבקשי מקלט, בעיקר מאריתריאה וסודן, ובין ילדים של אזרחים ישראלים ותיקים. מדיניות זו של הפרדה חינוכית קיבלה לאחרונה אישור בפסק דין בעתירה מנהלית שהוגשה על ידי מאות עותרים אשר יוצגו על ידי הקליניקה למשפט ומדיניות חינוך באוניברסיטת חיפה והאגודה לזכויות האזרח. רשימה זו תציע ניתוח ביקורתי של פסק הדין.
In a recent case, Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld two regulations issued by the Ministry of... more In a recent case, Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld two regulations issued by the Ministry of Education that allow charging payment from parents of students in public schools as a condition for their children’s participation in educational programs, courses and schools. In its decision, the HCJ rejected the arguments brought forward against the regulations, and while stressing their concern regarding the possible inequality the regulations may cause, the court ultimately decided that the regulations did not constitute an infringement on educational equality or the right to a free education. The court also found that when issuing the regulations, the Ministry of Education was acting within its authority and was not unreasonable. This article argues that public schools should not be allowed to charge payments for educational services. A critique of the HCJ’s decision is the starting point of this discussion, however the article goes beyond the analysis of the specific decision, and performs a thorough analysis of the legal, factual and normative arguments involved in the debate concerning parental payments in public education. בפסק הדין בעניין ג׳קלין שמשון ואח׳ נ׳ משרד החינוך דחה בג״ץ שתי עתירות שאוחדו בנושא תשלומי ההורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית. העתירות תקפו שני חוזרי מנכ״ל אשר התירו גבייה של תשלומי הורים בסך אלפי שקלים בטענה כי הם פוגעים בשוויון החינוכי ובזכות לחינוך חינם, כי הם מאפשרים הפליה על רקע מעמד כלכלי חברתי, בניגוד להוראות חוק זכויות התלמיד, ושהם התקבלו ללא הסמכה חוקית. אף שדעתו של בית המשפט, כפי שעולה מפסק הדין, אינה נוחה מתשלומי ההורים, הרי שבסופו של יום, הוא דוחה את העתירות ומותיר את חוזרי המנכ״ל על כנם. מאמר זה מציע בחינה יסודית של סוגיית תשלומי ההורים בבתי הספר הממלכתיים בישראל. ניתוח ביקורתי של פסק הדין בעניין שמשון מהווה נקודת הפתיחה לדיון, אך המאמר דן בטענות המשפטיות, החינוכיות-אמפיריות והנורמטיביות העיקריות המושמעות בדיונים המשפטיים והמקצועיים והציבוריים בנושא. המסקנה העולה מן הניתוח הוא שראוי לאסור על תשלומי הורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית, ולפיכך שגה בית המשפט כאשר דחה את העתירות בענין שמשון.
This Article focuses on the practice of assigning students to separate schools, tracks, and cours... more This Article focuses on the practice of assigning students to separate schools, tracks, and courses according to their academic ability, a practice I call ability segregation. Starting with the recent New York City controversy over the elimination of selective programs in the city’s public schools, the Article discusses ability segregation’s role in reinforcing racial segregation. However unlike most scholarship and previous legal challenges to ability segregation, which take issue almost exclusively with the racial imbalance it creates, the article argues that ability segregation is discriminatory even when it does not result in racial segregation. The article offers three legal frameworks for analyzing ability segregation and ultimately argues that it should be prohibited. First, I argue that ability segregation can be challenged according to the disparate impact doctrine. The dismal NYC statistics vividly illustrate the prevalent reality of racial exclusion caused by selective admission policies, a phenomenon well documented in the literature. The disparate impact created by ability segregation cannot be redeemed by appeal to an educational necessity, since it does not create educational benefits for children of low ability, and is not indispensable for developing excellence. The second framework for challenging ability segregation suggested in the article is disability discrimination doctrine, which includes the right of students with disabilities to receive reasonable accommodations for ensuring successful inclusion. Disability discrimination doctrine should be applied to non-disabled children with low ability, thus providing accommodations according to a pragmatic determination of need (and potential benefit) rather than diagnosis. Finally, and most fundamentally, the article argues that ability constitutes a discriminatory classification in itself (at least in the educational domain). To substantiate this claim, the article analyzes the various theories that explain the moral wrongness of discrimination, and argues that these apply to academic ability. Examining the three legal frameworks, the article concludes that although separating students according to their ability is embedded in our K-12 education system, the practice is, in fact, discriminatory.
Growing up in today’s world involves an increasing amount of interaction with technology. The ris... more Growing up in today’s world involves an increasing amount of interaction with technology. The rise in availability, accessibility, and use of the internet, along with social norms that encourage in- ternet connection, make it nearly impossible for children to avoid online engagement. The internet undoubtedly benefits children so- cially and academically and mastering technological tools at a young age is indispensable for opening doors to valuable opportu- nities. However, the internet is risky for children in myriad ways. Parents and lawmakers are especially concerned with the tension between important advantages and risks technology bestows on children. New technological developments in artificial intelligence are beginning to alter the ways parents might choose to safeguard their children from online risks. Recently, emerging AI-based devices and services can automatically detect when a child’s online behavior indicates that their well-being might be compromised or when they are engaging in inappropriate online communication. This technology can notify parents or immediately block harmful content in extreme cases. Referred to as algorithmic parenting in this Article, this new form of parental control has the potential to cheaply and effectively protect children against digital harms. If designed properly, algorithmic parenting would also ensure children’s liberties by neither excessively infringing their privacy nor limiting their free- dom of speech and access to information. This Article offers a balanced solution to the parenting dilemma that allows parents and children to maintain a relationship grounded in trust and respect, while simultaneously providing a safety net in extreme cases of risk. In doing so, it addresses the fol- lowing questions: What laws should govern platforms with respect to algorithms and data aggregation? Who, if anyone, should be liable when risky behavior goes undetected? Perhaps most fundamentally, relative to the physical world, do parents have a duty to protect their children from online harm? Finally, assuming that algorithmic parenting is a beneficial measure for protecting children from online risks, should legislators and policymakers use laws and regulations to encourage or even mandate the use of such algorithms to protect children? This Article offers a taxonomy of current online threats to children, an examination of the potential shift toward algorithmic parenting, and a regulatory toolkit to guide policymakers in making such a transition.
This article studies the privatization of education in Israel in the past ten years, focusing on... more This article studies the privatization of education in Israel in the past ten years, focusing on three important processes that have not been sufficiently addressed in the legal and educational literature: the incorporation of private schools into the public education system; publicization of Ultra-orthodox schools; and delegation of the management and operation of public schools from local authorities to private education networks.The examination of these processes show that Israel’s education policy in the past ten years does not comply with the typical characteristics of privatization. In fact, some of these even constitute, officially at least, a retreat from privatization, by widening the public sector’s involvement in education. However, these processes do not contribute to the realization of the goals of public education in a democratic state, including promoting equal opportunity, providing civic education and ensuring all students receive an adequate education. Instead, the processes have eroded the distinction between public and private education, which is no longer a helpful indicator for the strength of the public education system in Israel.
המאמר עוסק בהפרטת מערכת החינוך בישראל ומתמקד בניתוח התהליכים שהתרחשו בעשר השנים האחרונות. המאמר מנתח שלושה מקרי בוחן חשובים מהשנים האחרונות שטרם זכו לליבון מספק בספרות המשפטית וחלקם גם לא בספרות המחקר החינוכי: הטמעת מרבית בתי הספר המוכרים שאינם רשמיים בתוך מערכת החינוך הממלכתית; הצברה של החינוך החרדי; וניהול בתי ספר ממלכתיים והפעלתם על ידי גופים פרטיים. הניתוח מראה שמדיניות החינוך בישראל בעשור האחרון אינה מתנהלת על פי המאפיינים הטיפוסיים של הפרטה כפי שהיה בעבר, וחלק מן התהליכים אף מהווים, פורמלית, נסיגה מהפרטה והגדלת הסקטור הציבורי-ממלכתי בחינוך. יחד עם זאת, מבחינה מהותית תהליכים אלה אינם תורמים להגשמת המטרות החברתיות של חינוך ציבורי במדינה דמוקרטית, ובכלל זה שוויון הזדמנויות, חינוך לערכים דמוקרטיים, והבטחת חינוך איכותי לכלל התלמידים. תהליכים אלו שחקו את ההבחנה בין חינוך ציבורי ובין חינוך פרטי כך שהיא אינה מועילה עוד לשם הערכת חוסנו של החינוך הציבורי בישראל.
תקציר בעברית: הדילמה בדבר מעורבותה של המדינה במוסדות החינוך של הציבור החרדי ממלאת מקום חשוב בשיח ... more תקציר בעברית: הדילמה בדבר מעורבותה של המדינה במוסדות החינוך של הציבור החרדי ממלאת מקום חשוב בשיח הציבורי והמשפטי בישראל זה שנים רבות. לאחרונה חוקק חוק מוסדות חינוך תרבותיים ייחודיים, הקובע כי בתי ספר של העדה החרדית אשר יוכרו כמוסדות חינוך תרבותיים ייחודיים יקבלו מימון מאת המדינה, גם ללא לימוד ״תכנית הליבה״, ובלבד שתוכנית הלימודים או אורח החיים בבית הספר לא יהיו מנוגדים לערכיה של מדינת-ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית. במאמר זה אטען כי החוק מעניק אוטונומיה רחבה מדי לאוכלוסיה החרדית על חינוך ילדיה מבלי לספק מנגנוני הגנה לאינטרס הציבורי בחינוך, ובעיקר לאינטרס שהתלמידים יגדלו להיות אזרחים סובלניים ועצמאיים כלכלית. נוסף על כך, הסדר זה עלול לפגוע בזכותם של ילדים בני העדה החרדית לקבל חינוך שיאפשר להם לבחור בעתיד לעזוב את הקהילה. בתחילה אנתח את הדילמה המתעוררת במדינות ליברליות רבות ביחס לחינוכם של ילדים בני קבוצות מיעוט לא-ליברליות. לאחר מכן אציג שתי גישות פרדיגמטיות להתמודדות עם הדילמה, ואראה כיצד כל גישה מאמצת איזון המאפשר לקבוצות מיעוט לחנך את ילדיהן על-פי דרכן, תוך ייצור מנגנוני הגנה כמותי...
Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standi... more Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standing compared to others. Think, for example, about votes for presidential candidates. What matters, in terms of winning the election, is the relative position of the different candidates. A candidate may have a large (absolute) amount of votes, but if someone else has more than she does, she loses. Think, also, of the educational credentials of candidates competing for a job. A local college graduate is far more likely to get the job when the other candidates didn’t attend college at all, than when his opponent has an Ivy League college on his CV. We call these positional goods. The developing literature regarding the philosophical dimensions of positional goods, offers, roughly speaking, two approaches to contend with this unique trait of positional goods. According to the first approach, positional goods’ relative nature entails
This Article examines whether incorporating data mining technologies in education can promote equ... more This Article examines whether incorporating data mining technologies in education can promote equality. Following many other spheres in life, big data technologies that include creating, collecting, and analyzing vast amounts of data about individuals are increasingly being used in schools. This process has already elicited widespread interest among scholars, parents, and the public at large. However, this attention has largely focused on aspects of student privacy and data protection, and has overlooked the profound effects data mining may have on educational equality. This Article analyses the effects of data mining on education equality by focusing on one educational practice – ability grouping – that is already being transformed by educational data mining. Ability grouping is the practice of separating students into classes or tracks according to their perceived academic abilities. While some educators support the practice, arguing that it helps teachers adjust to the needs of t...
Hebrew Abstract: מאמר זה עוסק בשאלת ההצדקה של "השוואה כלפי מטה" בחינוך. השוואה כלפי מטה... more Hebrew Abstract: מאמר זה עוסק בשאלת ההצדקה של "השוואה כלפי מטה" בחינוך. השוואה כלפי מטה מתרחשת כאשר שוויון מושג על-ידי החלשתם של החזקים והורדתם לדרגתם של החלשים. על פניו, השוואה כלפי מטה נראית בלתי יעילה, בלתי רציונלית ובלתי מוסרית, כזו המונעת מקנאה גרידא. במאמר זה אטען כי בניגוד לאינטואיציה ראשונית זו, ישנם מקרים בהם השוואה כלפי מטה הינה מוצדקת ואף הכרחית לשם השגת צדק, וחינוך הוא אחד מהם. הטיעון במאמר מתחלק לשניים: טיעון פילוסופי נורמטיבי, וטיעון משפטי. הטיעון בחלקו הראשון של המאמר מתבסס על הדיון הפילוסופי העכשווי העוסק בצדק חלוקתי בחינוך, ועיקרו שבשל היותו של חינוך "טובין מדרגי", כלומר כזה שערכו נקבע באופן יחסי למצם של אחרים, אין די בשיפור מצבם של החלשים על מנת לקדם צדק, ופעמים רבות הגבלת היכולת לרכוש יתרון היא הכרחית לשם כך. חלקו השני של המאמר, ושם מצוי עיקר תרומתו, עוסק בניתוח ההיבטים המשפטיים של הגבלת יתרון בחינוך. הניתוח מתמקד בשני תחומים מרכזיים, שלשניהם השפעה מכרעת על צדק חלוקתי בחינוך, ובשניהם עוסק המשפט באופן מקיף ותדיר: הקצאת משאבי חינוך ושיבוץ תלמידים...
Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standi... more Some good things are good for the individual who has them wholly in virtue of his relative standing compared to others. Think, for example, about votes for presidential candidates. What matters, in terms of winning the election, is the relative position of the different candidates. A candidate may have a large (absolute) amount of votes, but if someone else has more than she does, she loses. Think, also, of the educational credentials of candidates competing for a job. A local college graduate is far more likely to get the job when the other candidates didn’t attend college at all, than when his opponent has an Ivy League college on his CV. We call these positional goods. The developing literature regarding the philosophical dimensions of positional goods, offers, roughly speaking, two approaches to contend with this unique trait of positional goods. According to the first approach, positional goods’ relative nature entails distributing them equally, even at the cost of leveling down. The second response to positional goods consists in preventing or minimizing the competitive element in their distribution. Both approaches respond to positional goods’ relative nature, assuming, by and large, that all positional goods are similar and that the normative rules that apply to them are therefore the same. In this paper, I argue that treating all positional goods alike misses some interesting differences within this category of goods and highlight one such difference, namely the difference between different positional goods in their sensitivity to the size of inequality.
Possessing high cognitive ability has obvious instrumental value for both individuals and society... more Possessing high cognitive ability has obvious instrumental value for both individuals and society. Some, however, intuitively feel that excellent ability is also valuable for its own sake. This intuition, which I call this “the perfectionist intuition” is so embedded in our thinking about education that it has become an unstated desideratum of principles of educational justice, making theories that do not ensure the full realization of potential unattractive. The perfectionist intuition also justifies educational practices that promote those already better off (such as gifted education), and limits what we owe the worst off. This paper attempts to undermine the perfectionist intuition, thereby offering support to some of the more radical theories of justice. Three different arguments are put forward. First, I try to “explain away” the intuition, in other words to trace alternative explanations as to why we intuit that high ability has intrinsic value when, in fact, it does not; Second, I demonstrate that the perfectionist intuition does not necessarily follow from perfectionist theories of the good life, and third I argue that developing excellence should not outweigh the instrumental benefits of developing ability for individuals at the lower end of the ability spectrum.
In her groundbreaking paper “Having too much” Ingrid Robeyns introduces “limitarianism”, arguing ... more In her groundbreaking paper “Having too much” Ingrid Robeyns introduces “limitarianism”, arguing that it is morally impermissible to have more resources than needed for a maximally flourishing life. Since, limitarianism is gaining attention from supporters and critics. This paper focuses on one component of Robeyns’ limitarian theory, namely the nature of the riches threshold, the point above which limitarian restrictions kick in. The threshold, according to Robeyns, is located at the point in which human flourishing is satiated; above this threshold, surplus resources do not have any moral weight. This paper suggests an alternative riches threshold: a relative, resource-based threshold, which is better attuned to limitarianism’s justifications, is not susceptible to the incentives objection, is suitable for a partial principle of justice that should be applied in tandem with other principles of justice, and is more compatible with the intuition underlying limitarianism. Since the riches threshold should fit the justification offered for limitarianism, different justifications for the principle result in different thresholds. Therefore, I also argue that limitarianism is best understood as a set of principles, each with its own threshold, justifications, and conditions for operation.
The meritocratic principle of educational justice maintains that it is unfair that individuals wi... more The meritocratic principle of educational justice maintains that it is unfair that individuals with similar ability who invest equal effort, have unequal educational prospects. In this paper I argue that the conception of ability that meritocracy assumes, namely as an innate trait, is critically flawed. Absent a coherent conception of ability, meritocracy loses its ability to morally evaluate educational practices and policies, rendering it an unworkable principle of educational justice. Replacing innate ability with an alternative conception of ability is, therefore, crucial for meritocratic educational justice. I propose incorporating an alternative conception of ability into meritocracy—as the ″current limits of student ability″. The account of meritocracy that follows entails that unequal educational prospects are fair only when they result from the constraints of individual potential (or from differential effort). I argue that this potential-based account of meritocracy, though demanding, is a plausible and attractive account of educational justice.
Recent decades have seen a dramatic expansion in higher education. Americans are accessing higher... more Recent decades have seen a dramatic expansion in higher education. Americans are accessing higher education at growing rates, at the undergraduate level and beyond. While this process is widely celebrated, this Article argues that the proliferation of higher education has, also, a dark side. Through a myriad of empirical evidence, we show that American higher education is plagued by an 'arms race'. Individuals acquire more education than is needed for performing their job or for personal growth, in order to gain an edge in a competitive job market. As people gain more education, employers become more selective, further fueling the educational arms-race. The Article argues that this arms-race is both socially wasteful and unjust. It is wasteful because enormous resources are invested by individuals and the public on higher education, without increasing work productivity or contributing to economic growth. It is unjust because it benefits those who can afford to study, while others are either forced to incur huge debt to fund education, or are left with low-paying menial jobs. The article then discusses several legal solutions aimed at mitigating the educational arms-race. The suggestions are designed to target only cases in which the expansion in higher education is indeed inefficient and unjust, rather than to restrict higher education generally. The first suggestion involves “banning the higher education box”, namely considering higher education requirements discriminatory when they are unjustified by a business necessity and cause racial disparity. Second, we offer imposing a “Signaling Fee” on employers upon hiring overeducated workers; and third we propose encouraging practices of lifelong learning and on-the-job-training. Adopting these (and perhaps other) measures is crucial for reversing the educational arms race and safeguarding higher education as the socially beneficial institution it should be.
In November 2016, Britain's High Court ruled that sex segregation in religious schools is not dis... more In November 2016, Britain's High Court ruled that sex segregation in religious schools is not discriminatory per se and is allowed as long as girls and boys receive education of equal quality. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CoA) in October 2017. We critique both courts' position on a number of fronts. The High Court was quick to reject, and the CoA quick to dismiss as irrelevant, the similarities between race segregation (deemed inherently unequal) and sex segregation (which is not). The courts were also wrong to dismiss the claim that sex segregation constitutes expressive harm to women in general. We examine whether religious or pedagogical considerations may override the argument against gender segregation, and whether institutional questions (e.g. if the school is private or public or if it is publicly funded) make a difference in this respect, issues not addressed by the courts.
Religious schools have long been recognized as an important component of parents’ rights in their... more Religious schools have long been recognized as an important component of parents’ rights in their children’s education. As long as they provide adequate secular and civic education it is commonly accepted that religious schools create no concerns that justify state intervention. However, when religious schools offer better education than public schools they become attractive to advantaged students, including those who are not members of the religious community, who are willing to ‘bear’ the religious content in order to enjoy quality education. As a result, these schools are able to ‘cream’ bright students from the public schools, creating segregated schools that serve predominantly privileged children. The traditional public schools, on the other hand, are substantially weakened by the exit of advantaged students and the loss of resources. Parents’ religious interests, therefore, become a tool for gaining educational advantage and avoiding integration. Examples of this phenomenon are widespread, including Catholic schools in Europe, Talmudic schools in Israel, Parochial schools in the post-Brown era, and, recently, American Religious Charter Schools. This paper aims to draw attention to elitist religious schools and to the challenges they create, and to examine the unexpected role that law has in enabling and aggravating these processes.
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While ability is one of the key concepts of education, it also suffers from chronic ambiguity. For example, although people possess many kinds of learning-related abilities, the complexity of cognitive, behavioral, and social abilities that are instrumental in academic success are rarely appreciated. Discussions of student ability in the educational philosophy scholarship usually refer only to a narrow set of cognitive abilities.
Confusion regarding the concept of ability is caused also by the fact that ‘ability’ is sometimes used interchangeably with other terms, including intelligence, IQ, talent, aptitude, potential, capabilities, skills, knowledge, proficiency, and more. All of these terms have slightly different meanings in different contexts. Additionally, there are often discrepancies between the various meanings of ‘ability’ we use when theorizing about education and the possibility of measuring (or affecting) them, creating discord between theoretical discourse and educational practice. A further source of confusion is that ‘student ability’ is both a precondition for learning and the end product of education, and abilities acquired through education are themselves preconditions for developing still further abilities (Bailey & Bridges 1983; McGeer 2018; Ryle 1949).
When discussing ability, therefore, careful work is required to delineate the various meanings of ‘ability’ and define the meaning of ‘ability’ used in each specific context. This chapter offers a discussion of student ability through an examination of one, prevalent educational practice—ability grouping. In this chapter I examine two ways to understand the term ‘ability’ and question whether either of them is suitable as a criterion for student assignment, concluding that neither of them supports the robust forms of ability grouping common in contemporary education systems. The conceptual analysis of ‘ability’ thereby contributes a novel perspective on the debate surrounding ability grouping.
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I introduce the practice of ability grouping and rehearse the main arguments in the traditional debate surrounding it. I then move on to distinguish two possible categories of ability: performative ability, and ability as a property of an agent. I argue that neither of these constitutes a suitable criterion for student assignment in most cases; they can support only limited cases of ability grouping.
This article argues that public schools should not be allowed to charge payments for educational services. A critique of the HCJ’s decision is the starting point of this discussion, however the article goes beyond the analysis of the specific decision, and performs a thorough analysis of the legal, factual and normative arguments involved in the debate concerning parental payments in public education.
בפסק הדין בעניין ג׳קלין שמשון ואח׳ נ׳ משרד החינוך דחה בג״ץ שתי עתירות שאוחדו בנושא תשלומי ההורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית. העתירות תקפו שני חוזרי מנכ״ל אשר התירו גבייה של תשלומי הורים בסך אלפי שקלים בטענה כי הם פוגעים בשוויון החינוכי ובזכות לחינוך חינם, כי הם מאפשרים הפליה על רקע מעמד כלכלי חברתי, בניגוד להוראות חוק זכויות התלמיד, ושהם התקבלו ללא הסמכה חוקית. אף שדעתו של בית המשפט, כפי שעולה מפסק הדין, אינה נוחה מתשלומי ההורים, הרי שבסופו של יום, הוא דוחה את העתירות ומותיר את חוזרי המנכ״ל על כנם. מאמר זה מציע בחינה יסודית של סוגיית תשלומי ההורים בבתי הספר הממלכתיים בישראל. ניתוח ביקורתי של פסק הדין בעניין שמשון מהווה נקודת הפתיחה לדיון, אך המאמר דן בטענות המשפטיות, החינוכיות-אמפיריות והנורמטיביות העיקריות המושמעות בדיונים המשפטיים והמקצועיים והציבוריים בנושא. המסקנה העולה מן הניתוח הוא שראוי לאסור על תשלומי הורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית, ולפיכך שגה בית המשפט כאשר דחה את העתירות בענין שמשון.
The article offers three legal frameworks for analyzing ability segregation and ultimately argues that it should be prohibited. First, I argue that ability segregation can be challenged according to the disparate impact doctrine. The dismal NYC statistics vividly illustrate the prevalent reality of racial exclusion caused by selective admission policies, a phenomenon well documented in the literature. The disparate impact created by ability segregation cannot be redeemed by appeal to an educational necessity, since it does not create educational benefits for children of low ability, and is not indispensable for developing excellence. The second framework for challenging ability segregation suggested in the article is disability discrimination doctrine, which includes the right of students with disabilities to receive reasonable accommodations for ensuring successful inclusion. Disability discrimination doctrine should be applied to non-disabled children with low ability, thus providing accommodations according to a pragmatic determination of need (and potential benefit) rather than diagnosis. Finally, and most fundamentally, the article argues that ability constitutes a discriminatory classification in itself (at least in the educational domain). To substantiate this claim, the article analyzes the various theories that explain the moral wrongness of discrimination, and argues that these apply to academic ability.
Examining the three legal frameworks, the article concludes that although separating students according to their ability is embedded in our K-12 education system, the practice is, in fact, discriminatory.
New technological developments in artificial intelligence are beginning to alter the ways parents might choose to safeguard their children from online risks. Recently, emerging AI-based devices and services can automatically detect when a child’s online behavior indicates that their well-being might be compromised or when they are engaging in inappropriate online communication. This technology can notify parents or immediately block harmful content in extreme cases. Referred to as algorithmic parenting in this Article, this new form of parental control has the potential to cheaply and effectively protect children against digital harms. If designed properly, algorithmic parenting would also ensure children’s liberties by neither excessively infringing their privacy nor limiting their free-
dom of speech and access to information.
This Article offers a balanced solution to the parenting dilemma that allows parents and children to maintain a relationship grounded in trust and respect, while simultaneously providing a safety net in extreme cases of risk. In doing so, it addresses the fol- lowing questions: What laws should govern platforms with respect to algorithms and data aggregation? Who, if anyone, should be liable when risky behavior goes undetected? Perhaps most fundamentally, relative to the physical world, do parents have a duty to protect their children from online harm? Finally, assuming that algorithmic parenting is a beneficial measure for protecting children from online risks, should legislators and policymakers use laws and regulations to encourage or even mandate the use of such algorithms to protect children? This Article offers a taxonomy of current online threats to children, an examination of the potential shift toward algorithmic parenting, and a regulatory toolkit to guide policymakers in making such a transition.
המאמר עוסק בהפרטת מערכת החינוך בישראל ומתמקד בניתוח התהליכים שהתרחשו בעשר השנים האחרונות. המאמר מנתח שלושה מקרי בוחן חשובים מהשנים האחרונות שטרם זכו לליבון מספק בספרות המשפטית וחלקם גם לא בספרות המחקר החינוכי: הטמעת מרבית בתי הספר המוכרים שאינם רשמיים בתוך מערכת החינוך הממלכתית; הצברה של החינוך החרדי; וניהול בתי ספר ממלכתיים והפעלתם על ידי גופים פרטיים. הניתוח מראה שמדיניות החינוך בישראל בעשור האחרון אינה מתנהלת על פי המאפיינים הטיפוסיים של הפרטה כפי שהיה בעבר, וחלק מן התהליכים אף מהווים, פורמלית, נסיגה מהפרטה והגדלת הסקטור הציבורי-ממלכתי בחינוך. יחד עם זאת, מבחינה מהותית תהליכים אלה אינם תורמים להגשמת המטרות החברתיות של חינוך ציבורי במדינה דמוקרטית, ובכלל זה שוויון הזדמנויות, חינוך לערכים דמוקרטיים, והבטחת חינוך איכותי לכלל התלמידים. תהליכים אלו שחקו את ההבחנה בין חינוך ציבורי ובין חינוך פרטי כך שהיא אינה מועילה עוד לשם הערכת חוסנו של החינוך הציבורי בישראל.
Through a myriad of empirical evidence, we show that American higher education is plagued by an 'arms race'. Individuals acquire more education than is needed for performing their job or for personal growth, in order to gain an edge in a competitive job market. As people gain more education, employers become more selective, further fueling the educational arms-race.
The Article argues that this arms-race is both socially wasteful and unjust. It is wasteful because enormous resources are invested by individuals and the public on higher education, without increasing work productivity or contributing to economic growth. It is unjust because it benefits those who can afford to study, while others are either forced to incur huge debt to fund education, or are left with low-paying menial jobs.
The article then discusses several legal solutions aimed at mitigating the educational arms-race. The suggestions are designed to target only cases in which the expansion in higher education is indeed inefficient and unjust, rather than to restrict higher education generally. The first suggestion involves “banning the higher education box”, namely considering higher education requirements discriminatory when they are unjustified by a business necessity and cause racial disparity. Second, we offer imposing a “Signaling Fee” on employers upon hiring overeducated workers; and third we propose encouraging practices of lifelong learning and on-the-job-training. Adopting these (and perhaps other) measures is crucial for reversing the educational arms race and safeguarding higher education as the socially beneficial institution it should be.
While ability is one of the key concepts of education, it also suffers from chronic ambiguity. For example, although people possess many kinds of learning-related abilities, the complexity of cognitive, behavioral, and social abilities that are instrumental in academic success are rarely appreciated. Discussions of student ability in the educational philosophy scholarship usually refer only to a narrow set of cognitive abilities.
Confusion regarding the concept of ability is caused also by the fact that ‘ability’ is sometimes used interchangeably with other terms, including intelligence, IQ, talent, aptitude, potential, capabilities, skills, knowledge, proficiency, and more. All of these terms have slightly different meanings in different contexts. Additionally, there are often discrepancies between the various meanings of ‘ability’ we use when theorizing about education and the possibility of measuring (or affecting) them, creating discord between theoretical discourse and educational practice. A further source of confusion is that ‘student ability’ is both a precondition for learning and the end product of education, and abilities acquired through education are themselves preconditions for developing still further abilities (Bailey & Bridges 1983; McGeer 2018; Ryle 1949).
When discussing ability, therefore, careful work is required to delineate the various meanings of ‘ability’ and define the meaning of ‘ability’ used in each specific context. This chapter offers a discussion of student ability through an examination of one, prevalent educational practice—ability grouping. In this chapter I examine two ways to understand the term ‘ability’ and question whether either of them is suitable as a criterion for student assignment, concluding that neither of them supports the robust forms of ability grouping common in contemporary education systems. The conceptual analysis of ‘ability’ thereby contributes a novel perspective on the debate surrounding ability grouping.
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I introduce the practice of ability grouping and rehearse the main arguments in the traditional debate surrounding it. I then move on to distinguish two possible categories of ability: performative ability, and ability as a property of an agent. I argue that neither of these constitutes a suitable criterion for student assignment in most cases; they can support only limited cases of ability grouping.
This article argues that public schools should not be allowed to charge payments for educational services. A critique of the HCJ’s decision is the starting point of this discussion, however the article goes beyond the analysis of the specific decision, and performs a thorough analysis of the legal, factual and normative arguments involved in the debate concerning parental payments in public education.
בפסק הדין בעניין ג׳קלין שמשון ואח׳ נ׳ משרד החינוך דחה בג״ץ שתי עתירות שאוחדו בנושא תשלומי ההורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית. העתירות תקפו שני חוזרי מנכ״ל אשר התירו גבייה של תשלומי הורים בסך אלפי שקלים בטענה כי הם פוגעים בשוויון החינוכי ובזכות לחינוך חינם, כי הם מאפשרים הפליה על רקע מעמד כלכלי חברתי, בניגוד להוראות חוק זכויות התלמיד, ושהם התקבלו ללא הסמכה חוקית. אף שדעתו של בית המשפט, כפי שעולה מפסק הדין, אינה נוחה מתשלומי ההורים, הרי שבסופו של יום, הוא דוחה את העתירות ומותיר את חוזרי המנכ״ל על כנם. מאמר זה מציע בחינה יסודית של סוגיית תשלומי ההורים בבתי הספר הממלכתיים בישראל. ניתוח ביקורתי של פסק הדין בעניין שמשון מהווה נקודת הפתיחה לדיון, אך המאמר דן בטענות המשפטיות, החינוכיות-אמפיריות והנורמטיביות העיקריות המושמעות בדיונים המשפטיים והמקצועיים והציבוריים בנושא. המסקנה העולה מן הניתוח הוא שראוי לאסור על תשלומי הורים במערכת החינוך הממלכתית, ולפיכך שגה בית המשפט כאשר דחה את העתירות בענין שמשון.
The article offers three legal frameworks for analyzing ability segregation and ultimately argues that it should be prohibited. First, I argue that ability segregation can be challenged according to the disparate impact doctrine. The dismal NYC statistics vividly illustrate the prevalent reality of racial exclusion caused by selective admission policies, a phenomenon well documented in the literature. The disparate impact created by ability segregation cannot be redeemed by appeal to an educational necessity, since it does not create educational benefits for children of low ability, and is not indispensable for developing excellence. The second framework for challenging ability segregation suggested in the article is disability discrimination doctrine, which includes the right of students with disabilities to receive reasonable accommodations for ensuring successful inclusion. Disability discrimination doctrine should be applied to non-disabled children with low ability, thus providing accommodations according to a pragmatic determination of need (and potential benefit) rather than diagnosis. Finally, and most fundamentally, the article argues that ability constitutes a discriminatory classification in itself (at least in the educational domain). To substantiate this claim, the article analyzes the various theories that explain the moral wrongness of discrimination, and argues that these apply to academic ability.
Examining the three legal frameworks, the article concludes that although separating students according to their ability is embedded in our K-12 education system, the practice is, in fact, discriminatory.
New technological developments in artificial intelligence are beginning to alter the ways parents might choose to safeguard their children from online risks. Recently, emerging AI-based devices and services can automatically detect when a child’s online behavior indicates that their well-being might be compromised or when they are engaging in inappropriate online communication. This technology can notify parents or immediately block harmful content in extreme cases. Referred to as algorithmic parenting in this Article, this new form of parental control has the potential to cheaply and effectively protect children against digital harms. If designed properly, algorithmic parenting would also ensure children’s liberties by neither excessively infringing their privacy nor limiting their free-
dom of speech and access to information.
This Article offers a balanced solution to the parenting dilemma that allows parents and children to maintain a relationship grounded in trust and respect, while simultaneously providing a safety net in extreme cases of risk. In doing so, it addresses the fol- lowing questions: What laws should govern platforms with respect to algorithms and data aggregation? Who, if anyone, should be liable when risky behavior goes undetected? Perhaps most fundamentally, relative to the physical world, do parents have a duty to protect their children from online harm? Finally, assuming that algorithmic parenting is a beneficial measure for protecting children from online risks, should legislators and policymakers use laws and regulations to encourage or even mandate the use of such algorithms to protect children? This Article offers a taxonomy of current online threats to children, an examination of the potential shift toward algorithmic parenting, and a regulatory toolkit to guide policymakers in making such a transition.
המאמר עוסק בהפרטת מערכת החינוך בישראל ומתמקד בניתוח התהליכים שהתרחשו בעשר השנים האחרונות. המאמר מנתח שלושה מקרי בוחן חשובים מהשנים האחרונות שטרם זכו לליבון מספק בספרות המשפטית וחלקם גם לא בספרות המחקר החינוכי: הטמעת מרבית בתי הספר המוכרים שאינם רשמיים בתוך מערכת החינוך הממלכתית; הצברה של החינוך החרדי; וניהול בתי ספר ממלכתיים והפעלתם על ידי גופים פרטיים. הניתוח מראה שמדיניות החינוך בישראל בעשור האחרון אינה מתנהלת על פי המאפיינים הטיפוסיים של הפרטה כפי שהיה בעבר, וחלק מן התהליכים אף מהווים, פורמלית, נסיגה מהפרטה והגדלת הסקטור הציבורי-ממלכתי בחינוך. יחד עם זאת, מבחינה מהותית תהליכים אלה אינם תורמים להגשמת המטרות החברתיות של חינוך ציבורי במדינה דמוקרטית, ובכלל זה שוויון הזדמנויות, חינוך לערכים דמוקרטיים, והבטחת חינוך איכותי לכלל התלמידים. תהליכים אלו שחקו את ההבחנה בין חינוך ציבורי ובין חינוך פרטי כך שהיא אינה מועילה עוד לשם הערכת חוסנו של החינוך הציבורי בישראל.
Through a myriad of empirical evidence, we show that American higher education is plagued by an 'arms race'. Individuals acquire more education than is needed for performing their job or for personal growth, in order to gain an edge in a competitive job market. As people gain more education, employers become more selective, further fueling the educational arms-race.
The Article argues that this arms-race is both socially wasteful and unjust. It is wasteful because enormous resources are invested by individuals and the public on higher education, without increasing work productivity or contributing to economic growth. It is unjust because it benefits those who can afford to study, while others are either forced to incur huge debt to fund education, or are left with low-paying menial jobs.
The article then discusses several legal solutions aimed at mitigating the educational arms-race. The suggestions are designed to target only cases in which the expansion in higher education is indeed inefficient and unjust, rather than to restrict higher education generally. The first suggestion involves “banning the higher education box”, namely considering higher education requirements discriminatory when they are unjustified by a business necessity and cause racial disparity. Second, we offer imposing a “Signaling Fee” on employers upon hiring overeducated workers; and third we propose encouraging practices of lifelong learning and on-the-job-training. Adopting these (and perhaps other) measures is crucial for reversing the educational arms race and safeguarding higher education as the socially beneficial institution it should be.