Relational egalitarians argue that democratic institutions are justified by appeal to relational ... more Relational egalitarians argue that democratic institutions are justified by appeal to relational equality. According to the skeptical challenge, equality of political power is not required for relational equality, and the relational egalitarian case for democracy fails. I defend the relational egalitarian justification of democracy. I develop an analysis of social status and show that inequalities of power will not entail inequalities of status. I then show that inequalities of power will robustly cause inequalities of status and argue that this vindicates the relational egalitarian case for democracy, because such theories have a much more pragmatic standard of success for the justification of democracy than conceptual necessity. I consider the objection that if inequalities of power robustly cause inequalities of status, then relational egalitarians should also oppose democratic institutions, because officials such as legislators or judges will have more power than citizens. In reply, I argue that relational egalitarians are only opposed to inequalities of status that mark a failure of recognition respect, and that inequalities of status that follow from democratically licensed inequalities of power will not mark such a failure. I conclude that the skeptical challenge is unsuccessful, and that the relational egalitarian justification of democracy is sound.
Functionalist theories of political authority are commonly challenged on the grounds that such th... more Functionalist theories of political authority are commonly challenged on the grounds that such theories cannot explain the boundaries of state of authority. If all that matters for political authority is whether a state is sufficiently just, then one will have some difficulty explaining why persons have political obligations to the particular state they reside in, why unilateral annexation by reasonably just states does not create political obligations on the part of the annexed, and why a reasonably just state may lack political authority because of past wrongdoing. In this paper, I develop a hybrid theory of political authority which combines fair play and functionalist criteria. I go on to show that fair play functionalism can resolve all three of the particularity problem, the problem of unilateral annexation, and the problem of historical injustice while maintaining a commitment to basic functionalist intuitions.
Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allow... more Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public justification mechanisms. I conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections
This paper examines different mechanisms for adjudicating disagreement about distributive justice... more This paper examines different mechanisms for adjudicating disagreement about distributive justice. It begins with a case where individuals have deeply conflicting convictions about distributive justice and must make a social choice regarding the distribution of goods. Four mechanisms of social choice are considered: social contract formation, Borda count vote, simple plurality vote, and minimax bargaining. I develop an agent-based model which examines which mechanisms lead to the greatest degree of satisfying justice-based preferences over the course iterated social choices. Agents are ascribed two kinds of motivations: they wish to realize justice and to receive a greater package of goods. Each agent seeks to realize her ideal distribution, and the failure to do so leaves agents “disappointed,” resulting in their trading off the pursuit of gains in justice in favor of gains in self-interest. Mechanisms are thus assessed using the metric of how many agents remain interested in justice over the course of iterated adjudication. The mechanisms are also examined under some non-ideal conditions, such as the presence of power asymmetries or strategic behavior. Several significant results are addressed: social contract formation and simple plurality voting are robust under the conditions considered, bargaining is a highly ineffective means of adjudicating distributive disagreement, and lastly allowing for concessions in justice for gains in self-interest proves to be a crucial mechanism for ensuring the stability of resolutions.
Accounts of public reason disagree as to the conditions a reason must meet in order to qualify as... more Accounts of public reason disagree as to the conditions a reason must meet in order to qualify as public. On one prominent account, a reason is public if, and only if, it is shareable between citizens. The shareability account, I argue relies on an implausibly demanding assumption regarding the epistemic capabilities of citizens. When more plausible, limited, epistemic capabilities are taken into consideration, the shareability account becomes self-defeating. Under more limited epistemic conditions, few, if any, reasons will be shareable between all reasonable citizens, making the shareability account so demanding that it precludes public reasoning altogether.
In "The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen Behind the Veil of Ignorance," Johan E. Gustafss... more In "The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen Behind the Veil of Ignorance," Johan E. Gustafsson, argues that the parties in the Original Position (OP) would not choose the Difference Principle to regulate their society's basic structure. In reply to this internal critique, we provide two arguments. First, his choice models do not serve as a counter-example to the choice of the difference principle, as the models must assume that individual rationality scales to collective contexts in a way that begs the question in favor of utilitarianism. Second, the choice models he develops are incompatible with the constraints of fairness which apply in the OP, and by design the OP subordinates claims of rationality to claims of impartiality. When the OP is modeled correctly the difference principle is indeed entailed by the conditions of the OP.
Relational egalitarians argue that democratic institutions are justified by appeal to relational ... more Relational egalitarians argue that democratic institutions are justified by appeal to relational equality. According to the skeptical challenge, equality of political power is not required for relational equality, and the relational egalitarian case for democracy fails. I defend the relational egalitarian justification of democracy. I develop an analysis of social status and show that inequalities of power will not entail inequalities of status. I then show that inequalities of power will robustly cause inequalities of status and argue that this vindicates the relational egalitarian case for democracy, because such theories have a much more pragmatic standard of success for the justification of democracy than conceptual necessity. I consider the objection that if inequalities of power robustly cause inequalities of status, then relational egalitarians should also oppose democratic institutions, because officials such as legislators or judges will have more power than citizens. In reply, I argue that relational egalitarians are only opposed to inequalities of status that mark a failure of recognition respect, and that inequalities of status that follow from democratically licensed inequalities of power will not mark such a failure. I conclude that the skeptical challenge is unsuccessful, and that the relational egalitarian justification of democracy is sound.
Functionalist theories of political authority are commonly challenged on the grounds that such th... more Functionalist theories of political authority are commonly challenged on the grounds that such theories cannot explain the boundaries of state of authority. If all that matters for political authority is whether a state is sufficiently just, then one will have some difficulty explaining why persons have political obligations to the particular state they reside in, why unilateral annexation by reasonably just states does not create political obligations on the part of the annexed, and why a reasonably just state may lack political authority because of past wrongdoing. In this paper, I develop a hybrid theory of political authority which combines fair play and functionalist criteria. I go on to show that fair play functionalism can resolve all three of the particularity problem, the problem of unilateral annexation, and the problem of historical injustice while maintaining a commitment to basic functionalist intuitions.
Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allow... more Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public justification mechanisms. I conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections
This paper examines different mechanisms for adjudicating disagreement about distributive justice... more This paper examines different mechanisms for adjudicating disagreement about distributive justice. It begins with a case where individuals have deeply conflicting convictions about distributive justice and must make a social choice regarding the distribution of goods. Four mechanisms of social choice are considered: social contract formation, Borda count vote, simple plurality vote, and minimax bargaining. I develop an agent-based model which examines which mechanisms lead to the greatest degree of satisfying justice-based preferences over the course iterated social choices. Agents are ascribed two kinds of motivations: they wish to realize justice and to receive a greater package of goods. Each agent seeks to realize her ideal distribution, and the failure to do so leaves agents “disappointed,” resulting in their trading off the pursuit of gains in justice in favor of gains in self-interest. Mechanisms are thus assessed using the metric of how many agents remain interested in justice over the course of iterated adjudication. The mechanisms are also examined under some non-ideal conditions, such as the presence of power asymmetries or strategic behavior. Several significant results are addressed: social contract formation and simple plurality voting are robust under the conditions considered, bargaining is a highly ineffective means of adjudicating distributive disagreement, and lastly allowing for concessions in justice for gains in self-interest proves to be a crucial mechanism for ensuring the stability of resolutions.
Accounts of public reason disagree as to the conditions a reason must meet in order to qualify as... more Accounts of public reason disagree as to the conditions a reason must meet in order to qualify as public. On one prominent account, a reason is public if, and only if, it is shareable between citizens. The shareability account, I argue relies on an implausibly demanding assumption regarding the epistemic capabilities of citizens. When more plausible, limited, epistemic capabilities are taken into consideration, the shareability account becomes self-defeating. Under more limited epistemic conditions, few, if any, reasons will be shareable between all reasonable citizens, making the shareability account so demanding that it precludes public reasoning altogether.
In "The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen Behind the Veil of Ignorance," Johan E. Gustafss... more In "The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen Behind the Veil of Ignorance," Johan E. Gustafsson, argues that the parties in the Original Position (OP) would not choose the Difference Principle to regulate their society's basic structure. In reply to this internal critique, we provide two arguments. First, his choice models do not serve as a counter-example to the choice of the difference principle, as the models must assume that individual rationality scales to collective contexts in a way that begs the question in favor of utilitarianism. Second, the choice models he develops are incompatible with the constraints of fairness which apply in the OP, and by design the OP subordinates claims of rationality to claims of impartiality. When the OP is modeled correctly the difference principle is indeed entailed by the conditions of the OP.
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