Andres Moles
Central European University, Political Science, Faculty Member
- Central European University, Philosophy, Faculty Memberadd
- Social Psychology, Social Cognition, Political and Social Philosophy, Ethics, Egalitarianism, Contemporary Political Theory, Philosophy, and 17 morePolitical Science, Liberalism, John Rawls, Political Legitimacy, Personal and Moral Autonomy, Ronald Dworkin, Social and Political Philosophy, Free Speech, Exclusion, Ethics, Political Philosophy, Politics, Feminism, Justice, Social Justice, Applied Ethics, and Global Justiceedit
In this paper I critically assess some arguments made by Elvio Baccarini in his book In a Better World?. I suggest some ways in which his arguments can be clarified; more notable in relation to his general framework of public... more
In this paper I critically assess some arguments made by Elvio Baccarini in his book In a Better World?. I suggest some ways in which his arguments can be clarified; more notable in relation to his general framework of public justification. I also suggests that Baccarini is too lenient with parents in two respects: he gives too much leeway to their right to shape their children’s ambitions and plans, and he also allows them too much room for improving their chances to get social and economic advantages. Finally, I make smaller remarks in relation to Baccarini’s conception of disabilities and the duties to enhance the severely disabled.
Research Interests:
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In this article I argue that anti-perfectionist liberals can accept nudging in certain areas: in particular, they can accept nudges aimed at helping people to discharge their nonenforceable duties, and to secure personal autonomy. I claim... more
In this article I argue that anti-perfectionist liberals can accept nudging in certain areas: in particular, they can accept nudges aimed at helping people to discharge their nonenforceable duties, and to secure personal autonomy. I claim that nudging is not disrespectful since it does not involve a comparative negative judgment on people's ability to pursue their plans, and that the judgments that motivate nudging are compatible with treating citizens as free and equal. I also claim that despite being sometimes manipu-lative, nudging is easy to resist and so it can be employed to pursue legitimate goals. Research in the behavioral sciences in recent decades strongly suggests that there are means other than rational persuasion by which governments can improve citizens' welfare without restricting any of their choices and without making their choices more costly. We now know that a variety of biases are pervasive features of human cognition. We also know that environmental settings have a deep impact on our choices and that seemingly trivial changes in the way information is conveyed, choices are arranged, or default rules are set can change the choices people make. 1 These biases make it possible that " choice architecture " can be arranged in a way that " nudges " people into making certain choices. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (T&S) have recently argued that nudging is compatible with libertarianism. 2 Their claim has been subject to serious criticism. 3 In this article, however, I explore a different question: Is nudging ever morally permissible from a liberal point of view? This question is pressing, I think, because critics have suggested that nudging is disrespectful and manipulative. 4 In this article, I endorse an
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In this paper I critically assess some arguments made by Elvio Baccarini in his book In a Better World?. I suggest some ways in which his arguments can be clarified; more notable in relation to his general framework of public... more
In this paper I critically assess some arguments made by Elvio Baccarini in his book In a Better World?. I suggest some ways in which his arguments can be clarified; more notable in relation to his general framework of public justification. I also suggests that Baccarini is too lenient with parents in two respects: he gives too much leeway to their right to shape their children's ambitions and plans, and he also allows them too much room for improving their chances to get social and economic advantages. Finally, I make smaller remarks in relation to Baccarini's conception of disabilities and the duties to enhance the severely disabled.
Research Interests:
In this chapter I focus on the claim that discrimination is wrong because it fails to track people's deserts. In particular, I analyze arguments that justify the distribution of economic benefits such as access to jobs on the basis of... more
In this chapter I focus on the claim that discrimination is wrong because it fails to track people's deserts. In particular, I analyze arguments that justify the distribution of economic benefits such as access to jobs on the basis of desert. Defenders of this argument hold that in a free labor market employers will choose the best-qualified candidates and that these candidates deserve being employed. I cast doubt on this claim by holding that markets are unfit to track desert. One the one hand, they are insensitive to factors that affects people's deserts such as their purposeful efforts. On the other hand, markets are sensitive to forms of luck that affects desert. I extend my analysis to desert-prioritarian accounts of discrimination and suggest that desert-based views of the wrongness of discrimination should be abandoned.
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There is a deep divide amongst political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an... more
There is a deep divide amongst political philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the community’s resources. On the other hand, there are so-called social egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other members of the community, such non-domination and lack of oppression, for example. In this paper, we have three aims. Our first aim is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing the debate in this way. Our second aim is to reconstruct this debate in alternative and more precise terms, so that disagreements between advocates of either side are easier to evaluate. Our third aim is to advance a hybrid account that integrates element from both views.
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The paper focuses on the claim that citizens’ expressive interests in speech warrant protection to hate speech. I analyse this view by exploring three different arguments that Ronald Dworkin has produced in recent years. The arguments I... more
The paper focuses on the claim that citizens’ expressive interests in speech warrant protection to hate speech. I analyse this view by exploring three different arguments that Ronald Dworkin has produced in recent years. The arguments I advance holds that Dworkin’s fails to show that such interests are sufficient for protection. Drawing from some research on social psychology I claim that hate speech is harmful in a justice-relevant manner. If I am correct, then, given Dworkin’s ideas about integrity and equality of resources, he cannot claim that restricting hate speech fails to treat speakers with less respect and concern.
