Political Obligation

This paper is primarily a response to John Simmons's critique of Locke's consent theory of political obligation (Two Treatises). It seeks to apply ordinary legal reasoning to what Locke actually says about "express consent" and "tacit consent." The result is a theory both different from the theory commonly attributed to Locke and more plausible. Among the differences is that express consent ("entering political society") is understood to arise chiefly from seeking to vote (rather than by oath or voting) and tacit consent is understood as a reasonable (but rebuttable) presumption of actual consent. In the course of presenting Simmons's critique, the paper identifies four commonly accepted criteria of adequacy for theories of moral obligation to obey law or government, noting that Locke's theory, under its lawyerly interpretation, fails to satisfy any of the four criteria but seems reasonably plausible (for example, in its ability to deal with Simmons's critique). This is taken to be reason to weaken all four criteria.

One hotly debated issue was the use of civil disobedience by members of racial minorities acting out of the claimthat they were citizens, but unjustly treated. The conventional political wisdomwas that these activists, as citizens, were obligated to work throughthe political system to bring ...

'Hume has no theory of sovereignty. As a result he is frequently supposed to lack a proper theory of politics, providing only a political sociology incapable of addressing the central normative significance of political obligation in thinking about the modern state. This is a serious mistake. Hume addressed himself directly to the question of political obligation, but his argument was predicated upon a prior reconfiguration of our thinking about the nature, role, and power of philosophy. In coming to appreciate this prior reconfiguration, in particular via a re-examination of Hume's indirect engagement with Locke's earlier juridical political theory, we can properly appreciate Hume as advancing a radically innovative theory of political obligation. What emerges is the possibility of a theory of the state without sovereignty. As well as thereby revealing Hume to be a major and highly original post-Hobbesian theorist of the state, we are invited to consider whether present political theory would do better by adopting Hume's recommended philosophical reconceptualisation.'

The article examines whether realist theory should adopt a philosophical anarchist position concerning political obligation. The conclusions are mixed. Drawing on a distinction between strong and weak theories of political obligation (in the terminology of the paper, strong theories are committed to morality-based theorizing while weak theories depart from it), the article argues that philosophical anarchism and realist theory are natural allies against strong theories of political obligation but they must part company when it comes to weak theories because it is exactly their departure from morality-based theorizing that can make weak theories especially appealing to realists. In addition, two further objections can be raised against philosophical anarchism on realist grounds: first, philosophical anarchists are drawn to undesirably sweeping conclusions about the non-existence of legitimate political authority or the extreme scarcity of genuine political relations by their Kantian or Lockean background assumptions and, second, Simmons seems to have an implicit weak theory of political obligation which could be, ironically, much more appealing to realists than his overall Lockean anarchism or his sweeping criticism of weak theories. All in all, can a realist be an anarchist? Probably, but definitely not on philosophical anarchist grounds.

How could a state have the moral authority to promulgate and enforce laws that citizens are thereby obliged to obey? That is the problem of political authority. The Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority contends that great social benefits depend upon there being a state with political authority. In his book, 'The Problem of Political Authority,' Michael Huemer considers different types of explanation of political authority and he rejects them all. I show that the objections he raises to consequentialist accounts are confused and that they fail to connect with the Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority. Huemer argues that anarchy of a particular kind would be better than the states that exist in current Western societies. I explain why that argument, if it were successful, would be an effective objection to the Consequentialist Explanation of Political Authority.

Is it always morally wrong to violate a law and in doing so does one necessarily act badly? I argue that whether in breaking a law one acts badly depends on considerations unique to the particular act of lawbreaking. The moral judgment in question is deeply contextual and cannot be settled by appeal to blanket moral rules such as that it is wrong to break (any) law. The argument is made by focusing on the example of a runner having to decide whether to disobey the law against trespass. If in trespassing one acts badly it is not because there is a prima facie moral obligation to obey law. Theories of political obligation which ground an obligation to obey law in the principles of fairness or gratitude or in consent all fail to provide a persuasive reason not to trespass given a particular fact situation. I argue that when it is morally wrong to trespass it is morally wrong not because one has broken the law, but because and insofar as one has violated reasonable expectations of privacy. Whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's property depends in part on the character of the property in question.

本文處理的是霍布斯式自然法在其政治理論中的角色與作用，霍
布斯自然法向來是其政治理論中較被忽略之處，因通常認為霍布斯為證成其絕對主權而弱化傳統自然法權威，但弔詭的是霍布斯式自然法卻又似乎具相當的規範效力，而因為兩種進路均有相當文本證據支持所以形成某種「詮釋的兩難」。為探討自然法在霍布斯政治理論中的角色與功能，本文將從霍布斯政治義務觀切入，探討自然法與其政治義務之關聯。本文主要論證兩點：首先，本文對當代主流事實權威論對於霍布斯之政治義務的詮釋提出質疑，此一主流論點認為霍布斯式自然法並無重要性，本文將論證若認真考量霍布斯的自然法論述，將對其政治義務觀有更完整的理解；具體而言，藉由探討自然法的角色，本文論證霍布斯的政治義務並非僅僅建立在「事實的強力」或「同意」之上，而必須考慮到自然法所給出的限制，因此可以說政治義務建立在「理性的同意」上。

I aim to defend the anarchist argument presented in the first chapter of Robert Paul Wolff’s ‘In Defense of Anarchism’ (1970). After outlining Wolff’s argument I aim to show that Harry Frankfurt’s objections to it in his paper ‘The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff’ (1973), are unsound. To conclude I will point out a key weakness in Wolff’s argument, and present an alternative argumentation in order to render it more robust to criticism.

Philosophical anarchism is the philosophical view that addresses the twofold problem of state legitimacy and political obligation. Its main claims are the absence of general political obligations on the part of citizens of a polity, and that states or governments are morally illegitimate. This viewpoint, then, challenges the pervasive preconceptions with regard to citizens having a special ethical bond with their state or government. The objective of this essay is to offer a defence of philosophical anarchism in the form introduced by Simmons. We begin by illustrating the basic elements of the theory, as well as subtle distinctions therein. Next, we turn to discuss what the implications would be if citizens adopted the philosophical anarchist stance; and reveal that they are not as startling as one might initially think. Finally, the remaining of the essay is dedicated to a series of objections and attempts of redress. Some were aimed at the consequences of the theory, yet expressed rather its alleged perniciousness, while others attacked Simmons argumentation method.

Most people think that the actual distribution of property poorly reflects moral entitlement. Were wealth to be justly distributed, some people would have more than they currently possess; others, less. Theft is one means by which a more just distribution could be pursued. Those who currently have less than their due could take from those that have more. Yet most people also think that theft is wrong, even when it redistributes wealth in the direction of justice. This article investigates why. It examines three arguments against redistributive theft: that (1) has bad consequences, (2) is illegal, (3) disrupts legitimate expectations or (4) is undemocratic.  The article finds none of the arguments wholly convincing.  Of the four, the first is the most successful.  Redistributive theft is wrong if it entails such large costs that the costs outweigh or negate the redistributive benefits.  Perhaps many instances of redistributive theft are wrong for this reason.  But as long as there are some instances in which the benefits of redistributive theft outweigh the costs we need to ask a further question: what is wrong with redistributive theft that is effective and proportionate in advancing distributive justice?  The other three arguments are potential responses to that further question.  But as this article shows, none provides a satisfactory answer.  The article thus concludes with the same puzzle.  While everyone seems agreed that the actual distribution of property does not represent genuine entitlement, everyone also seems agreed that, outside of emergency cases, theft is always wrong.  It remains unclear why this is so.

Examines various arguments about whether and under what circumstances political violence can be justified and how they can be employed in thinking ethically about violence. It begins by looking at arguments about the justifiability of violence that draw on major ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism and consequentialism. It then discusses more specific considerations and arguments concerning obligations to obey the law, the relationship between violence and reason, and between violence and democracy, and whether our duties and obligations regarding the use of violence are universal in scope or are limited by national, religious, community and class affiliation. Finally, it makes some novel suggestions about the overall purpose and conduct of discussions about the justifiability of violence in political theory and philosophy.

Стандартният отговор на въпроса „Какво е политическо задължение“ в политическата философия от Платон (в диалога “Критон” ) до днес е: морално задължение да се подчиняваш на законите на твоята държава. Съвременният дебат за политическото задължение също е фокусиран върху темата за всеобхватното общо задължение за подчинение на законите. В настоящия текст изследвам на пръв поглед контра-интуитивната хипотеза, че политическото задължение може да бъде по-добре разбрано като задължение за управление, а не за подчинение. Тази хипотеза – с нейните нормативни и политически предимства - е разгледана в светлината на кризата на управляемостта, характерна за състоянието на политическото днес.

This books defends at least three related theses: 1) that social contract originates in medieval practice, not in philosophy ancient or modern; 2) that its original form was actual contract, not hypothetical, and that its actual practice retains actual consent as the basis of political obligation; and 3) that most theorists of social contract before Rousseau can best be read as concerned with actual consent.

This article presents a new understanding of how the context of Restoration debates around toleration, magisterial authority and political obligation impinged upon Locke’s mature thought. It proposes that prominent Anglican clergymen, by utilising Hobbist ideas in their arguments for religious conformity, transformed the debate around toleration. In particular, Samuel Parker’s Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie’s potent mix of Hobbism, theological moralism and Scholastic natural law led to important nonconformists, such as Owen and Ferguson, reshaping their arguments in response. They were forced to make an argument upon first principles as to precisely why Parker’s naturalistic account of ecclesiastical authority was inadequate to justify their own particular view of religious institutions. Crucially, the specific features of Parker’s argument, led to John Humfrey, a largely overlooked figure, developing a set of ideas that preconfigured Locke’s later thought. This article then highlights Locke’s creative engagement with the ideas of his time, by charting the changes to Locke’s ecclesiology and view of natural law from 1667-1674, alongside the similar conceptual shifts made by Humfrey.

This essay seeks to provide a justification for the ‘egalitarian authority claim’, according to which citizens of democratic states have a moral duty to obey (at least some) democratically made laws because they are the outcome of an egalitarian procedure.
It begins by considering two prominent arguments that link democratic authority to a concern for equality. Both are ultimately unsuccessful; but their failures are instructive, and help identify the conditions that a plausible defense of the egalitarian authority claim must meet. The first argument (discussed in Section II, after Section I clarifies what authority and democracy are taken to consist in) appeals to the simple idea that fairness disallows granting ourselves special privileges that we deny to others; and it suggests that fairness thus requires obeying democratic decisions rather than acting on our own judgment of the right policy. I show that this argument fails; and its failure indicates that we must invoke a less formal, more substantive understanding of equality to justify democratic authority. The second argument, recently suggested by Thomas Christiano, does just that. Democratic authority is, on this account, not justified by the formal demand for equal treatment but by the distinctive value of showing public equal respect to our fellow citizens. Such public equal respect requires treating as authoritative the democratic decisions in which citizens had an equal say. This argument does not, however, succeed in its goal either. While it plausibly establishes the value of democratic institutions, it does not provide grounds for a duty to obey democratic decisions (Section III). This essay thus develops an alternative argument, according to which egalitarian procedures have authority because, by obeying them, we can avoid acting on certain considerations that must be excluded from our intrinsically valuable egalitarian relationships. The authority of democratic decisions rests on the egalitarian fact that none of us has more of a say than any other, not on the further fact (crucial to the previous argument) that each of us has a positive say (Sections IV and V). The argument in turn helps us understand the limits of democratic authority: it is constrained not only by a demand for equality, and by considerations of justice, but also by a requirement of mutual concern without which our egalitarian relationships lack their distinctive value (Section VI).

This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, in these cases, anarchist groups and societies and not the state have legitimate authority. When anarchism is not an existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Raz’s theory, have some legitimate authority, but that authority will be limited because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state. To support the political anarchist claim I discuss the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative to the state that better fulfils Raz’s service conception and also provide suggestive evidence that anarchism is in general a better possible alternative. I also discuss the relationship between political anarchism and authority and I argue that despite some tension they are not irreconcilable. I conclude that the interesting anarchist challenge for political theorists is political not philosophical.

Philosophical anarchists claim that all states lack political authority and are illegitimate , but that some states are nevertheless morally justified and should not be abolished. I argue that philosophical anarchism is either incoherent or collapses into either statism or political anarchism.

I argue that social-contract theory cannot succeed because reasonable people may always disagree, and that social-contract theory is irrelevant to the problem of the legitimacy of a form of government or of a system of moral rules. I note the weakness of the appeal to implicit agreement, the conflation of legitimacy with stability, the undesirability of “public justification” and the apparent blindness to the evolutionary critical-rationalist approach of Hayek and Popper. I employ that approach to sketch answers to the theoretical, historical and practical questions about the legitimacy of government or of systems of moral rules.

A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to postulate a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations that ground this duty sometimes justify forms of civil disobedience. However, this view entails that certain kinds of uncivil disobedience are also justified. Thus, either a) civil disobedience is never justified or b) uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified. Since a) is implausible, we should accept b). I respond to the objection that this ignores the fact that civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status on account of instantiating certain special features: nonviolence, publicity, the acceptance of legal consequences, and conscientiousness. I then show that my view is superior to two rivals: the view that we should expand the notion of civility and that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil disobedience is justifiable in but only in unfavorable conditions.

John Locke’s theory of state is heavily constructed around his doctrine of consent. The consent doctrine signifies a critical moment for the development of liberal and democratic theories in the history of political thought. Nevertheless, the doctrine has provoked various controversies, including the contents and forms of consent, and whether Locke’s early and later positions are reconcilable. This paper joins the aforesaid scholarly debate by means of investigating the role of consent in Locke’s theory of state. It rejects the ahistorical readings of the doctrine that
deliberation and voluntary intention constitute the necessary condition of consent. It
also opposes the view that the doctrine of consent offers a moral ground for Locke’s
argument on the legitimacy of government, nor does the doctrine directly makes the
case for political obligation. Instead, I propose to understand the doctrine to have
presented a dynamic process which contains two phases. The doctrine first justifies
the need of government in the course of proceeding from the state of nature to
political society. It subsequently maintains the liberty and rights of the people after
they enter a political society. I argue that consent, uniting the pivotal ideas of property
and the rule of law, proclaims the essential value of liberty in Locke’s theory of state
as a whole. Locke’s articulation of the doctrine also reveals his life-long concern
about the peril of anarchy.

In the recent debate on political legitimacy, we have seen the emergence of a revisionist camp, advocating the idea of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ as opposed to the traditional view that political obligation is necessary for state legitimacy. The revisionist idea of legitimacy is appealing because if it stands, the widespread skepticism about the existence of political obligation will not lead us to conclude that the state is illegitimate. Unfortunately, existing conceptions of ‘legitimacy without political obligation’ are subject to serious objections. In this article, I propose a new conception of ‘legitimacy without political obligation,’ and defend it against various objections that the revisionist idea of legitimacy is either conceptually or morally mistaken. This new conception of legitimacy promises to advance the debates between anarchists and statists by making the task of philosophical anarchists significantly more difficult.

Making use of the liberal concept of civil disobedience, this paper assesses, under which circumstances instances of illegal digital protest-called "hacktivism"-can be justified vis-à-vis the pro tanto political obligation to obey the law. For this, the paper draws on the three main criteria for liberal civil disobedience-publicity, nonviolence, and fidelity to law-and examines how these can be transferred to the realm of the digital. One of the main disanalogies between street and cyberspace protests is the tendency of hacktivists to remain anonymous, which in turn calls into question their fidelity to law (the third criterion). The paper argues that there are functionally equivalent alternatives to what can be called the "acceptance-of-legal-consequences-condition" (ALCC) associated with the fidelity to law. As a result, the ALCC is not a necessary condition for hacktivists to showcase their fidelity to law, thereby resolving the apparent disanalogy.

Democratic and radical democratic theorists have strongly criticized liberal approaches to civil disobedience. This article examines whether liberal theorist Judith Shklar’s unfinished work on resistance, disobedience and obligation can respond to these criticisms. One of the distinctive marks of Shklar’s unorthodox liberal approach is its concern with the sociological and psychological conditions of rule breaking and rule following. Examining individuals caught in loyalty conflicts allows Shklar to offer unconventional accounts of both the horizontal obligation to one’s fellow citizens and human beings and the vertical obligation to the law. First, Shklar discovers practices of disobedience as a source of civic obligations to one’s fellow citizens and fellow human beings through the works of Thomas Hill Green and Henry David Thoreau. A liberal notion of positive freedom that revalues Thoreau’s argument from conscience is the medium of this horizontal obligation. Second, the representative example of exiles helps Shklar to reflect upon the political obligation to obey the law in our contemporary “societies of strangers”. Shklar’s approach can meet some of the core challenges raised by liberalism’s critics, without however leaving the liberal paradigm.

The argument developed here, though not one Nozick has made or is likely to endorse, is implicit in certain principles that are relatively central to the arguments he does make. It is his much as an illegitimate child is its father's, however unintended and disowned.  The argument is simple. But it depends on seeing most so-called free-rider problems from a new angle, that of property. So, I begin by stating a "Lockean theory of property," explaining it and defending it against certain objections. Next, I show that the theory explicates certain intuitions Nozick has about free riders—at the cost of making them intuitions of property rather than of fairness. Having in this way made the new angle familiar, I sketch "Nozick's argument." I conclude with some speculation concerning the argument's importance for nonlibertarians.

Many countries have taken extensive measures to slow COVID-19’s progress and attempt to avert a sanitary collapse. Although the necessity of saving lives seems evident to many of us, these measures will nevertheless have dire economic effects and impose major costs on much of the population. A solid public justification is essential, for which a social contract perspective is useful. I argue that it helps us understand why such measures not only do justice to the claims of those who are likely to become severely ill, but also those of many others, and that no less is at stake than the foundational bonds of our communities.

Normative questions concerning political authority and political obligation are widely seen as central questions of political philosophy. Current global transformations require an innovative response from normative political thinking about these two topics. In light of a concrete example of the supranational forms of authority and obligation that have been and are emerging beyond the national state and beyond the traditional domains of international law, I lay out what has become the standard approach to authority and obligation and indicate why this approach is inadequate in contemporary circumstances. I sketch an alternative approach and suggest how the most promising exemplar of this kind, Habermas’ discourse theory of law and politics, can better deal with the example. Having thus made plausible the advantages of the discourse theory of the alternative approach, I end with an ‘internal’ critique of Habermas’ own recent writings on the global political order.

Въпросът за задължението за подчинение на закона традиционно се определя като въпрос за това дали има морални основания да се спазват задължителните за всички изисквания на един всеобхватен, морално погрешим и институционализиран политически авторитет. Този въпрос е обратната страна на друг извечен въпрос на политическата философия: дали има легитимни политически авторитети с право да управляват своите подчинени. Отговорът, който т.нар. философски анархисти дават, е като цяло отрицателен: няма легитимни политически авторитети и съответно - няма и общо морално задължение да им се подчиняваме, а дори и да имаше легитимни политически авторитети, от това не следва автоматично, че попадащите в тяхната юрисдикция имат и общо морално задължение да им се подчиняват. Детайлното разглеждане на тези позиции изисква специално внимание.
В настоящия текст ще разгледам само един от опитите да се отговори на предизвикателството на философските анархисти. Това е опитът да се изведе общо морално задължение за подчинение на закона от т.нар. задължение за честната игра, първоначално предложено от Хърбърт Харт и Джон Ролс и доразвито от редица съвременни политически философи, най-вече Джордж Клоско.
За да оценя успеха на такъв тип теория, първо ще анализирам аргументите на Робърт Нозик и Джон Симънс, които от волунтаристки позиции атакуват извеждането на общо задължение за подчинение от принципа за честна игра. Ще разгледам и дам оценка на опитите на Ричард Арнесън и Джордж Клоско да предложат базирано на честната игра задължение за подчинение, устойчиво на подобни волунтаристки атаки. Ще покажа, че теорията на Клоско за "презумптивните" публични блага като основа на задължението за подчинение на закона, макар и донякъде успешно да отговаря на тези предизвикателства, пренебрегва един не маловажен проблем. Това е проблемът, идентифициран от Ролс като "проблем с гаранциите" (assurance problem)", че достатъчно други хора също ще се подчиняват на закона, за да е жизнена схемата на съвместно сътрудничество и потенциалните участници действително да имат задължения да се включат в нея. Задълженията за честна игра са от класа "условни" задължения: те са валидни задължения, само ако условието "достатъчен брой други хора да ги спазват" е удовлетворено. Типичен пример за такива "условни" задължения са някои правни задължения, като задължението да се спазват ограниченията на скоростта на движение, задължението да не се замърсява околната среда и т.н. Имаме морално задължение да ги спазваме, само ако има достатъчно общо ниво на спазване от страна на другите на тези задължения. Ще твърдя, че това "условие за достатъчното спазване на правилата от другите" (или compliance condition, както го нарича Едмъндсън") поставя сериозно предизвикателство пред теориите за задължението за подчинение като задължение на честната игра, което все още не е адекватно адресирано от съвременните участници в този дебат.

Основният проблем, който разглеждам в този текст, е как можем да обясним задълбочаващата се криза на колективното действие в България. Моята хипотеза е, че ниски (и продължаващи да спадат) нива на хоризонтално социално доверие, са основното обяснение за проблемите на колективното действие в България.
Хипотезата е тествана с анализ на широкоразпространената в България практика на неплащане на сметки за топлоенергия (казусът Топлофикация).