Laetitia Ramelet

Der am 30. November 2022 veröffentlichte Chatbot ChatGPT verblüffte auf Anhieb Millionen von Nutzerinnen und Nutzer. In einem Themenpapier beleuchtet TA-SWISS die Schlüsselelemente, die zum Verständnis des Phänomens erforderlich sind, und wirft eine Reihe von Fragen auf, die in nächster Zukunft auf politischer, beruflicher und individueller Ebene relevant sein dürften.

Lancé le 30 novembre 2022, ChatGPT a d’emblée stupéfié des millions d’utilisatrices et d’utilisateurs. Cet article présente les éléments principaux à connaître pour comprendre le phénomène, ainsi qu’une série de questions à garder à l’esprit à l’avenir, que cela soit sur le plan politique, professionnel ou personnel.

Voir https://www.ta-swiss.ch/fr/chatgpt.

This chapter investigates the distinction between citizens and foreigners operated by Pufendorf’s contractual theory of the state. His account of the double covenant creates a long-lasting differentiation between the honorific title of citizen, which applies to the members of the state’s founding association as well as their descendants, and the status of foreigners, who at first can only covenant with the ruler, not with the members of this association. Foreigners’ right of entry and residency are then largely left for the sovereign to determine, because these are considered as a matter of safety, the purpose of the double covenant, which may take precedence over the natural, yet imperfect obligations of hospitality across borders.
The chapter also compares Pufendorf’s position with his predecessors Grotius’s and Hobbes’s contract theories and points to some enduring legacies of his views when it comes to the tendency of contract theories of the state to favour a community’s claims over foreigners.

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/pufendorfs-international-political-and-legal-thought-9780192883353?q=schr%C3%B6der%2C%20pufendorf&lang=en&cc=fr#

According to Grotius’s De Iure Belli ac Pacis, human beings are born naturally sociable, yet it is for the sake of some personal utility that they join a state. Thereby, they consent to grant it rights that may subsequently take precedence over their own whenever necessary to the community. This process proves to be particularly interesting to investigate the relation between individual and common good, as it places the individual’s interest at the very foundation of the state and simultaneously allows for restrictions to it for the sake of the common utility. Central to this account is Grotius’s juridical conception of the state as a vol-untary association, equipped with rights of its own to fulfil the functions attributed to it by its members. What the state needs to perform these functions then determines which concessions subjects have to make for the common good, mostly with reference to the utility subjects derive from the state, or alternately to the moral ties uniting the association’s members.

In this paper, I aim to show that Pufendorf's writings provide an innovative clarification of the respective scopes of consent and natural law that was not evidently apparent in other works of his time. Whereas there is a natural obligation to submit to some authority, human consent has the task of determining how this authority is to be organized in particular contexts. While unfolding the workings of this argument in Pufendorf's works, I will bring out close connections between two apparently distinct notions of consent: to wit, as an internal act of the will and as a political commitment. This should shed a new light on the meaning and history of the concept of consent itself.

https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/imp/hpt/2020/00000041/00000002/art00005

One of the reasons that elections have come to be so widely valued across the globe lies in their perceived ability to increase citizens' consent to be governed by their representatives. Yet inversely, one may ask what election results tell us about citizens' consent. For instance, to what extent can election winners be assumed to be backed up by citizens' consent? Does voting automatically imply consent to the outcome of the election? What does abstention mean? This paper addresses the question of what election results tell us about citizens' consent, from an empirically informed normative perspective. The question is of political importance, because the connection between voting and consenting is often exploited for political gain, and because representative institutions are now being increasingly questioned by citizens themselves. This paper pleads for caution in any endeavor to interpret election results (as well as abstentions) in terms of consent. As we will see, each (non)voter's motives and assessments are unique and can only be ascertained by asking him about these, and not from his sole act of voting. In addition, much variation is to be expected regarding what is being consented to, and to what degree.

Grotius (1583-1645) is now widely acknowledged as an important figure in early modern contractual and consensual theories of political authority and legitimacy.  However, as his thoughts on these debates are disseminated throughout his works rather than systematically ordained, it remains difficult to assess what, if anything constitutes his distinctive mark. In the present paper, I will argue that his works contain a combination of two conceptual elements that have come to constitute a salient characteristic of early modern contract and consent theories: first, a strong obligation to keep one’s promises, and second, an account of perfect promises as transferrals of rights. In the political sphere, this means that citizens who have promised their obedience to the authorities are obligated to keep faith, which provides a solid foundation for political obligations. In addition, their promise implies that authorities receive the right to rule over them, which accounts for the legitimacy of these authorities' power.

https://brill.com/view/journals/grot/40/1/article-p123_123.xml

Many countries have taken extensive measures to slow COVID-19’s progress and attempt to avert a sanitary collapse. Although the necessity of saving lives seems evident to many of us, these measures will nevertheless have dire economic effects and impose major costs on much of the population. A solid public justification is essential, for which a social contract perspective is useful. I argue that it helps us understand why such measures not only do justice to the claims of those who are likely to become severely ill, but also those of many others, and that no less is at stake than the foundational bonds of our communities.

(English abstract below)

Der vorliegende Beitrag soll die Grundsätze von Grotius’ Auslegungslehre rekonstruieren, wobei ich von der Hypothese ausgehe, dass das Bedürfnis nach praxistauglichen Auslegungsprinzipien den philosophischen Leitfaden des Kapitels bildet und sich in den Anleitungen des Grotius deutlich widerspiegelt. Da legale Institutionen zur Erfüllung ihres Zweckes auf effektive Prinzipien angewiesen sind und dadurch erst der gesellige Austausch zwischen den Mitgliedern einer durch rechtliche Grundlagen gebildeten Gemeinschaft ermöglicht wird, muss angesichts einer Vielfalt an möglichen subjektiven Interpretationen und Zweifeln der Rekurs auf eine einzige, rechtswirksame Auslegung unbedingt gewährleistet werden. Aus diesem Grund zögert Grotius, wann immer es erforderlich ist, nicht, der vernünftigen Auslegung einer Verpflichtung vor der Ermittlung des eigentlichen Willens der Versprechenden den Vorrang zu geben.

English Abstract
The present contribution aims to reconstruct the main principles of Grotius's theory of legal interpretation in his masterwork De Jure Belli ac Pacis, with an emphasis on his search for principles conducive to contractual exchanges between the members of a society. This approach is particularly reflected in his reliance on the notions of probability and rational intention.

This paper brings to light an unexplored aspect of Hobbes’s argument that political authority rests upon subjects’ consent. Consent enacts a transfer of subjects’ right of nature to the sovereign, yet she already possesses a natural right to everything. What moral difference, then, does this make to her possession of power, and how? In my reading, the difference lies in the rise of new obligations befalling the sovereign by means of an indirect mechanism: That many individuals, hoping for safety, transfer their right of nature to the sovereign, triggers an obligation for her to accept the role of a ruler and perform the duties attached to it, for the sake of the peace enjoined by the laws of nature. This reading should also confirm the possibility of a consensual foundation for the Hobbesian right to punish and shed new light on Hobbes’s notion of tacit consent.

https://brill.com/view/journals/hobs/aop/article-10.1163-18750257-bja10047/article-10.1163-18750257-bja10047.xml
(accepted manuscript available here: https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_5CA313281E88.P001/REF)

En philosophie politique, le concept de consentement est invoqué pour répondre au problème classique de la justification morale du pouvoir politique. L'argument du consentement établit le consentement des citoyens comme l'une des conditions nécessaires à la légitimité morale d'un pouvoir politique. Il s'avère toutefois délicat de saisir en quoi consiste un tel consentement dans le domaine politique, et quels sont les effets moraux qu'il produit. En outre, le terme de consentement prend plusieurs sens, ce qui génère une confusion qui peut susciter des doutes sur la pertinence de cette notion en philosophie politique.
Le présent article retrace une synthèse des utilisations principales du consentement en philosophie politique, avec pour but de proposer une clarification du sens et de la pertinence de ce concept. Pour ce faire, trois formes de consentement sont examinées : le consentement exprès, tacite et hypothétique. En outre, cet article discute des conditions de validité du consentement liées au degré d'information concernant les actions consenties, ainsi qu'à leur justice.
L'auteur plaide pour l'importance d'une distinction de deux concepts reliés par le terme de consentement : d'une part, le consentement en tant que source d'obligations volontaires, proche d'une promesse, et d'autre part, le consentement en tant que source de permission et d'autorisation, qui accorde des droits à autrui ou lève une interdiction. En philosophie politique, le second consentement s'avère être un concept essentiel pour saisir la légitimité morale du pouvoir politique, bien qu'insuffisamment développé théoriquement pour l'instant.