Fabian Wendt
Virginia Tech, Political Science, Faculty Member
- Political Philosophy, Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Freedom, Social and Political Philosophy, John Rawls, and 15 moreJohn Locke, Political Legitimacy, Liberty, Republicanism, Libertarianism, Legitimacy and Authority, Liberalism, Classical Liberalism, Egalitarianism, Justice, Public Reason, Peace, Political Realism, Metaethics, and Legitimacyedit
- https://www.fabianwendt.com/edit
This paper defends the view that the limits of compromise are identical with the moral principles that set limits to human action more generally. Moral principles that prohibit lying, stealing, or killing, for example, sometimes make it... more
This paper defends the view that the limits of compromise are identical with the moral principles that set limits to human action more generally. Moral principles that prohibit lying, stealing, or killing, for example, sometimes make it morally impermissible to accept a compromise proposal, for the simple reason that the proposal involves an act of lying, killing, or stealing. The same holds for any other moral principle that sets limits to human action. This may sound straightforward and, perhaps, trivial. Yet in the philosophical literature, discussions of the limits of compromise have singled out more specific principles: Avishai Margalit proposes that the limits of compromise are set by the value of humanity, Simon May points at racial equality and more generally democratic legitimacy, Alexander Ruser and Amanda Machin appeal to the value of integrity, and a fourth at least initially plausible account invokes the idea of public justifiability. After discussing in greater detail what an account of the limits of compromise may be expected to do, the paper will show that none of these accounts is convincing.
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The article argues that liberty-based arguments alone are not enough to justify a universal basic income, whether as a replacement of current welfare programs, or as an addition to them. Appeals to negative liberty, real freedom,... more
The article argues that liberty-based arguments alone are not enough to justify a universal basic income, whether as a replacement of current welfare programs, or as an addition to them. Appeals to negative liberty, real freedom, republican liberty, and autonomy cannot establish that a universal basic income is superior to (all kinds of) conditional benefits. To do so, proponents of a universal basic income will have to invoke values beyond liberty.
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Democratic party politics requires compromises. A question that has hardly been tackled in normative political theory is how political parties ought to navigate these compromises. In this paper, I would like to explore this question from... more
Democratic party politics requires compromises. A question that has hardly been tackled in normative political theory is how political parties ought to navigate these compromises. In this paper, I would like to explore this question from the specific perspective of classical liberal political parties. My focus will mostly be on parties in Western European countries with proportional representation and multi-party systems like Denmark, Germany, or the Netherlands, where liberal parties have often taken an active role in coalition governments.
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Philosophers in the Lockean tradition have argued that taxation is an - perhaps sometimes permissible - infringement of moral property entitlements. The article discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so,... more
Philosophers in the Lockean tradition have argued that taxation is an - perhaps sometimes permissible - infringement of moral property entitlements. The article discusses whether, or in what form, this charge is defensible. In doing so, it will explore the truth in and the limits of Murphy and Nagel's conventionalist reply to Lockean challenges to taxation. It argues that there is a moral rationale for property conventions that is independent from the question whether and how one can acquire natural, pre-conventional property rights in the state of nature, that this rationale sets a moral standard for how good property conventions are and whether they are justifiable at all, and that once property conventions are in place, people’s moral property entitlements are at least partly determined by these conventions, sometimes even by unjustifiable ones that ought to be reformed. The upshot is that taxation cannot be understood as theft, and that taxation is not as such an infringement of moral property entitlements, but that some taxation does infringe upon moral property entitlements, even though these entitlements are only in part non-conventional, and even though it is to some extent indeterminate at what rate taxation starts to infringe upon such entitlements.
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Encyclopedia entry. Intro: Taxation is the state’s main source of revenue, it is a tool for redistribution, and it is used to provide behavioral incentives. But what is the moral legitimation of taxation, given that it is a... more
Encyclopedia entry. Intro: Taxation is the state’s main source of revenue, it is a tool for redistribution, and it is used to provide behavioral incentives. But what is the moral legitimation of taxation, given that it is a straightforwardly coercive practice? The answer to this question largely depends on the moral standing of property entitlements. If citizens have property entitlements that are prior to and independent from legal conventions, then one will have to either find a tax base that is morally innocent, or find a moral principle that explains why some infringements of property entitlements are morally permissible. If on the other hand there are no pre-tax property entitlements, then the justification of taxation will not have to overcome a presumption against infringing them, and taxation can be legitimized by direct appeal to values like welfare, efficiency, and distributive justice.
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After the parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), The Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) started to negotiate about... more
After the parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), The Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) started to negotiate about forming a coalition government. But, surprising to many, the FDP decided to let these coalition talks collapse, and many commentators in Germany found it highly problematic for a political party to refuse to take responsibility in government. Interestingly, the question whether (or: when) democratic parties may legitimately refuse to govern has so far been neglected in political theory and political philosophy. The article develops a general answer by discussing several possible reasons for thinking that it is sometimes wrong to refuse to govern and thereby engages both democratic theory and the recent literature on compromise. The resulting view is that parties have an "integrity prerogative" that allows them to refuse to govern, except when there is no reasonable and stable alternative government coalition available.
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The article argues that persons should be conceived as self-owners and entitled to acquire private property within justifiable property conventions because they should be able to live as project pursuers. This is the ‘project pursuit... more
The article argues that persons should be conceived as self-owners and entitled to acquire private property within justifiable property conventions because they should be able to live as project pursuers. This is the ‘project pursuit argument’. It leads to a conception of self-ownership that is stringent, but weaker than standard libertarian notions of self-ownership, and to an understanding of private property as a convention that has to meet a sufficientarian threshold in order to be justifiable.
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Contribution to a special issue, edited by Giulia Bistagnino and Enrico Biale, on Matteo Bonotti's book Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies (Oxford 2017), in which I raise some objections to his account of partisan... more
Contribution to a special issue, edited by Giulia Bistagnino and Enrico Biale, on Matteo Bonotti's book Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies (Oxford 2017), in which I raise some objections to his account of partisan obligations.
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Handbuch-Artikel, der vier verschiedene Traditionslinien des Liberalismus und ihr Verhältnis zum Kapitalismus nachzeichnet: Den Naturrechtlichen Liberalismus in der Tradition von John Locke, den Klassischen Liberalismus in der Tradition... more
Handbuch-Artikel, der vier verschiedene Traditionslinien des Liberalismus und ihr Verhältnis zum Kapitalismus nachzeichnet: Den Naturrechtlichen Liberalismus in der Tradition von John Locke, den Klassischen Liberalismus in der Tradition von Adam Smith und Friedrich Hayek, den Perfektionistischen Liberalismus, wie er unter anderem von T.H. Green vertreten wird, und den Kontraktualistischen Liberalismus von John Rawls.
Philosophical anarchists claim that all states lack political authority and are illegitimate , but that some states are nevertheless morally justified and should not be abolished. I argue that philosophical anarchism is either incoherent... more
Philosophical anarchists claim that all states lack political authority and are illegitimate , but that some states are nevertheless morally justified and should not be abolished. I argue that philosophical anarchism is either incoherent or collapses into either statism or political anarchism.
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Moralismus ist, allgemein gesprochen, ein Missbrauch oder zumindest falscher Umgang mit der Moral. „Moralismus“ ist deswegen ein Vorwurf. Aber es gibt verschiedene Formen eines falschen oder missbräuchlichen Umgangs mit der Moral und... more
Moralismus ist, allgemein gesprochen, ein Missbrauch oder zumindest falscher Umgang mit der Moral. „Moralismus“ ist deswegen ein Vorwurf. Aber es gibt verschiedene Formen eines falschen oder missbräuchlichen Umgangs mit der Moral und damit einhergehend verschiedene Moralismus-Vorwürfe. In diesem Essay werden vier Formen des Moralismus unterscheiden und in der Migrationsdebatte verortet.
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It seems natural to think that compromises ought to be fair. But it is false. In this paper, I argue that it is never a moral desideratum to reach fair compromises and that we are sometimes even morally obligated to try to establish... more
It seems natural to think that compromises ought to be fair. But it is false. In this paper, I argue that it is never a moral desideratum to reach fair compromises and that we are sometimes even morally obligated to try to establish unfair compromises. The most plausible conception of the fairness of compromises is David Gauthier's principle of minimax relative concession. According to that principle, a compromise is fair when all parties make equal concessions relative to how much they can gain from an agreement and relative to how much they would lose without an agreement. To find out whether reaching a fair compromise sometimes is a moral desideratum, I discuss several paradigmatic cases in friendships, economics and politics, and I try to show that even when the parties have moral reasons to refrain from trying to maximize utility in the negotiations, they do not have moral reasons to aim at a fair compromise. My second claim is that we are sometimes morally obligated to try to establish unfair compromises, in particular when we are dealing with parties that try to establish morally very bad political arrangements. In such cases, we should try to concede as little as possible to achieve an outcome that is morally acceptable. Fair compromises, in other words, are morally much more dubious than is usually appreciated.
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Public reason liberals from John Rawls to Gerald Gaus uphold a principle of public justification as a core commitment of their theories. Critics of public reason liberalism have sometimes conceded that there is something compelling about... more
Public reason liberals from John Rawls to Gerald Gaus uphold a principle of public justification as a core commitment of their theories. Critics of public reason liberalism have sometimes conceded that there is something compelling about the idea of public justification. But so far there have not been many attempts to elaborate and defend a ‘comprehensive’ liberalism that incorporates a principle of public justification. This article spells out how public justifiability could be integrated into a comprehensive liberalism and defends the claim that what is worthwhile about public justification can be extracted from public reason liberalism.
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Sufficientarian libertarianism is a theory of justice that combines libertarianism's focus on property rights and non-interference with sufficientarianism's concern for the poor and needy. Persons are conceived as having stringent rights... more
Sufficientarian libertarianism is a theory of justice that combines libertarianism's focus on property rights and non-interference with sufficientarianism's concern for the poor and needy. Persons are conceived as having stringent rights to direct their lives as they see fit, provided that everyone has enough to live a self-guided life. Yet there are
different ways to combine libertarianism and sufficientarianism and hence different types of sufficientarian libertarianism. In the article I present and discuss three types, and I argue that the last one overcomes the problems of the other two. The first type combines libertarianism with a sufficiency principle in what is sometimes called the 'ethics of distribution'. The second incorporates modest welfare rights into a libertarian theory of justice. The third endorses a sufficientarian Lockean proviso for practices of private property within a libertarian theory of justice. I argue that it is superior to the others.
different ways to combine libertarianism and sufficientarianism and hence different types of sufficientarian libertarianism. In the article I present and discuss three types, and I argue that the last one overcomes the problems of the other two. The first type combines libertarianism with a sufficiency principle in what is sometimes called the 'ethics of distribution'. The second incorporates modest welfare rights into a libertarian theory of justice. The third endorses a sufficientarian Lockean proviso for practices of private property within a libertarian theory of justice. I argue that it is superior to the others.
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I thank Lamont Rodgers for critically discussing my work and giving me the chance to clarify and elaborate a couple of points about the sufficiency proviso and moderate libertarianism in general. I hope this exchange will help us better... more
I thank Lamont Rodgers for critically discussing my work and giving me the chance to clarify and elaborate a couple of points about the sufficiency proviso and moderate libertarianism in general. I hope this exchange will help us better understand where the main points of disagreement lie. My response to Rodgers has six sections. After a very brief summary of what moderate liber-tarianism and the sufficiency proviso are (section 1), I try to answer his main allegations: that I advance a problematically "consequentialist derivation of rights" (section 2) and a questionably "robust conception of 'care'" (section 3). Both allegations invoke a good deal of misunderstandings , as I will explain. I then discuss the role of personal responsibility (section 4) and whether self-ownership rights are mitigated in a problematic way (section 5) and thereby try to refute arguments against my view that many not-so-moderate libertarians will be inclined to make. The last section provides a short discussion of an issue I did not take up earlier: how practices of private property are to be individuated (section 6).
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In diesem Beitrag zeichne ich erstens Nozicks Kritik an strukturellen Gerechtigkeitstheorien nach und überlege, was sie wirklich zu zeigen vermag und was nicht; zweitens diskutiere ich, ob Nozicks Anspruchstheorie durch das von ihm... more
In diesem Beitrag zeichne ich erstens Nozicks Kritik an strukturellen Gerechtigkeitstheorien nach und überlege, was sie wirklich zu zeigen vermag und was nicht; zweitens diskutiere ich, ob Nozicks Anspruchstheorie durch das von ihm akzeptierte „Lockesche Proviso“ ebenfalls strukturell ist; drittens stelle ich zwei Gerechtigkeitstheorien vor, die die Lehren von Nozicks Kritik an strukturellen Gerechtigkeitstheorien annehmen, ohne deswegen gleich alle strukturellen Prinzipien über Bord zu werfen: Den „Links-Libertarismus“ und den „moderaten Libertarismus“. Beide kombinieren eine Anspruchstheorie mit einem strukturellen Prinzip, und bei beiden Theorien nimmt das strukturelle Prinzip die Form eines Lockeschen Provisos an.
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There have been four main motives to introduce the notion of modus vivendi in the political-philosophical literature. One is to use it as a negative contrast to what one regards as the ideal goal in politics. The second is to use it... more
There have been four main motives to introduce the notion of modus vivendi in the political-philosophical literature. One is to use it as a negative contrast to what one regards as the ideal goal in politics. The second is to use it within a distinctively realist political theory that refrains from advocating utopian ideals. The third is to defend liberal institutions as a modus vivendi. The fourth is to have a concept for the institutional tools for peace. Depending on the motive to introduce the notion of modus vivendi, the notion is conceptualized slightly differently. One aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the different motives that have led theorists to think about modus vivendi and the different conceptualizations of modus vivendi they have offered. But the chapter also makes a more substantial point: it argues that we should conceptualize the notion of modus vivendi in line with the fourth motive, because this seems the most promising way to get a conception of modus vivendi that is both ‘deeply motivated’ and ‘open’ for all kinds of approaches in political theory.
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Peter Stemmer hat eine elegante und beeindruckend elaborierte Theorie der Normativität und der Moral entwickelt. Ich werde in diesem Aufsatz zu zeigen versuchen, dass Stemmer jedoch zwei selbstgesteckte Ziele nicht erreicht. Erstens kann... more
Peter Stemmer hat eine elegante und beeindruckend elaborierte Theorie der Normativität und der Moral entwickelt. Ich werde in diesem Aufsatz zu zeigen versuchen, dass Stemmer jedoch zwei selbstgesteckte Ziele nicht erreicht. Erstens kann seine Theorie den kategorischen Verpflichtungscharakter moralischer Forderungen auch in Stemmers eigener Interpretation von Kategorizität nicht einfangen: Sie kann nicht zeigen, dass wir moralischen Forderungen unabhängig davon folgen müssen, was unsere individuellen Ziele und Wünsche sind. Zweitens zeigt Stemmer nicht, dass allein positive Moralen, die im Interesse alle Mitglieder sind (und ein Unterdrückungsverbot enthalten) legitim sind, nur weil sie rationalerweise in einem hypothetischen vormoralischen Zustand etabliert würden. Seine kontraktualistische Theorie wird deswegen letzten Endes zu einer relativistischen Theorie.
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The article defends the claim that if some laws are (or would be) widely accepted, this provides pro tanto moral reasons to support these laws and not to support otherwise better laws that are not widely accepted. In that sense the value... more
The article defends the claim that if some laws are (or would be) widely accepted, this provides pro tanto moral reasons to support these laws and not to support otherwise better laws that are not widely accepted. In that sense the value of having widely accepted laws provides moral reasons to make compromises in politics, and it justifies a modest and qualified status quo bias. Widely accepted laws are valuable because they reduce enforcement costs, have symbolic value, help to maintain peace, and realize the value of non-subjugation.
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A libertarian theory of justice holds that persons are self-owners and have the Hohfeldian moral power to justly acquire property rights in initially unowned external resources. Different variants of libertarianism can be distinguished... more
A libertarian theory of justice holds that persons are self-owners and have the Hohfeldian moral power to justly acquire property rights in initially unowned external resources. Different variants of libertarianism can be distinguished according to their stance on the famous Lockean proviso. The proviso requires, in Locke's words, to leave 'enough and as good' for others, and thus specifies limits on the acquisition of property. Left-libertarians accept an egalitarian interpretation of the proviso, 'right-libertarians' either reject any kind of proviso or accept rather weak versions of it. In between there is room for moderate interpretations of the proviso, and in particular for a sufficientarian interpretation: a 'sufficiency proviso.' The resulting theory of justice can be called 'moderate libertarianism.' In this article I make a case for moderate libertarianism, so understood. I argue that moderate libertarianism has advantages over both left-and right-libertarianism because it better coheres with the most plausible rationale for endorsing a libertarian theory of justice in the first place.
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Handbuch-Artikel. Abschnitte: Libertäre Gerechtigkeit: Selbsteigentum und die Aneignung äußerer Güter, Begründung libertärer Gerechtigkeit, libertäre Gerechtigkeit und der Staat, libertäre Gerechtigkeit vs. soziale Gerechtigkeit,... more
Handbuch-Artikel. Abschnitte: Libertäre Gerechtigkeit: Selbsteigentum und die Aneignung äußerer Güter, Begründung libertärer Gerechtigkeit, libertäre Gerechtigkeit und der Staat, libertäre Gerechtigkeit vs. soziale Gerechtigkeit, libertäre politische Philosophie ohne libertäre Gerechtigkeit, Bleeding Heart Libertarianism, Zusammenfassung.
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In the last ten or fifteen years, realism has emerged as a distinct approach in political theory. Realists are skeptical about the merits of abstract theories of justice. They regard peace, order, and stability as the primary goals of... more
In the last ten or fifteen years, realism has emerged as a distinct approach in political theory. Realists are skeptical about the merits of abstract theories of justice. They regard peace, order, and stability as the primary goals of politics. One of the more concrete aims of realists is to develop a realist perspective on legitimacy. I argue that realist accounts of legitimacy are unconvincing, because they do not solve what I call the “puzzle of legitimacy”: the puzzle how some persons can have the right to rule over others, given that all persons are equals. I focus on the realist accounts of legitimacy developed by Bernard Williams and John Horton.
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Robert Nozick and Eric Mack have tried to show that a minimal state could be just. A minimal state, they claim, could help to protect people’s moral rights without violating moral rights itself. In this article, I will discuss two... more
Robert Nozick and Eric Mack have tried to show that a minimal state could be just. A minimal state, they claim, could help to protect people’s moral rights without violating moral rights itself. In this article, I will discuss two challenges for defenders of a mini-mal state. The first challenge is to show that the just minimal state does not violate mor-al rights when taxing people and when maintaining a monopoly on the use of force. I argue that this challenge can be met. The second challenge is to show that the just min-imal state has political authority including, most importantly, the moral power to im-pose duties on citizens. I argue that both Nozick and Mack lack the resources to meet that challenge, and that political authority cannot be deflated. This is an important prob-lem because a lack of political authority also undermines a state’s justness.
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While John Rawls made the notion of a “modus vivendi” prominent in political philosophy, he treats modus vivendi arrangements rather short and dismissively. On the other hand, some political theorists like John Gray praise modus vivendi... more
While John Rawls made the notion of a “modus vivendi” prominent in political philosophy, he treats modus vivendi arrangements rather short and dismissively. On the other hand, some political theorists like John Gray praise modus vivendi as the only available and legitimate goal of politics. In the article I sketch the outlines of a different, more nuanced approach to modus vivendi arrangements. I argue that the moral standing of modus vivendi arrangements varies, and I try to spell out the factors that determine the relative moral standing of modus vivendi arrangements.
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From a left-libertarian perspective, it seems almost impossible for states to acquire political authority. For that reason, left-libertarians like Peter Vallentyne understandably hope that states without political authority could... more
From a left-libertarian perspective, it seems almost impossible for states to acquire political authority. For that reason, left-libertarians like Peter Vallentyne understandably hope that states without political authority could nonetheless implement left-libertarian justice. Vallentyne has argued that one can indeed assess a state’s justness without assessing its political authority. Against Vallentyne, I try to show that states without political authority have to be judged unjust even if they successfully promote justice. The reason is that institutions can be unjust independently from what they achieve or do: they can be
‘intrinsically unjust’. Institutions, I argue, are intrinsically unjust when they have legal liberties and powers without having the corresponding moral liberties and powers. States without political authority are intrinsically unjust in that sense. Hence the issues of a state’s justness and a state’s political authority cannot be dealt with separately. This is a problem not only for left-libertarians but for ‘philosophical anarchism’ more generally.
‘intrinsically unjust’. Institutions, I argue, are intrinsically unjust when they have legal liberties and powers without having the corresponding moral liberties and powers. States without political authority are intrinsically unjust in that sense. Hence the issues of a state’s justness and a state’s political authority cannot be dealt with separately. This is a problem not only for left-libertarians but for ‘philosophical anarchism’ more generally.
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Our societies are marked not only by disagreements on the good life, but also by disagreements on justice. This motivates philosophers as divergent as John Gray and Chandran Kukathas to focus their normative political theories on peace... more
Our societies are marked not only by disagreements on the good life, but also by disagreements on justice. This motivates philosophers as divergent as John Gray and Chandran Kukathas to focus their normative political theories on peace instead of justice. In this article, I discuss how peace should be conceived if peace is to be a more realistic goal than justice, not presupposing any moral consensus. I distinguish two conceptions of peace to be found in the literature. One, ordinary peace, conceives of peace as non-violent coexistence based on modus vivendi arrangements. Modus vivendi arrangements, in turn, are explained as a special kind of compromise. Ordinary peace does not presuppose any moral consensus and is therefore realistic, but at the same time it is too minimalist and undemanding to be satisfying. The other conception of peace, ambitious peace, can be found in Kukathas’s work. It is a conception of peace ‘beyond compromise’, not minimalist and undemanding, but, I will argue, not realistic because presupposing at least a second-order moral consensus. In the end, I advocate a division of labour between both conceptions of peace under the umbrella of an overarching ideal of peace.
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Das Prinzip öffentlicher Rechtfertigung ist ein Kernprinzip einer Hauptströmung des zeitge-nössischen Liberalismus. Es besagt, in einer von Gerald Gaus vertretenen Variante, dass Re-geln der Sozialmoral ebenso wie staatliche Institutionen... more
Das Prinzip öffentlicher Rechtfertigung ist ein Kernprinzip einer Hauptströmung des zeitge-nössischen Liberalismus. Es besagt, in einer von Gerald Gaus vertretenen Variante, dass Re-geln der Sozialmoral ebenso wie staatliche Institutionen und Gesetze gegenüber allen be-troffenen Personen mit ihren je verschiedenen evaluativen Standards rechtfertigbar sein müssen. Die Regeln, Institutionen oder Gesetze sind rechtfertigbar, wenn alle betroffenen Personen vor dem Hintergrund ihrer je verschiedenen evaluativen Standards einen hinrei-chenden Grund haben, sie zu akzeptieren. Das Universalisierbarkeitsprinzip dagegen ist kein normatives Prinzip der politischen Philosophie, sondern ein metaethisches Prinzip. Es besagt (in einer auf moralische Gründe bezogenen Variante), dass wenn es für Person A einen mora-lischen Grund gibt, x zu tun, es auch für Person B in relevant ähnlichen Umständen einen moralischen Grund gibt, x zu tun. Steven Wall nun hat zu zeigen versucht, dass beide Prinzipien inkompatibel sind. Da das Universalisierbarkeitsprinzip sehr plausibel erscheint, das Prinzip öffentlicher Rechtfertigung dagegen sehr umstritten ist, ist die Unvereinbarkeit der beiden Prinzipien für Wall ein Argument, das Prinzip öffentlicher Rechtfertigung abzulehnen. In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich Walls Unvereinbarkeitsthese kritisch diskutieren und schließlich zurückweisen.
(English):
The principle of public justification is a main principle of public reason liberalism, one of the most influential versions of contemporary liberalism. In Gerald Gaus’ version it claims that rules of social morality, state institutions and judicial laws have to be justifiable to all citizens with their varying evaluative standards. To be justifiable, each and every citizen has to have sufficient reasons to accept the rules, institutions or laws from his or her own perspective. The principle of universalizability, in contrast, is not a normative principle in political philosophy, but a metaethical principle. It claims (when applied to moral reasons) that if a person A has a moral reason to do x, then person B also has a moral reason to do x in relevantly similar circumstances. Steven Wall has tried to show that both principles are incompatible. As the principle of universalizability looks very plausible while the principle of public justification is highly contested, this would be an argument to drop the principle of public justification. In this paper I will critically discuss and finally reject Wall’s incompatibility-claim.
(English):
The principle of public justification is a main principle of public reason liberalism, one of the most influential versions of contemporary liberalism. In Gerald Gaus’ version it claims that rules of social morality, state institutions and judicial laws have to be justifiable to all citizens with their varying evaluative standards. To be justifiable, each and every citizen has to have sufficient reasons to accept the rules, institutions or laws from his or her own perspective. The principle of universalizability, in contrast, is not a normative principle in political philosophy, but a metaethical principle. It claims (when applied to moral reasons) that if a person A has a moral reason to do x, then person B also has a moral reason to do x in relevantly similar circumstances. Steven Wall has tried to show that both principles are incompatible. As the principle of universalizability looks very plausible while the principle of public justification is highly contested, this would be an argument to drop the principle of public justification. In this paper I will critically discuss and finally reject Wall’s incompatibility-claim.
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Philip Pettit’s republican conception of freedom is presented as an alternative both to negative and positive conceptions of freedom. The basic idea is to conceptualize freedom as non-domination, not as non-interference or self-mastery.... more
Philip Pettit’s republican conception of freedom is presented as an alternative both to negative and positive conceptions of freedom. The basic idea is to conceptualize freedom as non-domination, not as non-interference or self-mastery. When compared to negative freedom, Pettit’s republican conception comprises two controversial claims: the claim that we are unfree if we are dominated without actual interference, and the claim that we are free if we face interference without domination. Because the slave is a widely accepted paradigm of the unfree person, the case of a slave with a non-interfering master is often cited as providing a good argument for the first republican claim and against a negative conception of freedom. One aim of this article is to raise doubts about whether this is true. The other aim of the article is to show that the prisoner—also a paradigm of the unfree person—presents a good argument against the second republican claim and in favour of a negative conception of freedom. This is called the ‘prisoner-argument’. It will be argued that neither Pettit’s distinction between free persons and free choices nor his distinction between compromising and conditioning factors of freedom can help to rebut the charge of the prisoner-argument.
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Presents Robert Nozick's famous Wilt Chamberlain-Argument in a premise/conclusion format. Published in "Just the Arguments", Blackwell.
From citizens paying taxes to employees following their bosses’ orders and kids obeying their parents, we take it for granted that a whole range of authorities have the power to impose duties on others. However, although authority is... more
From citizens paying taxes to employees following their bosses’ orders and kids obeying their parents, we take it for granted that a whole range of authorities have the power to impose duties on others. However, although authority is often accepted in practice, it looks philosophically problematic if we conceive persons as free and as equals. In this short and accessible book, Fabian Wendt examines the basis of authority, discussing five prominent theories that try to explain how claims to authority can be vindicated. Focusing in particular on the issue of how states can rightfully claim authority, he rigorously analyses the theories’ arguments and evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. He also debates anarchism as an alternative that should be taken seriously if no theory ultimately succeeds in explaining state authority. This clear and engaging book will be essential reading for anyone grappling with the most fundamental questions of authority and obligation in political theory and political philosophy.
1 Varieties of Authority
2 Consent and Authority
3 The Service Conception of Authority
4 Community and Authority
5 Natural Duties and Authority
6 Fair Cooperation and Authority
7 States without Authority
Bibliography
Index
1 Varieties of Authority
2 Consent and Authority
3 The Service Conception of Authority
4 Community and Authority
5 Natural Duties and Authority
6 Fair Cooperation and Authority
7 States without Authority
Bibliography
Index
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This is the German translation of Fabian Wendt: Authority (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018). Staaten beanspruchen für sich das Recht, Gesetze geben und mit Zwangsgewalt durchsetzen zu dürfen. Doch unter welchen Bedingungen haben sie... more
This is the German translation of Fabian Wendt: Authority (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
Staaten beanspruchen für sich das Recht, Gesetze geben und mit Zwangsgewalt durchsetzen zu dürfen. Doch unter welchen Bedingungen haben sie dieses Recht tatsächlich? Das ist die grundlegendste Frage der Politischen Philosophie. Obwohl wir die Autoritätsansprüche des Staates oft als selbstverständlich hinnehmen, erscheinen sie moralisch durchaus fragwürdig, wenn man Personen als Freie und Gleiche begreift. Wie können wenige Parlamentsmitglieder das Recht haben, für Millionen Menschen verbindliche Gesetze zu erlassen? Wie können Polizeibeamte und Richter das Recht haben, diese Gesetze gegenüber Personen durchzusetzen, die sie ablehnen? In diesem kurzen, verständlichen und anregenden Buch stellt Fabian Wendt die fünf wichtigsten Theorien politischer Autorität aus der zeitgenössischen Politischen Philosophie vor. Er diskutiert darüber hinaus den Anarchismus, der als Alternative ernst zu nehmen ist, falls alle Begründungsversuche politischer Autorität fehlschlagen sollten.
Vorwort
1. Formen der Autorität
2. Zustimmung und Autorität
3. Die Service-Konzeption der Autorität
4. Gemeinschaft und Autorität
5. Natürliche Pflichten und Autorität
6. Faire Kooperation und Autorität
7. Staaten ohne Autorität
Bibliographie
Index
Staaten beanspruchen für sich das Recht, Gesetze geben und mit Zwangsgewalt durchsetzen zu dürfen. Doch unter welchen Bedingungen haben sie dieses Recht tatsächlich? Das ist die grundlegendste Frage der Politischen Philosophie. Obwohl wir die Autoritätsansprüche des Staates oft als selbstverständlich hinnehmen, erscheinen sie moralisch durchaus fragwürdig, wenn man Personen als Freie und Gleiche begreift. Wie können wenige Parlamentsmitglieder das Recht haben, für Millionen Menschen verbindliche Gesetze zu erlassen? Wie können Polizeibeamte und Richter das Recht haben, diese Gesetze gegenüber Personen durchzusetzen, die sie ablehnen? In diesem kurzen, verständlichen und anregenden Buch stellt Fabian Wendt die fünf wichtigsten Theorien politischer Autorität aus der zeitgenössischen Politischen Philosophie vor. Er diskutiert darüber hinaus den Anarchismus, der als Alternative ernst zu nehmen ist, falls alle Begründungsversuche politischer Autorität fehlschlagen sollten.
Vorwort
1. Formen der Autorität
2. Zustimmung und Autorität
3. Die Service-Konzeption der Autorität
4. Gemeinschaft und Autorität
5. Natürliche Pflichten und Autorität
6. Faire Kooperation und Autorität
7. Staaten ohne Autorität
Bibliographie
Index
Research Interests:
This book explores the morality of compromising. The author argues that peace and public justification are values that provide moral reasons to make compromises in politics, including compromises that establish unjust laws or... more
This book explores the morality of compromising. The author argues that peace and public justification are values that provide moral reasons to make compromises in politics, including compromises that establish unjust laws or institutions. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our moral duties and obligations in making such compromises. The book also contains discussions of the sources of the value of public justification, the relation between peace and justice, the nature of modus vivendi arrangements and the connections between compromise, liberal institutions and legitimacy. In exploring the morality of compromising, the book thus provides some outlines for a map of political morality beyond justice.
Research Interests:
This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy (Vol. 16, No. 4, 2013). When we compromise on justice, we accept or acquiesce to an arrangement that we judge to be... more
This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy (Vol. 16, No. 4, 2013).
When we compromise on justice, we accept or acquiesce to an arrangement that we judge to be unjust, or at least not fully just. Such arrangements are often described as constituting a ‘modus vivendi’. What reasons could we have to accept a modus vivendi, thereby compromising on justice? Given the fact of disagreement on justice, this is an important, but rather neglected question in political philosophy. One possible answer, inspired by John Rawls, is that compromising on justice is only justified if this nonetheless brings us as close to ideal justice as possible under given circumstances. The most straightforward way to take issue with this answer is to present other reasons to compromise on justice. The articles in this book explore epistemic reasons and those that stem from values besides justice, like democracy, peace, toleration and non-subjugation. This book thereby sheds some light on the relevance of compromising for the legitimacy of institutional arrangements.
When we compromise on justice, we accept or acquiesce to an arrangement that we judge to be unjust, or at least not fully just. Such arrangements are often described as constituting a ‘modus vivendi’. What reasons could we have to accept a modus vivendi, thereby compromising on justice? Given the fact of disagreement on justice, this is an important, but rather neglected question in political philosophy. One possible answer, inspired by John Rawls, is that compromising on justice is only justified if this nonetheless brings us as close to ideal justice as possible under given circumstances. The most straightforward way to take issue with this answer is to present other reasons to compromise on justice. The articles in this book explore epistemic reasons and those that stem from values besides justice, like democracy, peace, toleration and non-subjugation. This book thereby sheds some light on the relevance of compromising for the legitimacy of institutional arrangements.
Research Interests: Peace and Compromise
Libertäre politische Philosophie ist ihrem Selbstverständnis nach freiheitsradikal. Abgesehen von einem Minimalstaat, der das Leben und Eigentum seiner Bürger schützt, soll in allen Bereichen der Gesellschaft laissez-faire herrschen. Aber... more
Libertäre politische Philosophie ist ihrem Selbstverständnis nach freiheitsradikal. Abgesehen von einem Minimalstaat, der das Leben und Eigentum seiner Bürger schützt, soll in allen Bereichen der Gesellschaft laissez-faire herrschen. Aber ist ein solches Gesellschaftsmodell tatsächlich im Namen der Freiheit zu verteidigen? Das ist die erste Leitfrage dieses Buches. Zu ihrer Beantwortung analysiert der Autor zunächst den Begriff der Freiheit und den Begriff eines moralischen Rechts, um danach den Versuch zu unternehmen, mit diesen Begriffen eine allein auf einem moralischen Recht auf Freiheit basierende libertäre politische Philosophie zu rekonstruieren. Die erste Leitfrage wird letztlich affirmativ beantwortet: Der Libertarismus ist die reinste Philosophie der Freiheit. Doch stellt sich noch eine zweite zentrale Frage: Gibt es gute Gründe, sich diese Philosophie auch zu eigen zu machen? Es werden drei Begründungsversuche des Libertarismus diskutiert und am Ende als nicht erfolgreich zurückgewiesen. Das Buch schließt mit einem Ausblick, in dem für die Aufnahme eines starken Rechts auf Freiheit in eine pluralistische politische Philosophie geworben wird.