Cord Schmelzle

Effective and legitimate governance supposedly form a mutually reinforcing relationship, a virtuous circle of governance. We critically explore this argument in the context of limited statehood and underline why such areas challenge key assumptions underpinning the virtuous circle argument. In this special issue we ask: Does the effectiveness of governance affect the legitimacy of governance actors and institutions in areas of limited statehood, and vice versa? We develop a theoretical model of the virtuous circle and show that making such circles work is more complex, demanding and unlikely than often assumed. Empirical studies need to take these complexities into account, and policy makers are well-advised to adjust their policies accordingly.

So far, most of the philosophical literature on occupations has tried to assess the legitimacy of military rule in the aftermath of armed conflicts by exclusively employing the theoretical resources of just war theory. In this paper I argue that this approach is mistaken. Occupations occur during or in the aftermath of wars but they are fundamentally a specific type of rule over persons. Thus, theories of political legitimacy should be at least as relevant as just war theory for the moral evaluation of occupations. This paper therefore draws on both traditions and argues that just war theory plays a limited role in identifying the purposes and appropriate agents of occupation authority, but that theories of legitimacy are necessary for explaining why and under which conditions foreign actors have the right to rule in the aftermath of armed conflicts.

The state was long seen as the only institution able to govern legitimately. The empirical limitations of statehood in many parts of the world, as well as the normative ambivalences inherent to statehood, however, have led to a renewed interest in the legitimacy of non-state governance. A prominent approach holds that non-state governance is legitimate if and to the extent that it contributes to normatively desirable outcomes, such as an increase in security. This chapter argues that this approach faces four problems that severely limited the scope of legitimate governance by non-state actors in areas of limited statehood. They concern the definition of goods, the inclusiveness of governance services, the accountability of non-state actors, and the reliable assignment of responsibilities. We contend that these problems highlight the need for public institutions and explore whether and how non-state actors can assume public roles under conditions of limited statehood.