Post-Soviet Regimes

This study analyzes controversies and public attitudes concerning the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
and Stepan Bandera in Ukraine. The research question is: Which factors affect attitudes toward the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera in contemporary Ukraine? This article employs comparative and regression analyses of surveys commissioned by the author and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 2009 and 2013 to determine the effects of regional and other factors on attitudes toward these organizations and the OUN-B leader. The study shows that regional factors and perceptions of these organizations' involvement in mass murder were the strongest predictors of the views concerning the OUN-B, the UPA and Bandera. Their public support is strongest in Galicia and weakest in the East and the South, in particular, in Donbas and Crimea, two major conflict areas since the “Euromaidan.”

This study examines the role of political factors in attitudes toward World War II in contemporary Ukraine. The question under examination is which factors determine public views of the principal warring sides and their leaders in Ukraine. This paper uses a representative national survey specifically designed for this research project and conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 2012. It analyzes the roles of regionalism, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, age, and sex in attitudes toward the Red Army, Soviet partisans, the German Army (Wehrmacht), and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during the war, as well as toward the wartime leaders of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the UPA. The analysis of the survey data shows that regional values, political party preferences, ethnicity, language, and age have significant effects on views of the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and attitudes toward the wartime activities of Joseph Stalin and Roman Shukhevych. Public perceptions of the German Army and Adolf Hitler in Ukraine do not vary much across regions, political parties, and ethnic, language, age, and sex groups.

The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, with the exception of videos of the massacre.
              The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre.
          The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protesters. Qualitative content analysis includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV broadcasts from mass media and social media in different countries(some 150 gigabytes), news reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of violence during and after the “Euromaidan.” This study includes two video appendixes.
            This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.

This chapter seeks to assess Western and Russian influence on the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych’s regime. Drawing on the works of Levitsky and Way and Tolstrup, the chapter explains why during the 2014 crisis Yanukovych was able to withstand Western and domestic pressure much longer than Leonid Kuchma did in 2004, and why he was eventually toppled. I argue that Yanukovych’s ability to prolong his stay in power was circumscribed by three specific factors: his concentration of power, Russian backing and miscalculated Western threats to impose sanctions. His downfall, however, was ultimately determined from within the state.
The chapter contributes to the theory of hybrid regimes by extending the concept of linkage and leverage to non-democracies; it also offers an empirical measure of Russian anti-democratic influence on Ukraine.

Hat die derzeitige politische Ordnung in Russland mittel- und langfristig Bestand? Die fundamentale Herausforderung der Fortexistenz des heutigen kleptokratischen Regimes Russlands in den kommenden Jahren wird das Zusammenfallen zweier systemunterwandernder Tendenzen – ökonomischer Stagnation und politischer Transition – sein. Deren kombinierter Effekt wird selbst kluge Kremlführung nicht ohne weiteres neutralisieren können. Es wird daher früher oder später wieder zu einem System- und nicht nur Führungswechsel in Russland kommen, worauf der Westen sich bereits heute einstellen sollte.

В статье проанализированы основные проблемы киргизстанской историографии советского и постсоветского периодов по теме восстания 1916 года. В круг использованных источников входят новые архивные документы, научные и публицистические публикации на русском и киргизском языках.

В статье рассматриваются методологические аспекты анализа современной российской политической системы как неофеодальной или неопатримониальной. Краткий обзор существующих подходов сопровождается анализом возможной исследовательской повестки.

The Hungarian art collector Dénes Deák (1931–1993) offered a significant part of his collection to Székesfehérvár in 1986: paintings and sculptures of 20th century Hungarian artists (City Gallery – Deák Collection). Due to personal changes in the leadership of the city, collaboration between Deák and Székesfehérvár became more straightforward and friendly during the change of regime. In 1990, Deák set up a foundation for Székesfehérvár and in 1991 he envisioned donating a mobile sculpture to be constructed in a public square, to the city. Deák saw in the genre of the mobile the possibility of shaping social space. His first candidate for the mobile was not the neo-avantgarde István Harasztÿ (born in 1934); he wanted to commission Katalin Hetey (1924–2010) to create the work. Hetey emigrated in 1957 and settled down in Paris; her art is related to the concept of organic expression. Harasztÿ, who had been relegated by the state power to the ‘forbidden’ category of artists since 1972, interpreted the commission as the liberation of his art. He was requested to create the mobile in 1991 and the sculpture was inaugurated on 2nd October 1993. The artwork, later named Deák Dénes Fountain can therefore be perceived as the rehabilitation of the artist, since it was also his inaugural work presented to the Academy (Széchenyi Academy of Letters and Arts). As the sculpture is in many ways embedded in the period of the change of regime, it can be defined as the representation of the change of regime. It is a piece of work which was in the background, yet whose close relation to the change of the political system is unquestionable. It can therefore be considered on par with other symbolic artworks associated with the change of regime in Hungary.

Political legitimacy has become a scarce resource in Russia and other post-Soviet states in Eurasia. Their capacity to deliver prosperity has suffered from economic crisis, the conflict in Ukraine and the ensuing confrontation with the West. Will nationalism and repression enable political regimes to survive? This book investigates the politics of legitimation in post-Soviet countries, focusing on how political and intellectual elites exploit different modes of legitimation. Its chapters combine cross-national comparisons and country case studies, covering state-economy relations, pro-presidential parties, courts, ideas of nationhood, historical and literary narratives. The main conclusions are that weak economic performance, evidence of electoral fraud, unresponsive government and the waning authority of presidents continue to jeopardize institutional legitimacy. Incumbent elites have been able to shift between legitimation modes, but shifts towards nationalism, artificial charisma and traditionalism will not be sufficient in the long term to keep elites in power.

What happens to informal institutions and practices when political actors decide to implement democratic institutional reforms aimed at relieving formal institutions of informal constraints? Does informality disappear, or do the elites and affected populations continue to apply and abide by informal rules? What do we know about the relationship between institutional reforms and informal institutions? This book seeks to improve our understanding of how, when, and under which conditions democratic institutional reforms affect informal institutions and practices in countries transitioning to democracy, also known as hybrid regimes. With an empirical focus on three transitional post-Soviet regimes—Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—this book aims to explain the contentious relationship between democratic institutional reforms and informality in the broader post-Soviet context. These findings have implications not only for hybrid regimes, but also for the majority of other post-Soviet, as well as other post-communist, countries. This book engages with a large and growing body of literature on informal institutions and practices and offers theoretical insights relevant to comparative politics, democratization and institutional development studies, political sociology, human geography and political economy.

This book presents an innovative model linking insights from democratization, development and conflict studies to explain personalist behavior and their violent transitions.

Based on multiple case studies from Sub Saharan Africa, the author maps and predicts regime transitions, presenting examples of how states can avoid such vicious circles of conflict and tyranny. By integrating decades of specialist literature from various subfields of political science, the book models personalist behavior, its impact on the states they govern, and their future transitions. By systematizing regime behavior (coup-proofing, gatekeeping, repression and hoarding), the model identifies the mechanics on how personalist regimes establish vicious circles of personalism and explains how exactly they end up again in authoritarianism or in new personalist tyrannies after their demise, and so seldom transition to democracy.

This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of African politics, democratization and democratic consolidation, authoritarian rule and more broadly to political science, comparative politics, area studies, political leadership, peace and conflict studies and development studies.

Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s misrule, the popular reaction against it, and the manner of his downfall disrupted the very foundations of Ukraine’s still nascent and defective state. While in office, Yanukovych’s greed for power and wealth proved devastating to both him and his country. In order to grasp the reasons for the destructive effect of Yanukovych’s presidency, one needs to look at the way in which he reconfigured Ukraine’s political regime and the strategies that he adopted to maintain power. - See more at: http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/maidan-and-beyond-house-yanukovych-built#sthash.1Ys4LqaA.dpuf

In post-Soviet countries, the process of democratization is not linear and causes a variety of conflicts. The electoral process and the election institute, as essential elements of electoral political culture, have an important role in political process, especially when the state is transitioning to a parliamentary system of governance, where the quality of internal and external state politics effectiveness mainly depends on the national legislative body. Based on comparative statistical data analysis as well as using behavioral and discourse approaches, the article explores voter turnout in 1991-2018 national elections by revealing its impact on electoral processes as well as peculiarities of elections in Armenia. The findings of conducted research have shown that there was a higher voter turnout during presidential than parliamentary elections and constitutional referendums which is due to more personalized than institutionalized perception of political power. The electoral institute is not sustainable and has a conflict nature in Armenia. To improve the functioning of electoral institute and to restore public confidence in it, it is not necessary to improve only the legislation but to develop the political forces by inclusion of democratic values in public consciousness through political process. In this sense, the evolution of party system based mainly on democratic ideas and not only on personalities is needed. The political process in spring of 2018 in Armenia may create some preconditions ensuring electoral process transparency, taking into account the increase of public confidence among elections as well as the significant decrease in election fraud, and the credibility of early parliamentary election results after the Velvet Revolution. 2018 early parliamentary election can be considered as a step forward to democracy improvement in Armenia.

This article takes a closer look at the internal evolution of the North Korean political system and how it has been subjugated to the personalist regime of the Kim family. The author argues that North Korea should no longer be perceived as a totalitarian regime since it is now a fully entrenched personal regime in the first place. The author investigates how this process of personalization took place in the institutional, ideological and mobilizational dimensions of the DPRK as well as the influence on its international relations (gatekeeping). Based on these insights the author provides some scenarios for endogenous transitions from this regime type and how hereditary succession and personalism affect its survival strategies..

The South Caucasus region is quite diverse in its cultural, ethnic, civilization, religious and social structure. At the same time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, emerged numerous internal conflicts significantly hindered the democratization process in the region. The quarter-century post-Soviet experience shows that with some differences mainly pseudo-democratic or even autocratic regimes are established in South Caucasus countries. Many researches affirm that in plural societies of Azerbaijan and Georgia ethnocratic elements are also observed. In these countries the influence of dominant ethnic groups over other ethnicities not explicitly are encouraged by authorities. Local researchers of ten explain this situation by the transitional period. However, other numerous studies show that in these countries ethnic-based governments aspire to be strengthened. Therefore, these countries could not lead to a fully democratic transition, and in result, they will be able to build ethnic democracies or authoritarian regimes. In this case, the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of subordinate ethnicities will be in danger. To prevent such possible developments, the article explores the idea of cultural relativism as opposition to the ethnocentrism. The cultural relativism treats all ethnic segments of the same plural society as equal. And in this case, the most relevant model of democracy can be the consociational model which continues to be successfully use d for decades in many plural European states such as Netherlands, Belgium, etc. The article argues that in South Caucasus plural states the consociational discourse can be a real tool to build a democratic political culture. Based on the universal objectives and common interests, the consociational discourse tends to create guarantees of equality and security for all segments in South Caucasus plural states. Only on the base of civic culture devel opment, the consociational democracy model implementation can be efficient.

Cтоит ли классифицировать природу «системы Путина», ввиду ее недавней радикализации, как современное проявление фашизма, как это недавно сделали некоторые — в том числе и русские — обозреватели? У этих явно антипутинских комментаторов — напр., А. Мотыль, В. Иноземцев, М. Снеговая и др. — прослеживается своего рода утилитарное отношение и избирательный подход к набору свойств исторического фашизма для как можно более эффектного разоблачения бесспорно террористического, агрессивного и репрессивного характера сегодняшнего российского режима. Типичной ценой применения термина «фашистский» к путинскому режиму в результате этого «сбора вишни» является, однако, чрезмерно широкая дефиниция общего понятия «фашизм». Такого рода инклюзивные определения сути фашизма, как правило, приводят к имплицитному утверждению о существовании десятков независимых «фашистских» режимов в истории человечества — а не только в Германии Гитлера, Италии Муссолини, России Путина. Еще одним последствием такой преднамеренной инфляции этого ключевого исторического понятия является открытие вопроса о том, как же тогда обозначить комбинацию тех характеристик итальянской ПНФ, немецкой НСДАП, румынской «Железной гвардии», венгерской Партии скрещенных стрел, испанской Фаланги и др., которую в сравнительном обществоведении иногда называют «фашистским минимумом» или «ядром».

В современной Украине из Степана Бандеры и его организации делают героев, хотя на самом деле они были международными террористами, пишет Иван Качановский, пост-докторский сотрудник факультета политологии Торонтского университета, в своей колонке для журнала Корреспондент. Когда историю забывают – это плохо, но еще хуже – когда ее перекручивают. Яркий тому пример – то, во что в современной Украине превращают Организацию украинских националистов (ОУН) и ее лидера Степана Бандеру.
Работая в архиве президента США Франклина Рузвельта [глава государства в 1933-1945 годы] над книгой о массовом советском терроре в Украине в 1930-х годах, я натолкнулся на собранные американскими спецслужбами материалы об украинских террористах. Я и представить себе не мог, что теперь они станут героями популярной телепрограммы о Великих украинцах. А один из них и вовсе — фаворитом в гонке за звание величайшего из украинцев.

Документы об этих людях были собраны Генри Филдом,

Я натолкнулся на собранные американскими спецслужбами материалы об украинских террористах руководителем специальной разведслужбы при президенте Рузвельте, и Секретной службой США,  охраняющей американских президентов. Они описывают покушение на президента США, которое готовило руководство ОУН и немецкие спецслужбы в годы Второй мировой войны. Насколько мне известно, эти материалы нигде не публиковались, и их исследование еще впереди.

Исполнителем теракта должен был стать Григорий Мацейко, известный тем, что в 1934 году, по приказу Степана Бандеры, убил министра внутренних дел Польши Бронислава Перацкого. После этого убийца бежал в Аргентину. А оттуда, по американским данным, полученным в 1941-1942 годах, он планировал выехать в США. Цель "визита" – устранить Рузвельта по приказу представителей ОУН и нацистской Германии, которые обещали заплатить за это миллион марок.

В случае успеха резонанс от убийства был бы значительным не только в пределах Польши, как это произошло с атакой на польского министра (ее сейчас зачастую представляют как один из аргументов в пользу величия Бандеры), а имел бы мировое значение. Более того: он мог бы повлиять на ход Второй мировой войны.

Показательно, как рассекреченные документы американских спецслужб характеризуют ОУН, а также Бандеру, Мацейко, и других деятелей организации. Исходя из материалов этого дела, объемом в несколько десятков страниц, ОУН определялась американцами как "украинская террористическая организация", которая сотрудничает с нацистской Германией против США. И это не просто заявления – документы содержат агентурные и дипломатические донесения об этом сотрудничестве с конкретными именами и примерами.

Первая информация о подготовке покушения на Рузвельта датируется весной 1941 года. Мацейко должен был въехать в США с паспортом на чужое имя при содействии агентов гестапо и немецких дипломатов в Латинской Америке. В сообщении от 24 марта 1941-го указывается, что эта группа "украинских террористов" организована немецким дипломатом Кристианом Зинсером. Именно Зинсер был ведущим агентом гестапо в Аргентине и других странах Латинской Америки. Его выслали из Гондураса и Гватемалы, где он занимался антиамериканской деятельностью под дипломатическим прикрытием, в апреле 1941 года.

В документах упоминается и освобождение немцами осужденного за убийство министра Перацкого Николая Лебедя — в 1941-м он стал заместителем Бандеры в ОУН. Причем именно он восстановил связи с руководством этой организации. Показана и ведущая роль Бандеры в выборе Мацейко для устранения польского министра — глава ОУН характеризовал его как "умелого террориста".

В начале 1942 года, после того, как поступила новая агентурная информация о подготовке теракта против Рузвельта, американские спецслужбы создали спецгруппу. Она за несколько месяцев собрала детальную информацию на этих и других оуновских террористов и их сторонников в Южной и Северной Америке. Агенты открыто следили за украинскими иммигрантами, связанными с Мацейко и ОУН, чтобы дать понять, что американскому правительству известно о подготовке покушения.

Оуновский теракт против президента Рузвельта так и не был совершен, а след Мацейко спецслужбы потеряли.

Впрочем, на этом история взаимоотношений США и ОУН не заканчивается. 

Но это не помешало ЦРУ и другим правительственным организациям во время холодной войны сотрудничать с бывшими немецкими нацистами.

При этом закрывали глаза на то, что многие из них были причастны к нацистскому геноциду. К примеру, американские и английские спецслужбы использовали Бандеру и его организацию для забрасывания нелегальных групп в Украину на самолетах.

Но спецслужбы США не забывали об оуновской попытке теракта против президента Рузвельта. Даже в 1964 году руководитель Секретной службы США интересовался документами по этому делу, переданными Генри Филдом.

Архивы американских президентов и спецслужб должны содержать еще много интересных материалов, связанных со Степаном Бандерой, лидером террористической ультранационалистической организации и главным претендентом на телевизионное звание "великого украинца".

Эта колонка опубликована в №18 журнала Корреспондент от 17 мая 2008 года.

What the world is now witnessing in Ukraine is the cumulative effect of history and memory in the lives of the people of the region—and this book helps readers to understand those subjects. Centered in Kharkiv, a Russian-speaking city in eastern Ukraine, this is an oral history of a group of military colonels, their families, and their contemporaries, covering their lives from the 1960s through the post-Soviet transition. During this period, these military families went from comfortable economic circumstances, professional prestige, and political influence to destitution and disgrace in the 1990s. Based on the 3,000+ pages of Westrate’s interview transcripts and supplemented with materials gleaned from unprecedented access to personal, family, and institutional archives, this book investigates how families endured shifting social, cultural, and political realities. By analyzing the lives of individuals in context, Westrate provides insights from the grassroots level. He reveals how ideological, professional, gender, religious, ethnic, and national imperatives—as developed and transmitted by elites—were internalized, transformed, or rejected by the rank and file. In the process, he shows what those experiences have to offer the study of Soviet, post-Soviet, and transnational history. This study bridges the new boundaries created by the collapse of the USSR and examines the foundations of conflict in twenty-first century Ukraine.

Wenn ein Unterzeichnerland des Vertrages selbst vor einem der fünf Garanten des Sperrabkommens nicht sicher sein kann: Welchen Sinn hat dann das Verbot der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen? Im Austausch gegen einen Abbau von Nuklearwaffen erteilen drei atomwaffenbesitzende UNO-Sicherheitsratsmitglieder dem abrüstenden Land kollektive, ausdrückliche und schriftlich fixierte Sicherheitszusagen. Eines dieser Großmächte erklärt jedoch 20 Jahre später diese Vereinbarung für nichtig: Welches Land ohne eigene Atomwaffen oder enges Bündnis mit einer Nuklearmacht kann sich nun der Unverletzlichkeit seiner Grenzen noch sicher sein? Wenn selbst eine mit Ausnahmerechten ausgestattete Vetomacht im UNO-Sicherheitsrat sich auf Kosten eines Nachbarstaates territorial ausdehnen kann, dann wird das internationale Atomwaffensperrregime zum Selbstbedienungsladen der offiziellen Nuklearmächte.

In the process of decommunisation, Ukraine has toppled all its Lenin monuments. This book documents the inglorious fate of these Soviet statues, following their often violent removal. Photographer Niels Ackermann and journalist Sébastien Gobert have scoured the country in search of the remains of these toppled figures. They are found in the most unlikely places: Lenin inhabits gardens, scrap yards and store rooms. He has fallen on hard times –  cut into pieces, daubed with paint, turned into a Cossack or Darth Vader. Yet despite every attempt to reduce their status, the monuments retain a sinister quality, resisting all efforts to separate them from their history.

Myroslava Hartmond's introductory essay puts Niels and Sébastien's journey across Ukraine into historical and global perspective, highlighting the uniqueness of the Leninfall phenomenon and the significance of their work in the context of post-Soviet studies.

160x200 mm hardback
176 pages
ISBN 978-0-9931911-7-6
Published in 2017

Purchase from publisher here:
http://fuel-design.com/publishing/looking-lenin/

This study analyzes the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian foreign policy from political Realist perspective. We try to find and to demonstrate to our readers as to what extent Cold War Soviet foreign policy was under the impact of Realist political thinking, at what point a transformation to a more Constructivist approach began to be notable and Realism began to lose its monopoly in Kremlin’s foreign policy thinking and decision-making, and how political Realism regained its influence and is reviving in form of ‘new political Realism’ under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.