- Department of Philosophy
McIntosh Humanities Bldg 917 California State University Long Beach
1250 Bellflower Boulevard
Long Beach CA 90840–2408 USA - 562–985–2736
Cory Wright
California State University Long Beach, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Truth, Explanation, Pluralism, Brain Reward System, Cognitive Grammar, School of Brentano, and 97 moreAlethic Modality, Judgment Stroke, Psychologism, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Metaphysics of Judgment, Mechanistic Explanation, Intracranial Self-Stimulation, History of Analytic Philosophy, Diallelus, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Ontic Conception of Explanation, Theories Of Truth, Reductionism, Mechanism, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Functionalism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Theory Of Mechanisms, Kazimierz Twardowski, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Metaphysics of Science, Franz Brentano, Bernard Bosanquet, G. F. Stout, Cognitive Linguistics, Ronald Langacker, Mechanistic Conception of Explanation, Austrian Philosophy, States of Affairs, Facts, Propositions, Deflationism, Scientific explanation, Truth, Deflationism, Correspondence, Mental Acts, British Idealism, Mechanistic Psychology, Lvov-Warsaw School, Realist Phenomenology, Anton Marty, Explanatory Pluralism, Neuroscience, Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Dopamine, Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Science, Heuristics, Cognition, Cognitive Modeling, Modeling, Cognitive Sciences, Computational Cognitive Science, Psychological Explanation, Computional Complexity, Photographic truth and meaning, Verdad, Verdade, Teorías de la verdad, Explicação, Philosophical Logic, Minimalism, Liar Paradox, Paul Horwich, Philosophy of Truth, Deflationary Truth, Equivalence Schema, Epistemology, Truth, Philosophy of Logic, Minimalism (Truth), Mechanistic explanations for physiological phenomena, Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophical Psychology, Electrophysiology, Decomposition, History of Neuroscience, Localization, Pleasure, Dopaminergic Neurotransmision, Identity (Philosophy), History Of Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Mechanistic modeling, Identity theory, Behavioral Neuroscience, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, History and Philosophy of Neuroscience, Nucleus Accumbens, Reward, Mechanism and Explanation, History of neurosciences, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, History of Psychology and Neuroscience, Heuristic Identity Theory, Philosophy and Neuroscience, Dopamine System, Mechanisms, and paradox of idealizationedit
This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of behavioral neurology, dividing it roughly into six eras. In the ancient and classical eras, emphasis is placed on two transitions: firstly, from descriptions of head trauma and... more
This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of behavioral neurology, dividing it roughly into six eras. In the ancient and classical eras, emphasis is placed on two transitions: firstly, from descriptions of head trauma and attempted neurosurgical treatments to the exploratory dissections during the Hellenistic period and the replacement of cardiocentrism; and secondly, to the more systematic investigations of Galenus and the rise of pneumatic ventricular theory. In the medieval through post-Renaissance eras, the scholastic consolidation of knowledge and the role of compendia are emphasized, along with the use of new methods from within a mechanistic framework. With the discovery of electrical conductance and the rise of experimentalism, we frame the modern era as period of intense debate over localization, decomposition, and other mechanistic principles, and marked by rapid discovery about the brain. The chapter ends with a discussion of the contemporary era, focusing on the establishment of behavioral neurology research on aphasia, apraxia, and neuropsychiatric conditions.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Neuropsychology, Neurology, History of Medicine, History of Psychiatry, and 15 moreHistory of Neurology, History of Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, History and Philosophy of Neuroscience, Behavioral Neurology, Neuropsychiatry, Neurociencias, Neuropsicología, Neurociências, History of neurosciences, Neuropsicologia, Neurology and Psychiatry, History of Aphasia, and Neurology and the history of medicine
This paper adds to the philosophical literature on mechanistic explanation by elaborating two related explanatory functions of idealization in mechanistic models. The first function involves explaining the presence of... more
This paper adds to the philosophical literature on mechanistic explanation by elaborating two related explanatory functions of idealization in mechanistic models. The first function involves explaining the presence of structural/organizational features of mechanisms by reference to their role as difference-makers for performance requirements. The second involves tracking counterfactual dependency relations between features of mechanisms and features of mechanistic explanandum phenomena. To make these functions salient, we relate our discussion to an exemplar from systems biological research on the mechanism for countering heat shock-the heat shock response (HSR) system-in Escherichia coli (E. coli) bacteria. This research also reinforces a more general lesson: ontic constraint accounts in the literature on mechanistic explanation provide insufficiently informative normative appraisals of mechanistic models. We close by outlining an alternative view on the explanatory norms governing mechanistic representation.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Systems Biology, Biology, Explanation, and 15 moreSystems Biology (Biology), Mechanistic modeling, Filosofia De Las Ciencias, Filosofia De La Biologia, Modeling of biological systems, Filosofía de la Ciencia, Mechanistic Explanation, Escherichia coli, Bacteria, Idealization, E. coli, Scientific explanation, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Heat Shock Proteins, and System Modeling and Simulation
ABSTRACT: The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception , learning, and action, the free-energy principle has... more
ABSTRACT: The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception , learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment , life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences.
Research Interests: Ergodic Theory, Autopoiesis, Biology, Theory Of Mechanisms, Transcendental Arguments, and 15 moreMechanistic modeling, Modeling of biological systems, Entropy, Biological Sciences, Bayesian Inference, Bio Informatics, Mechanistic Explanation, First-principles modelling and simulation, Organicism, Mechanism, Predictive coding, Free Energy, Information Entropy, Karl Friston, and Predictive Processing
This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is inferentially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly... more
This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is inferentially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scientific practice. Firstly, the main argument that would speak in favor of OC is invalid, and faces several objections. Secondly, OC's superimposition of ontic explanation and singular causation leaves it unable to accommodate scientifically important explanations. Finally, attempts to salvage OC by reframing it in terms of 'ontic constraints' just concedes the debate to the epistemic conception of explanation. Together, these arguments indicate that the epistemic conception is more or less the only game in town.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, Causation, General Philosophy of Science, Explanation, Scientific Representation, and 15 moreFilosofia De Las Ciencias, Filosofía de la Ciencia, Filosofía, Mechanistic Explanation, Theories of Explanation, Filosofia da Ciência, Scientific explanation, Causal explanation, Idealization, explanation and understanding, Explicação, Wesley C. Salmon, Explicaciones, Ontic Conception of Explanation, Causation and Explanation, and Epistemic Conception of Explanation
ABSTRACT: Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a 'reversal of explanatory direction'. Once reversed, they purport... more
ABSTRACT: Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a 'reversal of explanatory direction'. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists' main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and the reversal legitimate, minimalists' adequacy thesis is still implausible.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Philosophy Of Language, Truth, Philosophical Logic, States of Affairs, Facts, Propositions, and 51 moreDeflationism, Minimalism, Explanation, Theories Of Truth, Philosophy of Language (Humanities), Filosofia Del Lenguaje, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Propositions, Filología, Filosofie, Philosophie, Filosofía, Filosophy, Truth theory, Verdad, Facticity, Minimalismo, Concept of Truth, Philosophy of language; theories of truth, Verdade, Teorías de la verdad, Vérité, Wahrheit, Truth, Deflationism, Correspondence, Hakikat, Theory of Truth, Paul Horwich, Philosophy of Truth, Explicação, Waarheid, Filosofia, Truth and Semantics, ἀλήθεια, Truth Deflationism, Deflationary Truth, Equivalence Schema, Filsafat Hakikat, Explicaciones, Prawda, The concept of truth, Epistemology, Truth, Philosophy of Logic, Deflationary Theory, Ter Waarheid, Teorias de verdade, Deflationism of Truth, Minimalism (Truth), Explanatory Adequacy, Minimalist Conception of Truth, Alethics, Alethic Deflationism, and Pravda
ABSTRACT: Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we consider a central case: reward-related activity of... more
ABSTRACT: Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we consider a central case: reward-related activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that current evidence vindicates explanatory pluralism, while leaves unwarranted the grand unifying claims of the predictive processing theory of the brain. More generally, we suggest that scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to come in the form of a single overarching grand unifying theory.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Psychology, Computational Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy, and 47 moreAffective Neuroscience, Dopaminergic Neurotransmision, General Philosophy of Science, Explanation, Scientific Theories, Cognitive Neuroscience, Logical Empiricism, Behavioral Neuroscience, Pluralism, Reductionism, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Social Cognitive Affective Neuroscience, Predictive Sensory Processing, Dopamine, Explanatory Models, Filosofía, Scientific Pluralism, Mechanistic Explanation, Hypothesis testing, Predictive coding, Neurowissenschaften, Reward prediction error, Prediction error, Scientific explanation, Pluralisme, Free Energy, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Neuroscienze, Filosofia Della Mente, Psicologia, Andy Clark, Ruthless Reductionism, Filozofia, Pluralismo, Pluralistic Epistemology, Reductive Physicalism, Explanatory Pluralism, Filosofia Della Scienza, Neurosciencia, Reductive Materialism, Neurofilosofia, Dopamine System, Brain Reward System, Philosophy and Neuroscience, Free-Energy Principle, Neurosciences, Pluralismo Epistemico, Karl Friston, and Predictive Processing
ABSTRACT: This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called 'Heuristic Identity Theory' (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why... more
ABSTRACT: This paper employs a case study from the history of neuroscience—brain reward function—to scrutinize the inductive argument for the so-called 'Heuristic Identity Theory' (HIT). The case fails to support HIT, illustrating why other case studies previously thought to provide empirical support for HIT also fold under scrutiny. After distinguishing two different ways of understanding the types of identity claims presupposed by HIT and considering other conceptual problems, we conclude that HIT is not an alternative to the traditional identity theory so much as a relabeling of previously discussed strategies for mechanistic discovery.
Research Interests: Neuroscience, Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, and 76 moreElectrophysiology, Heuristics, Philosophy of Psychology, History and Philosophy of Biology, Scientific Discovery (Cognitive Neuroscience), Decomposition, Affective Neuroscience, Theory Of Mechanisms, History of Neuroscience, Metaphysics of Mind, Localization, Pleasure, Dopaminergic Neurotransmision, Identity (Philosophy), Metaphysics of Science, Explanation, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, History Of Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Science, History of the Philosophy of Science, Epistemology of Experimentation, History of the Human sciences, History and Philosophy of the Human Sciences, Mechanistic modeling, Neurobiology, Identity theory, Behavioral Neuroscience, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, History and Philosophy of Neuroscience, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Metaphysics of Identity, Nucleus Accumbens, Reward, Mechanistic explanations for physiological phenomena, Dopamine, Psicología, Mechanistic Explanation, Methodology of Scientific Research, Philosophy of Science, Type-Identity, General Philosophy of Science, Logic, Causal Reasoning, História da Psicologia, Scientific explanation, Mechanism and Explanation, History of neurosciences, Historia De La Psicología, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Reward, Emotion, Pleasure, Modelo Heurístico, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, William Bechtel, História e filosofia das ciências, Heuristic Methods, Psicologia, Neuroscienze, Scienze Cognitive, Mechanical Philosophy, Explanatory Pluralism, Causal Mechanisms, Neural Basis of Craving, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, History of Psychology and Neuroscience, History of the Philosophy of Mind, Dopamine System, Type identity Relations, Brain Reward System, Philosophy and Neuroscience, Mechanistic Psychology, Psicologia, Heuristic Identity Theory, Neurosciences, Midbrain Dopamine Neurons, History and Philosophy of Science, Dopaminergic Neurons, Philosophical Theories of the Brain, Brain-Stimulation Reward, Mechanistic Philosophy, Mesolimbic, Intracranial Self-Stimulation, Mechanistic Conception of Explanation, and Mechanism (philosophy)
Pluralism, no less than traditional inflationism and deflationism, is consistent with all four main approaches to the alethic paradoxes: the truth-value gluts (dialethism) and gaps (analethism) solutions, the hierarchical gambit... more
Pluralism, no less than traditional inflationism and deflationism, is consistent with all four main approaches to the alethic paradoxes: the truth-value gluts (dialethism) and gaps (analethism) solutions, the hierarchical gambit (Tarskianism), and the meaninglessness strategy (positivism). The view explored in this chapter is that some variant of positivism could be a good bet—albeit not one that defends a meaningless strategy per se. Rather, I suggest an approach in which pluralists take a liar sentence (λ, hereafter) to be undecidable. That is, pluralists can decline to assert the dialethicist’s claim that λ is both true and false, and can decline to assert the analethicist’s claim that λ is neither true nor false; and they can decline to assert that λ is either true or false, and that λ is true, and that λ is false. Moreover, to so decline, pluralists need not positively assert that λ is meaningless. Rather, for pluralists, λ may be meaningful but undecidable.
Research Interests: Philosophy Of Language, Truth, Philosophy of Logic, Paradoxes, Theories Of Truth, and 15 moreTheories of truth (Philosophy), Logical Paradox, Pluralism, Liar Paradox, Semantic Paradoxes, Paradox, Verdad, Pluralisme, Verdade, Truth pluralism, Pluralismo, Teorías de la verdad, Alethic Pluralism, Philosophy of Truth, and Pluralism about Truth
ABSTRACT: The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, featuring original new work---both critical and constructive---from Keith Simmons, Cezary Cieśliński, Teresa Marques, Anil Gupta, Shawn Standefer, Andrew Howat, Filippo... more
ABSTRACT: The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, featuring original new work---both critical and constructive---from Keith Simmons, Cezary Cieśliński, Teresa Marques, Anil Gupta, Shawn Standefer, Andrew Howat, Filippo Ferrari, Paul Horwich, and Katarzyna Kijania-Placek. Special thanks to Gila Sher and the other editors-in-chief of Synthese for the opportunity, to my co-editor, Joseph Ulatowski, for making it all happen, and to each of the very many referees who generously gave us their time and scrupulous attention in reviewing the manuscripts.
Research Interests: Philosophy Of Language, Truth, Philosophical Logic, States of Affairs, Facts, Propositions, Deflationism, and 29 moreMinimalism, Theories Of Truth, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Liar Paradox, Propositions, Filosofie, Filosofía, Truth theory, Verdad, Philosophy of language; theories of truth, Verdade, Axiomatic truth theories, Teorías de la verdad, Wahrheit, Truth, Deflationism, Correspondence, Theory of Truth, Paul Horwich, Philosophy of Truth, Waarheid, Filosofia, Truth Deflationism, Deflationary Truth, Equivalence Schema, Epistemology, Truth, Philosophy of Logic, Deflationary Theory, Deflationism of Truth, Minimalism (Truth), Explanatory Adequacy, and Alethics
ABSTRACT: Wesley Salmon’s version of the ontic conception of explanation is a main historical root of contemporary work on mechanistic explanation. This paper examines and critiques the philosophical merits of Salmon’s version, and argues... more
ABSTRACT: Wesley Salmon’s version of the ontic conception of explanation is a main historical root of contemporary work on mechanistic explanation. This paper examines and critiques the philosophical merits of Salmon’s version, and argues that his conception’s most fundamental construct is either fundamentally obscure, or else reduces to a non-ontic conception of explanation. Either way, the ontic conception is a misconception.
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, History of Philosophy of Science, Causation, Metaphysics of Science, and 30 moreGeneral Philosophy of Science, Explanation, Scientific Realism, Causality, Mechanistic modeling, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Explanatory Models, Mechanistic Explanation, Theories of Explanation, Scientific explanation, Causal explanation, Wesley C Salmon, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Scientific Knowledge, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Idealization, explanation and understanding, Causal Mechanisms, Philosophy and history of science, Ontological Turn, Explanatory characteristics, Causality, Mechanism, Causal Mechanisms: In Social Theory, Wesley C. Salmon, Category Mistakes, Scientific Understanding, Scientific Explanation and Understanding, Metaforas en las ciencias, Ontic Conception of Explanation, José Alberto Coffa, and Causation and Explanation
ABSTRACT: The plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ in cognitive science is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Some have argued that intractability is a pseudoproblem, however, because cognizers do... more
ABSTRACT: The plausibility of so-called ‘rational explanations’ in cognitive science is often contested on the grounds of computational intractability. Some have argued that intractability is a pseudoproblem, however, because cognizers do not actually perform the rational calculations posited by rational models; rather, they only behave as if they do. Whether or not the problem of intractability is dissolved by this gambit critically depends, inter alia, on the semantics of the ‘as if’ connective. First, this paper examines the five most sensible explications in the literature, and concludes that none of them actually circumvents the problem. Hence, rational ‘as if’ explanations must obey the minimal computational constraint of tractability. Second, this paper describes how rational explanations could satisfy the tractability constraint. Our approach suggests a computationally unproblematic interpretation of ‘as if’ that is compatible with the original conception of rational analysis.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Computational Intelligence, Philosophy of Psychology, and 29 moreCognition, Computational Modelling, Realism (Philosophy), Approximation Algorithms, Rational Choice, Explanation, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Bounded Rationality, Cognitive Complexity, Cognitive Sciences, Bayesian Inference, Rationality, Computational Models of Cognition, Computational Cognitive Science, Psicología, Approximate Bayesian Computation, Mechanistic Explanation, Computational Psychology, Scientific explanation, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Psychological Explanation, As If Conditionals, Psicología Computacional, NP hard, Mechanistic Psychology, Functional Explanation, Intractability, Rational Analysis, and Surrealism (Philosophy)
ABSTRACT: Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue... more
ABSTRACT: Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Science, Cognitive Modeling, Heuristics, and 35 moreComputational Modeling, Philosophy of Psychology, Cognition, Computational Modelling, Modeling, Approximation Algorithms, Modeling and Simulation, Explanation, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Bounded Rationality, Philosophy of Computer Science, Cognitive Complexity, Cognitive Sciences, Computational Models of Cognition, Computational Cognitive Science, Psicología, Mechanistic Explanation, Cognitive Computing, Philosophy of Cognition, Heuristic and Meta-heuristic Algorithms, Psicologia Cognitiva, Computational Psychology, Psychological Explanation, Modelo Heurístico, Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Explanations in Psychology, NP-Hard, Heuristic Methods, Psicología Computacional, Intractable Problems, Mechanistic Psychology, Psicologia, Functional Explanation, Computional Complexity, and Intractability
ABSTRACT: The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary... more
ABSTRACT: The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have assimilated their conception of explanation to the ontic conception.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, Causal reasoning, Causation, Representation in science, Understanding, and 32 moreTheory Of Mechanisms, Metaphysics of Science, Explanation, Scientific Representation, Causality, Causal Inference, Ellipsis, Mechanistic explanations for physiological phenomena, Mechanistic Explanation, Ambiguity, Aufklärung, Mechanism, Theories of Explanation, Scientific explanation, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Scientific Knowledge, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Idealization, explanation and understanding, Explanation and Understanding, Epistemología Y Filosofía De Las Ciencias, Wesley C. Salmon, Mechanistic Psychology, Syllepsis, Category Mistakes, Semantic View of Theories, Scientific Understanding, Scientific Explanation and Understanding, Ontic Conception of Explanation, Reductive Explanation, José Alberto Coffa, Causation and Explanation, and Mechanistic Conception of Explanation
ABSTRACT: We describe the plurality of types of explanation and explanatory practices that are distinctive of experimental or scientific psychology. We also consider the extent to which the framework of mechanistic explanation provides a... more
ABSTRACT: We describe the plurality of types of explanation and explanatory practices that are distinctive of experimental or scientific psychology. We also consider the extent to which the framework of mechanistic explanation provides a unifying perspective.
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Psychophysics, Philosophy of Mind, and 29 morePhilosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Psychophysiology, Memory (Cognitive Psychology), Motivation (Psychology), Philosophy of Psychology, Theoretical Psychology, Theory Of Mechanisms, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, History Of Psychology, Mechanistic modeling, Filosofia De La Mente, Information Processing, Reward, Psychologie, Mechanistic Explanation, Filosofia da Mente, History and Philosophy of Psychology, História da Psicologia, Mechanism, Physiological Psychology, History of Psychology - Psychology Education - Psychology, Historia De La Psicología, Psychological Explanation, Non Reductive Approaches to Philosophy of Science/philosophy of Mind, Mechanistic Psychology, Nomological Explanation, Psychological Laws, and Mechanistic Conception of Explanation
ABSTRACT: This chapter argues that appeals to actual scientific practice show that higher-level psychological explanations are not precluded by reductive explanation, much less rendered extinct. To exemplify this conclusion, the case of... more
ABSTRACT: This chapter argues that appeals to actual scientific practice show that higher-level psychological explanations are not precluded by reductive explanation, much less rendered extinct. To exemplify this conclusion, the case of mesocorticolimbic dopamine is discussed at length.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, Decomposition, Neurophilosophy, and 36 moreTheory Of Mechanisms, Localization, Dopaminergic Neurotransmision, Metaphysics of Science, Explanation, Filosofia De La Mente, Reductionism, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Eliminativism, Reward, Mechanistic explanations for physiological phenomena, Dopamine, Eliminative materialism, Mechanistic Explanation, Filosofia da Mente, Reward based learning, Mechanism, Reward prediction error, Scientific explanation, Motivational Salience, Filosofia Della Mente, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Neuroscienze, Filosofia Della Mente, Psicologia, Filosofía de la Mente, Psychological Explanation, Ruthless Reductionism, Scientific Research, Reductive Materialism, Non Reductive Approaches to Philosophy of Science/philosophy of Mind, Dopamine System, Brain Reward System, Filosofia De Las Neurociencias, Mechanistic Psychology, Mesolimbic, Reductive Explanation, and Mechanistic Conception of Explanation
ABSTRACT: We describe the development of the mechanical philosophy and its applications to mental phenomena, and then turn toward a more analytical characterization of mechanism and mechanistic explanation. Understanding what mechanisms... more
ABSTRACT: We describe the development of the mechanical philosophy and its applications to mental phenomena, and then turn toward a more analytical characterization of mechanism and mechanistic explanation. Understanding what mechanisms are and recognizing the role they play in psychology casts a number of traditional philosophical issues about psychology in a very different light than in most philosophical discussions.
Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, and 27 moreMotivation (Psychology), Philosophy of Psychology, Theoretical Psychology, Theory Of Mechanisms, Metaphysics of Science, Explanation, History Of Psychology, Mechanistic modeling, Mechanistic explanations for physiological phenomena, Psychologie, Mechanistic Explanation, Theory of Mechanism, History and Philosophy of Psychology, História da Psicologia, Mechanism, Scientific explanation, Historia De La Psicología, Mechanistic Models of Explanation, Psychology and Philosophy, Psychological Explanation, Psychologia, Cognitive Mechanisms, Mechanistic Psychology, Deductive-Nomological Explanation, Ontic Conception of Explanation, Nomological Explanation, and Mechanistic Conception of Explanation
ABSTRACT: g-Aminobutyric acid subtype B (GABA-B) receptors play an important role in regulating brain reward function. Accumulating evidence suggests that chronic exposure to drugs of abuse may alter GABA-B receptor function. The present... more
ABSTRACT: g-Aminobutyric acid subtype B (GABA-B) receptors play an important role in regulating brain reward function. Accumulating evidence suggests that chronic exposure to drugs of abuse may alter GABA-B receptor function. The present studies investigated whether chronic nicotine administration, using a regimen that induces nicotine dependence, increased inhibitory regulation of brain reward function by GABA-B receptors, as measured by intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) thresholds in rats. Such an action of nicotine may contribute to the reward deficit observed during nicotine withdrawal. Nicotine-dependent and control rats received the GABA transaminase inhibitor g-vinyl-GABA or the GABA-B receptor agonist CGP44532 according to a within-subjects Latin square design, and ICSS thresholds were assessed post-injection. Systemic administration of the lowest doses of GVG or CGP44532 did not alter reward thresholds in control or nicotine-treated rats, whereas the highest doses of each drug elevated thresholds similarly in both groups. Further, micro-infusion of CGP44532 directly into the ventral tegmental area elevated ICSS thresholds similarly in saline- and nicotine-treated rats. Overall, these data demonstrate that prolonged nicotine exposure did not alter GABA-B receptor-mediated regulation of brain reward function, and suggest that alterations in GABA-B receptor activity are unlikely to play a role in the brain reward deficits associated with spontaneous nicotine withdrawal.
Research Interests: Addiction, Drugs And Addiction, Neuropharmacology, GABAergic Neurotransmission, Neurophysiology of addiction, and 19 moreReward, Drug abuse and addiction, Substance Abuse, GABA receptors, Nicotine, Nicotine Dependence, Drug Addiction, Drug Withdrawal, Nicotine Addiction, Nicotine Pharmacology, Drugs of Abuse, Ventral Tegmental Area, Drugs and Addictions, Brain Reward System, Nicotine Self-administration, GABAB receptors agonists, Brain-Stimulation Reward, Nicotine withdrawal, and Intracranial Self-Stimulation
ABSTRACT: I argue that embodied cognition research exhibits a striking imbalance of experimental progress and theoretical clarification. In particular, the concept of grounding—now one of the theoretical cornerstones of the embodied... more
ABSTRACT: I argue that embodied cognition research exhibits a striking imbalance of experimental progress and theoretical clarification. In particular, the concept of grounding—now one of the theoretical cornerstones of the embodied cognition movement—remains unilluminated. A major lacuna of Pecher & Zwaan's (2005) volume, 'Grounding Cognition', as a whole, is that it fails to articulate just what the grounding relation actually is. Subsequently, this volume exemplifies the need for a new direction in embodied cognition. Now more than ever, concepts like EMBODIMENT and GROUNDING are in dire need of some plain old-fashioned conceptual analysis.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Perception, Cognition, Distributed Cognition, Situated Cognition, and 22 moreEmbodied Cognition, Embodiment, Embodied Mind and Cognition, Perception-Action, Ecological Psychology, Cognitive Linguistics, Grounded Theory, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Embodied Embedded Cognition, Enaction (Psychology), Enactivism, Embodied and Distributed Cognition, Embodied Interaction, Grounded Cognition, Enaction, Symbol Grounding, Enactive cognition, Situated Action, Situated Knowledge, Embodied knowledge, Grounding, and Embodied and Enactive Cognition
ABSTRACT: Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term true, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative... more
ABSTRACT: Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term true, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists’ behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
Research Interests: Semantics, Property, Truth, Functionalism, Deflationism, and 38 moreTheories Of Truth, Concepts, Epistemic Circularity, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Pluralism, Denotational Semantics, Quantificação, Verification, Verdad, Functional Role Semantics, David Lewis, Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, Functionalist Theory, Pluralisme, Maximum de vraisemblance, Ramsey Sentence, Conceptual function, Verdade, Ramsification, Correspondence Theory, Multiple realization, Conceptual Change Strategy, Carnap sentence, Teorías de la verdad, Wahrheit, Não-verdade, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Alethic Functionalism, Implicit Definition, Functionalist Approaches, Waarheid, Aletheia, Prawda, Michael P. Lynch, Criteria Problem, Platitude-based strategies, and Alethics
ABSTRACT: Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable—or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its... more
ABSTRACT: Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable—or, worse, just a non-starter—it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
Research Interests: Truth, Theories Of Truth, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Pluralism, Verdad, and 13 morePluralisme, Verdade, Demandingness, Pluralismo, Teorías de la verdad, Wahrheit, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Alethic Functionalism, Truth (Concept), Waarheid, Pluralismo Epistemico, and The concept of truth
Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether... more
Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required---one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms play in discourse. We undertake such an analysis in this paper; in particular, we start with certain elements from Kant and Frege, and develop a construct of truth as a normative modality of cognitive acts (e.g., thought, judgment, assertion). Using the various biconditional T-schemas to sanction the general passage from assertions to (equivalent) assertions of truth, we then suggest that an illocutionary analysis of truth can contribute to its locutionary analysis as well, including the analysis of diverse constructions involving alethic terms that have been largely overlooked in the philosophical literature. Finally, we briefly indicate the importance of distinguishing between alethic and epistemic modalities.
Research Interests: Analytic Philosophy, Epistemology, History of Analytic Philosophy, Epistemology (Anthropology), Truth, and 29 moreImmanuel Kant, Theories Of Truth, Norms of assertion, Speech Act Theory, Gottlob Frege, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Assertion (and other linguistic actions), Speech acts, Epistemic Modals, Epistemic modality, Immanence, Psychologism, Metaphysics of Judgment, Cognitive Linguistics; Tense, Aspect and Modality; Syntax and Morphology, Epistemology of Modality, Normativity of Logic, Normativity of Truth, Illocutionary Acts, Judgment Stroke, Correspondence Theory, Epistemic Normativity, Normativity of the Intentional, Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts, Illocutionary Force, Epistemic truth, Language Truth and Logic, Alethic Modality, Diallelus, and Epistemic theories of truth
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Research Interests: Philosophy Of Language, Analytic Philosophy, Truth, Theories Of Truth, Filosofia Del Lenguaje, and 18 moreTheories of truth (Philosophy), Pluralism, Filosofie, Filosofía, Verdad, Pluralisme, Verdade, Pluralismo, Teorías de la verdad, Wahrheit, Theory of Truth, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Alethic Functionalism, Philosophy of Truth, Waarheid, Filosofia, and Filosofía Analítica. Pluralismo
Research Interests: Philosophy Of Language, Truth, Theories Of Truth, Filosofia Del Lenguaje, Theories of truth (Philosophy), and 16 moreFilosofie, Filosofía, Filosofia Analitica, Truth theory, Verdad, Verdade, Teorías de la verdad, Wahrheit, Theory of Truth, Philosophy of Truth, Waarheid, Filosofia, Filosofía Analítica, Filosofia Analítica, Filosofía Analítica. Pluralismo, and Analytisk Filosofi
ABSTRACT: A novel alternative to traditional inflationary approaches, second-order alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too... more
ABSTRACT: A novel alternative to traditional inflationary approaches, second-order alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too generates additional problems---such as its suspect appropriation of the multiple realizability paradigm and the criteria problem for platitude-based strategies---that need to be solved before it can become an adequate inflationary approach to the nature of truth.
Research Interests: Truth, Deflationism, Theories Of Truth, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Pluralism, and 22 moreConceptual analysis, Verdad, Functional Role Semantics, Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, Pluralisme, Ramsey Sentence, Concept of Truth, Verdade, Ramsification, Multiple realization, Teorías de la verdad, Wahrheit, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Alethic Functionalism, Waarheid, ἀλήθεια, Pluralismo Epistemico, Prawda, Pluralism and Propositional Truth, Criteria Problem, and Platitude-based strategies
ABSTRACT: 'New wave' reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of... more
ABSTRACT: 'New wave' reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a 'smooth' pole (theoretical identity) and a 'bumpy' pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that reductions of folk psychology to neuroscience will be located in the middle of this continuum; as neuroscientific evidence about mental states checks in, theoretical folk psychology will therefore be moderately revised. However, the model has conceptual problems which preclude its success in reviving reductionism, and its commitment to a syntactic approach wrecks its attempt to rescue folk psychology. Moreover, the architecture of the continuum operates on a category mistake that sneaks in an eliminativist conclusion. I argue that new wave reductionism therefore tends to be eliminativism in disguise.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophy of Psychology, Theoretical Psychology, and 44 moreFolk Psychology, Neurophilosophy, Materialism, General Philosophy of Science, Explanation, Scientific Realism, Filosofia De Las Ciencias, Filosofia De La Mente, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Reductionism, Unity of science, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Eliminativism, Filosofía de la Ciencia, Eliminative materialism, Filosofia da Mente, Theory of Science, Mind/body Problem, Paul Churchland, Filosofia da Ciência, Scientific explanation, Theory Change, Mind-body problem, Scientific Progress, Psychology and Neuroscience, Neuroscienze, Filosofia Della Mente, Psicologia, Filosofía de la Mente, Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Patricia Churchland, Philosophy of Mind and Metaphyics, Theoretical Change, Filosofía y Psicología, Filosofia Della Scienza, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, Reductive Materialism, Filosofia Da Psicologia, Intertheoretic Reduction, The Churchlands, Semantic View of Theories, Structuralist Theories of Scientific Progress, Reduction in Science, Syntactic View of Theories, Reductive Explanation, and New Wave Reductionism
This text provides an accessible introduction to the main concepts and methods of scientific reasoning. With the help of an array of contemporary and historical examples, definitions, visual aids, and exercises for active learning, the... more
This text provides an accessible introduction to the main concepts and methods of scientific reasoning. With the help of an array of contemporary and historical examples, definitions, visual aids, and exercises for active learning, the textbook helps to increase students’ scientific literacy. The first part of the book covers the definitive features of science: naturalism, experimentation, modeling, and their merits and limitations. The second part covers the main forms of inference in science: deductive, inductive, abductive, probabilistic, statistical, and causal. The book concludes with a discussion of explanation, theorizing and theory-change, and the relationship between science and society. The textbook is designed to be adaptable to a wide variety of different kinds of courses. In any of these different uses, the book helps students better navigate our scientific, 21st-century world, and it lays the foundation for more advanced undergraduate coursework in a wide variety of liberal arts and science courses.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, Social Sciences, Science Education, History of Science, Science, and 36 moreScientific Models, Scientific Reasoning, Nature of Science, Scientific Literacy, Elementary Science Education, Science Teaching Methods, Scientific method & Education, Scientific Inference, Scientific methodology, Science teacher education, Science and Mathematics Education, Ciencia, Ciências Da Educação, Ciencias, Science education, nature of science, Wissenschaftliche Weiterbildung, Escuela Ciencias de la Educación, Scientific Method, Ciencias de la educación, Educação em ciências, Scientific Research, Pedagogische wetenschappen, Videnskabelig Praksis, Models in science education, Ciencias Naturales, Modeling and Science Instruction, Wetenschapsfilosofie, Ciencias de la educacion, The Nature of Science and How Science Works, Science Education; Teacher Education Program; Nature of Science, Modeling in Science Education, Éducation Scientifique, Statistical Inference and Scientific Method, Bilimsel Din Eğitimi, Educazione Scientifica, and razonamiento cientifico
ABSTRACT: The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views about truth, such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention, and have fueled... more
ABSTRACT: The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views about truth, such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention, and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these views are in agreement in at least one fundamental respect: they are all alethic monists. They endorse the thesis that there is only one property in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea: there are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first to focus specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. One additional reason to examine truth pluralism is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature---particularly debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Language, Analytic Philosophy, Metaphysics of properties, and 36 moreRealism (Philosophy), Truth, States of Affairs, Facts, Propositions, Deflationism, Beliefs, Pragmatist Theory Of Truth, Theories Of Truth, Norms of assertion, Filosofia Del Lenguaje, Realism vs Anti-Realism, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Pluralism, Truthmaking, Liar Paradox, Objectivity, Expressivism, Ontology and Naturalized Metaphysics, Verificationism, Filosofía, Realism, Norms of belief, Paradox, Maximum de vraisemblance, Normativity of Truth, Coherence theories of truth, Correspondence Theory, Evaluation of Correspondence Theory of Truth, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Alethic Functionalism, Truth and Falsity, Assertibility, Identity theory of truth, The concept of truth, Alethic Primitivism, and Superassertibility
ABSTRACT: Two decades ago, there was a great flurry of work on the subject of truth, which subsequently set much of the agenda for future debates. Interest in the subject of truth remains unabated at all levels of inquiry, both within... more
ABSTRACT: Two decades ago, there was a great flurry of work on the subject of truth, which subsequently set much of the agenda for future debates. Interest in the subject of truth remains unabated at all levels of inquiry, both within philosophy and from without, in both academic and popular guises. But while truth continues to be of focal interest, it seems that there have been remarkably fewer new directions since then. New Waves in Truth offers eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty of the most promising young scholars working on truth today. Contributions to the volume span truth ascriptions, deflationism, realism and the correspondence theory, the value of truth, and kinds of truth and truth-apt discourse. The research programs of the contributors are beginning to reset that agenda, and each is positioned to make new waves throughout the subject.
Research Interests: Philosophy Of Language, Analytic Philosophy, Reference, Semantics, Realism (Philosophy), and 30 moreTruth, Theories Of Reference, Deflationism, Predication, Pragmatist Theory Of Truth, Theories Of Truth, Norms of assertion, Philosophy of Language (Humanities), Filosofia Del Lenguaje, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Truthmaking, Assertion (and other linguistic actions), Expressivism, Truth Relativism, Filosofía, Realism, Analyticity, Maximum de vraisemblance, Coherence theories of truth, Axiomatic truth theories, Correspondence Theory, Assertion, Truthfulness, Alethic Pluralism, Alethic Disjunctivism, Alethic Functionalism, Philosophy of Truth, Truth and Falsity, Rejectionism, and Disquotationalism
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Research Interests: Philosophy, Folk Psychology, Truth, Practical Reasoning, Transcendental Arguments, and 23 moreCategorization, Theories Of Truth, Practical Rationality, Theories of truth (Philosophy), Truthlikeness, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Rationality, Filosofía, Psychologism, Task analysis, Partial Truth, Accuracy, Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Verdade, Linguistic Categorization, Verisimilitude, Precision, Wahrheit, Waarheid, Conceptual Engineering, Epistemic theories of truth, Unity of the Intellect, and Verisimilitude, Truthlikeness, Truth Approximation
Research Interests: Psychiatry, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Phenomenological Psychology, Folk Psychology, and 26 morePhilosophy of Psychiatry, Psychopathology, Philosophy of Psychopathology, Beliefs, Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Self-deception, Delusions, Confabulation, Philosophy of Psychiatry (Philosophy), Irrationality, Epistemological beliefs, False Belief, Psychiatric Disorders, Philosophy, Epistemology, History of Psychiatry, Irrational Beliefs, Alief, Beliefs and attitudes, Self Deception, Cognitive Psychiatry, False Consciousness, Capgras Syndrome, Philosophy of Psychology, Psychotherapy, Psychiatry, Philosophy of Delusions, Cotard Syndrome, Capgras delusion, and Doxastic Conception of Delusions
Research Interests: Semantics, Cognitive Semantics, Meaning, Cognitive Linguistics, Lexical Semantics, and 12 moreLinguistics, Lexical-Functional Grammar, Philosophy of Linguistics, Cognitive Lexical Semantics, Construction of Meaning, Polysemy, Linguistics. Word-formation. Morphology. Lexicology. Semantics., Linguistics and Philosophy, Words and Meanings, Polysemic, Linguistics. Philosophy. Cognitive Sciences. Languages: Italian, and Polysemy, Monosemy, Psycholinguistic Evidence
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Research Interests: Psychology, Philosophy of Science, Neurophilosophy, Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, Reductionism, and 16 morePhilosophy of Neuroscience, Eliminativism, Eliminative materialism, Theory Change, Psychology and Neuroscience, Ruthless Reductionism, Psychology, Neurophilosophy, Cognitive Sscience, Reductive Physicalism, Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience, Reductive Materialism, Intertheoretic Reduction, Philosophy and Neuroscience, Reduction in Science, Metascience, Reductive Explanation, and New Wave Reductionism
Recent arguments for Ruthless Reductionism (RR) over New Mechanism (NM) appeal to metascientific treatments of optogenetic results as evidence for direct ‘mind-to-molecules’ reductive links. Optogenetics exemplifies the importance of tool... more
Recent arguments for Ruthless Reductionism (RR) over New Mechanism (NM) appeal to metascientific treatments of optogenetic results as evidence for direct ‘mind-to-molecules’ reductive links. Optogenetics exemplifies the importance of tool development in driving research and development in the life sciences. However, metascience offers inadequate theoretical grounds to adjudicate philosophical debates. Its treatment of optogenetic results are not tantamount to a parade case of reduction; and even if they were, RR would not thereby be established generally.
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ABSTRACT: Advancement in cognitive science depends, in part, on doing some occasional ‘theoretical housekeeping’. We highlight some conceptual confusions lurking in an important attempt at explaining the human capacity for rational or... more
ABSTRACT: Advancement in cognitive science depends, in part, on doing some occasional ‘theoretical housekeeping’. We highlight some conceptual confusions lurking in an important attempt at explaining the human capacity for rational or coherent thought: Thagard & Verbeurgt’s computational-level model of humans’ capacity for making reasonable and truth-conducive abductive inferences (1998; Thagard, 2000). Thagard & Verbeurgt’s model assumes that humans make such inferences by computing a coherence function (f_coh), which takes as input representation networks and their pair-wise constraints and gives as output a partition into accepted (A) and rejected (R) elements that maximizes the weight of satisfied constraints. We argue that their proposal gives rise to at least three difficult problems.
Research Interests: Cognitive Science, Algorithms, Heuristics, Cognition, Computational Modelling, and 27 moreTruth, Approximation Algorithms, Explanation, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, NP-Hard Optimization, Algorithm, Abduction, Explanatory Models, Computational Models of Cognition, Computational Cognitive Science, Partial Coherence, Metaheuristic Algorithms, Constraint Satisfaction Problems, Dialetheism, Coherence, P versus NP problem, Modelo Heurístico, Coherentism, Heuristic, Constraints, Heuristic Methods, Incoherence, Coherent Structures, NP hard, Structural Incoherence, P VS NP, and Intractability
ABSTRACT: Hypocretin regulates brain reward function and cocaine consumption in rats. The hypocretinergic (Hcrt) system is implicated in energy homeostasis, feeding and sleep regulation. Hypocretinergic cell bodies are located in the... more
ABSTRACT: Hypocretin regulates brain reward function and cocaine consumption in rats. The hypocretinergic (Hcrt) system is implicated in energy homeostasis, feeding and sleep regulation. Hypocretinergic cell bodies are located in the lateral hypothalamus (LH) and project throughout the brain. The aim of the present studies was to investigate the role of the Hcrt system in regulating brain reward function and the reinforcing properties of cocaine in rats. Intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS) thresholds provide an accurate measure of brain reward function in rats. Here we show that a single injection of Hcrt-1 (5 µg icv) induced persistent, long-lasting elevations in ICSS thresholds in drug-naïve rats. Indeed, Hrct-1 elevated ICSS thresholds for 36 h, with peak elevations between 6 and 12 hours after injection. Hrct-1-induced threshold elevations were attenuated by an antibody known to neutralize the binding of hcrt-1 to its receptors. Taken together, these observations suggest that Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function in rats. Because Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function, we hypothesized that it may attenuate the increased brain reward function usually observed after cocaine consumption, and thereby alter cocaine self-administration behavior. A daily injection of Hrct-1 (1 µg icv), for 4 consecutive days, slightly increased cocaine self-administration (0.25 mg/infusion) in rats. Overall, these data demonstrate that Hrct-1 negatively regulates brain reward function, and as such may indirectly alter cocaine self-administration. Given the well-established role of hypocretin neurons in regulating feeding behavior and sleep, we hypothesize that hypocretinergic regulation of brain reward function may provide a mechanism by which appropriate and competing behaviors (e.g. sleep or feeding) may be engaged to maintain energy homeostasis.
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Elevations in brain stimulation reward (BSR) thresholds have been observed in rats undergoing nicotine withdrawal and have been proposed as a sensitive measure of the negative affective state associated with nicotine withdrawal. mGluR are... more
Elevations in brain stimulation reward (BSR) thresholds have been observed in rats undergoing nicotine withdrawal and have been proposed as a sensitive measure of the negative affective state associated with nicotine withdrawal. mGluR are presynaptic autoreceptors that decrease glutamate release when stimulated. The aim of this study was to examine the role of glutamate neurotransmission in nicotine dependence. The mGluR agonist LY314582 (2.5-7.5 mg/kg) precipitated nicotine withdrawal as measured by elevations in BSR thresholds in nicotine-treated rats but not in controls. It was hypothesized that LY314582 precipitated nicotine withdrawal by decreasing glutamatergic tone at postsynaptic glutamate receptors. Therefore, the effects of MPEP (0.5-2 mg/kg), an mGluR antagonist, and MK-801 (0.01-1 mg/kg), an NMDA receptor antagonist, were examined. MPEP elevated BSR thresholds by an equal magnitude in control and nicotine-treated rats. At low doses, MK-801 (0.01-0.2 mg/kg) lowered BSR thresholds to a similar extent in control and nicotine-treated rats. At higher doses, MK-801 (0.25-1 mg/kg) disrupted performance in nicotine-treated and control rats. These data indicate that mGluR and NMDA receptors regulate BSR in opposite directions in non-dependent animals, and chronic nicotine treatment does not alter these effects. Most importantly, the data demonstrate that the mGluR is involved in nicotine dependence, but mGluR and NMDA receptors do not mediate mGluR actions in nicotine dependence.
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The Lvov-Warsaw School's logistic anti-irrationalism-particularly in the works of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Izydora Dąmbska, and Jan Woleński-offered an intellectually distinct alternative to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.... more
The Lvov-Warsaw School's logistic anti-irrationalism-particularly in the works of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Izydora Dąmbska, and Jan Woleński-offered an intellectually distinct alternative to the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. However, its attempt to critique the Franco-German currents of mysticism and romanticism in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, especially in the works of Henri Bergson, open it up to the question of whether its members fully appreciated the consequences of accepting that rational cognition is abstract and schematic. We argue that the abstract nature of rational cognition provides reasons to countenance approximate truth; but doing so seems to have revisionary consequences for the conception of scientific knowledge. The consequences of these arguments seem not to have been anticipated, and point to a new direction for research about the achievability of certain ambitious goals of the Lvov-Warsaw School's logistic anti-irrationalism.