Incoherence

RÉSUMÉ Ce roman est un réçit dans le quel Albert Camus compose un réquisitoire contre la société qui juge en ayant des préjugés. C'est la narration du problème du sens de la vie pour l'homme qui a un double comportement : son comportement social et son comportement naturel. Tout au long de cette narration, il nous donne l'absurdité de l'homme, son désir de tout et son désir d'imposer une vérité qui lui semble absolue. Il est possible de dire que Camus n'essaie pas de faire la peinture d'un tableau réaliste de l'Algérie coloniale. Mais par contre nous pouvons aussi dire qu'il essaie de montrer l'absurdité d'une pareille situation. Cette oeuvre est écrite à la première personne, donc il est possible, dans une certaine mesure, de dire qu'Albert Camus s'identifie à son caractère Meursault et lui donne la charge de narrer l'histoire. Il est intéressant de dire que nous n'assistons pas à la mort de notre personnage car celui-ci est le narrateur de l'histoire, donc il n'est pas possible pour lui de raconter sa propre mort. Meursault nous narre ses pensées et ses sentiments à travers une focalisation interne qui nous permet d'aller vers les profondeurs de sa conscience. Il est possible de dire que le lien qu'entretient Camus avec Meursault est obscur. La narration à la première personne ferait penser à l'autobiographie, mais nous savons qu'il n'en est rien. Le « je » est un procédé pour rendre plus opaque la conscience de son caractère Meursault en supprimant l'écart qui, placée entre Albert Camus et Meursault, facilite l'explication et le jugement moral. Nous allons nous questionner sur sa façon de se sentir étranger envers soi-même, les conventions sociales, son propre procès, le monde et nous essayerons de montrer que certains de ses actes n'ont aucun rapport avec l'idée que l'on peut se faire de lui. Bu makale Crosscheck sistemi tarafından taranmış ve bu sistem sonuçlarına göre orijinal bir makale olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

RÉSUMÉ Cette oeuvre est un récit dans lequel se développe toute une réflexion philosophique où Sartre montre son refus envers la société en général par le biais de Roquetin, qui vit dans un monde où il ne trouve aucun sens à la vie et où il s'étonne de voir que la bourgeoisie de la ville ne voit pas les aspects de la réalité qui, pour lui, sont assez évidents. Pour exprimer ses idées, Sartre utilise un langage sans ornements rhétoriques qui peuvent rendre difficile sa compréhension, puisque surtout, les auteurs engagés du XXème siècle (comme Sartre) donnent plus d'importance au message qu'à la forme dans l'objectif d'être lu par le plus possible public. Le thème principal de l'oeuvre est le fait que Roquentin se trouve dans un état d'angoisse, un état de démoralisation ; une sorte d'ennui qui va le mener à essayer de réfléchir sur ce qu'est l'existence et trouver un moyen de l'expliquer. Il ressent une sorte d'angoisse qu'il va appeler la nausée et il se rend compte qu'il ne peut définir l'existence de cette nausée. Pour lui ce sentiment de nausée est comme une sorte d'étrangeté et de dégout envers tout. Cette nausée qui progresse avec le temps se fait sentir en premier devant les objets puis devant personnes rencontrées et s'étend à tout son rapport au monde. ABSTRACT In this work where a phlosophical thought is told and explained, Jean Paul Sartre states his phlosophic views by means of protagonist Roquentin. Roquentin lives in a world that is not understood by him and he, bevilderedly, observes how the urban bourgeoisie cant perceive the reflections of the reality. Taking care of his thoughts to be clear, Jean Paul Sartre used a plain tongue and paid attention to his style to be cognisable. This is the

There are passages in Wittgenstein where he compares his method to psychotherapy and one or two where he seems to suggest that the ‘patient’ has the last word on his ‘illness’ and ‘cure’.  This paper tries to take these seriously, especially in connexion with the idea that victims of philosophical confusion talk nonsense.

Philosophical accusations of talking nonsense made in a polemical spirit are bound to fail, since the only way one can effectively criticise another’s utterance is by attaching some meaning to it.  But if the other acknowledges the possibility that his puzzlement arises from his having been taken in by nonsense, then perhaps a co-operative investigation of this suggestion might be fruitful.  Indeed self-diagnosis ought in principle to be possible.  Ought it not to have happened at least once in the history of philosophy if philosophical nonsense has ever been exposed? 

But there are difficulties.  For example:
a) We must ask whether or not philosophical nonsense, when exposed as such, is supposed to lose all appearance of meaningfulness.  Either answer is problematic.
b) The acknowledged similarity of the methodology under investigation to that of psychoanalysis exposes it to many of the familiar objections to the methodology of psychoanalysis, especially those that draw attention to the misleading influence of suggestion by an authority-figure.
c) The proposal that relentless cross-questioning of a suspected nonsense-talker will eventually lead her to ‘dry up’ (if she really is talking nonsense) seems to involve a version of the so-called Socratic Fallacy.

Anachrony (non-linear chronology) is an interesting narrative device. However, in games, the use of anachrony can lead to coherence problems in the story, as the player may change the course of the future, which can differ considerably from the future already presented to the player. If such issue is not tended to by the design at any point in the game, it means that an unexplained agency-related incoherence (UARI) is introduced into the game's storyline. The interesting questions evoked by this for game design are: What does UARI mean for players? How important game story coherence is for the play experience? Which emotions does UARI evoke? Would players prefer UARI to be removed? To answer these questions, games were developed that feature possibilities for the occurrence of UARI in both anachronic and linear game story scenarios. User studies were carried out with 20 participants, and the data was analyzed using grounded theory principles. In the resulting theory, three main player perspectives to UARI were identified: With anachronic game stories, an acceptive-ludic perspective views the UARI as an inevitable and natural result of the game mechanics of changing the future. With both anachronic and linear game stories, an acceptive-
diegetic perspective views the UARI as part of the story, belonging to the intended experience. With both anachronic and linear game stories, a rejective-logical perspective views the UARI as an unacceptable error in the logic of the game's causal story world.

Philosophers know a great deal about how reasoning can go wrong but very little about what can go wrong with the conclusions that philosophers try to establish by their reasonings.  It is Stove’s great merit that he tackles the latter problem directly, though a certain dogmatism in his approach and a contemptuous attitude towards the ‘great’ philosophers have almost certainly led to a neglect of his work.

This paper inquires into the appropriateness of the label ‘neo-positivist’ that he applies to his own position and considers his view that there are probably, but not certainly, innumerable ways in which a philosophical claim can be wrong, mistaken, untrue, absurd even.  An attempt is made to relate our lack of knowledge here to the Chomsky/McGinn thesis that there may be kinds of problem with which the human intellect is just not equipped to deal.

Ambivalence (as in practical conflicts, moral dilemmas, conflicting beliefs, and mixed feelings) is a central phenomenon of human life. Yet ambivalence is incompatible with entrenched philosophical conceptions of personhood, judgement, and action, and is denied or marginalised by thinkers of diverse concerns. This book takes a radical new stance, bringing the study of core philosophical issues together with that of ambivalence. The book proposes new accounts in several areas – including subjectivity, consciousness, rationality, and value – while elucidating a wide range of phenomena expressive of ambivalence, from emotional ambivalence to self-deception. The book rejects the view that ambivalence makes a person divided, showing that our tension-fraught attitudes are profoundly unitary. Ambivalence is not tantamount to confusion or to paralysis: it is always basically rational, and often creative, active, and perceptive as well. The book develops themes from Wittgenstein, Davidson, Sartre, and Freud. It engages with contemporary debates in Analytic Philosophy in addition to work ranging from Aristotle to Cultural Studies and Empirical Psychology, and considers a rich set of examples from daily life and literature.

Mental disorders have become the topic of numerous contemporary American novels. Attesting to the ongoing fascination with the workings and the sciences of the human mind, many of these texts turn to neuroscientific questions. This paper offers a close reading of one of these ‘neuronarratives’ – Joshua Ferris’s acclaimed 2010 novel The Unnamed, a story in which the protagonist is afflicted with an utterly mysterious condition that disrupts his sense of self as his mind appears to be separated from his body. In this paper, I aim to show how such a dualist conception problematizes not only the concepts of self and agency as the unnamed disease is linked to contemporary lifestyles in corporate America, but also helps to craft a counternarrative that challenges recent materialist conceptions and neuroscientific theories.

In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's reasons for an action rather than on one's reasons against that action. In this paper I want to explore this suggestion further. One of my tasks will be to distinguish my question from three standard philosophical questions that have tended to overshadow it: the question of freewill and determinism; that of the relation between fact and value; and that of the possibility of weakness of will. On these I shall, on the whole, maintain a studied agnosticism.

This paper will investigate the general class theory of polycalculii, and theory originally developed and introduced on the Quora platform as a kind of philosophy of logic and mathematics. The ostensible goal at minima will be to demonstrate the exclusion of an array of class types which edicate the theorem of the polycalculus. The polycalculus is a general method for deriving equivalent calculus’s other than the traditional intelligent calculus. The domain of this discussion is not only mathematics, but also logic, philosophy, and philosophy of science, as well as philosophy of the foundations of mathematics.

This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action.  Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’.  In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others.  I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question.  For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’.  For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.

I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense.  How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense?  It is generally agreed that the 'Tractatus' is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct.  But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant?  I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise.  If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense.  Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.

(The puzzling passage discussed in the addendum is one in which Diamond seems to be denying that there is any such thing as understanding or imaginatively identifying with the nonsense-talker.)

I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense.  How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense?  It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct.  But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant?  I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise.  If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense.  Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.

El presente artículo se dedica a revisar los sucesos de mayor impacto de la Agenda Global de Desarrollo y a los subsiguientes ejercicios de cooperación internacional para afrontarlos, transcurridos de octubre de 2014 a mayo de 2015. Se argumenta que el principal desafío de este conglomerado de piezas del puzzle de diverso tamaño y alcance es su capacidad para dejar de consistir en la mera suma de sus partes, para pasar a un estado de mayor coordinación entre sí, con miras a conformar un sistema de CID más cohesionado.