Deflationism

Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential – certainly, most discussed - modern conception of truth. It has provoked many different interpretations and reactions, some thinkers celebrating it for successfully explicating the notion of truth, whereas others have argued that it is no good as a philosophical account of truth. The aim of this work is to offer a systematic and critical investigation of its nature and significance, based on the thorough explanation of its conceptual, technical as well as historical underpinnings.

The methodological strategy adopted in the thesis reflects the author’s belief that in order to evaluate the import of Tarski’s conception we need to understand what logical, mathematical and philosophical aspects it has, what role they play in his project of theoretical semantics, which of them hang in together, and which should be kept separate. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a detailed exposition of the conceptual and historical background of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and his method of truth definition for formalized languages, situating it within his project of theoretical semantics, and Chapter 3 explains the formal machinery of Tarski’s truth definitions for increasingly more complex languages. Chapters 4 - 7 form the core of the thesis, all being concerned with the problem of significance of Tarski’s conception. Chapter 4 explains its logico-mathematical import, connecting it to the related works of Gödel and Carnap. Having explained the seminal ideas of the model-theoretic approach to semantics, Chapter 5 tackles the question to what extent Tarski’s ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (and related articles from the 1930s) anticipates this approach, and what elements might be missing from it. Chapter 6 then deals with the vexed question of its philosophical import and value as a theory of truth, reviewing a number of objections and arguments that purport to show that the method fails as an explanation (explication) of the ordinary notion of truth, and, in particular, that it is a confusion to think that Tarski’s truth definitions have semantic import. Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to the question whether Tarski’s theory of truth is a robust or rather a deflationary theory of truth.

On the basis of a careful analysis, the thesis aims to substantiate the following view. [A] Tarski’s theory with its associated method of truth definition was primarily designed to serve logico-mathematical purposes. [B] It can be regarded a deflationary theory of a sort, since it completely abstracts from meta- semantical issues concerning the metaphysical or epistemological basis or status of semantic properties. Indeed, [C] this can be interpreted as its laudable feature, since by separating formal (or logico-mathematical) from meta-semantical (or foundational) aspects it usefully divides the theoretical labour to be done in the area of meaning and semantic properties in general. [D] In spite of the fact that Tarski’s conception of truth has this deflationary flavour, the formal structure of its method of truth-definition is quite neutral in that it can be interpreted and employed in several different ways, some of them deflationary, others more robust.

—ABSTRACT— Since the publication of Truth, Paul Horwich's 'Minimalism' has become the paradigm of what goes under the label 'the deflationary conception of truth'. Despite the many theoretical virtues of Horwich's minimalism, it is usually contended that it cannot fully account for the normative role that truth plays in enquiry. As I see it, this concern amounts to several challenges. One such challenge—call it the axiological challenge—is about whether deflationists have the theoretical resources to explain the value of truth. Some philosophers (e.g. Michael Lynch and Bernard Williams) have argued that they do not. The thought is that by being valuable in the way it is, truth plays a non-trivial explanatory role with respect to core phenomena of enquiry. In order to account for this aspect of truth, the challenge goes, we need to inflate truth's nature to an extent incompatible with core tenets of the minimalist conception. In this paper, I first provide some clarifications of what we mean exactly when we say that truth is valuable. By borrowing important distinction from the current debate in axiology, I elaborate a framework within which to conduct investigations into the value of truth. With reference to Horwich's discussion of the issue, I then discuss the link between questions concerning the explanatory role of truth and the issue of its metaphysical inflation. I conclude by briefly exploring a few strategies on behalf of minimalists to address the axiological challenge. 2

There are many variants of deflationism about truth, but one of them, Paul Horwich's minimalism, stands out because it accepts as axiomatic practical variants of the equivalence schema: ⟨p⟩ is true if and only if p. The equivalence schema is epistemologically fundamental. In this paper, I call upon empirical studies to show that practical variants of the equivalence schema are widely accepted by non-philosophers. While in the empirical data there is variation in how non-philosophers and philosophers talk about truth and how they judge that a sentence is true, a significant amount of data collected over the years reveal that the ordinary or folk view of truth is compatible with the epistemological fundamentality of alethic minimalism. This, I take it, suggests that people share in the same intuitions that form the bedrock of Horwich's minimalism.

The intention of this mechanical engineering project is to fabricate a scrap collecting machine. Since complete automation is very complex and even research facilities haven’t come up with one, you better design one that is operated via a remote control. The automatic scrap collecting machine is designed to remove metal scraps from the work station to the disposal area with the help of Magnet and IR sensor. The use of this automated vehicle system reduces human ef orts and the chances of hazard. The collecting work station consists of the work room, conveyors and iron shattering machine. The big iron scraps from the work area is collected by a conveyor and is brought to an iron shattering machine to reduce its size. This shattered iron scraps are brought away from the machine to the rail module through a conveyor for disposal. An electromagnetic field is a physical field produced by electrically charged objects. It affects the behavior of charged objects in the vicinity of the field. The electromagnetic field extends indefinitely throughout space and describes the electromagnetic interaction. It is one of the four fundamental forces of nature. The field can be viewed as the combination of an electric field and a magnetic field. The electric field is produced by stationary charges, and the magnetic field by moving charges (currents); these two are often described as the sources of the field.

ABSTRACT: Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a 'reversal of explanatory direction'. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists' main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and the reversal legitimate, minimalists' adequacy thesis is still implausible.

My book, "Deflationism & Semantic Theories of Truth",  is available as a paperback via Amazon:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0993594549/

https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0993594549/

To say that the sentence “snow is white” is true, is to say that snow is white, and nothing more.  Because of this apparent redundancy of the truth predicate for sentences, deflationists maintain that truth is a notion lacking in content and therefore not a worthy subject for philosophical analysis.  This book builds on the work of Jeffrey Ketland in demonstrating that semantic definitions of truth for formalised languages, in particular those of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, are richer than their deflationary rivals, in the sense that they enable us to derive results that cannot be derived via deflationary theories.  This deductive power of semantic theories of truth suggests that truth is, contrary to the deflationists’ view, a substantive notion that warrants continued philosophical analysis.

In recent academic debates, a lot has been said about metaontology. Usually, the main point of disagreement in these debates is the relationship between ontology and the logical existential quantifier. It has been well-known, since the famous 'On What There Is' (1948), that the dominant view regarding the meaning of the existential quantifier of formal logic is ontological, which means that the ontological notion of existence is completely captured by it. This association between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier is explicitly defended by Quine with his criterion of ontological commitment. However, the most curious aspect about Quine's criterion that is commonly put aside, on purpose or not, is that it is a clear and extreme attempt to reduce ontological and metaphysical debates to the field of logic and semantics, more specifically, to the theory of reference. His criterion, as it was proposed, can be seen as a tool with which he defends the idea that the correct and only approach to answer the main ontological question " What is there? " is through logical analysis. If this interpretation is correct, the criterion of ontological commitment, although toughly defended by metaphysicians nowadays, is much closer to a deflationist point of view than is usually assumed. This is due to the fact that, as I intend to show, the relation between ontological existence and the logical existential quantifier, especially as proposed by Quine, is reductionist, superficial and completely anti-intuitive.

In this article, we discuss a simple argument that modal metaphysics is misconceived, and responses to it.  Unlike Quine’s, this argument begins with the banal observation that there are different candidate interpretations of the predicate ‘could have been the case’.  This is analogous to the observation that there are different candidate interpretations of the predicate ‘is a member of’.  The argument then infers that the search for metaphysical necessities is misguided in much the way the ‘set-theoretic pluralist’ (Clarke-Doane & Hamkins [2017]) claims that the search for the true axioms of set theory is.  We show that the obvious responses to this argument fail.  However, a new response has emerged that purports to prove, from higher order logical principles, that metaphysical possibility is the broadest kind of possibility applying to propositions, and is to that extent special.  We distill two lines of reasoning from the literature, and argue that their import depends on premises that a ‘modal pluralist’ should deny.  Both presuppose that there is a unique typed hierarchy, which is what the modal pluralist, in the context of higher-order logic, should disavow.  In other words, both presupposes that there is a unique candidate for what higher-order claims could mean.  We consider the worry that, in a higher-order setting, modal pluralism faces an insuperable problem of articulation, collapses into modal monism, is vulnerable to the Russell-Myhill paradox, or even contravenes the truism that there is a unique actual world, and argue that these worries are misplaced.  We also sketch the bearing of the resulting ‘Higher Order Pluralism’ on the theory of content.  An upshot is that, if Higher Order Pluralism is true, then there is no stable metatheory from which to characterize higher order reality.

This book proposes a novel theory of truth and falsity. It argues that truth is a form of reference and falsity is a form of reference failure. Most of the philosophical literature on truth concentrates on certain ontological and epistemic problems. This book focuses instead on language. By utilizing the Fregean idea that sentences are singular referring expressions, the author develops novel connections between the philosophical study of truth and falsity and the huge literature in the philosophy of language on the notion of reference. The first part of the book constructs the author's theory and argues for it in length. Part II addresses the ways in which the theory relates to, and is different from, some of the basic theories of truth. Part III takes up how to account for the truth of sentences with logical operators and quantifiers. Finally, Part IV discusses the applications and implications of the theory for longstanding problems in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and linguistics.

New Correspondence Theory of Truth without the Concept of Fact

CHEN Bo

ABSTRACT: Traditional correspondence theory of truth with the concept of fact encounters many serious difficulties, main one of whom is that it is difficult to explain clearly the concept of ‘fact’ and how propositions ‘correspond’ to facts. This does not mean that we should abandon the traditional correspondence theory of truth and turn to some other type theories of truth. In order to ensure the objectivity of truth, any reasonable theory of truth must adhere to the core insight of traditional correspondence theory of truth: it is not something in our language, nor in our mind, but something in the external world, that make the propositions we use to describe the states of the world true or false. It is entirely possible to formulate a new correspondence theory of truth without the concept of fact but adhering to the core insights mentioned above of traditional correspondence theory. New correspondence theory of truth has its own metaphysical hypothesis, epistemological hypothesis and hypothesis of philosophy of language. Because of the generative nature of language, when defining the concept of truth, new correspondence theory of truth must resort to Tarskian recursive procedure. First, it gives the semantic value of the components of propositions, then defines the truth of the simplest propositions, i.e. atomic propositions, and then gradually defines the truth of more and more complex propositions. Coherence is the intrinsic element of truth. The concept of truth is by no means mediocre and insignificant. On the contrary, it is very important and substantive. The pursuit of truth is our mission.

This is the introductory chapter to "Meaning Without Representation" (OUP 2015).  In it I discuss the nature and promise of, as well as some of the challenges to, anti-representational semantic theories.  Along the way I provide summaries of the remaining essays in the volume.

In this paper I will pose the question of the nature of subjects of experience or selves in the context of Russellian panpsychism. In order to solve the subject-summing problem in panpsychsim deflationary views about subjects are indorsed. Deflationary views about the nature of subjects have been defended by Hume, James, Parfit and Strawson among others. On such views subjects of experience are not persistent through time as we pre-theoretically conceive of them, though they have synchronic unity. Strawson’s deflatory transience view of the self is examined and criticized on the ground that it suffers from the problem of self-identification. Strawson’s view is problematic in light of phenomenal holism. Since synchronic experiential field as a whole is prior to its parts, there is only one holistic experience to which a subject is identical to. Even if a subject is identical to its stream of consciousness, on the base of diachronic unity, it cannot be short-lived.

Une introduction logique et philosophique au problème de la définition de la vérité. Le chapitre contient une présentation du travail de Tarski sur la vérité. Une présentation du travail de Kripke. Un aperçu sur quelques théories contemporaines plus récentes. Une présentation des débats philosophiques sur la nature de la vérité ouverts par le travail Tarski.

It is widely held that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated.  Quine’s arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non-rigid designators.    But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived.  It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest “non-epistemic” (non-deontic) notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every non-epistemic sense.  If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of “necessary”, not necessary in another, and that would be it.  The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime.  In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer.  In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question.  I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument.  I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility.  According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility.  Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory.

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a).1 Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible.

Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch's "one and many" strategy to other debates, I try show to how his argumentative steps can be used to solve—not just the controversy pertaining to truth—but any controversy that surrounds a "What is X?" question.

EXTRAIT : "Veblen offre du capitalisme financier, qu’il voit naître, la conception d’un régime économique fondé sur de nouvelles pratiques commerciales, financières et bancaires qui s’emparent de la production et nous éloigne du capitalisme de Ricardo et Marx. Quand la finance soumet l’industrie, il faut comprendre comment les représentations collectives aliénantes sont autant d’images agissantes sur la société. Veblen est un savant iconoclaste, un briseur de cette économie des images, secret de la nouvelle forme que prend le capitalisme au début du XXième siècle. Une forme qui, depuis lors, a connu bien des avatars déclinés à l’envi grâce aux multiples progrès techniques, mais une forme qui, pour l’essentiel, demeure un principe toujours organisateur du capitalisme. A cet égard, les dispositifs monétaires et financiers ne peuvent être compris sans l’empire que les vested interests exercent sur le système économique. Veblen soutient que le Système de la Réserve Fédérale est, par excellence, une émanation de ces intérêts établis, véritable machine à produire de l’illusion de façon à opérer des transferts de richesses au profit de la perpétuation d’un pouvoir de classe." La dernière version de ce texte a été publié dans un livre à téléchargement libre, c'est-à-dire https://www.ifporient.org/978-2-35159-720-0/
Il s'agit du support donné à une conférence à Beyrouth  en 2015 qui est enregistrée, voir https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3zmqik

This paper presents a new approach to the class-theoretic paradoxes. In the first part of the paper, I will distinguish classes from sets, describe the function of class talk, and  present several reasons for postulating type-free classes. This involves applications to the problem of unrestricted quantification, reduction of properties, natural language semantics, and the epistemology of mathematics. In the second part of the paper, I will present some axioms for type-free classes. My approach is loosely based on the Gödel-Russell idea of limited ranges of significance. It is shown how to derive the second-order Dedekind-Peano axioms within that theory. I conclude by discussing whether the theory can be used as a solution to the problem of unrestricted quantification. In an appendix, I prove the consistency of the class theory relative to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.

Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist-deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect it to contemporary thought about the nature and methods of philosophy. Due to limitations of space, I am unable to discuss all the forms contemporary substantivism has taken. But I try to give a clear sense of the central principles, challenges, and promise of this methodology.

In his influential book Truth, Paul Horwich deploys a philosophical method focused on linguistic usage, that is, on the function(s) the concept of truth serves in actual discourse. In doing so Horwich eschews abstract metaphysics, arguing that metaphysical or ontological conceptions of truth rest on basic misconceptions. From this description, one might reasonably expect Horwich's book to have drawn inspiration from, or even embodied philosophical pragmatism of some kind. Unfortunately Horwich relies upon Russell's tired caricature of pragmatism about truth (''p' is true if and only if it is useful to believe p' (Ibid., p. 34, p. 47)), and as a result underestimates the challenge it poses to Minimalism. This paper develops a pragmatist critique of minimalism that focuses on the seemingly central, plausibly constitutive role played by the concept of truth in the speech-act of assertion. The critique suggests that Horwich's Minimalism does not and cannot accomplish its stated goal of explaining all of the facts involving truth. Indeed, the kind of thorough-going deflationism sought by Horwich and others (including pragmatist sympathizer Bob Brandom) is incompatible with an adequate account of assertion, and perhaps other concepts (like belief, judgement and inquiry) as well.

The Western world in general is experiencing price increases that have not been recorded in decades; in the United States in particular, inflation is now running at a 40-year high of 7.5%, and the Federal Reserve is puzzling over how to exit the inflation tunnel without generating a recession.

With the consumer and producer price indexes recording respectively a 3.23% and a 9.99% annual increase in 2021, led by energy and food items, the debate about inflation finally reached Malaysia too; as happened everywhere else in the world, supply-chain disruptions have been blamed, while the monetary nature of inflation has not been recognized.

The Center for Market Education first warned about inflationary pressures in March 2021 and continued to do so throughout the year. We stressed in particular that inflation is a monetary phenomenon due to the quantity of money rising faster than output. We also explained how the increased quantity of money, generated by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies implemented to address the harms created by lockdowns, created a dichotomy between the real economy and the (over)availability of financial means, a dichotomy that could result in a distortion of the production structure, in a boom-and-bust cycle and, ultimately, in unemployment.

The results of such policies, which were a reaction not to COVID-19 per se, but to the harm created by stay-at-home orders, can be summarized as follows:
- Excess money supply, generating inflation;
- Price inflation, while during an economic crisis price deflation should be favoured (as we shall see);
- GDP still below the 2019 level, despite the expansionary policies;
- A fragile recovery resting on government consumption and government aid-led private consumption;
- A non-friendly ecosystem for investments.

We need to stress, once again, the unavoidable need for a plan of gradual government spending cuts in order to contain inflation, while a rise in interest rates would be detrimental to the investments that are very much needed now.

In this paper, we emphasize that another necessary measure is to abandon the fear of deflation which guides many choices in monetary policy. Are falling prices really such a disaster for an economy that they justify a massive liquidity injection, or are they just an excuse to allow welcome money production to benefit those disadvantaged by price deflation?

In the paper we argue that price deflation in most cases is something natural to the market, or that it is the beneficial – although painful – market reaction to government intervention. We conclude that policies enacted to prevent price deflation lead to harmful consequences for many economic agents.

The general fear of deflation is unfounded. Price deflation can be the natural and welcome consequence of growth, it can bring about real cash building, and it can shorten the recession after an artificial boom. Its most unpleasant form is credit contraction deflation, which decreases the money supply; however, that is only possible in a fractional reserve banking system that has previously created money out of nothing. The main effect is a redistribution of the existing wealth in the economy, rather than a necessary decline in general output, as assumed in various arguments.

The fear of deflation is artificially fed by those who benefit from the creation of new money, since they spend the new money first. Banks and government, as well as businesses that depend on a credit expansion boom, fear deflation and profit from the money production they recommend as a prescription against deflation, at the expense of other economic agents who pay higher prices than they otherwise would. By artificially lowering interest rates and distorting the structure of production, it is precisely expansionary monetary policy that triggers the greatest economic disasters and makes credit contraction possible in the first place. In a full reserve commodity money standard, price deflation is completely harmless and the symptom of strong economic growth or successful cash accumulation.

As our analysis shows, the inflationary policies in the years following the Great Recession must be considered a policy error, as they delayed recovery and reduced economic growth, and their price-inflationary consequences became more and more visible. This policy error was based on or justified by a faulty theory of inflation, which we have addressed in this paper by offering what we consider to be a more correct theory.

In a period such as the present that is characterized by strong inflationary pressures, price deflation should not be discouraged. Rather, we suggest the following policy measures:
- Allow productivity growth deflation by nurturing an environment conducive to innovation;
- Allow cash-building deflation, as savings are the necessary means for enhancing a process of sound growth;
- Reduce government spending to reduce the quantity of money in circulation;
- Reforms should be introduced to reinstate the primacy of balanced budgets.

Characteristic of neo-pragmatism is a commitment to deflationism about semantic properties, and inferentialism about conceptual content. It is usually thought that deflationism undermines the distinction between realistic discourses and others, and that the neo-pragmatists, unlike the classical pragmatists, cannot recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. I argue, however, that (1) the distinction between realistic discourses and others can be maintained even in the face of a commitment to deflationism, and (2) that neo-pragmatists can recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. If deflationism is true, realistic discourses, it turns out, are those that are inferentially integrated with a large body of other commitments, whereas those that call for an anti-realist treatment are inferentially isolated. Now, Grimm has persuasively argued that inquiry aims at achieving understanding, and that to understand something is, roughly, to grasp a large body of inferential connections in which it features. So, if he is right, realistic discourses are those in which the aim of inquiry can be achieved. This fact, together with an inferential theory of conceptual content, will, I argue, allow neo-pragmatists to recognize truth as a norm of belief and inquiry, despite their commitment to deflationism.

This article will address the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz-the leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will present arguments proving that the Polish philosopher could have anticipated contemporary metaontological discussions. In the first part, I will provide a profile of Ajdukiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will outline the assumptions of his metaepistemological projects: radical conventionalism and semantic epistemology. In the second part, I will argue that the former project resulted in views on existence similar to Hilary Putnam's and Eli Hirsch's, whereas the outcomes of the other project are views similar to those of Amie Thomasson and her easy ontology project.

Les pragmatistes soupçonnent la distinction entre vérité et justification d'être une de ces distinctions qui ne font pas de différence. L'objet de ce texte est d'établir que ce soupçon n'est pas fondé et combien au contraire est nécessaire, en pratique, l'usage du prédicat de vérité - aussi nécessaire que l'activité réflexive elle-même. En adoptant pour notre démonstration une conception logique de la vérité définie comme la notion la plus faible satisfaisant un "principe de décitation", le chemin parcouru est aussi une invitation à ne pas sous-estimer la valeur que les thèses dont s'est réclamé un certain  "déflationnisme" confèrent paradoxalement à la notion de vérité.

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Cette version en ligne est une version très légèrement corrigée de la version publiée en juin 2019 dans le volume Figures de la vérité dirigé par F. Rivenc.

Les corrections portent sur quelques formulations en particulier p.2 et p.15.

This article explores an alternative to the established dichotomy between philosophical (natural law) accounts of human rights, characterized by a foundationalist tendency, and political (practice-based) accounts of human rights, which aspire to be non-foundationalist. I argue that in order to justify human rights practice, political accounts of human rights cannot do without the support of theoretical foundations, although not necessarily of the natural-law variety. As an alternative to natural-law metaphysics, a deflationary theory of human rights, based on a deflationary account of truth, is put forward. Starting from a distinction between 'extreme' and 'moderate' forms of deflationism, this article defends a constructivist theory of human rights grounded on the Humean notion of conventionalism. This innovative approach to human rights provides political conceptions of human rights with the foundations (or quasi-foundations) they need, but are currently lacking. The only consensus about human rights is that there is no consensus on the nature and justification of human rights. Some argue that human rights are essentially moral rights since the idea of human rights denotes a moral concept. Others argue that human rights are a political concept; therefore, human rights are primarily legal or political rights. This underlying rift in theories of human rights is the reason why the literature on this idea is currently divided between those who defend a traditional, ethically driven vision of human rights, which is practice-independent (Buchanan, 2010; Gewirth, 1984; Griffin, 2008; Tasioulas, 2009), and those who reject it in favour of a political approach, allegedly free from metaphysics, where human rights are strictly practice-dependent (Beitz, 2009; Rawls, 1999; Raz, 2010). The aim of this article was to find a synthesis between these two dialectically opposed positions. I argue that the received view of a dichotomy between political and

Greece is the country in which the eurozone’s public debt crisis began in late 2009. The policy response of the EU elites was to provide financial assistance on condition that a strict austerity-cum-deregulation policy is applied under the watchful guidance of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF (the so-called Troika). Five years later, the country is in an economic, social and political limbo, as a debt deflation process has set in. Greece, however, is not a special case. Rather, it illustrates the failures of the prevailing economic and political orthodoxy in the EU. At best, it can
serve as an example of the cost of ignoring the lessons of the 1930s Great Depression

‘Proximity’ is a review of literatures that place contents minimalistically. Content is implicated in theorised structures' productivity in terms of discreteness and consequentiality and according to competing dependencies in representation relations. I talk about philosophical minimalism; minimalism in syntax; functionalism's dependencies on surface forms (as opposed to deep structure); Stephen Schiffer’s misuse of ‘hypostasisation’ and expressive limitations of apparently idiomatic types of uses; the resources required to express the minimalist content-correspondence intuitions; the suggestion that underpinning some structurally recognised contents are ’shape preserving’ individuations (in Edwin Williams' Representation Theory, 2003).

Дается обзор проблемы Фреге–Гича в контексте нонкогнитивизма и дефляционизма. Анализируются общие методологически принципы нонкогнитивизма и дефляционизма. Аргументируется, что проблема Фреге–Гича может быть решена путем обращения к прагматической интерпретации дефляционизма.

In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common 'pluralizing tendency' with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated interface between metaphysical and formal truth theories, pointing to several promising questions that arise here.

In this paper I defend the metaphysics of race as a valuable philosophical project against deflationism about race. The deflationists argue that metaphysical debate about the reality of race amounts to a non-substantive verbal dispute that diverts attention from ethical and practical issues to do with 'race.' In response, I show that the deflationists mischaracterize the field and fail to capture what most metaphysicians of race actually do in their work, which is almost always pluralist and very often normative and explicitly political. Even if debates about the reality of race turn out to be verbal disputes, they are substantive, and worth having.

Статья посвящена исследованию нонкогнитивизма и дефляционизма. Предпринимается попытка обозначить суть нонкогнитивистских теорий, ставится и исследуется проблема Фреге-Гича, анализируются общие методологические основания нонкогнитивизма и дефляционизма и делается вывод о том, что проблема Фреге-Гича может быть решена с помощью дефляционизма.

Deflationary theories of truth had two different types of responses to the Liar. A first class of deflationists considers that this paradox does not represent a problem for their theories. On the other hand, other deflationists find the Liar to be a serious issue. This article focuses on the first class. Both Grover and Gupta consider that the Liar does not represent a problem for a deflationary theory of truth. For Grover, the paradox is demolished through the construction of the theory and for Gupta, the Liar is not the problem of the deflationist, but rather it concerns a specialist. Dorothy Grover (2005) is an advocate of the prosentential theory of truth. This theory considers that truth works as a prosentence. The sentence resulted by adding the truth predicate to a referring expression has the same content as the sentence picked out by the initial referring expression. A prosentence does not have a meaning by itself; it takes its meaning from its antecedent. Grover considers that the truth predicate used in the Liar fails to pick up an antecedent, thus it does not have operative meaning. The operative meaning comes from using a word in a specific context. Gupta (2005) considers that a specialist-not a deflationist-should give the proper answers to the paradoxes. A deflationist should not be concerned with how the paradoxes can be avoided. His only interest is how the T-schema should be interpreted in order to give the meaning of the truth predicate and how the deflationary conclusions are reached. Paradoxes do not count in as an issue for deflationists, because they are able to answer to their main questions without facing paradoxes. Therefore, the Liar is not a real issue for the deflationist. The main aim of this article is to offer some counterarguments for these two views. Grover's difference between dictionary and operative meaning seems to make a distinction between accepted and restricted sentences. This distinction is needed in order to escape the problem of paradoxes. If this is the case, the Liar is an issue, but it is solvable. This is quite different from what Grover claims. On the other hand, Gupta's approach may ease the deflationist's work but it might destroy his theory.

Laypersons and even many philosophers say that much of what's discussed and stated in analytic metaphysics is ridiculous and/or “trivial”. That may be true. Though we must have a wider and more historical vision here because isn't it also the case that this sort of thing has been said about many historical philosophical positions – both by laypersons and by philosophers?

Philosophical disgust at metaphysics goes back to Kant or further. Then, 160 years or so years after Kant, we had Rudolf Carnap speaking out against metaphysics. Then again, so too did Martin Heidegger – in his What is Metaphysics? [1929] - at roughly the same time as Carnap. Not only that: Carnap spoke out against Heidegger's metaphysics – in his The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language [1931] - when Heidegger was himself speaking out against what he classed as “Western metaphysics”. Thus being against metaphysics – at least in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s - became both a sport and a philosophical fashion.

As stated, many positions within analytic metaphysics (sometimes within the entire genus of metaphysics) are deemed by laypersons to be trivial, scholastic and/or oblivious to science. Philosophers have also had a go at analytic metaphysics. David Chalmers, for example, thinks most of the disputes are primarily “verbal” in nature.

The problem is that no only may such anti-metaphysical philosophers throw out all metaphysics with their demands (i.e., if you follow their logic to its conclusion), it may also be the case that much science will be thrown out too. (This point was famously made against certain positions advanced by the logical positivists in the 1920s and 1930s.) For example, what about empirically-untestable string theory and multiverses? Are they examples of scientific “neo-Scholasticism”? What about some of the well-known mathematical and logical problems which can simply be seen as “intellectual puzzles” and nothing more?

Again, the major criticism of analytic metaphysicians is that they more or less ignore science. In at least some cases, metaphysicians do so because they believe that metaphysics comes before physics. (Yes, despite the Greek translation of the word.) It can be said that before the rise of modern science it was indeed philosophers who investigated “the fundamental structure and nature of physical reality” (as it's often put). However, after the rise of modern science, many philosophers now argue that metaphysicians shouldn't still be doing metaphysics without the help or findings of science.... at least not in 2019!

James Ladyman and Don Ross's (who are self-described “ontic structural realists”) main criticisms of analytic metaphysics seem a little rhetorical – at least as they stand. For example, in their book *Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized*, they argue/state:

i) That metaphysics "contributes nothing to human knowledge”.
ii) That metaphysicians are "wasting their talents”.
iii) That metaphysics “fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued”.

Many people who're deeply suspicious of analytic metaphysics will be keen on the position David Manley describes as “strong deflationism”; which is a term also used by Ted Sider in his paper/chapter, 'Ontological Realism'. The position of strong deflationism is, of course, still a metaphysical position.  Manley goes on to say that “[i]n its new forms, strong deflationism poses as serious a challenge to metaphysics as ever”.

The “mild deflationist” position (as enunciated by Manley) is difficult to grasp. Manley tells us that mild deflationists “admit that there is a genuine dispute at issue”; though they also believe that “it can be resolved in a relatively trivial fashion by reflecting on conceptual or semantic facts”. Moreover, “nothing of substance is left for the metaphysician to investigate”.

In any case, can any dispute be “merely verbal” in a literal sense?