I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 The Principles of Logic marks and separates contents under t... more I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 The Principles of Logic marks and separates contents under tension in judgments. The separation comes in attending to content as a device for recuperation of scale. For Bradley that involves scaling material of immediate presentations under limits. As unrealised commitments of so-called real and ideal are an exclusionary condition of singular comprehension, singularity of judgments is mark of singular reflex with privative force; not some singularity in objects taken in episodic correspondence forming distinctively in singular judgment. The distinguishing input, as it were, to judgment forms is via content in some consequential and fact-like limitive facing of the real. I want to approach Bradley in this slightly negative sense as imposing via inversion some sensible restrictions under some conditions of scaling rather than in direct contact with materials to which one stands in some act of obversion, finally.
One theoretical charge (of Optimality Theory in its early conception) must have been to retain th... more One theoretical charge (of Optimality Theory in its early conception) must have been to retain that sense of qualitative particularity as affecting as constraining theory relevant to a proscribed field when clearly a motivation was to divine in circumscriptions operational consequences conceived on a deferred abstractive level. An attraction of the theory’s embodying results of constraint interactions as responsive to theory-internal qualitative implementation, as being in fact supplementarily transparent to co-ordinations of variously language specific implementations, qualitative identifications, was apparent naturalistic coordination of defined features taken here—in OT—at one fell-swoop. Differently put, the uses of analyses of the relevant types of spaces (‘primitive from the viewpoint of linguistic theories’) will (latterly) involve a period of time-stretch or compression over a previously normal (I take it) process of embeddings in a new theorised and recursively enacted invocation/re-invocation of base as digestively present in results of corrected theories. Or as Prince and Smolensky have it
'What we have done, in essence, is to replace the iterative procedure (act/evaluate, act/evaluate, . . . ) with a recursive scheme: collect the results of all possible actions, then sort recursively.' OT, 16
In Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on... more In Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on an individual (sensitive bodywork composition). The individual experience, individually associated with a ‘scene’ (a filling-in, ASoC 64), stiffens delivered representational contents so that in their physicalised aspect described by Peacocke contents can be available as objectively describable in a way that then contributes to Peacocke’s thesis that they are both an index of and derivational base for assignment of non- conceptual contents. As I will stress in Peacocke such a characterisation is primarily focused on associating experience with content particularly as described utilising concepts. In A Study of Concepts ‘scenarios’—containers for scenes, for physical, spatial, egocentric awareness secured on bodily centres and made vivid basically—remain significantly local in the sense that they are allowedly but functionally and importantly (to his thesis) locally inchoate. I pass by the possibility that such inchoateness is a matter of gradience, that materials not rising to some degree are taken as support for some non-conceptual materiality, they expand only as they are a base for a conception of assigned non-conceptual contents where in that situation contents are a type of match. From that standpoint, scenarios describe local materials in terms of their development in the sort of way a certain gentrified kind of loaf of bread describes its origin in a starter.
When Burge uses ‘explication’ (quite often, during the period of interest to me—from the late 70s... more When Burge uses ‘explication’ (quite often, during the period of interest to me—from the late 70s through to the early 90s, to about the time of ‘Content Preservation’) he means something relatively distinct directed at conceptual clarification and certainly distinct from explanation, he means a parallel form of representation of some material (explicandum) reformed in clarification. In explication’s doing that, as it standardly does, there is a narrowing in the answer as to which materials significantly coordinate. Burge wants to clarify that coordination according to determinations linked with meanings in the abstracted sense cannot be linked with uses coordinating with specifications subject to sorts of rote determinations conventionally applicable to them. This is an example of that limitation corresponding to access to review mentioned above, when Burge wants to guarantee inchoateness, interacting with Burge’s own thesis of common or garden determination in contexts in which hard, external constrictions operate, Burge’s anti-individualistic determinations. Explications usefully rehearse material figured there reviewed as uses but coordinating as contents, in that insulated sense contents are items constituted in that review; uses being subject to hard determinations etc.
‘Proximity’ is a review of literatures that place contents minimalistically. Content is implicate... more ‘Proximity’ is a review of literatures that place contents minimalistically. Content is implicated in theorised structures' productivity in terms of discreteness and consequentiality and according to competing dependencies in representation relations. I talk about philosophical minimalism; minimalism in syntax; functionalism's dependencies on surface forms (as opposed to deep structure); Stephen Schiffer’s misuse of ‘hypostasisation’ and expressive limitations of apparently idiomatic types of uses; the resources required to express the minimalist content-correspondence intuitions; the suggestion that underpinning some structurally recognised contents are ’shape preserving’ individuations (in Edwin Williams' Representation Theory, 2003).
Fine’s thought, I think, is that there is a retention of a Russellian reliance on objects refined... more Fine’s thought, I think, is that there is a retention of a Russellian reliance on objects refined on according to the separable commitments of running contents. Those commitments can be chased through procedures that reflect varieties of conditional dependence, rightness or wrongness of which is determinable in connection with distinctions supported conventionally and in relation to semantic compositionality conventionally applied.
I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 The Principles of Logic marks and separates contents under t... more I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 The Principles of Logic marks and separates contents under tension in judgments. The separation comes in attending to content as a device for recuperation of scale. For Bradley that involves scaling material of immediate presentations under limits. As unrealised commitments of so-called real and ideal are an exclusionary condition of singular comprehension, singularity of judgments is mark of singular reflex with privative force; not some singularity in objects taken in episodic correspondence forming distinctively in singular judgment. The distinguishing input, as it were, to judgment forms is via content in some consequential and fact-like limitive facing of the real. I want to approach Bradley in this slightly negative sense as imposing via inversion some sensible restrictions under some conditions of scaling rather than in direct contact with materials to which one stands in some act of obversion, finally.
One theoretical charge (of Optimality Theory in its early conception) must have been to retain th... more One theoretical charge (of Optimality Theory in its early conception) must have been to retain that sense of qualitative particularity as affecting as constraining theory relevant to a proscribed field when clearly a motivation was to divine in circumscriptions operational consequences conceived on a deferred abstractive level. An attraction of the theory’s embodying results of constraint interactions as responsive to theory-internal qualitative implementation, as being in fact supplementarily transparent to co-ordinations of variously language specific implementations, qualitative identifications, was apparent naturalistic coordination of defined features taken here—in OT—at one fell-swoop. Differently put, the uses of analyses of the relevant types of spaces (‘primitive from the viewpoint of linguistic theories’) will (latterly) involve a period of time-stretch or compression over a previously normal (I take it) process of embeddings in a new theorised and recursively enacted invocation/re-invocation of base as digestively present in results of corrected theories. Or as Prince and Smolensky have it
'What we have done, in essence, is to replace the iterative procedure (act/evaluate, act/evaluate, . . . ) with a recursive scheme: collect the results of all possible actions, then sort recursively.' OT, 16
In Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on... more In Christopher Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on an individual (sensitive bodywork composition). The individual experience, individually associated with a ‘scene’ (a filling-in, ASoC 64), stiffens delivered representational contents so that in their physicalised aspect described by Peacocke contents can be available as objectively describable in a way that then contributes to Peacocke’s thesis that they are both an index of and derivational base for assignment of non- conceptual contents. As I will stress in Peacocke such a characterisation is primarily focused on associating experience with content particularly as described utilising concepts. In A Study of Concepts ‘scenarios’—containers for scenes, for physical, spatial, egocentric awareness secured on bodily centres and made vivid basically—remain significantly local in the sense that they are allowedly but functionally and importantly (to his thesis) locally inchoate. I pass by the possibility that such inchoateness is a matter of gradience, that materials not rising to some degree are taken as support for some non-conceptual materiality, they expand only as they are a base for a conception of assigned non-conceptual contents where in that situation contents are a type of match. From that standpoint, scenarios describe local materials in terms of their development in the sort of way a certain gentrified kind of loaf of bread describes its origin in a starter.
When Burge uses ‘explication’ (quite often, during the period of interest to me—from the late 70s... more When Burge uses ‘explication’ (quite often, during the period of interest to me—from the late 70s through to the early 90s, to about the time of ‘Content Preservation’) he means something relatively distinct directed at conceptual clarification and certainly distinct from explanation, he means a parallel form of representation of some material (explicandum) reformed in clarification. In explication’s doing that, as it standardly does, there is a narrowing in the answer as to which materials significantly coordinate. Burge wants to clarify that coordination according to determinations linked with meanings in the abstracted sense cannot be linked with uses coordinating with specifications subject to sorts of rote determinations conventionally applicable to them. This is an example of that limitation corresponding to access to review mentioned above, when Burge wants to guarantee inchoateness, interacting with Burge’s own thesis of common or garden determination in contexts in which hard, external constrictions operate, Burge’s anti-individualistic determinations. Explications usefully rehearse material figured there reviewed as uses but coordinating as contents, in that insulated sense contents are items constituted in that review; uses being subject to hard determinations etc.
‘Proximity’ is a review of literatures that place contents minimalistically. Content is implicate... more ‘Proximity’ is a review of literatures that place contents minimalistically. Content is implicated in theorised structures' productivity in terms of discreteness and consequentiality and according to competing dependencies in representation relations. I talk about philosophical minimalism; minimalism in syntax; functionalism's dependencies on surface forms (as opposed to deep structure); Stephen Schiffer’s misuse of ‘hypostasisation’ and expressive limitations of apparently idiomatic types of uses; the resources required to express the minimalist content-correspondence intuitions; the suggestion that underpinning some structurally recognised contents are ’shape preserving’ individuations (in Edwin Williams' Representation Theory, 2003).
Fine’s thought, I think, is that there is a retention of a Russellian reliance on objects refined... more Fine’s thought, I think, is that there is a retention of a Russellian reliance on objects refined on according to the separable commitments of running contents. Those commitments can be chased through procedures that reflect varieties of conditional dependence, rightness or wrongness of which is determinable in connection with distinctions supported conventionally and in relation to semantic compositionality conventionally applied.
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'What we have done, in essence, is to replace the iterative procedure (act/evaluate, act/evaluate, . . . ) with a recursive scheme: collect the results of all possible actions, then sort recursively.' OT, 16
'What we have done, in essence, is to replace the iterative procedure (act/evaluate, act/evaluate, . . . ) with a recursive scheme: collect the results of all possible actions, then sort recursively.' OT, 16