Jeffrey Kline

NPS NRP Executive SummaryProject Summary: Logistics support plays an essential role in the United States Navy’s success at sea as fuel, food, and equipment are delivered to underway ships on a daily basis via the Combat Logistics Force (CLF). However, with the advent of unmanned vehicle technologies, unmanned logistic surface vehicles (ULSVs) have the potential to provide a less costly and more efficient alternative to conventional CLF ships. Additionally, ULSVs have the potential to enhance freedom of maneuver and lethality in contested environments as they require little to no human intervention during transit. The ability to maintain communications is critical to ULSV operations, especially in a communication-challenged environment such as the Philippine Sea. Through review of literature and experimentation via wargaming, this thesis proposes an additional or alternative communication architecture onboard ULSVs by exploring the impact of tactical wireless mesh networks (WMN) in c...

Both traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose challenges to any combatant commander in a Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operation. Limited threats that were once confined to littoral and brown waters now extend to the green water theater. Many NATO countries operate frigates in green water SSTR missions, typically as a single unit scouting vast areas. In the calm waters of the Mediterranean and Gulf of Aden, small, agile, fast and usually cheap small craft are often encountered. In this study we investigate the question of whether a swarm of 4 8 small vessels, armed with hand-held weapons, can attack and achieve a mission kill on a typical NATO FFH operating in a SSTR mission. In this context our primary goals for IDFW18 were to examine the factors driving the model and create a suitable experimental design. Our secondary goals were to create inputs based on the selected design, conduct runs on the SEED Center’s cluster computer, and analyze th...

Surf-zone environments represent an extreme challenges to robot operation. A robot that autonomously navigates rocky terrain, constantly changing underwater currents, hard-packed moist sand and loose dry sand characterizing this environment, would have significant utility in a range of defence and civilian missions. The study of animal locomotion mechanisms can elucidate specific movement principles that can be applied to address these demands. In this work, we report on the design and optimization of a biologically inspired amphibious robot for deployment and operation in an ocean beach environment. We specifically report a new design fusing a range of insectinspired passive mechanisms with active autonomous control architectures to seamlessly adapt to and traverse a range of challenging substrates both in and out of the water, and the design and construction of SeaDog, a proof-of-concept amphibious robot built for navigating rocky or sandy beaches and turbulent surf zones. The rob...

The article of record as published may be found at http://cimsec.org/developing-new-tacticsand-technologies-in-naval-warfare-the-mdusv-example/39436The United States Department of Defense [DoD] and the military services have employed wargaming for well over a century to prepare for war and other operations. The Naval War College first employed naval wargames in the late 19th century at the tactical and strategic levels. During the period between world wars, Plan Orange wargaming at the Naval War College was a key contributor to the strategic plan that led to the defeat of the Japanese Empire in 1945. Since that conflict, wargaming techniques have become widespread within U.S. organizations and throughout the world

Naval Warfare Studies Institute (NWSI)Background: Annually over 300 students, faculty, and sponsors will conduct classroom projects, capstone projects, thesis work, workshops, wargame, seminars, and research programs related to a central Navy warfighting issue. In July 2019 the NPS Warfare Innovation Continuum deals with logistics in contested environments

Naval Warfare Studies Institute (NWSI)Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC)The Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) is a series of coordinated cross‐campus educational and research activities synchronized by the Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis with a central theme of interest to the United States Navy. Its purpose is to expose NPS faculty and students to emerging naval challenges and opportunities to allow relevant education and research across campus

: What is audacity?A dictionary uses flattering words such as intrepid (characterized by fearlessness, fortitude, and endurance), daring, originality and verve (specialized ability or talent); along side these, less complementary such as recklessly bold. 2 Many times which meaning a user implies depends on the final outcome of an audacious event successful bold actions are daring and original; unsuccessful bold actions tend to be reckless. There is an axiom that risk is commensurate with reward. In the examples provided here of action in the chaotic, confused and confined littoral maritime environment, success favors the audacious audacity favoring lethal, offensive action. On May 5, 1801, Lieutenant Thomas Cochrane s HMS Speedy, a 158-ton brig of 14 4-pound guns, was pursuing a Spanish gunboat near Barcelona as part of a successful littoral campaign against Napoleon s ally.3 From behind a fishing boat cluster appeared the Spanish frigate Gamo, a much larger and faster ship with 32 ...

We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attacker’s and/or defender’s access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDER’s mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide ...

This is a sea story about using a simple classroom example to save a great deal of money, as well as to convince beginning Postgraduate Naval School operations research students—experienced, skeptical military officers—that mathematical analysis can yield immediate results. The application is planning a ship’s transit from one point to another in a fixed amount of time, given that the ship can operate with one or more of its propulsion plants idled to save fuel. Simple analysis yields nonintuitive results that US Navy shipboard energy-conservation guides overlook. One of the authors (Kline) solved this homework problem as a student and subsequently applied this example when he took command of USS AQUILA, a patrol hydrofoil missile ship. AQUILA achieved results so striking in comparison to her sister ships that the squadron material officer inspected her engineering plant to ensure that no safety settings were being overridden to achieve this record. Kline’s spreadsheet decision-supp...

The twenty-first century will see the emergence of maritime powers that have the capacity and capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas. Unfortunately, the Navy’s ability to react to emerging maritime powers’ rapid growth and technological advancement is constrained by its own planning, acquisition, and political processes. Introducing our own technology advances is hindered as well. The planning and acquisition system for our overly platformfocused naval force structure is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that we are ill prepared to capitalize on the missile and robotics age of warfare. Yet by embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it represents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges and bring cutting-edge technology to contemporary naval wa...

This is a sea story about using a simple classroom example to save a great deal of money, as well as to convince beginning Postgraduate Naval School operations research students—experienced, skeptical military officers—that mathematical analysis can yield immediate results. The application is planning a ship’s transit from one point to another in a fixed amount of time, given that the ship can operate with one or more of its propulsion plants idled to save fuel. Simple analysis yields nonintuitive results that US Navy shipboard energy-conservation guides overlook. One of the authors (Kline) solved this homework problem as a student and subsequently applied this example when he took command of USS AQUILA, a patrol hydrofoil missile ship. AQUILA achieved results so striking in comparison to her sister ships that the squadron material officer inspected her engineering plant to ensure that no safety settings were being overridden to achieve this record. Kline’s spreadsheet decision-supp...

We describe JOINT DEFENDER, a new two-sided optimization model for planning the pre-positioning of defensive missile interceptors to counter an attack threat. In our basic model, a defender pre-positions ballistic missile defense platforms to minimize the worst-case damage an attacker can achieve; we assume that the attacker will be aware of defensive pre-positioning decisions, and that both sides have complete information as to target values, attacking-missile launch sites, weapon system capabilities, etc. Other model variants investigate the value of secrecy by restricting the attacker’s and/or defender’s access to information. For a realistic scenario, we can evaluate a completely transparent exchange in a few minutes on a laptop computer, and can plan near-optimal secret defenses in seconds. JOINT DEFENDER’s mathematical foundation and its computational efficiency complement current missile-defense planning tools that use heuristics or supercomputing. The model can also provide ...

Brown, G., Carlyle, W.M., Kelton, D., Kline, J. and Salmeron, J., 2009, “Operational Planning Tools for U.S. Navy Maritime Commanders,” in refereed conference proceedings of International Conference on Harbor, Maritime and Multimodal Logistics Modeling and Simulation, Bruzzone, A., Cunha, G. Martinez, R. and Merkuryev, Y., eds., Universidad de La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain. ISBN 978-84-692-5416-5.

W asteD Churchill commented that, ''True genius lies in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain. hazardous and conflicting information." In the March 2003 PHAlANX, then MQRS President Ted Smyth, FS highlighted the working group ''The Combatant Commander's Role in Leveraging CombatAnalysts" in the MORS Workshop entitled CombatAnalyst: Deploying Quantitative Support to the Combatant Commander as key to flnding ways to assimilate the CombatAnalyst into the staffof the ITF commander. That workshop, held in January 2003, provided insightful recommendations on improving the combat analyst's education and toolkit, and suggested various ways to aid me Commander's "capacity for evaluation of uncertain. hazardous. and con· flicting information," One method suggested by the workshop was to provide senior leadership with case studies that highlight how analysis can aid them in demanding decision environments. Influenced by the MORS Workshop's...

C ombat: adjective I: relating to combat (missions) 2: designed or destined for combat (troops) Analyst: noun I: a person who analyzes or who is skilled in analysis' Combat Analyst: Pro-active crisis-planning operator capable of applying critical thinking and problem SOlving techniques to war fighting environments at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level. Not to be confused with an Analyst of Combat. The Army's Sowhe", European Task Force (SETAF) Commanding General receives a call from European Commlllld staff-he is to prepare to lead a Joint Task Force in Westem Africa. He is given a general mission. strategic goals, told what forces will be available. and asked to begin planning. After he breaks the phone connecTion. he [lunches his speed dial to the G~J and direcls, "Send me our combat analysts! " Well, maybe not. Certainly not now. But in the future? For years, military officers educated in Operations Analysis (OAl have been closely allied with Washington progr...

The US naval services are facing a strategic imperative. The US Navy is no longer the most numerous in the world, nor does it hold the technological edge in all maritime domains; yet, measured by individual warship capability, it remains supreme. Nevertheless, that metric may be less important in the face of adversary numeric superiority and the presence of disruptive, emerging technologies. As we see a resurgence of great power competition and new technologies that can be employed to gain advantage across the spectrum of conflict, James Wirtz, Jeffrey Kline, Phillip Pournelle and Mie Augier argue that the US naval services need to capture opportunities to employ disruptive technologies and to think through how to adapt to the changing security environment.◼

Abstract : The Maritime Defense and Security Research Program (MDSRP) was part of the National Security Institute (NSI) -- a cooperative research institute whose members include the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The purpose of the MDSRP was to conduct, coordinate, and foster collaboration in maritime defense and security research, experimentation, and information exchange between partnership universities; federal, state, and local agencies; national laboratories; maritime industry, and international partners through the NSI. During its 7-year operating period, the MDSRP created a community of interest with over 1,000 members; inspired interagency cooperation through meetings, symposia, and short education programs; motivated interdisciplinary research and experimentation in maritime domain awareness, national maritime policy, and counter-piracy; and created a venue for government, industry, and academia to address maritime security issues. In collaboration with other sponsors, the MDSRP also underwrote several major field experimentations at NPS, including the maritime interdiction experimentation by Tactical Network Topology (TNT), the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS), and the Seaweb system of networked underwater sensors. Other programs receiving MDSRP funding include the NPS Graduate School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (GSEAS) maritime domain awareness (MDA) work and environmental impact on sensors. The MDSRP also gave initial funding to the Maritime Information Sharing Task Force (MIST), which continues to hold workshops in several U.S. domestic regional ports to research policy barriers to information exchange between commercial entities and government agencies. This report summarizes the program goals, activities, and accomplishments from its creation in 2004 to the close of the funding line at the end of fiscal year 2011.

Potential adversaries again challenge the United States Navy for control of the seas.  Unfortunately, the Navy’s ability to react to emerging maritime powers’ rapid growth and technology advancement is constrained by its own planning, acquisition, and political processes.  Introducing our own technology advances is also hindered.  Our overly platform-focused naval force structure planning and acquisition system is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that we are ill prepared to capitalize on the missile and robotics age of warfare.  Yet, by embracing the robotics age, recognizing its fundamental shift in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of our offensive kill chain--the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and non-kinetic effects—acquisition challenges may be hurdled and cutting-edge technology brought to contemporary naval warfare.  Incorporating robotics technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively and efficiently as possible magnifies capacity, lethality and opportunity – all critical to strategic and tactical considerations.  At the same time it recognizes the fiscal constraints our present force planning cannot sustain.

After addressing traditional foundations for force structure planning and inhibitors to change we  discuss how focusing on the packages delivered vice delivery platforms will allow us to better leverage new technologies in the 2030 timeframe.    What will a naval force architecture look like if this acquisition strategy is employed?  A force employment philosophy and warfighting strategy based on the tactical offensive will be presented in alignment with this acquisition approach.  This paper does not present an alternative force structure with actual numbers of ships and platforms, but suggests a force acquisition strategy and force design concept that provides a foundational underpinning to develop a specific force architecture.  Three strategic force measures—reactivity, robustness, and resilience—will be used to subjectively assess this fleet design over our traditional programmed forces.