Naval Strategy

This essay aims to discuss the prospects for PLA Navy’s presence in Indian Ocean, say in the medium-term time-frame of about 2025-30, and its impact on regional dynamics. What lies ahead flows essentially from what is China’s intent in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China has been characteristically opaque in issues of national policy. It is, nonetheless, essential to understand China’s maritime strategy for the IOR.

This presents an overview of the Indo-Pacific concept in the contemporary geopolitical discourse. It examines the genesis of the Indo-Pacific idea, its drivers, and the geopolitical interests, approaches and perspectives of some key actors like the ASEAN, Australia, China, the EU, Japan, and the US, with a specific focus on India. Based on current trends, it also presents a policy-relevant prognosis on the future relevance of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept, the emerging regional architecture, and the way forward to meet the objectives of the Indo-Pacific concept. (Detailed recommendations are being provided progressively, through periodic updates).

The Indo-Pacific concept—representing the 'maritime underbelly‘ of Asia—is being used increasingly in the contemporary geopolitical discourse. The paper examines the progressive genesis of the Indo-Pacific idea since the 1920s, along with the circumstances that led to its rebirth in 2006. Essentially, this was a result of the increased  'security‘ linkages between the two oceans, with China being a major factor. In the main analysis, the paper explores the strategic drivers, interests, approaches and perspectives of the key regional players and stakeholders— like the ASEAN, Australia, China, the EU, Japan, and the USA, with a specific focus on India. Based on an exploratory research methodology, the paper analyses the current trends, deducing a policy-relevant prognosis for the regional countries and stakeholders. In particular, it examines the emerging Indo-Pacific multilateral architecture, and the leading role that the existing organizations like the EAS and the IORA could play in it, along with the new Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad 2.0). The paper concludes with recommendations to meet the overarching objective of the Indo-Pacific vision: economic, material and societal prosperity of maritime-Asia. These are of much relevance for Indian policy-making, considering its long-overdue formal articulation of a national-strategy. In context of the Quad 2.0, it suggests that 'security‘ issues need not receive undue salience, since military strategy is merely a mechanism for 'assurance‘ and 'insurance‘ to achieve the ends of the Indo-Pacific vision.

The essay aims at retracing the tactical evolution in the english approach to naval warfare from the foundation of a standing Navy Royal by king Henry VIII, through the 1588 Armada Campaign and the 1652-54 First Anglo-Dutch War, until the Stuart Restoration and the Fighting Instructions issued on the eve of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1665. Special attention is devoted to the process of formalization of the line ahead, in an attempt to identify the historical and intellectual foundations of this tactical formation destined to radically influence naval cinematics in the Age of Sail. Despite a well-known body of primary sources devoid of any significant new archival discovery, a fresh interpretation of such records – often fragmentary and puzzling – capable of benefitting from the results of the most recent scholarship, is much needed in order to achieve a better understanding of the broad features of naval warfare, its limits and possibilites, during the period ideally comprised between the Armada Campaign and the battle of Trafalgar.

Dünya üzerindeki coğrafi alanlar jeolojik bir bütünlük içerisinde ele alınarak incelendiği takdirde denizler-göllerin yeryüzünde kapladığı yüzölçümünün oranı %79 iken, karasal alanlarınsa %21’dir. Kara sularının dünyanın yüzölçümü üzerinde açık arayla sahip olduğu bu üstünlük, insanlığın varoluşundan günümüze kadarki tüm süreçte ulusal-evrensel hâkimiyet mücadelesi veren bütün güç odaklarının göz önünde tuttuğu bir durum halini almıştır. Bu doğrultuda bölgesel-ulusal liderlik politikası amaçlayan bütün toplumlar bu hedeflerine kendilerini ulaştıracak en önemli basamağın etkili bir deniz gücüne sahip olmaktan geçtiğini idrak etmişlerdir. Bu perspektifte de kara sularını sahip olduğu deniz kuvvetleriyle kontrolü altına almayı becerebilen ve buna ek olarak güçlü bir deniz ticaret filosunu da elinde bulundurabilen bir ülkenin dünyanın bütün zenginliklerinden rahatça ve özgürce payını alabileceği kabul edilen bir gerçek halini almıştır.

"Any ruler that has but ground troops has one hand, but one that has also a navy has both."-Peter the Great
Abstract
The Russian Federation (Russia) today has a coastline more than 2.5 times as long as its land frontiers. Despite Russia has one centrally administered Navy, due to her geography, it should be viewed as functionally four and one half navies: the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and the Caspian Flotilla. Among those, Black Sea Fleet stands in a key position as Black Sea is the primary access of the Russian Federation Navy to warmer blue waters in the south. The Russian Black Sea fleet constitutes of roughly 50 ships and submarines, shore facilities and naval aviation forces. With the annexation of Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet also seized 12 important naval ships out of total 17 Ukrainian fleet. This paper argues the strategy followed by the Russian Navy and proposes that by 2020 the Russian Black Sea fleet is going to pose even a bigger importance in the south region of the Russian Federation and is going to be the major and primary power instrument of Russia to balance the activities of the Atlantic Block in the Black Sea, Balkans and Mediterranean region.

This is the final part of a three-part series on the intangibles of China's naval power. Parts 1 and 2 assessed China’s naval doctrine at the ‘military-strategic’ and ‘operational’ levels. Part 3 undertakes an assessment of the intangible elements of China’s naval power at the ‘tactical’ level, including the quality, disposition and employment of the ‘man behind the machine.’

On his recent tour of Asia, the US President Donald Trump offered the world a first glance into his formative geopolitical strategy, articulating his preference for the term “Indo-Pacific” over ‘Asia-Pacific’. As someone who was the first to use the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept in a published paper (2007), I find that the context of the articulation departs significantly from its original meaning and intent. My purpose was to re-conceptualise how nations in the maritime underbelly of Asia are actually linked together with the overarching aim of preserving global and regional stability through sharing the common public good in the global maritime common of strategic significance to all. It was not meant as its opposite – a geopolitical framework that divides Asia into friends and enemies.

The paper published in the French journal 'Études Marines' (in English language) published by Centre d’études stratégiques de la Marine (Paris) provides an overview of India's naval strategy. It begins with the Indian Navy's doctrinal evolution, and encompasses its operational concepts in peace and war, and force-development.

The article argues that India and the United States are poised to strengthen their bilateral strategic convergences, not only in the Indian Ocean but also in Pacific-Asia that lies eastwards of the Malacca Straits, and wherein India’s geo-strategic stakes as well as its military-strategic footprint are likely to increase in the coming years. This would progressively enhance the complementarities between their navies in the western Pacific and its contiguous seas, thereby enabling substantive naval cooperation towards ensuring security and stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Introducing the theoretical concept of ‘geo-strategic frontier’, the article examines the various factors at play and conceives the likely future scenarios of ‘high-end’ India–US naval cooperation in Pacific-Asia, in the short-, medium- and long-term time-frames.

On 12 Feb 16, the Indian Navy released the on-line version of Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, updated for 2015. It conforms to the new 'Indian Maritime Security Strategy’ promulgated in October 2015. This write-up aims to disseminate the specific need for updating the Indian Maritime Doctrine, 2009 and the salient amendments.

Nei decenni centrali del XVIII secolo, dal 1729 fino al 1768, la Repubblica di Genova dovette affrontare circa quarant’anni pressoché ininterrotti di ribellione e guerre civili nell’appendice insulare del suo Dominio, il Regno di Corsica. Fino alla metà degli anni Cinquanta le cosiddette “guerre di Corsica” rappresentarono un conflitto principalmente terrestre, in cui gli aspetti marittimi furono limitati ad operazioni di carattere logistico, di supporto diretto ad azioni militari terrestri, e di pattugliamento costiero per interdire il traffico dei contrabbandieri in affari coi ribelli e per contrastare le azioni di pochi e sparuti isolani dediti alla pirateria. Dalla metà degli anni Cinquanta, e ancor di più dagli esordi degli anni Sessanta, la creazione dal nulla di una marina “nazionale”, da parte del leader ribelle Pasquali Paoli, proiettò il conflitto sui mari. Genova, che già da due secoli e mezzo era impegnata nella guerra permanente sul mare contro i corsari barbareschi, si trovò alle prese con un nuovo nemico, la cui presenza nella acque liguri e alto tirreniche andò rafforzandosi nel corso del decennio, sovrapponendosi e intersecandosi con quella dei tradizionali avversari maghrebini. La corsa paolista possedeva caratteristiche differenti rispetto a quella nordafricana: affiancava il contrabbando all’attività predatrice, si celava sotto la copertura di false identità e bandiere ombra e impiegava per lo più legni leggeri e di piccole dimensioni che operavano tendenzialmente in vicinanza delle proprie basi o nei pressi di porti neutrali controllati da potenze compiacenti (le quali, a differenza di Genova, riconoscevano loro lo status di corsari). La Repubblica provò dapprima ad affrontarla secondo gli schemi collaudati in decenni di controcorsa antibarbaresca. Successivamente, tuttavia, si adattò alle sue caratteristiche, non senza contrasti, oscillazioni e ripensamenti, arrivando a combattere, con risorse alquanto limitate ma non prive di efficacia, due guerre di corsa parallele e sovrapposte all’interno dello stesso teatro

[P] Enquadramento das operações navais e das acções de fomento marítimo dos dois primeiros séculos da existência de Portugal numa estratégia marítima global de formação, consolidação e sustentação territorial.

[E] Analyzing naval operations and maritime policy during Portugal’s first two centuries as a part of a global maritime strategy concerning the conquest and maintenance of the national territory.

A Argentina teve uma trajetória conturbada durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, assumindo uma neutralidade polêmica durante um dos períodos de maior instabilidade política na sua história. Conforme diversos autores notaram, uma questão política sensível neste período, foi o reequipamento das suas forças armadas, algo que tinha repercussões tanto em âmbito doméstico como externo, porém quase não há nenhuma discussão sobre o conteúdo destas propostas de aquisição de material bélico. Considerando a importância da questão dos armamentos para os desenvolvimentos políticos na Argentina, este trabalho busca entender quais foram os planos de modernização da marinha argentina durante a guerra, relacionando-os com o contexto em que foram apresentados. Assim, ressaltamos a importância do cenário político externo nas discussões sobre os programas navais, especialmente diante do relativo declínio do poderio argentino em âmbito regional. Em âmbito interno, cumpre observar o papel das relações civil-militares. Por fim, apontamos que os planos renovação da esquadra refletiam inicialmente a política naval do pré-guerra, com foco em âmbito regional e assegurando uma superioridade argentina, porém o seu conteúdo foi se modificando conforme as novas tecnologias navais e desenvolvimentos políticos mudavam o cenário.

Argentina had a troubled trajectory during World War II, assuming a controversial neutrality during a period of great political instability in her history. As several authors noted, a sensitive political issue in this period was the re-equipment of her armed forces, something that had repercussions both domestically and externally, however there is almost no discussion on the content of these proposals for the acquisition of military materiel. Considering the importance of this issue for political developments in Argentina, this paper seeks to understand the plans for naval modernization during the war, relating them to the context in which they were presented. Thus, we emphasize the importance of the external political scenario in discussions about naval programmes, especially in view of the relative decline in Argentine power at the regional level. Internally, the role of civil-military relations must be observed. Finally, we pointed out that the fleet renewal plans initially reflected the pre-war naval policy, focusing on the regional scope and ensuring Argentine superiority, but its content was modified as new naval technologies and political developments changed the scenario.

Within five years after the China commissioned Liaoning in September 2012, it launched its first-ever domestic carrier on 26 April 2017. Such ‘flat-tops’ are indeed valuable platforms for maritime force-projection, which, for centuries, has been an important naval mission of all major power navies. However, given China’s maritime geography and the kind of insecurities it encounters today from vastly superior adversarial navies of the United States and Japan operating in the western Pacific rim, the PLA Navy’s growing doctrinal reliance on carriers seems to be an aberration. This essay explains how....

In February 2011, after five years of NATO powers rotating at the helm of UNIFIL's Maritime Task Force, its command was handed over to Brazil. What factors have motivated Brazil's participation, especially in light of the geographic distances separating Brazil and Lebanon and deepening crisis in Brazil? This article analyses Brazil's engagement with UNIFIL in light of key foreign policy and defence priorities and identifies three key motivations: the aspiration to participate more directly in Middle East security issues; the historical and political ties between Brazil and Lebanon; and the chance to expand Brazil's naval capacity in accordance with its new naval defence strategy within the South Atlantic. More recently, however, economic slowdown and political turbulence domestically have created new challenges for Brazil's ability to maintain its contributions to UN peacekeeping. These shifts offer an opportunity to refine the use of the ‘rising powers’ concept in the study of international security.

Surprisingly perhaps, the Southeast Asian region has a standard model navy. Several factors have created this: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) multilateral organisation’s success in managing regional political differences; a focus on economic growth – not military power; regional armies often receiving budgetary
priority; limited domestic shipbuilding capabilities; a desire to keep up with neighboring states but not surpass them; and interest in avoiding starting a regional arms race.

How should the U.S. respond to China's increasing provocations? This paper analyzes the game China is playing and its goal in teasing U.S. and Taiwan with provocations. I find that the real purpose has nothing to do with 'sending signals' to the U.S. and Taiwan.  The U.S.-Taiwan response should be very different than what you'd likely read elsewhere. And I suggest on the one hand that time is getting short and on the other that the U.S. needs to reset its relationship with Taiwan.

The paper published in the French journal 'Études Marines' (in French language) published by Centre d’études stratégiques de la Marine (Paris) provides an overview of India's naval strategy. It begins with the Indian Navy's doctrinal evolution, and encompasses its operational concepts in peace and war, and force-development.

Hoy en día, casi todos los Estados cuentan con unidades de Infantería de Marina, destacándose entre éstas la de los Estados Unidos. Desde su creación  - durante la guerra de Independencia de su país- la misión esencial de los Marines ha sido la de fuerza de proyección y de choque. Sin embargo, el pasado verano boreal el Secretario de Defensa estadounidense, Robert M. Gates, reconoció la preocupación de muchos oficiales del Cuerpo  -en actividad y en el retiro- sobre el futuro rol de la institución tras los conflictos bélicos de Irak y Afganistán
  y la utilidad de las operaciones anfibias en una era donde el desarrollo de la  artillería de precisión  vuelve  mucho más riesgoso ocupar las playas desde el mar,  y por ello  ordenó un estudio exhaustivo que defina la misión de los Marines en el siglo XXI .

On 14 November 2016, Bangladesh Navy (BN) took delivery of two old refurbished Chinese Type 035G Ming-class diesel-electric submarines. This may be a rather seminal development with strong ramifications not only for the littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal, but also for the wider Indo-Pacific region. This essay seeks to undertake an assessment of the development in the context of the likely imperatives of Bangladesh, the intentions of China, and its implications, with specific reference to the Indian context.