- 491, Cohen Hall
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6304 - (215) 898-5820
- Behavioral Decision Making, Social Norms, Philosophy of Social Science, Rational Choice, Epistemology, Experimental games, and 20 moreEthics, Decision And Game Theory, Social Epistemology, Philosophy Of Economics, Experimental philosophy, Moral Psychology, Evolution of cooperation (Evolutionary Biology), Formal Epistemology, social norms, measurement, UNICEF, Philosophy, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Trust, Cooperation, Social Dilemmas, Agent Based Simulation, Simulation (Computer Science), Social Simulation, Psychology, and Behavioral Sciencesedit
- My intellectual affinities lie at the border between philosophy, game theory and psychology. My primary research focu... moreMy intellectual affinities lie at the border between philosophy, game theory and psychology. My primary research focus is on judgment and decision making with special interest in decisions about fairness, trust, and cooperation, and how expectations affect behavior. A second research focus examines the evolution of social norms, especially norms of fairness and cooperation. A third, earlier research focus has been the epistemic foundations of game theory and how changes in information affects rational choices and solutions.
• In my most recent work, I have designed behavioral experiments aimed at testing several hypotheses based on the theory of social norms that I developed in my book, The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge University Press, 2006). The experimental results show that most subjects have a conditional preference for following pro-social norms. Manipulating their expectations causes major behavioral changes (i.e., from fair to unfair choices, from cooperation to defection, etc.). One of the conclusions we may draw is that there are no such things as stable dispositions or unconditional preferences (to be fair, reciprocate, cooperate, and so on). Another is that policymakers who want to induce pro-social behavior have to work on changing people's expectations about how other people behave in similar situations. These results have major consequences for our understanding of moral behavior and the construction of better normative theories, grounded on what people can in fact do.
• The nature and dynamics of social norms studies how norms may emerge and become stable, why an established norm may suddenly be abandoned, how is it possible that inefficient or unpopular norms survive, and what motivates people to obey norms. In order to answer some of these questions, I have combined evolutionary and game-theoretic tools with models of decision making drawn from cognitive and social psychology. For example, I use my theory of context-dependent preferences to build more realistic evolutionary models of the emergence of pro-social norms of fairness and reciprocity.
• My earlier (but never completely abandoned) research focus was the epistemic foundations of game theory. Many of my earlier contributions can be found in my book Rationality and Coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1993; second edition, 1996). I recently wrote about belief-revision in games, and what kind of solutions our belief-revision model supports. In my past work I have analyzed the consequences of relaxing the 'common knowledge' assumption in several classes of games. My contributions include axiomatic models of players' theory of the game and the proof that -- in a large class of games -- a player's theory of the game is consistent only if the player's knowledge is limited. An important consequence of assuming bounded knowledge is that it allows for more intuitive solutions to familiar games such as the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma or the chain-store paradox. I have also been interested in devising mechanical procedures (algorithms) that allow players to compute solutions for games of perfect and imperfect information. Devising such procedures is particularly important for Artificial Intelligence applications, since interacting software agents have to be programmed to play a variety of 'games'.edit - Amartya Sen and Martin Hollis (examiners), Ludovico Geymonat and Marco Mondadori (Italy), Mary Hesse (Cambridge)edit
Previous studies have used various normative expressions such as “should”, “appropriate” and “approved” interchangeably to communicate injunctions and social norms. However, little is known about whether people’s interpretations of... more
Previous studies have used various normative expressions such as “should”, “appropriate” and “approved” interchangeably to communicate injunctions and social norms. However, little is known about whether people’s interpretations of normative language differ and whether behavioral responses might vary across them. In two studies (total N=2903), we find that compliance is sensitive to the types of normative expressions and how they are used. Specifically, people are more likely to comply when the message is framed as an injunction rather than as what most people consider good behavior (social norm framing). Behaviour is influenced by the type of normative expression when the norm is weak (donation to charities), not so when the norm is strong (reciprocity). Content analysis of free responses reveals individual differences in the interpretation of social norm messages, and heterogeneous motives for compliance. Messages in the social norm framing condition are perceived to be vague and uninformative, undermining their effectiveness. These results suggest that careful choice of normative expressions is in order when using messages to elicit compliance, especially when the underlying norms are weak.
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The influence of social norms on individual behavior is a well-documented phenomenon with significant implications for promoting prosocial actions. This paper delves into the intricacies of norm-based interventions by examining how... more
The influence of social norms on individual behavior is a well-documented phenomenon with significant implications for promoting prosocial actions. This paper delves into the intricacies of norm-based interventions by examining how individuals make inferences from norm information, considering both empirical and normative aspects, and the valence of the targeted behavior. The study reveals that the valence of the behavior is a critical factor in shaping inferences drawn from norm information. Positive behaviors elicit a stronger inference from empirical information about behavior prevalence to beliefs about collective endorsement, while the reverse is true for negative behaviors. This finding underscores the importance of emphasizing information about the prevalence of positive behaviors in norm nudging interventions.
Furthermore, the research shows that providing norm information can alter baseline social expectations, with negative empirical and normative expectations being particularly sensitive to such information. This implies that negative empirical information can inadvertently reinforce undesirable behaviors by leading individuals to infer collective endorsement. The study also investigates the impact of behavioral attributes like observability and perceived social consequences on norm inferences. While observability does not significantly affect inferences, perceived social consequences influence inferences drawn from empirical information, suggesting that empirical data have a stronger impact on behavior than normative information.
Furthermore, the research shows that providing norm information can alter baseline social expectations, with negative empirical and normative expectations being particularly sensitive to such information. This implies that negative empirical information can inadvertently reinforce undesirable behaviors by leading individuals to infer collective endorsement. The study also investigates the impact of behavioral attributes like observability and perceived social consequences on norm inferences. While observability does not significantly affect inferences, perceived social consequences influence inferences drawn from empirical information, suggesting that empirical data have a stronger impact on behavior than normative information.
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Nudging is a popular approach to achieving positive behavior change. It involves subtle changes to the decision-making environment designed to steer individuals towards making better choices. Norm-nudging is a type of behavioral nudge... more
Nudging is a popular approach to achieving positive behavior change. It involves subtle changes to the decision-making environment designed to steer individuals towards making better choices. Norm-nudging is a type of behavioral nudge that aims to change social expectations about what others do or approve/disapprove of in a similar situation. Norm-nudging can be effective when behaviors are interdependent, meaning that their
preferences are influenced by others’ actions and/or beliefs. However, norm-nudging is not a one-size-fits-all solution and there are also risks associated with it, such as the potential to be perceived as manipulative or coercive, or the difficulty to effectively implement interventions. To maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of using social information
to achieve behavior change, policymakers should carefully choose what behavior they want to promote, consider the target audience for the social information, and be aware of the potential for unintended consequences.
preferences are influenced by others’ actions and/or beliefs. However, norm-nudging is not a one-size-fits-all solution and there are also risks associated with it, such as the potential to be perceived as manipulative or coercive, or the difficulty to effectively implement interventions. To maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of using social information
to achieve behavior change, policymakers should carefully choose what behavior they want to promote, consider the target audience for the social information, and be aware of the potential for unintended consequences.
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Where there is behavior there are social norms. Social norms are a key feature of societies, and their adherence is crucial to sustaining social order. This special issue brings together research at the interdisciplinary research frontier... more
Where there is behavior there are social norms. Social norms are a key feature of societies, and their adherence is crucial to sustaining social order. This special issue brings together research at the interdisciplinary research frontier investigating social norms with a focus
on behavior change. We categorize research according to different methods (theory, non- experimental, laboratory, extra-laboratory) and discuss their policy implications.
on behavior change. We categorize research according to different methods (theory, non- experimental, laboratory, extra-laboratory) and discuss their policy implications.
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Public policies often involve “norm nudging”, the use of norm information to steer individual behavior in a prosocial direction. Analysis of social norm messaging often concentrates on the outcome measure: the potential change in... more
Public policies often involve “norm nudging”, the use of norm information to steer individual behavior in a prosocial direction. Analysis of social norm messaging often concentrates on the outcome measure: the potential change in behavior. The cognitive and psychological processes that underlie individuals’ response to norm information, especially the inferences they draw, are usually overlooked. This knowledge gap may lead to adverse consequences, such as messages backfiring. To (factually) justify norm nudging interventions, it is essential that policymakers understand the complex mechanisms that link context, social expectations and preferences, and how the interpretation of different types of messages affects behavior.
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We investigate self-serving belief distortion about dominant norms of honesty. Consider an environment where the subject can earn a monetary reward by lying. In contrast to the existing literature on motivated beliefs, we do not focus on... more
We investigate self-serving belief distortion about dominant norms of honesty. Consider an environment where the subject can earn a monetary reward by lying. In contrast to the existing literature on motivated beliefs, we do not focus on distortion in one dimension alone, but instead consider beliefs in two dimensions: empirical (what other people do) and normative (what other people approve of). Our experimental findings are consistent with the predictions of a dual-self model in which conditional norm-followers strategically distort their beliefs to justify self-serving behavior. We argue that the asymmetry between what we infer from empirical as opposed to normative information is a key ingredient of belief distortion in our context: widespread honest behavior is a strong indicator of disapproval of lying (and thus that a norm of honesty is followed), but the opposite does not hold. Taken together, we show why, when, and which norm-relevant beliefs are strategically distorted.
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Anthropogenic carbon emissions have the potential to trigger changes in climate and ecosystems that would be catastrophic for the well-being of humans and other species. Widespread shifts in production and consumption patterns are... more
Anthropogenic carbon emissions have the potential to trigger changes in climate and ecosystems that would be catastrophic for the well-being of humans and other species. Widespread shifts in production and consumption patterns are urgently needed to address climate change. Although transnational agreements and national policy are necessary for a transition to a fully decarbonized global economy, fluctuating political priorities and lobbying by vested interests have slowed these efforts. Against this backdrop, bottom-up pressure from social movements and shifting social norms may offer a complementary path to a more sustainable economy. Furthermore, norm change may be an important component of decarbonization policies by accelerating or strengthening the impacts of other demand-side measures. Individual actions and policy support are social processes—they are intimately linked to expectations about the actions and beliefs of others. Although prevailing social norms often reinforce the status quo and unsustainable development pathways, social dynamics can also create widespread and rapid shifts in cultural values and practices, including increasing pressure on politicians to enact ambitious policy. We synthesize literature on social-norm influence, measurement, and change from the perspectives of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics. We discuss the opportunities and challenges for the use of social-norm and social-tipping interventions to promote climate action. Social-norm interventions aimed at addressing climate change or other social dilemmas are promising but no panacea. They require in-depth contextual knowledge, ethical consideration, and situation-specific tailoring and testing to understand whether they can be effectively implemented at scale. Our review aims to provide practitioners with insights and tools to reflect on the promises and pitfalls of such interventions in diverse contexts.
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Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement,... more
Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others' conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.
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We investigate how the intentionality of investors or trustees' actions affects third party compensation and punishment interventions after a trust game. Investors and trustees are randomly assigned to conditions where they either make... more
We investigate how the intentionality of investors or trustees' actions affects third party compensation and punishment interventions after a trust game. Investors and trustees are randomly assigned to conditions where they either make intentional choices or their choices are made by a random machine. Overall, we find that lack of reciprocity is punished more than lack of trust, and third parties exhibit strong preferences for compensation over punishment. We find that only the punishment choice is affected by the intentionality of parties' actions, whereas compensation occurs in all conditions, whether lack of trust or reciprocity has been intentional or unintentional.
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Economic inequality in the US has increased since the 1950s, yet this has not been accompanied by increased taxation and redistribution. The question how US Americans (mis-)perceive this inequality and to what extent this perception can... more
Economic inequality in the US has increased since the 1950s, yet this has not been accompanied by increased taxation and redistribution. The question how US Americans (mis-)perceive this inequality and to what extent this perception can translate into a demand for redistribution has therefore become an important policy question and a recent academic debate. We investigate how perceived income inequality causally a ects people's fairness views and their support for redistribution in a comprehensive and well-powered survey experiment with a representative sample of US Americans. We find precisely estimated null e ects. While US Americans underestimate the extend of poverty and, in particular, strongly overestimate the income of top earners, there is no evidence for a causal e ect of perceived inequality on political views or behavior. We test the role of a series of moderators and find that this null e ect holds for di erent income groups and party a liations, as well as for participants with di erent levels of trust in government and with di erent levels of perceived personal autonomy. Our study thus suggests that informing people about the extent of inequality in a society will not e ectively alter their support for redistributive policies.
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We study how compliance with norms of pro-social behavior is influenced by peers' compliance in a dynamic and non-strategic experimental setting. We show that social proximity among peers is a crucial determinant of the effect. Without... more
We study how compliance with norms of pro-social behavior is influenced by peers' compliance in a dynamic and non-strategic experimental setting. We show that social proximity among peers is a crucial determinant of the effect. Without social proximity, norm compliance erodes swiftly because participants only conform to observed norm violations while ignoring norm compliance. With social proximity, participants conform to both types of observed behaviors, thus halting the erosion of compliance. Our findings stress the importance of the broader social context for norm compliance and show that, even in the absence of social sanctions, norm compliance can be sustained in repeated interactions, provided there is group identification, as is the case in many natural and online environments.
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Human activities have had substantial impacts on the earth's climate and ecosystems, and have the potential to trigger irreversible changes that could be catastrophic for the well-being of the species on this planet. To address climate... more
Human activities have had substantial impacts on the earth's climate and ecosystems, and have the potential to trigger irreversible changes that could be catastrophic for the well-being of the species on this planet. To address climate change, widespread global shifts in dominant behavioral practices and consumption patterns are urgently needed, but multiple features of climate change pose challenges for individual and collective action. While transnational agreements and national policy and regulation are necessary for a transition to a fully decarbonized economy, fluctuating political priorities and lobbying against climate action by vested interests in high-emitting countries have thwarted such efforts; in this vacuum and to trigger political action, social movements and shifts in social norms may offer an alternative path towards a more sustainable economy. The Sixth Assessment Report (SAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, includes a chapter on demand side solutions that prominently features social norms. Individual decisions and beliefs are social processes: social information and expectations about the behavior or beliefs of others can shift consumption patterns and policy support. The same features that make collective mitigation efforts challenging also make them amenable to social influence. While prevailing social norms tend to reinforce unsustainable consumption patterns, social dynamics that reinforce cultural norms, such as benefits from coordination or the threat of sanctions, can trigger rapid societal change through tipping points in cultural values and practice. We synthesize the literature on social norm creation, change, and measurement from the perspectives of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and economics, and discuss opportunities and challenges for the application of social norm interventions to promote climate action. We argue that social norm interventions aimed at climate action and/or other social dilemmas are promising but no panacea. They require in-depth contextual knowledge and a high degree of tailoring and problem-specific pre-testing before they can be effectively implemented at scale. Our review tries to provide policy makers with the insights and tools to do so. SECTION I: Introduction The impacts of increasing greenhouse gas concentrations on Earth's climate are visible worldwide. Temperatures are reaching new extremes, and heavy precipitation, droughts, wildfires, and other extreme weather events are increasing in frequency and intensity. Glaciers are shrinking, sea ice is retreating, and sea levels are rising, causing recurrent flooding and threatening coastal communities. These physical changes are threatening biodiversity underwater and on land, and are exacerbated by overfishing, land use changes, the burning of tropical forests and other human interventions. Growing resource scarcity has created competition for food and water, and along with extreme weather events, is likely to increase global conflicts, political instability and large-scale climate migration. These and many other physical and social changes are clear indications of climate change, and require urgent and unprecedented local, national, and global action (Climate Central, 2013). The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated that rapid, large scale reorganization of daily life is possible, at least temporarily. Governments worldwide shut down their economies and mandated social distancing measures to mitigate the spread of coronavirus. However, there has also been resistance to these measures in some parts of the world and segments of the population. While the COVID-19 pandemic is distinct from the climate crisis, they share many characteristics: preventative action imposes large, concrete, and immediate costs; the negative consequences of inaction are delayed, and thus easily discounted or ignored, but they are also compounding; the benefits of action are dispersed, and the risks and impacts are unequally distributed; the risks are probabilistic and often communicated through abstract statistics by experts (Weber, 2020a). The actions needed to mitigate the spread of the virus also coincide with actions that mitigate climate change-video
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Although inequality in the US has increased since the 1960s, several studies show that Americans underestimate it. Reasons include over-reliance on one’s local perspective and ideologically motivated cognition. We propose a novel... more
Although inequality in the US has increased since the 1960s, several studies show that Americans underestimate it. Reasons include over-reliance on one’s local perspective and ideologically motivated cognition. We propose a novel mechanism to account for the misperceptions of income inequality. We hypothesize that compared to those who feel less autonomy, the people who believe they are autonomous and have control over their lives also believe that (1) income inequality is lower and (2) income inequality is more acceptable. Using a representative sample of 3,427 Americans, we find evidence to support these hypotheses.
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The magnitude and nature of the COVID-19 pandemic prevents public health policies from relying on coercive enforcement. Practicing social distancing, wearing masks and staying at home are voluntary and conditional on the behavior of... more
The magnitude and nature of the COVID-19 pandemic prevents public health policies from relying on coercive enforcement. Practicing social distancing, wearing masks and staying at home are voluntary and conditional on the behavior of others. We present the results of a large-scale survey experiment in nine countries with representative samples of the population. We find that both empirical expectations (what others do) and normative expectations (what others approve of) play a significant role in compliance, beyond the effect of any other individual or group characteristic. In our survey experiment, when empirical and normative expectations of individuals are high, compliance goes up by 55% (relative to the low expectations condition). Similar results are obtained when we look at self-reported compliance among those with high expectations. Our results are driven by an asymmetric interaction with individuals' trust in government and science. Holding both expectations high, the effect of trusting science is substantial and significant in our vignette experiment (22% increase in compliance), and even larger in self-reported compliance (76% and 127% increase before and after the lockdown). By contrast, trusting the government only generates modest effects. At the macro level, the country-level trust in science, and not in government, becomes a strong predictor of compliance.
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We study games where the impact of strategic uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about other players’ actions and beliefs) is compounded by the simultaneous presence of risky prospects (chance moves with known conditional probabilities). We... more
We study games where the impact of strategic uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about other players’ actions and beliefs) is compounded by the simultaneous presence of risky prospects (chance moves with known conditional probabilities). We embed such games in an experimental environment that let us test if risk-taking behavior is affected by information that reduces the extent of strategic uncertainty. In doing so, we test some implications of expected utility theory, while making minimal assumptions about individual-level risk attitudes. Our analysis provides evidence for an effect of such information: notably, we find that the effect on choice is due in some cases to rational belief revision about others’ actions, and in other cases to a reversal in risk preferences.
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Descriptive norms messaging interventions are used to motivate people to adopt or maintain desirable behaviors. Such interventions provide people with information that describes an undesirable behavior as uncommon or a desirable behavior... more
Descriptive norms messaging interventions are used to motivate people to adopt or
maintain desirable behaviors. Such interventions provide people with information that describes an undesirable behavior as uncommon or a desirable behavior as prevalent within a relevant social group. Descriptive norms messaging interventions have shown promise in increasing individual and social benefit for a broad range of health and sustainability programs. However, evidence suggests that people who have adopted desirable behaviors sometimes regress to undesirable behaviors after receiving descriptive norms messages due to the type of information provided in the messages. This phenomenon is called the boomerang effect. We aim to conduct a systematic review of boomerang effects on health and environmental sustainability behaviors resulting from exposure to descriptive norms messaging interventions.
maintain desirable behaviors. Such interventions provide people with information that describes an undesirable behavior as uncommon or a desirable behavior as prevalent within a relevant social group. Descriptive norms messaging interventions have shown promise in increasing individual and social benefit for a broad range of health and sustainability programs. However, evidence suggests that people who have adopted desirable behaviors sometimes regress to undesirable behaviors after receiving descriptive norms messages due to the type of information provided in the messages. This phenomenon is called the boomerang effect. We aim to conduct a systematic review of boomerang effects on health and environmental sustainability behaviors resulting from exposure to descriptive norms messaging interventions.
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Social norms are ubiquitous in social and economic life but the drivers of norm conformity are poorly understood. We study the specific ways in which others' norm compliance influences own norm compliance. Our context is a repeated... more
Social norms are ubiquitous in social and economic life but the drivers of norm conformity are poorly understood. We study the specific ways in which others' norm compliance influences own norm compliance. Our context is a repeated non-strategic Take-or-Give donation experiment in which we show that giving is considered socially appropriate while taking is inappropriate. We find that observation of norm violations by anonymous others strongly erodes own norm compliance. Most importantly, erosion is halted when people have even minimal social proximity to those they observe; in this case, individuals also pay attention to norm followers. Our results highlight the importance of social proximity for the dynamics of social norm compliance.
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Intentional harm is often a catalyst to action for victims and third party observers. Yet, harm may also be unintended. If there is a third party observer, and the victim does not know whether harm was intentional or accidental, would... more
Intentional harm is often a catalyst to action for victims and third party observers. Yet, harm may also be unintended. If there is a third party observer, and the victim does not know whether harm was intentional or accidental, would that observer reveal the offender’s intentions to the victim? In five studies, we investigated when and why third party observers reveal offenders’ intentions. We used an economic game in which participants observed a player being monetarily harmed either accidentally or intentionally. Third party observers were more likely to inform the victims when harm was accidental than intentional. We distinguish between two types of motives. First, emotional motives are desires to express one’s moral anger and empathy. Second, instrumental motives reflect desires to correct the victim’s impressions and ensure future fairness. Third party behavior is motivated by moral emotions of anger and empathy. Anger toward the offenders increases the likelihood that the observer will inform the victim when harm is intentional. Empathy for the victim increases the likelihood of informing the victim about intentional and accidental harm. Moreover, third party behavior is motivated by instrumental motives that reflect fairness concerns. By correcting the victim’s impression of the offender, the observer is ensuring fair future interactions between victim and offender. We discuss implications for forgiveness and management of conflict.
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Norms and nudges are both popular types of interventions. Recent years have seen the rise of `norm-nudges' - nudges whose mechanism of action relies on social norms, providing or eliciting social expectations. Norm-nudges can be powerful... more
Norms and nudges are both popular types of interventions. Recent years have seen the rise of `norm-nudges' - nudges whose mechanism of action relies on social norms, providing or eliciting social expectations. Norm-nudges can be powerful interventions, but they can easily fail to be e ective and can even back re unless they are designed with care.
We highlight important considerations when designing norm-nudges and discuss a general model of social behavior based on expectations and conditional preferences. We present the results of several experiments where norm-nudging can back re, and ways to avoid these negative outcomes.
We highlight important considerations when designing norm-nudges and discuss a general model of social behavior based on expectations and conditional preferences. We present the results of several experiments where norm-nudging can back re, and ways to avoid these negative outcomes.
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We explore the relationship between norm-uncertainty and lying. Lies are ubiquitous, and people often lie for their own bene t or for the bene t of others. Research in environments in which social norms are clearly de ned and... more
We explore the relationship between norm-uncertainty and lying. Lies are ubiquitous, and people often lie for their own bene t or for the bene t of others. Research in environments in which social norms are clearly de ned and communicated finds that social norms influence personal decisions, even when they are not in our own self-interest. We deviate from this approach and study lying under norm uncertainty with scope for opportunistic interpretation of the norm. We introduce variation along three dimensions: salience of different types of norm-uncertainty (normative/empirical), the beneficiary of the lie (self/other), and ex-ante knowledge about the opportunity to tell a lie in order to tease out potential belief-distortion mechanisms. We find compelling evidence that individuals engage in self-serving belief distortion to increase lying overall. However, we observe this only when uncertainty about what others do (empirical uncertainty), but not when uncertainty about what others approve of (normative uncertainty) is made salient. We also observe conditional liars, but only when the lie is self-serving rather than to the bene t of a third party. We discuss policy implications to improve the effectiveness of norm-based interventions.
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Great articles on social norms
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The explanation of social norms change faces two main challenges. One is to define precisely what social norms are. The social science literature is not very precise in this respect, as different collective behaviors often are conflated... more
The explanation of social norms change faces two main challenges. One is to define precisely what social norms are. The social science literature is not very precise in this respect, as different collective behaviors often are conflated under the label “norm.” Here we adopt a definition of social norms (Bicchieri 2006, 2016) that lets us specify the necessary elements of norm change. The other challenge is to understand the mechanisms of norm dynamics. Both individual actions and social structure play a role in norm emergence and change, as the network structure within which individuals interact may foster or even prevent social change. Moreover, individuals are heterogeneous in many respects, including norm conformity. Heterogeneous individuals have different thresholds for action, and thus understanding norm change requires a fine-grained analysis of the distribution of heterogeneous types in a population.
In this paper, we focus on norm abandonment and examine the role played by the initiators of norm abandonment—“trendsetters”—in spearheading change. We highlight the characteristics that make someone a potential trendsetter, model a social norm game where choices are determined by such characteristics, and show with simulations based on our model how the network that trendsetters interact with may help or hinder norm change.
In this paper, we focus on norm abandonment and examine the role played by the initiators of norm abandonment—“trendsetters”—in spearheading change. We highlight the characteristics that make someone a potential trendsetter, model a social norm game where choices are determined by such characteristics, and show with simulations based on our model how the network that trendsetters interact with may help or hinder norm change.
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In the Appendix, we model a social norm game where choices are determined by trendsetters' characteristics, and show with simulations based on our model how the network that trendsetters interact with may help or hinder norm change.
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Social norms and social preferences have increasingly become an integral part of the economics discourse. After disentangling the two notions, this paper focuses on social norms, which we stipulate as group-specific solutions to strategic... more
Social norms and social preferences have increasingly become an integral part of the economics discourse. After disentangling the two notions, this paper focuses on social norms, which we stipulate as group-specific solutions to strategic problems. More precisely, we define social norms as behavioral regularities emerging in mixed-motive games, as a result of preferences for conformity conditional on an endogenous set of beliefs and expectations. To that end, we review models that explicitly feature normative expectations, as well as models that account for category-specific prescriptions. We finally survey some relevant experimental evidence.
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This paper investigates the causal relationships among scripts, schemata, and social norms. The authors examine how social norms are triggered by particular schemata and are grounded in scripts. Just as schemata are embedded in a network,... more
This paper investigates the causal relationships among scripts, schemata, and social norms. The authors examine how social norms are triggered by particular schemata and are grounded in scripts. Just as schemata are embedded in a network, so too are social norms, and they can be primed through spreading activation. Moreover, the expectations that allow a social norm’s existence are inherently grounded in particular scripts and schemata. Using interventions that have targeted gender norms, open defecation, female genital cutting, and other collective issues as examples, the authors argue that ignoring the cognitive underpinnings of a social norm doom interventions to failure.
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A comparison of three different models of social preferences: inequity aversion, reciprocity and conditional preference for following social norms.
Research Interests: Experimental Economics, Philosophy, Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and 11 morePhilosophy of Economics (Philosophy), Experimental philosophy, Experimental games, Decision And Game Theory, Behavioral Decision Making, Philosophy Of Economics, Philosophy of Social Science, Behavioral Economics, Social Epistemology, Philosophy of economics (Economics), and Methodology of experimental economics
""Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we... more
""Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. We argue that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think we ought to do (normative
expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals’ decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators’ choices significantly predict a dictator’s own choice. However, dictators’ expectations regarding what other dictators think
ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. ""
expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals’ decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., systemic corruption, high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators’ expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators’ choices significantly predict a dictator’s own choice. However, dictators’ expectations regarding what other dictators think
ought to be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions after controlling for empirical expectations. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for designing policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior. ""
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What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in... more
What is considered to be fair depends on context-dependent expectations. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game, we demonstrate that both fair behavior and perceptions of fairness depend upon beliefs about what one ought to do in a situation — that is, upon normative expectations. We manipulate such expectations by creating informational asymmetries about the offer choices available to the Proposer, and find that behavior varies accordingly. Proposers and Responders show a remarkable degree of agreement in their beliefs about which choices are considered fair. We discuss how these results fit into a theory of social norms.
Research Interests: Social Psychology, Experimental Economics, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 11 moreExperimental philosophy, Moral Psychology, Social Sciences, Social Philosophy, Experimental games, Decision And Game Theory, Behavioral Decision Making, Philosophy Of Economics, Philosophy of Social Science, Social Norms, and Social and Political Philosophy
Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the... more
Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behavior, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer genuinely believed it was fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be unfair. In contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they could do so without the recipient’s knowledge, individuals made uneven offers despite knowing that their behavior was unfair.
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Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary motives underlying human decision-making. However, because income and wealth inequalities exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motives can point to... more
Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary motives underlying human decision-making. However, because income and wealth inequalities exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motives can point to different decisions. In particular, when a beneficiary is less wealthy than the benefactor, a reciprocal action can lead to greater inequality. In this paper we report data from a trust game variant where trustees’ responses to kind intentions generate inequality in favor of investors. In relation to a standard trust game treatment where trustees’ responses reduce inequality, the proportion of non-reciprocating decisions is twice as large when reciprocity promotes inequality. Moreover, we find that investors expect that this will be the case. Overall, we find that a majority (more than half) of trustees do not reciprocate when reciprocity increases inequality that favors investors. Our results call attention to the potential importance of inequality in principal-agent relationships and have important implications for policies aimed at promoting trust and cooperation.
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This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. In particular, I explore the relation between social... more
This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this 'communication effect'. One is that communication... more
In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this 'communication effect'. One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation.
Research Interests: Organizational Behavior, Social Psychology, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 12 moreCommunication, Experimental philosophy, Moral Psychology, Social Identity, Evolution of cooperation (Evolutionary Biology), Decision And Game Theory, Behavioral Decision Making, Philosophy Of Economics, Philosophy of Social Science, Social Epistemology, Social Norms, and Social Dilemmas
The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum... more
The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game that creates informational asymmetries between Proposer and Responder, a previous study showed that both perceptions of fairness and fair behavior depend upon normative expectations, i.e., beliefs about what others expect one should do in a specific situation. Individuals tend to comply with the norm when risking sanctions, but disregard the norm when violations are undetectable. Using the same methodology with children aged 8-10 years, the present study shows that children's beliefs and behaviors differ from what is observed in adults. Playing as Proposers, children show a self-serving bias only when there is a clear informational asymmetry. Playing as Responders, they show a remarkable discrepancy between their normative judgment about fair procedures (a coin toss to determine the offer) and their behavior (rejection of an unfair offer derived from the coin toss), supporting the existence of an outcome bias effect. Finally, our results reveal no influence of theory of mind on children's decision-making behavior.
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One of the most important concepts in social exchanges and interactions is that of fairness. We can come to accept the most onerous tasks if we are convinced that the decision procedure was fair and, conversely, we may reject even a... more
One of the most important concepts in social exchanges and interactions is that of fairness. We can come to accept the most onerous tasks if we are convinced that the decision procedure was fair and, conversely, we may reject even a profitable exchange if we feel treated unfairly. Since the dawn of philosophy, a concern with fairness, what is it, how to define it, has been central to the philosopher's quest.
ABSTRACT The paper presents a view of social norms as situationally contingent. We tend to obey a norm when it is made salient, and thus we can focus upon it. In turn, the salience of a norm is contingent upon the situation we are in. We... more
ABSTRACT The paper presents a view of social norms as situationally contingent. We tend to obey a norm when it is made salient, and thus we can focus upon it. In turn, the salience of a norm is contingent upon the situation we are in. We respond, often in an entirely automatic way, to situational cues that focus our attention on a salient norm. And we are able to focus on a particular norm because situational cues activate a cognitive schema that tells us how to behave appropriately in the present context. I present the results of several experiments ...
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Social cooperation often relies on individuals’ spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested... more
Social cooperation often relies on individuals’ spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested that an individual’s tendency toward norm conformity is affected by empirical information (i.e. what others did or would do in a similar situation) as well as by normative information (i.e. what others think one ought to do). Yet little is known about whether people have an intrinsic desire to obtain norm-revealing information. In this paper, we use a dictator game to investigate whether dictators actively seek norm-revealing information and, if so, whether they prefer to get empirical or normative information. Our data show that although the majority of dictators choose to view free information before making decisions, they are equally likely to choose empirical or normative information. However, a large majority (more than 80%) of dictators are not willing to incur even a very small cost for getting information. Our findings help to understand why norm compliance is context-dependent, and highlight the importance of making norm-revealing information salient in order to promote conformity.
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This is a long an hopefully exhaustive report on the status of research on social norms
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A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by fi rst looking at a simple... more
A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by fi rst looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
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The health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to disproportionately impact residents of lower-middle income countries. Understanding the psychological impact of the pandemic is important to guide outreach... more
The health and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to disproportionately impact residents of lower-middle income countries. Understanding the psychological impact of the pandemic is important to guide outreach interventions. In this study, we examined people's awareness of COVID-19 symptoms, risk perception, and changes in behaviors and stress levels during the lockdown in peri-urban Tamil Nadu India. Field workers conducted phone call surveys (included n = 2044) in 26 communities from 20-25 May 2020. The majority perceived no (60%) or low (23%) level of risk of personally contracting coronavirus. Common fears were related to health and economic concerns, including loss of income (62%), inability to travel freely (46%), and becoming sick (46%). Residents were well aware of the common symptoms of COVID-19, such as fever (66%) and dry cough (57%), but not the asymptomatic transmission (24%). The majority experienced increased stress about finance (79%) and the lockdown (51%). Our findings emphasize the need to develop context-adequate education and communication programs to raise vigilance about asymptomatic transmission and to sustain preventative behaviors. The evidence on fear and changes in stress levels could inform designing coping strategies and programs focused on mental well-being.
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Phase 2 report of Gates foundation project on social norms and sanitation in India
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Background Descriptive norms messaging interventions are used to motivate people to adopt or maintain desirable behaviors. Such interventions provide people with information that describes an undesirable behavior as uncommon or a... more
Background Descriptive norms messaging interventions are used to motivate people to adopt or maintain desirable behaviors. Such interventions provide people with information that describes an
undesirable behavior as uncommon or a desirable behavior as prevalent within a relevant social group. Descriptive norms messaging interventions have shown promise in increasing individual and social benefit for a broad range of health and sustainability programs. However, evidence suggests that people who have adopted desirable behaviors sometimes regress to undesirable behaviors after receiving descriptive norms messages due to the type of information provided in the messages. This phenomenon is called the boomerang effect. We aim to conduct a systematic review of boomerang effects on health and environmental sustainability behaviors resulting from exposure to descriptive norms messaging interventions.
undesirable behavior as uncommon or a desirable behavior as prevalent within a relevant social group. Descriptive norms messaging interventions have shown promise in increasing individual and social benefit for a broad range of health and sustainability programs. However, evidence suggests that people who have adopted desirable behaviors sometimes regress to undesirable behaviors after receiving descriptive norms messages due to the type of information provided in the messages. This phenomenon is called the boomerang effect. We aim to conduct a systematic review of boomerang effects on health and environmental sustainability behaviors resulting from exposure to descriptive norms messaging interventions.
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People often form perceptions about how prevalent a behavior is in a social group. However, these perceptions can be inaccurate and biased. While persistent undesirable practices in low-income countries have drawn global attention,... more
People often form perceptions about how prevalent a behavior is in a social group. However, these perceptions can be inaccurate and biased. While persistent undesirable practices in low-income countries
have drawn global attention, evidence regarding people’s perception of how prevalent these practices are is scarce. Among those harmful practices, open defecation in India remains a significant public health
concern, where it perpetuates the vicious cycle of disease and poverty. In this study, we focus on measuring the perceived prevalence of open defecation among respondents in Bihar, India. We examined the bias in perceived prevalence, which is defined as a pattern of deviation from the actual prevalence of open defecation. Results showed that respondents who defecate in the open overestimate the prevalence of open defecation, whereas those who consistently use toilets underestimate it. This finding suggests a false consensus bias in the perceived prevalence of open defecation. Scholars, policymakers, and program implementers who seek to correct misperceptions about open defecation by broadcasting real prevalence should be aware of biases in the perceived prevalence and address them in behavior change interventions.
have drawn global attention, evidence regarding people’s perception of how prevalent these practices are is scarce. Among those harmful practices, open defecation in India remains a significant public health
concern, where it perpetuates the vicious cycle of disease and poverty. In this study, we focus on measuring the perceived prevalence of open defecation among respondents in Bihar, India. We examined the bias in perceived prevalence, which is defined as a pattern of deviation from the actual prevalence of open defecation. Results showed that respondents who defecate in the open overestimate the prevalence of open defecation, whereas those who consistently use toilets underestimate it. This finding suggests a false consensus bias in the perceived prevalence of open defecation. Scholars, policymakers, and program implementers who seek to correct misperceptions about open defecation by broadcasting real prevalence should be aware of biases in the perceived prevalence and address them in behavior change interventions.
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“How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question but also an empirical one. Many organizations have implemented programs to abandon harmful social norms. These programs are standardly monitored and evaluated with a set of... more
“How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question but also an empirical one. Many organizations have implemented programs to abandon harmful social norms. These programs are standardly monitored and evaluated with a set of empirical tools. While monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of changes in objective outcomes and behaviors is well developed, we will argue that M&E of changes in the wide range of beliefs and preferences important to social norms is still problematic. In this paper, we first present a theoretical framework and then show how it should guide social norms measurement. As a case study, we focus on the harmful practice of child marriage. We show how an operational theory of social norms can guide the design of surveys, experiments, and vignettes. We use examples from existing research to illustrate how to study social norms change.
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“How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question but also an empirical one. Many organizations have implemented programs to abandon harmful social norms. These programs are standardly monitored and evaluated with a set of... more
“How social norms change” is not only a theoretical question but also an empirical one. Many organizations have implemented programs to abandon harmful social norms. These programs are standardly monitored and evaluated with a set of empirical tools. While monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of changes in objective outcomes and behaviors is well-developed, we will argue that M&E of changes in the wide range of beliefs and preferences important to social norms is still problematic. In this paper, we first present a theoretical framework and then show how it should guide social norms measurement. As a case study, we focus on the harmful practice of child marriage. We show how an operational theory of social norms can guide the design of surveys, experiments, and vignettes. We use examples from existing research to illustrate how to study social norms change.
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Experimental evidence on pre-play communication supports a “focusing function of communication” hypothesis. Relevant communication facilitates cooperative, pro-social behavior because it causes a shift in individuals’ focus towards... more
Experimental evidence on pre-play communication supports a “focusing function of communication” hypothesis. Relevant communication facilitates cooperative, pro-social behavior because it causes a shift in individuals’ focus towards strategies dictated by some salient social norm. After reviewing the formal foundations for a general theory of conformity to social norms, we provide an original application illustrating how a framework that allows for different conjectures about norms is able to capture the focusing function of communication and to explain experimental results.
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"Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why... more
"Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase
levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a
friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate
a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends."
levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a
friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate
a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends."
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We study the behavioral consequences of interpersonal communication prior to experimental Trust games. We manipulated the richness of the communication medium and the size of the communicating group. Communication richness failed to... more
We study the behavioral consequences of interpersonal communication prior to experimental Trust games. We manipulated the richness of the communication medium and the size of the communicating group. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments, but the size of the communicating group did: The amounts sent were significantly higher in the dyadic communication conditions than in the group communication and no-communication conditions. We also found that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation strongly predicted their levels of investment.
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""Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments.... more
""Subjects communicated prior to playing trust games; the richness of the communication media and the topics of conversation were manipulated. Communication richness failed to produce significant differences in first-mover investments. However, the topics of conversation made a significant difference: the amounts sent were considerably higher in the unrestricted communication conditions than in the restricted communication and no-communication conditions.
Most importantly, we find that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.""
Most importantly, we find that first-movers’ expectations of second-movers’ reciprocation are influenced by communication and strongly predict their levels of investment.""
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The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a ‘‘trust and reciprocate’’ norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be... more
The paper presents a simulation of the dynamics of impersonal trust. It shows how a ‘‘trust and reciprocate’’ norm can emerge and stabilize in populations of conditional cooperators. The norm, or behavioral regularity, is not to be identified with a single strategy. It is instead supported by several conditional strategies that vary in the frequency and intensity of sanctions.
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"The paper presents results of recent laboratory experiments that study if and how computer-mediated communication affects cooperation and trust. It is argued that communication medium does not matter much for trust-building and... more
"The paper presents results of recent laboratory
experiments that study if and how computer-mediated
communication affects cooperation and trust. It is argued
that communication medium does not matter much for
trust-building and maintenance, whereas relevant pre-play
communication and group size can have a major influence.
The implications of the findings for the design of sites that
depend on trusting communities are discussed."
experiments that study if and how computer-mediated
communication affects cooperation and trust. It is argued
that communication medium does not matter much for
trust-building and maintenance, whereas relevant pre-play
communication and group size can have a major influence.
The implications of the findings for the design of sites that
depend on trusting communities are discussed."
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This article investigates the impact of trust on bribery. We measure trust with a survey question from the World Values Survey on whether respondents think others would take advantage of them if given the chance, and we observe bribery... more
This article investigates the impact of trust on bribery. We measure trust with a survey question from the World Values Survey on whether respondents think others would take advantage of them if given the chance, and we observe
bribery behavior in an experimental bribery game. The research was conducted in China and Italy, which have relatively high perceived-corruption levels, as well as in Japan and the Netherlands, which have relatively low perceived-corruption levels. In the bribery game, participants have the
opportunity to bribe another participant to cheat to their advantage. We hypothesized that while honoring bribing agreements depends on trust, the endorsement
of such agreements is independent of trust. We find evidence
that trust enables bribery in the two low-corruption countries, but no evidence
that trust enables bribery in the two high-corruption countries. More specifically, trust predicts bribers’ trustworthiness in honoring the bribery agreement once they enter into one. The results reveal a dark side of trust: It supports socially detrimental cooperation when a deal is unenforceable.
bribery behavior in an experimental bribery game. The research was conducted in China and Italy, which have relatively high perceived-corruption levels, as well as in Japan and the Netherlands, which have relatively low perceived-corruption levels. In the bribery game, participants have the
opportunity to bribe another participant to cheat to their advantage. We hypothesized that while honoring bribing agreements depends on trust, the endorsement
of such agreements is independent of trust. We find evidence
that trust enables bribery in the two low-corruption countries, but no evidence
that trust enables bribery in the two high-corruption countries. More specifically, trust predicts bribers’ trustworthiness in honoring the bribery agreement once they enter into one. The results reveal a dark side of trust: It supports socially detrimental cooperation when a deal is unenforceable.
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We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded... more
We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded
bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment,compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by comparing negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties
bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment,compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by comparing negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties
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Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can... more
Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping, and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, anger is often seen as an anti-social motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both using modified trust games in which the investor experienced a loss either due to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated.
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Game theory has recently been recognized as a powerful tool to model interactions among artificial agents. Game theorists, however, have never tried to explicitly model how players reason to a solution. This becomes a crucial flaw... more
Game theory has recently been recognized as a powerful tool to model interactions among artificial agents. Game theorists, however, have never tried to explicitly model how players reason to a solution. This becomes a crucial flaw whenever one attempts to apply game theoretic solutions to multi-agents systems. In this paper we provide an effective procedure that allows artificial agents to coordinate using game-theoretic tools.
Abstract In building intelligent network agents, computer scientists may employ a variety of different design strategies, and their design decisions can have a significant effect on the ultimate nature of network interactions. Some agent... more
Abstract In building intelligent network agents, computer scientists may employ a variety of different design strategies, and their design decisions can have a significant effect on the ultimate nature of network interactions. Some agent designs are “cooperative,” and populations of agents based on them would be able to interact smoothly, effectively utilizing network resources.
"One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face ‘communication effect’ has been recently explained in terms of a... more
"One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face ‘communication effect’ has been recently explained in terms of a ‘focus theory of norms’: successful communication
focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation.
Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not further explore whether and to what extent the communication medium affects cooperative behavior. In this article, we ask if pro-social behavior can emerge and survive in computer-mediated environments. We show that, like face-to-face communication, computer-mediated communication also positively affects cooperation in social dilemmas, but cooperation is more difficult to establish and maintain. We argue that the discrepancy between the computer-mediated and the face-to-face communication effects is a consequence of the distinct capabilities of different media to focus agents on pro-social norms and to allow them to develop mutual expectations about future behavior."
focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation.
Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not further explore whether and to what extent the communication medium affects cooperative behavior. In this article, we ask if pro-social behavior can emerge and survive in computer-mediated environments. We show that, like face-to-face communication, computer-mediated communication also positively affects cooperation in social dilemmas, but cooperation is more difficult to establish and maintain. We argue that the discrepancy between the computer-mediated and the face-to-face communication effects is a consequence of the distinct capabilities of different media to focus agents on pro-social norms and to allow them to develop mutual expectations about future behavior."
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One of the ongoing puzzles of political economy is political protest. Unlike voting, however, what needs to be explained is not large turnout, but how small numbers can sometimes have a large impact. We develop a computational (signaling)... more
One of the ongoing puzzles of political economy is political protest. Unlike voting, however, what needs to be explained is not large turnout, but how small numbers can sometimes have a large impact. We develop a computational (signaling) model where individuals are privately informed yet also communicate with their
`neighbors,' or friends. Properties of this communication, or social network can give rise to different levels of information aggregation. Different amounts of information
can lead to different aggregate turnout. Hence, both the leader's and individuals' beliefs about the structure of the social network can have policy implications.
`neighbors,' or friends. Properties of this communication, or social network can give rise to different levels of information aggregation. Different amounts of information
can lead to different aggregate turnout. Hence, both the leader's and individuals' beliefs about the structure of the social network can have policy implications.
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In recent years there has been growing experimental evidence about cooperative behavior even in the absence of egoistic incentives, such as reputation formation opportunities (Andreoni and Miller 1991; Dawes and Thaler 1988). Moreover, it... more
In recent years there has been growing experimental evidence about cooperative behavior even in the absence of egoistic incentives, such as reputation formation opportunities (Andreoni and Miller 1991; Dawes and Thaler 1988). Moreover, it has been observed that once a cooperative pattern of behavior has been established, people tend to expect it to persist (Caporael et al. 1989). Those authors who claim there exists altruistic behavior tend to credit it to the working of norms of cooperation (Dawes 1980).
This report aims to diagnose what drives corrupt behaviour in Nigeria, and the types of beliefs that support practices understood to be corrupt. Its findings are based largely on a national household survey jointly developed by the... more
This report aims to diagnose what drives corrupt behaviour in Nigeria, and the types of beliefs that support practices understood to be corrupt. Its findings are based largely on a national household survey jointly developed by the Chatham House Africa Programme and the University of Pennsylvania’s Social Norms Group (PennSONG), in collaboration with Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics as well as a network of academics and practitioners from Nigerian universities and NGOs. The findings present new evidence of the social beliefs and expectations that influence some day-to-day forms of corruption in Nigeria.
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In this chapter, we examine corruption as a socio-psychological phenomenon. We argue that individuals’ engagement in corrupt behaviors is more complex than a mere choice between ethical and unethical behavior. To understand the etiology... more
In this chapter, we examine corruption as a socio-psychological phenomenon. We argue that individuals’ engagement in corrupt behaviors is more complex than a mere choice between ethical and unethical behavior. To understand the etiology of corruption, one should consider how social and institutional factors combine with psychological factors to influence individuals’ engagement in corruption. Drawing on Ajzen’s (1985) theory of planned behavior (TPB) and Bicchieri’s (2006, 2016) theory of social norms, we examine socio-psychological processes that precede corrupt behaviors. Based on our analysis, we then highlight various ways in which individuals’ propensity to engage in corruption can be reduced.
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This article investigates the impact of trust on bribery. We measure trust with a survey question from the World values survey on whether respondents think others would take advantage of them if given the chance, and we observe bribery... more
This article investigates the impact of trust on bribery. We measure trust with a survey question from the World values survey on whether respondents think others would take advantage of them if given the chance, and we observe bribery behavior in an experimental bribery game. The research was conducted in China and Italy, which have relatively high perceived-corruption levels, as well as in Japan and the Netherlands, which have relatively low perceived-corruption levels. In the bribery game, participants have the opportunity to bribe another participant to cheat to their advantage. We hypothesized that honoring bribing agreements depends on trust, the endorsement of such agreements is independent of trust. We find evidence that trust enables bribery in the two low-corruption countries, but no evidence that trust enables bribery in the two high-corruption countries. More specifically, trust predicts bribers' trustworthiness in honoring the bribery agreement once they enter into one. The results reveal a dark side of trust: It supports socially detrimental cooperation when a deal is unenforceable.
Research Interests:
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Abstract In a 1995 paper, Aumann [4] gave a proof of the claim that, in a game of perfect information, rational players who have common knowledge of their mutual rationality must play the backwards induction solution. Binmore [6] has been... more
Abstract In a 1995 paper, Aumann [4] gave a proof of the claim that, in a game of perfect information, rational players who have common knowledge of their mutual rationality must play the backwards induction solution. Binmore [6] has been quite vocal in his opposition to Aumann's claims. What would a player do, he asks, if she were to observe a deviation from the backwards induction equilibrium path?
The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game... more
The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is
that the players' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of being objectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an equilibrium will be attained. In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs. In this case it becomes necessary to explicitly model the process of belief formation. This model attributes to the players a theory of counterfactuals which they use in restricting the set of possible equilibria. If it were possible to attribute to the players the same theory of counterfactuals, then the players' beliefs would eventually converge.
that the players' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of being objectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an equilibrium will be attained. In particular, I analyze the case of multiple equilibria, since in this case there exists a whole set of rational beliefs, so that no player can ever be certain that the others believe he has certain beliefs. In this case it becomes necessary to explicitly model the process of belief formation. This model attributes to the players a theory of counterfactuals which they use in restricting the set of possible equilibria. If it were possible to attribute to the players the same theory of counterfactuals, then the players' beliefs would eventually converge.
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We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the... more
We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common reasoning about admissibility does not depend on how the strategic situation is represented. We further explore the links between iterated admissibility and backward and forward induction.
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In the last twenty years or so game theorists have devoted much effort to the development of so-called refinements of Nash equilibrium. However, too little attention has been paid to the very basic question of how a Nash equilibrium comes... more
In the last twenty years or so game theorists have devoted much effort to the development of so-called refinements of Nash equilibrium. However, too little attention has been paid to the very basic question of how a Nash equilibrium comes about. A Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) is a strategy profile in which each player's strategy is a best reply to the others' strategies. The problem is that nothing in the definition of Nash equilibrium entails that players will in fact play their equilibrium strategies.
Abstract In this paper we isolate a particular refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that is characterized by (< i> i</i>) the fact that it provides a unified framework for both backwards and forward induction; and (< i> ii</i>) by... more
Abstract In this paper we isolate a particular refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that is characterized by (< i> i</i>) the fact that it provides a unified framework for both backwards and forward induction; and (< i> ii</i>) by the fact that it is mechanically computable. We provide an effective procedure, whose definition embodies certain given principles of rationality.
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Abstract:" In this paper we isolate a particular refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that is characterized by two properties:(i) it provides a unified framework for both backwards and forward induction; and (ii) it is... more
Abstract:" In this paper we isolate a particular refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that is characterized by two properties:(i) it provides a unified framework for both backwards and forward induction; and (ii) it is mechanically computable. We provide an effective procedure that allows players, given the extensive-form representation of a game, to compute a set of'reasonable paths' through the tree.
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A large class of games is that of non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information. When the length of these games is finite, the method used to reach a solution is that of a backward induction. Working from the terminal... more
A large class of games is that of non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information. When the length of these games is finite, the method used to reach a solution is that of a backward induction. Working from the terminal nodes, dominated strategies are successively deleted and what remains is a unique equilibrium. Game theorists have generally assumed that the informational requirement needed to solve these games is that the players have common knowledge of rationality. This assumption, however, has given ...
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Game theory aims to understand situations in which decision-makers interact. Chess is an example, as are firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, jury members deciding on a verdict, animals fighting over prey,... more
Game theory aims to understand situations in which decision-makers interact. Chess is an example, as are firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, jury members deciding on a verdict, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships, and so on. What all these situations have in common is that the outcome of the interaction depends on what the parties jointly do. Decision-makers may be people, organizations, animals, robots, or even genes.
1. INTRODUCTION Deliberation about what to do in any context requires reasoning about what will or would happen in various alternative situations, including situations that the agent knows will never in fact be realized. In contexts that... more
1. INTRODUCTION Deliberation about what to do in any context requires reasoning about what will or would happen in various alternative situations, including situations that the agent knows will never in fact be realized. In contexts that involve two or more agents who have to take ...
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A game is an abstract, formal description of a strategic interaction. Any strategic interaction involves two or more decision-makers (players), each with two or more ways of acting (strategies), such that the outcome depends on the... more
A game is an abstract, formal description of a strategic interaction. Any strategic interaction involves two or more decision-makers (players), each with two or more ways of acting (strategies), such that the outcome depends on the strategy choices of all the players. Each player has well-defined preferences among all the possible outcomes, enabling corresponding utilities (payoffs) to be assigned. A game makes explicit the rules governing players' interaction, the players' feasible strategies, and their preferences over outcomes.
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The recent literature on the philosophy of economics focuses on two different, though related, problems. The first is whether economic theories are capable of generating interesting predictions, that is, testable results that would... more
The recent literature on the philosophy of economics focuses on two different, though related, problems. The first is whether economic theories are capable of generating interesting predictions, that is, testable results that would confirm (or falsify) their general statements. This is a particularly relevant problem in view of the aim of economic theories of generating policy prescriptions. The second problem has to do with the so-called'realism'of economic assumptions about individual behaviour.
Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines,... more
Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a cutting-edge reference work to philosophical issues in the practice of economics. It is motivated by the view that there is more to economics than general equilibrium theory, and that... more
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a cutting-edge reference work to philosophical issues in the practice of economics. It is motivated by the view that there is more to economics than general equilibrium theory, and that the philosophy of economics should reflect the diversity of activities and topics that currently occupy economists.
This volume brings together a diverse group of authors who have been associated with Robyn Dawes over the years. The breadth of topics covered reflects Dawes's wide-ranging impact on psychological theory and empirical practice. The two... more
This volume brings together a diverse group of authors who have been associated with Robyn Dawes over the years. The breadth of topics covered reflects Dawes's wide-ranging impact on psychological theory and empirical practice. The two themes of rationality and social responsibility are well developed in the book. Dawes had always urged investigators to take seriously the question of how individuals can reconcile self-interest (ie rationality) with the collective good (ie social responsibility).
The field of economics proves to be a matter of metaphor and storytelling--its mathematics is metaphoric and its policymaking is narrative. Economists have begun to realize this and to rethink how they speak. This volume is the result of... more
The field of economics proves to be a matter of metaphor and storytelling--its mathematics is metaphoric and its policymaking is narrative. Economists have begun to realize this and to rethink how they speak. This volume is the result of a conference held at Wellesley College, involving both theoretical and applied economists, that explored the consequences of the rhetoric and the conversation of the field of economics.
Positivism is dead, we all agree. Gone is the rigid set of dichotomies purporting to define what can be meaningfully said and what is deprived of meaning, what is literal and what is expressive, figurative, or whatever. Abandoned, too, is... more
Positivism is dead, we all agree. Gone is the rigid set of dichotomies purporting to define what can be meaningfully said and what is deprived of meaning, what is literal and what is expressive, figurative, or whatever. Abandoned, too, is the pretense of a unique, authoritative system of conditions defining scientific rationality once and for all. I could continue this necrology forever, since almost all of the tenets of the received view have been relinquished. We are left without a system, without a large and encompassing view of ...
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Academia.edu helps academics follow the latest research.
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A game-theoretic account of methodological rules in science
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Nei secoli passati la fusione tra le discipline era un dato di fatto. Sul tempio dell'Oracolo di Delfi, la prescrizione di conoscere se stessi (connessa oggi alle scienze psicologiche) sintetizzava la filosofia socratica, e per venir... more
Nei secoli passati la fusione tra le discipline era un dato di fatto. Sul tempio dell'Oracolo di Delfi, la prescrizione di conoscere se stessi (connessa oggi alle scienze psicologiche) sintetizzava la filosofia socratica, e per venir accolti nell'accademia platonica si richiedeva lo studio della geometria. Sempre nella Grecia antica, il gymnasium è palestra ove allenare il corpo (gymnos significa «nudo»: gli atleti competono nudi) e luogo in cui allenare la mente, grazie a confronti e dispute intellettuali.
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Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge University Press, 2006. In The Grammar of Society, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity,... more
Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
In The Grammar of Society, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies.
Author Biography:
Cristina Bicchieri
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Visit page at Cambridge University Press
In The Grammar of Society, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies.
Author Biography:
Cristina Bicchieri
For More Information:
Visit page at Cambridge University Press
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Rationality and Coordination. By Cristina Bicchieri. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
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Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in... more
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge.
ABSTRACT Proceedings of the 17th biennial meeting.
This is a course on social norms, the rules that glue societies together. It teaches how to diagnose social norms, and how to distinguish them from other social constructs, like customs or conventions. These distinctions are crucial for... more
This is a course on social norms, the rules that glue societies together. It teaches how to diagnose social norms, and how to distinguish them from other social constructs, like customs or conventions. These distinctions are crucial for effective policy interventions aimed to create new, beneficial norms or eliminate harmful ones. The course teaches how to measure social norms and the expectations that support them, and how to decide whether they cause specific behaviors. We also look at a variety of tools policy makers may use to effect change, highlight the role of trendsetters in social change, and the conditions under which they can be successful. The course is a joint Penn-UNICEF project, and it includes many examples of norms that sustain behaviors like child marriage, gender violence and sanitation practices.
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Interview on my applied work on norms for Il Sole 24 Ore
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Lei si occupa di temi afferenti discipline diverse (Filosofia, Economia, Matematica e Psicologia), per i quali è necessaria una preparazione in diversi campi. Quale percorso di studi ha caratterizzato la sua formazione? Mi sono laureata... more
Lei si occupa di temi afferenti discipline diverse (Filosofia, Economia, Matematica e Psicologia), per i quali è necessaria una preparazione in diversi campi. Quale percorso di studi ha caratterizzato la sua formazione? Mi sono laureata all'Università degli studi di Milano in Filosofia della Scienza con Ludovico Geymonat e Marco Mondadori, discutendo una tesi sui fondamenti della probabilità nella logica induttiva.
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Résumé/Abstract De nombreux mécanismes typiques des interactions sociales peuvent être décrits avec des modèles mathématiques et analysés à l'aide de théories telles que la théorie des jeux ou la théorie des catastrophes. Le recours à des... more
Résumé/Abstract De nombreux mécanismes typiques des interactions sociales peuvent être décrits avec des modèles mathématiques et analysés à l'aide de théories telles que la théorie des jeux ou la théorie des catastrophes. Le recours à des modèles dynamiques permet aujourd'hui d'étudier les comportements dans leur évolution même, de préfigurer les changements possibles: comme le développement d'un groupe, initialement restreint, de personnes honnêtes dans une société de corrompus.
Review of the new book, Norms in the Wild
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A nice review where my work is well explained
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Review by Ulf Hlobil, published in Metascience
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In this interesting and important book, Cristina Bicchieri seeks a middle ground. Social norms are indeed central to the explanation of human behaviour in general, and the well-known anomalies in particular, but they are brought to bear... more
In this interesting and important book, Cristina Bicchieri seeks a middle ground. Social norms are indeed central to the explanation of human behaviour in general, and the well-known anomalies in particular, but they are brought to bear by incorporating them as parameters in a general utility func-
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In low- and middle-income countries, poor autonomy prevents women from making financial decisions, which may impact their access to improved sanitation facilities. Inadequate access to improved sanitation disproportionately affects... more
In low- and middle-income countries, poor autonomy prevents women from making financial decisions, which may impact their access to improved sanitation facilities. Inadequate access to improved sanitation disproportionately affects women’s and children’s health and wellbeing. Although socio-cultural factors are known contributors to gender inequity, social beliefs that potentially motivate or dissuade women from making sanitation-related household decisions are not well understood. These beliefs may vary across settlement types. To empower more women to make sanitation-related decisions, the relevant socio-cultural norms and underlying social beliefs need to be addressed. In this mixed methods study, we explored women’s role in sanitation-related decision making in three settlement types, urban slums, peri-urban, and rural communities in Bihar. Trained qualitative researchers conducted six focus group discussions with women of two age groups: 18–30 years old, and 45–65 years old to ...
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IntroductionInconsistent toilet usage is a continuing challenge in India. Despite the impact of social expectations on toilet usage, few programs and studies have developed theoretically grounded norms-centric behavior change... more
IntroductionInconsistent toilet usage is a continuing challenge in India. Despite the impact of social expectations on toilet usage, few programs and studies have developed theoretically grounded norms-centric behavior change interventions to increase toilet use in low-income settings. This protocol details the rationale and design of an ex-ante, parallel cluster-randomized trial evaluating the impact of a demand-side, norms-centric behavior change intervention on exclusive toilet use and maintenance in peri-urban Tamil Nadu, India.Methods and AnalysisFollowing two years of formative research, we developed an evidence-based norm-centric behavior change intervention called Nam Nalavazhvu (Tamil for “Our wellbeing”). The multi-level intervention aims to shift collective beliefs by shifting empirical expectations or beliefs about other relevant people’s sanitation practices. It also provides action-oriented information to aid individuals to set goals and overcome barriers to build, con...
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Background Inconsistent toilet usage is a continuing challenge in India. Despite the impact of social expectations on toilet usage, few programs and studies have developed theoretically grounded norm-centric behavior change interventions... more
Background Inconsistent toilet usage is a continuing challenge in India. Despite the impact of social expectations on toilet usage, few programs and studies have developed theoretically grounded norm-centric behavior change interventions to increase toilet use in low-income settings. Objective The objective of this paper is to detail the rationale and design of an ex ante, parallel cluster-randomized trial evaluating the impact of a demand-side, norm-centric behavior change intervention on exclusive toilet use and maintenance in peri-urban Tamil Nadu, India. Methods Following formative research, we developed an evidence-based norm-centric behavior change intervention called Nam Nalavazhvu (Tamil for “our well-being”). The multilevel intervention aims to improve toilet usage by shifting empirical expectations or beliefs about other relevant people’s sanitation practices. It also provides action-oriented information to aid individuals to set goals and overcome barriers to own, consist...
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Social sanctions can be effective for sustaining beneficial norms by harnessing the power of social pressure and peer monitoring. Yet, field evidence regarding how norms might be linked to perceived risk of sanction is limited. In this... more
Social sanctions can be effective for sustaining beneficial norms by harnessing the power of social pressure and peer monitoring. Yet, field evidence regarding how norms might be linked to perceived risk of sanction is limited. In this study, we focused on communities located in peri-urban areas of Tamil Nadu, India, and examined how people’s perceived prevalence of a socially desirable behavior (i.e., toilet use) relates to the perceived risk of sanctions for deviating from this behavior (i.e., open defecation) in the sanitation domain. Cross-sectional data from 2427 participants in 75 communities revealed that the majority (77%, n = 1861) perceived the risk of informal sanctions related to open defecation. Among those, verbal reprimand was the most common (60%), followed by advice (30%) and gossip (7%). Results from multilevel logistic regression indicated that those who believed toilet use was prevalent in their community were more likely to perceive the risk of social sanctions ...
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Research Interests: Economics, Experimental Economics, Philosophy, Ethics, Experimental philosophy, and 15 moreMoral Psychology, Decision Making, Political Science, Behavioral Decision Making, Philosophy of Social Science, Behavioral Economics, Multidisciplinary, Fairness, Normative, DICTATOR GAME, Expectations, Empirical Research, Dictator, Social Norm, and Selfishness
"Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why... more
"Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people's attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results ...
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Research Interests: Experimental Psychology, Economics, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Sciences, Decision Making, and 15 moreDecision Sciences, Decision And Game Theory, Behavioral Decision Making, Design of Experiments, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Design, Applied Economics, Experimental Research, Cooperation, Crime and punishment, Behavioral Psychology, Conformity, Empirical Research, Behavioral Ethics, and Deviant Behavior
We investigate self-serving belief distortion about dominant norms of honesty. Consider an environment where the subject can earn a monetary reward by lying. In contrast to the existing literature on motivated beliefs, we do not focus on... more
We investigate self-serving belief distortion about dominant norms of honesty. Consider an environment where the subject can earn a monetary reward by lying. In contrast to the existing literature on motivated beliefs, we do not focus on distortion in one dimension alone, but instead consider beliefs in two dimensions: empirical (what other people do) and normative (what other people approve of). Our experimental findings are consistent with the predictions of a dual-self model in which conditional norm-followers strategically distort their beliefs to justify self-serving behavior. We argue that the asymmetry between what we infer from empirical as opposed to normative information is a key ingredient of belief distortion in our context: widespread honest behavior is a strong indicator of disapproval of lying (and thus that a norm of honesty is followed), but the opposite does not hold. Taken together, we show why, when, and which norm-relevant beliefs are strategically distorted.
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Where there is behavior there are social norms. Social norms are a key feature of societies, and their adherence is crucial to sustaining social order. This special issue brings together research at the interdisciplinary research frontier... more
Where there is behavior there are social norms. Social norms are a key feature of societies, and their adherence is crucial to sustaining social order. This special issue brings together research at the interdisciplinary research frontier investigating social norms with a focus on behavior change. We categorize research according to different methods (theory, non- experimental, laboratory, extra-laboratory) and discuss their policy implications.
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Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical... more
Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity—variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. Th...
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Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement,... more
Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of the existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike.
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Several studies have demonstrated that income inequality has risen since the 1960s. Other studies have found that people underestimate the extent of the inequality. Reasons for these mis-perceptions include over-reliance on one’s own... more
Several studies have demonstrated that income inequality has risen since the 1960s. Other studies have found that people underestimate the extent of the inequality. Reasons for these mis-perceptions include over-reliance on one’s own local environment and ideologically-motivated reasoning. We propose a novel mechanism to account for the mis-perceptions of income inequality. We posit that the degree to which people believe that they have control over their lives, their perceived autonomy, is related to: (1) the belief that inequality is low and, furthermore, (2) the belief that these inequalities are fair. Using a representative sample of 3,427 Americans, we find evidence to support these hypotheses.
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Where there is behavior there are social norms. Social norms are a key feature of societies, and their adherence is crucial to sustaining social order. This special issue brings together research at the interdisciplinary research frontier... more
Where there is behavior there are social norms. Social norms are a key feature of societies, and their adherence is crucial to sustaining social order. This special issue brings together research at the interdisciplinary research frontier investigating social norms with a focus on behavior change. We categorize research according to different methods (theory, non- experimental, laboratory, extra-laboratory) and discuss their policy implications.
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Public policies often involve “norm nudging”, the use of norm information to steer individual behavior in a prosocial direction. Analysis of social norm messaging often concentrates on the outcome measure: the potential change in... more
Public policies often involve “norm nudging”, the use of norm information to steer individual behavior in a prosocial direction. Analysis of social norm messaging often concentrates on the outcome measure: the potential change in behavior. The cognitive and psychological processes that underlie individuals’ response to norm information, especially the inferences they draw, are usually overlooked. This knowledge gap may lead to adverse consequences, such as messages backfiring. To (factually) justify norm nudging interventions, it is essential that policymakers understand the complex mechanisms that link context, social expectations and preferences, and how the interpretation of different types of messages affects behavior.
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We investigate self-serving belief distortion about dominant norms of honesty. Consider an environment where the subject can earn a monetary reward by lying. In contrast to the existing literature on motivated beliefs, we do not focus on... more
We investigate self-serving belief distortion about dominant norms of honesty. Consider an environment where the subject can earn a monetary reward by lying. In contrast to the existing literature on motivated beliefs, we do not focus on distortion in one dimension alone, but instead consider beliefs in two dimensions: empirical (what other people do) and normative (what other people approve of). Our experimental findings are consistent with the predictions of a dual-self model in which conditional norm-followers strategically distort their beliefs to justify self-serving behavior. We argue that the asymmetry between what we infer from empirical as opposed to normative information is a key ingredient of belief distortion in our context: widespread honest behavior is a strong indicator of disapproval of lying (and thus that a norm of honesty is followed), but the opposite does not hold. Taken together, we show why, when, and which norm-relevant beliefs are strategically distorted.
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Anthropogenic carbon emissions have the potential to trigger changes in climate and ecosystems that would be catastrophic for the well-being of humans and other species. Widespread shifts in production and consumption patterns are... more
Anthropogenic carbon emissions have the potential to trigger changes in climate and ecosystems that would be catastrophic for the well-being of humans and other species. Widespread shifts in production and consumption patterns are urgently needed to address climate change. Although transnational agreements and national policy are necessary for a transition to a fully decarbonized global economy, fluctuating political priorities and lobbying by vested interests have slowed these efforts. Against this backdrop, bottom-up pressure from social movements and shifting social norms may offer a complementary path to a more sustainable economy. Furthermore, norm change may be an important component of decarbonization policies by accelerating or strengthening the impacts of other demand-side measures. Individual actions and policy support are social processes—they are intimately linked to expectations about the actions and beliefs of others. Although prevailing social norms often reinforce th...
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A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by fi rst looking at a simple... more
A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by fi rst looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms. ... Sorry, the author hasn't uploaded a copy yet. Please check back later. ... Thank you! Your feedback has been sent. ... Want an instant answer ...
We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the... more
We analyze common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic and extensive form of a game. We define a notion of sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form and show that, in finite extensive games with perfect recall, the strategies that are consistent with common reasoning about sequential proper admissibility in the extensive form are exactly those that are consistent with common reasoning about admissibility in the strategic form representation of the game. Thus in such games the solution given by common reasoning about ...
Cristina Bicchieri Carol and Michael Lowenstein Professor Director, Philosophy, Politics and Economics University of Pennsylvania, USA Why were you initially drawn to game theory? I was a student in philosophy of science at Cambridge... more
Cristina Bicchieri Carol and Michael Lowenstein Professor Director, Philosophy, Politics and Economics University of Pennsylvania, USA Why were you initially drawn to game theory? I was a student in philosophy of science at Cambridge University in the early 80's. I was interested in Bayesian confirmation theory, but I was not happy about the formal tools available to answer questions about why we adopt a hypothesis or choose a theory. Those were the years in which Kuhn's ideas about scientific revolutions and sociological ...
Social norms, social change Cristina Bicchieri University of Pennsylvania 2012 PENN-UNICEF Goals• Give you diagnostic tools to determine the nature of different collective behaviors• Improve your understanding of how to address specific... more
Social norms, social change Cristina Bicchieri University of Pennsylvania 2012 PENN-UNICEF Goals• Give you diagnostic tools to determine the nature of different collective behaviors• Improve your understanding of how to address specific problems• Suggest ways to intervene in specific situations Cristina Bicchieri 2 Some presented case studies• Breastfeeding• Child marriage Understand similarities and differences Often different problems have a similar underlying structure Cristina Bicchieri 3 Similarities (factual ...
UNCORRECTED PROOF PART II MICROECONOMICS Harold Ch06. indd 157 10/25/2008 3: 28: 51 PM UNCORRECTED PROOF Harold Ch06. indd 158 10/25/2008 3: 28: 52 PM UNCORRECTED PROOF chapter 6 RATIONALITY AND INDETERMINACY cristina bicchieri 1.... more
UNCORRECTED PROOF PART II MICROECONOMICS Harold Ch06. indd 157 10/25/2008 3: 28: 51 PM UNCORRECTED PROOF Harold Ch06. indd 158 10/25/2008 3: 28: 52 PM UNCORRECTED PROOF chapter 6 RATIONALITY AND INDETERMINACY cristina bicchieri 1. Indeterminacy Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very search for better, more encompassing versions of rationality, as well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can be seen as answers, or ...
1 To appear in Philosophy of Social Science, N. Cartwright and E. Montuschi, eds., Oxford University Press Norms, conventions and the power of expectations Cristina Bicchieri What is the difference between a chair and a social norm? Both... more
1 To appear in Philosophy of Social Science, N. Cartwright and E. Montuschi, eds., Oxford University Press Norms, conventions and the power of expectations Cristina Bicchieri What is the difference between a chair and a social norm? Both are human artifacts, existing for human use. Yet think for a moment what would happen if, like in an old episode of Twilight Zone, all life on earth was wiped out. All life but one: you alone remain, wandering around in a world now horribly silent. You stumble on a broken chair, unusable. You may not look at ...
Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary motives underlying human decision-making. However, because income and wealth inequalities exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motives can point to... more
Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary motives underlying human decision-making. However, because income and wealth inequalities exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motives can point to different decisions. In particular, when a beneficiary is less wealthy than the benefactor, a reciprocal action can lead to greater inequality. In this paper we report data from a trust game variant where trustees' responses to kind intentions generate inequality in favor of investors. In relation to a standard trust game treatment where ...
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Journal Journal Changing Norms to Change Lives “It's one of the most exciting times of my life,” says Cristina Bicchieri about her work as a social norms and human rights consultant to the United Nations Children's Fund.... more
Journal Journal Changing Norms to Change Lives “It's one of the most exciting times of my life,” says Cristina Bicchieri about her work as a social norms and human rights consultant to the United Nations Children's Fund. Bicchieri, the Carol and Michael Lowenstein Professor of Philosophy and Legal Studies, is using the science behind social norms to help UNICEF workers around the world find more effective ways to end practices such as female genital cutting, child marriage, the denial of education to girls and violence against women and ...
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 3: 2 (2012) ISSN 2037-4445 CC http://www. rifanalitica. it Patrocinata dalla Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica I NTERVISTA AC RISTINA B ICCHIERI Carlo Monti, Mattia Sorgon P RESENTAZIONE.... more
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 3: 2 (2012) ISSN 2037-4445 CC http://www. rifanalitica. it Patrocinata dalla Società Italiana di Filosofia Analitica I NTERVISTA AC RISTINA B ICCHIERI Carlo Monti, Mattia Sorgon P RESENTAZIONE. Cristina Bicchieri è Professoressa di Filosofia, Scienze Sociali e Etica Comparativa presso la University of Pennsylvania. Il suo lavoro si pone al confine tra Filosofia, Psicologia e Teoria dei Giochi ei suoi principali interessi di ricerca riguardano l'Etica comportamentale, l'evoluzione delle ...
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In building intelligent network agents, computer scientists may employ a variety of" different design strategies, and their design decisions can have a significant effect on the ultimate nature of network interactions. Some agent... more
In building intelligent network agents, computer scientists may employ a variety of" different design strategies, and their design decisions can have a significant effect on the ultimate nature of network interactions. Some agent designs are “co-operative”, and populations of agents based on them would be able to interact smoothly, effectively utilizing network resources. In contrast, other agent designs can lead to ineffective and wasteful competition for network resources, resulting in massive bottlenecks and unacceptable access delays. ...
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This paper focuses on norm-following considerations as motivating behavior when lying opportunities are present. To obtain evidence on what makes it harder/easier to lie, we hypothesize that subjects might use belief-manipulation in order... more
This paper focuses on norm-following considerations as motivating behavior when lying opportunities are present. To obtain evidence on what makes it harder/easier to lie, we hypothesize that subjects might use belief-manipulation in order to justify their lying. We employ a two-stage variant of a cheating paradigm, in which subjects’ beliefs are elicited in stage 1 before performing the die task in stage 2. In stage 1: a) we elicit the subjects’ beliefs about majoritarian (i) behavior or (ii) normative beliefs in a previous session, and b) we vary whether participants are (i) aware or (ii) unaware of the upcoming opportunity to lie. We show that belief manipulation happens, and takes the form of people convincing themselves that lying behavior is widespread. In contrast with beliefs about the behavior of others, we find that beliefs about their normative convictions are not distorted, since believing that the majority disapproves of lying does not inhibit own lying. These findings are consistent with a model where agents are motivated by norm-following concerns, and honest behavior is a strong indicator of disapproval of lying but disapproval of lying is not a strong indicator of honest behavior. We provide evidence that supports this hypothesis.
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Economic inequality in the US has increased since the 1950s, yet this has not been accompanied by more progressive taxation and redistribution. The question how US Americans (mis-)perceive this inequality and to what extent this... more
Economic inequality in the US has increased since the 1950s, yet this has not been accompanied by more progressive taxation and redistribution. The question how US Americans (mis-)perceive this inequality and to what extent this perception can translate into a demand for redistribution has therefore become an important policy question. We investigate how perceived income inequality causally affects people's fairness views and their support for redistribution in a comprehensive and well-powered survey experiment with a large sample of US Americans. We find precisely estimated null effects. While US Americans underestimate the extent of poverty and, in particular, strongly overestimate the income of top earners, there is no evidence for a causal effect of perceived inequality on policy views or behavior. We test the role of a series of moderators and find that this null effect holds for different income groups and party affiliations, as well as for participants with different levels of trust in government and different levels of perceived personal autonomy. Our study thus suggests that informing people about the extent of inequality in a society will not effectively alter their support for redistributive policies.
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We study how an individual's compliance with social norms is influenced by other actors' norm compliance. In a repeated non-strategic Take-or-Give donation experiment we show that giving is considered socially appropriate while taking is... more
We study how an individual's compliance with social norms is influenced by other actors' norm compliance. In a repeated non-strategic Take-or-Give donation experiment we show that giving is considered socially appropriate while taking is socially inappropriate. Observing norm violations erodes an individual's own norm compliance. We show that the erosion of norm compliance is led by a change in norm-related beliefs. This change has a major effect on individuals who initially obey the norm, driving them to non-compliance, whereas initially non-compliant individuals do not change their taking behavior. Erosion is halted when individuals have even minimal social proximity to those they observe: individuals now also pay attention to norm followers.
Research Interests: Psychology, Social Psychology, Experimental Psychology, Economics, Experimental Economics, and 9 moreBehavioral Sciences, Compliance, Behavioral Decision Making, Design of Experiments, Ethics & Compliance Management, Behavioral Economics, Social Norms, Experimental Design, and Social Norms (Psychology)
Social norms are ubiquitous in social and economic life but the drivers of norm conformity are poorly understood. We study the specific ways in which others' norm compliance influences own norm compliance. Our context is a repeated... more
Social norms are ubiquitous in social and economic life but the drivers of norm conformity are poorly understood. We study the specific ways in which others' norm compliance influences own norm compliance. Our context is a repeated non-strategic Take-or-Give donation experiment in which we show that giving is considered socially appropriate while taking is inappropriate. We find that observation of norm violations by anonymous others strongly erodes own norm compliance. Most importantly, erosion is halted when people have even minimal social proximity to those they observe; in this case, individuals also pay attention to norm followers. Our results highlight the importance of social proximity for the dynamics of social norm compliance.
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Norms and nudges are both popular types of interventions. Recent years have seen the rise of `norm-nudges' - nudges whose mechanism of action relies on social norms, providing or eliciting social expectations. Norm-nudges can be powerful... more
Norms and nudges are both popular types of interventions. Recent years have seen the rise of `norm-nudges' - nudges whose mechanism of action relies on social norms, providing or eliciting social expectations. Norm-nudges can be powerful interventions, but they can easily fail to be effective and can even backfire unless they are designed with care. We highlight important considerations when designing norm-nudges and discuss a general model of social behavior based on expectations and conditional preferences. We present the results of several experiments where norm-nudging can backfire, and ways to avoid these negative outcomes.