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Political families in the Philippines dominate; however, little has ever been done to study why politicians in the Philippines adopted such de facto arrangements. Using the lens of agency (Besley, 2006) and elite coalitions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), I extend a model previously used in tax games to endogenize the rent-seeking motives of politicians in the ruling coalition. Conspiring with their subordinates in government, politicians violate binding commitments even within themselves in the coalition by taking out rents for themselves, resulting in low-level equilibrium in government resources. Fearing of getting punished from the ruling coalition, politicians resort to ally with politicians by sharing their rents. I show that selecting family member politicians is the optimal strategy because not only do family members protect them from rival politicians, the rents are simply transferred within the family stock of income as opposed to sharing it with equally sympathetic politicians.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Journal of development studies, 1982
The paper explores the ethical obligations of global business to refrain from corruption. Corruption is harmful for the growth prospects of host countries and can introduce inefficiencies and inequities. I argue that business corporations have an obligation to refrain from illegal payoffs as part of the quid pro quo implied by the laws that permit corporations to exist and to operate. The paper goes on to consider how firms might respond, and isolates situations where anti-corruption policies can be profitable for firms. It concludes with an analysis of international efforts to deter transnational bribery and with suggestions for additional international initiatives.
The World Bank, 2012
How does the social and political context in which decision-makers find themselves in affect their ability to realize their reform goals? How does this context facilitate or inhibit specific reform agendas and projects? How can we operationalize and evaluate these risks and opportunities in order to decide what reforms and projects are feasible given the circumstances? This book provides the reader with the full panoply of political economy tools and concepts necessary to understand, analyze, and integrate how political and social factors may influence the success or failure of their policy goals. Starting with the empirical puzzle of why corruption, rent seeking, and a lack of good governance emerge and persist in a host of countries and sectors the book reviews how collective action problems and the role of institutions, as well as a host of ancillary political economy concepts can affect the feasibility of different projects. However, the book is not just a one stop shop of political economy concepts, but also provides practical advice on how to organize and use this information via the introduction of stakeholder mapping tools and the development of an actionable political economy toolkit. In other words researchers, graduate students, and policy practitioners interested in understanding, the what, the why and the how of policy reform will find this book an essential tool.
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