James J Wirtz
JAMES J. WIRTZ
PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
James Wirtz served as Chair of the National Security Affairs Department from January 2000 and January 2005. He also served between 2009 and 2014 as the Director of the Global Center for Security Cooperation, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. From 2008 to 2020 he was Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at NPS. In 2016, he was honored as a Distinguished Scholar by the International Studies Association. He is also editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies.
Professor Wirtz is a past president of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association and the former section and program chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In 2005, he was a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.
Professor Wirtz earned his degrees in Political Science from Columbia University (MPhil, PhD), and the University of Delaware (MA, BA). He also was a John M. Olin Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Professor Wirtz is the author of Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning Response and Deterrence (Routledge, 2017) and The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Cornell University Press, 1991, 1994); co-author with Colin S. Gray of War Peace & International Relations 3rd ed (Routledge, 2024); and co-author with Jeffrey Kline and James Russell of The US Navy and the Rise of Great Power Competition (Routledge 2024). Wirtz is co-editor with T.V. Paul and Richard Harknett of The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Michigan University Press, 1998, 2000); co-editor with Peter Lavoy and Scott Sagan of Planning the Unthinkable: New Powers and their Doctrines for Using Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2000); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of Rockets’ Red Glare: National Missile Defense and the Future of World Politics (Westview, 2001); co-editor with Roy Godson of Strategic Denial and Deception (Transaction, 2002); co-editor with Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, John Baylis and Jeannie Johnson of Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2019. 2022); co-editor with Loch Johnson of Intelligence: Windows Into a Hidden World (Roxberry, 2004); co-editor with T.V. Paul and Michelle Fortmann of Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: 2004); co-editor with Eric Croddy of the Encyclopedia of Weapons of Mass Destruction (ABC-Clio, 2004); co-editor with Jeffrey A. Larsen of Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); co-editor with Loch Johnson of Intelligence : The Secret World of Spies (Oxford 2007, 2010, 2014, 2019, 2023); co-editor with James Russell of Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks and International Security (Routledge, 2007); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of Stability from the Sea: Naval Roles in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations (Routledge, 2009); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of Arms Control and Cooperative Security (Lynne Rienner, 2009), co-editor with T.V. Paul and Pat Morgan of Complex Deterrence (Chicago, 2009); co-editor with Peter Lavoy of Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats (Stanford, 2012); and co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen and Eric Croddy of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Essential Reference Guide (ABC-Clio, 2018); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of U.S. Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (Georgetown University Press, 2022); and co-editor with Robert Jervis of The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited (Routledge. 2022). His work on intelligence, deterrence, the Vietnam war and military innovation and strategy has been published in Air Power Journal, Annual Review of Political Science, Astropolitics, Comparative Strategy, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, Defense & Securite Internationale,. Defense Studies, Harvard International Review, Homeland Security Affairs, H-Diplo, Infinity Journal, Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, International Security, International Studies Notes, International Studies Perspectives, Joint Forces Quarterly, Marine Forum, Military Strategy Magazine, Osterreichische Militarische Zeiscrift, National Security Studies Quarterly, Orbis, Political Science Quarterly, RUSI Journal, SAIS Review, Security Studies, Strategic Review, Strategic Survey, Studies in Intelligence, Survival, Texas National Security Review, The Nonproliferation Review, Terrorism and Political Violence, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Naval War College Review, US Naval Institute Proceedings and Washington Quarterly..
PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
James Wirtz served as Chair of the National Security Affairs Department from January 2000 and January 2005. He also served between 2009 and 2014 as the Director of the Global Center for Security Cooperation, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. From 2008 to 2020 he was Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies at NPS. In 2016, he was honored as a Distinguished Scholar by the International Studies Association. He is also editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies.
Professor Wirtz is a past president of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association and the former section and program chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In 2005, he was a visiting professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.
Professor Wirtz earned his degrees in Political Science from Columbia University (MPhil, PhD), and the University of Delaware (MA, BA). He also was a John M. Olin Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Professor Wirtz is the author of Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning Response and Deterrence (Routledge, 2017) and The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Cornell University Press, 1991, 1994); co-author with Colin S. Gray of War Peace & International Relations 3rd ed (Routledge, 2024); and co-author with Jeffrey Kline and James Russell of The US Navy and the Rise of Great Power Competition (Routledge 2024). Wirtz is co-editor with T.V. Paul and Richard Harknett of The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order (Michigan University Press, 1998, 2000); co-editor with Peter Lavoy and Scott Sagan of Planning the Unthinkable: New Powers and their Doctrines for Using Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons (Cornell University Press, 2000); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of Rockets’ Red Glare: National Missile Defense and the Future of World Politics (Westview, 2001); co-editor with Roy Godson of Strategic Denial and Deception (Transaction, 2002); co-editor with Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, John Baylis and Jeannie Johnson of Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford, 2002, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2019. 2022); co-editor with Loch Johnson of Intelligence: Windows Into a Hidden World (Roxberry, 2004); co-editor with T.V. Paul and Michelle Fortmann of Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford: 2004); co-editor with Eric Croddy of the Encyclopedia of Weapons of Mass Destruction (ABC-Clio, 2004); co-editor with Jeffrey A. Larsen of Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. Nuclear Doctrine (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); co-editor with Loch Johnson of Intelligence : The Secret World of Spies (Oxford 2007, 2010, 2014, 2019, 2023); co-editor with James Russell of Globalization and WMD Proliferation: Terrorism, Transnational Networks and International Security (Routledge, 2007); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of Stability from the Sea: Naval Roles in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations (Routledge, 2009); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of Arms Control and Cooperative Security (Lynne Rienner, 2009), co-editor with T.V. Paul and Pat Morgan of Complex Deterrence (Chicago, 2009); co-editor with Peter Lavoy of Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats (Stanford, 2012); and co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen and Eric Croddy of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Essential Reference Guide (ABC-Clio, 2018); co-editor with Jeffrey Larsen of U.S. Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (Georgetown University Press, 2022); and co-editor with Robert Jervis of The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited (Routledge. 2022). His work on intelligence, deterrence, the Vietnam war and military innovation and strategy has been published in Air Power Journal, Annual Review of Political Science, Astropolitics, Comparative Strategy, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, Defense & Securite Internationale,. Defense Studies, Harvard International Review, Homeland Security Affairs, H-Diplo, Infinity Journal, Intelligence and National Security, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, International Security, International Studies Notes, International Studies Perspectives, Joint Forces Quarterly, Marine Forum, Military Strategy Magazine, Osterreichische Militarische Zeiscrift, National Security Studies Quarterly, Orbis, Political Science Quarterly, RUSI Journal, SAIS Review, Security Studies, Strategic Review, Strategic Survey, Studies in Intelligence, Survival, Texas National Security Review, The Nonproliferation Review, Terrorism and Political Violence, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Naval War College Review, US Naval Institute Proceedings and Washington Quarterly..
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leverage unmanned systems in campaigns, and how these systems can open up unique options for enhancing naval campaigns in pursuit of deterrence.
capabilities, especially along China’s littorals. This setting includes the major maritime allies of the United States in Asia and perhaps the most vital waterways of global commerce.
in the Bush administration's foreign and defense policies,
this article will first explore the way the concepts of
deterrence, preventive war, and preemption are presented
in current U.S. policy documents and identify the reasons
the administration is reshaping U.S. foreign and defense
policy. It will then briefly describe the international legal
framework governing the use of force to highlight the virtually
insurmountable hurdles that would have to be
overcome to justify a preventive war strategy. The article
will then turn to a comparison of how strategic realities
compare with the characterization of current policy
advanced by both the administration and its critics.
frequency of its occurrence in history,
however, offers neither adequate warning
nor consolation, especially when its effects
can be so devastating. The events of
September 11, 2001 proved especially
shocking both because they were so
destructive and because they were so
unexpected. Yet, both the fact that the
attack occurred and even the form it took
should not have taken the United States
completely unawares. Familiarity with
terrorist methods, repeated attacks against
U.S. facilities overseas, combined with indications that the continental United States was at the top of the terrorist target list might have alerted us that we were in peril of a significant attack. And yet, for reasons those who study intelligence failure will find familiar, 9/11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused by a breakdown of intelligence warning.
policy since 1946, the year that Bernard Brodie noted that the purpose of militaries
had changed from fighting to deterring wars. Nevertheless, a small but
persistent group of deterrence pessimists remain skeptical about many of the
policies prompted by this so-called nuclear revolution, especially the U.S. decision
in the 1960s to abandon any serious effort at damage limitation by forgoing
amissile-defense program. In their view, deterrence is an incredibly risky way to
guarantee national survival, because it ultimately turns over decisions about national
existence to one’s opponents, who are assumed to be both rational and
risk averse. In their view, it would be better to have the capacity to deny one’s opponents
the ability to attack in the first place than to rely on the threat of punishment
in retaliation for aggressive behavior.
Décor and decorum
China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement, Nicola
Horsburgh (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), 272 pages, $68.60 (ebook),
$96.00 (hardcover).
leverage unmanned systems in campaigns, and how these systems can open up unique options for enhancing naval campaigns in pursuit of deterrence.
capabilities, especially along China’s littorals. This setting includes the major maritime allies of the United States in Asia and perhaps the most vital waterways of global commerce.
in the Bush administration's foreign and defense policies,
this article will first explore the way the concepts of
deterrence, preventive war, and preemption are presented
in current U.S. policy documents and identify the reasons
the administration is reshaping U.S. foreign and defense
policy. It will then briefly describe the international legal
framework governing the use of force to highlight the virtually
insurmountable hurdles that would have to be
overcome to justify a preventive war strategy. The article
will then turn to a comparison of how strategic realities
compare with the characterization of current policy
advanced by both the administration and its critics.
frequency of its occurrence in history,
however, offers neither adequate warning
nor consolation, especially when its effects
can be so devastating. The events of
September 11, 2001 proved especially
shocking both because they were so
destructive and because they were so
unexpected. Yet, both the fact that the
attack occurred and even the form it took
should not have taken the United States
completely unawares. Familiarity with
terrorist methods, repeated attacks against
U.S. facilities overseas, combined with indications that the continental United States was at the top of the terrorist target list might have alerted us that we were in peril of a significant attack. And yet, for reasons those who study intelligence failure will find familiar, 9/11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused by a breakdown of intelligence warning.
policy since 1946, the year that Bernard Brodie noted that the purpose of militaries
had changed from fighting to deterring wars. Nevertheless, a small but
persistent group of deterrence pessimists remain skeptical about many of the
policies prompted by this so-called nuclear revolution, especially the U.S. decision
in the 1960s to abandon any serious effort at damage limitation by forgoing
amissile-defense program. In their view, deterrence is an incredibly risky way to
guarantee national survival, because it ultimately turns over decisions about national
existence to one’s opponents, who are assumed to be both rational and
risk averse. In their view, it would be better to have the capacity to deny one’s opponents
the ability to attack in the first place than to rely on the threat of punishment
in retaliation for aggressive behavior.
Décor and decorum
China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement, Nicola
Horsburgh (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), 272 pages, $68.60 (ebook),
$96.00 (hardcover).