Strategy and War

Ukrainekrieg: Moskaus Strategiewechsel. Übersicht über das Kriegsgeschehen bis zum 10. April 2022
Eine der Ursachen für das Scheitern der russischen Offensive vor Kiew scheint Wladimir Putins Tendenz, sich persönlich in die operative Führung seiner Armeen einzumischen. Die Bestellung eines für den gesamten Kriegsschauplatz verantwortlichen Oberbefehlshabers, General Alexander Dwornikow, soll jetzt Abhilfe schaffen.
Nach dem Rückzug aus der Nordukraine hat Russland einen Strategiewechsel vollzogen und will sich nun auf die Eroberung des Donbass konzentieren. Die erforderliche Umgruppierung ist im Gange.
1. Putins operative Führung
2. Die Ursachen der russischen Schwäche
3. Der neue Oberbefehlshaber
4. Der Angriff auf den Bahnhof von Kramatorsk
5. Die russische Umgruppierung
6. Die Kämpfe im Donbass
7. Die Belagerung von Mariupol
8. Die Lage um Maritopol und Cherson

The Ossetian Nartiada contains a unique feature: the main heroes use an argot warrior language to communicate during battles and conflicts in order to keep the meaning of their dialogues in secret. In that way they obtain a strategic advantage over their enemies. Three such examples are analyzed and compared with real Scythian stratagems described in antique literary sources.

Abstrak: Dalam bukunya yang berjudul On War, Carl von Clausewitz menjabarkan mengenai strategi=strategi perang modern yang terinspirasi berdasarkan peperangan pada jaman Napolean. Menurut Clausewitz perang merupakan kepanjangan dari politik, dimana tujuan dari perang tersebut adalah untuk meraih kepentingan atau tujuan politik dari aktor yang melakukan perang. Menurut Clausewitz pula, keputusan untuk berperang sangat bergantung pada kesinambungan tiga komponen dalam perang ,atau yang biasa disebut dengan the Trinity of War, yaitu pemerintah, militer/jendral, dan rakyat. Ketiga komponen inilah yang menentukan berhasil atau tidaknya strategi perang. Dalam perang Vietnam yang terjadi antara Komunisme Vietnam Utara dan Vietnam Selatan-Amerika Serikat, trinitas perang milik Clausewitz menjadi bukti pentingnya kesinambungan antara ketiga komponan tersebut yang ditunjukkan dengan kekalahan Amerika Serikat. Akan tetapi kondisi ini kemudian memunculkan perdebatan jika dilihat dari makna perang sebagai media untuk mencapai tujuan politik. Beberapa argument berpendapat, bahwa meski kalah dalam medan perang, Amerika Serikat tidak sepenuhnya " kalah " karena tujuan politik dari peperangan itu telah tercapai. Dalam tulisan ini akan penulis kaji lebih dalam bagaimana teori strategi perang Clausewitz memaknai kekalahan Amerika Serikat dalam perang Viertnam.

In the midst of massive, rapid and all-encompassing global changes in 21st century, the environment of conflict, nature of warfighting and even the character of warriors are also transforming from sole conventional state-based mode to multiple modes of war. Traditional operational art and design with their origins in Western Europe appear to be too simplistic in comparison to twenty-first century conflicts. Operational art and design, and corresponding campaign planning tools, which are being taught in military courses in modern armies, do not accommodate few contemporary issues like the effect of nuclear deterrence, ubiquitous and unprecedented influence of Internet-based media platforms in war, the capability of non-state actors in waging wars and cyber as the fifth domain of warfare. It seems that conventional operational art and design are incompatible and less relevant with regards to the changing characteristics of future warfare. It necessitates a shift in our thinking about traditional operational art and design.

A Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Arts Degree in Diplomatic Studies.
The unique ability of the human specie for purposeful application of organised knowledge is the foundation of the very own sophisticated civilisation mankind is proud of. Still, such achievement can be equally distinguished for creation as well as destruction. Ever since mankind felt liberated, from its immediate and menial survival needs, it perceived this aptitude both as a gift and a curse, and embarked in an almost schizophrenic behaviour, which can present both the fine face of arts and technology as well as the distorted characteristics of self-inflicted suffering. The above scheme proves to be persistent throughout the whole of history and nothing at present or in the near future threatens its resilience, since the nature of human attitudes always permits dyadic interpretations and applications of skills and means. Paradoxically, the human being seems to be just as creative and resourceful both in peace and at war. Evenly able to master a whole spectrum of arts, including warfare, the systematic development and subsequent application of technology can be of dual use.
Technology, from its crude early steps to today’s state-of-the-art levels has been always part of war. If man’s own hands and teeth were the very first weapons instinctively employed, today’s high-tech, multi-component, ‘intelligent’, warfare equipment, still follows the same simple but effective principle: tools are designed to overcome physical limitations, extend inherent abilities, and create new skills, in accordance with specific purposes and intentions.
In the case of warfare there is
integration of customised military and commercially available technologies, which provide tools and craft, the means to a varying -from harmless disablement to complete annihilation of the enemy- objective.
Currently, the field of war theory is contemplating the credibility and ramifications of a RMA that is claimed to be dislodging military thinking from its traditional pathways while radically transforming the modus operandi of armed forces by affecting its principal ‘performance parameters’ of: ‘firepower, protection, mobility, communications, and intelligence’.2 The coincidence of a post-cold war detente, where military establishments have the chance to review their practices, instead of being devoted to escalating arms races, plus the accelerating pace of technological innovation, with widely and largely available new products, has created the favourable conditions for the conception of the idea of a RMA.

This paper deals with the background, role players, sequence of events, geopolitical considerations and history of the Angolan War which took place from 1975 to 1990 between the Soviet Union and its allies & proxies on the one hand, and the Republic of South Africa and its allies on the other. It also has a section presenting a rebuttal of previously published material on this subject, and a section on disinformation techniques used in and by the Soviet Union.

Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, Gran Capitán de los ejércitos españoles, destacó por mantener la fidelidad a la misión, por la aplicación deliberada de la violencia a gran escala como resorte para mover voluntades propias o del enemigo. Impuso en Europa la forma de guerrear característica en Granada, de ardides, escaramuzas y emboscadas.
Procuró que los combatientes armados de distinta manera  se complementaran en sus capacidades, formando  agrupamientos tácticos, base de los Tercios, dominadores de los campos de batalla europeosdurante siglo y medio.
Sus enseñanzas sobre el aprovechamiento del terreno pasaron a convertirse en algo básico de la praxis militar; llevó a Italia la sorpresa para multiplicar la eficacia de sus fuerzas, y con ello devolvió a la guerra europea uno de sus principios fundamentales, mereciendo por ello un puesto entre los grandes jefes militares de la Historia.

Öz Günümüzde pek çok alanda gözlemlenen değişim ve dönüşüm eğilimi savaş anlayışında da kendini göstermektedir. Savaş basit bir şekilde; politikaları, amaçları ve çıkarları doğrultusunda karşı karşıya gelmiş taraflar arasındaki barışçıl olmayan yöntemlere dayanan üstünlük arayışını ifade etmektedir. Geleneksel savaşlar, sınırları belirli bir alanda yüzleşen ve kullanacakları yöntemler çoğunlukla tahmin edilebilir olan belirli düşmanlar arasında gerçekleşmiştir. Yeni dönemin savaşları ise öncekilerden oldukça farklıdır. Her ne kadar içerisine devletler arası sıcak çatışmaları alsa da yeni savaş anlayışı; devletleri büyük çoğunlukla kaynağı, süresi ve etkisi bilinmeyen saldırılardan oluşan savaşları yürütmeye hazırlıklı olmaya yönlendirmektedir. Devletler, sayıları giderek azalan askeri karşılaşmaların yerine siber, iç, vekâlet, asimetrik, ekonomik gibi isimlerle anılan savaşlara uyum sağlamak zorundalardır. Silahların kullanılmadığı, büyük oranda sessizliğin ve görünmezliğin var olduğu yeni savaşlarda ise istihbarat yapıları ve faaliyetleri temel başvuru yöntemi olarak gündeme gelmektedir. Yeni tür savaşların üzerindeki sis perdesinin aralanmasında istihbarat üretimi önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Çalışmada öncelikle güvenlik, savaş ve istihbarat kavramlarının genel çerçevesi çizilecek, ardından yeni savaş anlayışının genel hatları ve istihbaratın yeni savaş anlayışındaki yeri ele alınacaktır. Yeni tür savaşlarda istihbarat faaliyetlerine yönelik giderek artan ihtiyaç ve bu bağlamda istihbaratın modern savaş sahalarındaki rolü ifade edilecektir. Sonuçta ise genel bir değerlendirme ile beraber ilgili konuda gelecek projeksiyonu yapılacaktır. Abstract Nowadays, the trend of change and transformation observed in many areas is also manifested in the understanding of war. War in a simple way refers to the search for supremacy based on non-peaceful methods among the parties who face in the direction of their policies, objectives and interests. Traditional wars were confronted in certain areas and the methods used were predominantly predictable among certain enemies. The wars of the new era are quite different from the previous ones. Although it includes hot conflicts between states, the new understanding of war urges states to be prepared to wage wars of which most attacks of unknown origin, duration and impact. Instead of decreasing number of military encounters, states have to adapt to the wars mentioned by such names as cyber, internal, proxy, asymmetrical and economic. There is a great deal of silence and invisibility, intelligence structures and activities coming to the fore as the main application method for the new wars, where weapons are not used. In this study, the framework of the concepts of security, war and intelligence will be drawn, then the general aspects of the new understanding of war and the place of intelligence in the new understanding of war will be discussed. The growing need for intelligence activities in new types of wars and the role of intelligence in modern battlefields will be covered in details. As a result, an assessment on future of wars will be done besides an overall evaluation.

Le concept latourien d’« attachement à la terre » rencontre un succès grandissant dans le champ de l’écologie politique. Latour tente par là de transformer notre perspective sur les luttes écologiques en subvertissant profondément les arguments schmittiens relatifs aux territoires, aux luttes de classes, à l’amitié et l’inimitié. Pour Latour l’écologie doit affronter la question de la délimitation des territoires auquel on s’attache. Il en appelle à un nouveau « nomos de la terre ». Ce texte tente de montrer l’impasse stratégique et théorique de cette démarche, notamment à travers la perte de multiplicité interne que subit le concept de Gaïa avec cette approche. On cherche alors à insister sur cette multiplicité en s’appuyant sur l’anthropologie de Clastres et Viveiros de Castro ainsi que sur la philosophie deleuzienne.

The concept of “attachment to the Earth” is encountering a growing success in the field of political ecology. It has been particularly invested by Bruno Latour who tries to change our perspective on ecological struggles by using and transforming Schmittian arguments to apprehend territoriality,
social classes, friendship and enmity. For Latour, ecology is a matter of delineating a new “nomos of the Earth”. We argue that, in this movement, his concept of “Gaia” as a network of relations loses its emphasis on multiplicity. Latour seeks to build a hegemony with this new political
attractor. We show that this strategy is both in principle and in practice aporetical. Hence, against Latour, we set up the lineaments of a politics of multiplicities between Pierre Clastres, Gilles Deleuze and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.

Ce bref exposé tente d’établir les liens documentés que le film entretient à l’actualité contemporaine du début des années 1960. Il revient aussi sur l’érotisation de la guerre et l’ironie d’un propos manifeste qui prétend nous apprendre à aimer la bombe. L'analyse se concentre enfin sur la référence parodique à la théorie des jeux pour y trouver une clé de lecture du scénario.

ABSTRACT in English (the book is written in French):
This book presents a thorough analysis and a case study upon the "petite guerre" in the 18th century Europe - tactical and operational levels dealt with, as also relations between war and society (with a substantial historical reminder, in a large chapter exclusively devoted to the 17th century).

The “petite guerre“ was a type of warfare consisting in skirmishes and ambushes which, next to the sieges and battles, filled the theatre of operations during the conventional wars between princes. The locution "petite guerre" with this meaning was always used in the singular, and has to be used so today. The first treatises on the art of the “petite guerre” were published in France, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The locution “petite guerre” wasn’t translated into English in the eighteenth century, even in treatises published in Great Britain or America (on the contrary, it was translated into German).

Next to the case study of the Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the book makes an analysis of the thoughts on the “petite guerre” throughout the eighteenth century, in France and in the most important countries of Europe. A special chapter is devoted to the thoughts in Great Britain throughout the 18th century, and to the case study of the actions of British light troops in Flanders (example of 1747), because this topic has not been dealt with before - On the contrary, one book already dealt with the case study of Austria's and another, with the case study of Prussia's use of the "petite guerre" in the eighteenth century.

Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Önlemeye yönelik tüm girişimlere ve bu doğrultuda ortaya konulan fikir akımlarına rağmen savaşların meydan gelmelerindeki süreklilik, devletleri her an bir savaş durumunda kalma ihtimaline karşı hazır olmaya zorlamaktadır. Savaşın bir zorunluluk olduğu durumlarda da kazanmak için uygun stratejilerin ortaya konulması oldukça önemlidir. Geleneksel savaş stratejileri sadece askerî terimlerle ifade edilse de günümüzde savaşların değişen doğası nedeniyle savaş stratejileri askerî, siyasî, ekonomik, toplumsal, teknolojik alanları da içine alan çok boyutlu bir yapıya ulaşmıştır. Savaşan tarafların kimliği, savaş sahaları, kullanılan yöntemler, savaş süresi, düşman-dost algısı, silah ve araçlar büyük bir değişime uğramıştır. Sıcak çatışmaların yanına aktörler arasında yürütülen pek çok savaş türü eklenmiştir. Böylece de yeni bir savaş anlayışı ortaya çıkmıştır.
Savaş alanındaki gelişmeler ışığında günümüzde savaş stratejisi oluşturmanın devletleri hiç olmadığı kadar zorladığını söylemek gerekmektedir. Bu zorlu işte devletler, yoğun şekilde istihbarat faaliyetlerine başvurmaktadırlar. İstihbarat faaliyetleri ile; savaş stratejilerinin oluşturulmasında son derece önemli olan öze ve düşmanlara yönelik bilgilerin toplanması, tarafların kapasitelerin belirlenmesi, mevcut ve olası tehditlerin ve tehdit kaynaklarının tespit edilmesi, olası savaşların ve çatışmaların gerçekleşebileceği yer ve zamanla ilgili öngörülerin yapılması, önleyici faaliyetlerin gerçekleştirilmesi gibi görevler yerine getirilmektedir. Bu nedenle de savaşların kazanılmasında, ülke istihbaratının kalitesi belirleyici bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu çalışmada öncelikle savaş, strateji ve istihbarat kavramlarının genel hatları çizilecektir. Arkasından da savaşın ve savaş stratejisinin değişen doğası anlatılacak ve bu bağlamda istihbaratın savaş stratejisindeki önemine değinilecektir. Makale, yeni savaş anlayışına uygun stratejisi yapımında istihbaratın nasıl bir rol aldığını ortaya koymaya çalışacaktır. Değişen savaş anlayışında istihbaratın nasıl bir silah haline geldiği ve bu süreçteki strateji yapımında “bilinmezlik” tehdidinin önlenmesinde ilgili faaliyetlerin değerinin ifade edilmesi çalışmanın esasını oluşturmaktadır.

Savaşlar insanlık tarihi boyunca her zaman var olmuştur. Konseptleri ve doktrinleri icra edildiği döneme ve ortama göre farklılık göstermiş olsa da nihai sonuçları itibariyle savaşların ortak noktası insan faktörüdür. Günümüz dünyasında savaşların artık her ortamda ve nesnede insanların algılarına hitap edecek düzeyde ve geniş coğrafyaların bozkırlarından, evlerimizde bulunan kitle iletişim araçlarına kadar her türlü sahada etki olacak şekilde icra edilebildiğini görebilmekteyiz. Bu anlayışla

Recent peace operations1 demonstrated that traditional principles of peacekeeping require a significant interpretation to serve the needs of UN peacekeeping. There is a clear mismatch between doctrine and current practices. Furthermore, as many analysts point out, one underlying problem in peace operations lies in the lack of an overall strategy because any action in operations is as worthy as it supports the overall strategic objective. The authors argue that the current UN system is not capable to produce and maintain strategies, hence, strategic theory and doctrine can be useful in closing the gap between what is being asked and what UN peace operations can deliver. In this context, this paper examines the UN structure and peace operations from the perspective of strategy and doctrine. It provides proposals for each level of UN structure through the lens of strategic theory and discusses six main conceptual themes that need to be clarified in a new doctrine.

This is the submitted version of the article which was published in the Journal of International Peacekeeping.

Si la plupart des ouvrages traitant la Grande Guerre évoque les dures conditions de vie des combattants comme la boue, le froid, la pluie, la chaleur étouffante, peu accordent aux conditions météorologiques une importance particulière. Or, à la lecture des lettres et carnets de Poilus, on prend mesure de l’importance des conditions météorologiques, tant pour le moral des combattants, leur santé et leur corps, que pour l’ajournement d’offensives.

Paru dans Mémoire des Vosges, n°31, 2015|2, pp. 39-43.

This thesis seeks to answer the research question: What strategic policy assessments should be made by intelligence prior to committing U.S. military forces to war? Supporting details are culled from military and political writers addressing strategic policy issues and distilled into the following framework: problem identification, interests analysis, objective and end state assessment, internal strategic appraisal,
comparative national power assessment, strategy development, and the identification and closure of gaps between strategy and the means to execute that strategy. These seven basic considerations form the general outline for assessing the efficacy of committing U.S. forces to war.

Les dégâts provoqués par les bombardements de 1914 sur la cathédrale de Senlis, généralement considérés comme légers, n’en furent pas moins inquiétants. Ils se concentrèrent majoritairement au niveau de la façade occidentale et de la toiture. S’il est vrai que ces dégradations furent moins conséquentes que pour les cathédrales voisines de Noyon, Soissons ou Reims, le manque de crédits pour y remédier enclencha une détérioration progressive de l’édifice.
C’est pourquoi l’objectif de cette étude est de réévaluer les conséquences matérielles de cet épisode, de mieux en saisir le contexte ainsi que de souligner la mobilisation sans faille des architectes et des collectivités pour préserver ce monument. Ce travail s’appuie principalement sur les Archives des Monuments historiques et départementales, les témoignages écrits ainsi que les précieuses photographies d’Eugène Durand.

The research proposes to investigate the most characteristic and relevant aspects of the treatises of adherentia under the Visconti and Sforza, with the aim of highlighting the development and, above all, the innovative characteristics of a bond which, destined to last in the modern age, offers a new interpretative key to the genetic processes of a "new" statehood at the end of the Middle Age. Those treaties were elastic, flexible and tailored directly on the basis of the contingencies in which they were stipulated, and the bonds of adherentia (or collegatio, accomandatio, recomendisia, and so on) knew a wide diffusion in medieval and renaissance Italy, especially from the middle of the 14th century: they had the aim of coordinating the main powers of the Italian chessboards and the minor realities inside or outside them, especially the rural lords or, in some cases, the communities; summing up, the principalis was guaranteed military support, while the adherens received protection and legitimations of various kinds.
The use that the lords – and then the dukes – of Milan made of this instrument is of great interest, as Visconti and Sforza resorted with particular constancy to the link both to consolidate the state-building processes inside the state and the expansion processes outside the principality's borders. Since the middle of the fourteenth century, in fact, the lords of Milan frequently used treaties of adherentia to identify allies close to – or even inside – enemy territories. This mechanism was particularly exploited during the age of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, who made the pressure of his adherentes as effective as possible against the opposing powers (in particular Florence) and made strategic areas such as Romagna and Lunigiana a source of supporters.
With the death of the first duke of Milan in 1402 the bond went through a long period of crisis, due to the weakness of Giovanni Maria Visconti, and it was only after his violent death (1412) that Filippo Maria Visconti was able to rebuild, like the state, the network of adherentes, which the third duke declined in a defensive rather than offensive way. When the dynasty became extinct and the Duchy fell into the hands of the Sforza, the bond found itself inserted within the delicate equilibrium of the Italic League, thus becoming a way no longer to wage war, but was rather used to define and profile the spheres of influence, now somehow "stabilised" and no longer subject to excessive shocks.
From the point of view of the state-building processes, on the other hand, the bond maintained constant characteristics over time: through the accomandigie, the lords and dukes of Milan managed to better bind the restless noble families that dotted the spaces of the state, particularly in areas such as Piedmont and Emilia. There the bonds, which did not lose their military characteristics, revealed all their potential as elements of coordination and discipline: their fortune resides precisely in their elastic characteristics, which, if on the one hand made the bond so constructed unstable, on the other, substantiated its effective modernity, which guaranteed its long duration (albeit with alternating fortunes) throughout the fifteenth century and beyond.

In this paper we will deal with the relations between game theory and conflict. Firstly, we will outline the starting analisys of rational action in the field of international security, based on the model of prisoner’s dilemma, game of chicken, theory of moves and their empirical application. Secondly, we will compare this theorical notions considering the problem of the crisis subgame and initiation war crisis. Finally, we will consider some methodological limits through a critical approach to security studies.

La racionalidad es el lenguaje de comunicación por excelencia entre la inteligencia humana (IH) y la inteligencia artificial (IA). La racionalidad también ayuda a entender la relación entre la inteligencia artificial y la inteligencia humana. Esta relación es muy bonita, al menos al principio de los tiempos de la inteligencia artificial. Esta relación también nos explica en qué terrenos la inteligencia humana es superior a la artificial y viceversa.
El presente ejercicio se llevó a cabo bajo una gran cantidad de supuestos, la situación es hipotética, pero realista en el terreno de las probabilidades. El objetivo central es abrir la mente a toda la serie de posibles combinaciones del uso militar de la inteligencia militar y el papel de los humanos a ese respecto.  De todas maneras, la racionalidad es el lenguaje de comunicación entre la inteligencia artificial y la inteligencia humana y lo será hasta el fin de los tiempos, probablemente más de los tiempos humanos. Finalmente, en la naturaleza, la especie más fuerte tiende a dominar y hasta exterminar a la especie más débil. Los humanos, en el largo plazo, jugamos con las apuestas en contra.

La Prima Guerra Mondiale fu l’occasione in cui si sperimentò un'inedita e repentina mutazione ontologica del territorio a scala geografica; la modernità. Nel susseguirsi delle battaglie emerge sempre più chiaramente che il campo in cui si giocano gli esiti della guerra non è il fronte in se stesso ma la pianificazione e gestione di tutte le strutture e infrastrutture che si trovano a tergo di questo. Quest'evento catastrofico fu l'occasione per sviluppare uno strumento innovativo, la logistica moderna che in modo trasversale condizionerà lo sviluppo del territorio non solo lungo il Novecento ma ancora oggi all'interno  della "terza rivoluzione industriale".

: This thesis seeks to answer the research question: What strategic policy assessments should be made by intelligence prior to committing U.S. military forces to war? Supporting details are culled from military and political writers addressing strategic policy issues and distilled into the following framework: problem identification, interests analysis, objective and end state assessment, internal strategic appraisal, comparative national power assessment, strategy development, and the identification and closure of gaps between strategy and the means to execute that strategy. These seven basic considerations form the general outline for assessing the efficacy of committing U.S. forces to war.

La COP26 está en su apogeo en Glasgow, Escocia. La idea es salvarnos a nosotros mismos del cambio climático que hemos causado y producido desde la Revolución Industrial a la fecha. Contaminamos hasta el infinito y más allá. Y de no ser por participaciones en la cumbre climática tan valiosas como la de México, definitivamente a nadie se le hubiese ocurrido sembrar árboles en el planeta. De acuerdo a Greta Thunberg todo este rollo de la COP26 es puro bla, bla, bla… Cero acciones concretas, puras promesas y compromisos vagos. Y el futuro de la juventud es un juego más de muerte que de vida. El tiempo dirá si Greta tuvo razón o no. Aunque lo más seguro es que sí.
En el ajedrez, conforme se desarrolla un juego y un jugador puede ver que el otro jugador le puede ganar la partida en unos 15 movimientos, el primer jugador va a hacer todo lo posible por evitar ese escenario. A cualquier costo. Si lo logra, su estrategia fue magistral. Primero, porque lo pudo ver con la anticipación debida. Segundo porque pudo revertir el escenario en el que su Rey muere. ¿Pero qué pasa si ambos jugadores pueden ver dicho escenario y basan sus movidas en lo indicado por la Inteligencia Artificial? Lo más seguro es que la incertidumbre se apodere terriblemente del juego de ajedrez. Los escenarios cambiarían de manera casi simultánea para ambos jugadores y la tentación de un “pre-emptive strike” (un ataque preventivo) sería prácticamente inevitable… para ambos jugadores.
Hay que estar atentos a lo que sucede no únicamente con el COP26 y el probable cumplimiento de sus acuerdos y compromisos, sino también a lo que va a suceder con Taiwán. Yo siempre he dicho que es un poco complicado estar pensando cómo salvar al planeta de las consecuencias del cambio climático en medio de una lluvia de ojivas nucleares...

A comprehensive look at the different aspects of Beijing's ADIZ in the East-China Sea, including the motivations behind the move, the reaction by different countries (including Taiwan and Russia), the origins and evolution of ADIZs in international law, and the underlying conflicts between China and other nations. The paper also provides an overview of ADIZs in international law, indluding their origins and evolution. The connections between EEZs and ADIZs are also noted, together with Chinese perspectives on International Law.

In the midst of massive, rapid and all-encompassing global changes in 21st century, the environment of conflict, nature of warfighting and even the character of warriors are also transforming from sole conventional state-based mode to multiple modes of war. Traditional operational art and design with their origins in Western Europe appear to be too simplistic in comparison to twenty-first century conflicts. Operational art and design, and corresponding campaign planning tools, which are being taught in military courses in modern armies, do not accommodate few contemporary issues like the effect of nuclear deterrence, ubiquitous and unprecedented influence of Internet-based media platforms in war, the capability of non-state actors in waging wars and cyber as the fifth domain of warfare. It seems that conventional operational art and design are incompatible and less relevant with regards to the changing characteristics of future warfare. It necessitates a shift in our thinking about traditional operational art and design.

Japan fought a campaign in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945. An ambitious young Empire embarked on an expansionist policy to bring whole of South East Asia under its direct influence. Striking in the belly of the Goliath on December 7, 1941, the Japanese entered into a war with the United States. A war if prolonged would mean disaster for Japan, as in the words of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, "we have awakened a sleeping giant'. Japanese efficiency depended on speed and the Empire was racing against time. It did not have the industrial base or raw materials required to keep its war machine running. In June 1942, the most decisive naval battle was fought which was waged by aircraft carriers hundreds of mile apart. For Japan the battle of Midway was intended to be the linchpin of a great campaign to extend the frontiers of the Empire far into the Pacific. The island of Midway was to be bombed and then invaded. The remnants of the American Pacific fleet was to be searched and destroyed. If they would win, Japanese mastery over the Pacific would never again be challenged. In fact, in the battle, the Japanese carrier fleet, the mightiest in existence was utterly destroyed and Japan suffered her greatest defeat after nearly three centuries. At Midway, Japan at the height of her military power lost not only a major naval engagement but in a single day doomed the Japanese Empire to ruin and defeat. To understand and analyze the Japan's war for existence, and whether her defeat was inevitable, we have to trace its standpoint first.

The Malabar 2020 Naval Exercise began on November 3 with the United States, India, Japan and, for the first time, Australia participating. They are therefore the maneuvers of the Quad group (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which could challenge the expansionist drive of China. Concerns about such initiatives were reflected in Beijing’s reaction in the media and the diplomatic sphere.

Російська нетрадиційна стратегія ведення бойових дій, названа аналітиками як стратегія «нового покоління», акцентує на психологічних та масових аспектах військового конфлікту більше, аніж стратегії будь-яких їхніх геополітичних партнерів чи конкурентів. В епоху поширення участі місцевого населення у військових діях та уваги до іноземних конфліктів стратегічна оцінка цих аспектів, орієнтованих на маси, є важливішою аніж будь-коли. Анексія Криму та військові дії на Донбасі показали ефективність цієї стратегії нового покоління, розкрили окремі критичні недоліки щодо участі США у так званих «нетрадиційних війнах» та надали порцію інформації для подальшої розробки військової стратегії.

Hanna Rose Shell examine la logique du camouflage depuis la fin du XIXe siècle jusqu’à nos jours. Homme ou animal, caméléon ou soldat, il s’agit de voir sans être vu, de dissimuler son corps dans un environnement changeant – d’apprendre à devenir invisible.

It’s traditionally said that ‘the sea commands the land’. But the relationship between the maritime and terrestrial domains is more complex than that suggests. Episodes like the attack against HMS Glamorgan in the closing stages of the 1982 Falklands War—the ship was hit by a land-based Exocet missile—show how sometimes the land may command the sea, or at least try to prevent the sea from commanding it. Welcome to land-based anti-ship missiles. This paper examines some of the issues involved in their deployment and use, many of which remain unsettled.

This paper uses Game Theory as a theoretical framework to analyse the war strategies of Albus Dumbledore and Harry Potter during the Harry Potter series (Rowling 1997–2007). Over the course of the series, Dumbledore’s Prisoner’s Dilemma creates a zero-sum Game that relies on the ignorance of the people his Game is built around; namely, Harry Potter. Harry’s knowledge of himself is deliberately limited by Dumbledore, which establishes Harry as the embodiment of Dumbledore’s equilibria rather than as an active player with agency. Harry Potter reclaims his agency and personhood after his death and subsequent return to life, and he does this by adopting a Stag Hunt Game strategy, which empowers both himself and his opponent, Lord Voldemort. This paper argues that the Harry Potter series constructs the limitation of agency and the ignorance of young characters negatively, regardless of the potential good it could serve society. By contrast, Harry Potter’s cooperative Game strategy is empowering both to society and to other people because it provides them with the means to make informed decisions and exercise productive agency.

If the ability communicate complex ideas in an easily understood way is a valuable skill to the strategic thinker, then first principles offer one possible point of departure from which to begin any discussion on strategy. A few months ago, we posed a question on various strategy-related email chains and Facebook pages asking interested parties what the first principles of military strategy were. We got numerous responses; some humorous, some vitriolic, but all very interesting.

Development of a first principle is akin to boiling down information to uncover the elemental truth that lies within. We culled through the responses and necked down the subject to consider only ‘American’ military strategy to add further clarity and context. Then we tried to synthesize, combine, and distill each one down to the core of its essence. Our final list includes eight, but there are undoubtedly many, many more.