Intelligence

ABSTRACT Many people point to high profile failures like 9/11 and Iraq as indicators that CIA's analytic performance is inadequate or flawed. Flawed by design.1 A legacy of ashes.2 A culture of failure.3 Or so goes the conventional wisdom. Fortunately this conventional wisdom is wrong. These so-called failures more accurately represent the perennial dilemmas and tradeoffs associated with the analytic function and, most importantly, the inappropriate expectation that these observers hold of CIA's ability to prevent surprises. As a matter of fact, there is much that people do not fully understand about the CIA.

The importance of monitoring information that serves to assist in decision-making and to anticipate changes has been increasingly recognized in the organizational context because of the growing complexity of the environment. However, the more the strategic importance of the information in organizations is acknowledged, the more difficult it becomes to perceive the difficulties associated with the search and productive use of information. The issues of this research were therefore set up to investigate two points: is there an association between the difficulties perceived by managers in the management of weak-signal anticipative information and the level of entrepreneurial orientation of organizations? And is there is an association between the perceived difficulties and the dimensions of uncertainty perceived by organizations? To achieve this, we propose to conduct this research from the perspective of Intelligence, given that this view covers the steps involved in the search, identification, classification, storage, dissemination and use of information. This structure will make it possible to associate the main difficulties in the management of weak signals, which were identified in previous studies, according to their nature with the classic steps of the Intelligence process. In turn, this will enable an analysis of the relationship between the most significant difficulties perceived by organizations with the degree of entrepreneurship they employ, as well as with the dimensions of uncertainty perceived.

Security is (or should be) an immune system: it neutralises toxic and infectious organisms. Counterintelligence techniques comprise an important part of hardening that immunity. This contribution will build upon theorised patterns of lone actor radicalisation to inform ways of detecting employees potentially becoming or having been radicalised through behavioural and psychological traits, and what practical use counterintelligence principles are in establishing that kind of situational awareness as well as preventing an insider from causing harm. There will also be attention to the ethical dilemmas and HR implications posed by monitoring employees for possible suspicious behaviour in this way.

This is an early draft. For the actual chapter, please see the book. This chapter addresses two aspects of collection: policy and planning.  Collection policy is the long-term scheme to provide funding to research, design, acquire, and sustain collection capabilities.  The essence of collection planning is resource management—aligning assets with appropriate tasks with an eye to both effectiveness and efficiency.  Building a collection plan involves much more than assigning platforms and sensors.  While those are certainly an important part of the puzzle, there are a plethora of other challenges to work through to create an effective collection enterprise.

Nederland en België hebben een bijzonder hechte relatie. Zeker op het vlak van defensie en nationale veiligheid, al zijn er zowel gelijkenissen als verschillen zoals in andere domeinen. In deze presentatie worden ontwikkelingen op vlak van inlichtingen en veiligheid in de twee landen door Belgische bril vergeleken. Een historisch perspectief overloopt de groeiende toenadering, na een moeilijk uit elkaar gaan, van twee kleine staten in een precaire positie tussen de oorlogvoerende Fransen en Duitsers (1870, 1914, 1940), maar ook geconfronteerd met andere gemeenschappelijke dreigingen zoals het internationale terrorisme (vanaf het einde van de 19 de eeuw), hoe dat invloed heeft gehad op de benadering van beide over veiligheid en inlichtingen, en uiteindelijk de hechte naoorlogse alliantie. Ook de verschillen en gelijkenissen inzake de hedendaagse veiligheidsuitdagingen en – maatregelen komen aan bod (relaties met de politiek, verband tussen de diensten onderling, het wettelijk kader, werkingsmiddelen, en de publiekswerking) om te zien of sterktes en zwaktes van veiligheidsdiensten typisch zijn aan de landen die ze beschermen of meer gemeenschappelijk zijn dan gedacht, en of daar ook 'veiligheidsculturele' verschillen aan verbonden zijn. Uit deze comparatieve benadering worden dan implicaties geëxtrapoleerd voor wat van elkaar geleerd kan worden en wat toekomstige internationale samenwerking betreft.

The Gouzenko Affair is referred to as the event that started the Cold War. This article draws on recently declassified documents that shed new light on Britain’s role in this affair, particularly that of the Foreign Office and the British High Commissioner to Canada. The documents reveal how the British had a major part in directing the response to Igor Gouzenko’s defection in 1945. This event revealed the need for increased counterespionage security, but it also became a spectacle that directed the public’s attention away from the British connection: specifically, the role of Alan Nunn May, a British nuclear scientist who had provided the Soviets with classified information. Instead, the public’s interest was centred on Soviet spies, communism as a subversive force, and the brewing Soviet-US conflict. These newly declassified sources demonstrate how it was the British intelligence services and the British government that went to great lengths to help focus the public’s attention in this direction. They took great pains to direct Canadian policy making, which included working to discourage Canada’s prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King from handling the affair privately with the Soviet ambassador, and were likely behind the infamous press leak to US reporter Drew Pearson that forced King to call a Royal Commission and publicize the affair. With the help of the British government and intelligence services, the Cold War began.

The concept of intelligence and security adopted in post-1989 Poland has been characterized by redundant content, wide scope and a catch-all approach to state security. Similarly, Poland’s intelligence community has been dispersed, loosely coordinated, heavily burdened with political tasks and hardly efficient. At the outset, it was made up of four specialized services: The Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW), the Military Intelligence Service (SWW) and the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW). However, as time went by, intelligence functions were granted to other institutions and
bodies in charge of internal and territorial security - like the police, border guards, financial intelligence units and anti-corruption offices. Furthermore, the absence of a clearinghouse meant that lots of information acquired from different sources was locked in separate institutions and left practically useless.
Explaining this state of affairs is not simple. In general, its causes and conditions can be found in two different bundles of variables, dealing with geostrategic determinants (cooperation with the US, membership in the NATO and the UE, Russian penetration) on the one hand, and several significant weaknesses
of the political system on the other, the latter manifesting themselves in politicisation, “party politics” and interpersonal animosities. While the burden of the Communist past was hard to throw off immediately and plans for building up a completely new intelligence community gave way to a cautious restructuring of
the security sector, the verification of secret services was selective and generally friendly for the “old guard”. These processes have resulted in overlapping competences,
institutional frictions and legislative incoherence.
In consideration of this overall context, the purpose of this study is threefold: First, to describe the evolution of the Polish intelligence community, starting from the assumption that since the fall of the Communist regime the secret services in Poland have suffered the chronic ailment of politicisation and instrumental treatment by subsequent governing coalitions. Second, to give a picture of the relevant organisations and structures which form the Polish intelligence community. Finally, to point out the relations to, and the activities of, the two most influential external powers on Polish security, Russia and the
United States.

This study examines the relationship between a computerized neuropsychological assessment battery, the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM) and a widely used ability measure, Woodcock-Johnson III Tests of Cognitive Ability (WJ-III). Results indicated substantial relationship between the ANAM throughput (accuracy/response time) scores and the WJ-III Cognitive Efficiency cluster. An unexpectedly strong relationship was evident between accuracy scores on the ANAM Logical Reasoning scale and the WJ-III General Intellectual Ability score, purporting to measure the g factor. The findings support the viability of the ANAM as a time- and cost-effective tool for appraisal of cognitive function.

The present study examined the extent to which motivation contributes to the prediction of school achievement among elementary school children beyond general mental ability (g). The sample consisted of N=1678 nine-year-old UK elementary school children who took part in the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS). Teachers provided achievement assessments according to the UK National Curriculum criteria for Mathematics, English, and

KESER, Ulvi, Mustafa Durmuş Sönmez “Stratejik Güvenlik Bağlamında Ortadoğu’da Dinleme ve Espiyonaj Faaliyetleri”, Casus Belli; Kıbrıs, Yayına Hazırlayan Ulvi Keser ve Serdal Akgün, Kıbrıs- Akdeniz Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yay., Lefkoşa, 2015, s. 134-148

From "Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference"
Bob de Graaff, editor
https://www.rienner.com/title/Intelligence_Communities_and_Cultures_in_Asia_and_the_Middle_East_A_Comprehensive_Reference

October 10, 2023 update.
After an effort of many years, I have prepared a comprehensive timeline of UFO history that will be useful to UFO researchers and historians. “UFOs and Intelligence” is an up-to-date retrospective of UFO history (from Agobard of Lyons to the newly appointed US investigation agency UAPTF), intertwined with events in US and world history concerning military and civilian intelligence agencies and the cult of secrecy. It is now 679 pages and more than 555,000 words (including a substantial “Sources and Further Reading” appendix). Readers will discover or rediscover many events, people, and UFO cases they may not be familiar with. Some will find it useful for current or planned research projects. Military cases, those involving commercial aircraft, close encounters involving physical traces and other evidence, reports involving occupants or entities, and events surrounding military and sensitive nuclear sites are emphasized, but this timeline covers the full spectrum of UFO history, from contactee experiences to misidentifications of mundane phenomena and notorious hoaxes. Links to online sources are given, and links to biographical information are provided when available. A timeline like this allows us to view events from a different perspective, letting us make connections we might not otherwise see. It forces us to view the big picture, amid the grand flow of UFO cases, military security decisions, a vast swathe of personalities, and world history.

В 1996 р. Чеська Республіка вступила до НАТО, а ще через шість років – до Євросоюзу. Ці два головні чинники привели до формування у чехів враження, ніби вони живуть в цілком безпечному просторі, що їхню свободу та демократію вже не спіткають значні виклики. Проте Росія не відкликала своїх агентів, навпаки, за останні роки російський вплив лише збільшився. Російські спецслужби створюють чеськомовні ЗМІ, що стають рупорами пропутінської пропаганди, підкупляють чи шантажують чеських політиків, і все це – через імперські амбіції. І все це для того, щоб підірвати ще нетверду чеську демократію, яка продовжує формуватися, внести безлад, загальмувати інтеграцію Чехії до оборонних та політичних структур Заходу – аби ця центральноєвропейська країна якомога довше залишалася в цупких обіймах скутої санкціями недоімперії.
Відомий чеський журналіст Одржей Кундра в кількох нарисах розповідає про діяльність російських спецслужб в Чехії та Європі взагалі.

The goal of this work is to describe the relations and contacts between the most representative italian left wing terror group and the East Germany intelligence service at the time of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, one of the most investigated crimes in the italian 70's.

The new Requirement for a Fifth Dimension of war: Cyber Intelligence
Gokhan Bayraktar
ICCWS2014-9th International Conference on Cyber Warfare & Security: ICCWS 2014, 9, 2014
The structure and operational domain of intelligence concept has been evolving continuously in parallel to the change in threat perceptions since it became a discipline more than half a century back. The difficulties encountered in defining the Intelligence concept and its operational domain is a significant barrier to the construct of intelligence theory despite the steady transformation. It is observed that effective utilization of outer space and intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) functions, such as electronic‐war capabilities and remote detection, are as important as command control systems and warfare weapons in present day military expeditions, with respect to comparing military operational excellence and power. Moreover, it is also noticed that nations make use of invisible attacks and cyber space as a defense system during pre‐war, crisis and low intensity collisions period without employing conventional arms in addition to countries efforts to obtain new capabilities. All these developments brought a new approach to the war area. Indeed, specific intelligence started to dominate the field in comparison to conventional intelligence due to the quick progress in cyber space. Cyber‐attacks, which can be classified as an asymmetric warfare, are not only used as a support tool to conventional wars but also considered as an independent war type on its own so that it brings a new dimension to the military operations. It is predicted that attacks in cyber space will be more dangerous than conventional assaults because the usage of information technology spreads out quickly as well. Cyber‐attacks that usually target the information systems of the governments’ critical departments, are a great threat, especially for the nations that are heavily dependent on the cyber space domain. The importance of cyber‐attacks rise daily because the challenge to detect the source of the attack might be initiated through a wide spectrum of profiles ranging from simple individuals to complex organizations. Moreover, these attacks make a great impact despite their low cost. Furthermore, they are initiated through invisible methods where conventional weapons are not even utilized. Hence, the concept of cyber intelligence looms large against this threat. This paper strives to explain that cyber‐attacks can be classified as a new type of warfare, because it threatens national securities and happens in cyber space, a domain that does not have any defined borders in international relations. In addition to the above, this study defines cyber intelligence concept and its operational domain as well as puts forth the methodology for consideration in order to gain the advantage in cyber‐attacks and to make analysis on the threat.

AKP hükümetini devirmek amaçlı, 15 Temmuz 2016 Askeri Darbe kalkışması ve kaos yaratma eyleminin, yapan askerlerin çoğunluğunun Fethullah Gülen cemaati üyesi olması nedeniyle yurt dışı istihbarat örgütleri tarafından desteklenen bir örtülü operasyon olup olmadığı bu makalenin ana konusudur. Makalede Gülen cemaati, bir siyasi örtülü operasyonlar kapsamında yaratılmış, ülke yönetimini ele geçirerek, Türk devletinin yeniden inşa edilmesi ve dış politika uygulamalarında, Yurt dışı devletlerin çıkarlarına uygun olarak hareket etmesini sağlayacak siyasi bir araç olarak görülmektedir. Bu görüşten yola çıkarak 17-25 Aralık 2015  ve 15 Temmuz 2016 Askeri Darbe Kalkışması da bu örtülü faaliyetlerin devamı olarak sayılmaktadır.
Makale de öncelikle örtülü operasyon kavramı açıklandıktan sonra, Fethullah Gülen cemaatine değinilecektir. Cemaatin lideri, örgütlenme yapısı, uygulama geçirmek istediği amaçlar ve bu amaçlarla paralellik taşıyan Yurt dışı devletlerin ulusal politikaları arasındaki benzerliklere değinilecektir. Yurt dışı devletler olarak öncelikle ABD, İsrail sonrasında İngiltere ve Almanya temel alınmaktadır. Ancak ABD’den ikamet izni alarak, cemaatini buradan yöneten lideri Gülen nedeniyle ABD ve İsrail daha önemli ülkelerdir.

This book, the first in American history to be subjected to prior
government censorship began making news even before it was written. From the time it was no more than an outline to the present, the Central Intelligence Agency has been trying to prevent its publication. To a degree, the agency has succeeded. Legal proceedings and injunctions delayed publication for close to a year. One hundred and sixty-eight passages actually censored by the agency continue to be unavailable and are thus missing from the text as published here (although nearly 200 more, first cut and then yielded up by the CIA following insistent demands by lawyers for the authors and the publishers will be found
printed in boldface type). Ironically, however, in a broader sense the agency has failed. In recent months, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence has become more than a book, it has become a public issue of great symbolic importance —as a test of free speech and as a valuable and effective challenge to a peculiarly odious concept: the idea that any government body—even the CIA—should be permitted to exist beyond the reach of the Constitution and public control.

The impact of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), with its emphasis on preemptive military force, is a matter of considerable debate. This timely book employs a time series intervention approach to evaluate the extent to which the onset of the GWOT (beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan) and related events (the invasion of Iraq, the capture of Saddam Hussein, and the release of photos from Abu Ghraib) are associated with changes in transnational terrorist activity.

Utilizing an extremely sophisticated statistical analysis of longitudinal data exploring the relationship between the U.S. "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) and the frequency and lethality of acts of transnational terrorism, this study has produced some counterintuitive findings which are now compatible with official thinking.

Highly readable with a rich quantitative analysis of the largest ever terrorism database constructed for the period 1992-2004, the results of the study are fascinating and have important implications for current U.S. foreign policy in the Global War on Terrorism. The author has painstakingly examined, with precise numbers, the impact of the use of preemptive force in the War on Terrorism in a way that has never been done before.

This is the first publication showcasing compelling data on the impact of the current war on terrorism on the level, lethality and frequency of transnational terrorist activity around the globe. With extremely current data, When Terrorism and Counterterrorism Clash is a critical reference to all in the fields of international relations and political science.

This monograph considers how a classical challenge that commanders face in war—namely, making critical decisions on the basis of limited and often unreliable information—has been exacerbated in the era of big data. Data overload complicates the intelligence community’s efforts to identify and exclude disinformation, misinformation, and deception, and thus hampers its ability to deliver reliable intelligence to inform decision-makers in a timely manner. The military commander remains responsible for making a final decision, yet the great wealth of data now available through the intelligence cycle amplifies the risk of decision paralysis. With this in mind, technological solutions tend to be considered the most appropriate response for managing data overload and disinformation. While these remain relevant, they alone may be insufficient to equip the military commander with the necessary insight to guide decisions through the uncertainty of the big data environment. Rather, the militar...

In December 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter changed the cultural landscape of the military by stating the U.S. military will let women serve in all combat roles beginning in 2016. Just three years prior to this announcement, the American Intelligence Journal published an article titled "The Other Fifty Percent: Psychological Operations and Women in Eastern Afghanistan," which discussed the importance of females working in combat operations as psychological operations (PSYOP) soldiers. The intent of the article was to force the discussion of how women can be a unique resource on the battlefield beyond merely manpower. The purpose of this follow-up article is two-fold: first, to review how the military has changed in reference to women participating in combat roles since 2012; and second, to discuss how the Intelligence Community (IC) has long utilized women in operations and leadership roles in a way of interest to the military.

In this paper we present and discuss standardized T score systems for neuropsychological test data. Both linear and normalized T scores were calculated for 141 normal subjects and a group of 141 patients with diffuse or focal brain damage. Many standard neuropsychological tests have skewed raw score and linear T score distributions, and we argue that normalized T scores have practical advantages because they permit simple descriptions of both patient groups and individual test score distributions. We also argue that skewness can be partially explained by ceiling effects and other test construction artefacts and that skewed raw score distributions do not necessarily reflect skewed distributions of the underlying mental abilities. Consequently, use of normalized T scores seems appropriate in many research and clinical contexts.

Family, twin, and adoption studies have indicated that human intelligence quotient (IQ) has significant genetic components. We performed a low-density genome-wide association analysis with a family-based association test to identify genetic variants influencing IQ, as measured by Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale full-score IQ (FSIQ). We examined 11,120 single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from the Affymetrix GeneChips 10K mapping array genotyped in 292 nuclear families from Genetic Analysis Workshop 14, a subset from the Collaborative Study on the Genetics of Alcoholism (COGA). A replication analysis was performed using part of International Multi-Center ADHD Genetics Project (IMAGE) dataset. Twenty-two SNPs were identified as having suggestive associations with IQ (p<10(-3)) in the COGA sample and eleven of the SNPs were located within known genes. In particular, NTM at 11q25 (rs411280, p = 0.000764) and NR3C2 at 4q31.1 (rs3846329, p = 0.000675) were two novel genes which hav...

To estimate the burden of disease attributed to low fruit and vegetable intake by sex and age group in South Africa for the year 2000. The analysis follows the World Health Organization comparative risk assessment (CRA) methodology. Population-attributable fractions were calculated from South African prevalence data from dietary surveys and applied to the revised South African burden of disease estimates for 2000. A theoretical maximum distribution of 600 g per day for fruit and vegetable intake was chosen. Monte Carlo simulation-modelling techniques were used for uncertainty analysis. South Africa. Adults >or= 15 years. Mortality and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), from ischaemic heart disease, ischaemic stroke, lung cancer, gastric cancer, colorectal cancer and oesophageal cancer. Low fruit and vegetable intake accounted for 3.2% of total deaths and 1.1% of the 16.2 million attributable DALYs. For both males and females the largest proportion of total years of healthy l...