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I argue that Ricoeur's ideas about narrative can lead us toward a theory of the psyche that sees it as structured normatively, that is, as a system of conscious and unconscious processual rules that are rooted in the specific ways that... more
I argue that Ricoeur's ideas about narrative can lead us toward a theory of the psyche that sees it as structured normatively, that is, as a system of conscious and unconscious processual rules that are rooted in the specific ways that the mind has been shaped via interpersonal processes of relational development. I want to suggest that narrative is not only, as Ricoeur argues, a horizon from which a sense of self emerges, but that it can be seen as constituting a mode of mental functioning itself, that is, as a capacity for organizing experience as well as a dynamic that organizes thought itself. The thesis of a norm-governed psyche has much in common with Ricoeur's contention that narrative is, taking after Aristotle, a form of cohering disparate events into a linear form of meaning that can itself be interpreted and used to make sense of experience. I try to show how a theory of a norm-governed psyche can help us understand certain kinds of pathologies in thinking in patients and ways of intervening.
En este artículo presento una crítica de las corrientes contemporáneas de la teoría crítica posmetafísica. Sostengo que, a la hora de entender las teorías normativas que éstas han desarrollado y por qué son insuficientes como teoría... more
En este artículo presento una crítica de las corrientes contemporáneas de la teoría crítica posmetafísica. Sostengo que, a la hora de entender las teorías normativas que éstas han desarrollado y por qué son insuficientes como teoría crítica de la sociedad, hay que tener en cuenta los cambios en la economía política. Concluyo presentando un paradigma alternativo: el de una ontología social crítica que tenga en cuenta la estructura completa de las necesidades y capacidades humanas.
I will explore Erich Fromm's concept of "group narcissism" as a central feature of right-wing political culture and what we can call the regressive mind. The conditions of late capitalism provide a socioeconomic context for a rise in... more
I will explore Erich Fromm's concept of "group narcissism" as a central feature of right-wing political culture and what we can call the regressive mind. The conditions of late capitalism provide a socioeconomic context for a rise in anxiety resulting from shifts in social and economic hierarchies. As racial and ethnic dynamics have been altered by the expansion of liberalism on the one hand as well as increased immigration on the other, so too have the gradient in economic hierarchies thereby enhancing the experience of anxiety. This anxiety leads to reactionary search for meaning, but also to a regression of the individual ego toward more primitive states of consciousness. For Fromm, group narcissism was a way to ameliorate the anxiety caused by the isolation felt by the atomized self. Whereas mid-20 th century liberalism sought racial inclusion, the dynamic of late capitalism increased inequality, creating a new context of anxiety and a new thirst for group narcissism and authoritarian politics.
I explore the roots of ontological thinking in the late thought of Georg Lukács via the development of the nature of praxis in German Idealism and the thought of Marx. I contend that the thesis of spontaneous, self-creation as well as... more
I explore the roots of ontological thinking in the late thought of Georg Lukács via the development of the nature of praxis in German Idealism and the thought of Marx. I contend that the thesis of spontaneous, self-creation as well as social relatedness are both core themes in German Idealism that achieve definitive form in Marx's thought. In effect, I argue that the human capacities for relatedness and the formation of relations with others paired with the teleological structure of human practical agency constitutes a crucial ontological ground for critical theory. It is this that Lukács focuses on in his later ontological writings and which can be used as a means to reorient contemporary critical theory and critical philosophy which has been dominated by postmetaphysical and neo-Idealist currents in recent decades.
I explore the ways that the debate between Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm relates to the possibility of informing both a critical psychoanalysis as well as how psychoanalysis can fit into critical social theory. I argue that Fromm's... more
I explore the ways that the debate between Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm relates to the possibility of informing both a critical psychoanalysis as well as how psychoanalysis can fit into critical social theory. I argue that Fromm's emphasis on the social nature of the mind and the self is a more attractive template that Marcuse's more anachronistic reading of Freud and his metapsychology. Fromm grants centrality to the issue of praxis as central to the nature of critique, both in terms of one's relation to oneself in psychoanalytic terms as well as to the dynamics and structures of the social world of which we are a part.
This paper explores Erich Fromm’s concept of humanism arguing that it provides us with a unified theory for both clinical work as well as social criticism. Fromm humanistic ideas are rooted in a structure of thought that sees our... more
This paper explores Erich Fromm’s concept of humanism arguing that it provides us with a unified theory for both clinical work as well as social criticism. Fromm humanistic ideas are rooted in a structure of thought that sees our existence, our ontology as human beings as constituted by our inherent capacities for both relatedness as well as positing ends and purposes in the world.  By cultivating self-awareness of these dual capacities, we can achieve a state of freedom, a self-consciousness of our capacity to shape our reality as opposed to conforming ourselves to it.  In this way, Fromm’s ideas constitute a critical humanism that can be realized in the world via self- and social transformation and not merely an abstract set of principles or concepts
I argue that current trends in "progressive" left politics has been characterized by a move from solidarity to group-identity. This results from the ravages of neoliberal and cybernetic society's effects on social relations and... more
I argue that current trends in "progressive" left politics has been characterized by a move from solidarity to group-identity.  This results from the ravages of neoliberal and cybernetic society's effects on social relations and self-development giving rise to a weakened, withered ego that I call the "anaclitic self." In order to stave off the anxiety that affects the self, the fetish of identity is used as a means to feel included within a group, in relatedness that the ego needs for self-coherence. This form of group-membership also regresses the power of thinking and makes dogmatic modes of mind more pervasive. This is distinguished from theories of Left-Wing Authoritarianism.
In this paper, I will suggest that a new synthesis of Freud and Marx is possible along the lines of a theory of how we can de-reify consciousness. Both point to a structure of selfawareness of ourselves as practical, relational and... more
In this paper, I will suggest that a new synthesis of Freud and Marx is possible along the lines of a theory of how we can de-reify consciousness. Both point to a structure of selfawareness of ourselves as practical, relational and poietic beings. Both Freud and Marx give us ample means to be able to open consciousness up to critical reason and I will suggest that one way that they converge on this project is the capacity of opening up thought to the essentially creative dimensions of the psyche (Freud) and of human praxis (Marx). Freud is able to show how the unconscious hides unformulated, non-symbolized thoughts, desires and patterns of mind that entrap us in certain pathologies. I introduce the concept of what I call the "psychoontological" that is, the ways that the self's transformation is dependent on a social-ontological transformation; the ways that this transformation of self depends upon external transformation for it to be realized and fulfilled. Marx shows how this can manifest itself in the fetish of commodities as well as the reification of consciousness. I want to show how this pathology of consciousness can be exploded by demonstrating the ways that Freud and Marx are after that which is repressed and which also has power over the self and, by extension, society as well. I will review the ways that previous critical theorists have sought to merge Freud and Marx before endeavoring to show that a new synthesis is possible along the lines of a critical social ontology that is able to capture both the inner subjective world (Freud) as well as the collective, sociopractical world (Marx).
My thesis in this paper is that anxiety plays a central role in the shaping of modern subjectivity and agency. My argument is that anxiety in contemporary society is distinct from the forms of anxiety that plagued industrial society in... more
My thesis in this paper is that anxiety plays a central role in the shaping of modern subjectivity and agency.  My argument is that anxiety in contemporary society is distinct from the forms of anxiety that plagued industrial society in that it is a more complete and totalizing phenomenon that acts to constrict selfhood and regress the ego to more primitive states.  As a result, the modern self loses its capacities for civic life and consciousness as anxiety grips the psyche.  In what follows, I will reconstruct the theory of anxiety as a relational, and hence social phenomenon, that interpenetrates with the development of the self.  Next, I will explore the thesis that a civic self is a specific manifestation of our psychic and agentic capacity for cognition and affect for “others,” one that, as it is reduced, is replaced with a need for security and group narcissism. After this, I will explore how the dynamics of contemporary society (what I call the “cybernetic society”) enhances and totalizes anxiety in such a way that withdrawal from civic life gives further impetus to the psyche’s need for connection to stave off existential angst, giving more force to strivings for group identification and exclusion of others.
I argue in this paper for a critical social ontology, or an approach to theorizing social reality and social institutions that is more than descriptive of social reality, but is also able to provide practical reasoning with an ontological... more
I argue in this paper for a critical social ontology, or an approach to theorizing social reality and social institutions that is more than descriptive of social reality, but is also able to provide practical reasoning with an ontological dimension for judgment. At the heart of this idea is a different take on social metaphysics from most standard current accounts in that it begins with empirical, phylogenetic capacities of human beings for social practices (realizing abstract thought in the world) as well as relationality (the need for attachments to others). The combination of these two essential human capacities, what I call the practical-relational nexus, is generative of more complex social reality. The ontogeny of any social reality is the result of the ways that this practical-relational nexus has been organized and shaped by external social structures and systems, themselves the product of certain kinds of social power. I then explore the metaphysics of social power before considering the ways that this approach to social metaphysics can inform practical reasoning with the capacity for social and political criticism.
Argues that contemporary critical theory is the product of a welfare-statist political economy that is unable to deal with the post-neoliberal shifts in capitalist society and culture. Argues that postmetaphysics is a failed paradigm for... more
Argues that contemporary critical theory is the product of a welfare-statist political economy that is unable to deal with the post-neoliberal shifts in capitalist society and culture. Argues that postmetaphysics is a failed paradigm for contemporary capitalist societies and that a new paradigm for critical theory, what i call a critical social ontology, is more suited to the task of restoring the core aims of critical theory: that of rational social critique and of consciousness for social change.
In this paper, I outline the ways that reification as a pathology of what I call "cybernetic society" shapes the fundamental structures of the self and our shared social reality. Whereas the classical theory of reification was a... more
In this paper, I outline the ways that reification as a pathology of what I call "cybernetic society" shapes the fundamental structures of the self and our shared social reality. Whereas the classical theory of reification was a diagnostic attempt to understand the failure of class consciousness, I believe we must push this thesis further to show how is fundamentally an ontological and not a merely cognitive or epistemic concern. By this I mean that it is a pathology of consciousness as well as social praxis and, as such, infects the ontological substrates of social reality. In effect, reification is a collective rather than merely subjective phenomenon. I explore this dialectic between our subjective and social dimensions of being to show how reification actively shapes self and world. I end with a discussion of how this theory of reification as an ontological concept can be used to overcome it via what I term "ontological coherence," or the capacity of the self to reflect dialectically on the shapes of sociality that one inhabits, opening it up to evaluative reflection and critique.
This chapter develops a sketch o fa critical social ontology and contrasts it to a theory of sociality as presented in the work of Michael Brown. I argue that the ontology of our social forms requires categories for understanding them... more
This chapter develops a sketch o fa critical social ontology and contrasts it to a
theory of sociality as presented in the work of Michael Brown. I argue that the
ontology of our social forms requires categories for understanding them
descriptively, functionally as well as in evaluative terms. I contend that a
theory of power is needed for an understanding of the ontology of our social
forms and that this can contribute to the construction of a more critical social
ontology. I argue that a critical social ontology is a more attractive and
satisfying paradigm for critical theory than current post-metaphysical
approaches that emphasize discourse, recognition or other neo-Idealistic
aspects of human sociality.
Der Text argumentiert, dass Adornos Konzept einer 'Negativen Dialektik' zu einer Form von moralischem Solipsismus führt, dem es daran mangelt, die Kategorie 'Praxis' als zent-rales Mittel von Kritik und sozialer Transformation zu fassen.... more
Der Text argumentiert, dass Adornos Konzept einer 'Negativen Dialektik' zu einer Form von moralischem Solipsismus führt, dem es daran mangelt, die Kategorie 'Praxis' als zent-rales Mittel von Kritik und sozialer Transformation zu fassen. Zweitens argumentiere ich, dass dies Konzept Adornos nur dann gerettet werden kann, wenn wir es zu einer kritischen Metaphysik verschmelzen, so dass die Bedeutung der Hegelschen Idee von Dialektik da-rin liegt, als ontologisch verstandenes Konzept einem bloß epistemischen zu opponieren. Adornos Negativismus kann so helfen, eine kritische soziale Ontologie zu fassen, indem verdinglichte Formen des Denkens aufgebrochen werden. Adorno mangelt es an dieser so-zialen Ontologie, die uns mit einer praxisorientierten Form immanenter Kritik und einem zwingenden Konzept von sozialer Transformation ausstatten kann.
My approach sees social pathology as defects in our social ontology: that means being able to see social reason as a matter of the ways that our social relations, processes and purposes are able to realize freedom-enhancing forms of... more
My approach sees social pathology as defects in our social ontology: that means being able to see social reason as a matter of the ways that our social relations, processes and purposes are able to realize freedom-enhancing forms of social agency and collective forms of life that engender robust forms of interdependence oriented toward the cultivation of individual self-realization. This thesis entails that there is a way to understand society itself as an ontological entity, one that has distinctive features that can be the object of judgment, critique and transformation.  It means that there is more to social reality than norms and practices, more than the pragmatic dimension, and that there are rational ways to conceive of our ontogenetic processes of development.  The ontology of social facts is a dense complex of norms and practices that produce specific social facts and social artifacts that have causal power over the contents of our lives.
My thesis here is two-fold. First, that Adorno’s critique of conceptual rationality (in its Hegelian form) misconstrues its critical potential and forces a lapse into epistemic and ethical solipsism. Second, that a reconsideration of... more
My thesis here is two-fold. First, that Adorno’s critique of conceptual rationality (in its Hegelian form) misconstrues its critical potential and forces a lapse into epistemic and ethical solipsism. Second, that a reconsideration of Hegel’s doctrine of the concept as an ontological category can help us utilize negative thinking in a more compelling and politically relevant way. Adorno’s project for a negative dialectics leads us not toward a critical form of reason with political (and hence, transformative) potential, but, rather, toward a retreat from the actual mechanisms that prop up defective forms of social reality. In addition, in his radical skepticism of the doctrine of the concept, Adorno also misses the chance to develop a critical theory of the good and a kind of critical practical reason that has the power to re-shape our sociality and social reality.
Examines the nature of reification as seen through the theory of the normative theory of consciousness and its effects on ethical and political reflection.
Este ensaio traça u m quadro nor mativo para defender a política e os princípios do socialismo democrático. Ele argumenta que a tradição do socialismo democrático pode ser melhor entendida como cons istindo na conexão de três esferas da... more
Este ensaio traça u m quadro nor mativo para defender a política e os princípios do socialismo democrático. Ele argumenta que a tradição do socialismo democrático pode ser melhor entendida como cons istindo na conexão de três esferas da realidade social: a material, a política e a cultural . Cada um também possui um respectivo princípio que os organiza, o da interdependência cooperativa, da não subordinação e da auto realização. O artigo termina considerando como os movimentos sociais podem ver suas próprias lutas em termos da estrutur a d essas três esferas.
This essay charts a normative framework to defend the politics and principles of democratic socialism. It argues that the tradition of democratic socialism can be best understood as consisting of the connection of three spheres of social... more
This essay charts a normative framework to defend the politics and principles of democratic socialism. It argues that the tradition of democratic socialism can be best understood as consisting of the connection of three spheres of social reality: the material, the political and the cultural. Each also possesses a respective principle that organizes them, that of cooperative interdependence, non-subordination, and self-realization. The paper ends by considering how social movements can see their own struggles in terms of the structure of these three spheres.
If Hegel’s project is to have any salience for us today, it must address how the structure of the rational individual and the rational society are part of the same united structure. It must also be able to provide for us a kind of... more
If Hegel’s project is to have any salience for us today, it must address how the structure of the rational individual and the rational society are part of the same united structure.  It must also be able to provide for us a kind of practical reasoning with the capacity to grant us critical reflection on the prevailing social reality.  As I see it, Hegel’s aim was not to provide us with another variant of ethical constructivism nor with a merely reflective form of practical reason.  Rather, his philosophical project seeks to argue for objectively valid forms of the good and freedom that can be construed through constitutive (as opposed to regulative) concepts of rationality.  As I see it, Hegel’s understanding of practical reason deals with the metaphysical structures of social reality that are both constitutive of and constituted by rational agents.
Text of a talk given at the University of Brighton, UK, November 2019.
Research Interests:
In this paper, I outline the basic groundwork for a critical social ontology derived from the work of Marx and Lukács. At the center of this project is the thesis that social reality can be grasped critically once we take into... more
In this paper, I outline the basic groundwork for a critical social ontology derived from the work of Marx and Lukács. At the center of this project is the thesis that social reality can be grasped critically once we take into consideration the ways that our social world is organized around the creation of certain kinds of ends that shape other forms of social reality (such as relations, structures, and processes). I then use this discussion to show how a critical social ontology can be used as the ground for a critical theory of ethics along Marxian lines. Along the way, I show how Lukács' critical social ontology contrasts with the approaches of analytic theories such as those of Searle and Bratman as well as the critical realist tradition.
In this paper, I outline a theory of critical social ontology derived from the fundamental ideas of Marx and the later work on the ontology of social being by Georg Lukács. I argue that we can discern categories of social being that can... more
In this paper, I outline a theory of critical social ontology derived from the fundamental ideas of Marx and the later work on the ontology of social being by Georg Lukács. I argue that we can discern categories of social being that can aid in the project of diagnostic social critique, but also that these categories can be used to formulate an ethical theory that we can ground in this critical social ontology. I therefore defend the thesis, against postmetaphysical thinkers that have argued to the contrary, that a satisfactory and critical theory of ethics can and indeed must be rooted in a theory of ontology. I end with some reflections on how critical social ontology can help combat the problem of reification and help us think through issues of ethical or normative concern.
This paper reviews the influence of Weber and Lukács on the work of Adorno. It considers the way that Adorno's work differs from the important ideas that both Weber and Lukács put forth, particularly that of instrumental reason and... more
This paper reviews the influence of Weber and Lukács on the work of Adorno. It considers the way that Adorno's work differs from the important ideas that both Weber and Lukács put forth, particularly that of instrumental reason and reification. I then explore the way that Adorno's response to their ideas takes the form of an alternative metaphysics and aesthetic theory. I end by considering the limitations of Adorno's position and suggest a link of his theoretical project with the critical social ontology of Lukács as a path forward for a more robust critical theory of society.
Rousseau's work is permeated by the project of constructing both a form of government as well as a form of self that lies beyond the horizon of liberalism. In this paper, I discuss how Rousseau sees the development of what I call a "... more
Rousseau's work is permeated by the project of constructing both a form of government as well as a form of self that lies beyond the horizon of liberalism. In this paper, I discuss how Rousseau sees the development of what I call a " post-liberal self " which is defined by its capacity to think in terms of its social interdependence on others as well as maintain a critical autonomy from the community as a whole. What Rousseau is after is an expanded form of the self that is able to form the basis of the republican citizen capable of articulating the general will as well as proper participation in a modern republic. Rousseau's Emile in particular is where this part of his larger project is to be found and in what follows I trace the development of his theory of the self and explore its political implications.
This paper proposes a reconstruction of Georg Lukács' thesis of reifi-cation by viewing it through the normative theory of consciousness. As I see it, reification of consciousness is the result of the ways that norms that have been... more
This paper proposes a reconstruction of Georg Lukács' thesis of reifi-cation by viewing it through the normative theory of consciousness. As I see it, reification of consciousness is the result of the ways that norms that have been patterned by external social systems that come to be absorbed into the background structures of cognition. As a result, consciousness becomes increasingly fitted to these normative patters. A web of norms therefore heteronomously links consciousness and social systems via processes of socialization. I end with a consideration of how a theory of critical judgment can be used to overcome this rei-fication of consciousness, all the while sticking to Lukács' basic line of argument.
This paper traces Holderlin's aesthetic-philosophical critique of modernity and his ideas about the unification of human life through a new form of reason and experience that can serve as the ground for a new culture and the... more
This paper traces Holderlin's aesthetic-philosophical critique of modernity and his ideas about the unification of human life through a new form of reason and experience that can serve as the ground for a new culture and the transformation of individual agency. His ideas about modernity, freedom and nature are discussed. I then end by postulating the validity of Holderlin's ideas and their salience for reconstituting a more compelling conception of critical reason and critical theory with humanistic ends.
I argue in this essay that the Erich Fromm’s social theory rests on an implicit ontology of social relations that has a set of causal properties and powers. At the core of his critical theory of self and society is an ontological... more
I argue in this essay that the Erich Fromm’s social theory rests on an implicit ontology of social relations that has a set of causal properties and powers. At the core of his critical theory of self and society is an ontological conception of social relations that is in real contrast to the epistemic and communicative model of intersubjectivity championed by Habermas and his paradigm of critical theory. Fromm’s ideas about the ontology of social relations are built from a synthetic reading of Hegel, Marx and Freud and lead to a kind of practical reasoning that can inform an objective ethics. I will extract from Fromm’s writings this theory of an ontology of social relations and then go on to show how this can inform and support a critical theory of ethical judgment.
En este texto proporciono una crítica de la teoría del reconocimiento de Axel Honneth cuestionando hasta qué punto las relaciones de reconocimiento son inmunes a los efectos del poder social y económico y su capacidad para moldear la... more
En este texto proporciono una crítica de la teoría del reconocimiento de Axel Honneth cuestionando hasta qué punto las relaciones de reconocimiento son inmunes a los efectos del poder social y económico y su capacidad para moldear la conciencia y la cognición moral. Sostengo que, como teoría de la socialización, la teoría de Honneth es inadecuada para tratar con las fuertes fuerzas estructural-funcionales que mantienen unidas a las sociedades administrativo-capitalistas. Esto tiene el efecto de constituir la subjetividad de formas particulares y este problema de la constitución de la personalidad y la conciencia de los individuos vicia las pretensiones descriptivas y normativas de la teoría del reconocimiento. Termino considerando una forma alternativa de ver el reconocimiento y su papel en la promoción de una forma de subjetividad crítica.
I argue for an expanded conception of reification as resulting from the norms and value-orientations that are internalized through processes of socialization. I reconstruct Lukács' thesis of reification along the lines of a critical... more
I argue for an expanded conception of reification as resulting from the norms and value-orientations that are internalized through processes of socialization. I reconstruct Lukács' thesis of reification along the lines of a critical social ontology that can serve to re-ground critical theory away from intersubjective and neo-Idealist approaches and back to its project of critique with political intent.
Book review commissioned by the journal Contemporary Political Theory of Critical Theory in Critical Times, edited by Penelope Deutsche and Cristina Lafont. Columbia University Press, 2017.
In this paper, I argue that Marx's political and social theory expresses ideas that we can characterize as " radical republican " in nature. By this term, I mean a theory of the nature of human beings as essentially social in nature, of... more
In this paper, I argue that Marx's political and social theory expresses ideas that we can characterize as " radical republican " in nature. By this term, I mean a theory of the nature of human beings as essentially social in nature, of free individuality as a function of the developed interdependence of the social context within to which one has access for self-development, of a concept of the common good as the socioeconomic wealth of the community as oriented toward the ends of social and individual developmental aims and goods, and a concept of justice as the maintenance of these basic criteria. Marx's critique of capitalism is therefore more than a technical critique or an ethical critique, it is a genuinely political critique in that is embraces the economic and social dimensions of human reality. Marx's ideas about exploitation, alienation, commodity fetishism, and so on, all are categories that describe the defective nature of capitalism as the negation of the values of radical republican ideas. In this sense, Marx should be seen as being nourished by as well as developing the republican ideas that inspired other theorists such as Machiavelli, Rousseau and Hegel. I end with the consideration of how this interpretation affects Marxian theory and practice.
This paper traces and outlines the demise of the radical republican critique of economic inequality and contrasts its ideas about economic divisions with the prevailing views of modern liberal philosophy. My basic intent is to show the... more
This paper traces and outlines the demise of the radical republican critique of economic inequality and contrasts its ideas about economic divisions with the prevailing views of modern liberal philosophy. My basic intent is to show the compelling arguments and ideas that animate this structure of thought going back to Machiavelli, Rousseau and Marx, among others. I suggest that the critique of economic inequality that they provide can be resurrected today as a more compelling way to understand issue of social justice.
In this paper, I defend Karl Kautsky's conception of a socialist republic as an alternative to contemporary theories of radical democracy. I also defend Kautsky's idea of the "democratic-proletarian method" as a means for social... more
In this paper, I defend Karl Kautsky's conception of a socialist republic as an alternative to contemporary theories of radical democracy. I also defend Kautsky's idea of the "democratic-proletarian method" as a means for social transformation and the democratization of society and state. I end with a critique of postmodern theories of radical democracy and defend a return to class as a means to re-animate socialist political theory.
In this paper, I argue that the theory of recognition is impotent in the face of the kinds of normative power exerted by social hierarchies. I begin by discussing the particular forms of social pathology and their relation to hierarchical... more
In this paper, I argue that the theory of recognition is impotent in the face of the kinds of normative power exerted by social hierarchies. I begin by discussing the particular forms of social pathology and their relation to hierarchical forms of social structure that are based on domination, control and subordination. I then show how the internalization of the norms that shape and hold together hierarchical social formations causes pathologies within the self. As a result of these processes, I then go on to show how the recognitive aspects of social action that the theory of recognition posits are unable to overcome and in fact reproduce and in many instances reinforce the pathologies themselves. I end with a proposal for a critical social-ontological stance against the postmetaphysical and recognitive paradigm of critical theory that currently is in vogue. This falls back into a non-dialectical problem of the separation of the is from the ought. Recognition looses its power to be an intramundane practice of critique and instead becomes an ideal-typical ought that we can use impotently to reflect on the pathologies of the social.
I argue that Hölderlin's conception of aesthetics and can aid critical theory in its construction of a more robust form of knowledge.
I argue here for a conception of workers' councils that are embedded within the architecture of the modern state and parliamentary government as opposed to anti-statist and romantic conceptions of workers' councils. I defend the idea of... more
I argue here for a conception of workers' councils that are embedded within the architecture of the modern state and parliamentary government as opposed to anti-statist and romantic conceptions of workers' councils. I defend the idea of what I call " council republicanism " that blends the institution of workers councils with the institutions of the modern constitutional state in order to secure and expand the institutional capacities of workers councils. A second purpose of this theory of council republicanism is to achieve the maximization of the twin principles of non-domination in social relations as well as the need to orient social and economic activities toward common purposes and not particular, private purposes and ends. I argue that council republicanism can therefore provide us with a persuasive and compelling model toward which worker movements toward a deeper reality of democracy can provide.
This article traces the basic ideas of Axel Honneth's social philosophy and his contributions to critical theory. It assess them critically with respect to his claims for paradigm shift toward a recognitive account of modernity and... more
This article traces the basic ideas of Axel Honneth's social philosophy and his contributions to critical theory. It assess them critically with respect to his claims for paradigm shift toward a recognitive account of modernity and critical theory. I provide a critical treatment of Honneth's ideas and seek to defend the insights and theoretical commitments of the first generation of critical theorists.
I propose a theory of domination derived from republican political theory that is in contrast to the neo-republican theory of domination as arbitrary interference and domination as dependence. I suggest that, drawing off of the writings... more
I propose a theory of domination derived from republican political theory that is in contrast to the neo-republican theory of domination as arbitrary interference and domination as dependence.  I suggest that, drawing off of the writings of Machiavelli and Rousseau, we can see two faces of domination that come together to inform social relations.  One type of domination is extractive dominance where agents are able to derive surplus benefit from another agent or group.  Another is what I call constitutive domination where the norms, institutions, and values of the community shape the rationality of subjects in to accept forms of power and social relations and goals as legitimate.  Each of these make up two faces of a broader theory of social domination that is more concrete and politically compelling than that put forth by contemporary neo-republican theory.  I argue that this understanding of domination should be seen as a kind of “radical republicanism” where the centrality of asymmetrical power relations are placed at the center of all political concerns.  I end by considering the relevance of the common interest as a central means by which to judge the existence of these kinds of domination as well as establish a convincing evaluative criteria for critical judgment.
I argue in this paper that the theory of recognition cannot serve as a paradigm for a critical theory of society. I defend two theses. First, that it is unable to deal with the dynamics and effects of social power in any meaningful way.... more
I argue in this paper that the theory of recognition cannot serve as a paradigm for a critical theory of society. I defend two theses. First, that it is unable to deal with the dynamics and effects of social power in any meaningful way. Specifically, it is unable to deal with what I see to be as the core of critical theory as a tradition of thought, what I call "constitutive power" or that kind of power that shapes and orients the subjectivity of persons. Second, it rests on a flawed theory of the social as intersubjective practices and not as structural and normative based systems of functional integration. This derives from its insistence on the pragmatist ideas that essentially shred society of its structural-functional features and reduce it to its intersubjective practices. The problem with the pragmatist thesis, however, is that it is both insensitive to issues of power and domination and also can inculcate conformity to the prevailing reality. By shutting Marx out of his revisionism of critical theory, Honneth therefore ends up defanging it as a system of ideas.
I argue that Hegel's political philosophy can be seen as having a republican structure. I contend that a reading of Hegel's political philosophy must begin with exploring the metaphysical infrastructure of his ideas about human life and... more
I argue that Hegel's political philosophy can be seen as having a republican structure. I contend that a reading of Hegel's political philosophy must begin with exploring the metaphysical infrastructure of his ideas about human life and the essential sociality of what it means to be a human being. This constitutes an ontological structure to our sociality, one that, once it achieves cognitive reflection in the subject, becomes the basis for an expanded form of agency and individuality. This provides us with the requisite basis for reworking the ideas about individuality, freedom, the state and the common good that provides us with a thoroughly modern form of republicanism. Hegel's political philosophy can therefore be shown, through its metaphysical structure, to endorse a modern form of republicanism and serve as a critical bulwark against the limitations of modern liberalism.
This paper addresses the way that social power and domination can be understood in terms of collective intentionality. I argue that the essence of stable forms of rational power and domination must be understood as the functional... more
This paper addresses the way that social power and domination can be understood in terms of collective intentionality. I argue that the essence of stable forms of rational power and domination must be understood as the functional influence of material resource control and the power to control the norms and collective-intentional, constitutive rules that guide institutions. As a result, the routinization and internalization of these rules by subjects becomes the criterionm of success for any system of social power and social domination. I then consider how this relates the phenomenon of reification, which I proceed to show is when consciousness has been shaped by constitutive rules and group collective intentionality that sustain relations of domination and control and accept them as basic social facts, as second nature. I then go on to show parallels between Searle and Lukacs before outlining the distinction between descriptive and critical social ontology.
I propose an understanding of economic inequality that is distinct from the more economistic thinking that so deeply marks our policy and ethical debates. According to this “thin” understanding, economic equality is an issue mainly of... more
I propose an understanding of economic inequality that is distinct from the more economistic thinking that so deeply marks our policy and ethical debates.  According to this “thin” understanding, economic equality is an issue mainly of distributive justice alone; it concerns the extent to which the gap between incomes and wealth can be narrowed to the extent that individuals are allowed to have equal access to other personal and social goods – such as political participation, levels of consumption, educational and employment opportunities, and so on.  According to this view, inequality in the economy can be seen as the extent to which certain members of the community are able to control the common purposes of society as a whole; that economic inequality needs to be understood as violating two ethical conditions or principles, which I will call (i) the public maintenance condition, and (ii) the power relations condition.  Taken together, these two conditions can help us assess the deeper valences of economic inequality and formulate more compelling alternatives than that made available by liberal theory and policy.
In this paper, I outline the foundations for a critical social science based on dialectical-critical forms of reasoning. I contrast this to analytic-descriptive forms of reasoning that constitute the majority of mainstream social science... more
In this paper, I outline the foundations for a critical social science based on dialectical-critical forms of reasoning. I contrast this to analytic-descriptive forms of reasoning that constitute the majority of mainstream social science epistemology. My thesis is that dialectical-critical reasoning can serve as a more robust, more compelling and more rational method for the social sciences.

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