Review
Critical theory in critical times:
Transforming the global political
and economic order
Penelope Deutscher and Cristina Lafont (eds.)
Columbia University Press, New York, 2017, xxv + 290,
ISBN: 9780231181501
Contemporary Political Theory (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-018-0229-0
Penelope Deutscher’s and Cristina Lafont’s edited collection of essays, Critical
Theory in Critical Times, seems poised to deal with today’s problematic relation
between critical theory and the various crises spawned by the global capitalist
order. The table of contents certainly reads like an academic ‘who’s who’ of those
that are sometimes directly, sometimes loosely, associated with the term critical
theory. In the end, however, what the book succeeds in doing is put on display the
profound exhaustion of academic critical theory. This has been, to be sure, a
problem for some time. Nancy Fraser intelligently point to this problem in her
contribution to the volume: ‘we are living through a capitalist crisis of great
severity without a critical theory that could adequately clarify it’ (p. 142). It must
be said that the essays contained here, with the definite exception of Fraser’s,
present us with ample evidence of this thesis. Indeed, I would go so far to say that
the book is an expression of a non-critical critical theory. The central weakness of
the collection is that it suffers from the illusion that there can be a meaningful
critical theory of society without a confrontation with the structural imperatives of
administered capitalism and its power to shape mind, self and culture.
The first essay of the book concerns the ‘future of democracy.’ Jürgen
Habermas’ contribution argues for a new trans-national form of democracy that is
based not on a hierarchical federal structure with EU institutions hovering above
national institutions, but rather what he calls a ‘heterarchical’ structure that creates
a ‘supranational polity’ where ‘the higher political level should not be able to
overwhelm the lower one’ (p. 12). This heterarchical relationship is one where each
national community is open to the other and where decisions are made via mutual
and reciprocal interests. To buttress and cultivate this supranational polity,
Habermas argues for a ‘European public sphere’ that can enable ‘Europe-wide
political communication’ (p. 11). In this way, Habermas envisions a new form of
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institutional structure that is constituted democratically while deriving its
legitimacy also through democratic means.
Seyla Benhabib’s chapter explores what she calls ‘cosmopolitan norms of
justice.’ She argues that human rights ‘straddle the line between morality and
legality they enable us to judge the legitimacy of law’ (p. 27). She then goes on to
argue that ‘the right to self-government is the condition for the possibility of the
realization of a democratic schedule of rights’ (p. 29). How all of this justification
and reciprocal exchange of reasons is possible in the first place in societies racked
by alienation, populism, and de-rationalization of citizen competence is never
explored, however, and we are left more with a philosophical ideal-typical
argument than with radical critique. Who is the agent that Benhabib believes is or
will seek to implement these abstract claims? We are never told.
Cristina Lafont develops a form of human rights that takes into consideration the
nation state’s ability to protect the rights of their citizens in a global context. She
argues that the nation state is the primary actor in protecting human rights and that
coercive intervention against these states in order to protect their citizens ‘is a very
poor means of effectively protecting the human rights of the affected populations’
(p. 67).
Rainer Forst deals with what he terms a ‘critical theory of human rights.’ Here
issues become more problematic. As he frames his thesis, ‘The moral basis for
human rights… is the respect for the human person an autonomous agent who
possesses a right to justification – a right to be recognized as a subject who can
demand acceptable reasons for any action that claims to be morally justified and for
any social or political structure or law that claims to be binding upon him or her’ (p.
78). He believes this qualifies as a critical theory ‘because it starts from the
participant’s perspective in social struggles and reconstructs the basic emancipatory
claim of human rights’ (p. 75). Whatever one might think of Forst’s basically
liberal understanding of human rights, this does not really qualify as a desideratum
for a critical theory of society. Essentially for Forst, critical theory is liberalism. He
makes no gesture to the pathologies of reason under the social conditions of
capitalist modernity; no reference to the ways that social movements are drying up
due to the weakening psychological basis for dissent; no allusion to how social
forces and structures are deforming subjectivity, and disabling and corrupting the
rational capacities for justification and moral critique. Instead, we are asked to
consider an essentially liberal framework for human rights as the expression of
critical theory.
Up to this point in the volume, the essays all seem to be asking us to accept a
version of critical theory without any diagnosis of social pathologies rooted in
modern capitalism, with no theory of cognitive or psycho-pathologies stemming
from damaged social relations, reification, alienation, or conformism – the concerns
that motivated critical theory in the first place. The authors all labor under a neoIdealist reconstruction of critical theory. Their central effort is no longer to grapple
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with the empirical realities of social power, but rather to offer a philosophicalidealist brand of system building. Indeed, the whole idea of human rights as a
critical theory should be seen as highly suspect: for what critical force can rights
have when the agents themselves lack political or critical agency? Forst, Habermas,
Benhabib and Lafont suffer from a deep-seated neo-Idealism that renders their
ideas essentially abstract and acritical, if not affirmative of the prevailing social
order. In an age of increasing inequality, oligarchic political power, and conformist
subjectivity in the face of commodification and neoliberalism, this project rings
decidedly hollow. Indeed, the very relevance of this project of uniting critical
theory with human rights shows itself in these essays to be devoid of salience
except, perhaps, within the sealed-off walls of the graduate seminar room.
In an essay on neoliberalism and rights, Wendy Brown tries to get at some issues
that were resonant with the critical theory project. She discusses the problem of the
‘economization of subjects’ that seems to mean that we come to view ourselves as
commodities for exchange in market terms. She then applies the idea of the
neoliberal subject to the theory of the corporation as person and she reads the
Citizens United supreme court case as an example of how the neoliberalization of
subjectivity allows for expanded corporate power and diminishes our collective
understanding of rights and democracy.
Christoph Menke’s contribution provides a critique of Marx’s understanding of
bourgeois social law. He sees Marx’s critique of law as encompassing two
dimensions of law which Marx did not see. On one hand, there is social law – or the
rights of citizens to participate in society – and on the other, private law, or the
rights of individuals to property and the use of that property. Menke argues that
Marx unfairly critiqued law in terms of private law without appreciating the
political potential of social law. He argues that ‘Marx dismissed the socialist
conception of social law, and rights, as the ‘‘foolishness of those socialists’’’ (p.
122). But this critique really has little to offer. For one thing, although it is true that
liberalism has been able to expand social rights and participation and Marx did
dismiss these developments, he did so because he saw, quite rightly, that such
rights would not serve to contest the core aspects of social domination under
capitalism or provide a means for social transformation. Marx’s argument should
not be so easily dismissed: the expansion of liberal rights has mollified the critique
of capital and forestalled the project of social transformation even as it has allowed
for a sphere of rights that, although it has expanded social membership, has also
diverted many modern struggles away from capital and toward issues of identity.
The forms of participation that capital seems to tolerate are those that allow for its
continued reproduction. In addition, simply because Marx himself saw these
limitations of the state and law during his own time, it does not mean that a
Marxian theory of the law and the state is not fruitful, especially for anti-capitalist
projects. Indeed, it is problematic that in his discussion, Menke makes no mention
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of the Marxist theory of law and the state developed by thinkers such as Otto
Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann, among others.
Nancy Fraser’s essay stands out in the volume as an attempt to problematize the
way our current theories are unable to make real sense of the distinctive crises that
plague modern capitalist societies. She rightly claims that ‘the current boom in
capitalism talk remains largely rhetorical,’ (p. 141) and she insists that a more
thorough and robust critique of modern capitalism must proceed from a multifaceted approach, where there exist not only economic forms of exploitation, but
also forms of expropriation that occur within forms of social reproduction, where
capitalism’s ‘‘‘economic’’ foreground features depend on ‘‘noneconomic’’ background conditions’ (p. 151). This Fraser sees as essentially located in the sphere of
social reproduction, or ‘the forms of provisioning, caregiving, and interaction that
produce and maintain social bonds’ (p. 147). There are, then, nested forms of power
relations that are structurally differentiated in neoliberal capitalist society, and any
critical theory of society must keep these dimensions of power and domination in
view.
An essay by Rahel Jaeggi unabashedly reinvents the sociological wheel by
arguing that critical theorists should examine ‘economic social practices’ in
understanding what she broadly terms ‘forms of life.’ She claims that forms of life
are made up of social practices. But she seems confused about what social practices
actually are beyond the most basic definition of them as ‘practices concerning
oneself, others, and the material world’ (p. 164). She never delves into what a
practice is, and also seems to ignore the large amount of work in sociology, social
theory, and philosophy that has tackled this problem – with far more richness – than
her own account (think Searle or even Sartre for that matter). She also bifurcates
norms and practices in a way that is, I think, basically wrong. Social practices are
not regulated by norms, as she claims, they are more correctly constituted by
norms. This is what makes capitalism particularly insidious: it does not so much
regulate our activities as constitute new practices – it creates its own form of social
reality.
Amy Allen’s essay looks toward a critique of progress and seeks to incorporate
postmodernism into critical theory. She asks how can critical theory claim to be
critical if it ‘relies on an imperialist meta-narrative to ground its approach to
normativity?’ (p. 185). Allen suggests that Habermas and Honneth rely on a model
of human moral development that is based on a concept of progress, or the
expansion of moral-rational capacities that we accumulate over time. Instead, she
sees Adorno and Foucault as an alternative paradigm in that they ‘offer an
alternative way of thinking… that understands critique as the wholly immanent and
fragmentary practice of opening up lines of fragility and fracture within the social
world’ (p. 200). But this seems to me to be deeply problematic. We can indeed have
a concept of progress that is not based on ‘imperialism’ or ‘colonial’ assumptions
and which also militates against those projects. It is simply absurd to say that the
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ways that one community organizes its social relations cannot be seen as a
progressive improvement over another’s. Lacking this, we surrender all meaningful
forms of political and moral judgment. Attitudes, rights, and cultural ideas about
homosexuality in New York City as opposed to Uganda are radically more
progressed, and this only means that the ethical life of the former has progressed
enough to allow for more inclusion and more equality and respect of persons. The
practical implications for Allen’s argument seem more nihilistic than worthy of the
term critical theory.
Penelope Deutscher’s chapter seeks to adapt Foucault to critical theory, and the
last chapter by Charles Mills reflects on critical theory’s ‘failure to engage seriously
with race – whether on the individual level of white self-hood… or at the social
systemic level of white supremacy’ (p. 235). This was surprising to read given that
one of the core research areas for Frankfurt School theorists was the dynamics of
anti-Semitism and studies in prejudice and authoritarian personality. The idea that
these research programs cannot be extended into the more specific concerns Mills
has in terms of American race relations is a serious oversight. In fact, what these
comments reveal is a failure to defend the claim that ignoring race in the content of
their research or philosophical insights (which is a valid claim) has any constitutive
effects on the diagnostic and normative ideas that critical theory put forth. The
ideas of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, of Marcuse, Fromm, Adorno and Horkheimer, no
less than Habermas and Honneth, are not constituted by racist ideas and display no
racist character. They are also decidedly non-racist in their logic, their claims or in
the principles they espouse. It is irresponsible and intellectually disingenuous to
argue otherwise. In fact their ideas can (and should) be extended and developed to
explain and confront racism and racist attitudes, if the work were actually put in to
do so.
In the end, the essays here offer very little that can really help us move critical
theory forward as a tradition and as a paradigm of social critique. One major
problem is the way it has been taken up by philosophers without the interdisciplinary labors of critical social science. This was, after all, the real core of the
critical theory project from the beginning. The essays simply talk over the real
problems that Frankfurt School thinkers saw as salient in modern, mass societies. In
fact, problems of the decline of political agency, the slackening of contestatory
movements against capitalism, the reification of subjectivity, and the re-emergence
of authoritarian attitudes and political populism are not even touched in this
volume, even though this is where the trends of modern society are increasingly
heading. It would seem that we need less philosophical engagement with human
rights and postmodern ideas and a re-engagement with the ideas and theoretical
program of the first-generation of critical theorists. What critical theory needs is a
reformulation of its role outside of academic circles and debates. It needs to engage
in real, public problems and concerns. Unfortunately, the essays reviewed here
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demonstrate that critical theory’s academic state-of-the-art is in need of much work
to get us there.
Michael J. Thompson
William Paterson University, Wayne, NJ 07470, USA
thompsonmi@wpunj.edu
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