G.W.F. Hegel

In the history of philosophical thought, Hegelian speculation is generally considered to be in
opposition to Kantian criticism, or at least as an overcoming of the latter, especially when the
Romanticism-Enlightenment binomial and its broader cultural implications are taken as the reading
category. It also happens, during the school study, to take a position in favor of one or the other to
defend their attitude and perspective of reflection. Yet the two German philosophers are deeply linked
by the attention paid to man as a subject of knowledge and thought, they both conceive philosophy
as a great interpretative structure to access what man, with his rational faculty and with his will
practice, is able to trace in the world. And certainly, in Hegel's thought Kant's "Copernican
revolution" is an unavoidable foundation. In the passage from Kant to Hegel an attempt is made to
overcome the dualisms that characterize Kantian thought, for example that between theoretical and
practical reason, between normative and descriptive (with ethical implications and with the
complication of a God placed as an instance of conciliation), between concept and intuition. Another
fundamental problem is that of the thing in itself, unknowable in principle, which Fichte will eliminate
by radicalizing subjective idealism: if Kant had taken the validity of science, morals and aesthetics
for granted, Fichte will pose a foundation problem, as the “I” remain all German idealism, starting
from the reflexive undeniability of self-awareness, Schelling will instead give a new centrality to the
philosophy of nature, Hegel will finally reformulate the problem of the absolute in the system, giving
ample space to the philosophy of the spirit and thus crowning post Kantian development. Despite
deep admiration for his work, Hegel has deeply criticized Kant, for example regarding the problem
of criticism and metaphysics. For Hegel criticism must be an integral part of philosophy, nature has
ontological dignity and being itself has ideal value and is therefore not opposed to having to be. Hegel
also gave ethical depth to his practical philosophy by reflecting on institutions and warning against
the dangers of Kantian morality, analyzed in the logic of revolutionary terror. In our essay we will try
to highlight a further interesting comparison between Hegel and Kant, that is the one on the concept
of imagination in Kant with respect to the concept of recollection in Hegel. For example, we want to
underline how the imagination emerges in the Kantian Critiques as an indispensable conceptual tool
to secure the unity of the transcendental system while Hegel presents images as structural parts of the
process of Recollection (Erinnerung), a paradigmatic activity. It is the emblem of a procedure of
"assimilation" and "idealization" of a non-conceptual "data", which is elevated to the form of the
spiritual. Therefore, in the Recollection process, the image has a gnoseological function but also an
historical one, because the Recollection allows to explain also the cultural development of the human
conscience and her gradual self-awareness advancement. Basically, in Kantian philosophy the
imagination has a gnoseological function, while in Hegelian system the Recollection has a double
function, gnoseological and ontological.

A overview of the "Self-Consciousness" chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.  I analyze the basic significance of each of the three themes of the chapter, (which Hegel calls "desire," "recognition," and "thought"), and I consider how the relationship between self and other is constituted in each of these fundamental relationships.

Inhalt
Christoph Binkelmann: Enthusiasmus und Skepsis. Das europäische Pendel
Burkhard Nonnenmacher: Kants Postulatenlehre als Prüfstein für Heideggers »These der neuzeitlichen Ontologie«?
Günter Zöller : Ex aliquo nihil. Fichtes Anti-Kreationismus
Kai U. Gregor: Eine Kritik innerhalb der Grenzen der Vernunft. Wilhelm Weischedels Grundlegungsversuch einer Philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus und ein Gedanke Fichtes
Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Die Staatslehre Fichtes unter dem Aspekt der
politischen Theologie nach Carl Schmitt
Cristiana Senigaglia: Die Spur der Andersheit: Fichte und Levinas
Detlev Pätzold Hegels Philosophie der Religion: Die Stellung der Religion zwischen Kunst und Philosophie
Arthur Kok: Absoluter Geist und Schöpfung. Jan Hollaks neothomistische Hegelkritik
Kazimir Drilo: Kritik des religiösen Bewusstseins. Falk Wagners theologische Interpretation von Hegels »Wissenschaft der Logik«
Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz: »Der Mensch lebt in zwei Welten […]«. Religion und Staat in Hegels Ansicht und in der heutigen Debatte
Elena Ficara: Der ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Hegel und in der analytischen Philosophie 
Robert Marszałek: Die Gegenwart der Religionslehre des mittleren Schelling
Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak Philosophie und Religion bei K.W.F. Solger.
Ein Beitrag zur nachkantischen Frage nach dem Prinzip der Philosophie
Patrick Grüneberg: Der transzendentale Gott
Wibke Rogge: Emmanuel Lévinas: Über die Beziehung des Unendlichen zum Seienden als Gemeinschaft in der Trennung
Ansgar Lyssy : Darwin, Gott und Neurotheologie. Was können uns die Biowissenschaften über die Religion sagen?

In this paper, I reply to the critics of my book, Hegel's Concept of Life, by taking up the question of how a science of pure thought thinking itself arrives at the conclusion that it must determine itself as life. In particular, I consider how the logical concept of life informs Hegel's understanding of subjects, objects, and ground, and I also take up the relationship between logic and Realphilosophie in Hegel's system. Throughout, I aim to clarify and elaborate on one of the central arguments from my book, namely, that for Hegel, life is the primitive or original form of judgment. In a book rife with obscure philosophical puzzles, one of the most difficult puzzles to emerge in reading the Science of Logic is the following: why does the science of pure thinking, a science of thought thinking itself, arrive at the conclusion that it must determine itself as life? Why must the self-comprehension of pure thought ultimately comprehend its own essential activity as the activity of life? Immediately, one is struck by the sheer difficulty of bringing together two intuitively distinct modes of engagement: the austerity, formality, and abstraction required by the pursuit of pure thinking and logic on the one hand, and the vitality, dynamism, and concreteness of the phenomenon of life on the other. Although readers of Hegel are no strangers to the bringing together of opposites, this particular case poses special problems, not least because the Logic provides the method and central categories (the "thought-determinations") that are operative throughout the remainder of Hegel's philosophical system. In what follows, I will try to respond to this puzzle by clarifying one of the central lines of argument from my book, namely, that for Hegel, life is the primitive or original form of judgment. I am immensely grateful to my critics for providing an occasion for me to do so, and for the generous, thoughtful engagement that one always hopes for in philosophical debate. Responding to their critical questions concerning how life figures in Hegel's understanding of subjectivity, objectivity, and ground, as well as how we can best understand the relation between logic and Realphilosophie, will hopefully help to resolve the problem of how pure thinking and life are connected in Hegel's system.

This essay aims to demonstrate a clear and significant difference, not merely expository revisions or additions, in the logical progression of Being between Hegel's two main versions of the Doctrine of Being (1812-1817 and 1827-1830, 1832). This controversial issue is analysed by retracing and examining changes that international scholarship still widely neglects. Focussing on Hegel's introduction of the doubled transition of Quality and Quantity in the genesis of Measure, the essay argues that the main point of the revisions is that Hegel views the whole determinateness of Being as self-sublating its own externality, because in one determination of Being passing into another one, the first does not vanish; instead, both remain within their relational unity. Hegel's new version of the genesis of Measure indicates an essentially qualitative appreciation of the quantitative methods of the empirical sciences. This accords with Hegel's growing acknowledgment in Berlin of the independent cognitive status of the natural sciences in regard to philosophy, and with his reassessment of the relation among intuition, representation and conceptual cognition of the objects of consciousness, to do justice to their real differences and their being for themselves within their own existence.

In this paper, I shall discuss the problematic relations between logical and
temporal aspects of the Hegelian system. The assumed interdependence of
time and concept makes Hegel’s system peculiar for it seems to exceed the
opposition between diachrony and synchrony. This distinctive trait of speculative
dialectics has caused many misunderstandings in the reception of Hegelianism.
In particular, it has led to simplifying and one-sided interpretations
of the role of time in Hegel’s system, which violate the basic assumptions
of absolute idealism. There are two main types of such misreading,
namely (1) a historistic one, according to which thought structures are derivatives
of the accidental historical process, whose nature precludes the
possibility of a system as it falls into a spurious infinity. And (2) a panlogistic
interpretation, according to which history is subordinate to the eternal
concept that predetermines the necessary logic of all worldly events. In this
perspective, time is only a semblance that is exposed and eventually abolished
when absolute knowledge is established.

In order to restore the global economy to solid and sustainable growth, capitalism needs to be reformed from an irrational profit-maximising model into a more rational profit-equalising one. In the aggregate the growth rate of gross operating surplus plus gross mixed income must equal that of gross domestic product and not exceed it, thereby ensuring that the compensation of employees increases proportionally as well. This would prevent the deflationary effect of having continually to refinance debt as it increases disproportionally relative to GDP over successive economic cycles, the root cause of which is not treating the compensation of employees as both a cost and an income in the pursuit of maximising profitability. In SNA national income accounting methodology, income derived GDP is equal to gross operating surplus plus gross mixed income plus compensation of employees plus taxes on production and imports less subsidies. Thus, as profit and mixed income increase relative to GDP, employee compensation must necessarily decrease proportionally with allowances for taxes and subsidies. As wages and salaries are both a cost and an income, which is a self-evident truth, if they are suppressed as a cost on the supply side of an economy in order to maximise profit, this reduction affects aggregate demand by a proportional amount on the demand side by weakening the multiplier. This distorts supply and demand, leading to serious economic imbalances over time. Prices or rather their relative components of wages and profit determine the equilibrium of supply and demand in the aggregate rather than the other way around as the fundamental tenet of neo-classical economics proposes.

The equation below provides evidence that the first principle of wages being a cost and an income is key to balancing supply and demand, and income and expenditure over the economic cycle as well as economics becoming a fully-fledged science. Using United States’ national accounts time series data between 1972 and 2007 to empirically demonstrate a causal connection between the real and financial economies, the increasing dysfunction of the business cycle can be explained. Evidence from other national economies is examined as well. Despite wages being both a cost and a source of demand being obvious and fundamental to Keynes’ demand side theory in his General Theory, it has never been properly acknowledged or its effects fully understood. This reluctance to examine profit is an example of the dialectical opposition between convention based on excessive self-interest in the face of a seemingly uncertain and threatening environment and reason based on the underlying scientific laws of nature. Convention is always stronger than reason in the short to medium term and is only forced to become more rational in the longer term once it has finally collapsed under the weight of its contradiction with reality. The convention of profit-maximising capitalism could soon be at this point if the wall of corporate refinancing it faces in the next few years proves to be insurmountable.

1. L'ideologia dentro la critica dell'ideologia 2. La questione della prospettiva e il problema del tempo 3. Lo specchio e la lampada. La Widerspiegelungstheorie 4. Una mimesis dialettica, oltre soggettivismo e rispecchiamento meccanico 5. La narrazione e l'oggetto particolare 6. Il caso e la necessità. Confronto con Giacomo Debenedetti 7. L'estetica di Lukács critica del necessitarismo e del casualismo volgari 8. L'Interno e l'Esterno in prospettiva dialettica 9. Oltre il naturalismo e l'arte di tendenza. La «totalità intensiva» 10. Sublimazione idealistica e unilateralità dell'arte. Lo smarrimento dell'Intero 11. Il sognare ad occhi aperti e l'idealismo del Dover-essere 12. La partigianeria dell'oggettività. Il realismo di Tolstoj e di Philip Roth 13. Ben oltre Ždanov e ben oltre Trotsky. Lo Spirito assoluto 14. La lezione di Lukács. Il coraggio e l'importanza dell'eredità

Este texto foi elaborado para a discussão do (Neo)Hegelianismo aqui exposto no III Congresso Hegel em Diálogo: O Próprio Tempo Apreendido em Pensamento, realizado na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, de 29 a 31 de agosto de 2018.
Resumo: Este artigo expõe sucintamente conceitos (filosofia, especulação, Absoluto, Razão, Sistema das Filosofias, Filosofia, Autoconsciência, em si e para si de uma autoconsciência, Sistema das Autoconsciências e Espírito) relativos a um (Neo)Hegelianismo atual, explicitando suas articulações e organização.

The aim of the paper is to analyze the Hegelian interpretation of the notion of “irony” in the light of its evolution thorough the Berlin courses and in a comparison with the edition of the Ästhetik published by Hotho. The analysis of the last course of the 1828-29 is of particular importance, because there the notion of irony, which traditionally appears to be harshly criticized by Hegel, is taken as a decisive moment for the very concept of art. In this course, Hegel explicitly distinguishes between a “practical irony”, which he continues to criticize, and an irony that we could define as “artistic” or “aesthetic”, which he instead assumes as a significant moment in the constitution of the ideal. The discussion of this course can lead to a redefinition of Hegel’s interpretation of irony as it has been established by much of the critical tradition.

Staatsphilosophie AUFSATZSAMMLUNG 09-1/2 Der Staat-eine Hieroglyphe der Vernunft : Staat und Gesell-schaft bei Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel / Walter Pauly (Hrsg.).-1. Aufl.-Baden-Baden : Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009.-272 S. ; 23 cm.-(Staatsverständnisse ; 22).-ISBN 978-3-8329-4450-6 : EUR 29.00 [#0276] Wenige Philosophen sind in der Geschichte der Philosophie umstrittener als der deutsche Denker Hegel, der einmal als Höhepunkt des deutschen Idea-lismus gedeutet wird (und im 20. Jahrhundert von manchen als große und wichtige Vorbereitung des Denkens von Marx gewertet wurde), 1 ein anderes Mal als übler Scharlatan und Vorläufer totalitären Denkens präsentiert wur-de (so von Schopenhauer, Bertrand Russell und Karl Popper, aber auch Ernst Topitsch). Dementsprechend muß die Beschäftigung mit Hegel be-sonders gerechtfertigt werden, wie es scheint, auch wenn inzwischen in mancher Hinsicht wissenschaftliche Sachlichkeit das Feld bestimmt. 2 So heißt es auch gleich zu Beginn des von Walter Pauly herausgegebenen und im Rahmen der Reihe Staatsverständnisse erschienenen Aufsatzsamm-lung: "Degradiert zum preußischen Hofphilosophen und der Staatsvergot-tung bezichtigt, blieb Hegel anders als Kant lange Zeit die Aufnahme in den Klassikerhimmel verfassungsstaatlichen Denkens verwehrt" (S. 13). Hegel eröffnet aber weitere Interpretationsräume, die sich nicht auf einseitige "ver-ketzernde" Rezeptionen reduzieren lassen (vgl. auch den Beitrag von Til-man Reitz S. 221-241). 1 Es sei nur daran erinnert, daß etwa, um willkürlich einige Namen herauszugrei-fen, Joachim Ritter, Reinhart Maurer, Günter Rohrmoser und Alexandre Kojève die wirklichkeitserschließende Bedeutung von Hegel positiv hervorgehoben haben. 2 Man denke an die beiden in jüngerer Zeit erschienen empfehlenswerten Hilfsmit-tel für die Beschäftigung mit dem Denker: Hegel-Handbuch : Leben, Werk, Schu-le / Walter Jaeschke.-Stuttgart ; Weimar : Metzler, 2003.-XIV, 583 S. ; 25 cm.-ISBN 3-476-01705-2 : EUR 49.95 [7695].-Rez.: IFB 05-1-064.-Rez. in IFB: http://ifb.bsz-bw.de/bsz105475092rez.htm-Hegel-Lexikon / hrsg. von Paul Cob-ben ...-Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, [Abt. Verlag], 2006.-552 S. : 24 cm.

lthough the importance of Hegel’s thought to Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophy is well established, most of the scholarship discusses Beauvoir’s appropriation of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic.  In this paper, I suggest that Hegel’s influence on Beauvoir is wider, extending to Beauvoir’s conception of ethical freedom as articulated in the Ethics of Ambiguity.  Following Hegel, I argue that operative in Beauvoir’s ethical freedom is transgressive action; that freedom is inherently transgressive.  I suggest that conceptualizing action as inherently transgressive sheds light on the intersubjective and ambiguous dimensions of action and it provides the theoretical framework to better understand what’s at stake for mystified subjects, namely, their individuality.

Childhood is an important and influential era in the formation of human personality and has particular importance in education. Childhood education has always been of interest to thinkers in education, including Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant. With the special consideration of Rousseau (1712-1778), and later Piaget (1896-1980) and Dewey (1852-1952), childhood was considered as a distinct period of adulthood, and special programs were provided for education in this period. With the same distinction, we see that child-centered educational activities are increasingly expanding that concentrate just on the children’s freedom and interest. Therefore, some educational organizations and scholars introduce the teacher as “the guide on the side”, not “the sage on the stage”. However, it is the conflict between traditional and modern childhood education; the former supports the authority and discipline in childhood education. The latter supports children’s freedom and interests in education. This study argues that it is possible to collect between authority and freedom in education based on the process of formation of knowledge in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This process is education (Bildung), which has stages from natural consciousness to philosophical knowledge. In childhood education, we have authority and freedom simultaneously in this paradigm. Freedom inquires authority because it provides a safe situation to free action. Through this meaning of education at first, children have their freedom within the authority of immediate nature and family; the child is free to play and learn from the familiar situation. Second, at the same time, children become alienated from their situation by becoming familiar with unfamiliar that is not entirely strange for children. Here exist a soft discipline for a child. This process will continue and the child alienates with a new situation again. Therefore, childhood education in this view is dialectical. Children are educated to improve their freedom within the authority and accept the changes in the world and change or adapt themselves and rules in an open-ended process.

27 Ağustos 1770’de dünyaya gelen Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’in Outlines of the Philosophy of Right‘ı ahlaki, sosyal ve siyasi felsefenin en önemli eserlerinden biridir. Kitap adalet, ahlaki sorumluluk, aile hayatı, ekonomik aktiviteler ve devletin politik yapısına —bugün toplumda büyük ilgi uyandıran bütün konulara— ilişkin mühim fikirler içerir. Aşağıda, Hegel’in aile üzerine düşüncelerinin bir özetini bulabilirsiniz.

The concept of modernity has emerged as a major philosophical, theological and sociological category of interpretation in the aftermath of the French Revolution. It was meant to embrace fundamental changes to the fabric of Western culture including the rise of capitalism, liberalism, democracy, and secularity. From its inception, references to Luther and the Reformation have been a frequent element of this kind of theory. The first major theorist of modernity in this sense was arguably Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel who set the tone of subsequent contributions by aligning modernity with subjectivity. For him, the religious dimension of this development was crucial, and he was explicit in his claim that it was the Reformation that brought the turn to subjectivity in the realm of religion. A side-effect of the turn to subjectivity was the alienation of the subject from the world. Modernity is thus deeply ambivalent and so is Protestantism. Later thinkers developed further these insights, but also criticised the identification of Luther with the origin of modernity pointing to continuities between his theology and earlier, medieval thought.
The article discusses the following thinkers: Hegel, Ritschl, Troeltsch, Weber, de Maistre, and Maritain.

Der Materialismusstreit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts markierte die Selbstbehauptung und den Erfolg der Naturwissenschaften und der nun von einigen Wissenschaftlern formulierte Anspruch, die bereits im Niedergang befindliche idealistische Philosophie in ihrer Deutungshoheit anzugreifen. Als Tribüne dieses Kampfes diente die 1822 in Leipzig von dem Naturforscher und Arzt Lorenz Oken gegründete „Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte“ (DVNÄ), die zu dem Zweck gegründet wurde, einen interdisziplinären Austausch von Naturforschung und Applikation derselben zu fördern. Im Laufe der Jahre ließ jedoch der Streit um die Frage nach der Originarität und Genese des menschlichen Geistes und der Natur, und damit auch nach den theologischen Überzeugungen des Christentums, welche nach der idealistischen Philosophie wieder eröffnet war, einige Forscher mit dem Selbstbewusstsein hervortreten, dass nun diese Frage durch die damalige methodische Neubegründung der Biologie, auch eine Neubegründung und Beantwortung dieser Fragen durch die Naturwissenschaften (die damals noch Naturforschung war, denn der Begriff Wissenschaft blieb der Apodiktion vorbehalten) möglich machte.

Dieser Streit teilt sich in drei: Zum einen der Materialismus-Streit der 1850er Jahre, in der die klassischen metaphysischen Fragen durch die Vertreter des Materialismus neu verhandelt werden sollen. Dieser „deutsche Materialismus“ hat jedoch nicht die gleichen „radikalen“ Ansprüche wie bspw. der französische, da seine Vertreter Der Begriff der Materie spielt dabei eine wichtige Rolle: Es geht um die Frage, was das Medium sei, welches als Referenz und Grundlage naturwissenschaftliche Erklärungen von Natur & Geist möglich werden lässt. Daraus leitet sich entsprechend die Frage nach der Richtigkeit der christlichen Seelenlehre ab bzw. die Möglichkeit, einer naturwissenschaftlichen Beschreibung und damit Sterblichkeit dieser. Weiterhin bildet damit der Zweck-Begriff einen wichtigen Streitpunkt: Denn die damalige Physiktheologie, die man als Kooperation oder Symbiose zwischen Naturwissenschaften und Theologie bezeichnen kann, fasste den Zweckgedanken eines Weltschöpfers in die Vorgänge der kausalen Prozesse der Natur.

Weiter ist da der Darwinismus-Streit der 1860/70er Jahre, der als Fortführung des Materialismus-Streits gelten kann, der die methodische Neubegründung der Biologie mit Darwin und Lamarck versuchte, in den Materialismus-Streit einzubringen. Nun stand der Mensch in seiner Einzigartigkeit im Zentrum, da er nun nicht mehr als Gottes Ebenbild geschaffen, nun selbst ein Bestandteil des Naturprozesses und der Evolution ist, was sich ebenso auf Fragen der Moral und Kultur ausdehnte.

Der letzte Teil dieses Streits wurde durch eine Rede des Physiologen Emil Du Bois-Reymond 1872 auf der 45. Versammlung der DVNÄ unter dem Titel „Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis“ ausgelöst. Dieser Streit ging als Ignorabimus-Streit in die Geschichte ein und bezeichnet die kantische Position, dass es im Erkennen, aufgrund der Verfasstheit und Struktur der menschlichen Vernunft, es Fragen geben wird, die, unabhängig vom wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt, niemals beantwortet werden können. Dieser Streit war letztlich das Merkmal für die sich anbahnende Ausdifferenzierung von Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft, bzw. unterteilt später in Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft.

Diese Arbeit soll sich im ersten Teil zunächst der historischen und systematischen Rekonstruktion widmen. Dabei werden Systematik und Historie gemeinsam und zugleich betrachtet. Ferner betrachte ich diese drei unterschiedenen Dispute gemeinsam, weshalb ich auch in dieser Arbeit auch immer von dem Materialismus-Streit, der alle drei Dispute beinhaltet, sprechen werde. Es soll im Verlauf der Arbeit gezeigt werden, dass alle drei Dispute letztlich ein- und denselben Gegenstand zum Inhalt haben, nämlich, das Verhältnis des Menschen zur Natur.

Im zweiten Teil möchte ich eine grobe Skizze von Philosophie entwerfen, mit den Erfahrungen der Geschichte ausgerüstet, wie sie meiner Ansicht nach, in Tradition der kritischen Philosophie Kants, sich für die Gegenwart aufstellen muss. Dabei wollen wir zunächst bestimmen, was das Eigentümliche der Philosophie im Verhältnis zu anderen Wissenschaften ausmache. Weiterhin möchte ich einen Vorschlag der Typisierung von Begriffen und Sätzen machen, und inwieweit sie Theorien und Strukturen innerhalb dieser konstituieren. Im Anschluss daran wollen wir eine formale Rekonstruktion der transzendentalen Kategorien und Urteile bewerkstelligen, die auf dem Rücken der modernen Logik und Mengenlehre präzisere Betrachtungen dieser zulassen, die uns auch gestatten, die Antinomien, als eine aus den Kategorien und den Urteilen heraustreibende Motivation nach Vollständigkeit, zu betrachten.

İnsanın mahiyetine ilişkin tasavvurlar, tarih boyunca insani eylemlerin etik. politik ve metafizik yönelimlerini tayin etmiştir. Dolayısıyla ahlaki tercihlerden toplumsal örgütlenmelere, devlet düzenlerinden eğitim sistemlerine kadar ortaya çıkan birçok yapının, insanın ne olduğu sorusuna verilen cevabın doğrudan ya da dolaylı bir tezahürü olduğu söylenebilir. Bu sebeple insanın ne olduğu sorusu, her türden alem tasavvuru için merkezi bir mahiyet arz eder. Modernite. insanın mahiyetine dair klasik tasavvurları radikal bir şekilde dönüştürerek insanlık tarihindeki en önemli kırılmalardan birini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu sebeple modern döneme ilişkin doğru kavrayışa ulaşmanın bir yolu. insan tasavvurunun bu dönemde geçirdiği dönüşümleri tespit ve analiz etmekten geçer.
Bu kitapta ağırlıklı olarak insanın mahiyetine dair, modern Batı düşüncesindeki tartışmalar ele alınmakta; çeşitli ilmi disiplinlerin oluşumunda ve dönüşümünde bu alanlardaki farklı insan tanımlarının etkisi değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca kitap, modernlikle birlikte ortaya çıkan dönüşümlerin islam dünyasındaki insan tasavvurlarını nasıl etkilediği sorusuna cevap sağlayacak şekilde, çağdaş İslam düşüncesinde yer alan çeşitli tartışmalara da yer vermektedir. Bu sayede okuyucular, köklü bir biçimde değişen evren ve insan tasavvurunun eş düzeyli ve eş zamanlı etkilerini takip etme imkanı bulacaklardır.

Die Erforschung des historischen und systematischen Kontextes von Kants Philosophie weist bis auf den heutigen Tag signifikante Lücken auf. Dies gilt umso mehr für unser Verständnis der Bedeutung der gegenüber Kants Philosophie erhobenen Einwände und Kritikpunkte sowohl für die verschiedenen Entwicklungsphasen seiner Philosophie wie für ihre Rezeption und Darstellung in späteren Jahrhunderten. Die im vorliegenden Band versammelten Beiträge wollen einen Beitrag zur Schließung dieser Lücken leisten. Sie gehen auf Vorträge zurück, die auf dem VII. Multilateralen Kant-Kolloquium zum Thema „Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his critics – Kant et ses critiques“ gehalten worden sind, das vom 28.-30. April 2017 an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg stattfand.

هدف این پژوهش بیان تعریف، هدف و مؤلفه‌های مفهومی تعلیم و تربیت بر اساس فرایند تکوین دانش در پدیدارشناسی هگل است. تعریف تعلیم و تربیت بدون توجه به ماهیت دانش امکان‌پذیر نیست و نظریات تربیتی خواه به‌صورت صریح و خواه ضمنی، تعریفی از دانش را مفروض گرفته‌اند. این پژوهش نیز برای بیان ماهیت و ویژگی‌های تعلیم و تربیت، نظریه هگل در باب دانش را مبنا قرار داده است. برای نیل به هدف پژوهش، روش تفسیر مفهوم و مفهوم‌پردازی به کار گرفته شده است. یافته‌های پژوهش بدین قرارند؛ «بیلدونگ» به‌عنوان تعریف تعلیم و تربیت به عنوان فرایندی توصیف شده است که به دنبال ارتقای تجربه مفهومی فرد از طریق درک نابسندگی های موجود در زندگی است که با نگاهی به گذشته، رو به سوی آینده ای خردمندانه دارد. با این توصیف هدف بیلدونگ، «خردورزیِ فراگیرِ آشتی‌جویانه» در تعلیم و تربیت است. از جمله مؤلفه¬های مفهومی تعلیم و تربیت که در این پژوهش بیان شده اند، می توان به مواردی اشاره کرد؛ «آزادی‌بنیاد»، «تاریخ‌مند»، «بازسازانه»، «تعاملی»، «تأییدطلبانه» و «خطاشکیب». تعلیم و تربیت به‌مثابه بیلدونگ می‌تواند الهام‌بخش جریان نوینی در عرصه مطالعات تربیتی در ایران باشد که ارتقادهنده‌ی تجربه‌ی خرد بشری در تاریخ و فرهنگ این مرز و بوم است.

It will be shown that at least four foundational concepts of Cultural Historical Activity Theory were previously formulated by Hegel, viz., (1) the unit of analysis as a key concept for analytic-synthetic cognition, (2) the centrality of artifact-mediated actions, (3) the definitive distinction between goal and motive in activities, and (4) the distinction between a true concept and a pseudoconcept.

Der 20.Juli ist in Deutschland dem Andenken des deutschen Widerstandes während der Nazi-Diktatur gewidmet. Er ist aber auch dem gewidmet, was wir das „Gewissen“ nennen, weil es beim deutschen Widerstand sich um einen extremen Konflikt von Gesellschaft und Individuum handelt. Wenn sich Individuen entscheiden, nicht nur gegen einen Teil, sondern gegen die Gesellschaft als Ganze sich zu verhalten, werden sie automatisch in einen inneren – moralischen – Konflikt getrieben. Diesen Konflikt hat Graf Stauffenberg in seinen berühmten Sätzen so ausgedrückt: „Derjenige, der etwas zu tun wagt, muss sich bewusst sein, dass er wohl als Verräter in die deutsche Geschichte eingehen wird. Unterlässt er jedoch die Tat, dann wäre er ein Verräter vor seinem Gewissen.“ In meinem Beitrag analysiere ich den Begriff des Gewissens in Hinsicht auf seine existentiellen, moralischen, und religiösen Aspekte.

The paper examines Hegel’s claim in the Outlines of the Philosophy of
Right that philosophy always comes too late to instruct us as to what
the world ought to be from a dual perspective. In the first move, Hegel’s
intervention in the field of political philosophy is compared to that of
Spinoza, who similarly criticized philosophers who describe men from
a moralist perspective and thus fail to write a political theory because
they “conceive men not as they are, but as they would like them to be”
(Political Treatise). Similarly, Marx writes that a proper historical enterprise sets out from “real, active men,” and demonstrates that “morality,
religion, metaphysics, and the rest of ideology” (The German Ideology)
depend on the material processes of those real, active men. In the second
move, the article discusses Hegel’s concept of history and philosophy’s
late arrival from the perspective of the metaphor consistently used not
only by Hegel and Marx, but also by critics such as Louis Althusser:
the metaphor of stage performance. The aim of this contribution is to
tackle the intricate relationship between thinking and acting by way of
a detour through the metaphor of theatricality.

What do philosophy and verbal humor have in common? And what about the German philos-opher G. W. F. Hegel and the Czech-German comedian Felix Holzmann? This book (The night one can bear hunt rabbits) answers these questions in a concise and rigorous manner, thus not only providing an introduction to philosophy and its problems through the comicality of lan-guage but also by a philosophical exegesis of humor on the basis of contrast and the negative conceptions of experience (“There have to be crooks in this world too,” said Švejk, lying down in his straw mattress. “If everyone were honest with each other, they’d soon start punching each other’s noses.”). In dealing with this exegesis, the book takes advantage of Hegel’s writings and, most importantly, Felix Holzmann’s sketches and dialogues.

The night during which one can go bear hunting for rabbits along with Holzmann is the night in which all cows are black, i.e. Hegel’s Absolute. In it, all conceptual differences – not only between bear and rabbit but, more generally, between true and false, beautiful and ugly, or good and bad – can vanish if one does not sufficiently value the complicated relation between language and the world. Language is not only the means for the arbitrary naming of how things are in the world (thus Engels’: “If I include a shoe-brush in the unity mammals, this does not help it to get mammary glands.”) but the medium of their meaning. Verbal humor reveals and manifests this truth that is, in fact, the truth about truth.

The Hobbesian social contract is effectively a repudiation of politics. And the story of humanity that it tells is that of alienation. The multitude left politics behind in the state of nature, demarcating it as the power and domain of the Sovereign, as they surrendered their political capacities—their wills and judgments—to constitute the commonwealth. What they got in return is the guarantee to safely pursue the necessities of life. Thus, the politics of the modern state applied to subjects has always been the administration and care of mere life. This interpretation of Hobbes depends on a Hegelian and Arendtian reading of Hobbes.

published as:
“Leaving politics behind: An Arendtian and Hegelian reading of Hobbes,” in Φιλοσοφια (Philosophia), Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP), Quezon City: Ample Press; Issue 1, Jan-June 2012

Nineteenth century Christian thought about self and relationality was stamped by the reception of Kant’s groundbreaking revision to the Cartesian cogito. For René Descartes (1596-1650), the self is a thinking thing (res cogitans), a simple substance retaining its unity and identity over time. For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, consciousness is not a substance but an ongoing activity having a double constitution, or two moments: first, the original activity of consciousness, what Kant would call original apperception, and second, the reflected self, the “I think” as object of reflection. Both are essential to the possibility of an awareness of a unified experience. Such an awareness is achieved only insofar as the self is capable of reflecting on its activity of thinking. As such, the possibility of self-consciousness, or the capacity to reflect on one’s own acts of thought is essential to the constitution of the self. This new model of the mind became the starting point to the thought of central 19th century figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). This chapter will explore their reception of Kant’s model of self-consciousness, the controversies surrounding its development and exposition, and the advantages of this model for theological reflection. The idea of mind as essentially capable of reflection provided an account of how the self can stand in an ontologically immediate relation to God constitutive of the self, while at the same time allowing that the self’s consciousness of itself is distinct from this original moment, so that a limited or false consciousness of self is possible. As such the task of the self is to recognize (that is, to realize in and through self-consciousness) who it most truly is, both in relation to God, and in relation to self and other.

One of the most memorable lines of Hegel's oeuvre is from the preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit: ‘Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood.’ Surprisingly, relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to the notion of ‘the familiar’ in Hegel scholarship. This essay aims to rectify this lack by offering a preliminary inquiry in what the notion means across Hegel's work. It does so by focusing on three underexplored moments in Hegel's work: (1) the exposition of the logic of appearance in the description and diagnosis of seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch painting in the lecture notes from the 1823 Berlin lectures on the philosophy of fine art; (2) the function of institutionalized practice in Hegel's Tübingen essay of 1793; and (3) the conjunctural relation of the familiar with philosophical terminology in an entry from the ‘Aphorisms from the Wastebook.’ Through a careful reading of these three moments, I will show that the familiar is a point that constellates multiple processes, mechanisms and apparatuses that, when grasped in their complex totality, functions as the ‘prius’ (priority/prioritization/first moment) of Hegel's speculative philosophy.

Hegel's "Philosophy of Spirit" applies two different notions of 'social practice'-one as a condition of possibility for intentional action and another one as the living actuality within which an action is initiated and takes place. Both notions go hand in hand with their own logically distinct form of normativity-social normativity and the normativity of right. Whereas the first one can already be understood from the standpoint of subjective spirit, the second notion is at home in objective spirit or Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie. Stressing this distinction has consequences not only for a more differentiated account on Hegel's philosophy of action, but also for an interpretation of ethical life-which should not be equated with the first notion of social practice. In order to mark the importance of ethical life for Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie, the relevance of objectivity for objective spirit needs to be highlighted, which according to Hegel cannot be derived from a process of inner transformation of changing attitudes of the acting subject towards the norms of her action. Hegel-Studien 53/54 (2020), S. 117-134