Johann Gottlieb Fichte

One of the most persistent and poignant human experiences is the sensation of longing—a restlessness perhaps best described as the unspoken conviction that something is missing from our lives. In this study, Drew M. Dalton attempts to illuminate this experience by examining the philosophical thought of Emmanuel Levinas on longing, or what Levinas terms “metaphysical desire.”

Metaphysical desire, according to Levinas, does not stem from any determinate lack within us, nor does it aim at a particular object beyond us, much less promise any eventual satisfaction. Rather, it functions in the realm of the infinite where such distinctions as inside and outside or one and the other are indistinguishable, perhaps even eliminated. As Levinas conceives such longing, it becomes a mediator in our relation to the other—both the human other and the divine Other.

Dalton follows the meandering trail of Levinas’s thought along a series of dialogues with some of the philosophers within the history of the Western tradition who have most influenced his corpus. By tracing the genealogy of Levinas’s notion of metaphysical desire—namely in the works of Plato, Heidegger, Fichte, Schelling, and Otto—the nature of this Levinasian theme is elucidated to reveal that it is not simply an idealism, a “hagiography of desire” detached from actual experience and resulting in a disconnect between his phenomenological account and our own lives. Rather, Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire points to a phenomenology of human longing that is both an ethical and religious phenomenon. In the end, human longing is revealed to be one of the most profound ways in which a subject becomes a subject, arising to its “true self,” and hearing the call to responsibility placed upon it by the Other.

Throughout, Dalton explicates the nuance of a number of key Levinasian terms, many of which have been taken from the Western philosophical tradition and reinscribed with a new meaning. Eros, the “Good beyond being,” shame, responsibility, creation, the trace, the il y a, and the holy are discovered to be deeply tied to Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire, resulting in a conclusion regarding longing’s role in the relationship between the finite and the Infinite.

Inhalt
Christoph Binkelmann: Enthusiasmus und Skepsis. Das europäische Pendel
Burkhard Nonnenmacher: Kants Postulatenlehre als Prüfstein für Heideggers »These der neuzeitlichen Ontologie«?
Günter Zöller : Ex aliquo nihil. Fichtes Anti-Kreationismus
Kai U. Gregor: Eine Kritik innerhalb der Grenzen der Vernunft. Wilhelm Weischedels Grundlegungsversuch einer Philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus und ein Gedanke Fichtes
Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Die Staatslehre Fichtes unter dem Aspekt der
politischen Theologie nach Carl Schmitt
Cristiana Senigaglia: Die Spur der Andersheit: Fichte und Levinas
Detlev Pätzold Hegels Philosophie der Religion: Die Stellung der Religion zwischen Kunst und Philosophie
Arthur Kok: Absoluter Geist und Schöpfung. Jan Hollaks neothomistische Hegelkritik
Kazimir Drilo: Kritik des religiösen Bewusstseins. Falk Wagners theologische Interpretation von Hegels »Wissenschaft der Logik«
Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz: »Der Mensch lebt in zwei Welten […]«. Religion und Staat in Hegels Ansicht und in der heutigen Debatte
Elena Ficara: Der ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Hegel und in der analytischen Philosophie 
Robert Marszałek: Die Gegenwart der Religionslehre des mittleren Schelling
Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak Philosophie und Religion bei K.W.F. Solger.
Ein Beitrag zur nachkantischen Frage nach dem Prinzip der Philosophie
Patrick Grüneberg: Der transzendentale Gott
Wibke Rogge: Emmanuel Lévinas: Über die Beziehung des Unendlichen zum Seienden als Gemeinschaft in der Trennung
Ansgar Lyssy : Darwin, Gott und Neurotheologie. Was können uns die Biowissenschaften über die Religion sagen?

http://ojs.francoangeli.it/_omp/index.php/oa/catalog/book/510?fbclid=IwAR1kePaq_Yq-hpJUZ63DNFlz1dpKcQfE3UXX8VdxRnZYQmnWuyUTl3CpL7o

Il volume riunisce contributi che, rispondendo ad un’esigenza oggi molto sentita, si interrogano sui concetti di libertà, responsabilità e imputazione: si tratta di categorie fondamentali non solo in ambito morale, per definire la colpa del soggetto agente, ma anche in ambito giuridico, per definire una pena che sia equa e giusta.
I saggi qui presentati analizzano, da un lato, le condizioni di attribuzione di responsabilità e di libertà all’essere umano; dall’altro, rintracciano forme di libertà anche in riferimento alla natura (tradizionalmente compresa come regno della necessità) e all’indagine filosofica stessa. Si dispiegano così differenti prospettive, che risultano complementari nella comune ricerca di un fondamento filosofico.
A partire da un classico della filosofia antica, Platone, si giungerà, passando attraverso le concezioni della libertà di Leibniz, Kant e Fichte, alla filosofia di Hegel, di cui proprio nel 2020 si celebra il duecentocinquantesimo anniversario della nascita, proseguendo da qui verso la contemporaneità. Ci si interrogherà, infine, sul significato della pratica filosofica e sulla responsabilità che essa comporta.

Scritti di: G. Battistoni, G. Erle, S. Fuselli, P. Giuspoli, F.L. Marcolungo, F.
Menegoni, A. Moretto, A. Schmidt, K. Vieweg.

À mi-chemin entre philosophie morale et métaphysique de la liberté, cet essai se propose de méditer la possibilité d’une « éthique de la conviction » pour notre temps, et de réinventer ses coordonnées en la liant de manière indissoluble à la question du « monde ». Plaidant pour un universalisme de la réécriture et de la traduction perpétuelles, la réflexion menée dans ces pages utilise les ressorts de la fiction et de la narration, mobilise les mémoires de l’esclavage et du colonialisme, et investit la thématique de la catastrophe, afin de restituer au sujet moral une puissance d’invention et de création dans et pour le monde commun, là-même où le premier fait l’épreuve mélancolique d’une perte de sens abyssale. Tout au long d’un parcours exigeant qui nous entraine de la philosophie kantienne et fichtéenne au cinéma dramatique de Jeff Nichols, en passant par la tragédie de Heinrich von Kleist, le roman lyrique de Toni Morrison et le roman grotesque de Sony Labou Tansi, l’essai cartographie à nouveaux frais l’expérience vécue, pathique, d’une volonté inconditionnelle, et à proprement parler « folle », de liberté dans et pour un monde en droit habitable et partageable. Il situe son enquête – et ses propositions – dans l’aller-retour entre la liberté problématique, voire catastrophique, du sujet, et l’horizon indéterminé du monde, sous la menace constante de l’aliénation ou même de la privation de l’une et de l’autre.

Language was of no particular importance for the early transcendentalists. Hence, Fichte's treatise on language from 1795 is unique in this respect. It is however not obvious how the theory of language is related to his Wissenschaftslehre and whether it bears any transcendental significance. The present paper shows that the theory of language is an indispensable part of Fichte's project. His account of language as an intention-based form of interaction between rational subjects is systematically linked to his theory of intersubjectivity: language is a necessary condition for the possibility of the mutual acknowledgment of autonomous, self-conscious persons.

Die Texte, die in diesem Band versammelt sind, gehen hervor aus den Vorträgen, die im Rahmen des Philosophischen Kolloquiums am Institut für Philosophie der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg gehalten wurden. Hier stellen externe und interne Professor*innen und Nachwuchswissenschaftler*innen ihre Forschung vor, Absolvent*innen des Instituts finden hier Gelegenheit, ihre Thesen zu präsentieren und zur Diskussion zu stellen. Die hier versammelten Texte sollen einen Einblick geben in das Leben am Institut und in die vielfältigen Diskussionen, die hier geführt werden. Das Philosophische Kolloquium soll Studierenden, Lehrenden und Interessierten von außerhalb ein Forum bieten, sich über aktuelle Entwicklungen und Fragestellungen der Philosophie und anderer, naher Disziplinen zu informieren und diese zu diskutieren. Darum versammelt das Oldenburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 2017/2018 nicht nur Beiträge aus dem Philosophischen Kolloquium, sondern auch Beiträge, die das Institutsleben widerspiegeln. Dementsprechend streifen die einzelnen Kapitel vielfältige Themen der gegenwärtigen Philosophie: Fragen aus der Geschichte der Philosophie, Fragen nach dem Status des Subjekts, der Würde des Menschen, der Politischen Philosophie, der Ästhetik, der Didaktik, der gegenwärtigen Situation der Universität und der analytischen Erkenntnistheorie. Trotz aller thematischer Differenzen fühlen sich die Beiträge dem gemeinsamen philosophischen Gespräch verpflichtet, das dieses Jahrbuch hoffentlich weiter befördern wird.

1. Primo principio in tutto e per tutto incondizionato Obiettivo: trovare il primo principio assolutamente incondizionato e indimostrabile del sapere umano. Se il primo principio è tale, non può essere dimostrato e determinato → esprime l'azione in atto che non fa parte delle determinazioni empiriche della coscienza → è la condizione di esistenza. Si muove una ricerca a partire da un fatto della coscienza empirica → da cui vengono rimosse le determinazioni, le quali sono considerate come accettate da tutti e sono presupposto del primo principio→ fino a giungere a ciò che non può essere rimosso. Dimostrazione: 1.1 A=A proposizione ammessa come vera da tutti (nota in Aristotele come principio di identità), in modo assoluto e senza fondamento alcun, ha il potere di porre qualcosa in assoluto 1.2 Se "A è", allora "A è", il contenuto è salvo mentre si discute sulla forma, che è ciò che si sa indipendentemente dall'oggetto. 1.3 Se A=A è data come certa, allora tra "se" e "allora" è posta una condizione necessaria =X. 2.1 X è in io ed è posta dall'io → giudizio 2.2 L'io giudica secondo X → X è una legge dell'io → X è stabilita come assoluta → X è data dall'io grazie all'io stesso 2.3 X indica il legame fra la posizione in atto di A e la posizione assoluta di A → X è condizione dell'atto di porre → X è condizione anche ipotetica di una possibile relazione con A 2.4 Se X è posto nell'io → allora anche A è posta nell'io 3.1 X si riferisce ad A come soggetto e predicato → A è predicato posto in maniera assoluta se A è nel soggetto 3.2 Se A è posto nell'io → allora è posto → semplicemente "è" 4.1 Se A è posto da Io → allora A giudica l'io per il suo essere-posto nell'io 4.2 Se l'io ha in sé qualcosa di sempre identico a sé e X è posto del tutto → allora io=io è uguale a io=io sono io

The author explores the place, role, and significance of the transcendental ‘I’ in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, from a theoretical standpoint. It will be analysed through the ideas of absolute, unconditioned principle, as the residue of abstraction, and the product of real (existing) activity; ideas of the ideel ray in the structure of consciousness, as transcendental aspect in psychological consciousness; while the absolute ‘I’ will be interpreted as an activity of the spontaneity of mind, concluding with the ‘I’ in reflection. It will be shown to be, at the same time, on the one hand, pure, transcendental, and logical, and on the other, as concrete and individual. Thanks to this dual nature, it enables self-consciousness as sui generis mode of consciousness, different from the objectifying consciousness; but also, free acting, as an agent. In the analysis of consciousness as consciousness, Fichte shows that unitary psychological (real) consciousness has structural elements that are necessary and objective; a transcendental structure. Only through those transcendental moments (‘I’), as a condition of possibility, a concrete psychological subject comes into being. By differentiating psychological consciousness and transcendental moments, Fichte also distinguishes between First and Third-person point of view. Unified, the kernel of psychological consciousness, the ‘I’, is transcendental. This interpretation of Fichte's ideas aims to make them independent of German Idealism, and more accessible for analysis in the light of contemporary philosophy of mind and notions of consciousness. Thus, the result of the first section, ‘I’ as an unconditioned principle, can be interpreted epistemologically; the residue of abstraction has phenomenological connotations, while the ‘I’ as a real activity, contrary to factual knowledge, was an explicit distinction between consciousness and knowledge. The imperative indicates that psychological consciousness possesses its necessary form, which psychology alone cannot explicate; while the ideel ray represents an attempt to solve the problem of self-consciousness through form and structure alone. Also, in this view, the absolute ‘I’ is not interpreted metaphysically or in connotations with idealism, but as a pre-differentiated activity and spontaneity of mind. It also has, as a consequence, that consciousness should not be conceptualized only as a ‘state’ or ‘property’, but as a structure with unique form. Heidelberg School of self-consciousness’ insistence on the fallibility of the reflection model puts Fichte’s potential solutions to this problem at the forefront of contemporary concepts of self-consciousness, as they are conceptualized either on reflection or objectifying consciousness, therefore placing consciousness in the place of an object. Further emphasizing the importance of these ideas for the problems of egological and non-egological consciousness will be elaborated elsewhere.

In this paper I examine intellectual Intuition, Aufforderung and Pure Will in J. G. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo.  After considering the various senses in which Fichte used the term "intellectual intuition," I discuss the relations between intellectual intuition, Aufforderung, and pure will.

Die Erforschung des historischen und systematischen Kontextes von Kants Philosophie weist bis auf den heutigen Tag signifikante Lücken auf. Dies gilt umso mehr für unser Verständnis der Bedeutung der gegenüber Kants Philosophie erhobenen Einwände und Kritikpunkte sowohl für die verschiedenen Entwicklungsphasen seiner Philosophie wie für ihre Rezeption und Darstellung in späteren Jahrhunderten. Die im vorliegenden Band versammelten Beiträge wollen einen Beitrag zur Schließung dieser Lücken leisten. Sie gehen auf Vorträge zurück, die auf dem VII. Multilateralen Kant-Kolloquium zum Thema „Kant und seine Kritiker – Kant and his critics – Kant et ses critiques“ gehalten worden sind, das vom 28.-30. April 2017 an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg stattfand.

This volume examines Fichte's notion of the image in the systematic domains of ethics, philosophy of history, political philosophy, philosophy of language, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion. Several contributions investigate from various viewpoints the central feature of Fichte's late philosophy that, in terms of image theory, human freedom is understood as the ability to understand oneself as the image of an absolute that transcends all appearances. These investigations reveal that Fichte's image theory underlies his late ethics, state theory, and educational conception and thus characterizes the peculiar meaning in which Fichte's late philosophy is still to be understood as an expression of an Enlightenment project that goes beyond mere theory. This volume also contains the three papers awarded with the "Fichte Prize for Young Researchers" in 2018. Der vorliegende Band untersucht Fichtes bildtheoretisches Denken von der Theorie der Einbildungskraft bis in die systematischen Bereiche der Ethik, der Geschichtsphilosophie, der politischen Philosophie, der Sprachphilosophie, der Kunsttheorie und der Religionsphilosophie. Dass die Freiheit des Menschen bildtheoretisch aus der in seinem Selbstbewusstsein angelegten Fähigkeit zu verstehen ist, sich als Bild eines alle Erscheinungen transzendierenden Absoluten zu verstehen, ist ein zentraler Gedanke der Spätphilosophie Fichtes, der in mehreren Beiträgen unter verschiedenen Fragestellungen in den Blick genommen und diskutiert wird. Dabei zeigt sich, dass diese These Fichtes seiner späten Ethik, Staatstheorie und Erziehungskonzeption zugrunde liegt und damit den eigentümlichen Sinn prägt, in dem auch Fichtes Spätphilosophie noch als Ausdruck eines über die bloße Theorie hinauszielenden Au lärungsprojekts zu verstehen ist. Der Band wird von drei Beiträgen beschlossen, die 2018 mit dem "Fichte-Preis für junge Forscher" ausgezeichnet wurden.

Der 20.Juli ist in Deutschland dem Andenken des deutschen Widerstandes während der Nazi-Diktatur gewidmet. Er ist aber auch dem gewidmet, was wir das „Gewissen“ nennen, weil es beim deutschen Widerstand sich um einen extremen Konflikt von Gesellschaft und Individuum handelt. Wenn sich Individuen entscheiden, nicht nur gegen einen Teil, sondern gegen die Gesellschaft als Ganze sich zu verhalten, werden sie automatisch in einen inneren – moralischen – Konflikt getrieben. Diesen Konflikt hat Graf Stauffenberg in seinen berühmten Sätzen so ausgedrückt: „Derjenige, der etwas zu tun wagt, muss sich bewusst sein, dass er wohl als Verräter in die deutsche Geschichte eingehen wird. Unterlässt er jedoch die Tat, dann wäre er ein Verräter vor seinem Gewissen.“ In meinem Beitrag analysiere ich den Begriff des Gewissens in Hinsicht auf seine existentiellen, moralischen, und religiösen Aspekte.

Nineteenth century Christian thought about self and relationality was stamped by the reception of Kant’s groundbreaking revision to the Cartesian cogito. For René Descartes (1596-1650), the self is a thinking thing (res cogitans), a simple substance retaining its unity and identity over time. For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, consciousness is not a substance but an ongoing activity having a double constitution, or two moments: first, the original activity of consciousness, what Kant would call original apperception, and second, the reflected self, the “I think” as object of reflection. Both are essential to the possibility of an awareness of a unified experience. Such an awareness is achieved only insofar as the self is capable of reflecting on its activity of thinking. As such, the possibility of self-consciousness, or the capacity to reflect on one’s own acts of thought is essential to the constitution of the self. This new model of the mind became the starting point to the thought of central 19th century figures such as Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). This chapter will explore their reception of Kant’s model of self-consciousness, the controversies surrounding its development and exposition, and the advantages of this model for theological reflection. The idea of mind as essentially capable of reflection provided an account of how the self can stand in an ontologically immediate relation to God constitutive of the self, while at the same time allowing that the self’s consciousness of itself is distinct from this original moment, so that a limited or false consciousness of self is possible. As such the task of the self is to recognize (that is, to realize in and through self-consciousness) who it most truly is, both in relation to God, and in relation to self and other.

In Fichte’s late philosophy, the concept of image becomes the
central notion of the Science of Knowledge. Both the
representational reference of consciousness to the objects of its
experience and its relation to an absolute being which transcends
all appearances are explained from the image-like character which
consciousness acquires through its own activity. The present
volume collects contributions which contextualize Fichte’s theory
of image in various respects, focusing on its relation to pre-modern
theories of image, its changing role in the development of Fichte’s
thinking and its place within Fichte’s foundation of philosophy in
the area between theory of truth or validity and ontology. Der
Bildbegri f wird in Fichtes Spätphilosophie

Fernando Wirtz, « Los problemas del concepto de “idealismo trascendental” en el Sistema del idealismo trascendental de F.W.J. Schelling », Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte [En línea], 10 | 2015, Publicado el 01 septiembre 2015, consultado el 23 septiembre 2015. URL : http://ref.revues.org/619

THIS IS A PRE-PRINT of the paper published here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17570638.2021.1897181

It is a widely accepted idea that German Idealism stands on two pillars: Kant and Spinoza. The aim of this essay is to critically reflect on this way of understanding the history of philosophy through a study of the reception of Spinoza in the early writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This analysis will show that each of them builds a different image

What happens to language after the post-linguistic turn? In what does a speculative approach to religion consist? Such are the two questions around which this essay is structured. It answers them using some of the framework supplied by Iain Hamilton Grant in his robustly naturephilosophical deployment of Schellingianism. This chapter is intended as a “regional application” of Grant’s  presentation of Schelling onto philosophy of language and religion. The answer to both of the above questions, I conclude, is to be found in Schelling’s The Deities of Samothrace which identifies etymological enquiry into divine names with geological excavation.

The uploaded version is merely a preliminary draft; please follow the link for the published version: http://www.amazon.co.uk/After-Postsecular-Postmodern-Continental-Philosophy/dp/1443827045/ref=tmm_pap_title_0

Enlightenment is an approach that is based on the mind and the individual by purifying the world from the effects of superstitions associated with religion, and it has caused great changes in the way of thinking and social life of Western societies, especially since the eighteenth century. Enlightenment, which is focused on the use of the individual's mind with an analytical approach to the advancement of mankind, is a process which has reached its daily impacts as a phenomenon with its own characteristics, based on specific values and principles.

Fichte y Pestalozzi compartían algunos elementos que les acercaron el uno al otro. En primer lugar, la ciudad de Zúrich, donde nació Pestalozzi y en la que Fichte residió algún tiempo y encontró a la que fue mujer, Johanne, amiga de la de Pestalozzi. En 1788 Fichte había ya apreciado la novela de Pestalozzi Leonardo y Gertrudis, en donde, según él, se abordaba de manera apropiada el tema de la miseria del pueblo (GA II/1, p.104). En ese relato rural se defendía la educación como medio para resolver los males sociales y políticos. Pestalozzi había obtenido un gran éxito con ese libro, llegando a ser el único suizo nombrado Ciudadano de Honor por la Asamblea Nacional Francesa. En 1793-4, ambos llegaron a conocerse personalmente y a estimarse (Fuchs, 1978, pp.66-74), y Fichte, a principios de 1794, proyectó escribir una reseña de la novela (GA III/8, p.152). Según Pestalozzi, Fichte le hizo ver por aquel entonces que sus experiencias pedagógicas le habían conducido cerca de la filosofía kantiana (Pestalozzi, 1949, p.307); pero él declaró después: "desde los Fichte and Pestalozzi. On the education of the people Resumen: Fichte, en sus Discursos a la Nación alemana, consideró que la pedagogía de Pestalozzi era la correcta para los nuevos tiempos y la adecuada para entender su filosofía. Ambos pensaban que la educación había de ser accesible a todos, sin distinción de estamentos o clases, una educación del pueblo que Fichte convierte en educación nacional. Se ha de educar equilibradamente todas las fuerzas y capacidades del ser humano, atendiendo asimismo a las etapas de su desarrollo evolutivo. La intuición ha de ser la base de esa educación, que ha de potenciar la capacidad de pensar y actuar por sí mismo. Palabras clave: Fichte; Pestalozzi; educación; intuición; acción. Abstract: Fichte, in his Addresses to the German Nation, considered that the pedagogy of Pestalozzi was the right one for the new times and the right one for understand his philosophy. Both thought that education was to be accessible to all people, regardless of states or classes, an education of the people that Fichte turns into national education. All human forces and capacities must be educated in a balanced manner, also attending to the stages of their evolutionary development. Intuition must be the basis of that education, which must enhance the ability to think and act for himself.

Cet ouvrage oriente la réflexion philosophique sur le romantisme allemand dans une voie nouvelle ayant pour point de départ la singularité des paysages peints par Caspar David Friedrich, et pour concept opératoire majeur la romantisation du monde, dont Novalis a fait le programme d’une philosophie spécifique. Analyser la critique par Hegel du style de Friedrich ; étudier l’invention par Novalis, dans le prolongement de Herder, de quelque chose comme un paysage-corps ; suivre au-delà de Kant le destin du concept de sublime : tels sont les moments principaux d’un parcours qui permet de mettre au jour les liens existant entre la peinture de Friedrich et la problématique de la « révélation » énoncée par Novalis dans ses fragments sur la philosophie romantique.


Laure Cahen-Maurel. L'art de romantiser le monde. La peinture de Caspar David Friedrich et la philosophie romantique de Novalis (Münster/Berlin, LIT-Verlag, 339 pages, 2017), coll. "Ideal & Real. Aspekte und Perspektiven des Deutschen Idealismus", dirigée par Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak et Augustin Dumont.

Lorsqu’on évoque la place des humanités au sein de l’université contemporaine, c’est le terme de « crise » qui revient le plus souvent. Manque de financement, locaux vétustes, effectifs en baisse, débouchés professionnels incertains, perte de légitimité en vue des objectifs de productivité de l’université, les humanités ne semblent plus à leur place au sein de l’institution universitaire contemporaine. Mais si les humanités sont qualifiées comme étant en crise, cela signifie également qu’elles ont connu un âge d’or, un point de référence vers lequel on fait signe lorsqu’on déplore la situation actuelle. Ainsi, notre propos consistera à partir de cet âge d’or, soit le moment de la fondation de l’Université de Berlin en 1807, pour ensuite réfléchir sur l’impact des transformations de l’institution universitaire (démocratisation, professionnalisation, etc.) vis à vis de cette place initiale des humanités. En ouverture, nous explorerons plusieurs perspectives pratiques nous permettant de penser l’avenir des humanités.

En el presente artículo se expone la noción de dialéctica de Fichte en su libro Basamento de toda la doctrina de la ciencia (1784). La dialéctica presente en la relación entre yo, no-yo y yo absoluto es examinada tomando en cuenta el antecedente kantiano relativo a la dialéctica trascendental y la posterior crítica realizada por Hegel, en especial, el rechazo de este último a la idea de un no-yo.

Palabras clave: dialéctica, dialéctica trascendental, negación, subjetividad, yo absoluto.

Abstract: In the following article, Fichte’s notion of dialectics, present in his Doctrine of Science (1794), will be depicted. The dialectics present in the relation amongst the I, Not-I, and Absolute I is examined taking into account the Kantian background on the Transcendental Dialectics and the later critique made by Hegel, especially, his rejection of the idea of the Not-I.

Key words: Dialectics, Transcendental Dialectics, Negation, Subjectivity, Absolute I

This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel's mature treatment of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous.

Presentación, traducción y notas de la reseña de Fichte de 1794 al libro de Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833) "Aenesidemus" contra la filosofía de Reinhold, en la que Fichte anuncia por primera vez al Yo transcendental como el primer principio de su filosofía. Edición bilingüe alemán-español.

À quoi sert l’étude de la philosophie? Quels sont les débouchés professionnels de cette formation? Voici deux questions auxquelles ne peut pas échapper tout étudiant en philosophie. Elles révèlent une interrogation contemporaine récurrente sur l’applicabilité de l’enseignement de la philosophie que ce soit au niveau social, économique ou professionnel. De façon plus large, elles illustrent une opposition souvent faite au sein de l’université actuelle entre un savoir dit théorique et un savoir dit appliqué. Cette opposition laisse pourtant de côté une troisième forme de savoir, qui ne se limite pas au savoir appliqué, soit à l’acquisition de techniques: le savoir pratique. Ce savoir, tel que défendu par les philosophes de l’idéalisme allemand, est un savoir qui nous forme, nous oriente, guide nos actions.

De fait, lorsque le projet de fondation de l’Université de Berlin fut présenté en 1807 à Fichte, Schleiermacher et Humboldt et que tous les trois placèrent la faculté de philosophie comme élément central de la nouvelle université, ils ne se limitèrent pas à défendre la faculté de philosophie comme apportant un pur savoir théorique. Chacun à leur manière, ils accentuèrent  sur l’apport pratique de cette formation : formation de notre caractère, acquisition d’une vision d’ensemble, meilleure capacité à remplir notre future fonction professionnelle, etc.

Mais qu’en est-il aujourd’hui? Une formation universitaire en philosophie peut-elle continuer à apporter cette orientation pratique? L’éclatement du savoir en facultés spécialisées et le développement des filières professionnelles ne compromettent-elles pas ce rôle initial de la philosophie? Prenant appui sur la pensée des philosophes fondateurs de l’Université de Berlin ainsi que sur la pensée d’Habermas, il va s’agir, dans ce papier d’analyser de quelle façon la faculté de philosophie est à même, aujourd’hui, de répondre aux questions pratiques issues de l’évolution du savoir.

Sınır / sızlık.

Grekçede “komşu, tanıdık, uç.” σύνορον: sínoron.

Tanım yaparak kavram dünyasına adım atar insan. Türlü konuyu açımlayarak bir çerçeve çizer zihninde. Bu sayede hayatının her alanında bir sınır belirler. Teorik ve pratik alanı yanından ayırmaz, gün geçtikçe şekillendirir-dönüştürür.

“Her insan, kendi görüş alanının sınırlarını, dünyanın sınırları olarak algılar.” demişti Schopenhauer. Peki oluşturduğumuz sınırın bantlarını kendi yaşamımızda nasıl ve ne yönden çekeriz? Bazen sınırlar aşıldı mı artık geriye dönüş olmadığı söylenir. Yahut bazı konularda sınırların genişletilemeyeceği öğretilmiştir bize. Peki doğuştan gelen sınırlardan bahsedemez miyiz?

Kendi algımız, aklımız ve düşüncelerimizin sınırında (sınırsızlığında) dolaşırken, sınır kavramı anlaşılmazlığın-belirsizliğin derin okyanusunda bize barınacak bir oda sağlar mı? Kant, aklın sınırlarını bilmek için aklı bir mahkemeye çıkarıp şunu söylemişti: “İnanca yer açabilmek için bilgiyi ortadan kaldırmak zorunda kaldım” O halde inancın sınırları nerede başlayıp bitiyordu?

“Küreselleşen dünyada” diye başlayan her cümle, dünyada sınırların silikleştiğini âdeta müjdeliyordu. Küreselleşme olgusu, insanları birbirinden ayıran sınırların ortadan kalktığı evrensel ütopyaya doğru mu ilerliyordu yoksa küreselleşmenin kurduğu “küresel pazar” ile devletlerin ve ulusların arasından kaldırdığı sınırları, sosyoekonomik sınıfların arasına mı taşıyordu? Küreselleşmenin kaldırdığı sınırların yerine hangi sınırlar çizilmişti?

Noktasız Dergi, beşinci sayısında “sınır kavramını ele alıyor.

Der sehr verschlüsselte Text der Lehrlinge zu Sais wurde unterschiedlcih interpretiert, teils strukturalistisch, teils auf die wissenschaftlichen Vorlagen bezogen. Diese Arbeit zeigt erstmals, wie beide Interpratationen sinnvoll zusammengeführt werden können, indem nämlich das Kompositionsprinzip einer "zyklischen Ineinandersetzung" den naturwissenschaftlich-philosophischen Gedanken und Inhalten entsprechen.

https://www.routledge.com/Mysticism-and-Materialism-in-the-Wake-of-German-Idealism/Goggin-Hannan/p/book/9780367546137

This book argues that the rediscovery of mystical theology in nineteenth-century Germany not only helped inspire idealism and romanticism, but also planted the seeds of their overcoming by way of critical materialism. Thanks in part to the Neoplatonic turn in the works of J. G. Fichte, as well as the enthusiasm of mining engineer Franz X. von Baader, mystical themes gained a critical currency, and mystical texts returned to circulation. This reawakening of the mystical tradition influenced romantic and idealist thinkers such as Novalis and Hegel, and also shaped later critical interventions by Marx, Benjamin, and Bataille. Rather than rehearsing well-known connections to Swedenborg or Böhme, this study goes back further to the works of Meister Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, Catherine of Siena, and Angela of Foligno. The book offers a new perspective on the reception of mystical self-interrogation in nineteenth-century German thought and will appeal to scholars of philosophy, history, theology, and religious studies.