Laura Candiotto
University of Pardubice, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für Philosophie, Department MemberUniversity of Edinburgh, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, Faculty Memberadd
- Philosophy of Emotions, Philosophy of Mind, Virtue Epistemology, Epistemology, Plato, Socrates, and 16 moreAncient Greek Philosophy, Education, Rhetoric, Metaphysics, Socratic Method, Philosophy of Physics, Dialogue, Philosophy of Science, Gender, Feminist Philosophy, Environmental Philosophy, Socratic dialogue, Philosophical Practices, Philosophy of Nature, Social Epistemology, and Enactivismedit
- I'm Associate Professor in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of the University of Pard... moreI'm Associate Professor in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of the University of Pardubice, Czech Republic. I am a member of the Centre for Ethics at the same University. I'm the PI of the project "Vicious Epistemic Cultures" (funded by the Czech Science Foundation) and a team member of "Beyond Security" (Excellence Project, Comenius funding), workpackage "Environmental Emotions in the Anthropocene". My main research field is philosophy of emotions at the crisscross of social epistemology and the ethics of knowledge. I mostly employ enactive, pragmatist, existentialist and situated affectivity frameworks, withing a broader non-reductionist and anti-individualist accounts in the philosophy of mind and cognition (4E cognition). I am also a Plato scholar, working on the role of embodiment and social embeddedness in Plato's epistemology. Previous affiliations: Alexander von Humboldt Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of Philosophy at the Free University Berlin, Germany; Marie Curie Research Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland; visiting researcher at the IMéRA Institute of Advanced Study of the Aix-Marseille University, France; post-doctoral fellow at Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy. For further info please visit my personal website: www.emotionsfirst.orgedit
In this paper, I focus on the concept of embeddedness as the background against which eros is a force and a power in and through interactions. To go beyond an internalist account of eros, I engage in a dialogue with some philosophical... more
In this paper, I focus on the concept of embeddedness as the background against which eros is a force and a power in and through interactions. To go beyond an internalist account of eros, I engage in a dialogue with some philosophical accounts of desire from an enactive perspective.This enables me to shed light on the location of the embodied tension as "in-between" lovers and "all-around" them. Crucial to this tensional account of embedded eros is the intertwining between self and others' becomings in processes of participatory sense-making. Through participatory sense-making lovers make their worlds, creating new ways of being and knowing in the ensemble. I advance some steps towards an enactive ethics of eros where, I claim, the cultivation of the space in-between and all-around lovers is the key to avoid the traps of a degenerated form of eros.
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Sentience, as the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, is often understood as a property of an organism, and the main problem is to determine whether an organism possesses this property or not. This is not just an armchair worry. Sentient... more
Sentience, as the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, is often understood as a property of an organism, and the main problem is to determine whether an organism possesses this property or not. This is not just an armchair worry. Sentient ethics grounds its normative prescriptions on sentience, so assessing if an organism possesses sentience is crucial for ethical reasoning and behaviour. Assessing if it is the case is far from simple and there is no stable agreement about it. This is the problem of sentience. In this paper, I argue that there is a problem intrinsic to the problem of sentience. I call it the "metaproblem of sentience". I claim that the assumptions that underlie the concept of sentience are what create the "problem of sentience". In the first part of the paper, I list and describe these assumptions and show how they create the problem of sentience in sentient ethics. In the second part, I offer enactive and pragmatist tools for tackling the problem of sentience. I advance a participatory account of sentience and show of relevance of the transcendental argument in ethical discourse. My own contribution is that the transcendental argument should be understood in a relational manner, from the experience of participatory sentience. So it is not just that life can be known only by life. Life can be cared for only by life. So, as in sentient ethics, it is out of my concern for sentient begins that I need to care for them. But, distinct from sentient ethics, may approach to participatory sentience would push to known sentience from how I care for sentient begins, from how I engage with them, from how I take part in their life. I conclude by stressing the significance of a participatory ethics of sentience.
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In this paper, we argue that the affective experience that permeates the employment of Assistive Technology (AT) in special needs education is crucial for the integration of AT. "AT integration" generally means the fluid and automatic... more
In this paper, we argue that the affective experience that permeates the employment of Assistive Technology (AT) in special needs education is crucial for the integration of AT. "AT integration" generally means the fluid and automatic employment of AT for fulfilling certain tasks. Pritchard et al. (2021) have proposed a more specific conceptualisation of AT integration by saying that AT is integrated when it is part of the user's cognitive character. By discussing their proposal, in this paper, we argue that the user's affective experience is crucial for AT integration. To better appreciate the relevance of the affective experience in AT integration, we suggest shifting the perspective from the functionalist extended cognition framework, as Pritchard et al. (2021) propose, to affective scaffoldings. By affective scaffolding, we mean those items that are employed for emotion regulation (Colombetti and Krueger 2015), such as a glass of water for reducing one's anxiety while doing a presentation, or the arrangement of the living room for feeling at ease while meeting the boyfriend's parents for the first time. We understand affective scaffoldings from a pragmatist-oriented framework (Candiotto and Dreon 2021). So, we focus on the dispositions that are produced, nourished, and reset by the agents' affectively charged transactions with the world, AT included.
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In this paper, we contribute to the arising field of "enactive ethics," that is, the application of enactive cognitive science to the field of ethics. To this end, we will make a case that an "ethics of sense-making" should exist. With... more
In this paper, we contribute to the arising field of "enactive ethics," that is, the application of enactive cognitive science to the field of ethics. To this end, we will make a case that an "ethics of sense-making" should exist. With "sense-making," we mean the permanent everyday embodied activity of interpreting the surroundings we are in, as well as our role in them. In other words, we mean the activity of understanding our environments in such a way that certain things, but not others, stand out as meaningful and relevant to us. We argue that sense-making can be performed in ethically better or worse ways. For example, one might make sense of a potentially provocative comment either as an insult or as an invitation for a respectful discussion. How one makes sense in this case will affect oneself, the other, and their present and future relations. We propose that it is often helpful to hold humans responsible for their ways of sense-making. This opens up the possibility to transform their sense-making and the worlds they inhabit. This also has significance for their eudaimonic well-being. Our ethics of sense-making focusses on the ubiquitous activities of sense-making, which, when changed, will lead to great ethical improvements of people's actions, choices, and character traits.
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In this paper, I will consider a unique case in which changing one's character is part of a process of moral betterment when facing oppression. By engaging with the Dutch-Jewish intellectual and Holocaust victim Etty Hillesum, I will... more
In this paper, I will consider a unique case in which changing one's character is part of a process of moral betterment when facing oppression. By engaging with the Dutch-Jewish intellectual and Holocaust victim Etty Hillesum, I will highlight the situated dimension of moral betterment as a practice that is driven by the pressure of concurrent events. I will claim that moral betterment does not need to come out of an internal will to change for the better. Instead, I will argue that "bearing real suffering" (Hillesum 1996: 220) is what makes compassion a potential source of moral betterment. This is possible because, in compassion, one experiences emotional friction between weakness and strength in facing the suffering caused by oppression.
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This synoptic review surveys the philosophical literature on the epistemology of emotions to identify the role of emotions in knowledge production. It analyses their evaluative, motivational, hermeneutical and social functions as embedded... more
This synoptic review surveys the philosophical literature on the epistemology of emotions to identify the role of emotions in knowledge production. It analyses their evaluative, motivational, hermeneutical and social functions as embedded in epistemic practices and cultures. The focus on situated epistemic emotions stresses the importance of developing an ethics of knowledge production. The review introduces some new proposals for fostering inquiry in this field, drawing from agency-based accounts of emotions (enactivism, in particular) and virtue epistemology.
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Through a discussion of the socially extended mind, this paper advances the "not possible without principle" as an alternative to the social parity principle. By charging the social parity principle with reductionism about the social... more
Through a discussion of the socially extended mind, this paper advances the "not possible without principle" as an alternative to the social parity principle. By charging the social parity principle with reductionism about the social dimension of socially extended processes, the paper offers a new argumentative strategy for the socially extended mind that stresses its existential significance. The "not possible without principle" shows that not only is something more achieved through socially located processes of knowledge building, but also that, and more importantly, what is achieved is something that would not have been possible without social interaction. The social parity principle states that the result of an activity achieved via social interaction should be assumed functionally equivalent to a solitary investigation and is characterized by multiple realisability. Contrary to the social parity principle, the "not possible without principle" holds that the result would not have been achieved without the social interaction between (at least) two agents with specific existential needs. The socially extended mind never happens in a void. This means that the "not possible without" principle should be located in real-life, affectively charged, embodied experiences of skilful interactions between agents. This fundamental conceptual change via reference to the "existential necessity" that regulates socially extended processes is necessary in order to effectively lead the socially extended mind to a truly embedded and embodied account.
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The first set of topics is dedicated to the theoretical framework I employ in my target article "Loving the Earth by loving a place". I will explain (a) why sense-making is participatory from the beginning and (b) how a personal... more
The first set of topics is dedicated to the theoretical framework I employ in my target article "Loving the Earth by loving a place". I will explain (a) why sense-making is participatory from the beginning and (b) how a personal communication with a place is possible. The second set of topics tackles my proposal’s ethical and political significance. I will consider (c) the objection on how it is possible to love the unlovable and (d) the question of what should change for us to love nature.
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Context • I extend the enactive account of loving in romantic relationships that I developed with Hanne De Jaegher to the love of nature. > Problem • I challenge a universal conceptualization of love of nature that does not account for... more
Context • I extend the enactive account of loving in romantic relationships that I developed with Hanne De Jaegher
to the love of nature. > Problem • I challenge a universal conceptualization of love of nature that does not account
for the differences that are inherent to nature. As an alternative, I offer a situated account of loving a place as participatory
sense-making. However, a question arises: How is it possible to communicate with the other-than-human?
> Method • I use panpsychist and enactive conceptual tools to better define this situated approach to the love of nature
and to reply to the research question. In particular, I focus on Mathews’s “becoming native” and the generative
tensions that unfold in a dialectic of encounter when a common language is not shared. > Results • The fundamental
difference experienced in encountering the other-than-human is generative for building up the human–Earth connection
if we let each other be listened to. I describe the ethical dimension that permeates this type of “enactive listening”
at the core of a situated account of love of nature. > Implications • Love of nature is of paramount importance in our
current climate crisis characterized by environmental anxiety, despair, and anger. A situated love of nature emphasizes
the importance of community-based local interventions to preserve the Earth. Love, thus understood as a fundamental
moral and political power, is a catalyst for environmental activism. > Constructivist content • My article links to
participatory sense-making as defined by De Jaegher and Di Paolo, and De Jaegher’s loving epistemology. It offers a
broader understanding of participatory sense-making that includes the other-than-human. It also introduces the new
concept of “enactive listening.”
to the love of nature. > Problem • I challenge a universal conceptualization of love of nature that does not account
for the differences that are inherent to nature. As an alternative, I offer a situated account of loving a place as participatory
sense-making. However, a question arises: How is it possible to communicate with the other-than-human?
> Method • I use panpsychist and enactive conceptual tools to better define this situated approach to the love of nature
and to reply to the research question. In particular, I focus on Mathews’s “becoming native” and the generative
tensions that unfold in a dialectic of encounter when a common language is not shared. > Results • The fundamental
difference experienced in encountering the other-than-human is generative for building up the human–Earth connection
if we let each other be listened to. I describe the ethical dimension that permeates this type of “enactive listening”
at the core of a situated account of love of nature. > Implications • Love of nature is of paramount importance in our
current climate crisis characterized by environmental anxiety, despair, and anger. A situated love of nature emphasizes
the importance of community-based local interventions to preserve the Earth. Love, thus understood as a fundamental
moral and political power, is a catalyst for environmental activism. > Constructivist content • My article links to
participatory sense-making as defined by De Jaegher and Di Paolo, and De Jaegher’s loving epistemology. It offers a
broader understanding of participatory sense-making that includes the other-than-human. It also introduces the new
concept of “enactive listening.”
Research Interests:
This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in coinquiry... more
This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in coinquiry epistemic cultures, namely virtuous epistemic cultures that valorise participatory processes of inquiry as truth-conducive. Co-inquiry epistemic cultures are seen as playing a constitutive role in shaping, developing, and regulating epistemic emotions. Using key references to classical Pragmatism, the paper describes the bridge between epistemic emotions and co-inquiry culture in terms of habits of co-inquiry that act as the scaffolding of epistemic emotions. The result is a context-sensitive and practice-oriented approach to epistemic emotions that conceives of those emotions as being shaped by coinquiry epistemic cultures. Please visit the journal webpage for downloading the pdf. It is open access!
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In this chapter, I contend that a specific type of recollection (ἀνάμνησις), the one found in the Phaedrus (249b1-d3; 249e4-250b1) and the Phaedo (72e1-77a5), is made possible by a metaphysics of μίμησις. This is because recollection is a... more
In this chapter, I contend that a specific type of recollection (ἀνάμνησις), the one found in the Phaedrus (249b1-d3; 249e4-250b1) and the Phaedo (72e1-77a5), is made possible by a metaphysics of μίμησις. This is because recollection is a process of recognising the ideal world's mnestic traces in the sensible world. I first shed light on some characteristics of metaphysical μίμησις that are necessary in order to explain how this type of ἀνάμνησις is supported by metaphysical μίμησις (1). Then, I focus on the imperfection of the copies and argue that the deficiency of the sensible world ignites the philosopher's epistemic desire for the Forms (2). Finally, I identify ἔρως as a privileged bond to the ideal and explain its connection to the philosopher-lover's extraordinary perception required by this type of ἀνάμνησις (3). In so doing, I respond to the objection against conferring an important epistemic implication, that of recollection, to μίμησις, since μίμησις is illusory. The outcome is an interpretation of ἀνάμνης as an activity performed by the philosopher-lover who can remember the Forms by seeing their traces in the sensible world because the sensible world is an image of the ideal world.
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This paper introduces and discusses the core themes explored in the special issue on the social dimension of the ethics of knowledge at the intersection between virtue and vice epistemology. Here you can read and download the full... more
This paper introduces and discusses the core themes explored in the special issue on the social dimension of the ethics of knowledge at the intersection between virtue and vice epistemology.
Here you can read and download the full special issue:
https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM
Here you can read and download the full special issue:
https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM
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In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests... more
In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests understanding affective scaffoldings in a novel and broader sense by reorienting the debate from objects to interactions. We claim that habits play a positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, allowing us to avoid any residue of dualism between internalist and externalist conceptions of affectivity. We provide pragmatist tools for understanding the environment's role in shaping our feelings, emotions, moods, and affective behaviors. However, we contend that in addition to environment, the continuous and recursive affective transaction between agent and environment (both natural and cultural) are also crucially involved. We claim that habits are transformative, which is especially evident when we consider that emotions are often the result of a crisis in habitual behavior and successively play a role in prompting changes of habits. The final upshot is a conceptualization of affective habits as pervasive tools for feelings that scaffold human conduct as well as key features in the transformation of behaviors.
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In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the "I love to you" of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands... more
In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the "I love to you" of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray's account of love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation.
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In the last years of his life Michel Foucault devoted himself to the study of classical antiquity, focusing on what he called the ‘technologies of the self’, i.e., a system of therapeutic and ethical practices that constructed the ancient... more
In the last years of his life Michel Foucault devoted himself to the study of classical antiquity, focusing on what he called the ‘technologies of the self’, i.e., a system of therapeutic and ethical practices that constructed the ancient subject within a horizon of freedom. The motivations that led Foucault to undertake this study are still an object of debate today. The present study endorses the approach of those authors (such as Arnold Davidson and Judith Revel) who identify a continuity in the development of Foucault’s oeuvre. In this respect, I share Davidson’s and Revel’s views and do not interpret Foucault’s return to antiquity as a moment of self-absorption, an abandonment of politics or a way out from the pessimism characterizing the previous period of his work, as pointed out by Alexander Nehamas. Arguably, by studying the ancients, Foucault intended to elaborate possibilities of action for the present, without however searching in the past for solutions to problems which characterised a different age. In other words, for Foucault the study of classical thought enables to historicise our point of view and to conceive the possibility of other forms of life. It does not seek a ready-made model requiring implementation, but entails a perspectival exercise which aims at engendering effective forms of resistance and production. The critical posture of the intellectual is thus conjugated with a practice of self-transformation which enables the wider context in which the subject acts/reacts to be changed. From this perspective, Foucault emphasises the relation between government of the self and government of others, historicising philosophy and demonstrating how it encompassed a knowledge which was indissolubly bound to praxis. Mario Vegetti has criticized Foucault for reducing antiquity to a pacified form of Platonism or Neoplatonism, incapable of capturing the conflict and political tensions of the period. The present analysis intends to demonstrate that this is not the case, and it highlights how much Foucault drew from the notion of ergon that he learned from a very Socratic Plato for developing an account of transformative philosophy as mode of life embedded in the power dynamics.
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In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic reshaping and maintenance of... more
In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic reshaping and maintenance of the self is mediated first by affective interactions. We initially consider the different variations on the conception of the extended self that have been already proposed in the literature (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Heersmink 2017, 2018; Krueger 2018; Wilson, Lenart 2015). We then propose our alternative, contextualising it within the current debate on situated affectivity. While the idea that we exploit the external environment in order to manage our affective life is now rather widespread among philosophers (e.g. Colombetti & Krueger 2015, Piredda 2019), its potential consequences for and connections with the debate on the self remain underexplored. Drawing on James' intuition of the "material self", which clearly connects the self and the emotions in agency, and broadly envisioning an extension of the self beyond its organismic boundaries, we propose our pragmatist conception of the self: an affectively extended self that relies on affective artifacts and practices to construct its identity extended beyond skin and skull.
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In this paper I discuss the reasons for which we may consider wonder an epistemic emotion. I defend the thesis for which a specific type of wonder is aporia-based and that since it is aporia-based, this wonder is epistemic. The epistemic... more
In this paper I discuss the reasons for which we may consider wonder an epistemic emotion. I defend the thesis for which a specific type of wonder is aporia-based and that since it is aporia-based, this wonder is epistemic. The epistemic wonder is thus an interrogating wonder which plays the epistemic function of motivation to questioning in processes of inquiry. I first introduce the contemporary debate on epistemic emotions, and then I analyze the characteristics that make of wonder an epistemic emotion, from a data-based, phenomenological, and conceptual perspective.
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In this paper, I discuss the intrinsic value of truth from the perspective of the emotion studies in virtue epistemology. The strategy is the one that looks at epistemic emotions as driving forces towards truth as the most valuable... more
In this paper, I discuss the intrinsic value of truth from the perspective of the emotion studies in virtue epistemology. The strategy is the one that looks at epistemic emotions as driving forces towards truth as the most valuable epistemic good. But in doing so, a puzzle arises: how can the value of truth be intrinsic (as the most valuable epistemic good) and instrumental (being useful to the epistemic agent)? My answer lies in the
difference established by Duncan Pritchard (Pritchard 2014) between epistemic value and the value of the epistemic applied to the case of subjective motivations to knowing.
I argue that the value of truth is intrinsic as epistemic value and that this is not only compatible with the idea that truth can have different kinds of instrumental values but also that the subjective value of truth, disclosed by epistemic emotions, can make the value of truth stronger if regulated within patterns of virtuous enquiry.
difference established by Duncan Pritchard (Pritchard 2014) between epistemic value and the value of the epistemic applied to the case of subjective motivations to knowing.
I argue that the value of truth is intrinsic as epistemic value and that this is not only compatible with the idea that truth can have different kinds of instrumental values but also that the subjective value of truth, disclosed by epistemic emotions, can make the value of truth stronger if regulated within patterns of virtuous enquiry.
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This is a blog I wrote for the Springer Campaign for the World Philosophy Day 2019
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The aim of the chapter is to discuss and evaluate the epistemic role of emotions in participatory sense-making, assuming 4Ecognition as background. I first ask why could emotions be beneficial for the collective processes of knowledge,... more
The aim of the chapter is to discuss and evaluate the epistemic role of emotions in participatory sense-making, assuming 4Ecognition as background. I first ask why could emotions be beneficial for the collective processes of knowledge, especially discussing Battaly (Extending Epistemic Virtue: Extended Cognition Meets Virtue-Responsibilism, in Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) and arguing for a conceptualisation of emotions as socially extended motivations in virtue epistemology; then, I discuss participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition, in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6:485–507, 2007; Making Sense in Participation, in Intersubjectivity: A Cognitive and Social Perspective to the Study of Interactions. IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher, Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation, in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science 8:465–486, 2009), both conceptually and phenomenologically, arguing for a fundamental role played by emotions in boosting epistemic cooperation and determining the quality of social bonds. I advocate their specific function in epistemic cooperation. Epistemic cooperation is what brings about the generation of a shared meaning in participatory sense-making and thus, since emotions function as socially extended motivations, they boost the relationships among the agents, bonding them to the aims of their epistemic community.
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The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance that emotions can play in our epistemic life considering the state of the art of the philosophical debate on emotions. The strategy is the one of focusing on the three main models on... more
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance that emotions can play in our epistemic life considering the state of the art of the philosophical debate on emotions. The strategy is the one of focusing on the three main models on emotions as evaluative judgements, bodily feelings, and perceptions, following the fil rouge of emotion intentionality for rising questions about their epistemic functions. From this examination, a major challenge to mainstream epistemology arises, the one that asks to provide prominence to the epistemic agent and to her affects. This chapter discusses these implications, also providing an overview of the many alternatives available nowadays in epistemology, arguing for an open, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to emotions in knowledge.
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In the so-called "erotic dialogues", especially the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato explained why erotic desire can play an epistemic function, establishing a strong connection between erotic desire and beauty, "the most clearly visible... more
In the so-called "erotic dialogues", especially the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato explained why erotic desire can play an epistemic function, establishing a strong connection between erotic desire and beauty, "the most clearly visible and the most loved" (Phaedr. 250e1) among the Ideas. Taking the erotic dialogues as a background, in this paper I elucidate Plato's explanation in another context, the one of the Phaedo (72e3-77a5), for discussing the epistemic function of erotic desire in relation to the deficiency argument and the affinity argument. My claim is that the erotic desire of the philosopher is activated by the recognition of traces of the Ideas as something that the material world lacks and that, nevertheless, his soul is familiar with. This desire for the Ideas triggers the process of recollection, and thus erotic desire acquires a decisive role in the acquisition of knowledge in the Phaedo. In the final section of the paper, I highlight the contemporary relevance of Plato's epistemology of erotic desire.
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Plato, in the famous sixth definition of sophistry in the Sophist (230b4–230e5), depicted katharsis as the function played by shame in those aporetic states triggered by Socrates via the elenchus (cross-examination or refutation) of an... more
Plato, in the famous sixth definition of sophistry in the Sophist (230b4–230e5), depicted katharsis as the function played by shame in those aporetic states triggered by Socrates via the elenchus (cross-examination or refutation) of an interlocutor’s opinions (Candiotto 2015; 2018; 2019). This kind of epistemic purification made the epistemic agent aware of their faults, nurtured their desire to overcome this unpleasant situation, and thus, pushed them to struggle for knowledge within a process of collective inquiry. Bringing this conceptualization of shame to bear on the contemporary discourse on epistemic emotions entails that shame, in getting rid of false beliefs, is an affective tool for the epistemic enhancement of cognitive agents. Following the aporetic tradition, I maintain that the epistemic function of an aporetic state—specifically, the function of motivating one to face contradictions—is to purify the soul of its illness, which is understood here as the holding of a false belief. Moreover, this kind of purification is a crucial phase in the struggle for truth since it permits one to free their soul from the pernicious ignorance of having an unmotivated presumption of knowledge.
I first examine the function of aporetic states in the Socratic method and then in cooperative group learning, depicting their epistemic valence as purification from false beliefs.1 Aporetic states are disruptive mental states wherein one faces some contradiction that one does not know how to resolve, which then leads to an epistemic doubt that breaks one’s process of inquiry—as when one does not know how to solve a moral dilemma or when one finds some paradoxical conclusion in their argument. These states are endowed with a complex phenomenology, from bodily feelings to different kinds of emotional responses. My aim is to analyze the role played by one of these emotional responses—shame—by recognizing its epistemic primacy in the process of cognitive transformation. Second, I discuss the notion of cognitive
transformation as the outcome of the beneficial cathartic function played by
shame in epistemic purification. Third, I extend this analysis to the conditions
that are required to avoid shame’s well-known shortcomings, thereby introducing
lovely shame as a novel hermeneutical tool for detecting the virtuous
side of epistemic shame. I finally conclude by framing the virtues of lovely shame within the context of Socratic skepticism.
I first examine the function of aporetic states in the Socratic method and then in cooperative group learning, depicting their epistemic valence as purification from false beliefs.1 Aporetic states are disruptive mental states wherein one faces some contradiction that one does not know how to resolve, which then leads to an epistemic doubt that breaks one’s process of inquiry—as when one does not know how to solve a moral dilemma or when one finds some paradoxical conclusion in their argument. These states are endowed with a complex phenomenology, from bodily feelings to different kinds of emotional responses. My aim is to analyze the role played by one of these emotional responses—shame—by recognizing its epistemic primacy in the process of cognitive transformation. Second, I discuss the notion of cognitive
transformation as the outcome of the beneficial cathartic function played by
shame in epistemic purification. Third, I extend this analysis to the conditions
that are required to avoid shame’s well-known shortcomings, thereby introducing
lovely shame as a novel hermeneutical tool for detecting the virtuous
side of epistemic shame. I finally conclude by framing the virtues of lovely shame within the context of Socratic skepticism.
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The aim of the paper is to clarify why the separation from the sophists is an issue for Plato in the Statesman; to provide three answers that seek to frame the question of the relationship between Socrates and sophistry; and to re-examine... more
The aim of the paper is to clarify why the separation from the sophists is
an issue for Plato in the Statesman; to provide three answers that seek to frame the question of the relationship between Socrates and sophistry; and to re-examine the issue after the Sophist, and offer a new solution.
an issue for Plato in the Statesman; to provide three answers that seek to frame the question of the relationship between Socrates and sophistry; and to re-examine the issue after the Sophist, and offer a new solution.
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In this chapter, I contextualize the collective cognitive dimension of Socratic dialogue using socially extended mind and distributed cognition to identify the mechanism that leads to cognitive success through the elenchus as... more
In this chapter, I contextualize the collective cognitive dimension of Socratic dialogue using socially extended mind and distributed cognition to identify the mechanism that leads to cognitive success through the elenchus as cross-examination, a procedure that tests out the consistency of an interlocutors’ beliefs. Being liberated by those errors of reasoning that affect our way of life is for Socrates the most
prominent cognitive success. Success, for the elenchus, does not mean the production of knowledge – this will be the aim of the following phase, the maieutic one – but the purification (catharsis) of false beliefs, understandable as cognitive transformation. I argue that Socratic elenchus is a dialogically distributed cognitively motivational state that leads to a purification of reasoning through cross-examination, acting as
cognitive therapy that aims at intellectual and moral enhancement of the interlocutors and the public.
prominent cognitive success. Success, for the elenchus, does not mean the production of knowledge – this will be the aim of the following phase, the maieutic one – but the purification (catharsis) of false beliefs, understandable as cognitive transformation. I argue that Socratic elenchus is a dialogically distributed cognitively motivational state that leads to a purification of reasoning through cross-examination, acting as
cognitive therapy that aims at intellectual and moral enhancement of the interlocutors and the public.
Research Interests:
The aim of this essay is to detect the role of epistemic emotions in the development of rationality as human perfection. I will take the development of excellence as a process of self-transformation, broadening the notion of rationality... more
The aim of this essay is to detect the role of epistemic emotions in
the development of rationality as human perfection. I will take the development
of excellence as a process of self-transformation, broadening
the notion of rationality to include affective powers, and discussing the
eudaimonic value of wisdom. In doing so, I will refer to the account of
epistemic emotions as building blocks of intellectual virtues [Candiotto
2017], arguing for one of its tenets, the one for which epistemic emotions
have the capacity to transform the character of the epistemic agent
beneficially.
the development of rationality as human perfection. I will take the development
of excellence as a process of self-transformation, broadening
the notion of rationality to include affective powers, and discussing the
eudaimonic value of wisdom. In doing so, I will refer to the account of
epistemic emotions as building blocks of intellectual virtues [Candiotto
2017], arguing for one of its tenets, the one for which epistemic emotions
have the capacity to transform the character of the epistemic agent
beneficially.
Research Interests:
The aim of the paper is to discuss and evaluate the role of positive emotions for cooperation in dialogical inquiry. I analyse dialogical interactions as vehicles for inquiry, and the role of positive emotions in knowledge gain is... more
The aim of the paper is to discuss and evaluate the role of positive emotions for cooperation in dialogical inquiry. I analyse dialogical interactions as vehicles for inquiry, and the role of positive emotions in knowledge gain is illustrated in terms of a case study taken from Socratic Dialogue, a contemporary method used in education for fostering group knowledge. I proceed as follows. After having illustrated the case study, I analyse it through the conceptual tools of distributed cognition and character-based virtue epistemology, focusing on the two functions that emotions seem to play in the process of knowledge-building. These functions are (1) motives for joint inquiry, and (2) building blocks of the affective environment where the inquiry takes place. Positive emotions such as love and gratitude foster knowledge generation by providing an environment for posing questions and exploring aspects of a specific topic that a subject would not investigate outside of a group. This analysis helps me defend the thesis for which positive emotions are beneficial for cooperation. Because cooperation is the process that leads a group to cognitive transformation, emotions that support cooperation are beneficial for group knowledge creation as well. I assume that the beneficial function that positive emotions play within dialogical inquiry is the one of enhancement of cooperation. A beneficial factor not only comprises positive emotions that facilitate and strengthen cooperation among the agents in their epistemic practices, but also consists of such emotions that nurture the epistemic agents, enhancing their responsibility to generate epistemic goods, as propositional knowledge or explanatory understanding, for example. Thus, the responsibility toward the epistemic practice disclose the ethical dimension of group inquiry.
Research Interests: Emotion, Philosophy, Epistemology, Education, Distributed Cognition, and 8 moreDialogue, Extended Mind, Social Epistemology, Philosophy of Emotion, Extended Cognition, Group Facilitation, Group Dynamics, Facilitation, Group Work, Collaboration, Knowledge Creation, Positive Emotions, and Socratic dialogue
This essay will demonstrate the nexus between philosophical dialogue and political action by analyzing the work of Leonard Nelson and his disciples Gustav Heckman and Minna Specht. The central question is: “In which sense can a dialogical... more
This essay will demonstrate the nexus between philosophical dialogue and political action by analyzing the work of Leonard Nelson and his disciples Gustav Heckman and Minna Specht. The central question is: “In which sense can a dialogical education be considered as a political action?”
In the 1920s and 1930s, Nelson promoted Socratic dialogue amongst his students as a practice of freedom in opposition to the rising Nazi power. Nelson understood that to educate the new generation through a very participative model of philosophical inquiry that privileged critical thinking and autonomy was the best form of resistance.
Minna Specht’s idea of education for confidence gave to this dialogical practice a very innovative dimension, which led her to be engaged with UNESCO’s educational programs in post-war Germany. In this way, the Socratic dialogue faced history.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Nelson promoted Socratic dialogue amongst his students as a practice of freedom in opposition to the rising Nazi power. Nelson understood that to educate the new generation through a very participative model of philosophical inquiry that privileged critical thinking and autonomy was the best form of resistance.
Minna Specht’s idea of education for confidence gave to this dialogical practice a very innovative dimension, which led her to be engaged with UNESCO’s educational programs in post-war Germany. In this way, the Socratic dialogue faced history.
Research Interests:
Several key lines concerning the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, extracted from the Symposium and the Alcibiades 1, are discussed for the purpose of detecting the epistemic value that Plato attributed to eros in his new... more
Several key lines concerning the relationship between Socrates and
Alcibiades, extracted from the Symposium and the Alcibiades 1, are
discussed for the purpose of detecting the epistemic value that Plato
attributed to eros in his new model of education. As result of this analysis,
I argue for the philosophical significance of the relationship between
Socrates and Alcibiades as a clear example – even when failed – of the
epistemic role of eros in the dialogically extended knowledge.
Alcibiades, extracted from the Symposium and the Alcibiades 1, are
discussed for the purpose of detecting the epistemic value that Plato
attributed to eros in his new model of education. As result of this analysis,
I argue for the philosophical significance of the relationship between
Socrates and Alcibiades as a clear example – even when failed – of the
epistemic role of eros in the dialogically extended knowledge.
Research Interests:
Discussing the contemporary debate about the metaphysics of relations and structural realism, I analyse the philosophical significance of relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Relativising properties of objects (or systems) to other objects... more
Discussing the contemporary debate about the metaphysics of relations and structural realism, I analyse the philosophical significance of relational quantum mechanics (RQM). Relativising properties of objects (or systems) to other objects (or systems), RQM affirms that reality is inherently relational. My claim is that RQM can be seen as an instantiation of the ontology of ontic structural realism, for which relations are prior to objects, since it provides good reasons for the argument from the primacy of relation. In order to provide some evidence, RQM is interpreted focusing on its metametaphysics, in particular in relation to the very concept of relation, and to the meaning such concept assumes in the dispute between realism and antirealism.
Research Interests:
This article proposes an analysis of Plato’s Sophist (230b4–e5) that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical... more
This article proposes an analysis of Plato’s Sophist (230b4–e5) that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical practice. The use of emotions characterizing the ‘elenctic’ method described by Plato is crucial in influencing the audience and is introduced at the very moment in which the interlocutor attempts to protect his social image by concealing his shame at being refuted. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished. Purification through shame reveals how the medium is strictly related to the endorsement of specific ethical and political goals, making the Platonic dialogs the tools for the constitution of a new paideia.
Link for free access:
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/bWijCkETxFqmTFaGICUT/full
Link for free access:
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/bWijCkETxFqmTFaGICUT/full
Research Interests:
Curiosity, inquisitiveness, wonder, intellectual courage, grit, and perseverance are some of the emotions and dispositions that we experience in conjunction with epistemic processes such as inquiring, learning , remembering, and... more
Curiosity, inquisitiveness, wonder, intellectual courage, grit, and perseverance are some of the emotions and dispositions that we experience in conjunction with epistemic processes such as inquiring, learning , remembering, and understanding. These states, which have been called " epistemic emotions " , seem to have a causal and perhaps conceptual connection with knowledge and various processes related to knowing. In addition, some dispositions, such as love of truth or respect for good arguments, seem to be part of a desirable epistemic character. The aim of this monographic issue is to investigate the epistemic role of these emotions, affective experiences, and dispositions. This means discussing ongoing approaches to the role of emotions in rational processes and dispositions, as well as drawing connections between affective experiences, rationality, and cognition.
Research Interests:
Especially in the first platonic dialogues, Socrates does not only address the intellectual part of the soul of interlocutors, audience and public, but he also uses the emotional channel. This process takes place for various reasons: in... more
Especially in the first platonic dialogues, Socrates does not only address the intellectual part of the soul of interlocutors, audience and public, but he also uses the emotional channel. This process takes place for various reasons: in the first place to orient the dialogue and to transmit a specific content to the public, but also to accompany the interlocutor through a real transformation of the self – a transformation with the power of engendering a new style of life.
In other words, Plato elicits the collaboration of the rational and emotional spheres in order to urge citizens to pursue a philosophical style of life, changing, in this way, their modes of life, values, and role models. Therefore, emotions allow the constitution of identity in the inter-subjective cognitive dimension alongside a transformation of the self. This is possible thanks to their mediating character : emotions are not irrational aspects but the mediating instances between the irrational and the rational. In other words, they are crucial4 for the harmonic well-being of the individual – and of the polis – which is in search of the right composition. When correctly oriented, emotions – thanks to the collaboration with the rational component – are the driving force that leads the soul to the discovery of the truth. If, however, emotions are corrupted and are not governed by the rational part of the soul, they lead the soul to commit the greatest misdeeds (in this perspective, the analysis of the soul of the tyrant carried out in the Republic is exemplar).
Contemporary Socratic dialogue should assume an integral vision of philosophical practice too, according to which emotions are not just con- sidered as the antithesis of rationality but as elements constitutive of the human being, working constantly with reason in the various processes of research. This approach does not intend to neglect theoretical or rational aspects, but to enlighten the joint action of rationality and emotions in a type of philosophical enquiry that involves the whole phenomenological experience.
In other words, Plato elicits the collaboration of the rational and emotional spheres in order to urge citizens to pursue a philosophical style of life, changing, in this way, their modes of life, values, and role models. Therefore, emotions allow the constitution of identity in the inter-subjective cognitive dimension alongside a transformation of the self. This is possible thanks to their mediating character : emotions are not irrational aspects but the mediating instances between the irrational and the rational. In other words, they are crucial4 for the harmonic well-being of the individual – and of the polis – which is in search of the right composition. When correctly oriented, emotions – thanks to the collaboration with the rational component – are the driving force that leads the soul to the discovery of the truth. If, however, emotions are corrupted and are not governed by the rational part of the soul, they lead the soul to commit the greatest misdeeds (in this perspective, the analysis of the soul of the tyrant carried out in the Republic is exemplar).
Contemporary Socratic dialogue should assume an integral vision of philosophical practice too, according to which emotions are not just con- sidered as the antithesis of rationality but as elements constitutive of the human being, working constantly with reason in the various processes of research. This approach does not intend to neglect theoretical or rational aspects, but to enlighten the joint action of rationality and emotions in a type of philosophical enquiry that involves the whole phenomenological experience.
Research Interests:
Discussing the notion of " epistemic emotions " as proposed by Morton (2010), and his argument for which intellectual virtues will be " hard to attain " without those emotions, I introduce the thesis for which epistemic emotions... more
Discussing the notion of " epistemic emotions " as proposed by Morton (2010), and his argument for which intellectual virtues will be " hard to attain " without those emotions, I introduce the thesis for which epistemic emotions constitute one of the building blocks of intellectual virtues, in order to provide an explanation of the cognitive process that binds the two. Epistemic emotions are building blocks, as: (1) motivational component, and (2) transformative component, and they assay their causal role as necessary components (but not sufficient) of intellectual virtues. Framing the argument within virtue responsibilism, I explain the machinery that leads from epistemic emotions to intellectual virtues, and then from those to affective abilities, stressing the role of training in the process of transformation of the agent in the epistemic journey. Affective abilities, as the refined epistemic emotions that are ready to use within the practice of intellectual virtues, are the secure and beneficial dispositions that enhance the responsible practice of cognition.
Research Interests:
I discuss the primordial affectivity approach (Colombetti 2014) and the extended emotions theory (Krueger 2014, Slaby 2014, Candiotto 2015, Carter et al. 2016) in order to propose a novel account of “extended affectivity” (EA) as the... more
I discuss the primordial affectivity approach (Colombetti 2014) and the extended emotions theory (Krueger 2014, Slaby 2014, Candiotto 2015, Carter et al. 2016) in order to propose a novel account of “extended affectivity” (EA) as the cognition of primary intersubjectivity (EACPI). I explain why the distributed cognition model is the more convenient to understand the collective and the subjective dimension of EA. The novelty of EACPI consists in the recognition of the protocognitive valence of the affectivity, referring to the work of Colwin Trevarthen (Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen 2011), who has demonstrated the leading role of affectivity in the neonatal intersubjectivity in neurobiology.
Research Interests: Collective Behavior, Philosophy, Distributed Cognition, Philosophy of the Emotions, Extended Mind, and 7 morePhenomenology of the body, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Emotion, Collective Intentionality, Extended Cognition, Philosophy of mind: emotions, rationality., and Phenomenology, Philosophy of Mind, Embodied and Enactive Cognition
Get access: http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_311-1 The goal of this entry is to highlight the role of emotions in reasoning, focusing on their meaningfulness in learning environments and in those... more
Get access:
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_311-1
The goal of this entry is to highlight the role of emotions in reasoning, focusing on their meaningfulness in learning environments and in those educational practices where emotions work together with rationality to enhance understanding and learning.
http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_311-1
The goal of this entry is to highlight the role of emotions in reasoning, focusing on their meaningfulness in learning environments and in those educational practices where emotions work together with rationality to enhance understanding and learning.
Research Interests:
Relational structure is a primitive notion of Heidegger’s Dasein. By analyzing the concept of pros-ti as it emerges from the Heidegger’s 1924 course dedicated to Plato’s Sophist, I outline the Platonic and Aristotelic roots of... more
Relational structure is a primitive notion of Heidegger’s Dasein. By analyzing the concept of pros-ti as it emerges from the Heidegger’s 1924 course dedicated to Plato’s Sophist, I outline the Platonic and Aristotelic roots of Heideggerian Mitsein. Arguably the Mitsein makes explicit the instances of the pros ti — in other words, the instances of Aristotle’s concept of relatedness/intentionality that Heidegger ascribes to Plato’s heteron — but giving them an existential value, having Heidegger pursued the shift from realism to phenomenologyexistentialism. The article concludes by emphasizing the relevance of these themes for social ontology.
Please download the full article here:
http://www2.pucpr.br/reol/pb/index.php/rf?dd1=16136&dd99=view&dd98=pb
Please download the full article here:
http://www2.pucpr.br/reol/pb/index.php/rf?dd1=16136&dd99=view&dd98=pb
Research Interests:
By comparing the role of harmony in Eryximachus’ discourse (specifically in Symposium 187 a 1-188 a 1) with other Platonic passages, especially from the Timaeus, this article aims to provide textual evidence concerning Plato’s conception... more
By comparing the role of harmony in
Eryximachus’ discourse (specifically in
Symposium 187 a 1-188 a 1) with other
Platonic passages, especially from the
Timaeus, this article aims to provide textual
evidence concerning Plato’s conception of
cosmological medicine as “harmonic techne”.
The comparison with other dialogues will
enable us to demonstrate how Eryximachus’
thesis is consistent with Plato’s cosmology —
a cosmology which cannot be reduced to a
physical conception of reality but represents the
expression of a dialectical and erotic cosmos,
characterized by the agreement of parts.
Arguably, Eryximachus’ discourse is expression
of the Platonic tendency to translate onto the
philosophical plane the implications of a model
peri physeos. Harmonic techne is thus always
linked to the theme of moral responsibility:the philosopher is also doctor, musician and
demiurges in his harmonizing activity. The
speech of Eryximachus can be approached
as a Platonic step which is fundamental for
establishing the need for a “medicine” to cure
disorder, with a view to obtaining a cosmos
ordered according to the harmonic principle.
Eryximachus’ discourse (specifically in
Symposium 187 a 1-188 a 1) with other
Platonic passages, especially from the
Timaeus, this article aims to provide textual
evidence concerning Plato’s conception of
cosmological medicine as “harmonic techne”.
The comparison with other dialogues will
enable us to demonstrate how Eryximachus’
thesis is consistent with Plato’s cosmology —
a cosmology which cannot be reduced to a
physical conception of reality but represents the
expression of a dialectical and erotic cosmos,
characterized by the agreement of parts.
Arguably, Eryximachus’ discourse is expression
of the Platonic tendency to translate onto the
philosophical plane the implications of a model
peri physeos. Harmonic techne is thus always
linked to the theme of moral responsibility:the philosopher is also doctor, musician and
demiurges in his harmonizing activity. The
speech of Eryximachus can be approached
as a Platonic step which is fundamental for
establishing the need for a “medicine” to cure
disorder, with a view to obtaining a cosmos
ordered according to the harmonic principle.
Research Interests:
These last years have witnessed the emergence and blossoming of practices inspired by philosophy on the didactic and pedagogical scene. In this context, Socrates’ philosophy represents one main point of reference. Socratic dialogue is now... more
These last years have witnessed the emergence and blossoming of practices inspired by philosophy on the didactic and pedagogical scene. In this context, Socrates’ philosophy represents one main point of reference. Socratic dialogue is now a model for a maieutic conception of teaching as well as for the constitution of dialogical communities and for an interrogative inquiry into reality. However, at times this recovery of the Socratic model is not exempt from misunderstandings and anachronisms. The aim of this entry is to underline the main differences between the ancient and contemporary method.
Research Interests:
My main thesis concerns what I call the “extended elenchus”, a process based on the extended nature of the aporetic state. The first section highlights the “necessity thesis”, or the role of emotions in reasoning; the second focuses on... more
My main thesis concerns what I call the “extended elenchus”, a process based on the extended nature of the aporetic state. The first section highlights the “necessity thesis”, or the role of emotions in reasoning; the second focuses on shame as an epistemic emotion and on the cognitive role played by the audience in the implementation of the “system of shame”; the third addresses the role of cathartic and zetetic aporia.
Research Interests:
This paper highlights the Platonic conception of old age as very different from the traditional one. In order to demonstrate it, the Parmenides and the Laws will be analyzed as key text to understand the new philosophical meaning of old... more
This paper highlights the Platonic conception of old age as very different from the traditional one. In order to demonstrate it, the Parmenides and the Laws will be analyzed as key text to understand the new philosophical meaning of old age that finds his main characterization in connection with young age.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Table of contents of the special issue edited by Laura Candiotto on the social dimension of the ethics of knowledge.
The full special issue can be read and downloaded here:
https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM
The full special issue can be read and downloaded here:
https://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM
Research Interests:
Emotions ( pathè) such as anger, fear, shame, and envy, but also pity, wonder, love and friendship have long been underestimated in Plato’s philosophy. The aim of Emotions in Plato is to provide a consistent account of the role of... more
Emotions ( pathè) such as anger, fear, shame, and envy, but also pity, wonder, love and friendship have long been underestimated in Plato’s philosophy. The aim of Emotions in Plato is to provide a consistent account of the role of emotions in Plato’s psychology, epistemology, ethics and political theory. The volume focuses on three main issues: taxonomy of emotions, their epistemic status, and their relevance for the ethical and political theory and practice. This volume, which is the first edited volume entirely dedicated to emotions in Plato’s philosophy, shows how Plato, in many aspects, was positively interested in these affective states in order to support the rule of reason.
Research Interests:
This is a special issue edited by Laura Candiotto and Léo Peruzzo Jr. for the Journal Aurora. Among the contributors: Dina Mendonça, Valeria Bizzarri, Adrian Spremberg, Carlos Vara Sanchéz, Daniel O'Shiel, Alejandro Murillo-Lara, Carlos... more
This is a special issue edited by Laura Candiotto and Léo Peruzzo Jr. for the Journal Aurora. Among the contributors: Dina Mendonça, Valeria Bizzarri, Adrian Spremberg, Carlos Vara Sanchéz, Daniel O'Shiel, Alejandro Murillo-Lara, Carlos Andrés Muñoz-Serna, Daniel Calbino, Moysés Pinto Neto, Charles Borges, Godwin Darmanin, Daniel De Luca-Noronha, Léo Peruzzo Júnior, Laura Candiotto, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, José Araya
Research Interests:
Book - Léo Peruzzo (Org.)
Preface - Laura Candiotto
Preface - Laura Candiotto
Research Interests:
The Routledge Handbook of Classics and Cognitive Theory is an interdisciplinary volume that examines the application of cognitive theory to the study of the classical world, across several interrelated areas including linguistics,... more
The Routledge Handbook of Classics and Cognitive Theory is an interdisciplinary volume that examines the application of cognitive theory to the study of the classical world, across several interrelated areas including linguistics, literary theory, social practices, performance, artificial intelligence and archaeology. With contributions from a diverse group of international scholars working in this exciting new area, the volume explores the processes of the mind drawing from research in psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology, and interrogates the implications of these new approaches for the study of the ancient world.
Topics covered in this wide-ranging collection include: cognitive linguistics applied to Homeric and early Greek texts, Roman cultural semantics, linguistic embodiment in Latin literature, group identities in Greek lyric, cognitive dissonance in historiography, kinesthetic empathy in Sappho, artificial intelligence in Hesiod and Greek drama, the enactivism of Roman statues and memory and art in the Roman Empire.
This ground-breaking work is the first to organize the field, allowing both scholars and students access to the methodologies, bibliographies and techniques of the cognitive sciences and how they have been applied to classics.
Topics covered in this wide-ranging collection include: cognitive linguistics applied to Homeric and early Greek texts, Roman cultural semantics, linguistic embodiment in Latin literature, group identities in Greek lyric, cognitive dissonance in historiography, kinesthetic empathy in Sappho, artificial intelligence in Hesiod and Greek drama, the enactivism of Roman statues and memory and art in the Roman Empire.
This ground-breaking work is the first to organize the field, allowing both scholars and students access to the methodologies, bibliographies and techniques of the cognitive sciences and how they have been applied to classics.
Research Interests: Ancient History, Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Psychology, and 11 moreClassical Archaeology, Comparative Literature, Classics, Cognitive Narratology, Narratology, Cognitive Linguistics, Classical philology, Narrative Theory, Culture and Cognition, Ancient Greek and Roman Theatre, and Ancient Rhetoric and Poetics
- Collates twelve full-length articles by leading and up-and-coming academics on the exciting topic of philosophy of emotions. - Focuses on the different roles that emotions play in our life, particularly their role in knowledge; -... more
- Collates twelve full-length articles by leading and up-and-coming academics on the exciting topic of philosophy of emotions.
- Focuses on the different roles that emotions play in our life, particularly their role in knowledge;
- Investigates the epistemological value of emotions in reasoning, a prominent research programme in the cognitive sciences.
This innovative new volume analyses the role of emotions in knowledge acquisition. It focuses on the field of philosophy of emotions at the exciting intersection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science to bring us an in-depth analysis of the
epistemological value of emotions in reasoning. With twelve chapters by leading and up-and coming academics, this edited collection shows that emotions do count for our epistemic enterprise. Against scepticism about the possible positive role emotions play in knowledge, the
authors highlight the how and the why of this potential, lucidly exploring the key aspects of the functionality of emotions. This is explored in relation to: specific kinds of knowledge such
as self-understanding, group-knowledge and wisdom; specific functions played by certain emotions in these cases, such as disorientation in enquiry and contempt in practical reason;
the affective experience of the epistemic subjects and communities.
- Focuses on the different roles that emotions play in our life, particularly their role in knowledge;
- Investigates the epistemological value of emotions in reasoning, a prominent research programme in the cognitive sciences.
This innovative new volume analyses the role of emotions in knowledge acquisition. It focuses on the field of philosophy of emotions at the exciting intersection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science to bring us an in-depth analysis of the
epistemological value of emotions in reasoning. With twelve chapters by leading and up-and coming academics, this edited collection shows that emotions do count for our epistemic enterprise. Against scepticism about the possible positive role emotions play in knowledge, the
authors highlight the how and the why of this potential, lucidly exploring the key aspects of the functionality of emotions. This is explored in relation to: specific kinds of knowledge such
as self-understanding, group-knowledge and wisdom; specific functions played by certain emotions in these cases, such as disorientation in enquiry and contempt in practical reason;
the affective experience of the epistemic subjects and communities.
Research Interests:
Socrate à l'agora : Que peut la parole philosophique ?, Jun 6, 2017 Le regain d’intérêt contemporain pour la philosophie pratique et notamment pour la discussion et la délibération philosophiques incite à une réflexion sur les enjeux... more
Socrate à l'agora : Que peut la parole philosophique ?, Jun 6, 2017
Le regain d’intérêt contemporain pour la philosophie pratique et notamment pour la discussion et la délibération philosophiques incite à une réflexion sur les enjeux philosophiques, éthiques et politiques de la parole philosophique, des lieux et des pratiques dans lesquelles cette parole prend forme et s’exerce. Les textes ici réunis dans les Actes d’un colloque qui s’est tenu à Aix en Provence les 7 et 8 décembre 2013 contribuent à une telle réflexion en s’appuyant notamment sur la figure de Socrate à l’agora comme lieu de rencontre entre philosophes appartenant au monde académique et praticiens des « dialogues philosophiques » contemporains. Ont contribué à cet ouvrage : Dries Boele, Laura Candiotto, Leon de Haas, Anne Herla, Gaëlle Jeanmart, Lou Marinoff, Mieke de Moor, Isabelle Pariente-Butterlin, Thomas Polednitschek, Livio Rossetti, Kristof Van Rossem.
Vrin, Paris, 2017, isbn: 978-2-7116-2764-6
Le regain d’intérêt contemporain pour la philosophie pratique et notamment pour la discussion et la délibération philosophiques incite à une réflexion sur les enjeux philosophiques, éthiques et politiques de la parole philosophique, des lieux et des pratiques dans lesquelles cette parole prend forme et s’exerce. Les textes ici réunis dans les Actes d’un colloque qui s’est tenu à Aix en Provence les 7 et 8 décembre 2013 contribuent à une telle réflexion en s’appuyant notamment sur la figure de Socrate à l’agora comme lieu de rencontre entre philosophes appartenant au monde académique et praticiens des « dialogues philosophiques » contemporains. Ont contribué à cet ouvrage : Dries Boele, Laura Candiotto, Leon de Haas, Anne Herla, Gaëlle Jeanmart, Lou Marinoff, Mieke de Moor, Isabelle Pariente-Butterlin, Thomas Polednitschek, Livio Rossetti, Kristof Van Rossem.
Vrin, Paris, 2017, isbn: 978-2-7116-2764-6
This is the Portuguese translation of "Le dialogue socratique" (2011), puublished in São Paulo (Brazil) by Paulus Editore. Translated by Janaina Mafra. The book includes, other than a new preface (p 15 f.), a "Postfacio" (translated by... more
This is the Portuguese translation of "Le dialogue socratique" (2011), puublished in São Paulo (Brazil) by Paulus Editore. Translated by Janaina Mafra.
The book includes, other than a new preface (p 15 f.), a "Postfacio" (translated by Nicola Galgano) where the author and Dr. Laura Candiotto (Univ. Venezia, Univ. Edinburgh) offer a sustained exchange about subsequent developments of the investigations included in this book. The "Postfacio" is available in the section "Talks".
The book includes, other than a new preface (p 15 f.), a "Postfacio" (translated by Nicola Galgano) where the author and Dr. Laura Candiotto (Univ. Venezia, Univ. Edinburgh) offer a sustained exchange about subsequent developments of the investigations included in this book. The "Postfacio" is available in the section "Talks".
Research Interests:
Perché è necessario il dialogo? Partendo da Socrate e Platone e arrivando al dibattito contemporaneo sull’epistemologia delle virtù, passando per Giordano Bruno, Minna Specht e Luce Irigaray, Laura Candiotto sostiene che senza il dialogo... more
Perché è necessario il dialogo? Partendo da Socrate e Platone e arrivando al dibattito contemporaneo sull’epistemologia delle virtù, passando per Giordano Bruno, Minna Specht e Luce Irigaray, Laura Candiotto sostiene che senza il dialogo non si possa cambiare, né a livello individuale, né collettivo. Affinché il cambiamento sia positivo, il dialogo mette in atto una trasformazione che purifica non solo gli errori di giudizio ma anche lo stile di vita. Il dialogo tende così alla creazione di spazi per una relazione con la differenza dove l’intreccio continuo di gesti, emozioni e parole si coniuga con la fiducia nelle capacità di miglioramento di sé stessi, degli interlocutori e del contesto che si abita. Ma come è possibile trasformarsi grazie al dialogo? Attraverso lo studio di una dialettica incarnata e situata nel contesto relazionale, Candiotto offre strumenti concettuali ed esempi concreti che spingono il lettore a sperimentare una dialogica appassionata in prima persona plurale.
Research Interests:
In questo contributo mi confronto con le implicazioni esistenziali della proposta filosofica di Emanuele Severino, specialmente interrogando la portata salvifica della tesi dell’eternità dell’essere. Per fare questo mi concentro sulla... more
In questo contributo mi confronto con le implicazioni esistenziali della proposta filosofica di Emanuele Severino, specialmente interrogando la portata salvifica della tesi dell’eternità dell’essere. Per fare questo mi concentro sulla fenomenologia dell’eternità, esplorando alcune pagine di due testi autobiografici di Emanuele Severino, La follia dell’angelo, scritto in forma dialogica con Ines Testoni, e Il mio ricordo degli eterni. Questa scelta deriva dalla convinzione che non solo l’immediatezza logica debba sostenere l’immediatezza fenomenologica, come sostenuto da Severino ne La struttura originaria, ma che l’immediatezza fenomenologica possa essere un valido strumento per scoprire, in prima persona, le tracce dell’eternità.
Research Interests:
L'autrice rintraccia nei primi dialoghi le strategie socratiche, individuando nel dettaglio il loro funzionamento dal punto di vista logico-argomentativo e psicologico-emotivo. Il lettore viene accompagnato nella scoperta delle relazioni... more
L'autrice rintraccia nei primi dialoghi le strategie socratiche, individuando nel dettaglio il loro funzionamento dal punto di vista logico-argomentativo e psicologico-emotivo.
Il lettore viene accompagnato nella scoperta delle relazioni che sussistono fra dialogo e confutazione, biografia e verità, comunità filosofica e stile di vita quotidiano, educazione e politica. Inoltre un'appendice dedicata alle pratiche filosofiche contemporanee offre la possibilità di cogliere l'attualità del dialogo socratico e a comprendere le sue possibili applicazioni.
INDICE
PREFAZIONE di Luc Brisson
INTRODUZIONE
1. LE INTERPRETAZIONI SULLO STILE DIALOGICO
2. DIALOGO, RETORICA, DIALETTICA
3. GLI USI DELLA FORMA DIALOGICA
4. DIALOGO E CONFUTAZIONE
5. L’EPISTOLA VII E LA PRATICA DIALOGICA IN COMUNITÀ
CONCLUSIONE
APPENDICE: IL DIALOGO SOCRATICO CONTEMPORANEO
POSTFAZIONE
BIBLIOGRAFIA
Il lettore viene accompagnato nella scoperta delle relazioni che sussistono fra dialogo e confutazione, biografia e verità, comunità filosofica e stile di vita quotidiano, educazione e politica. Inoltre un'appendice dedicata alle pratiche filosofiche contemporanee offre la possibilità di cogliere l'attualità del dialogo socratico e a comprendere le sue possibili applicazioni.
INDICE
PREFAZIONE di Luc Brisson
INTRODUZIONE
1. LE INTERPRETAZIONI SULLO STILE DIALOGICO
2. DIALOGO, RETORICA, DIALETTICA
3. GLI USI DELLA FORMA DIALOGICA
4. DIALOGO E CONFUTAZIONE
5. L’EPISTOLA VII E LA PRATICA DIALOGICA IN COMUNITÀ
CONCLUSIONE
APPENDICE: IL DIALOGO SOCRATICO CONTEMPORANEO
POSTFAZIONE
BIBLIOGRAFIA
Research Interests:
"Il volume presenta una selezione di brani antologici che possono essere d'ispirazione per le pratiche filosofiche contemporanee. Esso non è una semplice antologia; i brani, infatti, sono correlati a un ampio commento e a una proposta di... more
"Il volume presenta una selezione di brani antologici che possono essere d'ispirazione per le pratiche filosofiche contemporanee. Esso non è una semplice antologia; i brani, infatti, sono correlati a un ampio commento e a una proposta di pratiche filosofiche da esso ispirate. Ogni capitolo è strutturato in questo modo: introduzione all'autore e al testo, brano antologico, commento, invito alle pratiche filosofiche, bibliografia per approfondire.
L'opera curata da Laura Candiotto e Luigi Vero Tarca nasce come lavoro collettivo ed è espressione della reale pratica filosofica portata avanti da più di dieci anni nel seminario di pratiche filosofiche dell'Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia. Essa vorrebbe avere un carattere generativo, essendo cioè un invito a cogliere nella vita quotidiana la pratica filosofica.
Indice
Presentazione (Luigi Vero Tarca)
Ringraziamenti
Introduzione: la pratica filosofica come relazione integrale (Laura Candiotto)
Invito alla lettura e alla condivisione del testo (Luigi Vero Tarca)
1. Socrate: il dialogo come farmaco (Laura Candiotto)
2. Platone: la ricerca della verità nel dialogo (Laura Candiotto)
3. Zhuang Zhi: la musica del Tao, musica della spontaneità (Massimiliano Cabella)
4. Epicuro: la misura nel corpo (Mauro Semenzato)
5. Marco Aurelio: il corpo nella Misura (Mauro Semenzato)
6. San Francesco: la pratica del perdono (Stefano Sangiorgio)
7. Giordano Bruno: questione di ‘punti’ di vista (Francesca Luise)
8. Montaigne: l’uomo deve essere ancora inventato (Stefano Guerini)
9. Pirandello: “Son tutte parole le formule dei filosofi” (Simona Alberti)
10. Klemperer: il «momento totalitario» del linguaggio (Mattia Pontarollo)
11. Heidegger: cura per l’Essere, Essere come Altro (Fabrizio Luciano)
12. Wittgenstein: le differenti terapie (Elisabetta Favaretto)
13. Giono: l'insegnamento radicale di un realista visionario (Andrée Bella)
14. Krishnamurti: osservazione dei condizionamenti (Giorgio Obene)
15. Suzuki: mente zen, mente di principiante (Christian Doni)
16. Bateson: contemplazione del mondo vivente e trasformazione di sé (Andrée Bella)
17. Lévinas: accenni di linguaggi e tracce di etica (Andrea Possamai)
18. Lama Gendun Rinpoche: la felicità, niente da forzare (Maurizio Pontiggia)
19. Panikkar: la “giusta visione del mondo” nello sguardo di un mistico.(Luigi Vero Tarca)
20. Foucault: (dire) la verità al potere (Mattia Pontarollo)
21. Foucault: la filosofia antica come cura di sé (Michelantonio Lo Russo, Moreno Montanari)
22. Ceronetti: svuota-menti. Retto pensare, retto agire (Chiara Fornasiero)
23. Severino: la verità di ogni cosa (Laura Candiotto, Stefano Sangiorgio)
24. Irigaray: amore vero. Amare a te e amarmi per quello che siamo (Grace Spinazzi)
Postfazione: le nostre pratiche filosofiche (Dott.ssa Ornella Mancin, Dott. Massimo Scassola, Ordine dei Medici della Provincia di Venezia)
Brevi autobiografie degli autori"
L'opera curata da Laura Candiotto e Luigi Vero Tarca nasce come lavoro collettivo ed è espressione della reale pratica filosofica portata avanti da più di dieci anni nel seminario di pratiche filosofiche dell'Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia. Essa vorrebbe avere un carattere generativo, essendo cioè un invito a cogliere nella vita quotidiana la pratica filosofica.
Indice
Presentazione (Luigi Vero Tarca)
Ringraziamenti
Introduzione: la pratica filosofica come relazione integrale (Laura Candiotto)
Invito alla lettura e alla condivisione del testo (Luigi Vero Tarca)
1. Socrate: il dialogo come farmaco (Laura Candiotto)
2. Platone: la ricerca della verità nel dialogo (Laura Candiotto)
3. Zhuang Zhi: la musica del Tao, musica della spontaneità (Massimiliano Cabella)
4. Epicuro: la misura nel corpo (Mauro Semenzato)
5. Marco Aurelio: il corpo nella Misura (Mauro Semenzato)
6. San Francesco: la pratica del perdono (Stefano Sangiorgio)
7. Giordano Bruno: questione di ‘punti’ di vista (Francesca Luise)
8. Montaigne: l’uomo deve essere ancora inventato (Stefano Guerini)
9. Pirandello: “Son tutte parole le formule dei filosofi” (Simona Alberti)
10. Klemperer: il «momento totalitario» del linguaggio (Mattia Pontarollo)
11. Heidegger: cura per l’Essere, Essere come Altro (Fabrizio Luciano)
12. Wittgenstein: le differenti terapie (Elisabetta Favaretto)
13. Giono: l'insegnamento radicale di un realista visionario (Andrée Bella)
14. Krishnamurti: osservazione dei condizionamenti (Giorgio Obene)
15. Suzuki: mente zen, mente di principiante (Christian Doni)
16. Bateson: contemplazione del mondo vivente e trasformazione di sé (Andrée Bella)
17. Lévinas: accenni di linguaggi e tracce di etica (Andrea Possamai)
18. Lama Gendun Rinpoche: la felicità, niente da forzare (Maurizio Pontiggia)
19. Panikkar: la “giusta visione del mondo” nello sguardo di un mistico.(Luigi Vero Tarca)
20. Foucault: (dire) la verità al potere (Mattia Pontarollo)
21. Foucault: la filosofia antica come cura di sé (Michelantonio Lo Russo, Moreno Montanari)
22. Ceronetti: svuota-menti. Retto pensare, retto agire (Chiara Fornasiero)
23. Severino: la verità di ogni cosa (Laura Candiotto, Stefano Sangiorgio)
24. Irigaray: amore vero. Amare a te e amarmi per quello che siamo (Grace Spinazzi)
Postfazione: le nostre pratiche filosofiche (Dott.ssa Ornella Mancin, Dott. Massimo Scassola, Ordine dei Medici della Provincia di Venezia)
Brevi autobiografie degli autori"
Research Interests:
Indice Prefazione, Maurizio Scassola Introduzione, Laura Candiotto Prima Parte: La comunicazione in medicina “Cura e comunicazione”, Luigi Perissinotto discussione a cura di Pietro Valenti “La comunicazione responsabile”, Ivana... more
Indice
Prefazione, Maurizio Scassola
Introduzione, Laura Candiotto
Prima Parte: La comunicazione in medicina
“Cura e comunicazione”, Luigi Perissinotto
discussione a cura di Pietro Valenti
“La comunicazione responsabile”, Ivana Padoan
discussione a cura di Giovanni Leoni
“Comunicazione e verità. La cura dei mortali nell'età della tecnica”, Luigi Vero Tarca
discussione a cura di Sandro Panese
“Comporre armonie. La cura delle relazioni nelle pratiche filosofiche integrali”, Laura Candiotto
discussione a cura di Ornella Mancin
Seconda Parte: Pratiche filosofiche per la medicina
“La relazione nel dialogo. A partire da Socrate e Gregory Bateson”, Andrée Bella, Laura Candiotto
“La cura dei gesti e l’amore per le immagini. Pratiche e riflessioni intorno alla fisiologia delle relazioni nel quotidiano a partire da James Hillman, Pierre Hadot, Raimon Panikkar”, Bruna Marchetti, Tiziana Mattiazzi
“Il corpo e la cittadella interiore. Pratiche di ascolto e parola per la cura di sé e delle relazioni”, Mauro Semenzato
“Il corpo della relazione. A partire dallo zen, dal taoismo e dalla filosofia greca”, Massimiliano Cabella, Christian Doni, Stefano Sangiorgio
Biografie degli autori
Prefazione, Maurizio Scassola
Introduzione, Laura Candiotto
Prima Parte: La comunicazione in medicina
“Cura e comunicazione”, Luigi Perissinotto
discussione a cura di Pietro Valenti
“La comunicazione responsabile”, Ivana Padoan
discussione a cura di Giovanni Leoni
“Comunicazione e verità. La cura dei mortali nell'età della tecnica”, Luigi Vero Tarca
discussione a cura di Sandro Panese
“Comporre armonie. La cura delle relazioni nelle pratiche filosofiche integrali”, Laura Candiotto
discussione a cura di Ornella Mancin
Seconda Parte: Pratiche filosofiche per la medicina
“La relazione nel dialogo. A partire da Socrate e Gregory Bateson”, Andrée Bella, Laura Candiotto
“La cura dei gesti e l’amore per le immagini. Pratiche e riflessioni intorno alla fisiologia delle relazioni nel quotidiano a partire da James Hillman, Pierre Hadot, Raimon Panikkar”, Bruna Marchetti, Tiziana Mattiazzi
“Il corpo e la cittadella interiore. Pratiche di ascolto e parola per la cura di sé e delle relazioni”, Mauro Semenzato
“Il corpo della relazione. A partire dallo zen, dal taoismo e dalla filosofia greca”, Massimiliano Cabella, Christian Doni, Stefano Sangiorgio
Biografie degli autori
Research Interests:
Primo saggio :La relazionalità del reale e soprattutto la relazionalità tra piano intelligibile e piano sensibile, seguendo il lessico platonico. La relazionalità tra questi due piani da un punto di vista di storia delle idee è la... more
Primo saggio :La relazionalità del reale e soprattutto la
relazionalità tra piano intelligibile e piano
sensibile, seguendo il lessico platonico.
La relazionalità tra questi due piani
da un punto di vista di storia delle idee è la
tematica del mio lavoro di tesi in filosofia,
di cui il saggio “L’esser sé dell’essente
come determinatezza in relazione” è il
frutto maturo dal punto di vista teoretico.
Secondo saggio: La relazionalità tra sviluppo di pensiero
critico ed espressività corporea è il tratto
innovativo in seno alla proposta di Lipman
che presento nel saggio “La Philosophy
for Children e il Teatro dell’Oppresso”.
Infatti in questo saggio propongo di
coniugare ad un’attività di stampo logicoargomentativo
un’attività di espressività
corporea su modello del Teatro
dell’Oppresso, assumendo, da un lato la
tesi stessa di Lipman che afferma la
complementarità del piano logico, emotivo
e della “cura”, dall’altro la convinzione
che la filosofia, anche nel suo senso più
teorico, debba essere esperienza.
relazionalità tra piano intelligibile e piano
sensibile, seguendo il lessico platonico.
La relazionalità tra questi due piani
da un punto di vista di storia delle idee è la
tematica del mio lavoro di tesi in filosofia,
di cui il saggio “L’esser sé dell’essente
come determinatezza in relazione” è il
frutto maturo dal punto di vista teoretico.
Secondo saggio: La relazionalità tra sviluppo di pensiero
critico ed espressività corporea è il tratto
innovativo in seno alla proposta di Lipman
che presento nel saggio “La Philosophy
for Children e il Teatro dell’Oppresso”.
Infatti in questo saggio propongo di
coniugare ad un’attività di stampo logicoargomentativo
un’attività di espressività
corporea su modello del Teatro
dell’Oppresso, assumendo, da un lato la
tesi stessa di Lipman che afferma la
complementarità del piano logico, emotivo
e della “cura”, dall’altro la convinzione
che la filosofia, anche nel suo senso più
teorico, debba essere esperienza.
Research Interests:
Il volume intende rilanciare la discussione in merito al cosiddetto “dualismo platonico”, vero luogo comune dell’interpretazione del pensiero di Platone e vero luogo del pensiero che interroga e mette in questione l'intera esperienza... more
Il volume intende rilanciare la discussione in merito al cosiddetto “dualismo platonico”, vero luogo comune dell’interpretazione del pensiero di Platone e vero luogo del pensiero che interroga e mette in questione l'intera esperienza della filosofia. Importanti specialisti del pensiero platonico e pensatori contemporanei esplorano nuovi percorsi nella filosofia di Platone che evidenziano, ognuno nella sua specificità, un modo nuovo per intendere la “dualità” , la partecipazione tra idee e sensibili, la relazione di anima e corpo e la finalità della conoscenza filosofica. È cioè di vitale importanza riuscire a pensare un oltrepassamento della concezione dualista che non si riduca a un monismo indifferenziato o a un immanentismo della presenza che nega ogni forma di trascendenza: lo sforzo è cioè quello di pensare la dualità senza dualismo.
Contributi di: Beatriz Bossi, Luc Brisson, Laura Candiotto, Giovanni Casertano, Francesco Fronterotta, Salvatore Lavecchia, Arnaud Macé, Maurizio Migliori, Olivier Renaut, Emanuele Severino, Luigi Vero Tarca, Anca Vasiliu, Mario Vegetti.
Contributi di: Beatriz Bossi, Luc Brisson, Laura Candiotto, Giovanni Casertano, Francesco Fronterotta, Salvatore Lavecchia, Arnaud Macé, Maurizio Migliori, Olivier Renaut, Emanuele Severino, Luigi Vero Tarca, Anca Vasiliu, Mario Vegetti.
Research Interests:
I contributi che compaiono in questo libro forniscono un aiuto alla migliore comprensione del rapporto tra la scelta professionale e la vocazione di fondo in campo medico. La prima sezione (Vocazione e professione) getta uno sguardo di... more
I contributi che compaiono in questo libro forniscono un aiuto alla migliore comprensione del rapporto tra la scelta professionale e la vocazione di fondo in campo medico. La prima sezione (Vocazione e professione) getta uno sguardo di carattere generale sulla vocazione riconducendola alle sue radici esistenziali e antropologiche, e il pensiero filosofico viene applicato ai fenomeni storici e istituzionali che investono oggi il mondo medico. La seconda sezione (Cura di sé e cura di noi) propone alcune possibili risposte filosofiche alla domanda circa come affrontare concretamente problemi così complessi. Il volume porta al centro dell’attenzione alcune testimonianze, narrate in prima persona dai medici, nelle quali vocazione e professione si intrecciano in maniera indissolubile. La vita reale è quindi il fil rouge che compone tra loro le diverse esperienze.
Research Interests:
Jacques Derrida first dwelled on a right to philosophy in his Du droit à la philosophie, 1990. Since that book, inside the philosophical practices movements, many things have changed: philosophy is not only a school discipline but it is... more
Jacques Derrida first dwelled on a right to philosophy in his Du droit à la philosophie, 1990. Since that book, inside the philosophical practices movements, many things have changed: philosophy is not only a school discipline but it is also a practice that is performed in many places, even unexpected, such as prisons, municipalities, hospitals, children gardens and primary schools and the idea of the existence of the right to philosophy has been growing up.
We usually ask for a right when we think it is denied without a reason. Is there anyone who denies this right? And what has now become the so “popular” and “hyper-specialized” philosophy? What would we expect the philosophy to be in the next years? How could philosophical dissemination reach a sharing elaboration of philosophizing? What are the risks and the benefits of this process?
Chapters in English, Italian, Spanish and Portoguese.
All the abstracts are in English.
We usually ask for a right when we think it is denied without a reason. Is there anyone who denies this right? And what has now become the so “popular” and “hyper-specialized” philosophy? What would we expect the philosophy to be in the next years? How could philosophical dissemination reach a sharing elaboration of philosophizing? What are the risks and the benefits of this process?
Chapters in English, Italian, Spanish and Portoguese.
All the abstracts are in English.
Research Interests:
Le emozioni e i sentimenti ci dicono molto di più delle parole. A volte sono anche in grado di dischiudere ciò che ci sta più a cuore, i valori attraverso cui diamo senso a ciò che ci accade. A volte possono ingannare, ma sempre esprimono... more
Le emozioni e i sentimenti ci dicono molto di più delle parole. A volte sono anche in grado di dischiudere ciò che ci sta più a cuore, i valori attraverso cui diamo senso a ciò che ci accade. A volte possono ingannare, ma sempre esprimono l’orizzonte di significato all’interno del quale il soggetto che sente, pensa e agisce costituisce la propria identità in relazione con il mondo. Questo volume interroga la dimensione conoscitiva svolta dalle emozioni in relazione all’etica, alla politica e alla teologia. Uno sguardo plurale (di studiosi diversi per formazione: Candiotto, De Monticelli, Tarca, Fortunato, Adinolfi) per orientare il lettore nella conoscenza affettiva e nei suoi valori.
Research Interests:
Siamo abituati a vedere intorno a noi oggetti, la cui esistenza sembra la cosa da dare più per assodata. Eppure, le nostre vite sono sempre più immerse in reti di interazioni: che cosa accadrebbe allora, se cominciassimo ad accorgerci che... more
Siamo abituati a vedere intorno a noi oggetti, la cui esistenza
sembra la cosa da dare più per assodata. Eppure,
le nostre vite sono sempre più immerse in reti di interazioni:
che cosa accadrebbe allora, se cominciassimo ad
accorgerci che siamo invece innanzitutto circondati da
relazioni e processi, prima che da cose e oggetti? È possibile
cominciare a guardare al mondo come se fosse
percorso da rapporti e trasformazioni?
Filosofia delle relazioni offre degli strumenti linguistici
e concettuali per comprendere la natura e il funzionamento
delle relazioni, elaborando una prospettiva in
grado tanto di tenere conto di alcune sollecitazioni provenienti
dalla scienza contemporanea, quanto di rendere
conto di alcuni aspetti che fanno parte della nostra
esperienza, anche se spesso in maniera inavvertita.
sembra la cosa da dare più per assodata. Eppure,
le nostre vite sono sempre più immerse in reti di interazioni:
che cosa accadrebbe allora, se cominciassimo ad
accorgerci che siamo invece innanzitutto circondati da
relazioni e processi, prima che da cose e oggetti? È possibile
cominciare a guardare al mondo come se fosse
percorso da rapporti e trasformazioni?
Filosofia delle relazioni offre degli strumenti linguistici
e concettuali per comprendere la natura e il funzionamento
delle relazioni, elaborando una prospettiva in
grado tanto di tenere conto di alcune sollecitazioni provenienti
dalla scienza contemporanea, quanto di rendere
conto di alcuni aspetti che fanno parte della nostra
esperienza, anche se spesso in maniera inavvertita.
Research Interests:
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Magazzino di filosofia. Quadrimestrale di informazione, bilancio ed esercizio della filosofia
n° 23, anno VIII, 2013/14 (B8): s e g m e n t i (peer review)
pp. 103-117.
n° 23, anno VIII, 2013/14 (B8): s e g m e n t i (peer review)
pp. 103-117.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
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Prefazione al volume di L. Cucciolotti, Manuale di alfabetizzazione emotiva. Una proposta per allenare il cuore, Edizioni il Ciliegio, Saronno (VA) 2015, pp. 9-13.
Research Interests:
Introduzione: in queste pagine viene descritto il piano dell'opera e le linee di ricerca che vengono percorse nel volume
Research Interests:
Laura Candiotto espone un modello di ontologia delle relazioni che permette di intendere il dualismo come dualità relazionale in una struttura di monismo differenziato, all'interno della quale la relazione è il nesso originario che... more
Laura Candiotto espone un modello di ontologia delle relazioni che permette di intendere il dualismo come dualità relazionale in una struttura di monismo differenziato, all'interno della quale la relazione è il nesso originario che costituisce l’identità di ogni ente. Tale struttura è la relazione originaria tra intelligibile e sensibile, grazie alla quale il sensibile si trasfigura in un kosmos articolato. Secondo Candiotto la trasfigurazione è la figura teoretica centrale per cogliere il rapporto tra sensibile e intelligibile nei termini di una partecipazione immanente che conduce a una trascendenza nei termini di nuova visione della realtà resa possibile dalla potenza delle relazioni che rendono la struttura stessa qualcosa di dinamico che vive del loro manifestarsi.
Research Interests:
L'articolo presenta un commento di un passo del Carmide (155e2-157c6), valorizzando quegli aspetti che sono significativi per le pratiche filosofiche contemporanee.
Research Interests:
La filosofia di Severino ha più volte evidenziato il nichilismo della prassi. La sua filosofia si pone quindi come una grande sfida per le pratiche filosofiche. É possibile pensare a delle pratiche di verità a partire dal pensiero di... more
La filosofia di Severino ha più volte evidenziato il nichilismo della prassi. La sua filosofia si pone quindi come una grande sfida per le pratiche filosofiche.
É possibile pensare a delle pratiche di verità a partire dal pensiero di Severino?
Gli autori propongono delle vie di risposta positiva a questa domanda proponendo delle pratiche capaci di porsi in ascolto dell'eternità dell'essere. Tali pratiche, pur non potendo essere esenti dalla contraddizione dell’agire, la trasformano in modo decisivo, per il modo in cui sono in relazione alla verità: esse rappresentano l’esercizio stesso del filosofare.
É possibile pensare a delle pratiche di verità a partire dal pensiero di Severino?
Gli autori propongono delle vie di risposta positiva a questa domanda proponendo delle pratiche capaci di porsi in ascolto dell'eternità dell'essere. Tali pratiche, pur non potendo essere esenti dalla contraddizione dell’agire, la trasformano in modo decisivo, per il modo in cui sono in relazione alla verità: esse rappresentano l’esercizio stesso del filosofare.
Research Interests:
Il racconto autobiografico di Platone nell'Epistola 7 si coniuga in questo capitolo a una indagine in merito alle modalità di conoscenza filosofica. Il contesto dialogico viene inteso come dimensione essenziale per la generazione della... more
Il racconto autobiografico di Platone nell'Epistola 7 si coniuga in questo capitolo a una indagine in merito alle modalità di conoscenza filosofica. Il contesto dialogico viene inteso come dimensione essenziale per la generazione della verità che si manifesta in ognuno grazie al confronto con l'altro e a una vita vissuta in comunità. Il capitolo presenta anche in dettaglio il metodo del dialogo socratico contemporaneo e propone delle significative innovazioni in seno al metodo del “dialogo socratico integrale”, così chiamato dall'autrice per evidenziare la compresenza della dimensione corporea, emotiva, mentale e spirituale in una modalità dialogica rinnovata.
Research Interests:
Nous and phren: intellectual knowledge, reasoning, and erotic wisdom in Socrates and Plato. The word nous, which is crucial for the epistemology of the Phaedo and the Republic, despite their evident differences, occurs rarely in the... more
Nous and phren: intellectual knowledge, reasoning, and erotic
wisdom in Socrates and Plato.
The word nous, which is crucial for the epistemology of the Phaedo and the Republic, despite their evident differences, occurs rarely in the Socratic dialogues and in the testimonies of the first generation of Socratics. My claim is that the study of the notion of nous is of great interest for understanding the difference between the epistemologies of Socrates and Plato, and, in
particular, that it is possible to catch their differences exactly throught the distinction between noein and phronein. If for Plato knowledge is intellectual, for Socrates it is practical; if the dialectics brings us to the vision of the ideas, the Socratic method of definitions brings us to aporia; if vision is crucial for the nous, listening and feeling are so for the phronesis.
After having clarified the use of the terminology of nous and phronesis in the tradition precedent and posterior to Socrates and Plato (ch. 1), I analyse the specificities of the two methods through the interpretations of some key passages belonging not only to Plato but also to Xenophon and Aristophanes. In chapter 2 I discuss the Socratic phronesis, underlying the cognitive valence of aporia as the “non-seeing” paths of escape in the elenchus (in contrast to
the Platonic paradigm of knowledge as vision) and emphasizing the notion of listening to the daimonion as practical reasoning. In ch. 3 I treat the Platonic nous in particular regarding its relations with the dianoia in the dialectic process and with eros. Eros allows the successful attainment of knowledge, overcoming the Socratic and aporetic outcome and attaining the notion of knowledge as the enlightening of vision. In the conclusion I claim that Socrates pursued a negative outcome in order to bring his interlocutors face to face with the aporia and, therefore, that is a purely Platonic goal to wish to resolve the Socratic impasse. The novelty of Platonic epistemology lies exactly in the invention of the intellectual object – the ideas – that realizes from an ontological point of view
the Socratic notion of universal, and giving to the nous the central role in the epistemology, since it is the capacity to grasp these objects. Platonic epistrophe is a katharsis of the “second level” which wishes to resolve positively the Socratic purification of errors, as being that of the “first level”. The necessity of negation, “not seeing” and silence that belongs to the Socratic method acquires in Plato the character of a positive generation of knowledge through the overabundance of the nous.
Despite these important differences that should be underlined to grasp the specificities of the Socratic and Platonic methods, the role of eros in the acquisition of knowledge highlights a line of continuity between the two and, therefore, between phronesis and nous. Noetic contemplation represents, therefore, the Platonic passion for knowledge and his faith in its
practical efficacy, exactly as does the Socratic erotic wisdom.
wisdom in Socrates and Plato.
The word nous, which is crucial for the epistemology of the Phaedo and the Republic, despite their evident differences, occurs rarely in the Socratic dialogues and in the testimonies of the first generation of Socratics. My claim is that the study of the notion of nous is of great interest for understanding the difference between the epistemologies of Socrates and Plato, and, in
particular, that it is possible to catch their differences exactly throught the distinction between noein and phronein. If for Plato knowledge is intellectual, for Socrates it is practical; if the dialectics brings us to the vision of the ideas, the Socratic method of definitions brings us to aporia; if vision is crucial for the nous, listening and feeling are so for the phronesis.
After having clarified the use of the terminology of nous and phronesis in the tradition precedent and posterior to Socrates and Plato (ch. 1), I analyse the specificities of the two methods through the interpretations of some key passages belonging not only to Plato but also to Xenophon and Aristophanes. In chapter 2 I discuss the Socratic phronesis, underlying the cognitive valence of aporia as the “non-seeing” paths of escape in the elenchus (in contrast to
the Platonic paradigm of knowledge as vision) and emphasizing the notion of listening to the daimonion as practical reasoning. In ch. 3 I treat the Platonic nous in particular regarding its relations with the dianoia in the dialectic process and with eros. Eros allows the successful attainment of knowledge, overcoming the Socratic and aporetic outcome and attaining the notion of knowledge as the enlightening of vision. In the conclusion I claim that Socrates pursued a negative outcome in order to bring his interlocutors face to face with the aporia and, therefore, that is a purely Platonic goal to wish to resolve the Socratic impasse. The novelty of Platonic epistemology lies exactly in the invention of the intellectual object – the ideas – that realizes from an ontological point of view
the Socratic notion of universal, and giving to the nous the central role in the epistemology, since it is the capacity to grasp these objects. Platonic epistrophe is a katharsis of the “second level” which wishes to resolve positively the Socratic purification of errors, as being that of the “first level”. The necessity of negation, “not seeing” and silence that belongs to the Socratic method acquires in Plato the character of a positive generation of knowledge through the overabundance of the nous.
Despite these important differences that should be underlined to grasp the specificities of the Socratic and Platonic methods, the role of eros in the acquisition of knowledge highlights a line of continuity between the two and, therefore, between phronesis and nous. Noetic contemplation represents, therefore, the Platonic passion for knowledge and his faith in its
practical efficacy, exactly as does the Socratic erotic wisdom.
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I argue that two types of physical law emerging in the exchange that Plato carries out with Heraclitus. (1) A law which is immanent to the elements themselves, but unstable and prone to destruction; (2) A transcendent law which functions... more
I argue that two types of physical law emerging in the exchange that Plato carries out with Heraclitus. (1) A law which is immanent to the elements themselves, but unstable and prone to destruction; (2) A transcendent law which functions as orientation for divine and human actions. The transcendent law is configured, in turn, in two modalities: (2.1) a law of invisible harmony that must be followed; (2.2) a positive law that must be imposed due to the instability of the elements which are unable to maintain a given form.
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The notion of “trace” appears in Severino’s works starting from La Gloria (2001), it assumes a central meaning in Oltrepassare (2007) and it is further elaborated in La morte e la terra (2011). It represents thus a relatively new concept... more
The notion of “trace” appears in Severino’s works starting from La Gloria
(2001), it assumes a central meaning in Oltrepassare (2007) and it is further elaborated in La morte e la terra (2011). It represents thus a relatively new concept connected with the testimony of Severino’s philosophy. However, already in La struttura originaria and then in Tautótēs it is possible to individuate concepts connected to this notion, such as the necessary relation among the parts and between the parts and the whole. These concepts contribute to the constitution of a specific approach, which might be defined
as “severinian holism”. Analyzing how the notion of trace outlines a relation that is established by means of negation, it will be possible to propose some traits of an ontology of relations based on the notions of what I call “transparent relation”, “transfiguration of the negation” and “integral relation”.
(2001), it assumes a central meaning in Oltrepassare (2007) and it is further elaborated in La morte e la terra (2011). It represents thus a relatively new concept connected with the testimony of Severino’s philosophy. However, already in La struttura originaria and then in Tautótēs it is possible to individuate concepts connected to this notion, such as the necessary relation among the parts and between the parts and the whole. These concepts contribute to the constitution of a specific approach, which might be defined
as “severinian holism”. Analyzing how the notion of trace outlines a relation that is established by means of negation, it will be possible to propose some traits of an ontology of relations based on the notions of what I call “transparent relation”, “transfiguration of the negation” and “integral relation”.
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In questo contributo sostengo la tesi secondo la quale la vocazione per la professione medica si costituisce come una pratica di costante ascolto al richiamo della sofferenza in vista della costituzione di spazi per la cura. Tale ascolto... more
In questo contributo sostengo la tesi secondo la quale la vocazione per la professione medica si costituisce come una pratica di costante ascolto al richiamo della sofferenza in vista della costituzione di spazi per la cura. Tale ascolto acquisisce senso all’interno di un’etica della cura appassionata che sappia riconoscere alla vulnerabilità un valore centrale per la trasformazione. Nel primo paragrafo espongo dunque alcuni tratti di un’etica della cura appassionata per la professione medica; nel secondo analizzo il rapporto fra persona e ruoli nello svolgimento della professione, enfatizzando come sia ancora possibile raggiungere un certo livello di autenticità, senza per questo produrre un dualismo tra una presupposta essenza vera di sé e maschera sociale; nel terzo descrivo la vocazione vulnerabile come quel tipo particolare di ascolto della sofferenza che dovrebbe, a mio parere, essere sostenuto; in conclusione introduco una pratica di ascolto del desiderio che ha per obiettivo quello di prendersi cura della vocazione del medico.
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Platone prima e Heidegger poi hanno portato alla luce un significato di negazione altro rispetto a quello della esclusione-incompatibilità. In questo articolo interpreto i loro risultati secondo la figura della trasfigurazione la quale, a... more
Platone prima e Heidegger poi hanno portato alla luce un significato di negazione altro rispetto a quello della esclusione-incompatibilità. In questo articolo interpreto i loro risultati secondo la figura della trasfigurazione la quale, a mio avviso, permette di cogliere che nella negazione stessa come esclusione si manifesti qualcosa di più originario, ovvero la negazione come relazione. L’altro dall’esclusione non è cioè qualcosa di esterno a essa ma è ciò che essa già contiene. Di più, è ciò che essa, come vedremo fra poco, elencticamente dimostra. In riferimento a questo, la nozione hegeliana di negazione assumerà un significato centrale. Hegel infatti dimostra la positività del negativo che emerge nel processo dialettico, ovvero grazie al motore della contraddizione che ha al suo interno proprio la negazione.
Uno degli obiettivi di questo articolo è quindi quello di evidenziare le strutture attraverso le quali la negazione si manifesta come relazione dimostrando come per Hegel e Heidegger la temporalità sia il carattere proprio dell’apparire trasfigurante. In tal senso, una iniziale dicotomia tra i due autori basata sui concetti di immediatezza e mediazione, acquisisce un senso nuovo.
Uno degli obiettivi di questo articolo è quindi quello di evidenziare le strutture attraverso le quali la negazione si manifesta come relazione dimostrando come per Hegel e Heidegger la temporalità sia il carattere proprio dell’apparire trasfigurante. In tal senso, una iniziale dicotomia tra i due autori basata sui concetti di immediatezza e mediazione, acquisisce un senso nuovo.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Ontology, Plato, Hegel, and 5 moreMartin Heidegger, Negation, Ontologia, Metafisica, and Filosofia
Laura Candiotto, nel capitolo V “Il dualismo strutturale e la naturacultura della violenza contro le donne. Una lettura fi losofi ca del preambolo alla Convenzione di Istanbul”, identifica nel dualismo il fondamento della violenza... more
Laura Candiotto, nel capitolo V “Il dualismo strutturale e la naturacultura
della violenza contro le donne. Una lettura fi losofi ca del preambolo
alla Convenzione di Istanbul”, identifica nel dualismo il fondamento della
violenza strutturale nei confronti delle donne. Il dualismo infatti si trasforma inevitabilmente nella vittoria sistemica e strutturale di un genere sull’altro e differisce dalla dualità che è invece garante dell’elemento vitale della differenza sessuale. Esplicitando il meccanismo secondo il quale viene reso “naturale” ciò che invece è “culturale”, Candiotto descrive, nelle loro caratteristiche principali, le dinamiche che conducono dall’iperseparazione all’inglobamento come violenza simbolica. Questo capitolo fornisce inoltre
un’accurata analisi linguistica e filosofica del preambolo alla Convenzione, portando in evidenza alcuni limiti. In particolare, Candiotto sottolinea come nella traduzione italiana le parole “equality” ed “égalité” siano state tradotte a volte come “uguaglianza” e a volte come “parità”, creando pericolosi slittamenti semantici verso l’espressione “uguaglianza di genere”. Il carattere performativo del linguaggio, infatti, rischia in questo modo di mediare una modello di prevenzione della violenza nei confronti delle donne incapace di ottemperare ai principi sanciti dalla “gender equality”.
Il capitolo si conclude enucleando alcune prospettive, specialmente in
merito agli impegni assunti dagli Stati parte, ed evidenziando come questi richiedano una chiara presa di posizione nei confronti di una trasformazione della cultura-struttura.
della violenza contro le donne. Una lettura fi losofi ca del preambolo
alla Convenzione di Istanbul”, identifica nel dualismo il fondamento della
violenza strutturale nei confronti delle donne. Il dualismo infatti si trasforma inevitabilmente nella vittoria sistemica e strutturale di un genere sull’altro e differisce dalla dualità che è invece garante dell’elemento vitale della differenza sessuale. Esplicitando il meccanismo secondo il quale viene reso “naturale” ciò che invece è “culturale”, Candiotto descrive, nelle loro caratteristiche principali, le dinamiche che conducono dall’iperseparazione all’inglobamento come violenza simbolica. Questo capitolo fornisce inoltre
un’accurata analisi linguistica e filosofica del preambolo alla Convenzione, portando in evidenza alcuni limiti. In particolare, Candiotto sottolinea come nella traduzione italiana le parole “equality” ed “égalité” siano state tradotte a volte come “uguaglianza” e a volte come “parità”, creando pericolosi slittamenti semantici verso l’espressione “uguaglianza di genere”. Il carattere performativo del linguaggio, infatti, rischia in questo modo di mediare una modello di prevenzione della violenza nei confronti delle donne incapace di ottemperare ai principi sanciti dalla “gender equality”.
Il capitolo si conclude enucleando alcune prospettive, specialmente in
merito agli impegni assunti dagli Stati parte, ed evidenziando come questi richiedano una chiara presa di posizione nei confronti di una trasformazione della cultura-struttura.
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Il dualismo è quel paradigma attraverso il quale si istituisce un’opposizione isolante che legittima come originaria una violenza culturale dell’uomo sulla natura. In questo senso una visione dualistica che contrappone uomo e natura è... more
Il dualismo è quel paradigma attraverso il quale si istituisce un’opposizione
isolante che legittima come originaria una violenza culturale dell’uomo
sulla natura. In questo senso una visione dualistica che contrappone
uomo e natura è alla base di ogni forma di dominio e, per quanto riguarda
il nostro tema, dello sfruttamento strutturale degli animali. In questo articolo,
dopo aver denunciato il dualismo come radice della tortura sugli animali,
intendo dimostrare, attraverso alcuni fondamentali riferimenti all’ecofemminismo
e all’ecologia profonda, il valore intrinseco dell’animale, al di
là delle sue caratterizzazioni come essere senziente, dotato di intenzionalità,
che prova coscientemente dolore. Tale riconoscimento permetterà di
prospettare una visione relazionale in grado di elaborare forme di relazione
tra animali umani e non umani, al di là di modelli antropocentrici e di
dominio gerarchizzante. Nel primo e nel secondo paragrafo tratterò quindi
la nozione di dualismo e di violenza strutturale, nel terzo il valore intrinseco
e il riconoscimento di principio dell’animale e nel quarto prospetterò alcuni
tratti del paradigma della differenza e di un’etica della relazione tra gli
animali umani e non umani.
isolante che legittima come originaria una violenza culturale dell’uomo
sulla natura. In questo senso una visione dualistica che contrappone
uomo e natura è alla base di ogni forma di dominio e, per quanto riguarda
il nostro tema, dello sfruttamento strutturale degli animali. In questo articolo,
dopo aver denunciato il dualismo come radice della tortura sugli animali,
intendo dimostrare, attraverso alcuni fondamentali riferimenti all’ecofemminismo
e all’ecologia profonda, il valore intrinseco dell’animale, al di
là delle sue caratterizzazioni come essere senziente, dotato di intenzionalità,
che prova coscientemente dolore. Tale riconoscimento permetterà di
prospettare una visione relazionale in grado di elaborare forme di relazione
tra animali umani e non umani, al di là di modelli antropocentrici e di
dominio gerarchizzante. Nel primo e nel secondo paragrafo tratterò quindi
la nozione di dualismo e di violenza strutturale, nel terzo il valore intrinseco
e il riconoscimento di principio dell’animale e nel quarto prospetterò alcuni
tratti del paradigma della differenza e di un’etica della relazione tra gli
animali umani e non umani.
Research Interests:
What Plato is complaining about Homer and poetry in the Republic is the same as what, in the Ion, Ion presents himself to be excellent in – namely to affect the audience emotionally through poetic performances. Ion’s excellence reveals... more
What Plato is complaining about Homer and poetry in the Republic is the same as what, in the Ion, Ion presents himself to be excellent in – namely to affect the audience emotionally through poetic performances. Ion’s excellence reveals itself to be without any knowledge: it is not a techne, but derives from divine inspiration. Plato’s criticism towards
poetry is directed to the lack of rational ground of Ion’s professional ability, depicting rhapsody and poetry as irrational, and denying Homer any kind of authority regarding citizens’ education.
In this essay, I highlight the criticism moved by Plato against rhapsody within a contrastive interpretation of Socrates and Ion on performance, which aims to unpack the practical motive of Plato’s writing, i.e. to establish a new cultural philosophical leadership for Athens. Since
Socrates has built his method of inquiry within the public dimension of oral performance too, I argue that Plato would not criticize rhapsody and poetry in conservative manners, but, on the contrary, using the power of the persuasive language for his benefits. Therefore, he provides it a
new meaning in the achievement of the epistemic goods, creating the new model of philosophical writing. Doing so, Plato presents himself as the new Homer, and philosophy as the only method that is able to assure knowledge.
Keywords: Ion, philosophy and poetry, emotions, techne and knowledge, Socrates.
poetry is directed to the lack of rational ground of Ion’s professional ability, depicting rhapsody and poetry as irrational, and denying Homer any kind of authority regarding citizens’ education.
In this essay, I highlight the criticism moved by Plato against rhapsody within a contrastive interpretation of Socrates and Ion on performance, which aims to unpack the practical motive of Plato’s writing, i.e. to establish a new cultural philosophical leadership for Athens. Since
Socrates has built his method of inquiry within the public dimension of oral performance too, I argue that Plato would not criticize rhapsody and poetry in conservative manners, but, on the contrary, using the power of the persuasive language for his benefits. Therefore, he provides it a
new meaning in the achievement of the epistemic goods, creating the new model of philosophical writing. Doing so, Plato presents himself as the new Homer, and philosophy as the only method that is able to assure knowledge.
Keywords: Ion, philosophy and poetry, emotions, techne and knowledge, Socrates.
Research Interests:
Dans cet article, je montre que la compréhension du rôle de l'affectivité dans des pratiques dialogiques est cruciale pour comprendre en quoi la connaissance peut être, dans certaines circonstances, socialement étendue. En m'appuyant sur... more
Dans cet article, je montre que la compréhension du rôle de l'affectivité dans des pratiques dialogiques est cruciale pour comprendre en quoi la connaissance peut être, dans certaines circonstances, socialement étendue. En m'appuyant sur l'exploration du terrain affectif de la relation coopérative, je présente une nouvelle conception de l'esprit dialogiquement étendu. Je discute ici le rôle de l'affectivité dans l'établissement de liens coopératifs entre les locuteurs dans la recherche dialogique. Autrement dit, l'extension se réalise à travers des interactions à la faveur d'un contexte de recherche communautaire. Dans un groupe de recherche dialogique, les interactions dialogiques deviennent donc des vecteurs de l'extension. Cela me permettra de faire valoir que l'affectivité et les émotions, à tout le moins certaines d'entre elles, ont une fonction épistémique importante dans l'acquisition des connaissances de groupe, c'est-à-dire dans le fait d'établir des relations de confiance mutuelle dans l'échange d'informations et le partage des connaissances distribuées entre les interlocuteurs.
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This article proposes an analysis of the use of emotions, in particular shame, characterizing the elenctic method performed by Socrates in the dialogue with Callicles in the third part of Plato’s Gorgias. The elenchus aims at improving... more
This article proposes an analysis of the use of emotions, in particular shame, characterizing the elenctic method performed by Socrates in the dialogue with Callicles in the third part of Plato’s Gorgias. The elenchus aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of purification that is capable of changing his whole existence. However, Plato’s dialogues only rarely give testimony of a successful transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor’s attitude towards shame : the feeling of shame can be accepted as a means for self‑transformation or hidden to protect a social status. The article will explore the way in which this fundamental difference is delineated within the dialogue by providing appropriate textual examples. Arguably, by outlining the distinction between the types of shame, it is possible to notice how the purification of the interlocutor implies a turning point for the public. This is what I call „outreach elenchus”, a specific hermeneutic figure that allows understanding a form of purification of the audience and the spectators witnessing the debate. This type of elenchus steps in at the very moment in which the Socratic interlocutor attempts to protect his social image, concealing his shame. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished.
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Recensione di Francesca Simeoni in Universa. Recensioni di filosofia – Anno 5, Vol. 1 (2016)
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Recensione del volume: L. Candiotto (a cura di). 2015. Senza dualismo. Nuovi percorsi nella filosofia di Platone. Mimesis: Milano.
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Luca Moretti edited the November issue of The Reasoner (11/2016) dedicated to the Eidyn Centre of the University of Edinburgh. Interviews to Duncand Pritchard, Michela Massimi, Jesper Kallestrup, Laura Candiotto, Matthew Chrisman, Adam... more
Luca Moretti edited the November issue of The Reasoner (11/2016) dedicated to the Eidyn Centre of the University of Edinburgh. Interviews to Duncand Pritchard, Michela Massimi, Jesper Kallestrup, Laura Candiotto, Matthew Chrisman, Adam Carter, Mark Sprevak, James Collin
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This exchange was prepared for the Portuguese translation of "Le dialogue socratique" (Paris 2011). Its Portuguese version is to be found on pages 271-296 of "O diálogo socratico", Paulus Editore, São Paulo BR, 2015, while the original... more
This exchange was prepared for the Portuguese translation of "Le dialogue socratique" (Paris 2011). Its Portuguese version is to be found on pages 271-296 of "O diálogo socratico", Paulus Editore, São Paulo BR, 2015, while the original Italian version is now available in the journal "Quaderni Urbinati di Cultira Classica", n.s. 109.
It is devoted to current investigations on the topic.
It is devoted to current investigations on the topic.
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Immagine realizzata con un gruppo di insegnanti all'interno del laboratorio di pratiche filosofiche "A scuola (non) si parla" (Borgia, aprile 2015) e presentata per un forum a un pubblico di circa 100 insegnanti.
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The conversation with Peter Worley offers a useful insight into how "The Philosophy Foundation" differs from other methods of doing philosophy with children.
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Emotions have become an important topic of research in Classics, joining historical, anthropological, literary, and philosophical approaches. Specific works on emotions within the ancient philosophical corpus are however unevenly... more
Emotions have become an important topic of research in Classics, joining historical, anthropological, literary, and philosophical approaches. Specific works on emotions within the ancient philosophical corpus are however unevenly distributed, and studies on the nature and functions of emotions in Plato are still only few. A joint workshop led by Laura Candiotto (University of Edinburgh, Eidyn Centre) and Olivier Renaut (Paris-Nanterre University, IREPH) is organized with the aim to bridge this gap, exploring the different available approaches on emotions within the Platonic corpus.
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International two days Workshop. University of Edinburgh, Eidyn Research Centre, 25th-26th May 2017
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Estratto
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Il programma dettagliato con i nomi dei relatori e i titoli degli interventi, gli orari, le sedi e tutte le info logistiche
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As shown in the attachment, a conference on IL DIRITTO ALLA FILOSOFIA in expected to take place in Venezia, Università Ca' Foscari, in October 2015. Deadline for the cfp: May 30, 2015; recipient: Laura Candiotto. The Univ. of Venezia and... more
As shown in the attachment, a conference on IL DIRITTO ALLA FILOSOFIA in expected to take place in Venezia, Università Ca' Foscari, in October 2015. Deadline for the cfp: May 30, 2015; recipient: Laura Candiotto.
The Univ. of Venezia and the Associazione AMICA SOFIA are serving as primary (but not unique) convenors and organizers.
Previous exchanges on this topic are available in http://www.amicasofia.it/forums/forum/dibattito/
The Univ. of Venezia and the Associazione AMICA SOFIA are serving as primary (but not unique) convenors and organizers.
Previous exchanges on this topic are available in http://www.amicasofia.it/forums/forum/dibattito/
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Translation to Portuguese of the interview to Livio Rossetti by Laura Candiotto.
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Underlying the possibility of a novel conception of shame, as well as the specificity of such a conception in comparison with its ancient counterpart, this paper aims at proposing a way to understand and practice a Socratic oriented... more
Underlying the possibility of a novel conception of shame, as well as the specificity of such a conception in comparison with its ancient counterpart, this paper aims at proposing a way to understand and practice a Socratic oriented philosophy that could both valorise the essence of the ancient method - by dispensing with its anachronistic aspects - and complement it - by adding insights concerning the relation between emotions and knowledge which have been elaborated in the course of our intellectual history.
The result of this strategy will be a practice characterized by the recognition of our own limits, of our powerlessness. The powerful force of shame enables the emergence of powerlessness as one main meaning of our shared dialogical experience. How is this possible? Which are the consequences of this process?
The result of this strategy will be a practice characterized by the recognition of our own limits, of our powerlessness. The powerful force of shame enables the emergence of powerlessness as one main meaning of our shared dialogical experience. How is this possible? Which are the consequences of this process?
Research Interests: Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Shame Theory, Philosophy of the Emotions, Socratic Method, and 9 moreSocrates, Affect/Emotion, Filosofía, Filosofía de la educación, educación matemática, didáctica de la escritura e integración de las TIC a la enseñanza., Emociones, Socratic dialogue, Filosofía De Las Emociones, Vergüenza, and Filosofía Feminista
We are pleased to invite you to submit your papers to the special issue of Aurora. Journal of Philosophy (a brasilian Open Access DOAJ and Peer Reviewed Journal, indexed in Scopus and Web of Science), dedicated to the philosophy of... more
We are pleased to invite you to submit your papers to the special issue of Aurora. Journal of Philosophy (a brasilian Open Access DOAJ and Peer Reviewed Journal, indexed in Scopus and Web of Science), dedicated to the philosophy of emotions. Call for papers (deadline 20/08/2019) https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/about/editorialTeam Description: Philosophy of emotions is a prominent field of contemporary research. The study of feelings, emotions, moods, and sentiments is detectable throughout the history of Western philosophy, from Aristotle to Descartes, from Hume to Kant. Then, it has acquired prominence within the phenomenological and existentialist traditions, disclosing its valence as one of the key tools for the understanding of human existence. Emotions have been studied by other disciplines too, and a very multidisciplinary approach is now detectable in the field, especially in relation to the developments of cognitive science. The aim of this special issue of the Journal Aurora (a Brasilian Open Access Journal, indexed in Scopus and Web of Science) is to discuss the new approaches in the field of philosophy of emotions, regarding both the taxonomy of emotions and their role in specific fields of inquiry (as epistemology, ethics, politics, aesthetics, religious studies, etc). Different traditions of thoughts and methodologies are welcomed, and a special interest will be given to those papers that will introduce new lines of investigation.
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This chapter reconstructs the classical pragmatists’ position on human emotions, by assuming an original inquiring approach. It considers James’s, Dewey’s and Mead’s conceptions as contributions to an open theoretical laboratory in which... more
This chapter reconstructs the classical pragmatists’ position on human emotions, by assuming an original inquiring approach. It considers James’s, Dewey’s and Mead’s conceptions as contributions to an open theoretical laboratory in which the suggestions and unresolved difficulties presented by James were first discussed and developed by Dewey and then, immediately afterward, reconsidered and further articulated by Mead. At the same time, the paper develops a constant comparison with current contributions on this subject, coming from the most advanced trends in so-called “4E cognition” studies. The chapter highlights some of the most relevant theses derived from the pragmatist debate, such as the continuity between bodily and mental aspects, as well as emotion and cognition, sensitiveness and appraisal. It shows the possibility of articulating this discourse by distinguishing between emotions and the pervasive aesthetic, qualitative and affective aspects of our experience. Furthermore, it focuses on the social dimension of emotions conceived as basic forms of gestural communication. Many interesting convergences are emphasized that derive from the abovementioned comparison, while Mead’s insight into a primary social configuration of emotions is presented in its enduring relevance for current inquiries in affective neurosciences.
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In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests... more
In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests understanding affective scaffoldings in a novel and broader sense by re-orienting the debate from objects to interactions. We claim that habits play a positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, allowing us to avoid any residue of dualism between internalist and externalist conceptions of affectivity. We provide pragmatist tools for understanding the environment's role in shaping our feelings, emotions, moods, and affective behaviors. However, we contend that in addition to environment, the continuous and recursive affective transaction between agent and environment (both natural and cultural) are also crucially involved. We claim that habits are transformative, which is especially evident when we consider that emotions are often the r...
Research Interests:
In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests... more
In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests understanding affective scaffoldings in a novel and broader sense by re-orienting the debate from objects to interactions. We claim that habits play a positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, allowing us to avoid any residue of dualism between internalist and externalist conceptions of affectivity. We provide pragmatist tools for understanding the environment's role in shaping our feelings, emotions, moods, and affective behaviors. However, we contend that in addition to environment, the continuous and recursive affective transaction between agent and environment (both natural and cultural) are also crucially involved. We claim that habits are transformative, which is especially evident when we consider that emotions are often the r...
Research Interests: Psychology, Philosophy, Pragmatism, Philosophy of the Emotions, John Dewey, and 14 morePhilosophy of Emotion, Pragmatism (Philosophy), Medicine, Enactivism, Emotions, Externalism, Habits, Affectivity and the Emotions, Feeling, Sensibility, Conceptualization, Internalism and Externalism, Frontiers in Psychology, and Situated Affectivity
The purpose of this article is to compare contemporary preambles, especially those to multilateral treaties, with the preambles theorized by Plato in the Laws. Our thesis is that preambles actually “persuade” states to implement treaty... more
The purpose of this article is to compare contemporary preambles, especially those to multilateral treaties, with the preambles theorized by Plato in the Laws. Our thesis is that preambles actually “persuade” states to implement treaty provisions and to justify the adoption of international legal instruments to their people, precisely as was argued by Plato in the Laws. In order to demonstrate this thesis, we will describe the main characteristics of Plato’s preambles and will provide textual evidence so as to point out their significance for an understanding of contemporary preambles. The article stresses the persuasive force that moral emotions may have if introduced in contemporary preambles. Keywords: Preambles, Plato, International Law, Persuasion, Rhetoric.
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In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic re-shaping and maintenance... more
In this paper we suggest an understanding of the self within the conceptual framework of situated affectivity, proposing the notion of an affectively extended self and arguing that the construction, diachronic re-shaping and maintenance of the self is mediated first by affective interactions. We initially consider the different variations on the conception of the extended self that have been already proposed in the literature (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Heersmink 2017, 2018; Krueger 2018; Wilson, Lenart 2015). We then propose our alternative, contextualising it within the current debate on situated affectivity. While the idea that we exploit the external environment in order to manage our affective life is now rather widespread among philosophers (e.g. Colombetti & Krueger 2015, Piredda 2019), its potential consequences for and connections with the debate on the self remain underexplored. Drawing on James’ intuition of the “material self”, which clearly connects the self and the emotion...
Research Interests: Psychology, Emotion, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and 15 morePragmatism, Situated Cognition, Intuition, Extended Mind, Philosophy of Emotion, Enactivism, Self, Filosofía, DDC, Affective turn, Situated, Extended Self, The Narrative Construction of the Self, Filosofia, and Situated Affectivity
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Art
In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands... more
In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation.
Research Interests: Sociology, Philosophy, Ethics, Epistemology, Feminist Theory, and 14 moreEmbodied Cognition, Political Science, Phenomenology, Philosophy of the Emotions, Luce Irigaray, Love, Dialectic, Phenomenology of the Body (Philosophy), Enactivism, Existentialism, Sense Making, Embodied and Enactive Cognition, Participatory Sense Making, and The Ethics
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Humanities, Art, Plato, Aristotle, and 6 moreSocrates, Plato and Platonism, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Chora, Chôra, and Askesis
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Research Interests: Ancient History, Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Psychology, and 13 moreClassical Archaeology, Comparative Literature, Classics, Cognitive Narratology, Narratology, Cognitive Linguistics, Classical philology, Narrative Theory, Culture and Cognition, Ancient Greek and Roman Theatre, Classical Philology, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetics, and Routledge
The Socratic elenchus is a procedure which tests out the consistency of the interlocutors’ beliefs. To this end, it is necessary to carry out, alongside the renowned Socratic strategies (questioning, examples, definitions, etc.), also an... more
The Socratic elenchus is a procedure which tests out the consistency of the interlocutors’ beliefs. To this end, it is necessary to carry out, alongside the renowned Socratic strategies (questioning, examples, definitions, etc.), also an emotional process acting inside reasoning and where shame has a leading role. The aporetic state is a good example of the collaboration of emotions and reasoning, growing from the shameful recognition of contradictions. It is a cognitive and emotional acknowledgement of errors that pushes the subject to transform his/her behaviour. The use of emotions is not merely a rhetorical strategy for argumentation; emotions are the elements that embody knowledge into a practice capable of transforming life into a good life thereby determining the rational way of living for flourishing. The recognition of mistakes does not happen just “in the head” but is “extended” in the public environment that permits the generation of shame. This is the case, not only beca...
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Aurora Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy of Emotions
Philosophy of Emotions
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This chapter reconstructs the classical pragmatists' position on human emotions, by assuming an original inquiring approach. It considers James's, Dewey's and Mead's conceptions as contributions to an open theoretical laboratory in which... more
This chapter reconstructs the classical pragmatists' position on human emotions, by assuming an original inquiring approach. It considers James's, Dewey's and Mead's conceptions as contributions to an open theoretical laboratory in which the suggestions and unresolved difficulties presented by James were first discussed and developed by Dewey and then, immediately afterward, reconsidered and further articulated by Mead. At the same time, the paper develops a constant comparison with current contributions on this subject, coming from the most advanced trends in so-called "4E cognition" studies. The chapter highlights some of the most relevant theses derived from the pragmatist debate, such as the continuity between bodily and mental aspects, as well as emotion and cognition, sensitiveness and appraisal. It shows the possibility of articulating this discourse by distinguishing between emotions and the pervasive aesthetic, qualitative and affective aspects of our experience. Furthermore, it focuses on the social dimension of emotions conceived as basic forms of gestural communication. Many interesting convergences are emphasized that derive from the abovementioned comparison, while Mead's insight into a primary social configuration of emotions is presented in its enduring relevance for current inquiries in affective neurosciences.
Research Interests:
Philosophy of Emotions
Research Interests: Emotion, Philosophy of Mind, Design and Emotion, Emotional intelligence, Sociology of Emotion, and 11 moreHistory Of Emotions, Philosophy of the Emotions, Emotions (Social Psychology), Anthropology of emotions, Social emotions, Moral emotions, Cognition and Emotion, Emotions, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Philosophy of mind: emotions, rationality., and Emotions and memory: study of flashbulb memories at an individual and a collective level
WORKSHOP NOW ONLINE THROUGHOUT MARCH 2021 Online event, Freie Universität Berlin, March 4, 11, 18 & 25, 2021 Are emotions vehicles of knowledge, and if yes, in virtue of which features? What is the role of emotions in social epistemic... more
WORKSHOP NOW ONLINE THROUGHOUT MARCH 2021
Online event, Freie Universität Berlin, March 4, 11, 18 & 25, 2021
Are emotions vehicles of knowledge, and if yes, in virtue of which features? What is the role of emotions in social epistemic practices? What is the impact of local affective arrangements on epistemic communities?
In this workshop we will discuss the epistemic value of emotions at the intersection of philosophy of emotion and social epistemology. The aim is to foster an understanding of the role played by emotions in epistemic life. Different philosophical approaches and methodologies are brought into critical conversation.
Online event, Freie Universität Berlin, March 4, 11, 18 & 25, 2021
Are emotions vehicles of knowledge, and if yes, in virtue of which features? What is the role of emotions in social epistemic practices? What is the impact of local affective arrangements on epistemic communities?
In this workshop we will discuss the epistemic value of emotions at the intersection of philosophy of emotion and social epistemology. The aim is to foster an understanding of the role played by emotions in epistemic life. Different philosophical approaches and methodologies are brought into critical conversation.
Research Interests:
Few other semantic fields pervade Plato’s oeuvre, from the earliest to the latest works, in such a definitive and ambivalent way as that of mimesis. From the philosophy of language to aesthetics and moral psychology, from metaphysics to... more
Few other semantic fields pervade Plato’s oeuvre, from the earliest to the latest works, in such a definitive and ambivalent way as that of mimesis. From the philosophy of language to aesthetics and moral psychology, from metaphysics to cosmology and theology: in a strikingly large array of philosophical subject areas, the semantics of mimesis have crucial significance in Plato. The conference volume “Platonic Mimesis Revisited” offers a comprehensive and context-sensitive re-examination of mimesis in all relevant dialogues. Unlike earlier monographic studies, it brings together a considerable variety of scholarly perspectives from Philosophy and Classics, thus providing a broad tableau of modern approaches to the topic.
Reviewed by Lloyd Gerson in BMCR 2022.06.09: "As Pfefferkorn and Spinelli note in their introduction, a central aim of this collection is to broaden the study of imitation in Plato beyond aesthetic questions. Indeed, one way that this book succeeds, in my view, is by showing how even aesthetic questions, including those relating to music, painting, theatre, and dance, for example, cannot be effectively addressed in regard to Plato without reference to the widest possible metaphysical context. [...] All of the essays [...] taken together, bring into focus a concept, that of mimesis, that one might have supposed is not as central as it in fact is in the dialogues."
https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2022/2022.06.09/
Reviewed by Lloyd Gerson in BMCR 2022.06.09: "As Pfefferkorn and Spinelli note in their introduction, a central aim of this collection is to broaden the study of imitation in Plato beyond aesthetic questions. Indeed, one way that this book succeeds, in my view, is by showing how even aesthetic questions, including those relating to music, painting, theatre, and dance, for example, cannot be effectively addressed in regard to Plato without reference to the widest possible metaphysical context. [...] All of the essays [...] taken together, bring into focus a concept, that of mimesis, that one might have supposed is not as central as it in fact is in the dialogues."
https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2022/2022.06.09/