James McGuirk

The purpose of this chapter is to examine what the notion of a call can bring to our understanding of professional practice and practical knowledge. I begin with a brief consideration of why the notion of a call fell out of favour. I argue that far from being a trivial change in the way we make sense of work, the absence of the call makes it more difficult to integrate subjective and objective senses of the justification of work. Drawing on the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Lévinas, I go on to argue that both subjective identity as well as social practices and institutions are held together by the experience of a call to responsibility which unites subjective and objective moments of justification in the personal/ethical. In the final part of the paper, I show how the notion of the call is not just concerned with the original entry into a practice, but is a structure in everyday practice which helps to make sense of the motivation of students of practical knowledge to make their practice as a whole an object of reflection.

Against the idea that habit involves thoughtless responses to external stimuli, phenomenologists have argued that habits are flexible and dynamic. I develop this idea by clarifying the role of attention in the development of habitual knowing. I argue that habits should be understood as capacities to attend to parts of the world in sharply focused or high-resolution ways. In the final part of the chapter, I provide some hints as to how the genesis of habit as high-resolution attending is cultivated in interpersonal and social educational settings.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine what the notion of a call can bring to our understanding of professional practice and practical knowledge. I begin with a brief consideration of why the notion of a call fell out of favour. I argue that far from being a trivial change in the way we make sense of work, the absence of the call makes it more difficult to integrate subjective and objective senses of the justification of work. Drawing on the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Lévinas, I go on to argue that both subjective identity as well as social practices and institutions are held together by the experience of a call to responsibility which unites subjective and objective moments of justification in the personal/ethical. In the final part of the paper, I show how the notion of the call is not just concerned with the original entry into a practice, but is a structure in everyday practice which helps to make sense of the motivation of students of practical knowledge to make their practice as a whole an object of reflection.

2018 saw the launch of the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training’s long anticipated new Core Curriculum for Norwegian Schools (UDIR, 2018), which has begun to be implemented in classrooms over the course of the last twelve months.  In addition to a revision of curricula for the core school subjects themselves, the new plan includes a preamble that lays out the central values upon which the curriculum as a whole revolves along with, interestingly, the introduction of three transdisciplinary themes to be integrated in all school subjects in the years to come. These are: public health, democracy and citizenship, and sustainability. This chapter focuses on a potential tension of visions as expressed with regard to the second of the transdisciplinary themes, democracy and citizenship. Specifically, the document seems to give voice to two competing conceptions of what is essential in democracy and citizenship education. On the one hand, there is a commitment to the procedural values that ensure autonomy and self-determination and, on the other hand, a commitment to substantive values embedded in specific traditions. I suspect that this tension of visions is not just a Norwegian phenomenon and is one that will be recognisable to school researchers in other parts of the globe. It is my hope that bringing this tension to light can contribute to the furtherance of critical reflection about the aims and goals of democracy and citizenship education.

This article explores the role of empathy in the teaching/learning relationship. I argue that not only are the phenomenological analyses of empathy offered by Husserl and Stein useful for understanding that relationship, but that Stein’s sensitivity to the positive primordiality of foreignness in empathy is especially illuminating with regard to the tripartite relationship of teacher-learner-world enacted in educational practice. In part 1, I introduce the problem of empathy as analyzed by Husserl and Stein and outline some differences in their respective accounts of the phenomenon in the period leading up to the publication of Stein’s doctoral thesis On the Problem of Empathy. While both are interested in the role of empathy in the constitution of a shared world that can become the domain of natural and social scientific inquiry, their accounts differ in the measure that Stein’s pays greater attention to the experience of foreignness as such in the perception of others. I argue that while Stein’s account offers a better account of the experience of foreign consciousness, it also provides a richer account of intersubjective world constitution by resisting the principled interchangeability of conscious perspectives on the world. In the second part of the paper, I turn to the teaching/learning relationship, especially as it is described in Hannah Arendt’s writings on education. I argue that Stein’s account of empathy helps to make sense of several of the key features of the relation as it is described by Arendt.

... Kevin Hermberg has asserted his right under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. ... Pol Vandevelde, whose mentorship, friendship, and quiet confidence in me have made an impact—I would never have gained entry into Husserl's ...

In the present article 1 wish to discuss the positive aspect of Nietzsche's thought. This includes the attempt to avoid the nihilism of a simple inversion of Platonism and the fact that for Nietzsche, critical/genealogical philosophy is always subordinate to the will to affirm existence as it is. In this regard, I will be drawing especially on the work of Gilles Deleuze, whose Nietzsche and Philosophy remains the canonical defense of the positive in Nietzsche's thought. In the second part of the paper, however, I will argue that the higher morality generated by this position is essentially otherless. While this critique is not in itself devastating, I will go on to argue that this ethic ultimately generates a paradox in Nietzsche's thought against which the will to affirmation is finally destroyed.

The present article addresses the question of whether, and to what extent, critical thinking should make attunement to current social and political landscapes central to its practice. I begin by outlining what I consider to be the basic positions

This chapter draws on ecological theories of action and research in education to develop and articulate an aspectual account of improvisation. According to this account, improvisation is not a species of action to be distinguished from planned action, but is rather an aspect of all action. I make classroom practice central to my argument in order to show how the meaningful core of this practice is constituted in the interplay between structured and non-structured moments, navigated in interpersonal relations. I conclude with a suggestion as to how the integrity of the practice can be understood through a notion of purpose that is not reducible to agential initiative.

The idea that narratives can provide a legitimate empirical basis for qualitative research is hardly novel. In many research areas, the narrative is considered on a par with the interview as a way of procuring empirical data. In recent years, even the use of one’s own narratives has begun to be taken seriously in the research context. This latter approach, often called autoethnography, emerges out of the idea that the researcher’s subjectivity is not something to be suppressed in the production of legitimate research, but a legitimate focal point for such research.
What I want to do in the pages that follow is offer some reflections on the precise nature of the status that research based on narrative(s), including the researcher’s own narratives, can have in terms of what we normally think about as the empirical, and the scientific. My thoughts on this matter are largely inspired by the phenomenological and hermeneutical schools of thought, and especially their focus on subjectivity as a field of research. It is hoped that this contribution can articulate possibilities for qualitative research.
I will begin by giving an account of what the phenomenological perspective on research in subjectivity is, based predominantly on the thought of Edmund Husserl. This is important because it provides the context for understanding the hermeneutical approach to narrative and stories. At stake in the phenomenological project is the procurement of an ‘unnatural’ perspective on (one’s own) experience, such that it becomes an ‘object’ of research. I will then turn to the hermeneutical tradition, especially the thought(s)/ideas of Paul Ricoeur, to argue that stories or narratives provide an exemplary way of objectifying experience by making the story a laboratory for exploring possibilities of understanding and action. I will argue throughout, that this process of reflecting and exploring should be understood in terms of Husserl’s notion of eidetic reflection. Eidetic reflection involves an imaginative play of possibilities, whose goal is uncovering the actual and potential meanings in experience such that they provide insights both backwards and forward in time. The intention of this discussion is to contribute to what experience-based research might be.

While the NOKUT committee which accredited the PhD in the study of Professional Praxis, was positively disposed to the idea of a study of Practical Knowledge, they warned against the tendency to emphasize positive aspects of practice at the expense of more negative ones. That this kind of critique is employed against Practical Knowledge is not surprising given that it is one that is commonly mobilized against phenomenology in general. While there are any number of versions of this critique in circulation, they all boil down to the idea that phenomenology both overstates the depth of insight that a first-personal perspective can give into states of affairs in the world and simultaneously naively ignores the extent to which the first-personal perspective is forged in language, history, and tradition. What I want to do in this chapter is to explore this claim as it relates to phenomenology and by extension to Practical Knowledge. The question is whether the phenomenological perspective is inherently naïve and uncritical by prioritizing first-personal experience, while remaining blind to other sources of meaning and/or the sources of meaning that underlie the first-personal?
The chapter will divide into four parts. In the first part, I will deal with the centrality of the motif of trust in much phenomenological philosophy. From the time of its earliest inception, phenomenology was intended to be a philosophy of description that, as much as possible, ‘leaves things as they are’. The point of phenomenology is to be attentive to lived experience so as to articulate the meaningful structures of the lifeworld. But if this is true, there seems to be a certain prima facie legitimacy to the abovementioned critique as to phenomenological naivety inasmuch as phenomenology seems to be wilfully blind to aspects of practice that do not appear in the focal gaze of the practitioner. I will explore this point in part two. In part three, I will argue that phenomenology is critical in at least two ways and I will attempt to show that these critical moments are not in opposition to the fundamental motif of trust, but only possible through it. The point of the chapter as a whole, then, will be to argue that phenomenology and phenomenologically-inspired research initiatives such as Practical Knowledge, are based on a fundamental attitude of trust that far from being naïve is the very condition of possibility of critique.

This chapter examines the various ways in which kinds of suffering have been explored in the phenomenological tradition, especially in terms of the capacity of suffering to disclose aspects of normal world experience. In the first part of the chapter, James McGuirk draws on work done in phenomenological psychopathology to show how attention to suffering is both clinically fruitful and philosophically illuminating, inasmuch as this research articulates the co-belonging of suffering and a felt loss of the normal. In the second part of the chapter, attention shifts to work done in the phenomenology of illness, which paints a more complex picture of the relationship between suffering and normality by drawing attention to the possibility of the restoration of the normal within the context of suffering. In the third and final part, McGuirk draws on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Kurt Goldstein to argue that these two approaches are more consistent than they at first appear. This claim rests on the commitment in both positions to normality as an experiential, rather than just a linguistic category and to the idea that the reconstitution of the normal in suffering is bounded by aspects of embodiment that are only finitely plastic.

It is acommonplaceamongst neuroscientists and philosopherstocon-sider habit to be a 'naturalization' of the mind, in which ways of thinkinga nd ways of acting sink below the level of conscious reflection and become thoughtless , blind, uncritical and unthinking.This paper seeks to challenget hatv iew, not by rejectingthe idea of habit as naturalization of the mind, but by challenging the receivedview of what such naturalization entails. Drawing on the work of Felix Ravaisson, and more specificallyp henomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty,PaulRicoeur and Gaston Bachelard, the paper argues that close attention to the role of embodiment and temporal unfolding in habitual acting demand a more nuanced understanding of habit as well as of the relationship between mind and nature generally. In ar ecent article on the neuroscienceo fh abits in Scientific American,t he following standard test for establishingt he presenceo fh abits is described:¹ Agroup of rats is placed in an experimentalbox,and trained to press alever,which releases food as areward. When the rats arereturned to their cages, the experimenters 'devalue' the rewardinthe boxeither by arranging it such that the rats can eat to oversatiation,orby injectingt hem with ad rugt hat induces nausea when they eat the food. When the rats are then returned to the experimentalbox,the presenceofahabitisidentified on the basis of whether the ratcontinues to pressthe lever and eat the food or not.Ifthey do so, in spiteof the fact that the rewardisnow unpleasant,they aresaid to have formed ahabit.If, on the other hand, they do not,they aresaid to be 'mindful' of the alteration in the situation and ares aid not to be actingh abitually. Researchers then studied the neurological processes in playinthe rats acting ha-bituallyi no rder to gain insight into the neuroscienceo fh abits generally. While there is much of interestthatcan be said about the details of this research, it is not something we can go into in anyd etail here. What is striking,h owever,i st hat this experiment or versions thereof, remains the standard wayinwhich habits are assessed in neuroscientific research  Research carried out at the Graybiel laboratory at MIT(Graybiel &S mith ) Brought to you by | University of Queensland-UQ Library Authenticated Download Date | 3/23/18 3:03 AM

The point of the present article is to investigate whether the key conceptions of epochē and reduction as found in Husserl’s phenomenology can be brought to bear in a fruitful re-reading of the speech of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium.  In pursuit of this goal, I will begin by revisiting the traditional reading of this speech in terms of a scala amoris in which the erotic subject is guided from attachment to a series of inferior objects to the Beautiful and Good itself such that the value of all preceding attachments is suspended. The critique that this approach to love instrumentalises all but the transcendent Good is one that is found both within and without the text. In opposition to this reading, however, I will suggest that Husserl’s notions of epochē and reduction enable us to read the speech not as an instrumentalising scala but in terms of a reflective distance in which our immersion in and with the erotic object is suspended so that we might re-appropriate the real meaning of the erotic engagement. According to this reading, Plato does not negate the particular or lower forms of eros but re-inscribes them with a value derived from their position in relation to the ultimate. The suspension of the lower forms, then, is not final but is merely employed in order to let what occurs in erotic engagement show itself.

The purpose of the present essay is to investigate Heidegger’s various readings of Plato’s Cave allegory in the works from 1927-1940 in the light of his understanding of truth as unhiddenness. In section §44 of Being and Time, Heidegger puts forward his original interpretation of the ground of truth in Dasein’s disclosure of its world. This position, rooted squarely in the phenomenological tradition, informs his endorsement of the allegory in the years around the publication of Being and Time. However, in a lecture series from 1931-2, entitled The Essence of Truth, he claims that the allegory constitutes a turning point in the history of philosophy insofar as it is both an important meditation on the fundamental experience of the truth/unconcealment (aletheia) of being as well as a crucial loss of this experience on foot of the emergence of an inappropriate understanding of the essence of untruth. Finally, in his best known treatment of the allegory, the 1940 essay Plato’s Doctrine of the Truth, we see Heidegger effectively dismissing the allegory as making hardly any significant contribution to the concept of truth insofar as he paints Plato as a mere moralist and educational theorist. We will argue that these texts reflect the evolution in Heidegger’s thinking about truth from consideration of Dasein as the origin of truth through a mining of the original experience of truth in Greek philosophy to a dissatisfaction with philosophy at all as a vehicle for the unconcealment of Being. As such, Plato’s Cave provides the ideal locus for tracking the so-called ‘turning’ in Heidegger’s thinking.

The point of the present article is to re-examine the relationship between the phenomenological projects of Emmanuel Lévinas and Edmund Husserl with a view
to challenging the notion that their projects are radically incompatible. This will involve a bringing together of the two thinkers from both sides. On the one hand, I will offer a reading of Lévinas’ phenomenology as operating within the framework of transcendentalism even while it problematizes aspects of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. On the other hand, I will address the notions of crisis and the call to
self-justification in Husserl’s later philosophy as suggesting an irrecuperable transcendence in immanence that cannot be fully recovered by the phenomenological method in the way that Lévinas often suggests.

Against the oft-repeated claim that Heideggerian authenticity calls for a resoluteness that is either indifferent or inimical to normative rationality, Steven Crowell has recently argued that the phenomenon of conscience in Sein und Zeit is specifically intended to ground normative rationality in the existential ontological account of Dasein so that Heidegger puts forward not a rejection of the life of reason but a more fundamental account of its condition of possibility in terms of self-responsibility. In what follows, I wish to take up the issue
of an existential grounding of rational life and its implications for the phenomenological reduction in relation to the work of Husserl by showing that he too is concerned with a self-responsible contextualizing of the life of reason even
at the level of individual human existence. In this way, Husserl, like Heidegger, can be read as framing the phenomenological reduction in terms of the subject’s concern for self-justification. However, this ‘framing’ cannot be seen
as a motivation to reduction but only as an ‘after-the-fact’ explanation of its import. But I will suggest, in conclusion, that the problem of the motivation to reduction is perhaps as much of a problem for Heidegger as it is for Husserl.

In several of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates claims to be an expert on only one topic, love. He can claim such expertise because love, unlike justice, piety, or courage, is not so much a theme to be delineated, but is the motivating force that defines the life of philosophy. To be a philosopher is, as the etymology of the word suggests, to be a lover.
But what kind of love is it that characterizes the life of philosophy, and how does it relate to other kinds of love? Specifically, what are the implications of the philosopher’s love of wisdom for the realization of the interpersonal forms of attachment that are necessary for ethics and politics to be possible?
James McGuirk explores this question in the present study though a close reading of Plato’s Symposium and through comparative readings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Emmanuel Lévinas, in which several indictments and defences of philosophy are explored. According to McGuirk, the trial of philosophy hangs ultimately on the meaning of philosophical eros. He argues that while eros can involve impulses toward tyranny and the subjugation of otherness, it is finally understood by Plato in terms of a subtle balance, in which the acquisitiveness of eros is enframed by a more fundamental affective attunement to the Good in Being. According to this reading, eros is not only compatible with ethical and political forms of the interpersonal, it is their condition of possibility.

In several of Plato's dialogues, Socrates claims to be an expert on only one topic, love. He can claim such expertise because love, unlike justice, piety, or courage, is not so much a theme to be delineated, but is the motivating force that defines the life of philosophy. To be a philosopher is, as the etymology of the word suggests, to be a lover.

But what kind of love is it that characterizes the life of philosophy, and how does it relate to other kinds of love? Specifically, what are the implications of the philosopher's love of wisdom for the realization of the interpersonal forms of attachment that are necessary for ethics and politics to be possible?

James McGuirk explores this question in the present study though a close reading of Plato's Symposium and through comparative readings of Friedrich Nietzsche and Emmanuel Lévinas, in which several indictments and defences of philosophy are explored. According to McGuirk, the trial of philosophy hangs ultimately on the meaning of philosophical eros. He argues that while eros can involve impulses toward tyranny and the subjugation of otherness, it is finally understood by Plato in terms of a subtle balance, in which the acquisitiveness of eros is enframed by a more fundamental affective attunement to the Good in Being. According to this reading, eros is not only compatible with ethical and political forms of the interpersonal, it is their condition of possibility.

When commentators attempt to explain the difference between the phenomenological approaches of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, they often do so mediately, by referring to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger is said to be the philosopher of praxis, who follows Aristotle in rejecting the Platonic intellectualism that valorizes only reflection as providing access to the good life. As against this, Husserl is often portrayed as a Platonist for whom the goal of human life is to be found in the disinterested spectating gaze of the philosopher that renders the world of life into objects for contemplation. The idea being that it is necessary to know the world in order to live well in it.
What I want to do in this paper is to look at the use to which Heidegger puts Aristotle and the consequences of this employment. This issue is complex such that the ambition in the present paper can only be to sketch the main lines of Heidegger’s reading. My claim will be that Heidegger’s reading of the Nichomachean Ethics involves a series of transformations or hermeneutical re-orientations of the text and that while certain of these are legitimate, some are problematic. Chief among these problems will be the transformation of the Aristotelian discourse from an ethical to an ontological register as well as Heidegger’s understanding of how phronetic insight should be lived. This last point, as we will see, bears witness to a kind of Kierkegaardian reading of Aristotle which in itself can be problematic.