- Political Science, International Studies, Peace and Conflict Studies, International Security, European Studies, European Politics, and 19 moreConflict, Peacekeeping, International Organizations (International Studies), International Negotiation, Balkan Politics, Cyprus Studies, Kosovo, External Relations of the EU, Greek-Turkish relations, political participation, minority rights, Secession, Serbian Politics, Cypriot Politics, Balkan Studies, History of Cyprus, Cyprus conflict, Turkish Greek Relations, Western Balkans, Cyprus, and Enlargement and Integration in the EUedit
- James Ker-Lindsay is Visiting Professor at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (... moreJames Ker-Lindsay is Visiting Professor at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Research Associate at the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford. His research is focused on conflict, peace and security in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (in particular the Cyprus Problem, Greek-Turkish relations and Kosovo), EU enlargement, and secession and recognition in international politics.
His authored books include, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (Oxford University Press, 2012); The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2011); Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (IB Tauris, 2009); Crisis and Conciliation: A Year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey (IB Tauris, 2007); EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964 (Bibliopolis, 2004). He is currently working on a co-authored book (with Mikulas Fabry): Secession and State Creation: What Everyone Needs to Know, to be published by Oxford University Press. He has also co-edited a number of volumes, such as, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution (IB Tauris) Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans (Palgrave Macmillan, with Denisa Kostovicova and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic); An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus (I.B.Tauris, co-edited with Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen); New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (2010, Routledge, with Dejan Djokic); The Government and Politics of Cyprus (2009, Peter Lang, with Hubert Faustmann), and, The Work of the United Nations in Cyprus (2001, Palgrave Macmillan, with Oliver Richmond). He is currently editing a journal special issue on the attitudes of EU members towards enlargement in the Western Balkans and another special issue on 'engagement without recognition' in international politics. He has also published articles in many leading journals, including International Affairs, Survival, Cambridge Review of International Affairs and the Journal of Common Market Studies. He has served as the co-editor of The Cyprus Review and is a member of the editorial boards of Ethnopolitics, the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, and Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. He is also a member of the Steering Committee of the ECPR Standing Group on South East Europe and was formerly co-convenor of the British International Studies Association (BISA) Working Group on South East Europe.
In addition to his academic work, he also has extensive experience in public and private sector consulting and advising and has a practical background in conflict analysis and resolution. He was the co-ordinator of the Greek-Turkish Forum, a peace support initiative run by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), where he was based, and the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). He has also served as an advisor/consultant to a number of governments and international organisations, including the European Union, Council of Europe and the United Nations. Most recently, he served as a research analyst at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and was a member of the British delegation at the 2017 UN-sponsored Conference on Cyprus. He has also undertaken regular media commentary and analysis. He has written for Jane's Foreign Report and the Economist Intelligence Unit (Cyprus politics correspondent 2001-2006), and has been cited/interviewed by many leading news sources, including BBC, CNN, Reuters, AFP, Associated Press, The Economist, The Guardian, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, SKY News, The Times and The Wall Street Journal.
He holds a BSc(econ) from London University and an MA and PhD in International Conflict Analysis from the University of Kent. He has held visiting positions at the University of Pristina, the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and the University of Nicosia.
YouTube Channel Page: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsayedit
This edited volume explores the different ways in which members of the European Union have interacted with Kosovo since it declared independence in 2008. While there is a tendency to think of EU states in terms of two distinct groups –... more
This edited volume explores the different ways in which members of the European Union have interacted with Kosovo since it declared independence in 2008. While there is a tendency to think of EU states in terms of two distinct groups – those that have recognised Kosovo and those that have not – the picture is more complex. Taking into account also the quality and scope of their engagement with Kosovo, there are four broad categories of member states that can be distinguished: the strong and weak recognisers and the soft and hard non-recognisers. In addition to casting valuable light on the relations between various EU members and Kosovo, this book also makes an important contribution to the way in which the concepts of recognition and engagement, and their relationship to each other, are understood in academic circles and by policy makers.
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This comprehensive volume is the first systematic effort to explore the ways in which recognised states and international organisations interact with secessionist ‘de facto states’, while maintaining the position that they are not... more
This comprehensive volume is the first systematic effort to explore the ways in which recognised states and international organisations interact with secessionist ‘de facto states’, while maintaining the position that they are not regarded as independent sovereign actors in the international system. It is generally accepted by policy makers and scholars that some interaction with de facto states is vital, if only to promote a resolution of the underlying conflict that led to their decision to break away, and yet this policy of ‘engagement without recognition’ is not without complications and controversy. This book analyses the range of issues and problems that such interaction inevitably raises. The authors highlight fundamental questions of sovereignty, conflict management and resolution, settlement processes, foreign policy and statehood.
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Over the past fifty years the Cyprus Problem has come to be regarded as the archetype of an intractable ethnic conflict. Since 1964, the United Nations has been at the forefront of efforts to find a political solution to the dispute... more
Over the past fifty years the Cyprus Problem has come to be regarded as the archetype of an intractable ethnic conflict. Since 1964, the United Nations has been at the forefront of efforts to find a political solution to the dispute between the island's Greek and Turkish communities. And yet, despite the active involvement of six Secretaries-General (U Thant, Kurt Waldheim, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon), every attempt to reach a mutually acceptable solution has failed. Here, James Ker-Lindsay draws together new and original perspectives from the leading experts on Cyprus, including academics, policy-makers, politicians and activists. All have addressed one deceptively simple question: 'Can Cyprus be solved?' Resolving Cyprus presents a comprehensive overview of the Cyprus Problem from a variety of approaches and offers new and innovative ideas as to how to tackle one of the longest running ethnic conflicts on the world stage. This represents an essential contribution to the body of work on Cyprus, and will be required reading for all those following the debates surrounding the Cyprus problem.
Contributors include: Emel Akcali, Ahmet An, Jan Asmussen, Tozun Bahcheli, Georgios Charalambous, Costas Constantinou, Hubert Faustmann, Ayla Gurel, Yeshim Harris, Robert Holland, Erol Kaymak, James Ker-Lindsay, Paschalis Kitromilidis, Klearchos Kyriakides, George Kyris, Neophytos Loizides, Robert McDonald, Michael Moran, Sid Noel, Mustafa Ergun Olgun, Yiannis Papadakis, Oliver Richmond, Nikos Skoutaris, Mary Southcott, Ahmet Sözen, Zenon Stavrinides, Harry Tzimitras, Birte Vogel
Contributors include: Emel Akcali, Ahmet An, Jan Asmussen, Tozun Bahcheli, Georgios Charalambous, Costas Constantinou, Hubert Faustmann, Ayla Gurel, Yeshim Harris, Robert Holland, Erol Kaymak, James Ker-Lindsay, Paschalis Kitromilidis, Klearchos Kyriakides, George Kyris, Neophytos Loizides, Robert McDonald, Michael Moran, Sid Noel, Mustafa Ergun Olgun, Yiannis Papadakis, Oliver Richmond, Nikos Skoutaris, Mary Southcott, Ahmet Sözen, Zenon Stavrinides, Harry Tzimitras, Birte Vogel
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This book examines the ambiguous role played by civil society in state-building, democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction in the Western Balkans. In doing so, it challenges the received wisdom that civil society is always a force... more
This book examines the ambiguous role played by civil society in state-building, democratisation and post-conflict reconstruction in the Western Balkans. In doing so, it challenges the received wisdom that civil society is always a force for good. Civil society actors have helped create the conditions for new, more constructive relations inside and between former Yugoslav countries. But, their agency has also rekindled nationalism hindering efforts to rebuild the region after the conflicts of the 1990s. The book demonstrates that diverse civil society effects cannot be captured without querying both the nature of civil society and the complexity of the ongoing transformation. So how can the emancipatory role of civil society be harnessed? This rigorous case study-driven reappraisal of the ability of civil society to support progressive transformation from an illiberal regime to democracy and from conflict to peace will be a valuable resource to scholars and practitioners alike.
Contributors: John O'Brennan, Adam Fagan, Iavor Rangelov, Giulio Venneri, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, Francesco Strazzari, Ervjola Selenica, Anita Brkanić, Nenad Markovic, Gemma Collantes-Celador, Jens Narten, Joanna Hanson, Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, Mladen Ostojić, Florence Hartmann
Contributors: John O'Brennan, Adam Fagan, Iavor Rangelov, Giulio Venneri, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, Francesco Strazzari, Ervjola Selenica, Anita Brkanić, Nenad Markovic, Gemma Collantes-Celador, Jens Narten, Joanna Hanson, Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, Mladen Ostojić, Florence Hartmann
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How do states prevent the recognition of territories that have unilaterally declared independence? At a time when the issue of secession is becoming increasingly significant on the world stage, this is the first book to consider this... more
How do states prevent the recognition of territories that have unilaterally declared independence? At a time when the issue of secession is becoming increasingly significant on the world stage, this is the first book to consider this crucial question. Analysing the efforts of the governments of Serbia, Georgia, and Cyprus to prevent the international recognition of Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and northern Cyprus, the work draws on in depth interviews with a number of leading policy makers to explain how each of the countries has designed, developed, and implemented its counter secession strategies. After explaining how the principle of the territorial integrity of states has tended to take precedence over the right of self-determination, it examines the range of ways countries facing a separatist threat can prevent recognition by other states and considers the increasingly important role played by international and regional organisations, especially the United Nations, in the recognition process. Additionally, it shows how forms of legitimisation or acknowledgement are also central elements of any counter-recognition process, and why steps to prevent secessionist entities from participating in major sporting and cultural bodies are given so much attention. Finally, it questions the effects of these counter recognition efforts on attempts to solve these territorial conflicts. Drawing on history, politics, and international law this book is the first and only comprehensive account of this increasingly important field of foreign policy.
Research Interests: International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Law, Contemporary History, Kosovo, and 14 moreYugoslavia, Russian Foreign Policy, Secession, Cyprus conflict, Abkhazia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, South Ossetia, Serbian Politics, International Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples (Nationalism, Self Determination, Secession), South Caucasus, Western Balkans, and Communism and national question
For nearly 60 years--from its uprising against British rule in the 1950s, to the bloody civil war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the 1970s, and the United Nation's ongoing 30-year effort... more
For nearly 60 years--from its uprising against British rule in the 1950s, to the bloody civil war between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the 1970s, and the United Nation's ongoing 30-year effort to reunite the island--the tiny Mediterranean nation of Cyprus has taken a disproportionate share of the international spotlight. And while it has been often in the news, accurate and impartial information on the conflict has been nearly impossible to obtain.
The Cyprus Problem covers all aspects of the Cyprus problem, placing it in historical context, addressing the situation as it now stands, and looking toward its possible resolution. The book begins with the origins of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as the other indigenous communities on the island (Maronites, Latin, Armenians, and Gypsies). It then examines the tensions that emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots after independence in 1960 and the complex constitutional provisions and international treaties designed to safeguard the new state. He pays special attention to the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the subsequent efforts by the UN and the international community to reunite Cyprus. The book's final two chapters address a host of pressing issues that divide the two Cypriot communities, including key concerns over property, refugee returns, and the repatriation of settlers. The book concludes by considering whether partition really is the best solution, as many observers increasingly suggest.
The Cyprus Problem covers all aspects of the Cyprus problem, placing it in historical context, addressing the situation as it now stands, and looking toward its possible resolution. The book begins with the origins of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as the other indigenous communities on the island (Maronites, Latin, Armenians, and Gypsies). It then examines the tensions that emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots after independence in 1960 and the complex constitutional provisions and international treaties designed to safeguard the new state. He pays special attention to the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the subsequent efforts by the UN and the international community to reunite Cyprus. The book's final two chapters address a host of pressing issues that divide the two Cypriot communities, including key concerns over property, refugee returns, and the repatriation of settlers. The book concludes by considering whether partition really is the best solution, as many observers increasingly suggest.
Research Interests:
Nearly twenty years after it ceased to exist as a multinational federation, Yugoslavia still has the power to provoke controversy and debate. Bringing together contributions from twelve of the leading scholars of modern and contemporary... more
Nearly twenty years after it ceased to exist as a multinational federation, Yugoslavia still has the power to provoke controversy and debate. Bringing together contributions from twelve of the leading scholars of modern and contemporary South East Europe, this volume explores the history of Yugoslavia from creation to dissolution. Drawing on the very latest historical research, this book explains how the country came about, how it evolved and why, eventually, it failed. From the start of the twentieth century, through the First World War, the interwar years and the Second World War, to the road to socialism under President Tito and the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, this volume provides up to date analysis of the causes and consequences of a range of events that shaped the development of this remarkable state across its various iterations. The book concludes by examining post-conflict relations in the era of European integration. Traversing ninety years of history, this volume presents a fascinating story of how a country that once served as the model for multiethnic states around the world has now become a byword for ethno-national fragmentation and conflict.
Contributors include Dejan Djokic, James Ker-Lindsay, Connie Robinson, Mark Cornwall, John Paul Newman, Tomislav Dulic, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Dejan Jovic, Nebojša Vladisavljevic, Florian Bieber, Jasna Dragovic-Soso and Eric Gordy.
Contributors include Dejan Djokic, James Ker-Lindsay, Connie Robinson, Mark Cornwall, John Paul Newman, Tomislav Dulic, Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Dejan Jovic, Nebojša Vladisavljevic, Florian Bieber, Jasna Dragovic-Soso and Eric Gordy.
In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Was this the final chapter in the break up of Yugoslavia and the successful conclusion to the Balkan Wars of the 1990s? Or was it just one more wrong turn in the path to... more
In February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Was this the final chapter in the break up of Yugoslavia and the successful conclusion to the Balkan Wars of the 1990s? Or was it just one more wrong turn in the path to stability in the Balkans which has set a dangerous precedent for regional conflict throughout the world? When the UN Security Council authorised negotiations to determine the final status of Kosovo in October 2005, most observers confidently expected the Serbian province to become an independent state by the end of the following year. However, the process did not go as planned. 'Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans' charts the course of the status process from 2005 to the present and analyses how and why it went so very wrong. This clear and perceptive account will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the recent history of the Balkans or in international conflict resolution.
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When Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), was arrested in February 1999, it marked a turning point in relations between Greece and Turkey. As the country's most wanted man, his arrest was greeted with jubilation... more
When Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), was arrested in February 1999, it marked a turning point in relations between Greece and Turkey. As the country's most wanted man, his arrest was greeted with jubilation throughout most of Turkey. However, it also led to a public outcry when it emerged that he had been captured leaving the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. This was seen as definitive proof that the Greek Government had been aiding and abetting the PKK. In the days and weeks that followed the arrest, relations between the Aegean neighbours sank to their lowest level since the summer of 1974, when Athens and Ankara had come to the brink of war over Cyprus. However, by the end of the year, the picture could not have been more different. An improbable series of events that included a regional conflict, two major disasters and the death of a senior Greek politician had led to a complete transformation in the relations between the two countries. The crowning moment of this change came in December when Greece dropped its long-standing opposition to Turkish candidacy for EU membership. How did this remarkable change come about? Who should take the credit? And what did it mean for diplomatic relations in the Eastern Mediterranean? This is the story of how two countries started down a path to peace after decades of tension and hostility and how, over the course of one monumental year, relations between Greece and Turkey went from the brink of conflict to an unprecedented affirmation of friendship and solidarity.
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This work traces the attempts by the United Nations to bring about the reunification of Cyprus prior to the island's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004. In addition to charting the course of previous efforts to solve the Cyprus... more
This work traces the attempts by the United Nations to bring about the reunification of Cyprus prior to the island's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004. In addition to charting the course of previous efforts to solve the Cyprus issue, the book recounts the direct discussions between the two sides from January 2002 through to April 2004 and analyses the reasons why the UN plan was rejected in a referendum.
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This work casts light on the actions of the United Kingdom during the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64. In particular, the volume concentrates on a very specific period of events, charting the course of British actions from the start of fighting... more
This work casts light on the actions of the United Kingdom during the Cyprus Crisis of 1963-64. In particular, the volume concentrates on a very specific period of events, charting the course of British actions from the start of fighting to the moment when UN Security Council Resolution 186 passed responsibility for peacekeeping and peacemaking over to the United Nations. Drawing on official British government documents and interviews with many of the protagonists of the period, this work is the first in-depth study of Britain’s leading role during this critically important juncture in the modern history of Cyprus.
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With all the turmoil and conflict taking place around the world, it is often tempting to think of the Western Balkans as yesterday’s problem. While it is true that the prospect of armed conflict has diminished significantly over the past... more
With all the turmoil and conflict taking place around the world, it is often tempting to think of the Western Balkans as yesterday’s problem. While it is true that the prospect of armed conflict has diminished significantly over the past two decades, there are still issues that contribute to a broader sense of instability. Until recently, three major issues undermined the region’s path towards ‘normality,’ whatever that may mean in the current international environment. The first, and most intractable of these is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though it has been over 20 years since the 1995 Dayton Agreement ended the vicious and bloody war in the country, Bosnia remains deeply divided. The second issue is Kosovo. The February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence remains a source of deep divisions, both regionally and internationally. Last, and truly least, was the so-called Macedonia name issue. Although viewed by many outsiders as a somewhat bizarre, if not wholly ridiculous, issue, the effects of the dispute were anything but laughable. It led to the wholesale corruption of the Macedonian state and impeded the general process of Euro-Atlantic integration in Southeast Europe. And yet, after 25 years, the issue has finally been resolved.
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Secessionist de facto states, by their very nature, sit outside of the international system. Having unilaterally declared independence from their parent state, they are invariably prevented from joining the United Nations, and thus taking... more
Secessionist de facto states, by their very nature, sit outside of the international system. Having unilaterally declared independence from their parent state, they are invariably prevented from joining the United Nations, and thus taking their place as members of the community of universally recognised countries. While the reasons for such punitive approaches have a logic according to prevailing political and legal approaches to secession, it is also recognised that isolation can have harmful effects. Ostracising de facto can not only hinder efforts to resolve the dispute by reducing their willingness to engage in what they see as an asymmetrical settlement process, it can also force them into a closer relationship with a patron state. For this reason, there has been growing interest in academic and policy circles around the concept of engagement without recognition. This is a mechanism that provides for varying degrees of interaction with de facto states while maintaining the position that they are not regarded as independent sovereign actors in the international system. As is shown, while the concept has its flaws, it nevertheless opens up new opportunities for conflict management.
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Traditionally, the international community has rejected unilateral declarations of independence. As a result, de facto states—territories that have declared independence but are not members of the United Nations (UN)—have been... more
Traditionally, the international community has rejected unilateral declarations of independence. As a result, de facto states—territories that have declared independence but are not members of the United Nations (UN)—have been stigmatised. However, not all secessionist de facto states are treated equally. Whereas some are wholly shunned, others enjoy a high degree of international interaction with the UN members that do not recognise them. This study explores why this is so and shows how levels of disapproval shape processes of engagement with non-recognising states. It notes that responses to cases of unilateral secession by states, and thus the stigma attached to de facto states, are shaped by three broad factors: systemic factors, contextual factors and national factors. Crucially, it is shown that the stigmatisation of individual de facto states can change over time and circumstance, and with it the degree of engagement without recognition enjoyed by that de facto state can vary.
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In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU). Although many issues shaped the Brexit campaign, the question of Turkey’s quest for EU membership emerged as an unexpectedly strong factor. This article examines how this... more
In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU). Although many issues shaped the Brexit campaign, the question of Turkey’s quest for EU membership emerged as an unexpectedly strong factor. This article examines how this happened and how the debate evolved. It shows that those who advocated leaving the EU not only distorted the prospect of Turkish membership, they also misrepresented British support for the country’s accession. While the UK had indeed been a strong advocate of Turkey’s EU integration in the past, support for enlargement in general had declined in recent years due to increasing voter concerns over immigration. However, the policy of supporting Turkish membership could not be wholly repudiated by the government, even in the name of campaigning to stay in the EU, as this would have damaged Britain’s strategic relationship with Turkey.
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This article examines the United Kingdom’s approach to the question of European Union enlargement in the Western Balkans. It shows that while Britain had no traditional attachment to the region, it championed expansion as part of its... more
This article examines the United Kingdom’s approach to the question of European Union enlargement in the Western Balkans. It shows that while Britain had no traditional attachment to the region, it championed expansion as part of its long-standing aim to widen EU membership to prevent deeper political union. However, as immigration from the EU increased after the 2004 enlargement and a Eurosceptic Conservative-led government took charge in 2010, official support for enlargement began to decline. Britain ceded its place to Germany as the strongest supporter of EU expansion. Meanwhile, during the referendum campaign on EU membership, the prospect that future enlargement could further increase the number of migrants emerged as a central point of debate. Although this discussion was primarily focused on Turkey, the Western Balkans also played a part. Therefore, even had the United Kingdom decided to remain in the EU, there is an argument to be made that Britain could well have become more opposed towards future expansion. As it is, the decision to leave the EU (Brexit), has ensured that Britain has now all but lost its say over enlargement.
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European enlargement has often been viewed from an institutional perspective. The academic literature in the field has tended to focus primarily on how the Commission or the Council has addressed the issue of EU expansion. Relatively... more
European enlargement has often been viewed from an institutional perspective. The academic literature in the field has tended to focus primarily on how the Commission or the Council has addressed the issue of EU expansion. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of individual member states. This article considers the way in which domestic political concerns and national politics affects the way in which EU members approach enlargement to the Western Balkans. It does this by examining studies conducted on seven countries: Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Hungary, Greece and Cyprus. It shows that there are in fact a wide variety of factors that shape individual member state attitudes towards enlargement. These factors include economic and commercial goals, ties to the region and to individual accession states, concerns over immigration, general foreign policy priorities and national ideological approaches towards the future shape and orientation of the European Union.
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The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral... more
The role of Great Powers in processes of secession and recognition has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. This analysis examines how Britain rallied international opposition to the November 1983 unilateral declaration of independence [UDI] of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” [TRNC]. The British Government tried hard to prevent the UDI. Once it occurred, Britain led efforts to condemn the move. It resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 541, which declared the TRNC illegal and called on states not to recognise it. As well as exploring the diplomacy behind the counter-secession efforts, this examination also answers a long-standing question as to whether any countries aside from Turkey ever recognised the TRNC. It also challenges the widely held view amongst Greek Cypriots that Britain invariably supports the Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus Problem.
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It is now generally understood that climate change poses a grave threat to international security. Rising temperatures will lead to droughts in large parts of Africa, while many low-lying countries in Europe and Asia face the prospect of... more
It is now generally understood that climate change poses a grave threat to international security. Rising temperatures will lead to droughts in large parts of Africa, while many low-lying countries in Europe and Asia face the prospect of catastrophic flooding. This is likely to lead to massive popula- tion displacement, food shortages, resource competition and an increased risk of conflict. And for one group of countries, the effects of global warming will be nothing short of apocalyptic. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that oceans will rise between 26 and 82 centimetres by the end of this century. This means that, in the decades to come, there is a real chance that a number of island states in the Pacific and Indian oceans will be completely submerged. At present, the four countries most at risk are Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, with a combined population of around half a million people.
The possible disappearance of these countries poses challenges to international policymakers on several levels. There are obvious and serious questions about what will happen to the populations of the countries at risk. Where will they live? What will be their status? Yet there are also pro- found, but less well understood, legal and political questions. As things stand, it is wholly unclear how the international community would handle the repercussions arising from the physical disappearance of these countries. In some instances, such uncertainty could lead to territorial tensions, and even conflict.
The possible disappearance of these countries poses challenges to international policymakers on several levels. There are obvious and serious questions about what will happen to the populations of the countries at risk. Where will they live? What will be their status? Yet there are also pro- found, but less well understood, legal and political questions. As things stand, it is wholly unclear how the international community would handle the repercussions arising from the physical disappearance of these countries. In some instances, such uncertainty could lead to territorial tensions, and even conflict.
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A British decision to leave the European Union (in what has become known as a potential ‘Brexit’) could have a significant effect on the UK's relationship with the Western Balkans, argues James Ker-Lindsay. It would almost certainly... more
A British decision to leave the European Union (in what has become known as a potential ‘Brexit’) could have a significant effect on the UK's relationship with the Western Balkans, argues James Ker-Lindsay. It would almost certainly reduce the country's influence over Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to shape the process of engagement between Serbia and Kosovo. At the same time, the UK would gain no material advantage in terms of its ability to handle other regional issues that may havea direct or indirect effect on Britain, such as illegal migration and the flow of fighters from the Balkans into Syria.
Research Interests:
This article examines the extent to which states are able to interact at an official level with a contested or de facto state—a state that has unilaterally declared independence but is not a member of the United Nations—without being... more
This article examines the extent to which states are able to interact at an official level with a contested or de facto state—a state that has unilaterally declared independence but is not a member of the United Nations—without being understood to have recognized it. This is an area of increasing interest and relevance to policy-makers as the number of contested states has grown in recent years. In many cases, interaction may be important for ongoing peace efforts. However, there are also instances when a state is prevented from recognizing the territory in question for specific domestic or foreign policy reasons and so has to find alternative means by which to cooperate. Drawing on several key examples, notably Kosovo and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, but also with reference to Abkhazia, the article explores the limits of interaction across various different forms of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity. As is shown, albeit with some significant provisos, legal theory and historic practice suggest that diplomatic engagement does not constitute recognition if there is no underlying intent to recognize. This means that there is in fact a very high degree of latitude regarding the limits of diplomatic engagement with contested states. This is especially the case in bilateral contexts. Indeed, in some circumstances, the level of engagement can even amount to recognition in all but name.
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The response of states to acts of secession on their territory has been subject to relatively little attention in the academic literature. Drawing on the examples of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Serbia and... more
The response of states to acts of secession on their territory has been subject to relatively little attention in the academic literature. Drawing on the examples of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Serbia and Kosovo, and Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, this article posits that there are in fact six reasons why states oppose acts of secession. These are: emotional attachment to the territory; internally displaced persons; economic factors; historical and cultural issues; fear of further secession; and national pride. Following on from this, the piece emphasises that subsequent efforts to prevent the secessionist territory from being recognised must be seen in the context of processes to resolve the situation arising from the act of secession. In some cases, this may be reunification. In others, it may be an agreed separation. At other times, it may be about leaving the door open for a military solution. In other words, opposing secession is a response to a tangible grievance. Opposing recognition is about shaping the conditions to redress that grievance. A better understanding of the specific dynamics of, and interrelationship between, these two factors would seem to be crucial for peacemakers.
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When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of... more
When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was a sui generis case in international politics. This essay considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovo's ‘unique’ statehood—such as the abuse of human rights—in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere.
It has been argued that the decision of key Western states to support Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, was driven by the fear that had this not happened there would have been a danger of renewed... more
It has been argued that the decision of key Western states to support Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, was driven by the fear that had this not happened there would have been a danger of renewed violence and instability. This begs the question as to whether this situation could have been averted had the United Nations taken a more active role in pacifying Kosovo following the intervention in 1999. This article argues that this was not in fact possible. For a variety of reasons, which will be explored, it was simply impossible to institute full-scale disarmament. Moreover, efforts to tackle the elements of organized resistance, which was built around former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, would have precipitated a conflict in the territory at a far earlier stage.
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Although Kosovo has been recognized by most members of the European Union, there are still five states that refuse to accept its unilateral declaration of independence. Kosovo's ‘European perspective’ would therefore appear to be hampered... more
Although Kosovo has been recognized by most members of the European Union, there are still five states that refuse to accept its unilateral declaration of independence. Kosovo's ‘European perspective’ would therefore appear to be hampered by its contested status. However, this paper argues that while the dispute over its independence is significant, and certainly makes establishing relations with the EU more difficult than might otherwise have been the case, it is not as problematic as it may appear. For the meantime, Kosovo remains a long way away from meeting even the most basic requirements for formal EU integration. At this stage, the key task facing the EU is state building. Somewhat paradoxically, this has not required a united position on status. Even in the medium term, the question of status need not be an impediment to Kosovo's EU integration in a range of areas. Even in those instances where a formal relationship needs to be established, there are ways in which this can be managed. Indeed, this paper argues that only when Kosovo is ready for full EU membership would its contested status become a wholly decisive issue for its ‘European perspective’.
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Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 has been widely regarded as a failure for international diplomacy in general, and for the European Union (EU) in particular. The narrative that has emerged suggests that, rather than... more
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 has been widely regarded as a failure for international diplomacy in general, and for the European Union (EU) in particular. The narrative that has emerged suggests that, rather than taking charge of the situation, the EU was instead a “victim” of external machinations led by Washington and Moscow. This article challenges this view. It argues that, during the status process, it became clear that in the case of Kosovo there was a tension between the constraints imposed by international law on acts of secession and the requirements for stability on the ground. While Russia insisted on the former, albeit for a range of reasons that went beyond upholding international law, the United States placed emphasis on the latter. For their part, the key members of the EU eventually decided that, after having tried to win Moscow over to their position, they too had to ensure regional security; even if this meant circumventing the United Nations and the Security Council and challenging long-standing legal norms and principles concerning the territorial integrity of states.
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In an essay I wrote for Peace Review 22.1, I described a rather illuminating, if somewhat startling, conversation I had with Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, in September 2008, just a few... more
In an essay I wrote for Peace Review 22.1, I described a rather illuminating, if somewhat startling, conversation I had with Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, in September 2008, just a few months after Kosovo had declared independence. In the course of our discussion about the Kosovo status negotiations, which he had overseen as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, he had announced that he did not believe that process played an important part in peacemaking. As he saw it, the outcome was all that mattered. How one got there was unimportant and not worthy of serious consideration. The end result was everything. As he had seen it, there was no alternative to Kosovo’s independence and so he had pursued this “solution,” even though it had been opposed by Serbia and had, as I argued, led to a stalemate over Kosovo’s status on the world stage.
In June 2010, I had another opportunity to speak with the Nobel Laureate. It proved to be equally interesting and no less surprising. This time, the subject of discussion was to be the importance of principles in peacemaking. Once again, he challenged a central tenet of peacemaking by arguing that principles were absolutely necessary and that these should not be compromised, even for the sake of a solution. What made this statement even more interesting was the fact, as will be shown in this essay, that in his handling of the Kosovo status talks, he himself had ignored important and well-established principles.
In June 2010, I had another opportunity to speak with the Nobel Laureate. It proved to be equally interesting and no less surprising. This time, the subject of discussion was to be the importance of principles in peacemaking. Once again, he challenged a central tenet of peacemaking by arguing that principles were absolutely necessary and that these should not be compromised, even for the sake of a solution. What made this statement even more interesting was the fact, as will be shown in this essay, that in his handling of the Kosovo status talks, he himself had ignored important and well-established principles.
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For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the “parent state.” Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from... more
For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the “parent state.” Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly “unique” - as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case.
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Just as the domestic political environment in Cyprus has changed dramatically over the past fifty years, so too has its relationship with the wider world. When the island achieved statehood, the European empires were in decline and the... more
Just as the domestic political environment in Cyprus has changed dramatically over the past fifty years, so too has its relationship with the wider world. When the island achieved statehood, the European empires were in decline and the Cold War was at its height. In this geo-political climate, the Republic of Cyprus opted to join the Non-Aligned Movement. Today, it is a member of the European Union. This has undoubtedly given it a degree of political security. However, questions remain as to whether the EU can really deliver on expectations. Thus the question of whether Cyprus should pursue closer relations with NATO is increasingly gathering attention. But behind this examination of how Cyprus has aligned itself on the world stage since independence lies a far more significant story of growing autonomy for the people of Cyprus. Having been a colony of one or other of the countless empires that had dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, independence has given Cyprus a degree of freedom to choose its orientation that has never been known before. That the Republic of Cyprus could effectively choose whether to join NATO or the Non-Aligned Movement, and that it has been able to accede to the European Union, highlights the degree to which it has been able to develop its own place in the world over the past fifty years.
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This article explores the way in which the European Union (EU) attempted to forge a united position on the question of Kosovo over the course of the latter stages of the status process, which ran from late 2005 until the end of 2007.... more
This article explores the way in which the European Union (EU) attempted to forge a united position on the question of Kosovo over the course of the latter stages of the status process, which ran from late 2005 until the end of 2007. Following an overview of the development of EU foreign policy decision-making processes, the work analyses how these were applied in the case of Kosovo. It shows that while significant efforts were made to reach a united position on the question of recognition, these efforts eventually proved to be unsuccessful. The EU Member States ultimately agreed to the establishment of a law and order mission for Kosovo. To some, this was a success, but it cannot disguise the fact that procedural changes in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making do not cover up for diverging Member State interests and that the EU was unable to take charge of what was essentially a European issue.
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The recent opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence has not provided a definitive answer to Kosovo's status. The International community remains divided. For this reason, a... more
The recent opinion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence has not provided a definitive answer to Kosovo's status. The International community remains divided. For this reason, a political solution will need to be found. Possible scenarios for the future of Kosovo include continuation of the status quo; enforcing Pristina's full authority across all of Kosovo; partition or partial territorial readjustment between Kosovo and Serbia; or some form of extended autonomy for northern Kosovo. While each of the models has its advantages and drawbacks, on balance the case for some form of extensive autonomy or a territorial readjustment remain the most compelling options for resolving the conflict in a manner most acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina, and which would open the way for Kosovo to gain wider, if not full, international acceptance.
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Does process matter when it comes to mediating a solution to international conflict? The standard theory of peacemaking would offer a resounding yes to this question. It is a basic tenet of conflict resolution that the parties must be... more
Does process matter when it comes to mediating a solution to international conflict? The standard theory of peacemaking would offer a resounding yes to this question. It is a basic tenet of conflict resolution that the parties must be given an integral role in any mediation effort. This is for practical reasons, as much as anything else. Evidence seems to suggest that the greater the input of the parties into the mechanics of a peace process, the more likely it is that the parties will accept the end result. Likewise, a process that is seen as fair by the parties is much more likely to produce a result that is acceptable to the parties than a process that was deemed to be intrinsically or essentially unjust. In this regard, the element of process control, or procedural fairness as it is otherwise known, is widely held to be absolutely essential to the success of any peacemaking initiative. The more control the parties have, the greater the likelihood of reaching a successful and stable end result.
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This article examines the concept of 'meditration' as a hybrid form of peacemaking that combines elements of mediation and arbitration. Traditionally, mediation by third parties has been based on impartial, non-coercive facilitation. This... more
This article examines the concept of 'meditration' as a hybrid form of peacemaking that combines elements of mediation and arbitration. Traditionally, mediation by third parties has been based on impartial, non-coercive facilitation. This has often resulted in prolonged processes. In the past decade, however, the United Nations has launched two initiatives—in Cyprus and Kosovo—in which a more robust approach was adopted. Either overtly or tacitly, time frames were put in place with the assumption that if the two sides were unable to reach an agreement, the UN would present the sides with a finalized plan. Thus, a process that started out as mediation would be completed by arbitration. However, in both cases this approach failed to produce an agreement acceptable to all parties, in part because it lacks legitimacy and partly as a result of the way in which it infringes state sovereignty.
Just how far does the idea of ‘meditration’ represent a new approach to international peacemaking? As Weller rightfully points out, peacemakers have adapted and adopted a range of techniques in their attempts to address international... more
Just how far does the idea of ‘meditration’ represent a new approach to international peacemaking? As Weller rightfully points out, peacemakers have adapted and adopted a range of techniques in their attempts to address international conflicts and disputes. Likewise, it was not hard to detect a sense of scepticism about the idea in Sid Noel’s response. This is understandable. At first glance, the concept does not seem markedly different from established mediating approaches and styles. As both noted, there is absolutely nothing new or radical about the idea of mediators presenting ideas to the parties. Indeed, it is a perfectly acceptable and long-established principle. It has certainly been used in Cyprus many times. But this point was never in dispute or being challenged in the article.
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This article examines how the Republic of Cyprus has confronted the threat of international terrorism. Although the threat of terrorism in Cyprus remains relatively low, the Cypriot authorities have nevertheless sought to minimize the... more
This article examines how the Republic of Cyprus has confronted the threat of international terrorism. Although the threat of terrorism in Cyprus remains relatively low, the Cypriot authorities have nevertheless sought to minimize the risk and maximize the level of preparedness. This has involved taking an uncompromising attitude toward those suspected of involvement with terrorist groups. At the same time, there has been a marked increase in the amount of international co-operation, especially since EU accession, in 2004. Nevertheless, shortcomings remain, particularly in terms of the legislative framework and the development of an analytical counterterrorism capability.
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This article examines the case for the development of a post-Balkan strategy for European Union enlargement specifically focused on the Black Sea. It argues that in light of recent events in Georgia, and concerns over political stability... more
This article examines the case for the development of a post-Balkan strategy for European Union enlargement specifically focused on the Black Sea. It argues that in light of recent events in Georgia, and concerns over political stability in the Ukraine, such a move would represent a clear statement in support of their integration into Euro- Atlantic structures. However, such a move would also have an extremely beneficial effect on Turkey’s accession process. By virtue of its pivotal role in such a strategy, many of the concerns that currently exist within the EU over Turkish membership would be mitigated.
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For most of the last forty years, the UN Secretary-General has been regarded by the Greek Cypriots as a fair and impartial intermediary in the efforts to solve the Cyprus Problem. However, a poll taken in the middle of 2005 showed that... more
For most of the last forty years, the UN Secretary-General has been regarded by the Greek Cypriots as a fair and impartial intermediary in the efforts to solve the Cyprus Problem. However, a poll taken in the middle of 2005 showed that the standing of the UN Secretary-General has fallen to extremely low levels. This was a direct result of the failed effort to reunite the island in 2004 when the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected a reunification plan drawn up by the Secretary-General. This article shows that at the time of the referendum campaign a deliberate effort was mounted to discredit the UN Secretary-General as a part of a larger effort to ensure that the plan was rejected by the electorate. While this policy was successful in its aim, it also led to an unprecedented climate of mistrust between the Greek Cypriots and the UN Secretary-General. This soured efforts to pursue a settlement for the rest of Kofi Annan’s term of office, which came to an end in December 2006.
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This article examines the relationship between Britain and Cyprus after the latter joined the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004.It argues that the difficulties that emerged were in part a product of the ill feeling that developed at the... more
This article examines the relationship between Britain and Cyprus after the latter joined the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004.It argues that the difficulties that emerged were in part a product of the ill feeling that developed at the time of the April 2004 referendum on a UN peace plan. However, it was also shaped by British attempts to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and ease Turkey's EU accession process. These tensions were particularly noticeable throughout 2005, when several attempts at rapprochement between London and Nicosia foundered. However, it now appears as if London and Nicosia have adapted to the new relationship. Although areas of tension still exist, it appears as if they will be at a lower level of intensity than was the case in the immediate aftermath of accession.
New Democracy's victory in the March 2004 Greek elections immediately raised questions about the continued development of the process of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, which had started five years earlier in 1999. However,... more
New Democracy's victory in the March 2004 Greek elections immediately raised questions about the continued development of the process of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, which had started five years earlier in 1999. However, concerns were misplaced. The incoming administration made it clear that it intended to maintain the policy of détente. Like the previous PASOK government, it sought to minimise the role of Cyprus as a factor in bilateral relations and continued to support Turkey's membership of the European Union. Where differences did arise between New Democracy and PASOK, they appeared to be more a result of the differing styles of George Papandreou and Petros Molyviatis, the two foreign ministers, than as a result of any significant disparity in basic foreign policy principles.
This article analyzes the views of the governments of Greece and Cyprus towards the question of Turkish membership in the European Union. Specifically, it shows that fundamental differences have emerged in the way in which the two... more
This article analyzes the views of the governments of Greece and Cyprus towards the question of Turkish membership in the European Union. Specifically, it shows that fundamental differences have emerged in the way in which the two perceive the benefits of Turkish engagement with the EU. For Greece, Turkish accession is seen as a transformative process. For the Greek Cypriots, the process of Turkish accession is viewed as a form of leverage. Moreover, and contrary to the prevailing view in certain quarters, there is no evidence of Greek collusion in Greek Cypriot thinking. Indeed, the ability of the Greek government to influence the Greek Cypriot leadership is rather limited.
This article examines the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) following the failed attempt to reunite the island in April 2004. It reviews the post-referendum reduction in the size of the Force and analyses the prospects for further major... more
This article examines the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) following the failed attempt to reunite the island in April 2004. It reviews the post-referendum reduction in the size of the Force and analyses the prospects for further major changes to the mission in the future. Specifically, it argues that while any further significant alterations would appear unlikely in the near term, given the current positions of the main parties in the Security Council, a radical rethinking of the UNFICYP may well be possible, if not necessary, in the light of Turkey's progress towards EU membership.
This article challenges the widely held view that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999 was the direct result of the collaboration following the earthquakes that hit both countries that year. The high-level political and diplomatic... more
This article challenges the widely held view that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement of 1999 was the direct result of the collaboration following the earthquakes that hit both countries that year. The high-level political and diplomatic efforts which form the basis of the improved relations and which preceded the earthquakes are examined. The article goes on to provide a detailed account of the efforts at governmental and nongovernmental levels to mitigate the effects of the disasters and illustrates the impact of the two disastrous events on public perceptions of the 'enemy' and on bilateral relations. In this context, the author warns against the simplistic assumption that diplomatic efforts should be causally linked with the occurrence of disasters. Instead, he asserts that disasters may have a multiplying and legitimising effect on diplomatic rapprochement.
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In almost all conflicts myths arise. Myths are false or inaccurate theories that become embedded in the psychological framework of a conflict and, by doing so, help to perpetuate differences between the parties. Thus myths, in themselves,... more
In almost all conflicts myths arise. Myths are false or inaccurate theories that become embedded in the psychological framework of a conflict and, by doing so, help to perpetuate differences between the parties. Thus myths, in themselves, can often prove to an important factors that result in the prolongation of conflicts. This piece examines the case of Cyprus 1963-64 and explodes three important myths that have arisen in the Cyprus conflict, and each of which is still used as an argument to this day. The first myth is the Greek Cypriot belief that the Treaty of Guarantee has been a detrimental force in Cyprus. The second myth is the Turkish Cypriot belief that at all stages in the Cyprus conflict Athens has manipulated the Greek Cypriots. The third and final myth is the belief held by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots that their respective motherlands have always promoted their best interests during discussions about Cyprus.
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The British government, the dominant partner in the Joint Truce Force in Cyprus in 1963-64, tried with US support to create a new NATO-based peacekeeping force, despite consistent opposition from the Greek Cypriots. Britain initially... more
The British government, the dominant partner in the Joint Truce Force in Cyprus in 1963-64, tried with US support to create a new NATO-based peacekeeping force, despite consistent opposition from the Greek Cypriots. Britain initially opposed UN involvement in peacekeeping, fearing that this would lead to the loss of the British sovereign bases on the island, and also opposed the creation of a Commonwealth force. Britain eventually accepted the creation of a UN force as a final option allowing the British government to be relieved of the sole burden of peacekeeping in an increasingly hostile environment.
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The United Kingdom has been Kosovo’s single most important European ally in its attempts to gain recognition and acceptance on the international stage. Having been at the forefront of efforts to NATO intervention in 1999, from the very... more
The United Kingdom has been Kosovo’s single most important European ally in its attempts to gain recognition and acceptance on the international stage. Having been at the forefront of efforts to NATO intervention in 1999, from the very start of the status process the British Government left no doubt that it viewed statehood as the only viable final status for Kosovo. Following the declaration of independence, in February 2008, Britain, along with the United States, led the international efforts to try to persuade countries to recognize Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo is now recognized by more than half the members of the United Nations. At the same time, Britain also helped pave the way for Kosovo’s membership of many key international bodies, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the International Olympic Committee. Britain also played a key role in supporting Kosovo during the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of the declaration of independence. For all these reasons, it would not be an exaggeration to say that no other EU member has done as much as the United Kingdom to support Kosovo’s recognition efforts.
Although Britain continues to support Kosovo’s international integration, and still lobbies for recognition whenever and wherever opportunities arise, there is no doubt that the intensity of British activity in this area has decreased in recent years. This is due to several factors. In large part, it is down to the increasing difficulty of persuading countries that have not yet recognized Kosovo to do so. Allied to this, there has been a growing realization of the damage that this failure to secure more recognitions has on wider perceptions of British influence. Then there is Britain’s frustration at what it sees as Kosovo’s inability to structure a plan to secure further recognitions. Meanwhile, British officials have expressed frustration at the dysfunctional domestic political situation in Kosovo. This has also made it more difficult to persuade countries to recognize Kosovo. Finally, all these factors are playing out at a time when the wider international environment is in a period of extreme change. The looming prospect of Britain’s departure from the European Union raises important questions about the way in which it can continue to support Kosovo in the years ahead.
Although Britain continues to support Kosovo’s international integration, and still lobbies for recognition whenever and wherever opportunities arise, there is no doubt that the intensity of British activity in this area has decreased in recent years. This is due to several factors. In large part, it is down to the increasing difficulty of persuading countries that have not yet recognized Kosovo to do so. Allied to this, there has been a growing realization of the damage that this failure to secure more recognitions has on wider perceptions of British influence. Then there is Britain’s frustration at what it sees as Kosovo’s inability to structure a plan to secure further recognitions. Meanwhile, British officials have expressed frustration at the dysfunctional domestic political situation in Kosovo. This has also made it more difficult to persuade countries to recognize Kosovo. Finally, all these factors are playing out at a time when the wider international environment is in a period of extreme change. The looming prospect of Britain’s departure from the European Union raises important questions about the way in which it can continue to support Kosovo in the years ahead.
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On 17 February 2008, following a two-year status process overseen by the United Nations, Kosovo declared independence. The decision was greeted by very different reactions around the world. While the newly created Republic of Kosovo was... more
On 17 February 2008, following a two-year status process overseen by the United Nations, Kosovo declared independence. The decision was greeted by very different reactions around the world. While the newly created Republic of Kosovo was quickly recognised by the United States and other key Western states, such as Canada and Japan, Kosovo’s claim to sovereign statehood was strongly rejected by Russia and China, as well as many emerging regional powers, such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and Indonesia. Significantly, these differences over Kosovo’s status were also mirrored within the European Union. While the overwhelming majority of the EU’s 27 members recognised Kosovo as an independent state in the months following the declaration of independence, five countries chose not to do so: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. More than a decade later, they have still not recognised Kosovo.
Given the highly contentious way in which it emerged, there is perhaps a tendency to think about the way in which the international community interacts with Kosovo in distinctly binary terms: the recognisers and the non-recognisers. This division naturally leads to assumptions about the quality of the relationship Kosovo enjoys with the wider world. Amongst the recognisers, or so the thinking goes, relations are good, and the ties are strong and fruitful. Meanwhile, as the non-recognisers refuse to accept Kosovo’s statehood, they must necessarily keep their distance. To be sure, there are some states that sit firmly within these categories. For instance, amongst the recognisers, there are those states that have built up strong relations with Kosovo across a range of areas. In some cases, these states have been at the forefront of efforts to help Kosovo cement its status on the international stage. Likewise, at the other end of the scale are the non-recognising countries that resolutely oppose Kosovo’s claim to statehood and steadfastly refuse to have anything to do with it. Some of these countries have been instrumental in trying to prevent Kosovo from being recognised by other states or from joining international bodies.
However, this simple division tells an incomplete, if not wholly wrong, story. In truth the two broad camps – recognisers and non-recognisers – are far more heterogeneous than is often realised. Over the course of the past ten years, a wide variation of positions has emerged. While recognition is important, there is a tendency to forget that it is merely one element, albeit an important one, of the wider process of interaction between states. It is, in many ways, a starting point (although not the only starting point). The subsequent establishment of working political, economic and cultural relations are the basis for deeper and more sustained engagement between countries. It is in this regard that the binary divisions between recognisers and non-recognisers begins to break down. One thing that has become very obvious is that recognition does not necessarily mean engagement. The past decade has shown that there are many countries that have recognised Kosovo but have little, if any, actual interaction with it, whether in terms of formal diplomatic relations or in terms of wider economic and cultural engagement. Equally, the past decade has also shown that non-recognition does not automatically preclude any form of interaction. Around the world, there are a number of countries that have not recognised Kosovo, but nevertheless have developed a range of relations with it, including regular contacts between officials.
Given the highly contentious way in which it emerged, there is perhaps a tendency to think about the way in which the international community interacts with Kosovo in distinctly binary terms: the recognisers and the non-recognisers. This division naturally leads to assumptions about the quality of the relationship Kosovo enjoys with the wider world. Amongst the recognisers, or so the thinking goes, relations are good, and the ties are strong and fruitful. Meanwhile, as the non-recognisers refuse to accept Kosovo’s statehood, they must necessarily keep their distance. To be sure, there are some states that sit firmly within these categories. For instance, amongst the recognisers, there are those states that have built up strong relations with Kosovo across a range of areas. In some cases, these states have been at the forefront of efforts to help Kosovo cement its status on the international stage. Likewise, at the other end of the scale are the non-recognising countries that resolutely oppose Kosovo’s claim to statehood and steadfastly refuse to have anything to do with it. Some of these countries have been instrumental in trying to prevent Kosovo from being recognised by other states or from joining international bodies.
However, this simple division tells an incomplete, if not wholly wrong, story. In truth the two broad camps – recognisers and non-recognisers – are far more heterogeneous than is often realised. Over the course of the past ten years, a wide variation of positions has emerged. While recognition is important, there is a tendency to forget that it is merely one element, albeit an important one, of the wider process of interaction between states. It is, in many ways, a starting point (although not the only starting point). The subsequent establishment of working political, economic and cultural relations are the basis for deeper and more sustained engagement between countries. It is in this regard that the binary divisions between recognisers and non-recognisers begins to break down. One thing that has become very obvious is that recognition does not necessarily mean engagement. The past decade has shown that there are many countries that have recognised Kosovo but have little, if any, actual interaction with it, whether in terms of formal diplomatic relations or in terms of wider economic and cultural engagement. Equally, the past decade has also shown that non-recognition does not automatically preclude any form of interaction. Around the world, there are a number of countries that have not recognised Kosovo, but nevertheless have developed a range of relations with it, including regular contacts between officials.
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There are few questions more interesting and more important for the international community than the issue of how new states are created and accepted into the wider global system through the process of recognition. While there are... more
There are few questions more interesting and more important for the international community than the issue of how new states are created and accepted into the wider global system through the process of recognition. While there are thousands of ethnic groups around the world, there are just 193 member states of the United Nations. And yet, for many years, the foreign policy aspects of secession and the recognition of seceding territories have received relatively little attention by scholars in the field of politics and international relations. This was largely because the subject was seen to be a marginal interest. Few territories managed to stage a credible attempt at secession. Almost none managed to gain widespread acceptance. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant growth in the attention given to secession and recognition in international relations. This has been particularly apparent since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, and because of heightened secessionist tensions in the former Soviet Union.
To date, the question of de facto states—territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized—has been at the heart of studies into secession and recognition in the field of politics and international relations. Attention in this area has tended to focus on the nature, structure, and international interaction of unrecognized territories. However, the scope of research is now widening. As well as interest in the historical development of attitudes towards secession and recognition practices, scholars are now looking at the way in which parent states—as the territories they have broken away from are generally known—attempt to prevent de facto states from being recognized or otherwise legitimized by the international community. Meanwhile, increasing attention is also being given to the role of external parties, such as great powers, as well as to the efforts of secessionist territories themselves to find ways to encourage recognition, or at least to participate more widely in the international system. Therefore, while the community of scholars working in the field of secession and recognition is still relatively small, the subject itself is undergoing rapid growth.
To date, the question of de facto states—territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized—has been at the heart of studies into secession and recognition in the field of politics and international relations. Attention in this area has tended to focus on the nature, structure, and international interaction of unrecognized territories. However, the scope of research is now widening. As well as interest in the historical development of attitudes towards secession and recognition practices, scholars are now looking at the way in which parent states—as the territories they have broken away from are generally known—attempt to prevent de facto states from being recognized or otherwise legitimized by the international community. Meanwhile, increasing attention is also being given to the role of external parties, such as great powers, as well as to the efforts of secessionist territories themselves to find ways to encourage recognition, or at least to participate more widely in the international system. Therefore, while the community of scholars working in the field of secession and recognition is still relatively small, the subject itself is undergoing rapid growth.
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On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). The result sent shockwaves around the world. Few could really believe that the British people (in reality, the people of England and Wales) had decided to... more
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). The result sent shockwaves around the world. Few could really believe that the British people (in reality, the people of England and Wales) had decided to turn their back on their 43-year relationship with the EU. Needless to say, the impact of this event is going to be felt for many years to come. One area where it is likely to be felt particularly strongly is in the Western Balkans.
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union will be felt in the Western Balkans in at least three distinct ways. In the first instance, Britain will no longer be a central actor in the region. This is likely to be felt most acutely in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, and perhaps contrary to perceived wisdom, its effects on enlargement might actually be rather less pronounced than many believe. Of course, Britain will try to ensure that its role in the region will be maintained through other avenues. These are likely to be very poor substi- tutes. Secondly, Brexit is likely to change the wider debate about enlargement. As the EU digests the consequences of Britain’s departure, the question many are now asking is whether the process of expansion will speed up, as the EU attempts to reinforce the European project, or slow down, as it confronts the need for fundamental changes internally. Indeed, will we perhaps see other countries follow the UK thereby weakening the EU even further? Thirdly, there is the wider question about growing populism across Europe. Brexit may well have been a product of specific circumstances pre- sent in the United Kingdom. However, we cannot ignore the fact that it also appears to have wider origins. Again, this could well be felt in the Western Balkans. Then there is the question about the reaction from the region. Will Brexit see a growth in Eurosceptic senti- ment in the Western Balkans?
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union will be felt in the Western Balkans in at least three distinct ways. In the first instance, Britain will no longer be a central actor in the region. This is likely to be felt most acutely in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, and perhaps contrary to perceived wisdom, its effects on enlargement might actually be rather less pronounced than many believe. Of course, Britain will try to ensure that its role in the region will be maintained through other avenues. These are likely to be very poor substi- tutes. Secondly, Brexit is likely to change the wider debate about enlargement. As the EU digests the consequences of Britain’s departure, the question many are now asking is whether the process of expansion will speed up, as the EU attempts to reinforce the European project, or slow down, as it confronts the need for fundamental changes internally. Indeed, will we perhaps see other countries follow the UK thereby weakening the EU even further? Thirdly, there is the wider question about growing populism across Europe. Brexit may well have been a product of specific circumstances pre- sent in the United Kingdom. However, we cannot ignore the fact that it also appears to have wider origins. Again, this could well be felt in the Western Balkans. Then there is the question about the reaction from the region. Will Brexit see a growth in Eurosceptic senti- ment in the Western Balkans?
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One of the most exciting developments for those working on trying to resolve conflict has been the emergence of what is called Track 1.5 initiatives. Traditionally, efforts to resolve long-standing disputes between states would be managed... more
One of the most exciting developments for those working on trying to resolve conflict has been the emergence of what is called Track 1.5 initiatives. Traditionally, efforts to resolve long-standing disputes between states would be managed by officials sitting across the table from each other in a very formal setting, either openly or in secret. Meanwhile, various non-governmental groups might try to contribute to peace by trying to pressure their governments or by attempting to build up wider public support for a conflict resolution process.
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The United Kingdom is still keen to express rhetorical support for EU enlargement, but its overall attitude towards the dossier, and its ability to shape the Union’s policies in this area, have been dampened by an increasingly hostile... more
The United Kingdom is still keen to express rhetorical support for EU enlargement, but its overall attitude towards the dossier, and its ability to shape the Union’s policies in this area, have been dampened by an increasingly hostile immigration debate, coupled with rising Euroscepticism and growing support for the UK Independence Party. To be sure, all political parties in the country have become increasingly hard-line on the subject of immigration, so that the freedom of movement within the EU has been conflated with the arrival of people from outside the European Union. In addition, the question of whether the United Kingdom will leave the EU has arguably weakened the weight of its views on new members and its influence on the Balkan region. To the extent that there is a strong and specific British interest in the accession of the Balkans, it is narrowly focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the interrelated paths of Serbia and Kosovo. Beyond that, there are no underlying historical, cultural or economic factors driving Britain’s commitment to the European perspective of the Balkan region.
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For over 50 years, the island of Cyprus has been a central bone of contention between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, one can argue that the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities has done more to poison the relationship... more
For over 50 years, the island of Cyprus has been a central bone of contention between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, one can argue that the conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities has done more to poison the relationship between Athens and Ankara than the myriad of other issues – such as the disputes over territorial waters and airspace in the Aegean, or the treatment of respective minorities – that have led to tensions between the two countries in the modern era. Cyprus has brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of armed conflict on several occasions. For this reason, it is now widely believed that any attempt to bring about a full normalisation of Greek-Turkish relations, let alone build a strong and enduring friendship between the two, can only occur once the long-standing division of Cyprus – often otherwise known as the Cyprus Issue or the Cyprus Problem – has been tackled. But is this really the case?
The problem is that solving Cyprus has seemingly become an impossible task. Starting in 1964 and continuing to the present day, the United Nations has been at the forefront of efforts to bridge the gap between the two communities. However, despite numerous initiatives, the island remains divided. This chapter will consider the various attempts to solve the Cyprus Problem before analysing the main points of difference that appear to stand in the way of a comprehensive settlement. Lastly, it will consider the implications of yet another breakdown of talks. What effects does the continued division of the island have for the various actors that are most directly involved – the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey, as well as the European Union and the United Nations? After all this time and effort, and with little apparent prospect of success on the horizon, does a solution to the Cyprus Problem really still matter?
The problem is that solving Cyprus has seemingly become an impossible task. Starting in 1964 and continuing to the present day, the United Nations has been at the forefront of efforts to bridge the gap between the two communities. However, despite numerous initiatives, the island remains divided. This chapter will consider the various attempts to solve the Cyprus Problem before analysing the main points of difference that appear to stand in the way of a comprehensive settlement. Lastly, it will consider the implications of yet another breakdown of talks. What effects does the continued division of the island have for the various actors that are most directly involved – the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey, as well as the European Union and the United Nations? After all this time and effort, and with little apparent prospect of success on the horizon, does a solution to the Cyprus Problem really still matter?
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Over the course of the past fifty years, Cyprus has become a byword for an intractable ethnic conflict. Most of the time, the Cyprus Problem is little more than a source of irritation for various international policymakers. Sometimes, it... more
Over the course of the past fifty years, Cyprus has become a byword for an intractable ethnic conflict. Most of the time, the Cyprus Problem is little more than a source of irritation for various international policymakers. Sometimes, it becomes front-page news. Having last made the headlines in 2004, when a major attempt by the United Nations to bring about the island’s reunification was defeated by Greek Cypriot voters, the island is starting to creep up the international agenda once again in 2012. The likely collapse of the latest round of UN-sponsored peace talks and the forthcoming Cypriot Presidency of the EU look likely to lead to further tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the discovery of natural gas off the south coast of Cyprus could yet spark a new conflict in the region.
Situated at the farthest eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, the small island of Cyprus has played a disproportionately large role in the development of human rights in the modern era. Over the course of forty years, the conflict... more
Situated at the farthest eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, the small island of Cyprus has played a disproportionately large role in the development of human rights in the modern era. Over the course of forty years, the conflict between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities has touched on a range of substantive human rights issues, including questions relating to self-determination, minority rights, the treatment of internally displaced persons and the introduction of settlers into areas deemed to be under occupation. However, it is perhaps with regard to the question of property rights that the island has become best known. During the 1974 Turkish military invasion of the island, many thousands of Greek Cypriots were forced to flee their homes. Twenty years later, and following numerous attempts to reunite the island, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Turkey was in military occupation of the northern third of the island and ordered the Turkish Government to pay compensation to Titina Loizidou for the ongoing loss of use of her property. This landmark judgement effectively cemented the principle that the invasion and occupation of territory cannot be legitimised with the passage of time. The land remained the property of its original owners and that states would be liable to pay ongoing compensation to the owners for the loss of use of that property. However, the ruling also opened up important new questions. Most notably, it raises questions about the degree to which a political settlement underpinned by a regime of compensation for property lost, rather than full restitution as laid down by the ECHR, can be held to be in conformity with the new principles laid down by the Court.
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This article explores the relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the Middle East. Although it is now a member of the European Union, geographically Cyprus was long viewed as a peripheral part of the Middle East. This has... more
This article explores the relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the Middle East. Although it is now a member of the European Union, geographically Cyprus was long viewed as a peripheral part of the Middle East. This has naturally created a certain ambiguity in terms of the relationship the island has with its regional neighbours. However, politics rather than geography has been the main force driving modern and contemporary relations. Throughout the Cold War, Cyprus was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, along with many of the other countries of the region. Its relations with the region have also been shaped by its desire to prevent the Muslim Arab states from recognizing the Turkish Cypriot breakaway regime in northern Cyprus. In turn, these factors shaped Cyprus' views on a number of regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the invasion of Iraq. Since it joined the EU, in May 2004, Cyprus has increasingly taken an equidistant approach on regional issues and increasingly sees itself as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
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In many ways, Cyprus can be regarded as the most significant recent example of the European Union’s (EU) potential to resolve conflict in its neighbourhood. The process that led to the referendum on the island’s reunification in 2004 was... more
In many ways, Cyprus can be regarded as the most significant recent example of the European Union’s (EU) potential to resolve conflict in its neighbourhood. The process that led to the referendum on the island’s reunification in 2004 was directly attributable to the EU decision to accept Cyprus as a member. However, as will be seen, this power had little to do with the EU’s active intervention or involvement as an overt and specific actor in the process. Unlike its role in other areas, such as the Balkans or Africa, it did not send peacekeepers to Cyprus. Nor did it conduct a formal mediation process or provide a means of communication between parties. Its role in the actual discussions was in fact very limited, mainly confined to providing technical advice to the parties and to the United Nations (UN).
Instead, the EU provided the context for a meaningful reunification process to take place. Its decision to accept Cyprus as a candidate for membership, and its insistence that it could not be held back because of the division, created the political conditions for the parties, most particularly the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community, to engage in the negotiation process in a way that had not been seen before. It therefore provided a catalyst for a settlement. The problem was that this process of ‘incentivisation’ was unevenly applied. Steps needed to be taken to ensure that the Greek Cypriot community could not play the system. This, perhaps more than anything, highlights the fact that while the EU can indeed be a ‘game changer’, this role requires it to be more active than many assume. It is not enough to think that the mere prospect of accession can help parties reach a solution to a long-standing dispute. The EU must continually ensure that the political incentives and conditions are managed to ensure full engagement by all sides. In other words, when one is considering the ways in which the EU can act as a catalyst for conflict resolution, even the power of attraction – the desirability of EU membership that draws countries closer to the Union – needs to be managed.
Instead, the EU provided the context for a meaningful reunification process to take place. Its decision to accept Cyprus as a candidate for membership, and its insistence that it could not be held back because of the division, created the political conditions for the parties, most particularly the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot community, to engage in the negotiation process in a way that had not been seen before. It therefore provided a catalyst for a settlement. The problem was that this process of ‘incentivisation’ was unevenly applied. Steps needed to be taken to ensure that the Greek Cypriot community could not play the system. This, perhaps more than anything, highlights the fact that while the EU can indeed be a ‘game changer’, this role requires it to be more active than many assume. It is not enough to think that the mere prospect of accession can help parties reach a solution to a long-standing dispute. The EU must continually ensure that the political incentives and conditions are managed to ensure full engagement by all sides. In other words, when one is considering the ways in which the EU can act as a catalyst for conflict resolution, even the power of attraction – the desirability of EU membership that draws countries closer to the Union – needs to be managed.
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It is a desperately difficult task to identify one specific area that could and should be the focus of efforts to break the deadlock between the two sides in Cyprus. For some, the path to reunification lies in tackling specific issues.... more
It is a desperately difficult task to identify one specific area that could and should be the focus of efforts to break the deadlock between the two sides in Cyprus. For some, the path to reunification lies in tackling specific issues. For example, many see security, either for the Greek or the Turkish Cypriots, as a fundamental point that needs to be addressed. This was borne out in 2004, when many Greek Cypriot respondents listed this as the main factor shaping their decision to vote against the Annan Plan. Take away the Turkish troops, and the unacceptable guarantee system that allows Turkey to intervene in the affairs of Cyprus, and the Greek Cypriots would be more amenable to a solution. Others focus on process, such as the way in which the UN handles the talks as the problem.
To my mind, the key problem lies in the way in which the end outcome of the process has been presented and debated. In particular, it seems regrettable that the concept of ‘loose federation’ has come to be seen by Greek Cypriots as a wholly unacceptable model for a settlement. Indeed, the mere mention of the term tends to provoke strongly negative reactions from many ordinary Greek Cypriots. This is unfortunate. In many ways, and being wholly realistic, as much as it would be desirable to see the two communities forge a close cooperative working relationship, it seems obvious that this is not going to happen at this stage. Instead, limiting the points of likely or potential political friction between the two communities represents the most logical aim for any settlement process.
To my mind, the key problem lies in the way in which the end outcome of the process has been presented and debated. In particular, it seems regrettable that the concept of ‘loose federation’ has come to be seen by Greek Cypriots as a wholly unacceptable model for a settlement. Indeed, the mere mention of the term tends to provoke strongly negative reactions from many ordinary Greek Cypriots. This is unfortunate. In many ways, and being wholly realistic, as much as it would be desirable to see the two communities forge a close cooperative working relationship, it seems obvious that this is not going to happen at this stage. Instead, limiting the points of likely or potential political friction between the two communities represents the most logical aim for any settlement process.
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In the months prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Serbian Government began devising a range of political, economic and legal responses to that territory’s decision to secede. At the core of the legal approach was a decision... more
In the months prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Serbian Government began devising a range of political, economic and legal responses to that territory’s decision to secede. At the core of the legal approach was a decision to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice. However, this raised a number of important questions. Should it try to challenge the declaration or the decision of countries to recognize an independent Kosovo? Serbia decided to seek an advisory opinion from the Court. This required support from the UN General Assembly. Despite opposition from key international supporters of Kosovo’s independence, Serbia engaged in an intense period of diplomacy to persuade countries to support its request. This chapter examines how Serbia brought the question of Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the Court, the political problems it encountered, and why it was ultimately successful in placing its cause before the Court.
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Research Interests: European Studies, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Balkan Studies, Conflict, and 15 moreKosovo, Foreign Policy, European Foreign Policy, European Politics, European Union, Cyprus, Peace Studies, European Union Politics, Czech Republic, Peace, Peacebuilding, Greece, Germany, Europe, and Kosovo Case
This article explores the way in which the European Union (EU) attempted to forge a united position on the question of Kosovo over the course of the latter stages of the status process, which ran from late 2005 until the end of 2007.... more
This article explores the way in which the European Union (EU) attempted to forge a united position on the question of Kosovo over the course of the latter stages of the status process, which ran from late 2005 until the end of 2007. Following an overview of the development of EU foreign policy decision-making processes, the work analyses how these were applied in the case of Kosovo. It shows that while significant efforts were made to reach a united position on the question of recognition, these efforts eventually proved to be unsuccessful. The EU Member States ultimately agreed to the establishment of a law and order mission for Kosovo. To some, this was a success, but it cannot disguise the fact that procedural changes in the EU’s foreign policy decision-making do not cover up for diverging Member State interests and that the EU was unable to take charge of what was essentially a European issue.
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Although Kosovo has been recognized by most members of the European Union, there are still five states that refuse to accept its unilateral declaration of independence. Kosovo's ‘European perspective’ would therefore appear to be... more
Although Kosovo has been recognized by most members of the European Union, there are still five states that refuse to accept its unilateral declaration of independence. Kosovo's ‘European perspective’ would therefore appear to be hampered by its contested status. However, this paper argues that while the dispute over its independence is significant, and certainly makes establishing relations with the EU more difficult than might otherwise have been the case, it is not as problematic as it may appear. For the meantime, Kosovo remains a long way away from meeting even the most basic requirements for formal EU integration. At this stage, the key task facing the EU is state building. Somewhat paradoxically, this has not required a united position on status. Even in the medium term, the question of status need not be an impediment to Kosovo's EU integration in a range of areas. Even in those instances where a formal relationship needs to be established, there are ways in which this can be managed. Indeed, this paper argues that only when Kosovo is ready for full EU membership would its contested status become a wholly decisive issue for its ‘European perspective’.
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For most of the last forty years, the UN Secretary-General has been regarded by the Greek Cypriots as a fair and impartial intermediary in the efforts to solve the Cyprus Problem. However, a poll taken in the middle of 2005 showed that... more
For most of the last forty years, the UN Secretary-General has been regarded by the Greek Cypriots as a fair and impartial intermediary in the efforts to solve the Cyprus Problem. However, a poll taken in the middle of 2005 showed that the standing of the UN Secretary-General has ...
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While certainly important for international peace and stability, there is nevertheless a prevailing view that the developments in the Middle East have a rather limited effect beyond the immediate region and that external involvement tends... more
While certainly important for international peace and stability, there is nevertheless a prevailing view that the developments in the Middle East have a rather limited effect beyond the immediate region and that external involvement tends to be concentrated on the key members of the ...
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For over fifty years, the international community, led by the United Nations, hasattempted to find a settlement to the so-called Cyprus Problem. Following the collapse of the latest talks in 2017, there is real concern that the island is... more
For over fifty years, the international community, led by the United Nations, hasattempted to find a settlement to the so-called Cyprus Problem. Following the collapse of the latest talks in 2017, there is real concern that the island is now drifting towards a permanent and irrevocable division as the communities become ever more estranged. To this end, urgent steps are needed to try to forge greater contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, many initiatives are being held back over fears of recognition. This report argues that such concerns, while understandable, are threatening to make reunification impossible. Building on a growing understanding in academic and policy circles that the concept of ‘engagement without recognition’ is a valuable tool of conflict management in secessionist disputes, the report outlines a number of tangible steps that can be taken to promote a ‘culture of engagement’ between the island’s communities. These range from making the political case for greater communal interaction and offering official funding such activities through to implementing already agreed initiatives and addressing the legacy of the past. While such steps should be locally driven, the international community has a crucial part to play. In future, the leaders of the two communities should not merely be judged on their willingness to engage in settlement negotiations. They should also be judged on their willingness to create the wider conditions for reunification and future cohabitation.
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Research Interests: Foreign Policy Analysis, Balkan Studies, Kosovo, Foreign Policy, Czech & Slovak Studies, and 21 moreBritish Foreign Policy, Cyprus, Enlargement and Integration in the EU, German Foreign Policy, Southeastern Europe, Poland, Czech Republic, Spain, United Kingdom, Greek Foreign Policy, Greece, Balkans, Germany, EU Foreign Policy, EU Enlargement, Spanish Foreign Policy, Western Balkans, Polish Foreign Policy, Slovakia, Slovak Foreign Policy, and Czech Foreign Policy
This collection of papers draws together some of the latest thinking about ways in which Turkey can and should cooperate with its international partners in tackling terrorism. Drawn from a conference held at the Royal United Services... more
This collection of papers draws together some of the latest thinking about ways in which Turkey can and should cooperate with its international partners in tackling terrorism.
Drawn from a conference held at the Royal United Services Institute in March 2009, it explores a wide range of topics, ranging from the ways in which Turkey is seeking to secure its energy infrastructure, through to the ways in which it has built a co-operative relationship with neighbours who once supported terrorist activities in Turkey.
The conference discussions were based at the time on the UK’s long-term CONTEST strategy and its four main pillars: PREPARE, PURSUE, PREVENT and PROTECT as they applied to Turkey, bringing experts together to explore the issues and ways of tackling them.
Drawn from a conference held at the Royal United Services Institute in March 2009, it explores a wide range of topics, ranging from the ways in which Turkey is seeking to secure its energy infrastructure, through to the ways in which it has built a co-operative relationship with neighbours who once supported terrorist activities in Turkey.
The conference discussions were based at the time on the UK’s long-term CONTEST strategy and its four main pillars: PREPARE, PURSUE, PREVENT and PROTECT as they applied to Turkey, bringing experts together to explore the issues and ways of tackling them.
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For over fifty years, the Cyprus Problem has been a byword for an intractable ethnic conflict. Despite many efforts to broker an agreement, the UN has been unable to resolve the dispute between the island's Greek and Turkish communities.... more
For over fifty years, the Cyprus Problem has been a byword for an intractable ethnic conflict. Despite many efforts to broker an agreement, the UN has been unable to resolve the dispute between the island's Greek and Turkish communities. In the early hours of Friday, 7 July, UN sponsored talks aimed at the reunifi-cation of Cyprus broke up without agreement. After ten days of discussions in the Swiss mountain resort of Crans Montana, the UN Secretary-General was forced to conclude that no settlement was possible. It was a bitter blow for the many observers who felt that this latest negotiation process between the Cypriot leaders had been the best chance to resolve the long-standing division of the island. The collapse of the most recent settlement initiative has raised serious questions about the future of efforts to reach a solution. With the resumption of talks unlikely in the foreseeable future, and the possibility of tension over energy resources in the region, attention is turning to longer term ways to resolve the Cyprus Problem. Efforts to reunite the island as a federation look increasingly untenable. However, the international community will not accept two separate states on the island. Meanwhile, the threat of Turkish annexation would have disastrous consequences for both communities. It may be time to take a radically different approach. Perhaps a more organic approach towards a settlement is now needed.
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The role of the European Union as a catalyst for conflict transformation and resolution has become a major area of interest for scholars in recent years. However, the catalytic effect, while accepted as a real phenomenon, is nevertheless... more
The role of the European Union as a catalyst for conflict transformation and resolution has become a major area of interest for scholars in recent years. However, the catalytic effect, while accepted as a real phenomenon, is nevertheless rather nebulous and ill-defined. As a result, efforts are now being made to define the precise nature of the catalytic effect, examine its limitations and explore the ways in which it can be strengthened. One approach to enhance its effect is to try to incorporate some form of conditionality into the process. In order to explore this idea more fully, this article examines the case of Cyprus, which is a prominent recent example of the way in which the EU can help to create the conditions conflict resolution. But while Cyprus highlights that strength of the catalytic effect, it also provided a graphic illustration of the multitude of difficulties associated with trying to enhance the effect by formally incorporating an element of associated conditionality into the process.
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There have been growing fears that the political leadership in Republika Srpska (RS) is in the process of laying the foundations for an attempt to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Drawing on a range of legal and political arguments,... more
There have been growing fears that the political leadership in Republika Srpska (RS) is in the process of laying the foundations for an attempt to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Drawing on a range of legal and political arguments, this paper assesses whether a unilateral declaration of independence is in fact a realistic scenario. It concludes that it is not. Apart from the international community’s deep-rooted aversion to secession, there are very strong specific factors that mitigate against it. Moreover, for varying reasons, Bosnia cannot be compared to other cases, such as Kosovo, Scotland or Catalonia. Meanwhile, at a very practical level, any act of secession would need to be supported by Serbia. This will not happen. For all these reasons, the threat of secession, and even the significance of any referendum on separation, should be downplayed. Indeed, it is argued that the biggest threat to peace and stability in the country is not the prospect of secession, but the danger that such a scenario is being given undue and unwarranted credibility by some officials and observers.
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As a new round of talks to reunify Cyprus continues, there is a real sense that a solution might at long last be possible. Significantly, there also seems to be a desire by the two sides to reach their own settlement with minimal external... more
As a new round of talks to reunify Cyprus continues, there is a real sense that a solution might at long last be possible. Significantly, there also seems to be a desire by the two sides to reach their own settlement with minimal external input. However, while most issues can be dealt with at a bilateral level, security is one specific area that necessarily requires outside involvement, whether in terms of input from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom – the three Guarantor Powers – of from the wider international community. This paper explores the various dimensions of the security debate,
examining the implications of a continued Greek and Turkish military presence on the island and the proposals for demilitarisation, which will require a rather more comprehensive approach to security than has hitherto been the case. In ensuring the island’s domestic stability, as well as securing its external defences, inventive thinking will be needed to reach some form of acceptable mechanism to ensure the island’s post-solution independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Keywords: Cyprus, Security, Defence, United Nations, NATO, OSCE, European Union, Britain, Greece, Turkey
examining the implications of a continued Greek and Turkish military presence on the island and the proposals for demilitarisation, which will require a rather more comprehensive approach to security than has hitherto been the case. In ensuring the island’s domestic stability, as well as securing its external defences, inventive thinking will be needed to reach some form of acceptable mechanism to ensure the island’s post-solution independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Keywords: Cyprus, Security, Defence, United Nations, NATO, OSCE, European Union, Britain, Greece, Turkey
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2004 marked the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations presence in Cyprus. Since March 1964, the UN has been responsible for addressing and managing both peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts on the island. This paper focuses on this... more
2004 marked the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations presence in Cyprus. Since March 1964, the UN has been responsible for addressing and managing both peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts on the island. This paper focuses on this latter task. Starting with U Thant, who served as UN Secretary-General from 1961-71, it surveys and summarises the efforts of five successive secretaries-general of the United Nations to resolve the political differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the course of four decades. It concludes with the most recent effort to broker a settlement undertaken by the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. In addition to evaluating the various types of UN efforts undertaken, such as mediation and the mission of good offices, it also reviews the way in which the goals of the peacemaking process have changed along the way, such as the search for increased autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots, the creation of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal settlement and confidence building. Looking ahead, and in view of suggestions that the European Union might take over a peacemaking role, the paper concludes that the UN will in fact continue to manage attempts at reunification in the future.
In May 2023, significant clashes broke out in Kosovo when the central government in Pristina tried to impose ethnic Albanian mayors in the predominantly Serb-inhabited north. The resulting fighting led to over 40 NATO peacekeepers being... more
In May 2023, significant clashes broke out in Kosovo when the central government in Pristina tried to impose ethnic Albanian mayors in the predominantly Serb-inhabited north. The resulting fighting led to over 40 NATO peacekeepers being injured and saw the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, heavily criticised by the United States and the European Union for destabilising regional peace and security. All this has once again highlighted the desperate need for a full and final agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. But while attention has long been focused on some form of autonomy, has the time come to reconsider a more radical option? Partition.
Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008 has left the International community bitterly divided. However, it has also seen divisions within Kosovo. While ethnic Serbs in the central and southern parts of Kosovo accept the new state of affairs, the Serbs in the north have acknowledged Pristina's authority. However, calls for the four northern regions - Leposavic, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica - to be handed over to Serbia's control as part of a wider territorial adjustment, or 'land-swap', between Serbia and Kosovo has been steadfastly rejected by many Western countries. Indeed, talks aimed at a settlement based on this option in 2018 were blocked by Britain and Germany. Instead, international efforts have been directed towards autonomy in the form of an Association of Serb Municipalities. But a decade after the idea was first proposed, no progress has been made on the issue. Given the ongoing problems, is it time to revisit a territorial settlement that would finally allow Kosovo to gain full international acceptance and allow Serbia to move on?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008 has left the International community bitterly divided. However, it has also seen divisions within Kosovo. While ethnic Serbs in the central and southern parts of Kosovo accept the new state of affairs, the Serbs in the north have acknowledged Pristina's authority. However, calls for the four northern regions - Leposavic, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica - to be handed over to Serbia's control as part of a wider territorial adjustment, or 'land-swap', between Serbia and Kosovo has been steadfastly rejected by many Western countries. Indeed, talks aimed at a settlement based on this option in 2018 were blocked by Britain and Germany. Instead, international efforts have been directed towards autonomy in the form of an Association of Serb Municipalities. But a decade after the idea was first proposed, no progress has been made on the issue. Given the ongoing problems, is it time to revisit a territorial settlement that would finally allow Kosovo to gain full international acceptance and allow Serbia to move on?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
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Since May 2023, the Indian state of Manipur has been riven by ethnic violence as members of the majority Meitei and the minority Kuki hill tribe have been locked in conflict. But the fighting, which has left over a hundred dead and tens... more
Since May 2023, the Indian state of Manipur has been riven by ethnic violence as members of the majority Meitei and the minority Kuki hill tribe have been locked in conflict. But the fighting, which has left over a hundred dead and tens of thousands homeless, is merely the latest in a long history of ethnic tensions in the state. More to the point, it has revived calls for Manipur to be divided, thus allowing the Kuki to establish a homeland within India.
Manipur lies in northeast India, close to the borders with Bangladesh, China and Burma, also known as Myanmar. Once an independent kingdom, it became a princely state within British India in the Kate nineteenth century. Then, after Indian independence, it briefly became an independent kingdom again before uniting with India, where it became an Indian state in 1972. However, throughout its history, it has faced a conflict between the various main groups: the Meitei, the Naga and the Kuki - the latter two recognised as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and thus protected under the Indian Constitution. This tension has been fed by the privileges enjoyed by the Hindu-majority Meitei and the Christian Kuki ties to neighbouring regional groups, including the Mizo and the Chin, in Burma. But while this at one stage led to an armed independence movement, since 2008, the Kuki insurgents have accepted a ceasefire agreement - the Suspension of Operation (SoO). However, this was thrown into doubt when the Manipur government refused to renew the SoO, and the Manipur Hugh Court called for the Meitei also to be given Scheduled Tribe status. Seen as a threat by the Kuki, this soon led to rioting and wider unrest. It has also fed calls for a new Kuki territory within India, known as Kukiland. But is this likely?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Manipur lies in northeast India, close to the borders with Bangladesh, China and Burma, also known as Myanmar. Once an independent kingdom, it became a princely state within British India in the Kate nineteenth century. Then, after Indian independence, it briefly became an independent kingdom again before uniting with India, where it became an Indian state in 1972. However, throughout its history, it has faced a conflict between the various main groups: the Meitei, the Naga and the Kuki - the latter two recognised as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and thus protected under the Indian Constitution. This tension has been fed by the privileges enjoyed by the Hindu-majority Meitei and the Christian Kuki ties to neighbouring regional groups, including the Mizo and the Chin, in Burma. But while this at one stage led to an armed independence movement, since 2008, the Kuki insurgents have accepted a ceasefire agreement - the Suspension of Operation (SoO). However, this was thrown into doubt when the Manipur government refused to renew the SoO, and the Manipur Hugh Court called for the Meitei also to be given Scheduled Tribe status. Seen as a threat by the Kuki, this soon led to rioting and wider unrest. It has also fed calls for a new Kuki territory within India, known as Kukiland. But is this likely?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
In April 2023, France launched a major security operation to round up and deport tens of thousands of migrants who had arrived illegally on Mayotte, one of its overseas departments in the Indian Ocean. However, Operation Wuambushu (“Take... more
In April 2023, France launched a major security operation to round up and deport tens of thousands of migrants who had arrived illegally on Mayotte, one of its overseas departments in the Indian Ocean. However, Operation Wuambushu (“Take Back”) caused an outcry amongst human rights groups. At the same time, it also cast a light on the contested status of the island, which is a part of the archipelago of the Comoros Islands.
Even today, the legacy of European imperialism is still felt worldwide. But it is most acutely felt in territories that were partitioned as part of a process of partial decolonisation. Mayotte is one of the most interesting examples. It refused to join the Union of the Comoros, which unilaterally declared independence from France in 1975. Instead, following its referendum, it decided to remain a part of France. In the years since then, it has gradually integrated further into France - to the point that it is now the country's 101st department and one of its five overseas departments, alongside French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion. But this integration has also made the island a destination for Comorans seeking a better life. But as the number of migrants reaches unsustainable levels and social problems grow, the Mahorais (the inhabitants of Mayotte) have called for action. And this led to the latest massive crackdown by French security forces. But in the face of anger from Comoros, the operation has also cast an important spotlight on the consequences of the partition of the Comoros Islands fifty years ago.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Even today, the legacy of European imperialism is still felt worldwide. But it is most acutely felt in territories that were partitioned as part of a process of partial decolonisation. Mayotte is one of the most interesting examples. It refused to join the Union of the Comoros, which unilaterally declared independence from France in 1975. Instead, following its referendum, it decided to remain a part of France. In the years since then, it has gradually integrated further into France - to the point that it is now the country's 101st department and one of its five overseas departments, alongside French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion. But this integration has also made the island a destination for Comorans seeking a better life. But as the number of migrants reaches unsustainable levels and social problems grow, the Mahorais (the inhabitants of Mayotte) have called for action. And this led to the latest massive crackdown by French security forces. But in the face of anger from Comoros, the operation has also cast an important spotlight on the consequences of the partition of the Comoros Islands fifty years ago.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
As the war in Ukraine continues, there has been a growing debate in Ireland about its traditional policy of military neutrality and whether it should now consider joining NATO. Having expressed its full support for Ukraine, and with... more
As the war in Ukraine continues, there has been a growing debate in Ireland about its traditional policy of military neutrality and whether it should now consider joining NATO. Having expressed its full support for Ukraine, and with growing Russian naval activity around its shores, the Irish government has announced a public consultation on its defence policy and future strategic alignment. But will it really go so far as to end its neutral stance in world affairs and join the Western alliance?
For much of its history, Ireland has clung to the principle of military neutrality. Originally defined as a way to set itself apart from neighbouring Britain, this controversially saw Ireland refuse to take up arms against Nazi Germany during the Second World War. It also rejected a US offer to join NATO when it was founded in 1949. Since then, neutrality has become a fundamental part of the Irish identity on the world stage. The Irish Defence Forces have been a leading participant in UN peacekeeping operations. But there are now questions about whether it is time to rethink the policy of neutrality. Many argue that Ireland can no longer afford to ignore changes in the world. This is especially important given Ireland's growing significance for vital undersea cables linking Europe and North America. More to the point, a stunning revelation that Ireland has had a secret agreement with the United Kingdom for seventy years that allows the Royal Air Force (RAF) to protect Irish airspace has called into question one of the main rationales for Irish neutrality. So, is it time for Ireland to abandon neutrality and formally join NATO?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
For much of its history, Ireland has clung to the principle of military neutrality. Originally defined as a way to set itself apart from neighbouring Britain, this controversially saw Ireland refuse to take up arms against Nazi Germany during the Second World War. It also rejected a US offer to join NATO when it was founded in 1949. Since then, neutrality has become a fundamental part of the Irish identity on the world stage. The Irish Defence Forces have been a leading participant in UN peacekeeping operations. But there are now questions about whether it is time to rethink the policy of neutrality. Many argue that Ireland can no longer afford to ignore changes in the world. This is especially important given Ireland's growing significance for vital undersea cables linking Europe and North America. More to the point, a stunning revelation that Ireland has had a secret agreement with the United Kingdom for seventy years that allows the Royal Air Force (RAF) to protect Irish airspace has called into question one of the main rationales for Irish neutrality. So, is it time for Ireland to abandon neutrality and formally join NATO?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Over March and April 2023, India was gripped by efforts to arrest a young Sikh militant, Amritpal Singh. This has led to growing fears about the rise in separatist sentiment in the northern province of Punjab, where there has been a... more
Over March and April 2023, India was gripped by efforts to arrest a young Sikh militant, Amritpal Singh. This has led to growing fears about the rise in separatist sentiment in the northern province of Punjab, where there has been a long-standing effort to create an independent Sikh homeland, Khalistan. But are such concerns justified.
Sikhism is the fifth largest religious group globally, with over 25 million adherents worldwide. Founded in the early sixteenth century By Guru Nanak, it was later refined by nine further Gurus. However, from the start, it has faced persecution. As a result, when Britain decolonised India, there were calls for a separate Sikh homeland. However, this was rejected. Instead, in 1966, Punjab was reorganised and partitioned to create a Sikh-majority federal state. But in the years that followed, disillusionment grew. This then led to tensions. This came to a head in 1984 when Indian forces raided the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest shrine of the Sikhs. As well as killing the leader of the militants, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, many thousands were killed. Operation Blue Star, as it was known, caused outrage and led to the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by two of her Sikh bodyguards. But in the years that followed, it seemed that the Khalistani movement was gradually declining. However, this changed with the emergence of a young preacher: Amritpal Singh. But is this really the start of a new phase of violent agitation for an independent Sikh state?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
Sikhism is the fifth largest religious group globally, with over 25 million adherents worldwide. Founded in the early sixteenth century By Guru Nanak, it was later refined by nine further Gurus. However, from the start, it has faced persecution. As a result, when Britain decolonised India, there were calls for a separate Sikh homeland. However, this was rejected. Instead, in 1966, Punjab was reorganised and partitioned to create a Sikh-majority federal state. But in the years that followed, disillusionment grew. This then led to tensions. This came to a head in 1984 when Indian forces raided the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest shrine of the Sikhs. As well as killing the leader of the militants, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, many thousands were killed. Operation Blue Star, as it was known, caused outrage and led to the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, by two of her Sikh bodyguards. But in the years that followed, it seemed that the Khalistani movement was gradually declining. However, this changed with the emergence of a young preacher: Amritpal Singh. But is this really the start of a new phase of violent agitation for an independent Sikh state?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
Research Interests:
In April 2023, fierce fighting erupted on the streets of Khartoum as the military fought against the Rapid Security Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary faction. After months of tension, it has seen many countries scramble to evacuate... more
In April 2023, fierce fighting erupted on the streets of Khartoum as the military fought against the Rapid Security Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary faction. After months of tension, it has seen many countries scramble to evacuate their civilians against fears that Sudan could be heading towards another brutal civil war.
Sudan has been in a state of war for almost its entire history. Having become independent in 1956, it was immediately plunged into a brutal conflict as the Christian African South fought against the predominantly Arab Muslim North. While a peace deal was reached in the early 1970s, fighting erupted again in the early 1980s. But while this eventually led to the independence of South Sudan, another major conflict emerged in the Western province of Darfur. This saw the army assisted by a vicious paramilitary group, the Janjaweed. But as accusations of genocide grew, the fighters were incorporated into the armed forces as the RSF, under their leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (or Dagolo or Daglo), also known as Hemedti. This all came to a head in 2019 when Sudan's standing dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown, and the army took over. This saw Dagalo become deputy leader under the head of the armed forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. However, this relationship has now broken down, sparking the latest conflict. But how much further could it escalate? And why are other countries - including the United States, Russia and China and the EU - watching developments so closely?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Sudan has been in a state of war for almost its entire history. Having become independent in 1956, it was immediately plunged into a brutal conflict as the Christian African South fought against the predominantly Arab Muslim North. While a peace deal was reached in the early 1970s, fighting erupted again in the early 1980s. But while this eventually led to the independence of South Sudan, another major conflict emerged in the Western province of Darfur. This saw the army assisted by a vicious paramilitary group, the Janjaweed. But as accusations of genocide grew, the fighters were incorporated into the armed forces as the RSF, under their leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (or Dagolo or Daglo), also known as Hemedti. This all came to a head in 2019 when Sudan's standing dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown, and the army took over. This saw Dagalo become deputy leader under the head of the armed forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. However, this relationship has now broken down, sparking the latest conflict. But how much further could it escalate? And why are other countries - including the United States, Russia and China and the EU - watching developments so closely?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
On 14 May 2023, Turkey will go to the polls for presidential and parliamentary elections. For many, the vote is seen as potentially historic. After twenty years in power, it represents the best hope of finally unseating the country's... more
On 14 May 2023, Turkey will go to the polls for presidential and parliamentary elections. For many, the vote is seen as potentially historic. After twenty years in power, it represents the best hope of finally unseating the country's president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. During that time, there's no doubt that Erdogan has profoundly transformed Turkey (or Türkiye, as it now officially wants to be known). But how exactly should we judge his legacy?
Turkey is a fascinating country. Following its emergence in 1923 from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, one figure dominated the country: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the country's first president. Although he died in 1938, his ideology and image dominated the state. However, over the past two decades, Erdogan has also had an enormous influence over the country. But while we now think of this negatively - especially given his growing authoritarianism, which has seen a clampdown on media, democratic failings, an ailing economy, and serious allegations of corruption - it is easy to overlook the country he effectively took over in late 2002. And its also easy to forget some of his initial successes, such as efforts to take Turkey closer to the European Union and resolve Cyprus. So, is this really the end of the Erdogan era? And how should he be judged?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Turkey is a fascinating country. Following its emergence in 1923 from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, one figure dominated the country: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the country's first president. Although he died in 1938, his ideology and image dominated the state. However, over the past two decades, Erdogan has also had an enormous influence over the country. But while we now think of this negatively - especially given his growing authoritarianism, which has seen a clampdown on media, democratic failings, an ailing economy, and serious allegations of corruption - it is easy to overlook the country he effectively took over in late 2002. And its also easy to forget some of his initial successes, such as efforts to take Turkey closer to the European Union and resolve Cyprus. So, is this really the end of the Erdogan era? And how should he be judged?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Has Scotland lost its best hope for independence? In March 2023, Humza Yousaf was elected as the new leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and as the First Minister of Scotland. He will now take charge of efforts to lead the country... more
Has Scotland lost its best hope for independence? In March 2023, Humza Yousaf was elected as the new leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and as the First Minister of Scotland. He will now take charge of efforts to lead the country to complete independence. But has Scotland missed its best chance to become a sovereign state?
Although Scotland emerged as a kingdom in the ninth century, in 1603, James VI of Scotland became King of England, thus uniting the crowns of the two countries. Just over a century later, in 1707, the two parliaments merged to form Great Britain. However, in 1997, Scotland voted to re-establish its own parliament. This paved the way for an eventual referendum on independence on 18 September 2014. However, Scottish voters rejected this by 55% to 45%. Since then, Scotland has made a case for secession - especially after the Brexit referendum, which saw English voters pull Scotland out of the European Union. But even though support for independence appeared to be rising, the numbers now seem to be falling. So, is the dream of Scottish independence now over?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Although Scotland emerged as a kingdom in the ninth century, in 1603, James VI of Scotland became King of England, thus uniting the crowns of the two countries. Just over a century later, in 1707, the two parliaments merged to form Great Britain. However, in 1997, Scotland voted to re-establish its own parliament. This paved the way for an eventual referendum on independence on 18 September 2014. However, Scottish voters rejected this by 55% to 45%. Since then, Scotland has made a case for secession - especially after the Brexit referendum, which saw English voters pull Scotland out of the European Union. But even though support for independence appeared to be rising, the numbers now seem to be falling. So, is the dream of Scottish independence now over?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
While international attention has been on Somalia's battle against Al-Shabaab, a severe conflict has emerged in the Horn of Africa between Somaliland and several clans that want to remain part of Somalia or join neighbouring Puntland.... more
While international attention has been on Somalia's battle against Al-Shabaab, a severe conflict has emerged in the Horn of Africa between Somaliland and several clans that want to remain part of Somalia or join neighbouring Puntland. This has led to fighting around Las Anod (Laascaanood), the administrative city of the eastern province of Sool, which is seeking to establish its own breakaway administration: Khatumo State of Somalia. This has left hundreds dead and forced over two hundred thousand to flee. All this makes it a complex conflict as both sides see the other as a separatist group. But what exactly lies behind it?
While we think of secessionist conflicts as being fought between different ethnic, national or religious groups, sometimes issues arise between groups that come from the same background. The conflict between Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland is a case in point. While ethnic Somalis share a language, culture and religion, it is highly fragmented along clan lines. In the context of the current conflict this has seen the Isaaq, the most prominent clan in Somaliland, come into tensions with the Majeerteen, the dominant clan in Puntland, and the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli, which are centred on eastern Somaliland - an area known as Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC). All three are aligned to the Harti, a sub-clan of the Darod (Darood) clan - one of the five key Somalia clans. This has raised fears that the fighting around Lasanod may evolve into a far larger clan war. At the same time, it raises crucial questions about efforts to reach a final agreement on the status of Somaliland.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
While we think of secessionist conflicts as being fought between different ethnic, national or religious groups, sometimes issues arise between groups that come from the same background. The conflict between Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland is a case in point. While ethnic Somalis share a language, culture and religion, it is highly fragmented along clan lines. In the context of the current conflict this has seen the Isaaq, the most prominent clan in Somaliland, come into tensions with the Majeerteen, the dominant clan in Puntland, and the Dhulbahante and the Warsangeli, which are centred on eastern Somaliland - an area known as Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC). All three are aligned to the Harti, a sub-clan of the Darod (Darood) clan - one of the five key Somalia clans. This has raised fears that the fighting around Lasanod may evolve into a far larger clan war. At the same time, it raises crucial questions about efforts to reach a final agreement on the status of Somaliland.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Japan and South Korea have one of the most difficult relationships between partners in the modern international system. Despite being liberal democracies with advanced economies and sharing many close concerns and interests, the two... more
Japan and South Korea have one of the most difficult relationships between partners in the modern international system. Despite being liberal democracies with advanced economies and sharing many close concerns and interests, the two countries have extraordinarily complex and challenging relations. However, a recent meeting between the South Korean President, Yoon Suk Yeol, and the Japanese Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, has raised hopes that the two countries may finally be about to open a new chapter in the relations. But as others have pointed out, their history is littered with similar "new starts". So, is this really different?
The relationship between Japan and South Korea is still shaped by the brutal legacy of the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. This lasted from 1910 until 1945 when Japan was defeated in the Second World War. During this period, Imperial Japan not only introduced a policy of assimilation but also made many men work as slave labour and forced tens of thousands of Korean women (along with women in many other Asian countries) into sexual slavery - the so-called "comfort women". This has had a lasting impact on bilateral ties. Despite later Japanese apologies, and even though the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1965, the Republic of Korea has long sought proper compensation for those affected. And even now, almost eighty years after the war's end, the occupation and the horrific acts of abuse that took place at the time are a lingering sore between these two countries. But can things finally change?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
The relationship between Japan and South Korea is still shaped by the brutal legacy of the Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. This lasted from 1910 until 1945 when Japan was defeated in the Second World War. During this period, Imperial Japan not only introduced a policy of assimilation but also made many men work as slave labour and forced tens of thousands of Korean women (along with women in many other Asian countries) into sexual slavery - the so-called "comfort women". This has had a lasting impact on bilateral ties. Despite later Japanese apologies, and even though the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1965, the Republic of Korea has long sought proper compensation for those affected. And even now, almost eighty years after the war's end, the occupation and the horrific acts of abuse that took place at the time are a lingering sore between these two countries. But can things finally change?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
In March 2023, news emerged that Saudi Arabia and Iran had agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations after seven years. But what made the announcement really stand out was that the deal had been brokered by China during talks hosted in... more
In March 2023, news emerged that Saudi Arabia and Iran had agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations after seven years. But what made the announcement really stand out was that the deal had been brokered by China during talks hosted in Beijing. Coming soon after a Chinese proposal to try to tackle the war between Russia and Ukraine, many see this as evidence that China is now trying to become a significant diplomatic powerbroker. But is China becoming a new peacemaker in the Middle East and on the international stage more generally?
There has been a cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran for over forty years. While the countries have differences over religion - with Saudi Arabia following the Sunni branch of the faith and Iran leading the Shia faction - the two countries once had relatively good ties. However, this collapsed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Since then, the two countries have differed on various issues and have taken opposing sides in multiple conflicts. These include the civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Meanwhile, tensions also grew over rising unrest in Saudi Arabia. This came to a head when Saudi Arabia executed 47 people in 2015 - an incident that led to demonstrations in Iran and saw the Saudi Embassy in Tehran attacked. Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations by accusing the Iranian government of instigating the attack. And it's this breakdown in relations that China has just repaired. But just how important is the Chinese agreement? And does it mark a new role for China? And could this mean the end of US influence in the region?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
There has been a cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran for over forty years. While the countries have differences over religion - with Saudi Arabia following the Sunni branch of the faith and Iran leading the Shia faction - the two countries once had relatively good ties. However, this collapsed after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Since then, the two countries have differed on various issues and have taken opposing sides in multiple conflicts. These include the civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Meanwhile, tensions also grew over rising unrest in Saudi Arabia. This came to a head when Saudi Arabia executed 47 people in 2015 - an incident that led to demonstrations in Iran and saw the Saudi Embassy in Tehran attacked. Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations by accusing the Iranian government of instigating the attack. And it's this breakdown in relations that China has just repaired. But just how important is the Chinese agreement? And does it mark a new role for China? And could this mean the end of US influence in the region?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
Research Interests:
The dispute over the Spratly Islands is one of the most complex conflicts in international relations. It is also one of the most dangerous. Lying in the South China Sea, this collection of around a hundred essentially uninhabited islets,... more
The dispute over the Spratly Islands is one of the most complex conflicts in international relations. It is also one of the most dangerous. Lying in the South China Sea, this collection of around a hundred essentially uninhabited islets, rocks, reefs and atolls are claimed, either in whole or in part, by no less than six separate actors: Brunei, the People's Republic of China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. And there are growing fears it could lead to war. In recent months, China has increased its activity in the region, most notably warning US aircraft to leave the area and harassing and shining a military-grade laser at a Philippines naval vessel in February 2023.
All this matters because the islands are strategically significant. Indeed, they sit in the middle of one of the busiest waterways in the world. On top of this, they are also economically valuable. As well as having considerable fish stocks, they are believed to have substantial oil and gas reserves. But while competing claims to the strategically important islands date back well over a century, having been claimed by colonial Britain and France and by Imperial Japan, the dispute really took off in 1947 when Taiwan published a map - the so-called Nine-Dash Line - that showed them as a part of its territory - a claim also made by the People's Republic of China. Since then, the issue has become increasingly tense, leading to an armed confrontation between China and Vietnam in 1988. Since then, China's increasingly forceful claims have been challenged by the Philippines, which brought a case against China in 2013 before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. But while the Court ruled against China, Beijing has continued to build several bases on reclaimed land and artificial islands. For all these reasons, there are growing fears that a major war could break out in the region.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
All this matters because the islands are strategically significant. Indeed, they sit in the middle of one of the busiest waterways in the world. On top of this, they are also economically valuable. As well as having considerable fish stocks, they are believed to have substantial oil and gas reserves. But while competing claims to the strategically important islands date back well over a century, having been claimed by colonial Britain and France and by Imperial Japan, the dispute really took off in 1947 when Taiwan published a map - the so-called Nine-Dash Line - that showed them as a part of its territory - a claim also made by the People's Republic of China. Since then, the issue has become increasingly tense, leading to an armed confrontation between China and Vietnam in 1988. Since then, China's increasingly forceful claims have been challenged by the Philippines, which brought a case against China in 2013 before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. But while the Court ruled against China, Beijing has continued to build several bases on reclaimed land and artificial islands. For all these reasons, there are growing fears that a major war could break out in the region.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Is it time for Austria to give up its neutral stance on the world stage? The war in Ukraine has seen many countries reevaluate their foreign and security policies. Most notably, Sweden and Finland have applied to join NATO. However, there... more
Is it time for Austria to give up its neutral stance on the world stage? The war in Ukraine has seen many countries reevaluate their foreign and security policies. Most notably, Sweden and Finland have applied to join NATO. However, there are a number of European states that firmly cling to the policy of neutrality. One of the most important of these is Austria.
Austria's neutrality emerged during the Cold War. Following the end of the Second World War, it was occupied by the Allied Powers - Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, this came to an end with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, in 1955. In return for removing their troops, Austria agreed to permanent military neutrality. In the decades that followed, this principle became enshrined in the Austrian identity. And even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when many surrounding states joined NATO, it steadfastly retained its neutral stance. But with the start of the war in Ukraine, there have been suggestions that it is time for Austria to reconsider its neutral stance - a policy that it adheres to voluntarily. So far, though, public opinion stands strongly against any change. So too do the country's political leaders. Indeed, the country's chancellor has insisted that Austria will remain neutral. So, what exactly are the arguments for and against any change to Austrian neutrality?
Austria's neutrality emerged during the Cold War. Following the end of the Second World War, it was occupied by the Allied Powers - Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. However, this came to an end with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, in 1955. In return for removing their troops, Austria agreed to permanent military neutrality. In the decades that followed, this principle became enshrined in the Austrian identity. And even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when many surrounding states joined NATO, it steadfastly retained its neutral stance. But with the start of the war in Ukraine, there have been suggestions that it is time for Austria to reconsider its neutral stance - a policy that it adheres to voluntarily. So far, though, public opinion stands strongly against any change. So too do the country's political leaders. Indeed, the country's chancellor has insisted that Austria will remain neutral. So, what exactly are the arguments for and against any change to Austrian neutrality?
Research Interests:
Over the past decade, tensions have been growing between Egypt and Ethiopia, two of the largest and most influential counties in Africa. Once fully operational, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be the largest hydroelectric... more
Over the past decade, tensions have been growing between Egypt and Ethiopia, two of the largest and most influential counties in Africa. Once fully operational, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be the largest hydroelectric generator on the continent - and one of the largest such projects in the world. However, Egypt fears that it will also threaten to disrupt water flowing along the Nile River.
Depending on the river for over 97% of its drinking water, as well as for agriculture, Egypt has demanded that the two countries reach a settlement over the issue. However, despite long-standing mediation efforts by the African Union, they have failed to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, there are also growing tensions with neighbouring Sudan over the issue. So, why exactly has the problem emerged? Can a solution be found? And is there really a possibility that it could lead to armed conflict?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Depending on the river for over 97% of its drinking water, as well as for agriculture, Egypt has demanded that the two countries reach a settlement over the issue. However, despite long-standing mediation efforts by the African Union, they have failed to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, there are also growing tensions with neighbouring Sudan over the issue. So, why exactly has the problem emerged? Can a solution be found? And is there really a possibility that it could lead to armed conflict?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
As Kosovo marks the 15th anniversary of its declaration of independence from Serbia, tensions remain high between the sides. While the diplomatic battle over recognition continues on the international stage, there have been a number of... more
As Kosovo marks the 15th anniversary of its declaration of independence from Serbia, tensions remain high between the sides. While the diplomatic battle over recognition continues on the international stage, there have been a number of serious confrontations in northern Kosovo that have seemingly threatened to reignite conflict in the Western Balkans. To this end, in early 2023, officials from the EU, France, Germany, Italy and the United States travelled to Belgrade and Pristina to present the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo with their proposals for a new agreement between the sides. But can this really end the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia?
Kosovo has emerged as one of the most interesting and significant secessionist disputes in modern international relations. Highly controversial at the time it declared independence, its significance has been underscored by the fact that it has been cited by Russia as a justification for many of its own actions in the former Soviet Union, including its attempts to annex Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine. In many ways, it highlights to the tensions and apparent contradictions between the concepts of self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states.
This would have a major impact when, on 17 February 2008, it declared independence. Having been an autonomous part of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the fact that it was not a republic meant that it was not granted the right of independence enjoyed by the other parts of the state. As a result, in the late 1990s, it took up arms to fight for statehood, leading to a brutal guerrilla war with Serbian forces and, eventually, NATO's decision to intervene and launch a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia. Following on from this, it came under UN administration according to the terms of UN security Council Resolution 1244, which affirmed its place as a part of Yugoslavia. However, following deadlocked UN-led final status talks, it chose to declare independence, supported by much of the West, but opposed by Russia, China and half the United Nations. As a result, 15 years later, the issue still remains unresolved.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
Kosovo has emerged as one of the most interesting and significant secessionist disputes in modern international relations. Highly controversial at the time it declared independence, its significance has been underscored by the fact that it has been cited by Russia as a justification for many of its own actions in the former Soviet Union, including its attempts to annex Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine. In many ways, it highlights to the tensions and apparent contradictions between the concepts of self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states.
This would have a major impact when, on 17 February 2008, it declared independence. Having been an autonomous part of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the fact that it was not a republic meant that it was not granted the right of independence enjoyed by the other parts of the state. As a result, in the late 1990s, it took up arms to fight for statehood, leading to a brutal guerrilla war with Serbian forces and, eventually, NATO's decision to intervene and launch a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia. Following on from this, it came under UN administration according to the terms of UN security Council Resolution 1244, which affirmed its place as a part of Yugoslavia. However, following deadlocked UN-led final status talks, it chose to declare independence, supported by much of the West, but opposed by Russia, China and half the United Nations. As a result, 15 years later, the issue still remains unresolved.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
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On 28 January 2023, what appears to have been a drone strike took place against a weapons factory in Isfahan, Iran. While there was relatively little international coverage of the attack, at least at first, speculation quickly grew that... more
On 28 January 2023, what appears to have been a drone strike took place against a weapons factory in Isfahan, Iran. While there was relatively little international coverage of the attack, at least at first, speculation quickly grew that Israel had been behind the operation (although other immediate suspects included Ukraine, Azerbaijan and even Saudi Arabia). However, while Iran has now formally blamed Israel for what it has called a "cowardly attack", it has nevertheless played down the incident - arguing that it managed to shoot down two of the drones and that a third had merely done minor damage with no casualties. Meanwhile, Israel has yet to openly accept responsibility for the incident.
This raises the question as to why the response has been so low key? In truth, it plays out against a history of covert confrontation between the two countries - a confrontation that has often been called a cold war or "shadow war". While Israel and Iran enjoyed good relations for many decades, and even had some significant ties after the Iranian Revolution, since the mid-1980s the relationship has completely collapsed over a range of issues, including Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Developing nuclear weapons, Iran has vowed to destroy the Jewish state. Since then, Israel and Iran have engaged in a covert confrontation. This has involved proxies in Gaza and Lebanon (Hamas and Hezbollah), assassinations, bombings, cyber attacks and now, seemingly, drones. In this sense, the latest incident fits a wider pattern of a serious, but nevertheless clandestine, conflict that's been fought in the shadows and which neither side wants to escalate. But as Russia deepens its ties to Iran over Ukraine, could the latest incident indicate that the Iran-Israel conflict is now set to intensify?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
This raises the question as to why the response has been so low key? In truth, it plays out against a history of covert confrontation between the two countries - a confrontation that has often been called a cold war or "shadow war". While Israel and Iran enjoyed good relations for many decades, and even had some significant ties after the Iranian Revolution, since the mid-1980s the relationship has completely collapsed over a range of issues, including Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Developing nuclear weapons, Iran has vowed to destroy the Jewish state. Since then, Israel and Iran have engaged in a covert confrontation. This has involved proxies in Gaza and Lebanon (Hamas and Hezbollah), assassinations, bombings, cyber attacks and now, seemingly, drones. In this sense, the latest incident fits a wider pattern of a serious, but nevertheless clandestine, conflict that's been fought in the shadows and which neither side wants to escalate. But as Russia deepens its ties to Iran over Ukraine, could the latest incident indicate that the Iran-Israel conflict is now set to intensify?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/JamesKerLindsay
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There was widespread jubilation in Pakistan when neighbouring Afghanistan fell to the Taliban, in August 2021. Many, including the then Prime Minister, Imran Khan, expected that it would herald a new era of Pakistani influence over the... more
There was widespread jubilation in Pakistan when neighbouring Afghanistan fell to the Taliban, in August 2021. Many, including the then Prime Minister, Imran Khan, expected that it would herald a new era of Pakistani influence over the new regime, which the important military and security establishment in Islamabad had nurtured for many decades. However, such hopes have remained unrealised.
In recent months there’s been a growing wave of attacks in Pakistan by Tehrik-e Taliban - otherwise known as the TTP or the Pakistani Taliban. However, while Islamabad may have hoped that the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan would help to control its Pakistani partners, it has seemingly done little to control them. Meanwhile, having reasserted control in Kabul, tensions appear to be emerging between the Taliban and Pakistan in other ways. For example, there have been renewed questions over the border between the two countries, the Durand Line, which was drawn up by British colonial authorities in Imperial India. This divided the Pashtun people, who make up most of the Taliban, and has been a lingering source of resentment. This all suggests that relations may now become increasingly difficult between Pakistan and its former partners.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
In recent months there’s been a growing wave of attacks in Pakistan by Tehrik-e Taliban - otherwise known as the TTP or the Pakistani Taliban. However, while Islamabad may have hoped that the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan would help to control its Pakistani partners, it has seemingly done little to control them. Meanwhile, having reasserted control in Kabul, tensions appear to be emerging between the Taliban and Pakistan in other ways. For example, there have been renewed questions over the border between the two countries, the Durand Line, which was drawn up by British colonial authorities in Imperial India. This divided the Pashtun people, who make up most of the Taliban, and has been a lingering source of resentment. This all suggests that relations may now become increasingly difficult between Pakistan and its former partners.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/jameskerlindsay
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Over the course of 2023, the United States will aim to conclude a series of vital agreements with what are known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). These three countries - the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the... more
Over the course of 2023, the United States will aim to conclude a series of vital agreements with what are known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). These three countries - the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau - have a very special and unusual form of relationship with the USA. Under a system known as free association, they allow Washington to have complete authority over the defence and security in return for significant aid, grants and an agreement to let their citizens live and work in the US.
However, the financial elements of each Compact of Free Association (CoFA) with the three countries are due to end in 2023 and 2024. Without a renewal, the vast sums of money will come to an end. This in turn could pose a huge risk to the US presence in the Pacific at a time when China is steadily increasing its influence in the region. Even if the states don't abandon their agreements, they may love closer to Beijing diplomatically. This could see the Marshall Islands and Palau rescind their recognition of Taiwan. And yet, as crucial as the talks clearly are, the negotiations are proving a lot more difficult than many expected. So, just what are the problems?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
However, the financial elements of each Compact of Free Association (CoFA) with the three countries are due to end in 2023 and 2024. Without a renewal, the vast sums of money will come to an end. This in turn could pose a huge risk to the US presence in the Pacific at a time when China is steadily increasing its influence in the region. Even if the states don't abandon their agreements, they may love closer to Beijing diplomatically. This could see the Marshall Islands and Palau rescind their recognition of Taiwan. And yet, as crucial as the talks clearly are, the negotiations are proving a lot more difficult than many expected. So, just what are the problems?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
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On 30 December 2022, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution referring Israel’s occupation of Palestine to the International Court of Justice. The decision, only the fourth such decision in twenty years, marks a potentially... more
On 30 December 2022, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution referring Israel’s occupation of Palestine to the International Court of Justice. The decision, only the fourth such decision in twenty years, marks a potentially significant moment. The judges of the ICJ will be asked to rule on the legal implications arising from what many now regard as the de facto annexation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as the areas are officially called by the United Nations. But just how did this situation arise and what is the request for an advisory opinion likely to mean?
The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most complex and emotional disputes in modern international relations. It has not only sparked four major wars, it has also seen the emergence of an insurgency and popular uprising - the Intifada. However, at one stage, it appears as though a settlement could be found. In the early 1990s, the sides agreed on a two-state solution. However, in the years since then, hopes for a negotiated solution have diminished. While Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, it has steadily expanded its settlements across the West Bank. This makes it hard to envisage the creation of a viable Palestinian State. But what does this longterm occupation now mean under international law? This is the question now facing the justices of the ICJ.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most complex and emotional disputes in modern international relations. It has not only sparked four major wars, it has also seen the emergence of an insurgency and popular uprising - the Intifada. However, at one stage, it appears as though a settlement could be found. In the early 1990s, the sides agreed on a two-state solution. However, in the years since then, hopes for a negotiated solution have diminished. While Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, it has steadily expanded its settlements across the West Bank. This makes it hard to envisage the creation of a viable Palestinian State. But what does this longterm occupation now mean under international law? This is the question now facing the justices of the ICJ.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
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In 2011, Tunisia came to world attention as mass protests forced the country's longstanding dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to flee the country. The uprising, known as the Jasmine Revolution, would spark huge demonstrations elsewhere... more
In 2011, Tunisia came to world attention as mass protests forced the country's longstanding dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to flee the country. The uprising, known as the Jasmine Revolution, would spark huge demonstrations elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa: The Arab Spring. But a decade later, there are fears that the country's president, Kais Saied, is taking the country back to authoritarianism, if not dictatorship. So, is democracy really now under threat in Tunisia?
Tunisia has always had a rather unusual place in the Arab world. Having become a French Protectorate in 1881, in the first part of the 20th century a nationalist movement arose. In 1934, this split to form Neo-Destour, which would become the ruling party after the country eventually attained independence in 1956. After the monarchy was abolished in 1957, the country came under the rule of Habib Bourguiba, who ruled as a dictator until 1987, when he was ousted by Ben Ali. However, all this changed in 2011, when a young market trader, Mohamed Bouazizi, took his own life in protest at police corruption. However, a decade later, Tunisia faces huge economic, political and social problems. It against this backdrop that Saied has introduced a number of measured rolling back democracy. But is this for the country's good, as he claims. Or is it the return to dictatorship?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
Tunisia has always had a rather unusual place in the Arab world. Having become a French Protectorate in 1881, in the first part of the 20th century a nationalist movement arose. In 1934, this split to form Neo-Destour, which would become the ruling party after the country eventually attained independence in 1956. After the monarchy was abolished in 1957, the country came under the rule of Habib Bourguiba, who ruled as a dictator until 1987, when he was ousted by Ben Ali. However, all this changed in 2011, when a young market trader, Mohamed Bouazizi, took his own life in protest at police corruption. However, a decade later, Tunisia faces huge economic, political and social problems. It against this backdrop that Saied has introduced a number of measured rolling back democracy. But is this for the country's good, as he claims. Or is it the return to dictatorship?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
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For fifteen years, Al-Shabaab has terrorised Somalia. However, at long last there are signs that it may now be in retreat. Somali armed forces, assisted by the United States, the African Union and other international and local partners,... more
For fifteen years, Al-Shabaab has terrorised Somalia. However, at long last there are signs that it may now be in retreat. Somali armed forces, assisted by the United States, the African Union and other international and local partners, is fighting back. So, is Al-Shabaab being defeated?
Somalia became independent in 1960. However, following the overthrow of the country's military dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, in 1991, the country descended into chaos and became a failed state. This has led to a range of security concerns. The most serious of these today is Al-Shabaab, a group that is now openly affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Since early 2007, it has waged a large scale Islamist insurgency in much of the country. However, there are now signs that the tide may be turning. The election of a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who has pledged to wage "total war" against the militants has seen an increase in military operations against the group, led by a special forces unit; Danab, the Lightning Brigade. On top of this a new vigilante organisation. Macawisley, has seen local Somalis rise up against Al-Shabaab. However, as shown, Al-Shabaab remains powerful and well armed. Indeed, it has staged a strong fightback in late-2022. Nevertheless, there are signs that Somalia's Islamist insurgency may yet be on the path to defeat.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
Somalia became independent in 1960. However, following the overthrow of the country's military dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, in 1991, the country descended into chaos and became a failed state. This has led to a range of security concerns. The most serious of these today is Al-Shabaab, a group that is now openly affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Since early 2007, it has waged a large scale Islamist insurgency in much of the country. However, there are now signs that the tide may be turning. The election of a new president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who has pledged to wage "total war" against the militants has seen an increase in military operations against the group, led by a special forces unit; Danab, the Lightning Brigade. On top of this a new vigilante organisation. Macawisley, has seen local Somalis rise up against Al-Shabaab. However, as shown, Al-Shabaab remains powerful and well armed. Indeed, it has staged a strong fightback in late-2022. Nevertheless, there are signs that Somalia's Islamist insurgency may yet be on the path to defeat.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
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Over the course of 2022, fears have grown that Turkey is preparing to launch an invasion of Syria. If so, it will be its fourth in total, and its most major incursion since October 2019. These concerns have risen following a terrorist... more
Over the course of 2022, fears have grown that Turkey is preparing to launch an invasion of Syria. If so, it will be its fourth in total, and its most major incursion since October 2019. These concerns have risen following a terrorist attack in Istanbul, in November 2022, that the Turkish Government has pinned on the PKK and its Syrian Partners, the PYD and YPG. But while Ankara looks poised to launch another attack, it has faced calls for restraint from the United States, Russia and Iran. All this once again draws international attention to Turkey's long-standing conflict with the Kurds, a conflict that has now been running for almost 40 years.
The conflict between Turkey (which has officially changed its name to Türkiye, but remains widely known as Turkey) and the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, is one of the most serious and long-running insurgencies of modern times. Since it started in 1984, it has led to tens of thousands of deaths. It has also spread into neighbouring countries. Over the years, the Turkish Army has staged numerous incursions into norther Iraq, where the PKK has established bases. However, the conflict has now also extended into neighbouring Syria. As the country descended into civil war, Kurdish forces have managed to establish their own region - the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), better known as Rojava. But will Turkey really invade? And why are the United States and other NATO partners so concerned?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
The conflict between Turkey (which has officially changed its name to Türkiye, but remains widely known as Turkey) and the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, is one of the most serious and long-running insurgencies of modern times. Since it started in 1984, it has led to tens of thousands of deaths. It has also spread into neighbouring countries. Over the years, the Turkish Army has staged numerous incursions into norther Iraq, where the PKK has established bases. However, the conflict has now also extended into neighbouring Syria. As the country descended into civil war, Kurdish forces have managed to establish their own region - the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), better known as Rojava. But will Turkey really invade? And why are the United States and other NATO partners so concerned?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
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In November 2022, pictures emerged of Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, touring a missile site with his daughter. The pictures made international headlines as this was the first confirmed glimpse of any of his three... more
In November 2022, pictures emerged of Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, touring a missile site with his daughter. The pictures made international headlines as this was the first confirmed glimpse of any of his three children. Although it's believed that she is aged nine or ten, Kim Ju-ae has already been identified as a potential successor to her father. If so, she would become the fourth generation of the Kim family to rule the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK. So, just how did this secretive country, often known as the hermit kingdom, effectively become the world's first and only marxist monarchy?
North Korea has emerged as a pariah state. Having distanced itself from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, when it built a system built on self-reliance - or Juche as it's known in the official ideology - it has become an increasingly serious threat to international peace and security. As well as sponsoring organised crime, it has also developed a nuclear weapons programme and advanced ballistic missiles. And yet, it has remained firmly in the grip of one family. Having been founded by Kim Il-sung, power then passed to his son, Kim Jong-il, before being passed to his son, the country's current leader, Kim Jong-un. And now there appears to be another generation of leader on the horizon with Kim's daughter, Kim Ju-ae. But things might not be quite so straightforward. There is potentially another Kim waiting in the wings: Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-Jong. Either way, could we be on course to see North Korea come under the rule of its first female leader - the world's first woman dictator?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
North Korea has emerged as a pariah state. Having distanced itself from the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, when it built a system built on self-reliance - or Juche as it's known in the official ideology - it has become an increasingly serious threat to international peace and security. As well as sponsoring organised crime, it has also developed a nuclear weapons programme and advanced ballistic missiles. And yet, it has remained firmly in the grip of one family. Having been founded by Kim Il-sung, power then passed to his son, Kim Jong-il, before being passed to his son, the country's current leader, Kim Jong-un. And now there appears to be another generation of leader on the horizon with Kim's daughter, Kim Ju-ae. But things might not be quite so straightforward. There is potentially another Kim waiting in the wings: Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-Jong. Either way, could we be on course to see North Korea come under the rule of its first female leader - the world's first woman dictator?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
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In November 2022, the members of the Organization of Turkic States met in Uzbekistan for their ninth summit. But while the group has long been thought of as little more than a talking shop, there seems to be a new dynamism emerging.... more
In November 2022, the members of the Organization of Turkic States met in Uzbekistan for their ninth summit. But while the group has long been thought of as little more than a talking shop, there seems to be a new dynamism emerging. Squeezed between Russia and China, the group seems to be charting a new course. But could it really become the next major geopolitical bloc?
The Turkic states span an arc from Europe to China. Drawn together by closely related languages, culture and religion, the six countries - Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - have a long and fascinating history. On top of this, there are Turkic communities in many other surrounding countries, including Mongolia, China, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus. However, efforts to develop closer ties between the Turkic states have long been hampered by political factors. This is now seemingly changing. The emergence of the Organization of Turkic States - previously known as the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States - seems to indicate a new impetus for cooperation. Indeed, some have suggested that it could even become a Turkic version of the European Union. But is this realistic?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
The Turkic states span an arc from Europe to China. Drawn together by closely related languages, culture and religion, the six countries - Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - have a long and fascinating history. On top of this, there are Turkic communities in many other surrounding countries, including Mongolia, China, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus. However, efforts to develop closer ties between the Turkic states have long been hampered by political factors. This is now seemingly changing. The emergence of the Organization of Turkic States - previously known as the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States - seems to indicate a new impetus for cooperation. Indeed, some have suggested that it could even become a Turkic version of the European Union. But is this realistic?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
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The decision to name Qatar as the host of the 2022 World Cup led to widespread condemnation. Many felt that the country should never have been awarded such a prestigious and high-profile competition. This has led to serious questions... more
The decision to name Qatar as the host of the 2022 World Cup led to widespread condemnation. Many felt that the country should never have been awarded such a prestigious and high-profile competition. This has led to serious questions raised about the way in which the decision was made by FIFA, football's world governing body, which has been widely accused of corruption. Since then, many other controversies have emerged. Many have highlighted the large numbers of deaths amongst the foreign workers building the stadiums and other infrastructure. More recently, concerns have also been raised about the possible treatment of fans, especially member of the LGBT community travelling to a country that criminalises homosexuality. So, should Qatar host the 2022 World Cup?
In recent decades, public diplomacy has become an important part of the foreign policy toolkit. Within this, sports diplomacy, which includes holding major international competitions - such as the Olympic Games, World cup, tennis tournaments and Formula 1 Grand Prix - can have an enormous effect on a country's international standing. Having become one of the wealthiest countries in the world following major oil and gas discoveries, the ruling Al Thani family in Qatar has sought to leverage the state's wealth to increase its international standing through a wide range of cultural initiatives. This would see it for the 2022 Football World Cup. But the subsequent success of the bid has led to a widespread international condemnation. But there are good reasons to suggest that Qatar won't end up regretting its decision to bid for the games.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
In recent decades, public diplomacy has become an important part of the foreign policy toolkit. Within this, sports diplomacy, which includes holding major international competitions - such as the Olympic Games, World cup, tennis tournaments and Formula 1 Grand Prix - can have an enormous effect on a country's international standing. Having become one of the wealthiest countries in the world following major oil and gas discoveries, the ruling Al Thani family in Qatar has sought to leverage the state's wealth to increase its international standing through a wide range of cultural initiatives. This would see it for the 2022 Football World Cup. But the subsequent success of the bid has led to a widespread international condemnation. But there are good reasons to suggest that Qatar won't end up regretting its decision to bid for the games.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
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For the past four years, Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan leader, has been shunned by the West. Following disputed elections in 2018, his second term in office has not been recognised by many countries, including the United States and the... more
For the past four years, Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan leader, has been shunned by the West. Following disputed elections in 2018, his second term in office has not been recognised by many countries, including the United States and the members of the European Union. Indeed, many have openly called him a dictator. However, in November 2022, he had a very public and friendly meeting with the French President Emmanuel Macron, who openly called him president. At the same time, the United States also seems to be changing position. So, what has happened? And is Venezuela still a dictatorship? (Indeed, was it ever really one?)
Venezuela has a fascinating history. Sitting on the world's largest oil reserves, it is widely seen as an excellent example of a country suffering from the resource curse - the phenomenon whereby countries with a lot of natural wealth do badly economically and politically. Once one of the richest and most stable states in South America, these problems have grown over the past 25 years. Under Hugo Chavez, the country's firebrand socialist leader, tensions started to grow. However, it has been under his successor that the problems have really escalated. As economic problems worsened, Maduro clamped down on civil liberties, leading many to accuse him of increasingly authoritarian behaviour. But this all came to a head after disputed elections in 2018. Although he was sworn in for a second term in 2019, this was rejected by Venezuela's National Assembly, which appointed Juan Guaidó as the interim president. This was widely recognised by the West as well as many South American states. But after a number of years of strong opposition to Maduro, things now seem to be changing. But why?
CHANNEL LINK http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Venezuela has a fascinating history. Sitting on the world's largest oil reserves, it is widely seen as an excellent example of a country suffering from the resource curse - the phenomenon whereby countries with a lot of natural wealth do badly economically and politically. Once one of the richest and most stable states in South America, these problems have grown over the past 25 years. Under Hugo Chavez, the country's firebrand socialist leader, tensions started to grow. However, it has been under his successor that the problems have really escalated. As economic problems worsened, Maduro clamped down on civil liberties, leading many to accuse him of increasingly authoritarian behaviour. But this all came to a head after disputed elections in 2018. Although he was sworn in for a second term in 2019, this was rejected by Venezuela's National Assembly, which appointed Juan Guaidó as the interim president. This was widely recognised by the West as well as many South American states. But after a number of years of strong opposition to Maduro, things now seem to be changing. But why?
CHANNEL LINK http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
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Over the past decade, Hungary has become increasingly authoritarian under the leadership of its Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. Indeed, Orban has barely disguised his dislike of liberal democratic values, openly calling for the creation of... more
Over the past decade, Hungary has become increasingly authoritarian under the leadership of its Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. Indeed, Orban has barely disguised his dislike of liberal democratic values, openly calling for the creation of an “illiberal democracy”. This stands fundamentally at odds with the basic principles of the West. But while this poses problems for Hungary’s partners in the European Union and NATO, concerns have also grown over Hungary’s close relationship with Russia. All this has led many to ask whether Orban is Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe, or Putin’s Puppet. So, should we think of Hungary? Is it really the West’s enemy within?
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Hungary has a long and fascinating history. Having become a fully independent state after the First World War, it lost most of its territory under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. This is still s source of bitterness to this day. However, disputer coming under Soviet Control during the Cold War, and period that saw the 1956 Hungarian Revolution brutally suppressed, Hungary became a member of NATO and there European Union after the end of Communism. However, while it started out well, things changed in 2010, when Viktor Orban became prime minister. Having once been seen as a moderate liberal, he now began to crack down on press freedoms, before restricting civil liberties. He also pursued an overtly nationalist and xenophobic agenda. But while this led to severe criticism, little was done to stop him. However, it has been his relation ship with Russia and with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, that has been the most serious cause for concern. This has seemingly led to a new effort to challenge his authoritarianism. But many believe that the time has come for far more radical steps, including expelling Hungary from the EU and NATO. But could this really happen?
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Hungary has a long and fascinating history. Having become a fully independent state after the First World War, it lost most of its territory under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon. This is still s source of bitterness to this day. However, disputer coming under Soviet Control during the Cold War, and period that saw the 1956 Hungarian Revolution brutally suppressed, Hungary became a member of NATO and there European Union after the end of Communism. However, while it started out well, things changed in 2010, when Viktor Orban became prime minister. Having once been seen as a moderate liberal, he now began to crack down on press freedoms, before restricting civil liberties. He also pursued an overtly nationalist and xenophobic agenda. But while this led to severe criticism, little was done to stop him. However, it has been his relation ship with Russia and with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, that has been the most serious cause for concern. This has seemingly led to a new effort to challenge his authoritarianism. But many believe that the time has come for far more radical steps, including expelling Hungary from the EU and NATO. But could this really happen?
Research Interests:
In July and September 2022, Iran launched a series of highly damaging cyber attacks against Albania. Carefully planned and executed, the attacks targeted various Albanian government services and critical infrastructure. In response,... more
In July and September 2022, Iran launched a series of highly damaging cyber attacks against Albania. Carefully planned and executed, the attacks targeted various Albanian government services and critical infrastructure. In response, Tirana severed diplomatic relations with Tehran, the first time any country has broken off diplomatic relations with another state following a cyber attack. But why did the Islamic Republic of Iran launch such a serious attack on Albania? On the surface, there would seem to be little reason for it. However, underneath there is a fascinating story.
Hello and welcome! My name is James Ker-Lindsay. Here I take an informed look at International Relations with a focus on conflicts, security, and statehood. If you like what you see, please do subscribe. If you want more, including exclusive content and benefits, consider becoming a channel member. Many thanks!
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Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has had extremely strained relations with many countries, not least of all the United States. This has led to forty years of tensions. As part of this, the United States has supported various dissident groups, including the People’s Mujaheddin Organisation of Iran (PMOI), or Mojahedin-e-Khalq, also known as MEK. And it was this that seems to have been behind the latest attack. Having previously been based in Iraq, the group relocated to Albania in 2014-16 where it changed its tactics. Instead of direct armed insurgencies, it set up troll farms and came to the forefront on the online battle against Iran. And it’s this that appears to have led to the attack by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. But while the attack against Albania was heavily condemned by the United States, and other NATO members, Albania held off calling for joint action under the terms of the Chapter 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for collective defence. Nevertheless, the incident raises some very important questions about cyber warfare and the future of conflict in the 21st century.
Hello and welcome! My name is James Ker-Lindsay. Here I take an informed look at International Relations with a focus on conflicts, security, and statehood. If you like what you see, please do subscribe. If you want more, including exclusive content and benefits, consider becoming a channel member. Many thanks!
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has had extremely strained relations with many countries, not least of all the United States. This has led to forty years of tensions. As part of this, the United States has supported various dissident groups, including the People’s Mujaheddin Organisation of Iran (PMOI), or Mojahedin-e-Khalq, also known as MEK. And it was this that seems to have been behind the latest attack. Having previously been based in Iraq, the group relocated to Albania in 2014-16 where it changed its tactics. Instead of direct armed insurgencies, it set up troll farms and came to the forefront on the online battle against Iran. And it’s this that appears to have led to the attack by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. But while the attack against Albania was heavily condemned by the United States, and other NATO members, Albania held off calling for joint action under the terms of the Chapter 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for collective defence. Nevertheless, the incident raises some very important questions about cyber warfare and the future of conflict in the 21st century.
Research Interests: European Studies, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Albanian Studies, International Security, and 9 moreNATO, Iranian Studies, European Security and Defence Policy, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency(COIN), Cyber Warfare, Computer Security, Cyber Security, Cyber security / cyber warfare, and Hybrid Warfare
As the war in Ukraine continues, there's been growing speculation that Russia could be heading towards defeat. This has led to fears that Moscow may resort to desperate measures. There's even been growing talk of a Russian nuclear strike... more
As the war in Ukraine continues, there's been growing speculation that Russia could be heading towards defeat. This has led to fears that Moscow may resort to desperate measures. There's even been growing talk of a Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine. But is the nuclear threat real? And what would be the likely Western and international response if Russia did launch a nuclear attack?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Since 1945, the international community has lived in the shadow of nuclear weapons. As well as the Superpower confrontation of the Cold War, we have also seen the proliferation of nuclear technology in South and East Asia. However, as nuclear weapons have increased in power, so there's also been a sense that they may never be used. However, over the course of 2022, fears have been growing that we may be on the verge of seeing a nuclear weapon used in combat for the first time in almost 80 years. As the war in Ukraine has continued, Russia has made it clear that it would use all weapons available - including its nuclear arsenal - to defend its position in the east of Ukraine and Crimea. While the United States, European Union and others have warned against any strike, many still believe that such threats are just a bluff. However, there are good reasons to take such claims seriously. In contrast to Western thinking, Russia's military doctrine envisages using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a war. And there's a logic to this. But if it works, it raises the risk that other states could follow. To this extent, if Russia does use a nuclear weapon, the reaction of the wider international community will be vital. Indeed, it could well affects the course of international security for decades to come.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Since 1945, the international community has lived in the shadow of nuclear weapons. As well as the Superpower confrontation of the Cold War, we have also seen the proliferation of nuclear technology in South and East Asia. However, as nuclear weapons have increased in power, so there's also been a sense that they may never be used. However, over the course of 2022, fears have been growing that we may be on the verge of seeing a nuclear weapon used in combat for the first time in almost 80 years. As the war in Ukraine has continued, Russia has made it clear that it would use all weapons available - including its nuclear arsenal - to defend its position in the east of Ukraine and Crimea. While the United States, European Union and others have warned against any strike, many still believe that such threats are just a bluff. However, there are good reasons to take such claims seriously. In contrast to Western thinking, Russia's military doctrine envisages using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a war. And there's a logic to this. But if it works, it raises the risk that other states could follow. To this extent, if Russia does use a nuclear weapon, the reaction of the wider international community will be vital. Indeed, it could well affects the course of international security for decades to come.
Research Interests:
In September 2022, Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed in the most serious outbreak of fighting since they went to war in September 2020. While a ceasefire was soon put in place, there are very real fears that this is merely the prelude to... more
In September 2022, Armenia and Azerbaijan clashed in the most serious outbreak of fighting since they went to war in September 2020. While a ceasefire was soon put in place, there are very real fears that this is merely the prelude to another full-scale war between the countries - a war that ultimately see the end of Nagorno-Karabakh. So, what exactly has led to this dangerous situation? And is there any way to stop a catastrophic new conflict in the Caucasus.
Hello and welcome! My name is James Ker-Lindsay. Here I take an informed look at International Relations with a focus on conflicts, security, and statehood. If you like what you see, please do subscribe. If you want more, including exclusive content and benefits, consider becoming a channel member. Many thanks!
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For over thirty years, tensions have been high between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway province of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the early 1990s, Armenia scored a decisive victory over Azerbaijani forces, taking control of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (also known as the Artsakh Republic). However, while efforts were made to reach a peace agreement under the so-called Minsk Group of the OSCE, Azerbaijan began to build up its armed forces. After several serious clashes, in 2016 and July 2020, the two countries went to war in September 2020. After 44-days, Russia brokered a ceasefire. But hopes that this would lead to a final peace agreement have come to little. Almost two years later, the sides are still yet to reach a settlement. As frustration grows in Baku, there are now very fears that Azerbaijan may seriously be considering a new war to end the issue once and for all. The Caucasus seems at a crossroads. But will it opt for a final peace agreement, or be plunged back into war?
Hello and welcome! My name is James Ker-Lindsay. Here I take an informed look at International Relations with a focus on conflicts, security, and statehood. If you like what you see, please do subscribe. If you want more, including exclusive content and benefits, consider becoming a channel member. Many thanks!
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
For over thirty years, tensions have been high between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the breakaway province of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the early 1990s, Armenia scored a decisive victory over Azerbaijani forces, taking control of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (also known as the Artsakh Republic). However, while efforts were made to reach a peace agreement under the so-called Minsk Group of the OSCE, Azerbaijan began to build up its armed forces. After several serious clashes, in 2016 and July 2020, the two countries went to war in September 2020. After 44-days, Russia brokered a ceasefire. But hopes that this would lead to a final peace agreement have come to little. Almost two years later, the sides are still yet to reach a settlement. As frustration grows in Baku, there are now very fears that Azerbaijan may seriously be considering a new war to end the issue once and for all. The Caucasus seems at a crossroads. But will it opt for a final peace agreement, or be plunged back into war?
Research Interests:
At the end of August 2022, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, visited Algeria. Coming as the country marks the 60th anniversary of its independence from French colonial rule - an independence won following a particularly bitter and... more
At the end of August 2022, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, visited Algeria. Coming as the country marks the 60th anniversary of its independence from French colonial rule - an independence won following a particularly bitter and brutal war - the aim was to try to rebuild relations between France and Algeria. However, although the leaders called for a new era in ties, many feel that Paris and Algiers cannot have a normal relationship until France formally apologises for colonial rule and the treatment of Algerians during the War of Independence. But while France has been willing to acknowledge the past, will it ever formally say sorry?
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There were few colonial wars more bitter and brutal than the Algerian War of Independence. Bringing to an end 132 years of French rule, the war saw more than a million people killed, injured, and displaced. It also led to deep divisions within and across Algerian and French society. As well as the fighting between the French Army and the forces of the National Liberation Front, the FLN, it also saw fighting between the native Algerians and French settlers, the Pieds Noirs. On top of this, Algerians fought against Algerians as 200,000 Muslim Algerians served as French auxiliaries, the Harkis. As a result, the war left bitter divisions between France and Algeria, which finally won its independence in 1962. And even today, the effects are still being felt. Although President Macron has acknowledged the wrongdoings of the past, he has steadfastly refused to apologise, with officials close to him insisting none will be coming. But can relations ever be normal until France atones for its actions?
Hello and welcome! My name is James Ker-Lindsay. Here I take an informed look at International Relations with a focus on conflicts, security, and statehood. If you like what you see, please do subscribe. If you want more, including exclusive content and benefits, consider becoming a channel member. Many thanks!
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There were few colonial wars more bitter and brutal than the Algerian War of Independence. Bringing to an end 132 years of French rule, the war saw more than a million people killed, injured, and displaced. It also led to deep divisions within and across Algerian and French society. As well as the fighting between the French Army and the forces of the National Liberation Front, the FLN, it also saw fighting between the native Algerians and French settlers, the Pieds Noirs. On top of this, Algerians fought against Algerians as 200,000 Muslim Algerians served as French auxiliaries, the Harkis. As a result, the war left bitter divisions between France and Algeria, which finally won its independence in 1962. And even today, the effects are still being felt. Although President Macron has acknowledged the wrongdoings of the past, he has steadfastly refused to apologise, with officials close to him insisting none will be coming. But can relations ever be normal until France atones for its actions?
Research Interests:
In August 2022, serious fighting broke out in the Green Zone, the heavily defended heart of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. While immediate fears of a wider return to conflict appear to have been premature, it nevertheless served to... more
In August 2022, serious fighting broke out in the Green Zone, the heavily defended heart of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. While immediate fears of a wider return to conflict appear to have been premature, it nevertheless served to highlight the deep problems facing Iraq almost twenty years after the 2003 US invasion of the country. This prompts the question: was it worth it?
The United States invasion of Iraq was one of the most controversial wars of modern times. Coming at a moment when US strength was at its greatest after the end of the Cold War, it marked the peak of a line of thinking in many Western circles that armed intervention was acceptable to tackle human right abuses, spread liberal democracy and take on countries that posed a direct threat to the US and the wider West. In the case of Iraq, the Ba'ath Party regime of Saddam Hussein, which has invaded Kuwait in 1990, had come to be seen by many members of the Bush Administration (2001-2009) as one of the greatest threats to US interests. And yet the invasion and occupation proved to be a disaster. Liberated from Saddam Hussein, Iraq quickly sank into a violent insurgency and civil war between the Sunni and Shia communities. Ultimately, this all led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and cost trillions of dollars. Since then, Iraq has continued to be plagued by numerous ethnic, religious and political problems. It has also seen Iran increase its influence over the country. And yet, for all these difficulties, is there a case to be made that it has had some positive effects?
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The United States invasion of Iraq was one of the most controversial wars of modern times. Coming at a moment when US strength was at its greatest after the end of the Cold War, it marked the peak of a line of thinking in many Western circles that armed intervention was acceptable to tackle human right abuses, spread liberal democracy and take on countries that posed a direct threat to the US and the wider West. In the case of Iraq, the Ba'ath Party regime of Saddam Hussein, which has invaded Kuwait in 1990, had come to be seen by many members of the Bush Administration (2001-2009) as one of the greatest threats to US interests. And yet the invasion and occupation proved to be a disaster. Liberated from Saddam Hussein, Iraq quickly sank into a violent insurgency and civil war between the Sunni and Shia communities. Ultimately, this all led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and cost trillions of dollars. Since then, Iraq has continued to be plagued by numerous ethnic, religious and political problems. It has also seen Iran increase its influence over the country. And yet, for all these difficulties, is there a case to be made that it has had some positive effects?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
Research Interests:
Research Interests: International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Cyprus Studies, Mediation, Turkey, and 10 moreInternational Negotiations, Cyprus conflict, Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and Civil War, Ethnicity & Ethnic Conflicts, Greece, The Cyprus Problem, Eastern Mediterranean, Peace and Conflicts Studies, and Conflict and Conflict Resolution
In July 2022, Sri Lanka’s president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was forced to resign following mass protests. This came after a growing economic crisis that has effectively left the country bankrupt and unable to buy basic provisions, such as... more
In July 2022, Sri Lanka’s president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was forced to resign following mass protests. This came after a growing economic crisis that has effectively left the country bankrupt and unable to buy basic provisions, such as fuel, food and medicines. As a result, many now call it a failing state. And yet, just a decade ago, Sri Lanka was hailed as an economic success story. Having emerged from a almost three decades of civil war, it seemed well on the way to recovery. So, what happened? And can it still be saved?
Around the world, there are many failed and failing states. But while many of them have a long history of conflict and mismanagement, Sri Lanka doesn’t seem to fit the mould of other collapsed countries. While it had fought an exceptionally bitter and brutal conflict against the Tamil Tigers, this had ended in 2009. Since, then the country seemed to be rebuilding and had even been praised by the World Bank for its efforts. And yet, beneath the surface, the situation was far less positive. Under the Rajapaksa family, the country had become increasingly corrupt and authoritarian. At the same time, it built up unsustainable levels of debt, especially to China. However, the underlying problems would be exacerbated by a series of events, including a devastating terrorist attack and the global pandemic - as well as by a series of disastrous decisions. But can the new president, Ranil Wickremesinghe, turn things around?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Around the world, there are many failed and failing states. But while many of them have a long history of conflict and mismanagement, Sri Lanka doesn’t seem to fit the mould of other collapsed countries. While it had fought an exceptionally bitter and brutal conflict against the Tamil Tigers, this had ended in 2009. Since, then the country seemed to be rebuilding and had even been praised by the World Bank for its efforts. And yet, beneath the surface, the situation was far less positive. Under the Rajapaksa family, the country had become increasingly corrupt and authoritarian. At the same time, it built up unsustainable levels of debt, especially to China. However, the underlying problems would be exacerbated by a series of events, including a devastating terrorist attack and the global pandemic - as well as by a series of disastrous decisions. But can the new president, Ranil Wickremesinghe, turn things around?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Cyprus has become a model of a seemingly unsolvable conflict in international relations. Over the past sixty years, the United Nations has repeatedly attempted to find a bridge between the island’s Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities -... more
Cyprus has become a model of a seemingly unsolvable conflict in international relations. Over the past sixty years, the United Nations has repeatedly attempted to find a bridge between the island’s Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities - but without success. All this has led many observers to increasingly question whether a settlement can be found. So, can Cyprus ever be solved?
The Mediterranean island of Cyprus has become a byword for intractable conflict. Rich in history, the island was settled by Bronze Age Greeks almost 4000 years ago. Since then, it has come under the rule of numerous civilisations - including Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders and the Venetians - before being conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571. This led to the creation of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, in 1878 the Ottomans handed the island to Britain as part of a defence agreement. While this led to Greek Cypriot calls for union with Greece (enosis), these were repeatedly rejected. In 1955, the Greek Cypriots launched a campaign to end British rule and unite with Greece - a campaign that led to Turkish Cypriots calls for Cyprus to be partitions (taksim). Instead, Greece and Turkey reached a compromise and in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was created. However, the complex power sharing agreement soon collapsed, which led to the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force, UNFICYP. In 1974 the island was divided when Turkey invaded Cyprus following an attempt by the Greek military government to annex the Island. Since then, efforts to reunite the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation have continued without success. Today, many ask whether Cyprus is now destined to remain forever divided. Or can Cyprus still be solved?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
The Mediterranean island of Cyprus has become a byword for intractable conflict. Rich in history, the island was settled by Bronze Age Greeks almost 4000 years ago. Since then, it has come under the rule of numerous civilisations - including Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders and the Venetians - before being conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1571. This led to the creation of the Turkish Cypriot community. However, in 1878 the Ottomans handed the island to Britain as part of a defence agreement. While this led to Greek Cypriot calls for union with Greece (enosis), these were repeatedly rejected. In 1955, the Greek Cypriots launched a campaign to end British rule and unite with Greece - a campaign that led to Turkish Cypriots calls for Cyprus to be partitions (taksim). Instead, Greece and Turkey reached a compromise and in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was created. However, the complex power sharing agreement soon collapsed, which led to the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force, UNFICYP. In 1974 the island was divided when Turkey invaded Cyprus following an attempt by the Greek military government to annex the Island. Since then, efforts to reunite the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation have continued without success. Today, many ask whether Cyprus is now destined to remain forever divided. Or can Cyprus still be solved?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
In July 2022, violent demonstrations broke out in Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic in Uzbekistan. But while the rioting was quickly contained, it has raised questions about the status of the region and whether we could not see a... more
In July 2022, violent demonstrations broke out in Karakalpakstan, an autonomous republic in Uzbekistan. But while the rioting was quickly contained, it has raised questions about the status of the region and whether we could not see a more serious and prolonged uprising emerge in this important - though long neglected and often forgotten - territory.
What creates an independence movement? In truth, there are many factors that drive secession. Sometimes it can be caused by an attempt to remove the self-rule of a region that already enjoys autonomy. But could we now see a separatist movement emerge in Karakalpakstan. While little known internationally, this territory has a long and fascinating history. Within the Soviet Union is was passed between Russia and Kazakhstan before becoming an autonomous republic in Soviet Uzbekistan. This made it the only autonomous republic - a second order substate unit in the Soviet Union - in Central Asia. Crucially, following the collapse of the USSR, and the emergence of the newly-independent Republic of Uzbekistan, it retained its autonomous status. More to the point, and extremely unusually in international relations, it was also given a right to secede. As a result, Uzbekistan didn't witness the territorial disputes seen elsewhere. However, Karakalpakstan's autonomy, and its right to independence, have now been questioned by the Uzbek President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. And it was this that sparked the recent violence. But what could this mean for Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan in the period ahead?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
What creates an independence movement? In truth, there are many factors that drive secession. Sometimes it can be caused by an attempt to remove the self-rule of a region that already enjoys autonomy. But could we now see a separatist movement emerge in Karakalpakstan. While little known internationally, this territory has a long and fascinating history. Within the Soviet Union is was passed between Russia and Kazakhstan before becoming an autonomous republic in Soviet Uzbekistan. This made it the only autonomous republic - a second order substate unit in the Soviet Union - in Central Asia. Crucially, following the collapse of the USSR, and the emergence of the newly-independent Republic of Uzbekistan, it retained its autonomous status. More to the point, and extremely unusually in international relations, it was also given a right to secede. As a result, Uzbekistan didn't witness the territorial disputes seen elsewhere. However, Karakalpakstan's autonomy, and its right to independence, have now been questioned by the Uzbek President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. And it was this that sparked the recent violence. But what could this mean for Karakalpakstan and Uzbekistan in the period ahead?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
In March 2022, Anatoly Bibilov, the leader of the Georgian breakaway territory of South Ossetia announced plans to hold a referendum on unification with Russia. However, by the end of the May, the planned vote had been called off... more
In March 2022, Anatoly Bibilov, the leader of the Georgian breakaway territory of South Ossetia announced plans to hold a referendum on unification with Russia. However, by the end of the May, the planned vote had been called off following strong opposition from Moscow. However, the reasons for the Kremlin's objections aren't entirely clear. Certainly, the timing seemed ideal for annexation, especially as international attention was focused on Ukraine and Russia was already under extensive Western sanctions. So, what does Russia really want with South Ossetia?
As the Soviet Union collapsed at the start of the 1990s, South Ossetia seized the opportunity to try to break away from Georgia. However, it was unable to achieve its goal of unification with neighbouring North Ossetia-Alania, lying across the Caucasus Mountains. Instead, Georgia repeatedly tried to retake the territory. This eventually came to a head in 2008 with the Five Day War between Georgia and the Russian Federation. In response, Moscow recognised South Ossetia - and Abkhazia, another breakaway territory - as an independent state; thus becoming South Ossetia's patron state. However, in the decade and a half since then, South Ossetians have shown little overt commitment to their statehood. Instead, repeated calls for a referendum on unification with North Ossetia within Russia have been rejected by Moscow. The question is why? While the situation certainly gives Russia leverage over Georgia, it appears more complex than this.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
As the Soviet Union collapsed at the start of the 1990s, South Ossetia seized the opportunity to try to break away from Georgia. However, it was unable to achieve its goal of unification with neighbouring North Ossetia-Alania, lying across the Caucasus Mountains. Instead, Georgia repeatedly tried to retake the territory. This eventually came to a head in 2008 with the Five Day War between Georgia and the Russian Federation. In response, Moscow recognised South Ossetia - and Abkhazia, another breakaway territory - as an independent state; thus becoming South Ossetia's patron state. However, in the decade and a half since then, South Ossetians have shown little overt commitment to their statehood. Instead, repeated calls for a referendum on unification with North Ossetia within Russia have been rejected by Moscow. The question is why? While the situation certainly gives Russia leverage over Georgia, it appears more complex than this.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Nigeria faces an unprecedented range of security challenges. In addition to the ongoing Biafran independence movement in the southeast, an insurgency continues in the Delta region. To the northeast, the country faces a brutal Islamist... more
Nigeria faces an unprecedented range of security challenges. In addition to the ongoing Biafran independence movement in the southeast, an insurgency continues in the Delta region. To the northeast, the country faces a brutal Islamist terrorist campaign by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Meanwhile, violent Muslim Fulani herders from the northwest are increasingly pushing into the central and southern parts of the country. On top of this, there are now signs that the southwest, which has tended to be more peaceful, is also facing growing security threats. This has led many to ask whether Nigeria should now be thought of as a failed state. Indeed, is it a collapsing country?
Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960. However, since then it has faced a bewildering array of security challenges. As well as a brutal civil war in the 1960s - the Biafran War - it has endured conflicts over oil and land resources as well as religious extremism. It is also mired in banditry, gang violence, vigilantism and many more localised ethno-national conflicts. And a major attack on a Catholic Church in the southwest suggests a dangerous new direction could be emerging. Worryingly, there is little sign that the situation is getting better. The security forces seem unable to handle the range of security threats the country faces. Looking ahead, there is little room for optimism as the government fails to address the huge structural problems the country faces. This includes endemic corruption, high youth unemployment, the growing effects of climate change and small arms proliferation. All of which contribute to the bleak security situation Nigeria faces.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960. However, since then it has faced a bewildering array of security challenges. As well as a brutal civil war in the 1960s - the Biafran War - it has endured conflicts over oil and land resources as well as religious extremism. It is also mired in banditry, gang violence, vigilantism and many more localised ethno-national conflicts. And a major attack on a Catholic Church in the southwest suggests a dangerous new direction could be emerging. Worryingly, there is little sign that the situation is getting better. The security forces seem unable to handle the range of security threats the country faces. Looking ahead, there is little room for optimism as the government fails to address the huge structural problems the country faces. This includes endemic corruption, high youth unemployment, the growing effects of climate change and small arms proliferation. All of which contribute to the bleak security situation Nigeria faces.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Kaliningrad is the only part of Russia geographically separated from the rest of the Federation. Wedged between Lithuania and Poland it is more than 300 kilometres from the rest of the Russian Federation. Strategically vital for Russia as... more
Kaliningrad is the only part of Russia geographically separated from the rest of the Federation. Wedged between Lithuania and Poland it is more than 300 kilometres from the rest of the Russian Federation. Strategically vital for Russia as the headquartered of its Baltic fleet, the enclave came to international attention in June 2022 when the Lithuanian government imposed tough new EU-mandated restrictions of good crossing its territory into Kaliningrad. This has sparked a furious reaction from Moscow, which has vowed to retaliate and take actions that will have a negative effect on the Lithuanian people. But what exactly can it do? And what effects are the sanctions likely to have on Kaliningrad?
Kaliningrad was founded in 1255 by the Teutonic Knights, a medieval German crusader military order. As Konigsberg, it would grow to become the heart of the German Kingdom of Prussia. However, after the First World War, it was separated from the rest of Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. However, everything changed in 1945. Following the end of the Second World War, the city was annexed by the Soviet Union, becoming an oblast or region of Soviet Russia. In this capacity, it became a strategically vital war warm port for the Baltic Fleet. But following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it found itself geographically isolated from Russia. This isolation has been compounded following Poland and Lithuania's membership of the EU and NATO and deteriorating relations between Moscow and the West. All this raises serious questions about Kaliningrad, including the question of whether it could even look to secede.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Kaliningrad was founded in 1255 by the Teutonic Knights, a medieval German crusader military order. As Konigsberg, it would grow to become the heart of the German Kingdom of Prussia. However, after the First World War, it was separated from the rest of Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. However, everything changed in 1945. Following the end of the Second World War, the city was annexed by the Soviet Union, becoming an oblast or region of Soviet Russia. In this capacity, it became a strategically vital war warm port for the Baltic Fleet. But following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it found itself geographically isolated from Russia. This isolation has been compounded following Poland and Lithuania's membership of the EU and NATO and deteriorating relations between Moscow and the West. All this raises serious questions about Kaliningrad, including the question of whether it could even look to secede.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
For over two hundred years, Switzerland has stood out as the very model of a neutral country. And yet the war in Ukraine has raised very real questions about it commitment to the principle. While it has come in for criticism over its... more
For over two hundred years, Switzerland has stood out as the very model of a neutral country. And yet the war in Ukraine has raised very real questions about it commitment to the principle. While it has come in for criticism over its decision to prevent NATO members from re-exporting Swiss-made weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, Switzerland has full aligned itself to European Union sanction on Russia. It has also spoken openly about the need to rethink what neutrality really means in the modern era. So, is Switzerland still neutral? And, if it is, could this be about to change?
Switzerland is one of the most interesting countries in the world. Its origins can be traced back to 1291, when a group of communities - now known as cantons - formed a defensive alliance. In the centuries that followed they were joined by others and Switzerland became an expansionist collection of statelets. This was until France defeated it. While this has usually been seen as the start of the country’s moves towards neutrality. Its formal neutral status came in 1815, following the Napoleonic Wars. But while it has become famed for its neutrality, in recent years there have been growing signs that this is changing, Switzerland has already forged close ties to NATO. And following the start of the war in Ukraine its has aligned with the EIU and others to impose cantons on Moscow. And inside the country, there is growing support for NATO membership. This has prompted the country’s president, Ignazio Cassis, to refer to a new principle of “cooperative neutrality”.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Switzerland is one of the most interesting countries in the world. Its origins can be traced back to 1291, when a group of communities - now known as cantons - formed a defensive alliance. In the centuries that followed they were joined by others and Switzerland became an expansionist collection of statelets. This was until France defeated it. While this has usually been seen as the start of the country’s moves towards neutrality. Its formal neutral status came in 1815, following the Napoleonic Wars. But while it has become famed for its neutrality, in recent years there have been growing signs that this is changing, Switzerland has already forged close ties to NATO. And following the start of the war in Ukraine its has aligned with the EIU and others to impose cantons on Moscow. And inside the country, there is growing support for NATO membership. This has prompted the country’s president, Ignazio Cassis, to refer to a new principle of “cooperative neutrality”.
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a stunningly beautiful country. But it is also a country mired in difficulties. In the midst of ongoing constitutional deadlock, there has been growing debate about the future of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian... more
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a stunningly beautiful country. But it is also a country mired in difficulties. In the midst of ongoing constitutional deadlock, there has been growing debate about the future of Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian Serb entity that was created under the 1995 Peace Agreement. In recent years, Bosnian Serb leaders have increasingly threatened to break away and form their own independent state. This in turn has led to growing calls by many Bosniaks for RS to be abolished. So, what is the answer?
In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement brought a final end to the bitter and bloody three-way war between the Bosnian Muslims (now known as Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. To do this, it saw the Serbian breakaway state of Republika Srpska reintegrated into Bosnia-Herzegovina alongside the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But while at first the new arrangement seemed to be making progress, over the past 15 years tensions have been growing. Today, many regard Bosnia as a dysfunctional state. As well as growing calls for secession by nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders, most notable Milorad Dodik, the Bosniaks have been calling for greater decentralisation, with some even suggesting the complete abolition of the Republika Srpska - an entity that many see as the product of genocide and ethnic cleansing. But as tempting as it may be to view this as the solution to the country's difficulties, RS is not the problem that many present it as bring. Instead, the problems lie elsewhere. Indeed, a successful Bosnia needs to be built on respecting Bosnia's territorial integrity and the legitimacy of Republika Srpska.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement brought a final end to the bitter and bloody three-way war between the Bosnian Muslims (now known as Bosniaks), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. To do this, it saw the Serbian breakaway state of Republika Srpska reintegrated into Bosnia-Herzegovina alongside the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But while at first the new arrangement seemed to be making progress, over the past 15 years tensions have been growing. Today, many regard Bosnia as a dysfunctional state. As well as growing calls for secession by nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders, most notable Milorad Dodik, the Bosniaks have been calling for greater decentralisation, with some even suggesting the complete abolition of the Republika Srpska - an entity that many see as the product of genocide and ethnic cleansing. But as tempting as it may be to view this as the solution to the country's difficulties, RS is not the problem that many present it as bring. Instead, the problems lie elsewhere. Indeed, a successful Bosnia needs to be built on respecting Bosnia's territorial integrity and the legitimacy of Republika Srpska.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
On 9 May 2022, the Philippines went to the polls to elect a new president. The landslide winner was Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos. The son of the country’s former dictator, the victory was greeted with horror by many observers and human... more
On 9 May 2022, the Philippines went to the polls to elect a new president. The landslide winner was Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos. The son of the country’s former dictator, the victory was greeted with horror by many observers and human rights groups. But just how did it happen? And what it is likely to mean for the country?
Around the world there are countries where the highest political positions are held by two generations of a family. Examples include Canada, Kenya, Malaysia, Azerbaijan, and Syria to name just a few examples. But few if any countries have taken it as far as the Philippines. Already we have seen two recent presidents assumes office after a parent - Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno Aquino III. However, it is the election of Bongbong Marcos, the son of former leader, Ferdinand Marcos, this has raised real fears for the future of the country. However, in reality, his victory doesn't mark a new chapter for the country. Instead, it may in fact represent a continuation of trends we have already seen under the current president, Rodrigo Duterte. And looking ahead, the fact that Duterte's daughter, Sara, the new vice-president, may wish to run for office when Marcos's single six year term ends, may prevent him from staying in power - even if he wants to. But, in a country increasingly shaped by dynasticism, there is already another generation of Marcos political leaders seemingly waiting to take over.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Around the world there are countries where the highest political positions are held by two generations of a family. Examples include Canada, Kenya, Malaysia, Azerbaijan, and Syria to name just a few examples. But few if any countries have taken it as far as the Philippines. Already we have seen two recent presidents assumes office after a parent - Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno Aquino III. However, it is the election of Bongbong Marcos, the son of former leader, Ferdinand Marcos, this has raised real fears for the future of the country. However, in reality, his victory doesn't mark a new chapter for the country. Instead, it may in fact represent a continuation of trends we have already seen under the current president, Rodrigo Duterte. And looking ahead, the fact that Duterte's daughter, Sara, the new vice-president, may wish to run for office when Marcos's single six year term ends, may prevent him from staying in power - even if he wants to. But, in a country increasingly shaped by dynasticism, there is already another generation of Marcos political leaders seemingly waiting to take over.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
On 18 May 2022, Finland and Sweden formally submitted their applications to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO. For both countries, it is a landmark decision. But their quest to join the alliance has already run into... more
On 18 May 2022, Finland and Sweden formally submitted their applications to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO. For both countries, it is a landmark decision. But their quest to join the alliance has already run into problems. In a surprise move, Turkey has objected to their membership. But will it really stand in the way of what many see as a hugely significant enlargement for NATO?
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a fundamental rethinking of European security. Perhaps the most significant symbol of this has been the decision of Sweden and Finland to apply to join NATO. For both countries, it represents a landmark decision. But while we tend to think of them as being driven by some sort of Nordic neutrality, this isn't really the case. They are rather different from each other. Sweden has been neutral for over 200 years. And Finland has long had a policy of non-alignment deriving from its relationship with neighbouring Russia. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, with have built top strong ties to NATO. In this sense, joining the alliance is not perhaps as dramatic in real terms as it may seem. The problem is that those hopes may now be obstructed by Turkey.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a fundamental rethinking of European security. Perhaps the most significant symbol of this has been the decision of Sweden and Finland to apply to join NATO. For both countries, it represents a landmark decision. But while we tend to think of them as being driven by some sort of Nordic neutrality, this isn't really the case. They are rather different from each other. Sweden has been neutral for over 200 years. And Finland has long had a policy of non-alignment deriving from its relationship with neighbouring Russia. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, with have built top strong ties to NATO. In this sense, joining the alliance is not perhaps as dramatic in real terms as it may seem. The problem is that those hopes may now be obstructed by Turkey.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
In May 2022, Sinn Féin won a hugely symbolic victory in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections. This has led to growing speculation that we could well be about to see the unification of the island of Ireland. But just how likely is it... more
In May 2022, Sinn Féin won a hugely symbolic victory in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections. This has led to growing speculation that we could well be about to see the unification of the island of Ireland. But just how likely is it that we could be on the cusp of Irish unity?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Ireland has had a long and troubled history. Starting in the twelfth century it came under increasing English and then British dominance. This not only saw protest Anglo-Irish land-owning class emerge, but also the arrival of protestant settlers in the north of the island, an area known as Ulster. While Ireland was united with Great Britain in the nineteenth century, pressure grew for home rule. In 1919, the Irish War of Independence erupted. Two years later, in 1921, Britain decided to partition the island. While Ulster would remain a part of the UK, the rest would become independent as the Irish Free State, a self-ruling British Dominion. This would formally become a republic in 1949, but continued to claim the north. Meanwhile, an armed campaign to unite the two parts under the sovereignty of the Irish Republic emerged, led by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the IRA. This led to violence between the largely protest Unionists, who want to the Northern Ireland remain a part of the United Kingdom, and nationalists, who want to see Ireland reunified. However, while the Good Friday Agreement out an end to violence in 1998, unification has been hard to achieve given the protestant dominance in the North. But is this changing?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Ireland has had a long and troubled history. Starting in the twelfth century it came under increasing English and then British dominance. This not only saw protest Anglo-Irish land-owning class emerge, but also the arrival of protestant settlers in the north of the island, an area known as Ulster. While Ireland was united with Great Britain in the nineteenth century, pressure grew for home rule. In 1919, the Irish War of Independence erupted. Two years later, in 1921, Britain decided to partition the island. While Ulster would remain a part of the UK, the rest would become independent as the Irish Free State, a self-ruling British Dominion. This would formally become a republic in 1949, but continued to claim the north. Meanwhile, an armed campaign to unite the two parts under the sovereignty of the Irish Republic emerged, led by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the IRA. This led to violence between the largely protest Unionists, who want to the Northern Ireland remain a part of the United Kingdom, and nationalists, who want to see Ireland reunified. However, while the Good Friday Agreement out an end to violence in 1998, unification has been hard to achieve given the protestant dominance in the North. But is this changing?
Research Interests:
The war in Ukraine has thrown a spotlight on the long-standing issue of Transnistria in neighbouring Moldova. With claims that Russia is considering a push on the breakaway territory, where it already has a contingent of troops, there are... more
The war in Ukraine has thrown a spotlight on the long-standing issue of Transnistria in neighbouring Moldova. With claims that Russia is considering a push on the breakaway territory, where it already has a contingent of troops, there are growing questions about the future of this de facto state. So, what is the Transnistrian dispute all about? And could we be about to see it resolved - peacefully or otherwise?
The conflict in Ukraine has drawn attention to a number of seemingly frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. One of the most significant is the dispute over Transnistria, which broke away from Moldova in the last months of the Soviet Union. Originally created as the heart of the largely Slavic-inhabited Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a part of Soviet Ukraine on the east bank of the Dniester River, it was designed to allow the USSR to maintain a claim to Bessarabia, a largely Romanian-speaking territory that had broken away from Russia and united with Romania at the end of the First World War. This opportunity came at the start of the Second World War, when Bessarabia and Trans-Dniester (now more generally known as Transnistria) were united, becoming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic - one of the 15 top-level republics of the Soviet Union. However, despite an effort to change the demographics, the union became increasingly uneasy. This came to a head when, in 1991, Transnistria broke away, forming the internationally-unrecognised Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR). Since then, international efforts to reunite Transnistria with Moldova - the so-called 5+2 process - have been unsuccessful. But could this be about to change?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
The conflict in Ukraine has drawn attention to a number of seemingly frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. One of the most significant is the dispute over Transnistria, which broke away from Moldova in the last months of the Soviet Union. Originally created as the heart of the largely Slavic-inhabited Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, a part of Soviet Ukraine on the east bank of the Dniester River, it was designed to allow the USSR to maintain a claim to Bessarabia, a largely Romanian-speaking territory that had broken away from Russia and united with Romania at the end of the First World War. This opportunity came at the start of the Second World War, when Bessarabia and Trans-Dniester (now more generally known as Transnistria) were united, becoming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic - one of the 15 top-level republics of the Soviet Union. However, despite an effort to change the demographics, the union became increasingly uneasy. This came to a head when, in 1991, Transnistria broke away, forming the internationally-unrecognised Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR). Since then, international efforts to reunite Transnistria with Moldova - the so-called 5+2 process - have been unsuccessful. But could this be about to change?
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
El Salvador in under a state of emergency. Following a spate of killings in March 2022, which left 62 dead in a single day, the country has imposed harsh new measures to curb gang violence. This includes mass arrests, longer prison terms,... more
El Salvador in under a state of emergency. Following a spate of killings in March 2022, which left 62 dead in a single day, the country has imposed harsh new measures to curb gang violence. This includes mass arrests, longer prison terms, and limits on press freedom. All this has led to concern that the country is moving towards authoritarianism under its young president, Nayib Bukele. So, is it battling a new gang war, or is there something else behind this current crackdown?
The Central American country of El Salvador once had the reputation as the murder capital of the world. Plagued by gang wars, in 2015, its violent death rate exceeded that of most of the world's war zones. Only Syria had a higher level. However, since 2019, things have seemed to be turning around. Under President Bukele, the country seemed to be turning around. However, in March 2022, there was another spike in violence. This has led to a dramatic new crackdown as the government has imposed a state of emergency and arrested well of 20,000 people suspected of having links to the country's two main gangs - MS-13 and Barrio 18. But is this really all about cracking down on the gangs. Or is there more to it?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
The Central American country of El Salvador once had the reputation as the murder capital of the world. Plagued by gang wars, in 2015, its violent death rate exceeded that of most of the world's war zones. Only Syria had a higher level. However, since 2019, things have seemed to be turning around. Under President Bukele, the country seemed to be turning around. However, in March 2022, there was another spike in violence. This has led to a dramatic new crackdown as the government has imposed a state of emergency and arrested well of 20,000 people suspected of having links to the country's two main gangs - MS-13 and Barrio 18. But is this really all about cracking down on the gangs. Or is there more to it?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
As the war in Ukraine continues, attention has turned to neighbouring Moldova - one of the least known countries in Europe. Facing considerable economic, political and now security problems, there have been growing calls for unification... more
As the war in Ukraine continues, attention has turned to neighbouring Moldova - one of the least known countries in Europe. Facing considerable economic, political and now security problems, there have been growing calls for unification with neighbouring Romania in recent years. But could this really happen?
While we (incorrectly) tend to think of countries as national homelands, there are some nations that find themselves divided into two separate countries where they exist in a majority. In effect, a national homeland becomes divided. In many cases, they learn to live a separate existence - and may even develop a wholly separate identity. But sometimes there are calls for unification. Romania and Moldova are a good example. Having once been known as Bessarabia, a part of the Principality of Moldavia, Moldova was ceded to Russia in the early nineteenth century. However, in 1918, it was reunited with what was then the Kingdom of Romania. In 1940, the Soviet Union retook the territory, proclaiming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, with the end of the USSR, in 1991, the Republic of Moldova came into being. This in turn led to calls for union with neighbouring Romania. But could this reunification really happen? While there is certainly support for the idea in both countries, there are many economic, political, social and international factors that need to be taken into account. Ultimately, union - in one form or another - is very possible.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
While we (incorrectly) tend to think of countries as national homelands, there are some nations that find themselves divided into two separate countries where they exist in a majority. In effect, a national homeland becomes divided. In many cases, they learn to live a separate existence - and may even develop a wholly separate identity. But sometimes there are calls for unification. Romania and Moldova are a good example. Having once been known as Bessarabia, a part of the Principality of Moldavia, Moldova was ceded to Russia in the early nineteenth century. However, in 1918, it was reunited with what was then the Kingdom of Romania. In 1940, the Soviet Union retook the territory, proclaiming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, with the end of the USSR, in 1991, the Republic of Moldova came into being. This in turn led to calls for union with neighbouring Romania. But could this reunification really happen? While there is certainly support for the idea in both countries, there are many economic, political, social and international factors that need to be taken into account. Ultimately, union - in one form or another - is very possible.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
Research Interests:
The images of Chechen paramilitaries fighting in alongside the Russian Army in Ukraine has raised the question of just how Russia was able to reassert control over Chechnya following its unilateral declaration of independence, in 1991.... more
The images of Chechen paramilitaries fighting in alongside the Russian Army in Ukraine has raised the question of just how Russia was able to reassert control over Chechnya following its unilateral declaration of independence, in 1991. For almost a decade and a half Moscow fought two brutal conflicts in the North Caucasus as it sought to secure its sovereignty over the Chechen Republic. So, just how did it manage to retake its rebel republic? And just how loyal is it likely to remain?
How do countries that fought against a breakaway territory reassert their sovereignty? And can that territory every truly accept a return to the control of the 'parent' state? One of the most interesting examples in modern international relations centres on the Russian Federation and Chechnya. In 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Chechnya declared independence as the Chechen Republic of Ikcheria. While ignored at first, by late 1994 Moscow could no longer ignore the challenge to its authority and it invaded. However, the conflict - now known as the First Chechen War - was a disaster. Facing stiff opposition, Russia levelled the republics capital, Grozny. In 1997, Russia and Chechnya signed a peace agreement. However, just two years later, in 1999, Vladimir Putin, the new prime minister of Russia ordered troops back in. This time Moscow was more successful. In 2009, the Second Chechen War came to an end. Since then, Russia's sovereignty is unquestioned. This is due to the successful relationship Putin has established with the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who now exerts complete control over Chechnia. And it's this relationship that has seen Chechen forces fighting alongside the Russian Army in Ukraine. But just how secure is this relationship?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
How do countries that fought against a breakaway territory reassert their sovereignty? And can that territory every truly accept a return to the control of the 'parent' state? One of the most interesting examples in modern international relations centres on the Russian Federation and Chechnya. In 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Chechnya declared independence as the Chechen Republic of Ikcheria. While ignored at first, by late 1994 Moscow could no longer ignore the challenge to its authority and it invaded. However, the conflict - now known as the First Chechen War - was a disaster. Facing stiff opposition, Russia levelled the republics capital, Grozny. In 1997, Russia and Chechnya signed a peace agreement. However, just two years later, in 1999, Vladimir Putin, the new prime minister of Russia ordered troops back in. This time Moscow was more successful. In 2009, the Second Chechen War came to an end. Since then, Russia's sovereignty is unquestioned. This is due to the successful relationship Putin has established with the Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who now exerts complete control over Chechnia. And it's this relationship that has seen Chechen forces fighting alongside the Russian Army in Ukraine. But just how secure is this relationship?
Channel Link http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
2 April 2022 marked the 40 anniversary of Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands. In 1982, the Argentinian Military Junta attempted to seize the Islands, along with South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. However, just... more
2 April 2022 marked the 40 anniversary of Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands. In 1982, the Argentinian Military Junta attempted to seize the Islands, along with South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. However, just ten-weeks later Britain had retaken the Islands following a brief undeclared war. However, four decades later the issue remains a point of contention between the United Kingdom and Argentina. So, is there any way to resolve it?
For almost 200 years, Britain and Argentina have been at odds over The Falkland Islands. Indeed, in 1965, the United Nations General Assembly called for negotiations between the two countries over the issue, which is viewed as an issue of decolonisation. However, after 15 years of talks, in 1982, the Military Government in Argentina tried to retake the Islands, known to the Argentinians as the Malvinas, by force. Although this fails, the issue remains a source of tension. While Argentine sees it as a matter of territorial integrity, Britain views it as an issue of self-determination. As long as the Falkland Islanders see themselves as British, or want to be ruled by Britain, then they have the right to have their wishes respected. But is there an alternative to the binary sovereignty problem. Could shared sovereignty - a condominium - offer an alternative route.
CHANNEL LINK http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
For almost 200 years, Britain and Argentina have been at odds over The Falkland Islands. Indeed, in 1965, the United Nations General Assembly called for negotiations between the two countries over the issue, which is viewed as an issue of decolonisation. However, after 15 years of talks, in 1982, the Military Government in Argentina tried to retake the Islands, known to the Argentinians as the Malvinas, by force. Although this fails, the issue remains a source of tension. While Argentine sees it as a matter of territorial integrity, Britain views it as an issue of self-determination. As long as the Falkland Islanders see themselves as British, or want to be ruled by Britain, then they have the right to have their wishes respected. But is there an alternative to the binary sovereignty problem. Could shared sovereignty - a condominium - offer an alternative route.
CHANNEL LINK http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay?sub_confirmation=1
Research Interests:
As the war in Ukraine continues, calls have been growing for Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, to be held accountable for the invasion. Already President Biden has openly called him a war criminal. And the Chief Prosecutor at the... more
As the war in Ukraine continues, calls have been growing for Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, to be held accountable for the invasion. Already President Biden has openly called him a war criminal. And the Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court has opened an investigation. But could we really see Putin put on trial for war crimes?
For over a hundred and sixty years, the international community has sought to introduce rules to govern the conduct of armed conflict. Known as International Humanitarian Law, this includes the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. However, this has also been supplemented by other categories of crime related to conflict, such crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide. At the same time, steps have been taken to bring those committing such crimes to justice. Following the trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War, the 1990s saw the establishment of tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well as Rwanda and Sierra Leone. But the most significant step forward was the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in 1998. But what does all this mean for Putin and Russia. Is there are realistic prospect that he could face a war crimes trial. As is shown, there are certainly some major obstacles.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
For over a hundred and sixty years, the international community has sought to introduce rules to govern the conduct of armed conflict. Known as International Humanitarian Law, this includes the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. However, this has also been supplemented by other categories of crime related to conflict, such crimes of aggression, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide. At the same time, steps have been taken to bring those committing such crimes to justice. Following the trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo after the Second World War, the 1990s saw the establishment of tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well as Rwanda and Sierra Leone. But the most significant step forward was the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in 1998. But what does all this mean for Putin and Russia. Is there are realistic prospect that he could face a war crimes trial. As is shown, there are certainly some major obstacles.
Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay
Research Interests:
This year started on a particularly pessimistic note in Cyprus. In December 2013, the latest attempt by the United Nations to bring the island’s Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders back to the negotiating table had foundered. The two sides... more
This year started on a particularly pessimistic note in Cyprus. In December 2013, the latest attempt by the United Nations to bring the island’s Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders back to the negotiating table had foundered. The two sides had been unable to reach an agreement on the wording of a joint statement that would have laid down the parameters for a renewed attempt to reunify the island.
How has the refugee crisis affected countries in South Eastern Europe? In a discussion on the situation in Serbia, Croatia and Hungary, James Ker-Lindsay argues that with no country – Germany included – managing to get all of their moves... more
How has the refugee crisis affected countries in South Eastern Europe? In a discussion on the situation in Serbia, Croatia and Hungary, James Ker-Lindsay argues that with no country – Germany included – managing to get all of their moves right, the crisis is proving to be the most divisive issue Europe has so far had to face.
Fews answers from James Ker-Lindsay, Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe, London School of Economics and Political Science. 1. In your opinion, what is going on in Macedonia, is it a political crisis, ethnic... more
Fews answers from James Ker-Lindsay, Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe, London School of Economics and Political Science.
1. In your opinion, what is going on in Macedonia, is it a political crisis, ethnic crisis, mix or both, or maybe something even worse (heading towards full scale conflict, perhaps) ?
What we are seeing is a political crisis. Over recent years there have been growing concerns about the autocratic turn taken by Prime Minister Gruevski. This has even prompted the EU to suggest that the long standing recommendation to start formal accession talks with Macedonia, which has been an EU candidate since 2005, could be rescinded. Meanwhile, worries about the country have grown significantly over the past few months. Since February, the opposition has been releasing tapped conversations that appear to show that the government has been involved in a stunning array of serious misdeed and political skullduggery, including voter fraud, manipulating the justice system and even covering up a murder. As a result, there has seen rising public opposition to the regime, culminating in serious demonstrations this past week.
It is against this backdrop that we have now seen serious clashes between police and what are being described as ‘terrorists’ in the city of Kumanovo, close to the border of Serbia and Kosovo. To many observers, the timing just seems too suspicious. Questions are being asked as to whether the government has somehow orchestrated this in order to divert attention away from the growing scandal. This may certainly sound implausible to outsiders. The problem is that such views cannot be easily dismissed as Balkan conspiracy theorising. Given the evidence of serious wrongdoings by the government, many people believe that the administration is more than capable of staging a terrorist attack in order to stay in power. This in itself is an indication of just how grim the political situation in Macedonia is.
Crucially, it is important to stress that these claims do not mean that the country is not in fact facing some sort of armed insurgency. It is more than possible that a separatist group is indeed trying to take advantage of the political instability in the country. We just don’t know as yet. However, one must be wary about promoting the idea that this means that the country is teetering on the verge of serious renewed ethnic conflict, as it did in 2001. For a start, leaders of the Albanian community have been quick to stress that there will be no return to fighting. And to my mind there does seem a genuine will to avoid bloodshed. Also, the recent anti-government protests have seen the country’s various communities come out onto the streets to demonstrate together. (I also saw at first hand how a protest at the university earlier this year crossed ethnic boundaries.) Nevertheless, the situation is fraught with danger. Until the political situation is resolved, there is always the risk, however small, that it could take a turn for the worse and develop a violent ethnic dimension. This is why it needs to be resolved as soon as possible.
2. What could/should the EU do?
The European Union needs to take a much firmer role than it has done to date. At the moment, there is a political mediation process conducted by three MEPs. However, this is simply not enough. There needs to be much higher level intervention. Obviously, the EU faces a number of very serious challenges at the moment, such as Russia and Ukraine and the horrific situation in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it is imperative that senior officials, as well as leaders from the member states, recognise the dangers of the current crisis in Macedonia and respond urgently to resolve the situation. What would this mean in real terms? The current thinking is that some form of interim transitional government is needed in advance of fresh elections (properly monitored, of course). Beyond that, the EU will need to take steps to rebuild and consolidate democracy in the country. The best way to do this will be to open accession talks. However, for this to happen Greece will need to lift its veto. One sincerely hopes that this will happen. This is not to say that Athens must abandon its position that a solution to the name issue needs to be found. Rather, it is about the Greek Government behaving in a responsible manner and recognising that the political stability of its northern neighbour is far more important to its interests than ongoing turmoil and possibly conflict.
1. In your opinion, what is going on in Macedonia, is it a political crisis, ethnic crisis, mix or both, or maybe something even worse (heading towards full scale conflict, perhaps) ?
What we are seeing is a political crisis. Over recent years there have been growing concerns about the autocratic turn taken by Prime Minister Gruevski. This has even prompted the EU to suggest that the long standing recommendation to start formal accession talks with Macedonia, which has been an EU candidate since 2005, could be rescinded. Meanwhile, worries about the country have grown significantly over the past few months. Since February, the opposition has been releasing tapped conversations that appear to show that the government has been involved in a stunning array of serious misdeed and political skullduggery, including voter fraud, manipulating the justice system and even covering up a murder. As a result, there has seen rising public opposition to the regime, culminating in serious demonstrations this past week.
It is against this backdrop that we have now seen serious clashes between police and what are being described as ‘terrorists’ in the city of Kumanovo, close to the border of Serbia and Kosovo. To many observers, the timing just seems too suspicious. Questions are being asked as to whether the government has somehow orchestrated this in order to divert attention away from the growing scandal. This may certainly sound implausible to outsiders. The problem is that such views cannot be easily dismissed as Balkan conspiracy theorising. Given the evidence of serious wrongdoings by the government, many people believe that the administration is more than capable of staging a terrorist attack in order to stay in power. This in itself is an indication of just how grim the political situation in Macedonia is.
Crucially, it is important to stress that these claims do not mean that the country is not in fact facing some sort of armed insurgency. It is more than possible that a separatist group is indeed trying to take advantage of the political instability in the country. We just don’t know as yet. However, one must be wary about promoting the idea that this means that the country is teetering on the verge of serious renewed ethnic conflict, as it did in 2001. For a start, leaders of the Albanian community have been quick to stress that there will be no return to fighting. And to my mind there does seem a genuine will to avoid bloodshed. Also, the recent anti-government protests have seen the country’s various communities come out onto the streets to demonstrate together. (I also saw at first hand how a protest at the university earlier this year crossed ethnic boundaries.) Nevertheless, the situation is fraught with danger. Until the political situation is resolved, there is always the risk, however small, that it could take a turn for the worse and develop a violent ethnic dimension. This is why it needs to be resolved as soon as possible.
2. What could/should the EU do?
The European Union needs to take a much firmer role than it has done to date. At the moment, there is a political mediation process conducted by three MEPs. However, this is simply not enough. There needs to be much higher level intervention. Obviously, the EU faces a number of very serious challenges at the moment, such as Russia and Ukraine and the horrific situation in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it is imperative that senior officials, as well as leaders from the member states, recognise the dangers of the current crisis in Macedonia and respond urgently to resolve the situation. What would this mean in real terms? The current thinking is that some form of interim transitional government is needed in advance of fresh elections (properly monitored, of course). Beyond that, the EU will need to take steps to rebuild and consolidate democracy in the country. The best way to do this will be to open accession talks. However, for this to happen Greece will need to lift its veto. One sincerely hopes that this will happen. This is not to say that Athens must abandon its position that a solution to the name issue needs to be found. Rather, it is about the Greek Government behaving in a responsible manner and recognising that the political stability of its northern neighbour is far more important to its interests than ongoing turmoil and possibly conflict.
On 10 November, a month later than usual, the European Commission released its annual reports on the progress achieved by EU candidate and potential candidate countries. We asked seven experts in the region to give their responses to the... more
On 10 November, a month later than usual, the European Commission released its annual reports on the progress achieved by EU candidate and potential candidate countries. We asked seven experts in the region to give their responses to the key points raised for each state. (If you are interested in how this compares to last year’s reports, the 2014 expert reactions are available here).
The results of the European Parliament elections will have been closely watched in the Western Balkans – and with good reason. James Ker-Lindsay writes that support for enlargement, undermined in recent years by the attention given to the... more
The results of the European Parliament elections will have been closely watched in the Western Balkans – and with good reason. James Ker-Lindsay writes that support for enlargement, undermined in recent years by the attention given to the financial crisis, is likely to diminish still further as the anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic feeling that emerged from the period of austerity has finally been reflected in the ballot box. However, the region may yet find a champion, or two, from within the new line up at the heart of the European Union.
The European Parliament elections in Cyprus came a little over a year after the severe financial crisis which hit the country in 2013. James Ker-Lindsay writes that with the allocation of seats among parties remaining the same as it was... more
The European Parliament elections in Cyprus came a little over a year after the severe financial crisis which hit the country in 2013. James Ker-Lindsay writes that with the allocation of seats among parties remaining the same as it was in the 2009 European elections, public discontent was largely expressed through abstention rather than protest votes. Perhaps the biggest story of the campaign, however, was the participation of several Turkish Cypriot candidates, as well as the creation of special polling centres allowing Turkish Cypriot voters to take part in the election. Nevertheless, the turnout among Turkish Cypriots was exceptionally low at a little over 3 per cent.
Declaring independence is all the rage in international politics. Recently, Venice voted overwhelmingly in favour of becoming an independent city state, while over in the UK, the Scots are debating whether to consign the Union Jack to the... more
Declaring independence is all the rage in international politics. Recently, Venice voted overwhelmingly in favour of becoming an independent city state, while over in the UK, the Scots are debating whether to consign the Union Jack to the dustbin of history. And ever since the whole Crimea incident, rumours have been flying around that Taiwan will formally attempt to declare independence from China, and that Misrata will attempt to do the same in Libya.
But what if the next big independence movement happened closer to home? With more money than the North’s biggest cities combined, a booming population and established trading links with the rest of the world, what would happen if the people of London chose to go it alone?
It’s an idea that’s been mooted a few times, not least by former Mayor Ken Livingstone. When asked what he wanted for London during the 2012 elections, he claimed he wanted a "Republic of London", and that the city could be improved if other areas of the UK weren’t so busy sucking all the blood out of it. According to Ken, London generates between £10bn and £20bn more in tax for the UK than it receives in public expenditure, making it the cashcow of the UK’s feckless regions.
But how feasible would London’s independence claim be? After convincing him this wasn’t a joke, I spoke to Dr James Ker-Lindsay, a senior research fellow at the London School of Economics who specialises in secession movements.
But what if the next big independence movement happened closer to home? With more money than the North’s biggest cities combined, a booming population and established trading links with the rest of the world, what would happen if the people of London chose to go it alone?
It’s an idea that’s been mooted a few times, not least by former Mayor Ken Livingstone. When asked what he wanted for London during the 2012 elections, he claimed he wanted a "Republic of London", and that the city could be improved if other areas of the UK weren’t so busy sucking all the blood out of it. According to Ken, London generates between £10bn and £20bn more in tax for the UK than it receives in public expenditure, making it the cashcow of the UK’s feckless regions.
But how feasible would London’s independence claim be? After convincing him this wasn’t a joke, I spoke to Dr James Ker-Lindsay, a senior research fellow at the London School of Economics who specialises in secession movements.
A number of movements aimed at securing independence for territories within European states have emerged in recent decades. While some of these, such as the Scottish and Catalan independence movements, have received a great deal of... more
A number of movements aimed at securing independence for territories within European states have emerged in recent decades. While some of these, such as the Scottish and Catalan independence movements, have received a great deal of attention, others are relatively unknown outside of their own regions. In an interview with Theodora Vasilopoulou, LSE’s James Ker-Lindsay discusses the history of contested states. He notes that with increasing calls for political autonomy from regions across the world, the international community has faced a dilemma in maintaining international stability while also respecting the right to self-determination.
THIS WEEK saw the fiftieth anniversary of a true milestone in the history of the Cyprus problem – the establishment of UNFICYP, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. While the force is a fixture of the Cypriot political... more
THIS WEEK saw the fiftieth anniversary of a true milestone in the history of the Cyprus problem – the establishment of UNFICYP, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
While the force is a fixture of the Cypriot political landscape, few now remember the difficult political circumstances surrounding its creation. It is a fascinating story that unfolded against the backdrop of the Cold War and British imperial decline.
The breakdown of the constitutional order in Cyprus, in December 1963, just three years after independence, sparked concern in many Western capitals. The emergence of a full scale civil war in Cyprus could have spilled over to Greece and Turkey, with potentially catastrophic implications for NATO unity.
In London, there was particular panic. Apart from the wider implications for the Western alliance, fighting on the island could threaten Britain’s military bases as well as the lives of the many British citizens still living in Cyprus.
Having hastily recalled ministers back from their Christmas holidays, the British government decided to take the lead on the creation of a peacekeeping mission composed of troops from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the three states that had undertaken to guarantee the island’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity under the terms of the island’s 1960 constitution.
However, from the very start, the mission – the Joint Truce Force (JTF) – ran into problems. The Turkish troops earmarked to participate had left their barracks to take up positions in Turkish Cypriot villages and neighbourhoods. They were not coaxed back. Without them, Athens made it clear that its forces on the island could not play a part in the operation. This effectively left Britain as the lone peacekeeper from day one.
Although the force carried out its duties to the best of its abilities, it was immediately apparent that Britain could not sustain such a major commitment indefinitely. Apart from its major presence in Germany, it was also dealing with its retreat from empire across the globe. Fighting several insurgencies and small wars elsewhere, it simply did not have the manpower to maintain a mission for more than a few months.
By late January, the pressure was starting to show. Although it was doing a good job calming tensions between the communities, many Greek Cypriots were starting to question the neutrality of the British army they had been fighting just a few years earlier. Meanwhile, a conference in London to try to broker a political agreement had failed. As a result, Turkey was showing increasing signs that it would take matters into its own hands and invade the island.
Faced with this, Britain scrambled to put together a new, more permanent peacekeeping force. One obvious option was to create a UN mission. However, the fear was that this would give the Soviet Union a say over developments. London therefore decided to explore the possibility of a force based around NATO. Cautious at first, Washington soon came to support the idea enthusiastically.
In contrast, the Greek Cypriot community, under the leadership of President Makarios, roundly rejected any talk of NATO involvement on the island. As they saw it, the organisation would always be inclined to side with Ankara given Turkey’s strategic position as the Western alliance’s most south-easterly flank. The presence of a NATO force would inevitably cement Turkish control over the island.
With growing pressure from London and Washington, Makarios played the Cold War card. In early February 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, wrote to the three Guarantor Powers warning them against any interference in Cypriot affairs.
As its desperation increased, London now had no choice but to give up on the idea of a NATO force. Although a couple of other options were explored, including the idea of a Commonwealth Force, they failed to gain enough wider support. On February 15, and acting against the wishes of the United States, which still believed that an alternative route could be found, the United Kingdom gave up and submitted a request for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation on the island.
The debates that took place in New York over the next two weeks or so were to have a profound effect on the nature of the Cyprus Problem. It was, for example, at this stage that the Greek Cypriot led administration was recognised as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. Most notably, it culminated in Security Council Resolution 186, passed on March 4, 1964, which established a mediating role for the UN – a role that essentially continues to this day – and the creation of UNFICYP. The first peace-keepers arrived in Cyprus on March 13.
One can only speculate what might have happened had a NATO force been introduced instead. It would certainly not have been beyond the realms of possibility that Cyprus could have been united with Greece, albeit with a large Turkish military presence on the island, or perhaps partitioned between Greece and Turkey. We will never know. However, what can be said for certain is that for a few weeks in early 1964, Cyprus became a frontline state in the Cold War and a visible symbol of Britain’s rapidly declining strength on the world stage.
Quite apart from anything else, UNFICYP is an enduring reminder of that long gone era.
James Ker-Lindsay is Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. He is the author of ‘Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964’ and ‘The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know’, as well several other books on the modern history, politics and international relations of Cyprus. He is on Twitter http://www.twitter.com/JamesKerLindsay
While the force is a fixture of the Cypriot political landscape, few now remember the difficult political circumstances surrounding its creation. It is a fascinating story that unfolded against the backdrop of the Cold War and British imperial decline.
The breakdown of the constitutional order in Cyprus, in December 1963, just three years after independence, sparked concern in many Western capitals. The emergence of a full scale civil war in Cyprus could have spilled over to Greece and Turkey, with potentially catastrophic implications for NATO unity.
In London, there was particular panic. Apart from the wider implications for the Western alliance, fighting on the island could threaten Britain’s military bases as well as the lives of the many British citizens still living in Cyprus.
Having hastily recalled ministers back from their Christmas holidays, the British government decided to take the lead on the creation of a peacekeeping mission composed of troops from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, the three states that had undertaken to guarantee the island’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity under the terms of the island’s 1960 constitution.
However, from the very start, the mission – the Joint Truce Force (JTF) – ran into problems. The Turkish troops earmarked to participate had left their barracks to take up positions in Turkish Cypriot villages and neighbourhoods. They were not coaxed back. Without them, Athens made it clear that its forces on the island could not play a part in the operation. This effectively left Britain as the lone peacekeeper from day one.
Although the force carried out its duties to the best of its abilities, it was immediately apparent that Britain could not sustain such a major commitment indefinitely. Apart from its major presence in Germany, it was also dealing with its retreat from empire across the globe. Fighting several insurgencies and small wars elsewhere, it simply did not have the manpower to maintain a mission for more than a few months.
By late January, the pressure was starting to show. Although it was doing a good job calming tensions between the communities, many Greek Cypriots were starting to question the neutrality of the British army they had been fighting just a few years earlier. Meanwhile, a conference in London to try to broker a political agreement had failed. As a result, Turkey was showing increasing signs that it would take matters into its own hands and invade the island.
Faced with this, Britain scrambled to put together a new, more permanent peacekeeping force. One obvious option was to create a UN mission. However, the fear was that this would give the Soviet Union a say over developments. London therefore decided to explore the possibility of a force based around NATO. Cautious at first, Washington soon came to support the idea enthusiastically.
In contrast, the Greek Cypriot community, under the leadership of President Makarios, roundly rejected any talk of NATO involvement on the island. As they saw it, the organisation would always be inclined to side with Ankara given Turkey’s strategic position as the Western alliance’s most south-easterly flank. The presence of a NATO force would inevitably cement Turkish control over the island.
With growing pressure from London and Washington, Makarios played the Cold War card. In early February 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Premier, wrote to the three Guarantor Powers warning them against any interference in Cypriot affairs.
As its desperation increased, London now had no choice but to give up on the idea of a NATO force. Although a couple of other options were explored, including the idea of a Commonwealth Force, they failed to gain enough wider support. On February 15, and acting against the wishes of the United States, which still believed that an alternative route could be found, the United Kingdom gave up and submitted a request for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation on the island.
The debates that took place in New York over the next two weeks or so were to have a profound effect on the nature of the Cyprus Problem. It was, for example, at this stage that the Greek Cypriot led administration was recognised as the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus. Most notably, it culminated in Security Council Resolution 186, passed on March 4, 1964, which established a mediating role for the UN – a role that essentially continues to this day – and the creation of UNFICYP. The first peace-keepers arrived in Cyprus on March 13.
One can only speculate what might have happened had a NATO force been introduced instead. It would certainly not have been beyond the realms of possibility that Cyprus could have been united with Greece, albeit with a large Turkish military presence on the island, or perhaps partitioned between Greece and Turkey. We will never know. However, what can be said for certain is that for a few weeks in early 1964, Cyprus became a frontline state in the Cold War and a visible symbol of Britain’s rapidly declining strength on the world stage.
Quite apart from anything else, UNFICYP is an enduring reminder of that long gone era.
James Ker-Lindsay is Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics. He is the author of ‘Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963-1964’ and ‘The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know’, as well several other books on the modern history, politics and international relations of Cyprus. He is on Twitter http://www.twitter.com/JamesKerLindsay
The subject of state recognition is becoming increasingly important in International Relations. Long ignored by IR scholars, the issue has gained greater prominence following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February... more
The subject of state recognition is becoming increasingly important in International Relations. Long ignored by IR scholars, the issue has gained greater prominence following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, and Russia’s decision, later that same year, to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia. What was once seen as a rather dry and theoretical subject, mainly of interest to scholarly international lawyers, has now become an issue of real practical significance on the world stage.
One question relating to recognition that has become especially important in the field, particularly for policy makers, is the degree to which third party states, in other words not the state from which the territory has seceded, can interact at a bilateral level (multilateral interaction is a rather different matter) with secessionist entities – variously called de facto states, unrecognised states, partially recognised states, and my personally preferred term, contested states – without actually recognising them, or giving the impression to the rest of the world that they have recognised them.
One question relating to recognition that has become especially important in the field, particularly for policy makers, is the degree to which third party states, in other words not the state from which the territory has seceded, can interact at a bilateral level (multilateral interaction is a rather different matter) with secessionist entities – variously called de facto states, unrecognised states, partially recognised states, and my personally preferred term, contested states – without actually recognising them, or giving the impression to the rest of the world that they have recognised them.
Cyprus is one of the five EU member states that refuse to recognise the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. James Ker-Lindsay writes that a recent meeting between the Cypriot Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of... more
Cyprus is one of the five EU member states that refuse to recognise the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. James Ker-Lindsay writes that a recent meeting between the Cypriot Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Kosovo suggests that the country’s stance may be softening over the issue. He notes that although this may seem surprising given Cyprus’s own dispute with the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it is in keeping with changing attitudes among other EU member states and a shift in Cypriot foreign policy. He also argues that if a change is to be made, there is a good case for pressing ahead with full recognition.
On Monday, the Cypriot government agreed a €10 billion bailout deal with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, following a week of uncertainty and controversy. James Ker-Lindsay writes that while the situation has... more
On Monday, the Cypriot government agreed a €10 billion bailout deal with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, following a week of uncertainty and controversy. James Ker-Lindsay writes that while the situation has damaged Cyprus’s economy, it has also had a significant impact on the country’s relations with its neighbours and partners. Russia and Israel, who had both developed close associations with Cyprus, may scale back their involvement in the aftermath of the crisis, leaving the country’s place in the geopolitical order much more uncertain than it was a week ago.
There has rarely been a more interesting time to study secession. It is not just that the number of separatist movements appears to be growing, particularly in Europe, it is the fact that the international debate on the rights of people... more
There has rarely been a more interesting time to study secession. It is not just that the number of separatist movements appears to be growing, particularly in Europe, it is the fact that the international debate on the rights of people to determine their future, and pursue independence, seems to be on the verge of a many change. The calm debate over Scotland’s future, which builds on Canada’s approach towards Quebec, is a testament to the fact that a peaceful and democratic debate over separatism is possible. It may yet be the case that other European governments choose to adopt a similar approach; the most obvious cases being Spain and Belgium towards Catalonia and Flanders.
However, for the meanwhile, the British and Canadian examples remain very much the exception rather than the rule. In most cases, states still do everything possible to prevent parts of their territory from breaking away, often using force if necessary.
It is hardly surprising that most states have a deep aversion to secession. In part, this is driven by a sense of geographical and symbolic identity. A state has an image of itself, and the geographic boundaries of the state are seared onto the consciousness of the citizenry. For example, from an early age school pupils draw maps of their country. But the quest to preserve the borders of a country is rooted in a range of other factors. In some cases, the territory seeking to break away may hold mineral wealth, or historical and cultural riches. Sometimes secession is opposed because of fears that if one area is allowed to go its own way, other will follow.
For the most part, states are aided in their campaign to tackle separatism by international law and norms of international politics. While much has been made of the right to self-determination, the reality is that its application is extremely limited. Outside the context of decolonisation, this idea has almost always taken a backseat to the principle of the territorial integrity of states. This gives a country fighting a secessionist movement a massive advantage. Other countries rarely want to be seen to break ranks and recognise a state that has unilaterally seceded.
When a decision is taken to recognise unilateral declarations of independence, it is usually done by a state with close ethnic, political or strategic ties to the breakaway territory.Turkey’s recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are obvious examples. Even when other factors shape the decision, as happened in the case of Kosovo, which has been recognised by the United States and most of the European Union, considerable effort has been made by recognising states to present this as a unique case that should be seen as sitting outside of the accepted boundaries of established practice.
However, states facing a secessionist challenge cannot afford to be complacent. While there is a deep aversion to secession, there is always the danger that the passage of time will lead to the gradual acceptance of the situation on the ground. It is therefore important to wage a concerted campaign to reinforce a claim to sovereignty over the territory and prevent countries from recognising – or merely even unofficially engaging with – the breakaway territory.
At the same time, international organisations are also crucial battlegrounds. Membership of the United Nations, for example, has come to be seen as the ultimate proof that a state has been accepted by the wider international community. To a lesser extent, participation in other international and regional bodies, and even in sporting and cultural activities, can send the same message concerning international acceptance.
The British government’s decision to accept a referendum over Scotland’s future is still a rather unusual approach to the question of secession. Governments rarely accept the democratic right of a group of people living within its borders to pursue the creation of a new state. In most cases, the central authority seeks to keep the state together; and in doing so choosing to fight what can often be a prolonged campaign to prevent recognition or legitimisation by the wider international community.
James Ker-Lindsay is Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (2012) and The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (2011), and a number of other books on conflict, peace and security in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.
- See more at: http://blog.oup.com/2012/12/secession-independence-scotland/#sthash.JbKhtS5o.dpuf
However, for the meanwhile, the British and Canadian examples remain very much the exception rather than the rule. In most cases, states still do everything possible to prevent parts of their territory from breaking away, often using force if necessary.
It is hardly surprising that most states have a deep aversion to secession. In part, this is driven by a sense of geographical and symbolic identity. A state has an image of itself, and the geographic boundaries of the state are seared onto the consciousness of the citizenry. For example, from an early age school pupils draw maps of their country. But the quest to preserve the borders of a country is rooted in a range of other factors. In some cases, the territory seeking to break away may hold mineral wealth, or historical and cultural riches. Sometimes secession is opposed because of fears that if one area is allowed to go its own way, other will follow.
For the most part, states are aided in their campaign to tackle separatism by international law and norms of international politics. While much has been made of the right to self-determination, the reality is that its application is extremely limited. Outside the context of decolonisation, this idea has almost always taken a backseat to the principle of the territorial integrity of states. This gives a country fighting a secessionist movement a massive advantage. Other countries rarely want to be seen to break ranks and recognise a state that has unilaterally seceded.
When a decision is taken to recognise unilateral declarations of independence, it is usually done by a state with close ethnic, political or strategic ties to the breakaway territory.Turkey’s recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are obvious examples. Even when other factors shape the decision, as happened in the case of Kosovo, which has been recognised by the United States and most of the European Union, considerable effort has been made by recognising states to present this as a unique case that should be seen as sitting outside of the accepted boundaries of established practice.
However, states facing a secessionist challenge cannot afford to be complacent. While there is a deep aversion to secession, there is always the danger that the passage of time will lead to the gradual acceptance of the situation on the ground. It is therefore important to wage a concerted campaign to reinforce a claim to sovereignty over the territory and prevent countries from recognising – or merely even unofficially engaging with – the breakaway territory.
At the same time, international organisations are also crucial battlegrounds. Membership of the United Nations, for example, has come to be seen as the ultimate proof that a state has been accepted by the wider international community. To a lesser extent, participation in other international and regional bodies, and even in sporting and cultural activities, can send the same message concerning international acceptance.
The British government’s decision to accept a referendum over Scotland’s future is still a rather unusual approach to the question of secession. Governments rarely accept the democratic right of a group of people living within its borders to pursue the creation of a new state. In most cases, the central authority seeks to keep the state together; and in doing so choosing to fight what can often be a prolonged campaign to prevent recognition or legitimisation by the wider international community.
James Ker-Lindsay is Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (2012) and The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (2011), and a number of other books on conflict, peace and security in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean.
- See more at: http://blog.oup.com/2012/12/secession-independence-scotland/#sthash.JbKhtS5o.dpuf
This weekend Cyprus will elect a new president. James Ker-Lindsay writes that history will not be kind to outgoing president, Dimitris Christofias – and rightly so. Over the course of the past five years he has presided over the failure... more
This weekend Cyprus will elect a new president. James Ker-Lindsay writes that history will not be kind to outgoing president, Dimitris Christofias – and rightly so. Over the course of the past five years he has presided over the failure of yet another round of UN peace talks aimed at reuniting the island, oversaw the collapse of the island’s economy, and was blamed for a major disaster.
Over the course of five decades, numerous efforts have been undertaken to solve the Cyprus Problem. All have failed. James Ker-Lindsay argues that there is a good case to be made for civil society to play a greater role in the peace... more
Over the course of five decades, numerous efforts have been undertaken to solve the Cyprus Problem. All have failed. James Ker-Lindsay argues that there is a good case to be made for civil society to play a greater role in the peace process, and that such a bottom-up approach, drawing on a variety of stakeholders, might have more chance of meeting with success than previous efforts.
The EU is often seen as most ambitious conflict management project ever undertaken. But Ker-Lindsay questions whether it has brought about as much peace as people think. He points to the still unresolved situation in Cyprus as a major... more
The EU is often seen as most ambitious conflict management project ever undertaken. But Ker-Lindsay questions whether it has brought about as much peace as people think. He points to the still unresolved situation in Cyprus as a major failing. However, it is in the Balkans that the prize has been greeted with most skepticism he says.
After many long months of negotiations, and with just days to spare before European Union leaders met to reconsider Serbia’s application for candidacy, it was finally announced that a breakthrough had been reached on Kosovo’s designation... more
After many long months of negotiations, and with just days to spare before European Union leaders met to reconsider Serbia’s application for candidacy, it was finally announced that a breakthrough had been reached on Kosovo’s designation at regional meetings. Kosovo-UNMIK will be ditched. Henceforth it will be listed as Kosovo*. The asterisk refers to the following footnote: ‘This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.’
It is a major breakthrough for all concerned.
It is a major breakthrough for all concerned.
Last Sunday’s presidential elections in Serbia saw a surprise win by opposition leader Tomislav Nikolic, of the right-leaning Serbia Progressive Party. James Ker-Lindsay argues that Nikolic will not be able to ignore the issue of Kosovo... more
Last Sunday’s presidential elections in Serbia saw a surprise win by opposition leader Tomislav Nikolic, of the right-leaning Serbia Progressive Party. James Ker-Lindsay argues that Nikolic will not be able to ignore the issue of Kosovo during his term as the EU is very likely to push Serbia to resolve its differences with Pristina for it to be able to continue down the path towards accession.
The question of Scottish independence has been heavily debated in the United Kingdom, with one claim against it being that some European countries might not recognise its independence from the UK and would therefore block Scotland’s... more
The question of Scottish independence has been heavily debated in the United Kingdom, with one claim against it being that some European countries might not recognise its independence from the UK and would therefore block Scotland’s membership of the European Union. Citing the examples of Kosovo and South Sudan, James Ker-Lindsay argues that this argument is not based on any real evidence.
Partition is somewhat of a dirty word in international affairs. India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine and Ireland, to name just some prominent examples, conjure up images of forced displacement, families torn apart, and communities divided. It... more
Partition is somewhat of a dirty word in international affairs. India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine and Ireland, to name just some prominent examples, conjure up images of forced displacement, families torn apart, and communities divided. It has therefore come to be seen as a rather unfashionable, if not wholly unacceptable, method by which to approach the resolution of ethnic conflicts. But should territorial division be always viewed in such a negative light? What if it is consensual and does not involve violence or population transfers? (Indeed, in the contemporary era any suggestion of forced migration would violate well established principles of human rights.) Should it be greeted with the opprobrium it currently generates? In many cases, it can represent an eminently logical and peaceful solution to a protracted conflict – a decision of two peoples with little in common and a long history of antagonism, but shoehorned into an uncomfortable and unwanted union, to live apart from one another. The forthcoming independence of South Sudan, following decades of civil war, is a case in point. Likewise, Kosovo is another example where a decision to draw a new boundary may well provide the best means by which to resolve an intractable dispute.
The arrest of Ratko Mladic undoubtedly marks an important moment for the Balkans. But while the capture of Mladic is a significant step forward for the region, it is not yet time to draw a line under the wars of the 1990s.
While they will be celebrating in Pristina, and there is no doubt that in a broad sense this is a victory for Kosovo, yesterday's ruling opinion is far more complex. The issue that this International Court of Justice (made up of the 15... more
While they will be celebrating in Pristina, and there is no doubt that in a broad sense this is a victory for Kosovo, yesterday's ruling opinion is far more complex.
The issue that this International Court of Justice (made up of the 15 most eminent jurors in the world) did not touch upon – and the one that ultimately matters – is the question of recognition. Recognition is important because it means entry into the community of nations, access to global trading treaties and the United Nations.
In reality we're not a lot further on this morning from where we were 24 hours ago. The countries that didn't want to recognise Kosovo will still not have to do so. However, in another sense, the ruling does have real significance in as much as it seems to get Russia off the hook over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The two territories are claimed by Georgia but have both declared independence and been recognised by Russia. With this ruling, Russia can now say their declarations were not illegal, and that it has the sovereign right to recognise these territories, just as the US, Britain, France, Germany and other EU states have recognised Kosovo.
The danger is that we're looking at what we might call secondary states; sphere states that depend on others. Kosovo looks to the EU and the US; South Ossetia looks to Moscow.
For some countries that are very worried about secession – such as Cyprus, Georgia and Moldova – they will take some comfort from this ruling because it doesn't say secession is legal. What this ruling means for separatist groups around the world is they are now much freer to make the declaration and try their luck.
But good luck to them on getting recognition. 2008 was not the first time that Kosovo had declared independence. It did so in the early 1990s, when it was recognised only by Albania. Ultimately if Kosovo wants to join the UN, it will have to find a way to satisfy Russia. Something will therefore have to be sorted out between Serbia and Kosovo. We've tried the legal route and yesterday that provided its answer. What still needs to be found is a lasting and viable political solution that solves the matter once and for all.
The issue that this International Court of Justice (made up of the 15 most eminent jurors in the world) did not touch upon – and the one that ultimately matters – is the question of recognition. Recognition is important because it means entry into the community of nations, access to global trading treaties and the United Nations.
In reality we're not a lot further on this morning from where we were 24 hours ago. The countries that didn't want to recognise Kosovo will still not have to do so. However, in another sense, the ruling does have real significance in as much as it seems to get Russia off the hook over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The two territories are claimed by Georgia but have both declared independence and been recognised by Russia. With this ruling, Russia can now say their declarations were not illegal, and that it has the sovereign right to recognise these territories, just as the US, Britain, France, Germany and other EU states have recognised Kosovo.
The danger is that we're looking at what we might call secondary states; sphere states that depend on others. Kosovo looks to the EU and the US; South Ossetia looks to Moscow.
For some countries that are very worried about secession – such as Cyprus, Georgia and Moldova – they will take some comfort from this ruling because it doesn't say secession is legal. What this ruling means for separatist groups around the world is they are now much freer to make the declaration and try their luck.
But good luck to them on getting recognition. 2008 was not the first time that Kosovo had declared independence. It did so in the early 1990s, when it was recognised only by Albania. Ultimately if Kosovo wants to join the UN, it will have to find a way to satisfy Russia. Something will therefore have to be sorted out between Serbia and Kosovo. We've tried the legal route and yesterday that provided its answer. What still needs to be found is a lasting and viable political solution that solves the matter once and for all.
Europe should not obstruct Serbia's efforts to bring the question of Kosovo's independence to the international court
A number of recent developments at the United Nations have been welcomed as significant reassertions of the importance of multilateral diplomacy. Barack Obama's speech at the general assembly on 23 September 2009, followed a day later by... more
A number of recent developments at the United Nations have been welcomed as significant reassertions of the importance of multilateral diplomacy. Barack Obama's speech at the general assembly on 23 September 2009, followed a day later by the UN Security Council's unanimous resolution in favour of nuclear disarmament, are but two events that highlight the central role the UN can play in providing a means for states to work with one another.
There is a real danger, however, that such moves have come too late. For the UN's multilateral potential has already suffered great damage - and not always at the hands of the usual suspects (such as Iran or North Korea). Indeed, it is arguable that the single most significant challenge to the organisation's authority in recent times has been led by the western members of the Security Council: Britain, France and the United States. In particular, their decision to recognise Kosovo, following its unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008, marked a major - perhaps irreparable - break with the established rules of UN politics.
Such a statement may seem unduly harsh, if not a gross exaggeration. After all, climate change, nuclear proliferation and the conflicts in the middle east and Afghanistan would all rank as more serious threats to human peace and security than a relatively insignificant issue in the western Balkans. But the argument here is not about the magnitude of the threat but the erosion of UN authority. And if the UN is considered as the supreme forum for international cooperation of matters of peace and security, the handling of Kosovo has dealt a great blow to the UN's authority. Even the invasion of Iraq does not compare, for in that case the decision was at least based on a particular reading of a UN Security Council resolution. In the case of Kosovo, by contrast, the problem was that action was taken to bypass the Security Council altogether.
The process
The UN Security Council authorised the start of future-status talks between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanian leadership in autumn 2005; it appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland, to lead the talks. Ahtisaari decided that there was no alternative to independence - an option bitterly opposed by Serbia - and thus set to work drafting a proposal to this end.
This approach was troubling on two counts. First, in making no effort to reach a solution acceptable to both sides, it broke with established principles of conflict-resolution. Instead, one side was given everything it wanted, and the other side told that it should accept it. Many officials defended this decision by arguing that there was no other option, because the wars of the 1990s in the region had made reconciliation impossible. This is a weak argument. The same line of reasoning, after all, is not applied to other groups around the world who have suffered persecution at the hands of a larger or more powerful ethnic group (the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Kurds of Turkey or Iraq, for example); and the claim that Kosovo's position in Yugoslavia supported its right to statehood alongside the six republics (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) does not hold up.
Second, the decision to propose independence marked an important departure from international practice on the creation of new states. Ahtisaari, by proposing statehood against Belgrade's wishes, undermined the principle enshrined in the UN charter of the territorial integrity of states. This prompted Russia's then representative at the UN, Vitaly Churkin, to suggest that it was the most important issue to come before the organisation in the past decade. In response, many would see another right embodied in the UN charter - that of self-determination - as supporting Kosovo's independence. But this is not the position of western officials, who have instead consistently argued that the case for independence is rooted in unique factors arising from the collapse of Yugoslavia - something that many other groups around the world could equally claim.
The rules
The Russian government, influenced by these considerations (as well as other, perhaps less honourable, intentions) decided to block a resolution implementing Martti Ahtisaari's proposals when they were brought before the UN Security Council. Moscow held fast to its position against numerous pressures and inducements (including the offer of a further series of talks). In the end, the three western members of the Security Council - after Russia's veto of the Ahtisaari proposals in the UNSC, and amid a deteriorating situation in Kosovo itself - decided that there was no alternative but to let Kosovo go its own way without UN approval.
The serious problem is that, in the context of a debate on UN authority, this argument has no validity. The permanent members' right to block decisions in the Security Council, whatever problems this may cause to the decision-making process, is also enshrined within the UN charter - and thus a fundamental cornerstone of international law. It cannot merely be ignored. Britain, France and the United States all expect their decisions to veto resolutions to be respected and accepted; even if it is deeply unpopular and isolates them in the council. If the sanctity of the UN system is to be preserved, the same principle must apply to all.
True, it is inherently troubling and uncomfortable to see powerful states such as Russia blocking UNSC decisions on grounds of selfish national interest or Realpolitik. But Moscow has the same legal right as the other permanent members to express a view and cast a veto; and the UN's integrity cannot be retained if the will of one permanent member is simply ignored. The UN system desperately needs reform, but until this is achieved the rules it operates under should be observed.
The repair
The decision of three permanent members of the Security Council to recognise Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence without an explicit council resolution was understandable in terms of the regional situation in the Balkans, and may have been done with the best of intentions. It has also severely undermined the UN and opened the way for others to follow suit. It was all too apparent that Russia was able to use the decision of Britain, France and the United States in justification for its own recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. If the western members can choose when to ignore the Security Council and the principles of international law when it suits them, so too can Russia - and China.
Indeed, in an era when the balance of power is shifting in international affairs and new leaders are emerging on the world stage, it is ever more important to ensure that the rule of law and the principles established over sixty years are bolstered rather than weakened.
The evidence of renewed commitment to the strengthening of the United Nations as a global actor, including from the Barack Obama administration, is welcome. The question is whether it is too late to repair the damage that has already been done - and if not, how to do it?
There is a real danger, however, that such moves have come too late. For the UN's multilateral potential has already suffered great damage - and not always at the hands of the usual suspects (such as Iran or North Korea). Indeed, it is arguable that the single most significant challenge to the organisation's authority in recent times has been led by the western members of the Security Council: Britain, France and the United States. In particular, their decision to recognise Kosovo, following its unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008, marked a major - perhaps irreparable - break with the established rules of UN politics.
Such a statement may seem unduly harsh, if not a gross exaggeration. After all, climate change, nuclear proliferation and the conflicts in the middle east and Afghanistan would all rank as more serious threats to human peace and security than a relatively insignificant issue in the western Balkans. But the argument here is not about the magnitude of the threat but the erosion of UN authority. And if the UN is considered as the supreme forum for international cooperation of matters of peace and security, the handling of Kosovo has dealt a great blow to the UN's authority. Even the invasion of Iraq does not compare, for in that case the decision was at least based on a particular reading of a UN Security Council resolution. In the case of Kosovo, by contrast, the problem was that action was taken to bypass the Security Council altogether.
The process
The UN Security Council authorised the start of future-status talks between the Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanian leadership in autumn 2005; it appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland, to lead the talks. Ahtisaari decided that there was no alternative to independence - an option bitterly opposed by Serbia - and thus set to work drafting a proposal to this end.
This approach was troubling on two counts. First, in making no effort to reach a solution acceptable to both sides, it broke with established principles of conflict-resolution. Instead, one side was given everything it wanted, and the other side told that it should accept it. Many officials defended this decision by arguing that there was no other option, because the wars of the 1990s in the region had made reconciliation impossible. This is a weak argument. The same line of reasoning, after all, is not applied to other groups around the world who have suffered persecution at the hands of a larger or more powerful ethnic group (the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the Kurds of Turkey or Iraq, for example); and the claim that Kosovo's position in Yugoslavia supported its right to statehood alongside the six republics (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) does not hold up.
Second, the decision to propose independence marked an important departure from international practice on the creation of new states. Ahtisaari, by proposing statehood against Belgrade's wishes, undermined the principle enshrined in the UN charter of the territorial integrity of states. This prompted Russia's then representative at the UN, Vitaly Churkin, to suggest that it was the most important issue to come before the organisation in the past decade. In response, many would see another right embodied in the UN charter - that of self-determination - as supporting Kosovo's independence. But this is not the position of western officials, who have instead consistently argued that the case for independence is rooted in unique factors arising from the collapse of Yugoslavia - something that many other groups around the world could equally claim.
The rules
The Russian government, influenced by these considerations (as well as other, perhaps less honourable, intentions) decided to block a resolution implementing Martti Ahtisaari's proposals when they were brought before the UN Security Council. Moscow held fast to its position against numerous pressures and inducements (including the offer of a further series of talks). In the end, the three western members of the Security Council - after Russia's veto of the Ahtisaari proposals in the UNSC, and amid a deteriorating situation in Kosovo itself - decided that there was no alternative but to let Kosovo go its own way without UN approval.
The serious problem is that, in the context of a debate on UN authority, this argument has no validity. The permanent members' right to block decisions in the Security Council, whatever problems this may cause to the decision-making process, is also enshrined within the UN charter - and thus a fundamental cornerstone of international law. It cannot merely be ignored. Britain, France and the United States all expect their decisions to veto resolutions to be respected and accepted; even if it is deeply unpopular and isolates them in the council. If the sanctity of the UN system is to be preserved, the same principle must apply to all.
True, it is inherently troubling and uncomfortable to see powerful states such as Russia blocking UNSC decisions on grounds of selfish national interest or Realpolitik. But Moscow has the same legal right as the other permanent members to express a view and cast a veto; and the UN's integrity cannot be retained if the will of one permanent member is simply ignored. The UN system desperately needs reform, but until this is achieved the rules it operates under should be observed.
The repair
The decision of three permanent members of the Security Council to recognise Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence without an explicit council resolution was understandable in terms of the regional situation in the Balkans, and may have been done with the best of intentions. It has also severely undermined the UN and opened the way for others to follow suit. It was all too apparent that Russia was able to use the decision of Britain, France and the United States in justification for its own recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. If the western members can choose when to ignore the Security Council and the principles of international law when it suits them, so too can Russia - and China.
Indeed, in an era when the balance of power is shifting in international affairs and new leaders are emerging on the world stage, it is ever more important to ensure that the rule of law and the principles established over sixty years are bolstered rather than weakened.
The evidence of renewed commitment to the strengthening of the United Nations as a global actor, including from the Barack Obama administration, is welcome. The question is whether it is too late to repair the damage that has already been done - and if not, how to do it?
As the status quo in Cyprus becomes untenable, perhaps the solution lies in a more radical option - partition.
Partition of Kosovo may be an obvious option, but no one wants to be the first to put it up for discussion.
It is one thing for a territory to declare independence. It's another, harder, thing for it to be recognised by key parties.
The election of Cyprus's new president offers hope for the islands reunification but there are many difficult issues that will need to be negotiated first.
The defeat of Tassos Papadopoulos in the first round of the Cypriot presidential elections on 17 February 2008 came as a complete shock. Almost every poll - and there had been many - had suggested that, if not the lead candidate, the... more
The defeat of Tassos Papadopoulos in the first round of the Cypriot presidential elections on 17 February 2008 came as a complete shock. Almost every poll - and there had been many - had suggested that, if not the lead candidate, the incumbent president was a certainty for the expected run-off vote on 24 February. But it was not to be. Instead, the second round will be fought between Dimitris Christofias, the leader of the Cypriot Communist Party (Akel), and Ioannis Kasoulides, an MEP and former foreign minister, who is supported by Disy, the main rightwing party. Importantly, both are seen as moderates on the issue of the political division of the island.
It is had to underplay the significance of the decision to oust Papadopoulos. When the Greek Cypriots resoundingly rejected the United Nations reunification proposals (the Annan plan) in the April 2004 referendum, a rejection led by Papadopoulos, many observers believed that they had turned their back on the very principle of a federal settlement. However, this result has shown that this is not the case. The decision to oust Papadopoulos in favour of candidates who have clearly restated their commitment to a federation appears to show that most people were instead concerned about the details of the plan on offer, rather than its underlying philosophy. In this sense, the result will have gone a long way to restoring international confidence in the Greek Cypriots, and their real desire to reach a settlement - on realistic terms.
James Ker-Lindsay is senior research fellow in European and international studies at Kingston University. Among his books is EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave, 2005)The natural extension of this is to assume that this will open the way for an immediate resumption of peace talks between the two sides. While it would certainly be good to see the Greek and Turkish Cypriots re-engage in discussions as soon as possible, the international community must be careful not to be seen to put too much pressure on the new leader if he doesn't make an immediate dash for the negotiating table. For domestic reasons, the next president may have to act with a certain degree of caution. If he appears to be rushed into a settlement, and have simply accepted whatever was put on the table, it could well backfire. Many Greek Cypriots will want to be sure that their leader, while supporting a federation, will also be defending their interests. Quite apart from being seen to conduct proper negotiations, he has to be able to show that he is controlling the pace of the process.
As well as showing the international community that he is serious about a settlement, the new president will also have to build up support amongst Greek Cypriots. This will be tougher than many outside observers perhaps realise. While the majority of Greek Cypriots obviously do still favour a federation, many of their deep-seated concerns from 2004 remain. Many people will want to be sure that questions relating to security, property, refugees, settlers, the economy and the constitution are dealt with properly. In any new peace process, steps will have to be taken to address their deep-rooted and understandable worries.
Also in openDemocracy on the politics of Cyprus:
Alex Rondos, "Cyprus: the price of rejection" (22 April 2004)
Fred Halliday, "Cyprus's risky stalemate" (28 August 2007)
Costa Carras, "Cyprus in the world: beyond conflict" (5 February 2008)Likewise, efforts will have to be taken to win over the more entrenched doubters and the nationalists. Although the majority of voters in Cyprus came out in support of the two moderate candidates, Papadopoulos still received almost a third of the vote. As a result, his party has already leveraged this by supporting Christofias in the second round in return for cabinet seats, which may in turn limit the latter's room to manoeuvre should he win. But even if Kasoulides should take the presidency, he will face a substantial bloc of potential spoilers who need to be won over. Again, forcing a new leader back to the table too quickly is unlikely to ease their fears that the Greek Cypriots are being "stitched-up" once again by outside powers.
A pragmatic tide
Although there are good reasons for taking a rather cautious approach towards the resumption of negotiations, the bigger picture suggests there are other reasons to be hopeful that a settlement might now be within sight. While the rejection of the UN plan in 2004 was undoubtedly seen as a serious blow at the time, it may in fact have made reaching a settlement now that much easier. Many voters then were lured into the "no" camp by the promise that European Union membership would lead to a better solution. This has not happened. In the four years since the referendum and the island's EU accession, President Papadopoulos failed to deliver anything on the Cyprus problem. Rather than bring about a better solution, his policies have managed to alienate the Turkish Cypriots and the international community alike, irritate the European Union, hand Turkey a PR coup, and make the eventual partition of the island that much more likely. Many voters may still not be entirely enamoured with the thought of a federation, but it would appear as though many now accept that it is the only feasible option. In this sense, Dimitris Christofias's much derided decision to call for a "no' vote in 2004 in order to cement a "yes" later on might yet be vindicated.
At the same time, there is a growing recognition that international patience is now running out, and that this could have grave consequences. Although reports in the local press suggesting that the UN is seriously reconsidering its presence on the island have been denied, after forty-four years keeping the peace, and countless peacemaking initiatives, many observers increasingly believe that the time has come to pull out and leave the island to its own devices. If talks take place and fail again, it may be the case that moves will be made to recognise some form of partition - with or without UN sanction. As the declaration of Kosovo's independence (also on 17 February) has shown, there is now a greater willingness by some countries in the west to press for pragmatic solutions in cases where Security Council vetoes prevent strictly legal ones from emerging. This has not been lost on the Greek Cypriots.
Whoever wins on Sunday, the feeling is that the path is now clear for another, perhaps last, push for reunification. However, while there are certainly grounds for optimism, it will not be an easy process. The past forty years offer many examples of Cyprus's ability to confound the best efforts of many of the world's leading diplomats. If the international community is really serious about trying to achieve a settlement now, it must accept that process matters as much as substance. While it is to be hoped that the sides will agree to resume negotiations in the near future, the temptation to press the communities too hard, too fast for a resumption of talks must be resisted. The will is there. But it must be nurtured and not forced.
It is had to underplay the significance of the decision to oust Papadopoulos. When the Greek Cypriots resoundingly rejected the United Nations reunification proposals (the Annan plan) in the April 2004 referendum, a rejection led by Papadopoulos, many observers believed that they had turned their back on the very principle of a federal settlement. However, this result has shown that this is not the case. The decision to oust Papadopoulos in favour of candidates who have clearly restated their commitment to a federation appears to show that most people were instead concerned about the details of the plan on offer, rather than its underlying philosophy. In this sense, the result will have gone a long way to restoring international confidence in the Greek Cypriots, and their real desire to reach a settlement - on realistic terms.
James Ker-Lindsay is senior research fellow in European and international studies at Kingston University. Among his books is EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave, 2005)The natural extension of this is to assume that this will open the way for an immediate resumption of peace talks between the two sides. While it would certainly be good to see the Greek and Turkish Cypriots re-engage in discussions as soon as possible, the international community must be careful not to be seen to put too much pressure on the new leader if he doesn't make an immediate dash for the negotiating table. For domestic reasons, the next president may have to act with a certain degree of caution. If he appears to be rushed into a settlement, and have simply accepted whatever was put on the table, it could well backfire. Many Greek Cypriots will want to be sure that their leader, while supporting a federation, will also be defending their interests. Quite apart from being seen to conduct proper negotiations, he has to be able to show that he is controlling the pace of the process.
As well as showing the international community that he is serious about a settlement, the new president will also have to build up support amongst Greek Cypriots. This will be tougher than many outside observers perhaps realise. While the majority of Greek Cypriots obviously do still favour a federation, many of their deep-seated concerns from 2004 remain. Many people will want to be sure that questions relating to security, property, refugees, settlers, the economy and the constitution are dealt with properly. In any new peace process, steps will have to be taken to address their deep-rooted and understandable worries.
Also in openDemocracy on the politics of Cyprus:
Alex Rondos, "Cyprus: the price of rejection" (22 April 2004)
Fred Halliday, "Cyprus's risky stalemate" (28 August 2007)
Costa Carras, "Cyprus in the world: beyond conflict" (5 February 2008)Likewise, efforts will have to be taken to win over the more entrenched doubters and the nationalists. Although the majority of voters in Cyprus came out in support of the two moderate candidates, Papadopoulos still received almost a third of the vote. As a result, his party has already leveraged this by supporting Christofias in the second round in return for cabinet seats, which may in turn limit the latter's room to manoeuvre should he win. But even if Kasoulides should take the presidency, he will face a substantial bloc of potential spoilers who need to be won over. Again, forcing a new leader back to the table too quickly is unlikely to ease their fears that the Greek Cypriots are being "stitched-up" once again by outside powers.
A pragmatic tide
Although there are good reasons for taking a rather cautious approach towards the resumption of negotiations, the bigger picture suggests there are other reasons to be hopeful that a settlement might now be within sight. While the rejection of the UN plan in 2004 was undoubtedly seen as a serious blow at the time, it may in fact have made reaching a settlement now that much easier. Many voters then were lured into the "no" camp by the promise that European Union membership would lead to a better solution. This has not happened. In the four years since the referendum and the island's EU accession, President Papadopoulos failed to deliver anything on the Cyprus problem. Rather than bring about a better solution, his policies have managed to alienate the Turkish Cypriots and the international community alike, irritate the European Union, hand Turkey a PR coup, and make the eventual partition of the island that much more likely. Many voters may still not be entirely enamoured with the thought of a federation, but it would appear as though many now accept that it is the only feasible option. In this sense, Dimitris Christofias's much derided decision to call for a "no' vote in 2004 in order to cement a "yes" later on might yet be vindicated.
At the same time, there is a growing recognition that international patience is now running out, and that this could have grave consequences. Although reports in the local press suggesting that the UN is seriously reconsidering its presence on the island have been denied, after forty-four years keeping the peace, and countless peacemaking initiatives, many observers increasingly believe that the time has come to pull out and leave the island to its own devices. If talks take place and fail again, it may be the case that moves will be made to recognise some form of partition - with or without UN sanction. As the declaration of Kosovo's independence (also on 17 February) has shown, there is now a greater willingness by some countries in the west to press for pragmatic solutions in cases where Security Council vetoes prevent strictly legal ones from emerging. This has not been lost on the Greek Cypriots.
Whoever wins on Sunday, the feeling is that the path is now clear for another, perhaps last, push for reunification. However, while there are certainly grounds for optimism, it will not be an easy process. The past forty years offer many examples of Cyprus's ability to confound the best efforts of many of the world's leading diplomats. If the international community is really serious about trying to achieve a settlement now, it must accept that process matters as much as substance. While it is to be hoped that the sides will agree to resume negotiations in the near future, the temptation to press the communities too hard, too fast for a resumption of talks must be resisted. The will is there. But it must be nurtured and not forced.
The Serbian Radical party candidate in this weekend's presidential election runoff has not been as anti-Europe as you might have expected.
Surveying the Spectrum of EU Member State Policies Towards Kosovo
Research Interests:
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the European Union. While 23 members recognised Kosovo, fve refused to accept its statehood. At the time, many observers expected the... more
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the European Union. While 23 members recognised Kosovo, fve refused to accept its statehood. At the time, many observers expected the non-recognisers to fall into line eventually and accept Kosovo. However, in the decade since then, that has not happened. If anything, the picture has become more complex. Rather than two distinct camps, four broad groups now exist. First, there are the countries that have recognised Kosovo, and have forged meaningful re-lations with it. These include Britain and Germany and most of the other members of the EU. At the other end of the scale there are the states that still refuse to recognise Kosovo, and continue to have very little to do with it. Spain and Cyprus fall into this category. However, between those two poles lie two other factions. Although Greece, Romania and Slovakia have refused to recognise Kosovo, they have nevertheless forged relatively good relations with Pristina. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic and Poland, while recognising Kosovo, have in fact had relatively little diplomatic interaction with Kosovo authorities over the past ten years.
This report examines Kosovo’s relations with these four broad categories of states. In doing so, it shows that even within these groups – what we can roughly term ‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and non-engagers’ – there are significant variations in how states behave. For ex-ample, even those states that recognise Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it in the past, may now be far less engaged than they once were. Also, whereas some counties that have always been hostile towards Kosovo have seen their positions harden, rather than soften, with the pas-sage of time, others have gone the other way and become more willing to engage with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons for these changes in positions are complex, and vary from country to country. In some cases, they refect domestic political changes. In other cases, it is driven by external policy concerns, such as a wish to be seen to be working closely with European partners. Also, the broader international political environment can play a part. For instance, events in Spain have made many countries warier about secession.
This report examines Kosovo’s relations with these four broad categories of states. In doing so, it shows that even within these groups – what we can roughly term ‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and non-engagers’ – there are significant variations in how states behave. For ex-ample, even those states that recognise Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it in the past, may now be far less engaged than they once were. Also, whereas some counties that have always been hostile towards Kosovo have seen their positions harden, rather than soften, with the pas-sage of time, others have gone the other way and become more willing to engage with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons for these changes in positions are complex, and vary from country to country. In some cases, they refect domestic political changes. In other cases, it is driven by external policy concerns, such as a wish to be seen to be working closely with European partners. Also, the broader international political environment can play a part. For instance, events in Spain have made many countries warier about secession.
Research Interests: European integration, Foreign Policy Analysis, Balkan Studies, Kosovo, European Foreign Policy, and 9 moreBritish Foreign Policy, European Union, German Foreign Policy, Greek Foreign Policy, Spanish Foreign Policy, Romanian Foreign Policy, Polish Foreign Policy, Slovak Foreign Policy, and Czech Foreign Policy
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the European Union. While 23 members recognised Kosovo, five refused to accept its statehood. At the time, many observers expected the... more
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, in February 2008, resulted in a deep division within the European Union. While 23 members recognised Kosovo, five refused to accept its statehood. At the time, many observers expected the non-recognisers to fall into line eventually and accept Kosovo. However, in the decade since then, that has not happened. If anything, the picture has become more complex. Rather than two distinct camps, four broad groups now exist. First, there are the countries that have recognised Kosovo, and have forged meaningful relations with it. These include Britain and Germany and most of the other members of the EU. At the other end of the scale there are the states that still refuse to recognise Kosovo, and continue to have very little to do with it. Spain and Cyprus fall into this category. However, between those two poles lie two other factions. Although Greece, Romania and Slovakia have refused to recognise Kosovo, they have nevertheless forged relatively good relations with Pristina. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic and Poland, while recognising Kosovo, have in fact had relatively little diplomatic interaction with Kosovo authorities over the past ten years.