Foriegn Policy

There has been a growing recognition in the post-Cold War era that culture has increasingly become a factor in determining the course of today’s complex and interconnected world.  The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq extended this trend to national security and military operations.  One might call this the Department of Defense’s “cultural turn,” therefore the emphasis placed on culture.  The focus thus far has been on the importance of culture at the tactical and operational levels. 

There is also a growing recognition by the national security community that culture is an important factor at the policy and strategy levels.  The ability to understand and appreciate the role and impact of culture on policy and strategy is increasingly seen as a critical strategic thinking skill.  Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategic levels means the ability to consider history, values, ideology, politics, religion, and other cultural dimensions and assess their potential effect on policy and strategy.

A more useful way to consider the role of culture in security studies than through the levels of war (tactical, operational, strategic) is a framework that includes the following three dimensions: cultural considerations at the individual level; cultural considerations in tactical and operational level military operations; and cultural considerations at the political and strategic levels.

Policymakers and strategists tend to view situations through their own cultural and strategic “lens” with insufficient consideration and calculation of the “Other’s” perspective and interests.  The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses.  The national security community is interested in cultural features or dimensions that drive political and strategic action and behavior.  The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining political and strategic action and behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation and outcomes.

- Identity: the basis for defining identity and its linkage to interests
- Political Culture: the structure of power and decision making
- Resilience: the capacity or ability to resist, adapt or succumb to external forces

Identity is the most important, because it ultimately determines values and interests that form the foundation for policy and strategy to attain or preserve those interests.

This research paper investigates the role of media towards foreign policy issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For this purpose, it examines the type of coverage Pak-Afghan relations get in Pakistani newspapers Dawn and The News International, Afghan newspaper Afghanistan Times and Afghan news website Kabul Press. Content analysis of news reports from years 2013 and 2014 is done in order to know the framing of Pak-Afghan relations. Results reveal that Pakistani newspapers give more favorable and positive coverage than Afghan news media which tends to be more critical of Pakistan. Thus it is evident that media of both countries seems to be aligned with the foreign policy of their governments.

Агресія Росії проти України: історичні передумови та сучасні виклики / П.П.Гай-Нижник (керівник проекту, упоряд. і наук. ред.); авт. кол.: П. П. Гай-Нижник, Л. Л. Залізняк, І.Й.Краснодемська, Ю.С.Фігурний, О.А.Чирков, Л.В.Чупрій. – К.: «МП Леся», 2016. – 586 с.

Автори колективної монографії «Агресія Росії проти України: історичні переду-
мови та сучасні виклики» подали увазі читача власний погляд на історичні витоки та паралелі російської агресії проти України, здійснили наукову оцінку Російській Федерації як державі-агресору та спонсору міжнародного тероризму, проаналізували російсько-українську війну, що розпочалася у 2014 р. внаслідок віроломного нападу Росії, а також сучасні виклики та шляхи зміцнення системи національної безпеки України. Пропонується увазі державних органів влади, істориків, політологів, викладачів вищих навчальних закладів, студентів й усіх, хто цікавиться новітньою історією України і є небайдужим до долі соборної і самостійної України.
Колективна монографія містить результати досліджень, проведених за грантової підтримки Державного фонду фундаментальних досліджень за конкурсним проектом (Ф-72/21443) «Історичні передумови та сучасні суспільні наслідки агресії Російської Федерації проти України».

Mediation from soft diplomacy to foreign policy In this chapter we will explore how Qatar gained its current title as a "trusted partner" through mediation. Running in the 2nd decade of its enriched journey, where it was started from north of Yemen mountains passing by Lebanon, Sudan, Djibouti, Palestine until the most recent mediation between Taliban and Afghani government. There are many examples for Qatar mediation roles, it happened where Qatar mediated between countries and other actors, in partnership with other allies and global, continental, regional, and sub regional organizations. As it's a principle in Qatar foreign policy to comply diplomatic efforts with UN principles and international law. On the other hand, tools and potentials that made Qatar recognition as a successful mediator are a complexity of various things such, widely strong political connections, huge financial resources, reliability and impartiality. Involving in mediation for Qatar wasn't easy task, as its always stuffed with unpredicted challenges coming from several geopolitical factors along with other variations. We will demonstrate some of these challenges and how it affects the whole processes and initiatives. Also, Impartiality principle sometimes leads to dilemmas where it requires tremendous efforts and resources to solve issues and bring parties back to negotiations, this includes but not limited to, shuttling diplomacy, huge financial resources, multilateral diplomacy and sometimes coaching and trainings for some parties to narrow the differences and pave the way for middle ground. Mediation in Qatar case made fruit of soft diplomacy and created a high profile for the small gulf country, however this has created some negative competition from some neighbors who is ready to destroy any achievement no matter what is the lost just to undermine the efforts been made. And this been the case; honesty, transparency and dignity always played a key role to contain tensions. Spoilers repeatedly showing up regardless their goals, mostly its conflict of interests is the driver behind those, but sometimes it's just change resistance and fear of future specially with elites lived long time in conflict. The theoretical model of Qatar mediation strategy, is yet to be identified by scholars and all what has been written "personally" is descriptive reports with some analysis built on relative articles and publications. n conclusion although that many has described Qatar mediation as

To Western eyes, China’s wolf-warrior foreign affairs policy and Russia’s extravagant threats over Ukraine can appear cryptic. These seem designed not to make friends but rather to antagonise others. Moreover, Chinese and Russian actions don’t seem to be advancing their interests. Instead, they are only convincing many countries to pushback, including through diversifying trade away from China and Russia, reshaping national defence forces and posture, highlighting Chinese and Russian internal failings and opposing the two nations in diplomatic forums. However, Chinese and Russian strategies can usefully be looked at differently, to both highlight their logic and the implications that then arise.

Independent Singapore and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have a historically varied and complex relationship. The two states enjoy excellent economic ties, which have been a key feature of bilateral interactions since the PRC’s “Opening and Reform” initiative in the late 1970s. Substantial cultural, educational and tourist exchanges are also a feature of Singapore–PRC relations. Yet diplomatic ties have only recently reverted to a general cordiality after a protracted two-year period of friction. There have been other, longer periods of estrangement between Singapore and Beijing – Singapore discouraged its citizens from having contact with the PRC during the Cultural Revolution and established official ties with the PRC only in 1992.

Singapore and the PRC are deeply economically intertwined. The PRC is Singapore’s largest trading partner, as well as being the largest of the other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As a major international capital exporter, Singapore is the PRC’s second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI). Singaporean investments in the PRC include major government-linked development projects in Suzhou, Tianjin and Chengdu, in addition to regular commercial interests. Globalized production and capital networks mean that the Singaporean and Chinese economies also connect through other economies in the region and beyond.

What must be noted, however, is the diversification of Singapore’s economy: ASEAN, the United States, Europe and Japan remain substantial trading partners for Singapore. Moreover, the United States, Europe and Japan are still larger investors in Singapore than the PRC in terms of both FDI and capital stock. Even if some proportion of trade and investment tilts more favourably towards the PRC, especially as Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gets underway, Singapore is likely to continue to seek economic options beyond the PRC. These relationships provide Singapore with some buffer against overdependence on the PRC.

The BRI obviously presents opportunities for Singapore. Indeed, Singapore was one of the earliest members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is associated with the project. To the extent that infrastructure development promotes growth in Singapore’s immediate neighbourhood, this could raise demand for Singaporean goods and services. Prosperous neighbours are likely to be more invested in regional security. Of course, Hong Kong is likely to offer competition to Singapore, particularly in terms of financial and finance-related services. Moreover, Singapore’s economy has been diversifying away from maritime services — they now account for only about 7 percent of GDP. This mitigates some of the pressure resulting from enhancements in regional transport infrastructure.

Externalities that could result from the BRI may be cause for greater concern. Economic benefits from the initiative that flow to various business and political elites in Southeast Asia may make the establishment of consensus more difficult among ASEAN members, particularly over issues that Beijing deems sensitive. Limited transparency and unclear corporate governance in the BRI projects may encourage rent-seeking and abuse, as well as distributions of costs and benefits that foster political instability. Furthermore, uncertainty over dispute management stemming from investment projects introduces higher degrees of risk in such projects. “Win–win” approaches and “setting differences aside” are fine until problems that require urgent management or resolution emerge.

Rules, procedures, norms, laws, processes, and their practice, especially as they pertain to strategic restraint by the powerful, are especially important to Singapore. This is an area of some divergence between Beijing and Singapore. Singapore tends to favour stronger, binding processes that guarantee a degree of even-handedness.

An area where Singapore–PRC differences over rules and processes are especially noticeable is over the rule of law in the South China Sea. When the Philippines sought an interpretation from an arbitral tribunal over claims on maritime features in waters it disputes with Beijing, the PRC called the processes flawed, refused direct participation and rejected the ruling of the tribunal. Singapore, in comparison, stressed the importance of the legal process and the binding nature of its findings even though it is not a South China Sea claimant. Rather, Singapore felt that complying with such internationally established legal procedures offered a better means of handling differences, maintaining stability and protecting its interests. A similar distinction appears to divide Singapore and the PRC over the degree to which a South China Sea code of conduct should be binding. Such differences recently presented key points of contention and friction between the PRC and Singapore.

More knotty for Singapore is, perhaps, the way ethnicity intersects with PRC nationalism. Given that Singapore’s population is 70 per cent ethnic Han Chinese, many PRC citizens and even officials believe that Singapore should be particularly understanding of, if not sympathetic to, PRC concerns. This includes issues such as the PRC’s various territorial disputes and suspicions of the United States and Japan. There is sometimes surprise, a sense of betrayal, and even anger from PRC official quarters when Singapore’s official position diverges from that of Beijing. Such perspectives come from a sense of Chinese nationalism that rests heavily on linking ethnicity to political loyalty to the PRC.

Singapore and its Chinese citizens, however, do not and should not share the same sense of nationalism as in the PRC. Despite historical linkages between Chinese nationalist movements, ethnic Chinese in Singapore now have very different political loyalties. Even though Singaporean Chinese may speak languages and share cultural practices that originated from what is today the PRC, they are no more Chinese citizens than French-Canadians are French citizens. Singapore’s post-independence nation-building project continues to be about creating distinct Singapore citizens. Such a position is critical given the need to hold together Singapore’s multi-ethnic population and avoid characterisation as a potentially hostile Chinese “fifth column” by its neighbours.

The PRC is one of Singapore’s most important foreign relationships. Much of this comes from the fact that the PRC is critical to prosperity and stability in Asia. Singapore’s future is in many ways tied to the PRC doing well. However, Singapore will continue to seek other partnerships, inside its region and out, for the simple reason that such diversification of ties is an effective risk management strategy. This means that Singapore has an incentive to continue engagement with Europe, Australia, India, Japan, the United States and others. Singapore also has a longstanding interest in binding international rules that it prefers major powers, including the PRC, to abide by.

To the extent that Beijing accepts an open and inclusive Southeast Asia as well as established and binding rules, the Singapore–PRC relationship is likely to continue smoothly. That said, predictability and comfort in the Singapore–PRC relationship also depend on a continued commitment to the region by Singapore’s other international partners. The positive trajectory of Singapore’s current ties with the PRC rests on such conditions being sustained. If this situation changes, as may arguably be the case at present, Singapore’s relationship with the PRC may become more fraught and require some recalibration.

Japan's diplomatic strategy toward East Asia underwent three main changes in the post-Cold War era. The fi rst change occurred soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War propelled Japan to consider a potential way to contribute to international security, resulting in the creation of dual-track diplomacy. The second was the consolidation of Japan's dual-track diplomacy by strengthening the US-Japan alliance and supporting the ASEAN's multilateral initiatives in the early 2000s. The third was the enhancement of Japan's own security efforts to maintain regional stability while making the most of the existing political and security mechanisms in East Asia-multilateralizing US alliance networks and enhancing the ASEAN-led multilateral frameworks. In the future, two factors would likely play a critical role in shaping Japan's diplomatic strategy: the degree of the future US commitment to the alliance with Japan and the level of China's assertiveness.

In this paper, I present evidence from a meta-analysis of one of the most dominant theoretical perspectives in executive-legislative policy making relations—Aaron Wildavsky's (1966) two presidencies thesis. Wildavsky's work suggested that no less than two policy making presidencies existed within a single president's relationship with the Congress (1966). Furthermore, that while the president " dominated " the construction of policies in foreign affairs vis-à-vis the Congress; he was impeded in that effort in the realm of domestic politics (1966). After Wildavsky's work was published no less than an entire school of academic thought grew up around the idea and inherent possibilities of a " two presidencies thesis " (Shull 1991). It is my intention in this analysis to examine that body of literature and report on its general conclusions relative to the existence of and subsequent evolution of the two presidencies as an intellectual endeavor. My findings indicate that the two presidencies is subject to examination within institutional, methodological and partisan terms and from that an adequate theoretical, empirical and normative critique can be developed which is the finished project of this paper. As an empirical theory, the two presidencies is rather strongly support with a support rate among two presidency researchers of 62.5%. The strongest level for the explanatory existence of the two presidencies comes from Wildavsky's classic institutional (Wildavsky 1966) version and the strongest reason for rejection of the two presidencies comes from its notion as a " cultural phenomenon " (Peppers 1975). Despite wide spread discussion within the literature there is little evidence to support a strictly partisan version of the thesis probably due to its lack of clear association between itself and either support or refutation of the thesis. (see Edwards 1986). Methodologically, the two presidencies has some association between the employment of an aggregate level of analysis and the institutional explanation, however, while some qualitative evidence exists for such a relationship between the employment of an individual level of analysis and the partisan version of the two presidencies no such relationship is corroborated quantitatively. Also, the cultural version of the theory is associated at least through the qualitative meta-analysis with the employment of qualitative methods; this relationship does not appear in the quantitative portion of the meta-analysis. Finally, the lack of normative study either as a critique of executive-legislative relations or as a reflexive commentary on the body of research itself holds the two presidencies back from fulfilling a broader promise regarding American political analysis. Lastly, the need for re-theorization is necessitated by the conclusions of this meta-analysis because the two presidencies as it currently exists is not developed enough to truly get at the " heart of the executive-legislative policy making divide. " A more nuanced approach is needed to provide greater empirical " fit, " provide stronger explanative/ predictive " power, " and establish a normative " critique " as to the appropriateness of presidential prerogatives and congressional involvement in foreign and domestic policy making.

The strategic culture of the Republic of Korea (ROK)/South Korea is based on three pillars: attaining prosperity and strength as an enduring national purpose and objective; countering the existential North Korean threat; and maintaining strong alliance with the United States. This strategic culture is grounded in history, especially in Koreans’ sense of themselves as an ancient and homogeneous people, the minjok, and in a constructed martial heritage. Keepers of strategic culture include the national security establishment, the National Assembly, the media, the public, and the United States, but the most important keeper is the president who ultimately defines South Korea’s strategic interests and how they should be attained or guarded. Contemporary illustrations of South Korean strategic culture in action include defenses reform measures, shifts in the U.S. alliance, and the “Crisis of 2013” that included a North Korean nuclear test and extreme threats of war. This essay reinforces the view that while strategic culture may be a universal concept, in its operationalized and practiced form, the true value of the concept is that the unique and particularistic characters that define each specific strategic cultural tradition is placed at the center of analysis. South Korea’s strategic culture is unique, but if there is an aspect that can be applied to other nations it is that shared historical memory and public historiography are crucial factors that inform that nation’s strategic culture.

Abstract:

This paper offers a variety of reasons as to Russia’s Intervention in the Syrian Crisis and tackles Russia’s foray into entering the International scene anew through its policy of expansionism manifest in its involvement in Syria. Taking its cue from Antonio Gramsci’s idiosyncratic concept of hegemony, this paper is a rejoinder to some analyses vindicating Russia’s intervention in Syria in the name of support. This paper does not go against this assumption, but goes to great lengths to show that “involvement with justification” reminds one of a traditional scenario repeating itself on a postcolonial stage. This paper is not be taken as an indictment on Russia’s intervention in Syria nor should it be seen as altogether negative since Russia has in fact brought support to Syria on Bashar Al-Assad’s behest. It remains that, in spite of Russia’s assistance, its intervention constitutes a hegemonic power in itself since, had it not been to an interest, Russia would never have intervened in one of the most precarious crises that the contemporary world has ever faced. In the first part of this paper entitled “Background to the Syrian Crisis” I have given an insight into Syria’s ‘friendship’ with Russia and how the latter officially intervened in the Syrian conflict in 2015. In the second part entitled “Russian Entrance in Syria: Positive Intervention”, I have tackled the positive reasons of Russia’s intervention in the Syrian Crisis as a token of assistance, during a time when Syria finds itself on the verge of a complete economic collapse. In the third part entitled “Russian Entrance in Syria: Hegemonic Intervention”, I have investigated the hegemonic reasons which led Russia to assist Assad’s regime. These parts will be followed by a conclusion which will sum up the results reached and draw a comparison between the statistics found as to the Russian Intervention in the Syrian conflict.

" So historical experience and realism both bid us to be more objective and less emotional, or if we are to engage our emotions it should be based on our authentic identity as Asians. It is on this basis that we reexamine the world, our region and ourselves. We are Asians. We live in Asia. Our future is in Asia. And we should remodel our thoughts and our policies in accordance with that indubitable fact. " – Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Sr., June 9, 1975 on the occasion of his Official Visit to China " China will never be a superpower, and will never commit aggression or bully other countries. We always maintain that all countries, big or small, should be equal. We support all the oppressed nations and oppressed peoples in their just struggles. It is possible for countries with different social systems to develop state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Our policy and stand are consistent and firm. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, State Banquet Welcoming President Ferdinand ABSTRACT The paper aims to examine the nature of Philippine foreign policy towards China by reviewing the timeline of their relations through the theory of critical junctures. While the tie that connects these two nations can be traced back a thousand of year ago but its formal relationship as sovereign entities is not a replication not even a reinforcement of what has been cited to as to their long and rich 'traditional friendship' in the distant pasts. Some factors may have come along the way that hinders the flourishing of this ancient connection like politics among nations and the alliances especially the period of ideological confrontations between the Liberals of the US and the Communist of the Soviets

In American History, war and God are never separate affairs. As historian Andrew Preston framed it: Religion can be a Sword of the Spirit and it can, at the same time, be a Shield of Faith. Religion can justify and perpetuate war; religion can inspire individuals to work for peace and criticize violence.

This course examines four intertwined dynamics. First, this course considers how the American Catholic Church influenced the Vietnam War. How did Catholics shape policy, ideology, and strategy when it came to the Vietnam War? Second, this course examines the impact of the Vietnam War on the American Catholic Church. How did the war shape Catholic notions of citizenship? Did the war foster divisions among American Catholics? Third, this course looks at the significant events and players in the Vietnam conflict. The devil is always in the details. As such, this course quickly surveys the important diplomatic, military, ideological, and political dynamics of the war. Finally, this course studies American Catholics in a particular time and place: in America between 1945 and 1975.

The course is organized into three sections. Section I lays the groundwork for the course by investigating the years prior to the American invasion of Vietnam. Catholics are very important in this period. Section II looks at the war itself and analyzes battlefield religion and the Catholic peace movement. The final section considers the consequences of the war (a crisis of confidence, an immigration crisis, and human rights).

Гай-Нижник П. П. Взаємини України з Францією і Великою Британією за Центральної Ради (1917–1918 рр.): становлення і розлад // Гілея. – 2017. – Вип.124 (№9). – С32–43.

Hai–Nyzhnyk P. P., Doctor of Historical Sciences, Academician
of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Department
of Historical Studies at the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies
(Ukraine, Kyiv), Hai-Nyzhnyk@ukr.net

Mutual relations of Ukraine with France and Great Britain at Central Council (1917–1918): formation and disintegration.

Motion of becoming and reason of disorder of political, intergovernmental and diplomatic relations of Ukraine lights up at Central Council of UPR with France and Great Britain in at the end of 1917 – at the beginning of 1918.

Japan’s diplomatic strategy toward East Asia underwent three main changes in the post-Cold War era. The first change occurred soon after the 1991 Persian Gulf War propelled Japan to consider a potential way to contribute to international security, resulting in the creation of dual-track diplomacy. The second was the consolidation of Japan’s dual-track diplomacy by strengthening the US–Japan alliance and supporting the ASEAN’s multilateral initiatives in the early 2000s. The third was the enhancement of Japan’s own security efforts to maintain regional stability while making the most of the existing political and security mechanisms in East Asia—multilateralizing US alliance networks and enhancing the ASEAN-led multilateral frameworks. In the future, two factors would likely play a critical role in shaping Japan’s diplomatic strategy: the degree of the future US commitment to the alliance with Japan and the level of China’s assertiveness.

The Syrian crisis has been the theatre of complicated and unpredictable dynamics strongly connected to the growing power struggle among the major players. Central to the foreign policy goals of the major actors in this crisis is national economic and strategic interests, the need for power and dominance, the security dilemma and military dominance in the Middle East. The conflict has become international in character drawing the involvement of such countries such as Russia, the United States, Turkey, Iran, Israel, China and Saudi Arabia among others. This paper seeks to evaluate the foreign policy goals of the major actors in the Syrian crisis since 2011.

The PNG National Public Service Male Advocacy Network (PNG PS MAN) is one of the few uniquely home-grown initiatives of the Government of Papua New Guinea in 2013 as outlined in the 2013 KOKODA COMMITMENTS agreed to by Central Government Agencies and Line Agencies at the Kokoda Motel, Sogeri, outside Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

The PNG Public Service Male Advocacy Network was the initiative of the Department of Personnel Management (DPM) under the able leadership of former Acting Secretary Mr. John Kali, with funding from the Government of Papua New Guinea and co-finacning support from the Australian Government funded Economic and Public Sector Program (EPSP).

The Department of Personnel Management was particularly keen in enforcing Section 55 of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea, “calling for equality of citizens in all areas of social, economic, and political development irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex“. 

The Department of Personnel Management proceeded to launch the Gender Equity and Social Inclusion Policy or GESI in 2013 at the Parliament State function room.

The GESI Policy was developed in support of a number of National policies and priorities as well as international agreements including the National Constitution; the Vision 2050; numerous National policies which support gender equity; the Public Service Code of Business Ethics and Conduct as well as International commitments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and others that concern gender equity, social inclusion and development.

The GESI Policy of 2013 infused renewed spirit, enthusiasm, and energy to enforcing Section 55 of the Constitution of PNG and re-affirmed the strong stand by former Acting Secretary, Mr. John M. Kali, OBE of the Department of Personnel Managment that “the PNG National Public Service is committed to encourage and support the principles of ‘equality‘ in every aspect of the Public Service work place”.

The then Minister for Public Service, Hon. Dr. Sir Puka Temu KBE CMG MP, and Former Acting Secretary, Mr. John M. Kali, OBE including the Former Minister Counsellor of AusAID, Mr. James Hall (prior to its incorporation into the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - now known as “Australian AID DFAT“), witnessed the launching in the company of other fellow representatives of various Multilateral, Bilateral, and UN Bodies including the first pioneer thirty male advocates of the PNG National Public Service Male Advocacy Network or MAN.

The objective of the project is to continue the implementation and mainstreaming of the National Public Service GESI policy into public sector workplaces (at national provincial and district levels) and into service delivery both internally (within the public Service) and externally shaping services provided to the community. This is guided by a Gnder Equity and Social Inclusion (GESI) Matrix.
Seven years on since preparations began in 2012 for the Launching of the GESI Policy of 2013 and the KOKODA COMMITMENTS of 2013, the benefits of these policies have yet to be realized and felt equally across the entire Public Service machinery.

This is despite partial evidence of the establishment of Gender focal points in designated in-line positions in the PNG National Public Service. This is recorded in the Department of Personnel Management sponsored National Exective Council Decision Number 172 NG/2012.
The implementation of the KOKODA COMMITMENTS and the GESI POLICY of 2013 can not be successful without the support of all agencies of Government - Central Agencies, Line Agencies, State-Owned Enterprises, and Provincial Governments.

This still doesn’t answer the key question: “Who do we blame for the lack of IMPACT and success of these Policies 43 years after independence and Why??? “

Гай-Нижник П. П. Законодавче та нормативно-правове підґрунтя становлення дипломатичної служби Української Держави за Гетьманату 1918 р. // Гілея. – 2017. – Вип.123 (№8). – С.28–36.

Hai-Nyzhnyk P. P. Legislative and normatively-legal basis of becoming of the diplomatic service of the Ukrainian State for Hetmanat in 1918

The purpose of this paper is to establish whether it is largely beneficial for the UK to employ it’s intelligence community in it’s strategic shift to the Indo-pacific announced within the 2021 Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. This paper focuses on contemporary risks and vehicles for liaison whilst exploring the contextual factor of Chinese ascendancy. Additionally this adds to the broader body of literature discussing the increased western engagement within the Indo-pacific and strategic shifts. Although a core aspect of intelligence studies, Intelligence liaison has received limited and irregular attention from the academic community through a critical lens, which is in significant need of addressing. Further, as a recent development the UK’s Strategic tilt has not yet amassed sufficient publicly available research, as a result application of evaluating intelligence co-operation possibilities and risks regarding the strategic shift had not been undergone prior. This paper critically evaluates existing academic literature, government publication and contemporary case studies. Through this assessment this paper has found that, despite potential risks there is sufficient scope and benefit for the UK’s strategic shift to employ intelligence liaison as a method of achieving its ambitions in regard to certain Indo-Pacific Actors, furthermore, it may be a requirement in order counter Chinese influence.

India and Russia have endorsed the importance of the 'Special and Privileged Strategic' partnership as a result of the historical foundation of the partnership, strategic cultures and also keeping in pace with the geopolitical and geo-economic developments. Given the contemporary geopolitical realities of international relations, India and Russia have pursued a pragmatic approach to promote their respective foreign policy interests. In the context of growing security and strategic concerns, the engagement of both India and Russia with other international actors such as India's growing proximity with the US and Russia's strengthening of relations with China has resulted in diversifying the foreign policy approach respectively. These developments call for an assessment of what the India-Russia strategic partnership holds in coming years.

Great power competition is today’s defining strategic issue. Crucially this competition is seen as remaining below the level of great power armed conflict, instead ranging across diverse areas including economic, diplomatic, cyber, information campaigns and proxy wars. Such diversity gives the great powers much more choice in the grand strategies they could potentially use to advance their interests than during the Cold War bi-polar confrontation. In sharp contrast, American grand strategy thinking has today been captured by a single approach.

This paper compares the ways in which countries that have suffered from terrorist actions combat terrorism. Specifically, I compare counterterrorism policies in the United States and Spain before and after two of the most severe acts of foreign terrorism, the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 and the attacks in Spain on March 11, 2004. These comparisons are made in two counterterrorism policy aspects: Bureaucracy and Institutions, as well as Foreign Relations and Military Intervention. Each of these sections shows both convergent and divergent choices made by the Spanish and American governments. In terms of bureaucratic institutions, Spain has a more modern and hierarchically fluid approach whereas the United States has a system with multiple agencies where specific issues are addressed by individual, specialized agencies. Both governments utilize military intervention as a part of a response to terrorism, however, here too, these nations differ, in part because Spain's foreign policy response was conditioned by the existence and actions of the European Union whereas the United States reacts more unilaterally. The United States as well, possesses a vast military network and budget which allows them to respond more dramatically and without the constraints of a multilateralism. While both Spain and the United States collaborated in the “War on Terror” in the wake of 9/11, Spain withdrew its troops from Iraq after the Madrid terrorist attacks. While the new Spanish government that came to power after the terrorist attacks continued to focus on fighting terrorism, it emphasized the importance of deterring and preempting terrorist strikes. The American government, on the other hand, has specialized in criminalizing and responding to terrorism. While America has faced terrorism from several different perpetrator groups (i.e. the Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, ELF/ALF, anti-abortion extremists, etc.) which have allowed the nation to holistically prepare its counterterrorism institutions, Spain has faced terrorism from Basque nationalists (ETA) which has led to a more direct approach from the Spanish counterterrorism organization while the United States takes a targeted approach on the type of attack that occurred (NCSTRT 2016). In addition, the way in which Spain and the United States respond internationally changes, as well. Spain takes a far more reticent approach, in pulling back from international engagement whereas the United States exhibits a more bellicose attitude. This paper examines the internal and external elements that have led to the convergence and divergence of the Spanish and American counterterrorism paths.

As relações entre Brasil e Rússia se desenvolveram e ampliaram no decorrer dos anos em relações simétricas e convergentes. Apoiadas sob bases e condutas similares, projetar o país em intenções de cooperação em trocas comuns, trouxeram as duas nações posicionadas em partes distintas do globo, ao progresso e evolução das relações bilaterais e também multilaterais, com a criação dos BRICS. Nesse ínterim, pretende-se identificar os padrões de aproximação entre a Federação Russa e a República Federativa do Brasil no sistema internacional, à luz da diplomacia de Lula e Celso Amorim que compreende os anos de 2003 a 2010.

One familiar, even pervasive, narrative in Singapore is that the country and its people live under the shadow of ever-present existential threats. Such dangers are supposedly always lurking just beneath the surface of internal prosperity and calm or just outside the country’s borders, ready to ensnare Singapore and Singaporeans if they should ever let down their guard. From successive generations of political leaders to senior civil servants, estab- lishment elites repeatedly remind Singaporeans of these grave external dangers.5 ey reiterate the need for Singapore to be ever vigilant in the constant defence against perils beyond the border just to be able to survive. An extension to this account is the need to keep political and social liberalisa- tion in check lest they render Singapore vulnerable to deadlock, susceptible to unrest, and prone to predation. According to this perspective, only a government headed by a strong and capable ruling party that guarantees political stability can protect the nation, its people, and its prosperity from danger. is reasoning provides continuing justi cation for Singaporeans to accept the political status quo and continued controls over political contestation and civic organisation in Singapore. By taking a comparative perspective that considers other states in positions of external vulnerability, this essay brings the tension between security imperatives and greater political openness, plurality, and contestation into sharper relief. In doing so, I wish to encourage re ection over the possibilities for stable political evolution, security, and prosperity in the face of di cult conditions.

The article is devoted to the study of the contemporary approaches on Great Silk Road by analyzing historical preconditions to the development of relations between Europe and states of Central Asia. Paper sheds light upon the historical and contemporary significance of the Great Silk Road that fostered relationship between the two continents from medieval times until nowadays. The author provides his own proposals for rediscovering of the Great Silk Road referring to the Idea of the Modern Great Silk Road in the example of the EU and Central Asian states. Especially, it is argued that under the current globalization cultural component of a dialogue between the Eastern and Western countries should be reconsidered and be given more emphasis.

After 40 years, Richard Nixon, US president for the first time, had tried to stabilize the relation between the People 's Republic of China. Both countries are working together and making close ties to avoid their strategic mistrust. The US and China both are competing in the race for global power position. No doubt after the cold war US was the hegemonic power, later years many rising powers such as ASEAN, India, Brazil and EU are trying to limit the influence of US hegemony. And China is a main and crucial rising power since the last two decades. Now China is ambitious towards their global power position. Regarding US and China rising conflict and cooperation many analysts have their own different perspectives. China policy shift , positive diplomacy and economic aid towards weaker and developing countries specially where the US has crucial space is clearly showing how China is trying to cut the edges of Us hegemony. Most scholars interpret US-China ties as good remarks that will benefit globally. If both countries cooperate and work on global issues such as Environment, globalization terrorism. But on the other hand there are scholars who define their relationship as a threat to global security, mistrust and dissatisfaction in their reactions will harm the whole world. Here I have tried to summarize A New Model of Big Power Relations by Suisheng Zhao, China's rise as a conflict by David Shambaugh and at the end Lampton's interpretation of US-China ties during the Obama administration. I have summarized all the perspectives of US-CHINA ties in three major groups. The first deals with stability and growing fundamental cooperation, the second is about balance of power and strategic rivalry and third is about a model of Big power relation and US implications of China's rise.

Increased energy trade has important economic and strategic significance for the United States and Mexico. Mexico’s energy-market reforms that opened access and improved natural gas trade between American producers and Mexican consumers have been beneficial for citizens in both countries. President López Obrador’s desire to return to energy nationalism threatens those gains. Both the U.S. and Mexico should commit to policies and regulations that continue to open access to markets, improve transparency, and expand opportunities for investment. Doing so will benefit both Americans and Mexicans. https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/increasing-natural-gas-trade-between-the-us-and-mexico

A szíriai polgárháború dinamikája 2016 vége óta alapvető átalakuláson megy keresztül. Bár a háromszintű – helyi, regionális és globális – szereplőkkel és érdekellentétekkel zajló konfliktus rövid távon továbbra sem tűnik megoldhatónak, a megindult változások révén már körvonalazódni látszanak a rendezés feltételei, keretei és következményei. A Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet munkatársai „A lezárás felé? A szíriai polgárháború megoldásának körvonalai” címmel 2017. áprilisban többrészes elemzéssorozatot indítottak, amelynek célja a polgárháború alakulásának, illetve a megoldás lehetséges formáinak a bemutatása. Az ötödik elemzés a 2018 elején megfigyelhető reeszkalációs folyamatot, valamint a Dúmában végrehajtott áprilisi (feltehetően) vegyifegyver-támadást követő amerikai–brit–francia beavatkozás kérdéseit járja körbe.

من المؤكد أن الجدل الدائر على صفحات المجلات ومواقع السوشيال ميديا إنما يعكس توترًا حقيقيًّا بين الخليج ومصر، وإن ظلت المواقف الرسمية على تحفظها مؤكدة متانة علاقات الدعم والتحالف بين مختلف الأطراف، وهو ما يفتح الباب أمام تكهنات حول مستقبل هذه العلاقة ومن موقف أبو ظبـي والرياض تجاه النظام الذي ساهما في الحفاظ عليه ودعمه ماليًّا وسياسيًّا إزاء الانتقادات الموجهة له في الغرب والاضطرابات التـي أثارتها جماعة الإخوان وحلفائها في الداخل عقب الإطاحة بهم. بيد أن العامل الأهم الذي يستحق التركيز عليه هو مستقبل نظام الرئيس السيسـي في حال أحجمت هاتان العاصمتان عن دعمه. ومن ثم، يحاول هذا التقرير سبر أغوار التوتر القائم ومحاولة معرفة مدى عمقه وسيناريوهات تطوره وتأثيره على مجمل العلاقات المصرية الخليجية وعلى مستقبل النظام المصري.

على الرغم من أن الاتفاق النووي الإيراني- اتفاقية فيينا- قد أنهـى عقودًا من التوتر بين القوى الغربية والنظام الإيراني، وفتح آفاقًا للتعاون الاقتصادي بين الطرفين مع رفع العقوبات المفروضة على طهران، إلا أن الشرق الأوسط الغارق في حروبه ذات التعقيدات الأهلية والطائفية والإقليمية في سوريا والعراق واليمن، سرعان ما شهد استقطابات أعمق بين أطراف هذه الصراعات بما ينبأ بأن المنطقة لن تشهد تسويات تنهي الصراعات متزايدة المخاطر في الأمد القريب.
من ناحية أخرى، تبدو السياسات الغربية تجاه صراعات المنطقة أقرب إلى ترتيبات الانسحاب على نحو يشابه سياساتها في مرحلة ما بعد الاستعمار، فهي تحاول تجنب عواقب ما خلفته سياسات التدخل والحروب التـي كان لها الدور الأبرز في انهيار بنية الدول الوطنية العربية، وانفجار الصراعات الطائفية، والانقسام على خطوط مذهبية وعرقية.
في السياق نفسه، لا زالت الحرب التـي يشنها النظام الدولي الذي يمر بمرحلة غير مسبوقة من السيولة القطبية على تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية بلا نتائج واقعية على الأرض، خاصة أن التنظيم ببنيته الشبكية المركبة أظهر أنه قادر على اختراق أمن البلدان الغربية وهو ما ظهر في عمليات باريس الأخيرة التـي دفعت فرنسا إلى تكثيف هجماتها على التنظيم في سورية وإعلانها التنسيق مع الجانب الروسـي المنخرط في حربه الخاصة مع التنظيم وغيره من مناهضـي نظام الأسد.

The July 2020 issue of Strategic Assessment focuses on the theme of Israeli foreign policy and national security. To complement the articles in this issue, we held a discussion with former senior figures from the Foreign Ministry and researchers on foreign policy. Our goal was to shed light on a number of issues relating to the status of the Foreign Ministry from a historical and contemporary perspective, the contribution of foreign policy to national security, and the challenges facing the Foreign Ministry in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis and the future. Participants were