- Birkbeck College, University of London, Department of History, Classics & Archaeology, Faculty MemberThe Catholic University of America, History, Faculty Member, and 6 moreadd
- History, American History, International History, Global History, History of International Relations, Diplomatic History, and 30 moreEuropean History, Intellectual History, United States In The World, U.S. and the World, 1865-present, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, History of American Foreign Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, American Foreign Policy, International Politics, International Law, History and Theory of International Law, Public International Law, History of Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, International organizations, Global Governance, Colonialism, Imperialism, Empire, International Relations, International Relations Theory, International Security, History of International Law, History of Political Thought, History of International Thought, The League of Nations, Critical International Relations Theory, Critical Legal Theory, Grand Strategy, and American Grand Strategyedit
- Stephen Wertheim is a historian of the United States in the world and analyst of contemporary American grand strategy... moreStephen Wertheim is a historian of the United States in the world and analyst of contemporary American grand strategy. He is a Senior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at Yale Law School, where he is a Visiting Faculty Fellow at the Center for Global Legal Challenges, and a Distinguished Lecturer at Catholic University.
Wertheim specializes in U.S. foreign policy and international order from the late nineteenth century to the present. In Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy (Harvard University Press, 2020), he reveals how American leaders, in the lead-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, decided to pursue global military dominance as the effectively permanent vocation of the United States.
Wertheim regularly writes about current events. His essays have appeared in The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Guardian, The Nation, The New York Review of Books, The New York Times, The New Yorker, The Washington Post, and elsewhere. Prospect magazine named him one of “the world’s 50 top thinkers for the Covid-19 age.”
He has published scholarly articles on U.S. ideas and projects of diplomatic engagement, international law, world organization, colonial empire, and humanitarian intervention. His research on the intellectual origins of the League of Nations won the Fischel-Calhoun Prize from the Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.
Before coming to Carnegie, Wertheim was Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a think-tank he co-founded in 2019. Prior to that, he was a Visiting Assistant Professor in history at Columbia University and a Lecturer in history at Birkbeck, University of London. He has also served as a Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton University, and a Junior Research Fellow at King’s College, University of Cambridge.
Wertheim received a PhD from Columbia University in 2015. He received an MPhil from Columbia in 2011 and an AB summa cum laude from Harvard University in 2007.
In his spare time, he thinks up comedy ideas, talks about them, and fails to carry them out.edit
A new history explains how and why, as it prepared to enter World War II, the United States decided to lead the postwar world. For most of its history, the United States avoided making political and military commitments that would... more
A new history explains how and why, as it prepared to enter World War II, the United States decided to lead the postwar world.
For most of its history, the United States avoided making political and military commitments that would entangle it in European-style power politics. Then, suddenly, it conceived a new role for itself as the world’s armed superpower—and never looked back. In Tomorrow, the World, Stephen Wertheim traces America’s transformation to the crucible of World War II, especially in the months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the Nazis conquered France, the architects of the nation’s new foreign policy came to believe that the United States ought to achieve primacy in international affairs forevermore.
Scholars have struggled to explain the decision to pursue global supremacy. Some deny that American elites made a willing choice, casting the United States as a reluctant power that sloughed off “isolationism” only after all potential competitors lay in ruins. Others contend that the United States had always coveted global dominance and realized its ambition at the first opportunity. Both views are wrong. As late as 1940, the small coterie of officials and experts who composed the U.S. foreign policy class either wanted British preeminence in global affairs to continue or hoped that no power would dominate. The war, however, swept away their assumptions, leading them to conclude that the United States should extend its form of law and order across the globe and back it at gunpoint. Wertheim argues that no one favored “isolationism”—a term introduced by advocates of armed supremacy in order to turn their own cause into the definition of a new “internationalism.”
We now live, Wertheim warns, in the world that these men created. A sophisticated and impassioned narrative that questions the wisdom of U.S. supremacy, Tomorrow, the World reveals the intellectual path that brought us to today’s global entanglements and endless wars.
For most of its history, the United States avoided making political and military commitments that would entangle it in European-style power politics. Then, suddenly, it conceived a new role for itself as the world’s armed superpower—and never looked back. In Tomorrow, the World, Stephen Wertheim traces America’s transformation to the crucible of World War II, especially in the months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the Nazis conquered France, the architects of the nation’s new foreign policy came to believe that the United States ought to achieve primacy in international affairs forevermore.
Scholars have struggled to explain the decision to pursue global supremacy. Some deny that American elites made a willing choice, casting the United States as a reluctant power that sloughed off “isolationism” only after all potential competitors lay in ruins. Others contend that the United States had always coveted global dominance and realized its ambition at the first opportunity. Both views are wrong. As late as 1940, the small coterie of officials and experts who composed the U.S. foreign policy class either wanted British preeminence in global affairs to continue or hoped that no power would dominate. The war, however, swept away their assumptions, leading them to conclude that the United States should extend its form of law and order across the globe and back it at gunpoint. Wertheim argues that no one favored “isolationism”—a term introduced by advocates of armed supremacy in order to turn their own cause into the definition of a new “internationalism.”
We now live, Wertheim warns, in the world that these men created. A sophisticated and impassioned narrative that questions the wisdom of U.S. supremacy, Tomorrow, the World reveals the intellectual path that brought us to today’s global entanglements and endless wars.
Research Interests: History, American History, American Studies, International Relations, Globalization, and 15 moreForeign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Law, Global Governance, International Security, International History, United Nations, Global Studies, Foreign Policy, Second World War, History of International Relations, Global Leadership, World War II, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Grand Strategy
Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of... more
Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of the conferences that directly established the UN in 1944 and 1945. The answer lies earlier in the war, from 1940 to 1942, when, under the pressure of fast-moving events, American officials and intellectuals decided their country must not only enter the war but also lead the world long afterwards. International political organization gained popularity – first among unofficial postwar planners in 1941 and then among State Department planners in 1942 – because it appeared to be an indispensable tool for implementing postwar US world leadership, for projecting and in no way constraining American power. US officials believed the new organization would legitimate world leadership in the eyes of the American public by symbolizing the culmination of prior internationalist efforts to end power politics, even as they based the design of the UN on a thoroughgoing critique of the League, precisely for assuming that power politics could be transcended.
Research Interests: History, American History, Diplomatic History, International Relations, International Relations Theory, and 14 moreInternational Studies, International Law, International organizations, International Security, War Studies, International History, Security Studies, American Foreign Policy, United Nations, Diplomacy, History of International Relations, History of International Law, History of International Thought, and United Nations Security Council
From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the interwar world emerges as the birthplace of familiar forms of global knowledge. This special issue examines the production of global knowledge in the 1920s and 30s. It explores how... more
From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the interwar world emerges as the birthplace of familiar forms of global knowledge. This special issue examines the production of global knowledge in the 1920s and 30s. It explores how think tanks and similar organisations generated and still generate knowledge of the world and by so doing helped and help constitute what is now called ‘global governance’.
Research Interests: European Studies, Latin American Studies, International Relations, International Relations Theory, Globalization, and 15 moreForeign Policy Analysis, Expertise, International Studies, International Law, Sociology of Knowledge, International organizations, Global Governance, International Politics, Second World War, History of International Relations, First World War, Interwar Period History, IR Theory, Think Tanks, and Foreign Affairs
Public opinion polls came into being only in the latter half of the 1930s. Until then, internationalists possessed no reliable method for quantifying momentary mass preferences within their own nations, let alone across nations. And they... more
Public opinion polls came into being only in the latter half of the 1930s. Until then, internationalists possessed no reliable method for quantifying momentary mass preferences within their own nations, let alone across nations. And they knew it. When they invoked international public opinion — staking the peace of the world on it in 1919 — what did they mean and what were they doing?
This chapter charts a genealogy of the concept of international public opinion in Anglo-American political discourse. It argues that in anointing public opinion as the watchword of their new diplomacy, the founders of the League of Nations scarcely intended to anoint popular preferences as the guide of diplomatic practice. While trading on the term's democratic connotations, they valorized something closer to Kantian will or Hegelian spirit. Most important, they empowered national politicians to interpret public opinion, through decision processes they declined to specify. In so doing, they asserted their own authority to articulate public opinion, regardless of actual public sentiment. In the name of public opinion, they exercised their own discretion, practicing a kind of Schmittian decisionism avant la lettre.
This chapter charts a genealogy of the concept of international public opinion in Anglo-American political discourse. It argues that in anointing public opinion as the watchword of their new diplomacy, the founders of the League of Nations scarcely intended to anoint popular preferences as the guide of diplomatic practice. While trading on the term's democratic connotations, they valorized something closer to Kantian will or Hegelian spirit. Most important, they empowered national politicians to interpret public opinion, through decision processes they declined to specify. In so doing, they asserted their own authority to articulate public opinion, regardless of actual public sentiment. In the name of public opinion, they exercised their own discretion, practicing a kind of Schmittian decisionism avant la lettre.
Research Interests: American History, American Politics, International Relations, Public Opinion, International Relations Theory, and 15 moreBritish History, International Law, International organizations, British Politics, American Foreign Policy, History of American Foreign Relations, Political communication, British Foreign Policy, History of International Relations, History of International Law, Internationalism, US History, The League of Nations, History and Theory of International Law, and English School of International Relations Theory
Trump's America enters the international arena to square off against comparable competitors, each equally capable of becoming great. What will become of American foreign policy when greatness, no longer bestowed, must be seized?
Research Interests: History, International Relations, International Studies, International Security, Ideology, and 8 moreAmerican Foreign Policy, History of American Foreign Relations, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, American Exceptionalism, History of US Foreign Relations, International Strategy, and Donald Trump
During the First World War, civil society groups across the North Atlantic put forward an array of plans for recasting international society. The most prominent ones sought to build on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 by developing... more
During the First World War, civil society groups across the North Atlantic put forward an array of plans for recasting international society. The most prominent ones sought to build on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 by developing international legal codes and, in a drastic innovation, obligating and militarily enforcing the judicial settlement of disputes. Their ideal was a world governed by law, which they opposed to politics. This idea was championed by the largest groups in the United States and France in favour of international organizations, and they had likeminded counterparts in Britain. The Anglo-American architects of the League of Nations, however, defined their vision against legalism. Their declaratory design sought to ensure that artificial machinery never stifled the growth of common consciousness. Paradoxically, the bold new experiment in international organization was forged from an anti-formalistic ethos – one that slowed the momentum of international law and portended the rise of global governance.
Research Interests: International Relations, French History, International Law, Transnationalism, Global Civil Society, and 17 moreInternational organizations, Global Governance, Transatlantic History, International History, Transatlantic relations, British Foreign Policy, Pacifism, History of International Relations, First World War, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, Foreign policy and ideology, History of International Thought, History of International Legal Thought, Internationalism, U.S. Foreign Policy, International society, and The League of Nations
Two rival conceptions for international organization circulated in America during World War I. The first and initially more popular was a "legalist-sanctionist" league, intended to develop international legal code and obligate and enforce... more
Two rival conceptions for international organization circulated in America during World War I. The first and initially more popular was a "legalist-sanctionist" league, intended to develop international legal code and obligate and enforce judicial settlement of disputes. The second was the League of Nations that came into being. This article traces the intellectual development and political reception of the former from 1914 to 1920. Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and William H. Taft were its most important architects and advocates. Like President Woodrow Wilson, they aimed to create an international polity without supranational authority. Unlike Wilson, they insisted on the codification of law and the necessity of physical sanction: the league had to enforce its word or not speak at all. Wilson fatally rejected legalist-sanctionist ideas. Holding a thoroughgoing organicist understanding of political evolution, he and the League's British progenitors preferred international organization to center on a parliament of politicians divining the popular will and anticipating future needs, not a court of judges interpreting formal codes of law. A flexible model of organization carried over to the United Nations, the alternative forgotten by a world leader that now found it natural to subordinate law to politics."
Research Interests: International Relations, International Relations Theory, International Law, International organizations, International History, and 10 moreHistory of International Relations, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, Foreign policy and ideology, History of International Thought, History of International Legal Thought, U.S. Foreign Relations History, Internationalism, U.S. Foreign Policy, International society, and The League of Nations
This article traces the rise of humanitarian interventionist ideas in the US from 1991 to 2003. Until 1997, humanitarian intervention was a relatively limited affair, conceived ad hoc more than systematically, prioritized below... more
This article traces the rise of humanitarian interventionist ideas in the US from 1991 to 2003. Until 1997, humanitarian intervention was a relatively limited affair, conceived ad hoc more than systematically, prioritized below multilateralism, aiming to relieve suffering without transforming foreign polities. For this reason, US leaders and citizens scarcely contemplated armed intervention in the Rwandan genocide of 1994: the US 'duty to stop genocide' was a norm still under development. It flourished only in the late 1990s, when humanitarian interventionism, like neoconservatism, became popular in the US establishment and enthusiastic in urging military invasion to remake societies. Now inaction in Rwanda looked outrageous. Stopping the genocide seemed, in retrospect, easily achieved by 5,000 troops, a projection that ignored serious obstacles. On the whole, humanitarian interventionists tended to understate difficulties of halting ethnic conflict, ignore challenges of postconflict reconstruction, discount constraints imposed by public opinion, and override multilateral procedures. These assumptions primed politicians and the public to regard the Iraq war of 2003 as virtuous at best and unworthy of strenuous dissent at worst. The normative commitment to stop mass killing outstripped US or international capabilities—a formula for dashed hopes and dangerous deployments that lives on in the 'responsibility to protect'.
Research Interests: Military History, Military Ethics, International Relations, International Law, Human Rights, and 14 moreHumanitarianism, International Security, Genocide Studies, International History, International Ethics, Humanitarian Intervention, Responsibility to Protect, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, Military and Politics, Foreign policy and ideology, Rwanda, U.S. Foreign Relations History, U.S. Foreign Policy, and International society
The important questions in politics are of probability, not possibility. What would the plausible and probable consequences of a particular intervention have been? What would have had to differ in order for successful intervention to... more
The important questions in politics are of probability, not possibility. What would the plausible and probable consequences of a particular intervention have been? What would have had to differ in order for successful intervention to result? Only an anti-political ethical framework – a kind of crude deontology – could find overriding significance in the mere possibility that lives could have been saved.
Research Interests: Military History, Military Ethics, Human Rights, Humanitarianism, Genocide Studies, and 10 moreInternational Ethics, Humanitarian Intervention, Responsibility to Protect, Ethics and International Relations, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, Military and Politics, Foreign policy and ideology, Rwanda, U.S. Foreign Relations History, and U.S. Foreign Policy
Woodrow Wilson saw the League of Nations as the embryo of a fuller global polity. To illuminate his vision, this essay turns to Wilson’s elaborate theories of how national polities develop. The result significantly revises prevailing... more
Woodrow Wilson saw the League of Nations as the embryo of a fuller global polity. To illuminate his vision, this essay turns to Wilson’s elaborate theories of how national polities develop. The result significantly revises prevailing portrayals of Wilsonianism, both scholarly and popular. They emphasize Wilson’s determination either to spread liberal democracy abroad or to support international law and organization. On both counts, however, Wilson’s principles and actions betrayed deep ambiguities. Mixing Burkean organicism with a loosely neo-Hegelian teleology, Wilsonianism was a capacious set of ideas that, on principle, could and did cut either way on whether to implant democracy by force of arms. It gave Wilson a particular conception of liberal democracy, one that challenges Wilson’s reputation as a champion of the rule of “global public opinion.” Wilson meant “public opinion” non-literally. Statesmen in the League were supposed to divine the latent general will of international society through introspection, not to obey momentary mass preferences. Nor was Wilson the wholehearted advocate of binding international institutions that he might seem. His progressive, teleological vision allowed him to skate over the tensions between unilateralism and multilateralism, national interests and common concerns. Rather than decisively prioritize one value over the other, Wilson assumed there was no need, for national and common interests would draw ever nearer to one another. Moreover, Wilson in 1919 rejected popular proposals to strengthen the League’s commitments to international law and collective security. He did so to preserve the League as a flexible and thus formally weak organization that would constantly remold itself around an organically growing world spirit. In sum, Wilsonianism is unintelligible except by understanding the categories Wilson employed himself. His assumptions are so unlike those currently popular in international-relations discourse that it is difficult to apply Wilsonianism to present dilemmas.
Research Interests:
Theodore Roosevelt is well known as an imperialist. The common understanding is both too weak and too strong. Too weak, because Roosevelt idealized an imperialism that could last forever in civilizing savages. Too strong, because... more
Theodore Roosevelt is well known as an imperialist. The common understanding is both too weak and too strong. Too weak, because Roosevelt idealized an imperialism that could last forever in civilizing savages. Too strong, because Roosevelt prepared the American-occupied Philippines for independence within a generation. This article analyzes Roosevelt's philosophy of self-government and reinterprets his Philippines policy in light of the philosophy. Roosevelt emerges as a reluctant anti-imperialist—an imperialist by desire but an anti-imperialist in governance. His imperialist ambitions were thwarted by America's ideals of self-government and its democratic political system, channeled through the powers of Congress and the process of regular elections. At a crest of imperial opportunity, America eschewed empire. Imperial occupation remained a great aberration in American foreign relations.
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George W. Bush never chose, in the meaningful sense of the word, to invade Iraq. He chose to brand Iraq ringleader of an "axis of evil," to seek weapons inspections backed by the threat of force and to deploy hundreds of thousands of... more
George W. Bush never chose, in the meaningful sense of the word, to invade Iraq. He chose to brand Iraq ringleader of an "axis of evil," to seek weapons inspections backed by the threat of force and to deploy hundreds of thousands of troops to the region. The administration did debate these steps one-by-one, but it does not appear that Bush ever prefaced those steps, nor followed them, with substantial debate on whether and not merely how to go to war. By August 2002, when Secretary of State Colin Powell met privately with Bush to lay out the costs of war for the first time, Powell did not feel able to admit explicitly his genuine opposition to war, only to insist on U.N. involvement. From there, as the war council debated one step at a time, American options narrowed. Quickly, and almost certainly by January 2003, when Bush approved invasion, war in Iraq became a fait accompli; the decision was over before it was seriously made. Bush had asked neither Powell, Rumsfeld nor Vice President Dick Cheney for an overall recommendation on whether to go to war, perhaps because there never seemed an appropriate time to do so. In the absence of a clear decision—made early, with the benefit of foresight and considering all the factors involved in going to war—the administration's failures of coalition building and postwar occupation planning become intelligible.
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Eighty years ago, the United States made a tragic decision to pursue global supremacy. The project has outlived its purpose.
Research Interests: History, American History, Military History, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, and 13 moreGlobalization, International Studies, International Law, U.S. history, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, Ideology, Second World War, Global Leadership, World War II, Empire, and Strategy
As the war on terror loses its emotive force, American leaders cast fellow-citizens as akin to foreign enemies. Senators call for an "overwhelming show of force" against protesters with the knee-jerk zeal once reserved for distant... more
As the war on terror loses its emotive force, American leaders cast fellow-citizens as akin to foreign enemies. Senators call for an "overwhelming show of force" against protesters with the knee-jerk zeal once reserved for distant peoples. Endless war has not merely come home; endless war increasingly is home. American politics has taken on the qualities of American wars.
Research Interests: Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, Terrorism, and 13 moreImmigration, War Studies, Political Science, Race and Ethnicity, Armed Conflict, Democracy, United States History, War on Terror, United States Foreign Policy, United States, Polarization, Donald Trump, and Public Policy
This year, for the first time ever, the presidential nominees of both major parties are promising to end the "endless" or "forever" wars in which they acknowledge their nation to be engaged.
Research Interests: American History, Military History, American Studies, International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, and 15 moreInternational Studies, International Security, Political Science, Afghanistan, Politics, United States In The World, Second World War, Global Leadership, World War II, United States History, War on Terror, United States Foreign Policy, United States, Global War on Terror, and Foriegn Policy
Three-quarters of Americans want to bring U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. The Biden-Harris ticket needs to transform U.S. foreign policy for good.
Research Interests: American Studies, International Relations, Globalization, Foreign Policy Analysis, Climate Change, and 13 moreInternational Law, Political Science, Security Studies, Politics, Humanitarian Intervention, International Politics, China, Armed Conflict, Global Leadership, U.S. Foreign Policy, Realism, Grand Strategy, and United States
Because their leaders prize armed dominance, the American people are unsafe where they live and work.
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The president wants a new cold war to deflect attention from his failures. (with Rachel Esplin Odell)
Research Interests: American History, Military History, American Studies, International Relations, International Relations Theory, and 15 moreGlobalization, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Security, Strategic Studies, Cold War, World History, China, Global Leadership, China studies, U.S. Foreign Policy, Global Warming, Grand Strategy, Donald Trump, and COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Washington's post–Cold War strategy has failed. The United States should abandon the quest for armed primacy in favor of protecting the planet and creating more opportunity for more people. It needs a grand strategy for the many.
Research Interests: American History, Russian Studies, American Studies, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, and 14 moreGlobalization, Foreign Policy Analysis, Climate Change, International Studies, International Law, International Security, Politics, International Political Economy, International Politics, China, U.S. Foreign Policy, Russia, Strategy, and Grand Strategy
Donald Trump's Iran policy — the current policy of the United States — is driven by a thirst for vengeance and domination. Of course Trump has no coherent strategy, makes slipshod decisions, and flouts the law. That is the point.
Research Interests: Military History, Psychology, Constitutional Law, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, and 15 moreForeign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Law, International Security, War Studies, Iranian Studies, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Neoconservatism (American Foreign Policy), War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, Strategy, Iraq War, Intervention, and Donald Trump
There is a reason the quagmire in Afghanistan, despite costing thousands of lives and $2 trillion, has failed to shock Americans into action: The United States for decades has made peace look unimaginable or unobtainable. We have... more
There is a reason the quagmire in Afghanistan, despite costing thousands of lives and $2 trillion, has failed to shock Americans into action: The United States for decades has made peace look unimaginable or unobtainable. We have normalized war.
Research Interests: History, American History, Military History, American Studies, International Relations, and 14 moreInternational Relations Theory, Globalization, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Law, Global Governance, International Security, War Studies, Afghanistan, United Nations, Military and Politics, War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, and United States
By going along with the myth that the president is pulling out of the Middle East, his critics are helping make U.S. wars there worse.
Research Interests: American History, American Studies, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, and 15 moreInternational Studies, Middle East Studies, International Law, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, Kurdish Studies, Politics, Turkey, Syria, Middle East Politics, Ethnic Conflict and Civil War, U.S. Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, and Public Policy
First, America has to give up its pursuit of global dominance.
Research Interests: History, Military History, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, International Relations Theory, and 15 morePeace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Law, Global Governance, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, World History, Foreign Policy, Global Leadership, War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, Peace, and Donald Trump
Quincy stands accused of being "the 'new' isolationists." "Let's go back to the 1920's and 30's!" neoconservative pundit Bill Kristol tweeted sarcastically. Might there exist a choice besides armed domination or total isolation? The... more
Quincy stands accused of being "the 'new' isolationists." "Let's go back to the 1920's and 30's!" neoconservative pundit Bill Kristol tweeted sarcastically. Might there exist a choice besides armed domination or total isolation? The American people have heard enough from those who dismiss as "isolationist" anyone who objects to the use of force. If it remains impermissible to oppose war anywhere, the United States will end up waging war everywhere.
Research Interests: Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, and 11 moreGlobal Governance, International Security, War Studies, Strategic Studies, Afghanistan, Ideology, American Foreign Policy, Global Leadership, Neoconservatism (American Foreign Policy), Hegemony, and U.S. Foreign Policy
Democrats need to articulate a positive vision that combines peaceful engagement with military restraint — an American internationalism fit for the 21st century. Otherwise Trump's nativist pitch will stand alone as the alternative to... more
Democrats need to articulate a positive vision that combines peaceful engagement with military restraint — an American internationalism fit for the 21st century. Otherwise Trump's nativist pitch will stand alone as the alternative to establishment platitudes.
Research Interests: International Relations, Public Opinion, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Security, and 13 moreWar Studies, Political Science, Security Studies, Politics, American Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Elections, War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, National Security, U.S. National Security Policy, Donald Trump, and Public Policy
Led by President Trump, Washington is swiftly and decisively turning against the world's No. 2 power. That could be disastrous.
Research Interests: American History, Military History, American Studies, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, and 15 moreGlobalization, Foreign Policy Analysis, Climate Change, International Studies, Chinese Studies, Global Governance, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, Cold War, International Politics, China, Grand Strategy, South China Sea, and United States
Trump and the establishment are one in assuming that the United States must maintain global military dominance, regardless of circumstances, forever. It is long past time to question this assumption.
Research Interests: History, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, and 15 moreInternational Security, War Studies, Political Science, Politics, American Foreign Policy, History of American Foreign Relations, Neoconservatism (American Foreign Policy), Military and Politics, War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, Strategy, United States Foreign Policy, Realism, Grand Strategy, and Public Policy
Is it time for the U.S. to confront other great powers — or to retreat?
Research Interests: American History, Russian Studies, International Relations, Political Economy, International Relations Theory, and 15 moreForeign Policy Analysis, International Studies, Middle East Studies, Global Governance, International Security, Political Science, Politics, Foreign Policy, China, Middle East Politics, China studies, Strategy, Grand Strategy, Donald Trump, and Public Policy
The congresswoman's foreign policy views are far more in line with voters than the disconnected party establishment
Research Interests: Latin American Studies, American Politics, International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, Latin American politics, and 14 moreWar Studies, Political Science, Politics, Israel/Palestine, American Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Humanitarian Intervention, Anti-Semitism, Neoconservatism (American Foreign Policy), Military and Politics, War on Terror, United States Foreign Policy, and United States
On foreign policy, the best way to oppose Trump is to oppose war. And it is the only way to build a better foreign policy after Trump.
Research Interests: International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, Middle East Studies, and 13 moreInternational Security, War Studies, Korean Studies, Afghanistan, American Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, Syria, Middle East Politics, Military and Politics, U.S. Foreign Policy, Strategy, North Korea (politics and society), and Donald Trump
Trump has forced neoconservatives to decide, for the first time, whether they are more against "totalitarianism" or "globalism." If anti-totalitarians take Trump to be perverting what they hold dear, anti-globalist neocons have found in... more
Trump has forced neoconservatives to decide, for the first time, whether they are more against "totalitarianism" or "globalism." If anti-totalitarians take Trump to be perverting what they hold dear, anti-globalist neocons have found in Trump a kindred spirit and vehicle for power.
Research Interests: American History, Intellectual History, Diplomatic History, International Relations, International Relations Theory, and 15 moreGlobalization, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, Global Governance, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, Politics, Conservatism, American Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Neoconservatism (American Foreign Policy), U.S. Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and international relations, and Donald Trump
Despite claiming a seven-decade pedigree, the defense of the “liberal order” is surprisingly vulnerable to attack from each side, for it offers a nationalism that dares not to speak its name, and an internationalism afraid to walk the talk.
Research Interests: American History, International Relations, International Relations Theory, International Studies, U.S. history, and 10 moreInternational organizations, Ideology, American Foreign Policy, History of International Relations, Ideology and Discourse Analysis, Political Ideology, U.S. Foreign Policy, IR Theory, Military Orders, and Donald Trump
Normality is the wrong yardstick, analytically and politically. "This is not normal" offers a false diagnosis and sorry comfort that Trump came from nowhere and will revert there soon. It disarms his critics from taking full measure of... more
Normality is the wrong yardstick, analytically and politically. "This is not normal" offers a false diagnosis and sorry comfort that Trump came from nowhere and will revert there soon. It disarms his critics from taking full measure of the problem and developing adequate solutions.
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Democracy requires experts but it also requires something from them: that they facilitate public debate and respect the ultimate power of the electorate to set the aims of the nation. By rallying behind the lowest common denominator of... more
Democracy requires experts but it also requires something from them: that they facilitate public debate and respect the ultimate power of the electorate to set the aims of the nation. By rallying behind the lowest common denominator of "anything but Trump," they are disengaging the public's discontent, pulling up the drawbridge until the next election. In that sense, Donald Trump is not the only one who might be called an isolationist.
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Like it or not, the emerging Trump doctrine has deep roots in American tradition. Six months in, the time has come for advocates of American world leadership to own up to a fact: Donald Trump is one of you.
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In order to restore public trust, foreign policy experts must engage citizens in different, more democratic ways. Fortunately, American history offers guidance for bringing experts and the public back together.
Research Interests: American History, International Relations, Expertise, U.S. history, American Foreign Policy, and 9 moreHistory of American Foreign Relations, Elites (Political Science), Political Elites, History of International Relations, Democracy, History of International Thought, U.S. Foreign Policy, US History, and Donald Trump
Obama's unwillingness to deal with Iraq opened the door to more mistakes to come.
Research Interests:
Trump is no isolationist, whether caricatured or actual. Rather than seeking to withdraw from the world, he vows to exploit it. Far from limiting the area of war, he threatens ruthless violence against globe-spanning adversaries and... more
Trump is no isolationist, whether caricatured or actual. Rather than seeking to withdraw from the world, he vows to exploit it. Far from limiting the area of war, he threatens ruthless violence against globe-spanning adversaries and glorifies martial victory. In short, the president is a militarist.
Research Interests: American History, Military History, International Relations, Presidency (American Politics), Foreign Policy Analysis, and 12 moreWar Studies, Militarism, American Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, International Politics, Military and Politics, United States History, U.S. Foreign Policy, United States Foreign Policy, US History, Isolationism, and Donald Trump
What will become of American foreign policy when greatness, no longer bestowed, must be seized?
Research Interests: American History, American Politics, International Relations, History of Ideas, Presidency (American Politics), and 11 moreAmerican Foreign Policy, History of American Foreign Relations, History of concepts, International Politics, History of International Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, Barack Obama, US History, US politics, US Foreign Relations, and Donald Trump
Trump has distinguished himself in one dramatic respect: He may be the first president to take office who explicitly rejects American exceptionalism.
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Is there a single, overarching purpose, much less strategy, around which a world power should orient everything it does? Certainly, if an all-consuming threat truly exists, but otherwise grand strategy becomes a recipe for simplifying the... more
Is there a single, overarching purpose, much less strategy, around which a world power should orient everything it does? Certainly, if an all-consuming threat truly exists, but otherwise grand strategy becomes a recipe for simplifying the world and magnifying threats—in which case the best “grand strategy” may be no grand strategy.
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By turning to history, The Internationalists opens up a possible direction for American foreign policy going forward. Rather than endorse humanitarian interventions that threaten state sovereignty, Hathaway and Shapiro suggest a more... more
By turning to history, The Internationalists opens up a possible direction for American foreign policy going forward. Rather than endorse humanitarian interventions that threaten state sovereignty, Hathaway and Shapiro suggest a more modest agenda: buttress the international system as it stands. Better to uphold norms against conquest than to launch semi-conquests of our own. Yet like the liberal interventionists they seek to supersede, the authors continue to overrate American power as the guarantor of global norms. Their reclamation of past internationalists turns out, on inspection, to be suspiciously nationalist. In the name of recovering lost alternatives, they divert us from more potent replacements, then and now.
Research Interests: American History, Military History, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, International Studies, and 15 moreInternational Law, International organizations, Global Governance, International Criminal Law, International Security, War Studies, Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, United Nations, Public International Law, Second World War, Global Leadership, Internationalism, U.S. Foreign Policy, and The League of Nations
Slobodian makes a groundbreaking contribution. Unlike standard accounts, which cast neoliberals as champions of markets against governments and states, Slobodian argues that neoliberals embraced governance—chiefly at the global level. By... more
Slobodian makes a groundbreaking contribution. Unlike standard accounts, which cast neoliberals as champions of markets against governments and states, Slobodian argues that neoliberals embraced governance—chiefly at the global level. By going above national borders, they neutralized politics within those borders, so that democratic governments could not obstruct the security and mobility of property. Gradually, despite encountering resistance at every turn, they helped build a world order guided by the principle of “capital first.” For Slobodian, their success casts a disturbing light on many of the international rules and institutions that make up today’s global order—but also shows how different people, with a different program, could change them.
Research Interests: History, European History, European Studies, International Relations, Political Economy, and 14 moreInternational Relations Theory, Globalization, International Studies, International Law, International organizations, Global Governance, Political Science, International Political Economy, Capital Markets, European Union, Neoliberalism, Neoliberal ideologies, Political Economy and History, and Global Economic Governance
The internationalists of the last century are, it turns out, quite relevant to our current crisis: they helped us get here, and they offer us no way out. A review of Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: How A Radical... more
The internationalists of the last century are, it turns out, quite relevant to our current crisis: they helped us get here, and they offer us no way out.
A review of Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: How A Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (Simon & Schuster, 2017).
A review of Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: How A Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World (Simon & Schuster, 2017).
Research Interests: American History, International Relations, Peace and Conflict Studies, International Studies, International Law, and 15 moreInternational organizations, Global Governance, International Security, War Studies, Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, World History, United Nations, Public International Law, Second World War, Global Leadership, Internationalism, U.S. Foreign Policy, The League of Nations, and Military Orders
American power dramatically expanded not despite but because of the fact that lawyers and law exerted more influence in the making of foreign policy than ever before or since. In turn, the achievement of world power legitimated the new... more
American power dramatically expanded not despite but because of the fact that lawyers and law exerted more influence in the making of foreign policy than ever before or since. In turn, the achievement of world power legitimated the new profession of international law, which secured its credentials, at least for a time, as an ally of American exceptionalism.
Research Interests: History, International Relations, International Law, International History, American Foreign Policy, and 9 moreHistory of American Foreign Relations, Public International Law, Diplomacy, History of International Relations, History of International Law, Empire, History and International Relations, History and Theory of International Law, and U.S. empire
(Review of Pamela Hagg, The Gunning of America) In 1870 Thomas Addis urinated on a rifle before the Ottoman Sultan and saved one of the largest gun businesses in the world...
Research Interests:
(Review of John A. Thompson, A Sense of Power) In order for the United States to choose world leadership, basic values had to change. Americans had to accept military force as essential to world order, and the willingness to use it as the... more
(Review of John A. Thompson, A Sense of Power) In order for the United States to choose world leadership, basic values had to change. Americans had to accept military force as essential to world order, and the willingness to use it as the definition of enlightened 'internationalism' rather than European-style imperialism...
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Research Interests:
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El historiador y especialista en política exterior estadounidense analizó con Clarín el escenario mundial que se avecina después de la pandemia.
Research Interests: Latin American Studies, American Studies, Comparative Politics, International Relations, Globalization, and 13 moreForeign Policy Analysis, International Studies, Politics, Argentina, International Cooperation, China, Global Leadership, China studies, U.S. Foreign Policy, China's foreign policy, United States, International Poltiics, and COVID-19 PANDEMIC
The form of globalization the United States helped to set up in the 1990s has not benefited enough of the American people. Now we see a backlash at home.
Research Interests:
We have divided the world — already, before even the emergence of a serious rival — into allies that we are sworn to send our men and women to defend and, implicitly, enemies. It’s no surprise that if you’re not in that expansive club of... more
We have divided the world — already, before even the emergence of a serious rival — into allies that we are sworn to send our men and women to defend and, implicitly, enemies. It’s no surprise that if you’re not in that expansive club of allies, you become suspect to the United States.
Research Interests:
Interview with Mila Atmos: The U.S. search for military primacy creates its own threats. Once you've abandoned the defense of the United States and the welfare of the American people as the lodestar for the use of force, it's very hard to... more
Interview with Mila Atmos: The U.S. search for military primacy creates its own threats. Once you've abandoned the defense of the United States and the welfare of the American people as the lodestar for the use of force, it's very hard to know where to stop.
Research Interests: American History, Military History, Future Studies, American Studies, International Relations, and 15 morePeace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Law, War Studies, Political Science, International History, Politics, Diplomacy, Global Leadership, War on Terror, Peace, United States, Diplomacy and international relations, and Public Policy
Free-floating intellectuals can speak truth to power. Then what? What will power do with truth? Probably deny it or ignore it. It takes power to beat power, and in today’s United States, it takes institutions to organize power.
Research Interests: History, American History, Military History, Intellectual History, American Studies, and 15 moreInternational Relations, Media Studies, International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, Expertise, International Studies, Democratic Theory, International Security, Political Science, Foreign Policy, Media and Democracy, Democracy, U.S. Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, and Public Policy
Washington Journal, C-SPAN, July 29, 2019 (interview with John McArdle and viewers) Responsible statecraft will be both more peaceful and more strategic than what we see in the current administration and what we have seen for decades... more
Washington Journal, C-SPAN, July 29, 2019 (interview with John McArdle and viewers)
Responsible statecraft will be both more peaceful and more strategic than what we see in the current administration and what we have seen for decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Responsible statecraft will be both more peaceful and more strategic than what we see in the current administration and what we have seen for decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Research Interests: Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, International Relations Theory, Peace and Conflict Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, and 14 moreInternational Studies, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, American Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War on Terror, U.S. Foreign Policy, Grand Strategy, Iraq War, Intervention, Donald Trump, and Public Policy
What is the plan for taking on the military-industrial complex? The transpartisan nature of the Quincy Institute is essential to uniting forces on the left and the right who favor a shift away from a foreign policy based on militarism and... more
What is the plan for taking on the military-industrial complex? The transpartisan nature of the Quincy Institute is essential to uniting forces on the left and the right who favor a shift away from a foreign policy based on militarism and an attempt at domination.
Research Interests: History, American History, American Studies, International Relations, International Relations Theory, and 13 moreForeign Policy Analysis, International Studies, International Law, International organizations, Global Governance, International Security, Liberalism, Global Leadership, U.S. Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, American Exceptionalism, United States, and International Order
Dartmouth College debate with Eugene Gholz, Jennifer Lind, Constanze Stelzenmueller, and Jake Sullivan
Research Interests: American Studies, Strategy (Military Science), International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, and 10 moreGlobal Governance, International Security, Political Science, Politics, American Foreign Policy, Global Leadership, U.S. Foreign Policy, Strategy, United States Foreign Policy, and United States
Before Trump, neoconservatives faced the problem that they loved to crusade against totalitarianism, but totalitarianism was disappearing from the world. Trump provided them with a new specter to oppose: globalism.
Research Interests: American History, Intellectual History, International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, International Studies, and 10 moreU.S. history, International Security, Political Science, Politics, Foreign Policy, International Politics, Neoconservatism (American Foreign Policy), Concepts, American Exceptionalism, and Donald Trump
In response to the Singapore summit, mainstream foreign policy commentators criticized Trump for "losing" and letting North Korea, America's enemy, "win." They were perfectly happy to talk in zero-sum terms in a particular situation, even... more
In response to the Singapore summit, mainstream foreign policy commentators criticized Trump for "losing" and letting North Korea, America's enemy, "win." They were perfectly happy to talk in zero-sum terms in a particular situation, even as they insist in general that the interests of America are those of the world. Trump inverts that relationship. Famously he often speaks of an America generally pitted against the world. But in the concrete case of North Korea, at least, he framed a deal as a victory for all.
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There are international norms, laws, and institutions, and there are powers who set out to order the world, but "the liberal international order" is mythical history, not to mention dubious politics.
Research Interests:
To the extent there was a coherent line against Trump during the election, it was that he was an "isolationist" who stood foursquare against U.S. world leadership and the "liberal international order." That line has fallen apart during... more
To the extent there was a coherent line against Trump during the election, it was that he was an "isolationist" who stood foursquare against U.S. world leadership and the "liberal international order." That line has fallen apart during his presidency.
Research Interests:
An interview with Max Strasser and New York Times readers about Trump's foreign policy six months in.
Research Interests:
Featuring the author Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, and Contributing Editor, Foreign Policy magazine; with comments by Stephen Wertheim, Visiting Scholar, Saltzman... more
Featuring the author Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, and Contributing Editor, Foreign Policy magazine; with comments by Stephen Wertheim, Visiting Scholar, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Visiting Assistant Professor in History, Columbia University; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was confident that it stood on the precipice of a new era of peace and prosperity as the world’s sole superpower. U.S. leaders adopted a strategy of primacy, aimed at discouraging others from challenging American power, and they sought to spread democracy and liberal economics within an American sphere of influence that encompassed most of the world. Today, relations with Russia and China have deteriorated, nationalist movements are on the rise, and the European Union seems unsteady at best.
In his new book, The Hell of Good Intentions, Stephen Walt traces many of these problems to the flaws inherent in primacy. U.S. power has allowed policymakers to pursue ambitious foreign policy goals, even when those goals are unnecessary or doomed to fail. And yet, despite many setbacks, an entrenched foreign policy elite retains its faith in liberal hegemony. Walt explores these ideas and outlines the case for a fresh, new approach to American foreign policy based on realism and restraint.
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was confident that it stood on the precipice of a new era of peace and prosperity as the world’s sole superpower. U.S. leaders adopted a strategy of primacy, aimed at discouraging others from challenging American power, and they sought to spread democracy and liberal economics within an American sphere of influence that encompassed most of the world. Today, relations with Russia and China have deteriorated, nationalist movements are on the rise, and the European Union seems unsteady at best.
In his new book, The Hell of Good Intentions, Stephen Walt traces many of these problems to the flaws inherent in primacy. U.S. power has allowed policymakers to pursue ambitious foreign policy goals, even when those goals are unnecessary or doomed to fail. And yet, despite many setbacks, an entrenched foreign policy elite retains its faith in liberal hegemony. Walt explores these ideas and outlines the case for a fresh, new approach to American foreign policy based on realism and restraint.
Research Interests: History, International Relations, International Relations Theory, Expertise, International Studies, and 12 moreInternational Security, Liberalism, International History, American Foreign Policy, Realism (Political Science), History of International Relations, History Of U.S. Foreign Relations, U.S. Foreign Policy, Realism, Grand Strategy, International Order, and Restraint
There is a lot of talk bemoaning the death of the liberal rules-based world order. But it is less clear exactly what this order entailed, in what sense it was liberal, how (and by whom) the rules were established and maintained, and who... more
There is a lot of talk bemoaning the death of the liberal rules-based world order. But it is less clear exactly what this order entailed, in what sense it was liberal, how (and by whom) the rules were established and maintained, and who benefited from it. The panel discusses these issues and the questions of whether the order can and should be maintained and what might replace it.
A Panel Discussion with:
Stuart Gottlieb
International Affairs Professor, SIPA
Robert Jervis
Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics
Rebecca Friedman Lissner
Assistant Professor of Security Studies, U.S. Naval War College
Jack Snyder
Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations
Stephen Wertheim
Visiting Scholar, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Moderated by Richard Betts
Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
A Panel Discussion with:
Stuart Gottlieb
International Affairs Professor, SIPA
Robert Jervis
Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics
Rebecca Friedman Lissner
Assistant Professor of Security Studies, U.S. Naval War College
Jack Snyder
Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations
Stephen Wertheim
Visiting Scholar, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Moderated by Richard Betts
Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Research Interests: History, American History, International Relations, International Relations Theory, Globalization, and 15 moreInternational Studies, International Law, International Security, War Studies, Political Science, Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, World History, Global Leadership, World War II, U.S. Foreign Policy, IR Theory, Military Orders, Liberal Internationalism, and Donald Trump
Research Interests:
"The important questions in politics are of probability, not possibility. What would the plausible and probable consequences of a particular intervention have been? What would have had to differ in order for successful intervention... more
"The important questions in politics are of probability, not possibility. What would the plausible and probable consequences of a particular intervention have been? What would have had to differ in order for successful intervention to result? Only an anti-political ethical framework – a kind of crude deontology – could find overriding significance in the mere possibility that lives could have been saved." ... Thank you! Your feedback has been sent. ... Want an instant answer to your question? Check the FAQs.
Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of... more
Why did the United States want to create the United Nations Organization, or any international political organization with universal membership? This question has received superficial historiographical attention, despite ample scrutiny of the conferences that directly established the UN in 1944 and 1945. The answer lies earlier in the war, from 1940 to 1942, when, under the pressure of fast-moving events, American officials and intellectuals decided their country must not only enter the war but also lead the world long afterwards. International political organization gained popularity – first among unofficial postwar planners in 1941 and then among State Department planners in 1942 – because it appeared to be an indispensable tool for implementing postwar US world leadership, for projecting and in no way constraining American power. US officials believed the new organization would legitimate world leadership in the eyes of the American public by symbolizing the culmination of prior ...
Research Interests: History, American History, Diplomatic History, International Relations, International Relations Theory, and 15 moreInternational Studies, International Law, International organizations, Contemporary History, International Security, International History, Security Studies, American Foreign Policy, United Nations, Diplomacy, History of International Relations, History of International Law, History of International Thought, Historical Studies, and International Organizations
"The Internationalists" is an extraordinarily ambitious and thought-provoking study of the impact of the 1928 ‘General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy’ on world politics. The central contention of... more
"The Internationalists" is an extraordinarily ambitious and thought-provoking study of the impact of the 1928 ‘General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy’ on world politics. The central contention of authors Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro is that this accord, which is better known as the ‘Kellogg-Briand Pact,’ inaugurated nothing less than ‘a new era of human history’ characterised by the decline of inter-state war as a structuring dynamic of the international system. In making their case, Hathaway and Shapiro present an eloquent argument for the importance of international law in shaping a more peaceful international future. They also intervene in the debate over the importance of ideas that is fundamental to the discipline of international relations.