European Values

The aim of this paper is to show how changes in the social fabric of Malta have resulted in amendments to the school curriculum in respect to the teaching of moral values. The curriculum now caters for a new subject in schools called Ethics, which is aimed at students who opt out of the mainstream Catholic Religious Education classes. As educators directly involved in its introduction in Maltese schools, as well as in the training of the subject teachers, we reflect on how this new subject relates to the development of both Maltese and migrant students’ identities. We highlight some of the challenges the subject of Ethics presents to parents, teachers and students, and the tensions some students encounter between the religious values taught at home and secular values taught at school.

Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 2015, pp. 689-714

French Abstract: L’adoption par la Commission européenne en mars 2014 d’un nouveau cadre destiné à renforcer le respect de l’Etat de droit au niveau des Etats membres de l’Union, ainsi que l’arrivée de Frans Timmermans au poste de premier vice-président de la Commission, chargé, entre autres, et de manière inédite, des questions touchant au respect de l’Etat de droit, traduisent une nette prise de conscience au niveau de l’UE de l’importance de prévenir plus efficacement et, éventuellement, de sanctionner toute violation des valeurs fondamentales de l’UE par tout Etat membre. Si le nouveau mécanisme adopté par la Commission européenne en 2014 n’est en rien révolutionnaire, il n’est dénué ni d’opportunité ni de potentialité. Indépendamment de la question de savoir si la Commission le mettra effectivement en œuvre – question qui reste ouverte à l’heure où de nombreuses voix s’élèvent pour inciter la Commission à le faire en relation avec la Hongrie ou plus récemment, la Pologne – il est possible d’estimer que ce Nouveau Cadre de l’UE pour l’Etat de droit constitue tout autant un outil opportun qu’une avancée en demi-teinte.

English Abstract: This article (in French) offers a comprehensive examination of the rationale underlying the rule of law framework adopted by the Commission in March 2014 before outlining its main features. It is argued that while the Commission’s ‘light-touch’ framework falls short of what is required to effectively address internal threats to EU values of a systemic nature, it remains preferable to the new mechanism adopted by the Council in December 2014 and which consists of holding an annual rule of law dialogue among all Member States within the Council. To make the Commission’s framework more workable and effective, which should in turn increase its ‘dissuasive potential’, a number of modest recommendations are also offered at a time where an increasing number of voices are asking the Commission to activate the first phase its new mechanism in relation to Hungary and more recently, Poland.

Note: Downloadable document is in French.

This contribution contains a concise annotated analysis of Article 2 TEU, the EU Treaty’s key provision on values, prepared for the Oxford Commentary and aiming to give a reliable first overview of basic history and all the key elements and functions of this provision.

Resumen Este artículo aborda la crisis del Estado de derecho en Hungría y Polonia, situándola en el marco de la historia de la integración europea. Desde mediados de los años noventa, la Unión se fue dotando progresivamente de procedimientos específicos con el fin de que sus instituciones pudiesen responder a una eventual vulneración de sus valores por parte de un Estado miembro. Este proceso respondía particularmente a la inminencia de una quinta ampliación cuya dimensión no tenía precedentes y que habría de incorporar a Estados de corta trayectoria democrática. Años después, en un contexto marcado por el auge de los populismos, la deriva iliberal de los Gobiernos húngaro y polaco ha provocado el primer uso de los nuevos procedimientos, poniendo de manifiesto su insuficiencia ante una crisis de esta naturaleza y mostrando los límites de la capacidad de influencia de la Unión Europea después de la adhesión.

The EU motto “United in diversity” might sound abstract or even utopian. However, as we are zooming into the working relationships and collaboration modes within EU institutions and partner organizations, we are gaining new insights about its meaning and how it is reflected in European teams, which are composed of individuals from various national backgrounds. We are more particularly exploring examples in the context of European external action and cultural diplomacy. This also allows us identify interfaces between EU staff and non-European staff and partners, e.g. in European delegations abroad. We are focusing on value and identity related statements on the institutional mezzo-level, comparing it to the institutions official discourse and decreed values on a macro level. To further identify centripetal and centrifugal forces caused by this specific organizational context, we are superposing micro-level statements from European citizens outside these institutions who are from comparable social backgrounds and also working internationally.

This publication is an introductory speech “Let’s unite the right!”, delivered at the first General Assembly of the Bulgarian Democracy Movement (Sofia, March 19, 2022). The speech deals with issues related to the socio-economic and political situation in Bulgaria in the second half of 2020 and throughout 2021. During this period, the country is going through a serious political crisis, which has undermined public trust in state institutions. As a result, the existence of democracy has been jeopardized. For this reason, the BDM was established, which aims to initiate the unification of right-wing parties in Bulgaria. The unification of the right-wing parties into a single new Democratic Bloc can be considered a painful utopia, but this is of particular need to protect Bulgarian democracy from the influence of populism. It is against populism in Bulgarian politics that the BDM is fighting, revealing the principles of democracy. In this regard, this publication sets out the goals, tasks and priorities of this civil movement.

In recent years, the rule of law and, especially, its “proper” implementation has become one of the most debated topics in Europe in recent years. The “Big Bang Enlargement” marked the beginning of dilemmas whether the new EU Member States fulfil the necessary rule of law criteria and opened the way for divergent views on how to implement TEU Article 2 values in practice. Furthermore, constant problems and difficulty of the candidate countries to fulfil the necessary rule of law criteria added to the complexity of the problem. In turn, the European institutions have tried to introduce a series of mechanisms and procedures to improve the over- sight and make the states follow the rules - starting from the famous Treaty on the European Union (TEU) Article 7, the Rule of Law Mechanism, annual reports on the rule of law and the most recent Conditionality Regulation.
The Conditionality Regulation was finally adopted in December 2020 after much discussion and opposition from certain EU Member States. It calls for the suspension of payments, com- mitments and disbursement of instalments, and a reduction of funding in the cases of general deficiencies with the rule of law. On the other hand, similar provisions were laid out in the February 2020 enlargement negotiation methodology specifying that in the cases of no progress, imbalance of the overall negotiations or regression, the scope and intensity of pre-accession as- sistance can be adjusted downward thus descaling financial assistance to candidate countries.
The similarities between the two mechanisms, one for the Member States, the other for can- didate countries shows an increased sharing of experiences and approaches to dealing with possible deficiencies or breaches of the rule of law through economic sanctioning, in order to resolve challenges to the unity of the European union. The Covid-19 pandemic and the crisis it has provoked on many fronts has turned the attention of the Member States (i.e. the Council) away from the long running problematic issues. Consequently, the procedures against Poland and Hungary based on the Rule of Law Mechanism have slowed down or become fully stalled, while certain measures taken up by some European states have created concerns about the limitations of human rights and liberties.
This paper, therefore, analyses the efforts the EU is making in protecting the rule of law in its Member States and the candidate countries. It also analyses the new focus of the EU in the financial area where it has started to develop novel mechanisms that would affect one of the most influential EU tools – the funding of member and candidate countries through its struc- tural and enlargement policy. Finally, it attempts to determine and provide conclusions on the efficiency of new instruments with better regulated criteria and timing of activities will be and how much they would affect the EU and its current and future member states.
Keywords: rule of law, financial interests, Western Balkans, EU, Covid-19

Good neighbourliness is one of the most important aspirations of international law relating to harmonious interstate relations. Developing out of the ideas of territorial sovereignty and equality of states in international law, good neighbourliness is among the key underpinnings of the peaceful coexistence between states. The exercise of the state rights inherent in full sovereignty is only possible where the idea of good neighbourliness is respected in governing interstate relations. In contrast, the violation of good neighbourliness, particularly between contiguous states, can lead to tensions, if not military conflicts. This contribution goes into meticulous details in providing a multi-faceted assessment of all the crucial aspects of the good neighbourliness principle in both international and EU legal contexts. To achieve this, it splits into two parts. The first part clarifies the legal framework of good neighbourliness in international law, i.e. its legal basis and the corresponding rights and duties of states in international law. The second part analyses good neighbourliness within the EU context. The starting point of such analysis is the acknowledgment of the new legal order of the Union, which exists autonomously from international law, but is bound by an obligation to adhere strictly to the latter’s norms and principles, and, as expressly mentioned, the UN Charter. There is a stark difference in the application of the good neighbourliness principle in international law and EU law. While in the case of the former respect for ‘good fences’ may indeed make good neighbours, in the case of the latter it is not the borders, but precisely the lack thereof in a number of crucial contexts of inter-state inter-connections, which is key for the proper understanding of the principle in question. EU values play a central role in the functioning of the supranational legal order, determining the developmental framework of good neighbourliness principle in the constitutional system of the Union.

The article is devoted to the comparative analysis of the far right (nationalist) as political actors in Russia and in Europe. Whereas the European far-right movements over the last years managed to achieve significant success turning into influential political forces as a result of surging popular support, in Russia the far-right organizations failed to become the fully-fledged political actors. This looks particularly surprising, given the historically deep-rooted nationalist tradition, which stems from the times Russian Empire. Before the 1917 revolution, the so-called «Black Hundred» was one of the major far-right organizations, exploiting nationalistic and anti-Semitic rhetoric, which had representation in the Russian parliament-The State Duma. During the most Soviet period all the far-right movements in Russia were suppressed, re-emerging in the late 1980s as rather vocal political force. But currently the majority of them are marginal groups, partly due to the harsh party regulation, partly due to the fact, that despite state-sponsored nationalism the position of Russian far right does not stand in-line with the position of Russian authorities, trying to suppress the Russian nationalists. This is sharply contrasting to the situation with the far right in Europe, which are more well-established and institutionalized as political actors, using conventional forms of political activity. However, despite development gap in comparison with the European counterparts, the Russian far right have obvious potential as political actors, which can be realized under certain circumstances, enabling them to play more significant in the political system of Russia.

Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.

This book chapter emphasizes the importance of rethinking the approach to the enforcement of EU values as listed in Article 2 TEU. The on-going disregard of the key values of the Union in Hungary and Poland, illustrates with utmost clarity the Union’s helplessness in ensuring reliable and timely enforcement of the core of its law, as reflected in the key principles of democracy and the Rule of Law, which the Treaty of Lisbon has most misleadingly rebranded as ‘values’. Besides articulating the legal nature of Article 2 principles and providing a brief overview of the role played by the key principles of Article 2 in the context of EU law’s evolution, the focus turns to the gap in the general EU law enforcement literature which tends to focus on the technical issues while ignoring the bigger picture, and, finally, a critical survey of the key approaches to the enforcement of the principles of Article 2, which the Union could rely on in bridging the enforcement gap and bringing its defiant Member States to compliance.

Vortrag "Künstliche Intelligenz und Robotik – einige Überlegungen aus unionsrechtlicher Perspektive", auf der Fachtagung "Künstliche Intelligenz und Robotik als theologisch-ethische Herausforderung", organisiert vom Institut für Islamische Theologie und Religionspädagogik an der Universität Innsbruck | Zusammenfassende Thesen:

Im EU Recht ist Ethik vor dem Hintergrund der gemeinsamen Werte (insb. Menschenwürde) und der Grundrechte zu sehen.

So wie die Werte der EU zu gegenseitigem Vertrauen unter den Mitgliedstaaten führen, so sind Werte und Vertrauen auch im Bereich KI etc. im Verhältnis zu den BürgerInnen von Bedeutung (KOM[2019] 168 endg.; EAG, 2018, S. 20; etc.).

Neben den Werten sollen auch Prinzipien (Transparenz, Integrität, etc.) sowie das „Vier-Prinzipien-Modell“ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013; Floridi et al., 2018) eine Rolle spielen (krit.: Mittelstadt, 2019; zu möglichen Risiken, siehe auch Floridi, 2019).

Der Vorschlag einer Rechtspersönlichkeit von Robotern (neben natürlichen und juristischen Personen) stößt überwiegend auf Ablehnung (Reinisch, 2019, S. 301, etc.).

Betreffend Haftungsfragen wird mehrheitlich einer Gefährdungshaftung (’strict liability’) der Vorzug gegeben (EP 2017, Pkt. 52-54; CEPS, 2019, S. 121; bzw. zu Datenschreibern, siehe: KOM[2018] 283 endg. S. 139).

Ziel der Kommission ist es, „den Ansatz der Union auch weltweit zur Geltung zu bringen und einen Konsens über eine auf den Menschen ausgerichtete KI zu erzielen“ (KOM[2019] 168 endg. S. 9; so auch EAG, 2018, S. 10; AI HLEG, 2019, S. 5).

Um den Herausforderungen im Bereich Künstliche Intelligenz und Robotik erfolgreich begegnen zu können, benötigt es einen interdisziplinären Ansatz (so auch Rahwan et al., 2019, 183; EAG, 2018, S. 22).

This inquiry investigates the concept of European values and cultural, philosophical, legal and political presuppositions on which the idea of European values is based. There are two approaches to the idea of European values. The first one is substantive approach (and includes philosophical, ethical, religious and ideological understanding of values). The substantive approach defines European values as based on the European heritage (ancient Greece and Rome, Christianity, Renaissance and humanism, Enlightenment and liberal traditions). This conception of European values is fixed. Another understanding of European values is represented by legal/political approach (that includes the definition of European values within European treatises, declarations, charters and other documents). Legal and political definition of European values includes: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights. Most authors consider that only from this second level, from legal and political definition, general features of European values can be achieved, that is, universal rules of the game. This paper shows how these two different approaches can be integrated, relying on John Rawls"s idea of overlapping consensus. It should be emphasized that the question of European values and European identity is still a topic of debate. There are different definitions and interpretations of these concepts, regardless of the legal definitions within the framework of European declarations and treaties. European identity (based on European values) is a polyphonic category, which cannot be founded on monolithic definitions. Otherwise, the entire continent would fall under the rule of one homogeneous culture.

Faced with the 'crisis of the Rule of Law' caused by the 'backsliding' of some Member States the EU institutions failed to react in a speedy and efficient manner. This contribution introduces the Journal of Common Market Studies symposium edited by the authors and dealing with the state of the Rule of Law in the EU and the reactions from the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU to the outstanding challenges. Although much is seemingly being done, there is little room for optimism.

Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has bee...

Par son arrêt rendu le 25 juillet 2018 à l’occasion d’une procédure préjudicielle d’urgence relative à l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen (MAE) émis en Pologne1, dans le contexte de réformes
judiciaires controversées2, la Cour de justice touten acquiesçant à l’idée selon laquelle « la confiance se mérite, et ne peut s’exiger »3 apporte des clarifications relatives au principe de confiance mutuelle régissant le MAE et aux mécanismes du droit de l’Union visant à préserver les valeurs et droits fondamentaux.

The European Union has been facing a cyclus of serious crises for about 8 years already. All of them have weakened not only the EU as a whole but also each of the Member States separately. This has caused two serious consequences being a subject of this analysis, namely 1. it has challenged the value of solidarity lying upon the European integration concept, 2. it has also undermined the EU’s pursuit of achieving the competitive advantage, stated in the strategy Europe 2020. The lack of solidarity is particularly visible in the EU Member States’ differentiated attitudes towards the migration crisis while reduction of determination in achieving competitive advantage is strongly related to consequences of the EU’s economic crisis, threats for the single market (i. a. limitations within the Schengen zone), finally possible Brexit. The paper will focus on analysis of solidarity in the light of intergovernmental approach in the EU crisis management. The above-mentioned emanations of the crisis will serve as case studies in this regard.

Since the 2000s, the reference to 'values' has become a key topic in the legitimation and politicization of the European Union (EU). This article studies to which extent and how members of the European Parliament (MEPs) mobilize values in their Facebook communication and whether it contributes to the politicization-understood as polarization-of their discourse. Our findings show that references to values are minor in MEPs' Facebook discourse. Differences are visible along national and party lines and according to issues at stake. However, no clear patterns emerge to relate specific value narratives to stable coalition-or conflict-lines. Empirically, the article analyses Facebook posts by MEPs of four nationalities (France, Italy, Poland and Hungary) in pre-and post-electoral times (March 2019-March 2020). Theoretically, it contributes to the literature on the politicization and legitimation of the EU ; and on MEPs' communication and use of social networks.

Access to healthcare within the EU varies significantly, as competences for public health are mainly those of the Member States (Art. 168 TFEU). However, both the Court of Justice of the EU, as well as soft- (common values and principles) and hard-law (harmonization in selected fields) have had some noteworthy impact; both on national health systems, as well as for patients seeking cross-border healthcare. Quality of care is a vital issue for access to healthcare; thus, this contribution will also shed some light on quality of care and patient safety, as influenced both by case-law and harmonization rules. Finally, against the background of the current migration challenge, this contribution will point out who, under EU law, is genuinely entitled to access healthcare.

Article 7 TEU is unique in that it established the procedures for stating the threat of a breach of EU values by a Member States, the existence of such breach, as well as a possible sanctioning mechanism to bring the recalcitrant Member States back to compliance, while not being confined by the general EU competence limitations. This commentary outlines all the sub-instruments and stages of deployment of the provision in question in order to demonstrate Article 7 TEU eminent usability in the face of the claims by the Institutions to the contrary which are as baseless as they are persistent. The goal of this contribution is to explain the richness and significance of Article 7 TEU, thereby busting the unhelpful ‘nuclear’ myth about it. Such myth proclaims Article 7 TEU to be ‘unusable’ and is deployed by those in search of a valid pretext – however feeble – to exclude EU law from solving the Rule of Law crisis of the European Union. Two Member States, Hungary and Poland, are working hard, day and night, to undermine democracy, the Rule of Law and the protection of fundamental rights, i.e. the foundational values of the Union. The claims that EU law should not intervene are irresponsible and, ultimately, illegal.

The gradual legal and political evolution of Europe has not, thus far, been accompanied by the articulation or embrace of any substantive ideal of justice going beyond the founders' intent or the economic objectives of the market integration project. This absence arguably compromises the foundations of the EU legal and political system since the relationship between law and justice – a crucial question within any constitutional system – remains largely unaddressed. The presented text is a draft introduction to the edited volume Europe’s Justice Deficit?, which the authors edited together with Gráinne de Búrca. The volume, which this introduction describes, chapter by chapter, brings together a number of contributions by leading academics and young scholars whose work addresses both legal and philosophical aspects of justice in the European context. The relationship of law to justice is a core dimension of constitutional systems around the world, and the EU is arguably no different in this respect. The critical assessment of justice in the EU provided by the contributions to the Europe’s Justice Deficit? book could help to create a fuller picture of the justice deficit in the EU and at the same time potentially open up an important new avenue of legal research of immediate importance.

There are multiple definitions of social cohesion, both scientific and political. Thus, the concept of social cohesion lacks a succinct and coherent definition and remains subject to different interpretations: such as political, which defines it as a term aimed at tackling social inequality, but primarily in economic terms (tackling poverty, unemployment ...). From a sociological point of view, social cohesion can be reduced to three basic dimensions: solidarity of society members, trust in the institutions of the society, and the general sociability of its members. The main objective of the paper is to comparatively analyze the degree of social cohesion in the counties of the Croatian Adriatic. The analysis will be carried out through the use of secondary data collected in the European Value Study 2018 project. For the purposes of this paper, questions directly related to the theoretical determinants of social cohesion are used. Special emphasis is placed on analyzing and interpreting the differences between the counties of the Croatian Adriatic in terms of solidarity/trust/sociability with respect to some socio-demographic characteristics (salaries, employment, age, traditional/modern attitude) of the respondents, and the data obtained are critically interpreted and contextualized.

Dans l’Union en crise socio-économique et financière, sinon politique, des mécanismes intergouvernementaux, tel le Mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES), imposent des mesures d’austérité génératrices de situations indignes des valeurs fondatrices de l’Union et déjouant ses objectifs fondamentaux, tels la dérégulation du droit du travail et de la sécurité sociale et le démantèlement de l’État social. Il en résulte une « paupérisation et un chômage d’une ampleur sans précédent depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale », et « la gouvernance par les nombres » au sens de la « quantification » et la « programmation » des êtres humains, voire leur « déshumanisation ». La Cour refuse de contrôler ces mesures au regard de la Charte au motif qu’elles ne relèvent pas du droit de l’Union mais du droit international. Cependant, par l’arrêt Ledra, elle reconnaît que les institutions de l’Union impliquées dans la prise et l’application de ces mesures, quoiqu’agissant en dehors du cadre juridique de l’Union, gardent le caractère et la mission que leur assignent les traités, étant liées par la Charte. Cet arrêt débloque le contrôle du MES à travers le contrôle des institutions. Reste cependant le problème des limitations de la protection des droits fondamentaux, normes constitutionnelles de l’Union, par des actes externes à l’Union que la Cour a entérinées. Cette contribution tente de démontrer que de telles limitations vont à l’encontre de l’autonomie et de la primauté du droit de l’Union, telles que reconnues par la Cour, ainsi que de son objectifs fondamental de «promouvoir […] ses valeurs et le bien-être de ses peuples»; elles privent la Charte d’effectivité et d’efficacité et les particuliers de protection juridictionnelle et portent atteinte à l’État de droit, valeur fondatrice de l’Union qui résume toutes ses autres valeurs et dont la sauvegarde est plus nécessaire que jamais.

This contribution honouring Prof. Martin Krygier scholarship provides a brief critical reading of the European Commission’s July 2019 Communication on the Rule of Law (COM(2019) 343 final). It argues that although the Commission’s effort is welcome, the Communication fails to correctly identify the core problem related to the Rule of Law in the EU, which is the constitutional capture in the illiberal regimes. The failure to identify the core problem with unequivocal precision and spell out its key elements as well as dissect its causes undermines the likely effectiveness of the tools proposed by the Commission to address the unnamed and unanalyzed ongoing Rule of Law concerns. Consequently, the Communication is lacking in vital essentials, if not vacant at the core.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the nature and main characteristics of the current threat of terrorism in Europe and its impact and influence on particular EU member states, the EU institutional and legislative mechanism and its basic values. In this regard, focus is placed on the threats originating from the so-callled " Islamic State " , foreign terrorist fighters and radicalized individuals, in the context of the Syrian conflict and refugee/migration crisis. The impact of threats on particular member states is presented through a comparative overview of Belgium, France and Germany in the face of recent counterterrorism efforts. The response at EU level, is presented through new initiatives regarding coordination, cooperation and information sharing among the European member states. The threat of Terrorism also has an influence on basic EU values, bringing about different attitudes to migration and Islam, whilst demonstrating the importance of inter-religious and inter-cultural relations in Europe.

The ‘Europe–Asia Dialogue on Business, Ethics and Spirituality’ proved to be a successful step in a long journey. The Business Ethics Center of the Corvinus University of Budapest and European SPES Forum in Leuven are committed to continuing the Europe–Asia dialogue. We believe that Europe and Asia can get many inspirations from each other, especially if they return to and apply creatively their own spiritual foundations.

In various (binding and non-binding) legal documents, the European Union (EU) refers to “ethics” and “morality”, without providing a definition or even referring to a common understanding. However, if a certain activity is qualified as “unethical”, there can be important consequences, such as stringent ethics reviews in case of the use of human stem cells under the “Horizon 2020” program, or, under the same program, the exclusion from funding, or, under the “EU Patient Mobility Directive”, no right to cross-border healthcare, to name but a few. This article focuses both on EU Primary and Secondary law, with a special emphasis on the latter. I will argue that in a lot of cases, ethics is (only) used in order to avoid interference of the EU in Member States’ competences, especially in sensitive fields, like abortion. However, there are also examples where the relevant content is determined, either by Ethics Committees and/or Code of Conducts, either at EU or at national level. Nevertheless, other situations remain undetermined. I will further argue that the determination of ethics should be carried out by referring to the EU’s values and fundamental rights, especially the “corner stone” of human dignity.

У статті обговорюється проблема формування єдиного европейського простору на основі спільних ціннісних засад. Після падіння комуністичного режиму европейський політичний простір значно розширився, об’єднавши Східну і Західну Европу. Втім, мультикультуралізм виявився для оновленої Европи радше випробуванням, ніж бажаним благом. Західноевропейський ліберальний релятивізм, з одного боку, і східноевро пейський цезаропапізм, з іншого боку, знову змушують замислитися над питанням про роль релігії як практичного виразу ціннісних переконань у публічному просторі. Автор висловлює надію, що, попри все, релігійний потенціял Східної Европи достатній для оновлення европейського етосу.The article discusses the formation of a united Europe based on common values and principles. After the fall of communism, the European political space expanded considerably by the disappearance of the wall between Eastern and Western Europe. However, for the renewed Europe, multiculturalism has proved to be a chall...

This chapter scrutinises how the EU deals with crisis in the quality of democracy (QD) in Member States, and how it seeks to safeguard European values at the supranational level. I argue that the past and current debates on the power of the EU to safeguard its common values at the supranational level are an illustration of the tensions that the establishment of the EU as a political regime engenders between and among EU and domestic actors. As a reminder, in the context of the revision of the treaties in the 1990s, the EU sought to reduce its democratic deficit. However, the institutional framework put forward in the 1990s revealed the weak anchors of EU’s input, output and throughput legitimacy in dealing with the rule of law at the European level. Against this backdrop, the overarching aim of the chapter is to show how, over time, the EU institutional actors sought to strengthen the input, output and throughput legitimacy of the institutional framework designed to prevent and sanction non-compliance with European values in general and the rule of law in particular. Input legitimacy is related to the question: Who can determine the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ (the prevention mechanism), and who can determine that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach of the common values’ (the penalty mechanism)? Throughput legitimacy is a way to see how to determine the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ (the prevention mechanism’) and how to determine that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach of the common values’ (the sanction mechanism). Output legitimacy refers to the final decision to sanction Member States’ non-compliance with the EU’s values.

The aim of this paper is to show how changes in the social fabric of Malta have resulted in amendments to the school curriculum in respect to the teaching of moral values. The curriculum now caters for a new subject in schools called Ethics, which is aimed at students who opt out of the mainstream Catholic Religious Education classes. As educators directly involved in its introduction in Maltese schools, as well as in the training of the subject teachers, we reflect on how this new subject relates to the development of both Maltese and migrant students' identities. We highlight some of the challenges the subject of Ethics presents to parents, teachers and students, and the tensions some students encounter between the religious values taught at home and secular values taught at school.

The chapter analyses the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the enlargement process of the European Union (EU). It has three objectives: first, the chapter shows that, in addition to its formal role, the EP has an informal yet potentially crucial normative role in the enlargement process. Second, it offers an analytical framework for studying the EP’s normative actorness in engaging the political elite of third states in communicative processes. Third, it evaluates this analytical framework in light of the empirical evidence from inter-parliamentary relations with Turkey, with a special focus on Joint Parliamentary Committee meetings over the course of two legislative terms of the EP – the seventh (2009–14) and eighth (2014–18). The chapter concludes that the EP’s normative role in EU–Turkey relations remains largely limited when the EP aspires to promote new, politically controversial conditions that go beyond the Copenhagen political criteria.

This chapter scrutinises how the EU deals with crisis in the quality of democracy (QD) in Member States, and how it seeks to safeguard
European values at the supranational level. I argue that the past and current debates on the power of the EU to safeguard its common values at the supranational level are an illustration of the tensions that the establishment of the EU as a political regime engenders between and among EU and domestic actors. As a reminder, in the context of the
revision of the treaties in the 1990s, the EU sought to reduce its democratic deficit. However, the institutional framework put forward in the 1990s revealed the weak anchors of EU’s input, output and throughput legitimacy in dealing with the rule of law at the European level.
Against this backdrop, the overarching aim of the chapter is to show how,
over time, the EU institutional actors sought to strengthen the input, output and throughput legitimacy of the institutional framework designed to prevent and sanction non-compliance with European values in general and the rule of law in particular. Input legitimacy is related to the question: Who can determine the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ (the prevention mechanism), and who can determine that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach of the common values’ (the penalty mechanism)? Throughput legitimacy is a way to see how to determine the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ (the prevention mechanism’) and how to determine that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach of the common values’ (the sanction mechanism). Output legitimacy refers to the final decision to sanction Member States’ non-compliance
with the EU’s values.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the nature and main characteristics of the current<br> threat of terrorism in Europe and its impact and influence on particular EU member<br> states, the EU institutional and legislative mechanism and its basic values. In this<br> regard, focus is placed on the threats originating from the so-callled "Islamic State",<br> foreign terrorist fighters and radicalized individuals, in the context of the Syrian<br> conflict and refugee/migration crisis. The impact of threats on particular member<br> states is presented through a comparative overview of Belgium, France and Germany<br> in the face of recent counterterrorism efforts. The response at EU level, is presented<br> through new initiatives regarding coordination, cooperation and information sharing<br> among the European member states. The threat of Terrorism also has an influence on<br> basic EU values, bringing about differ...

Unia Europejska znalazła się w takim punkcie swojego rozwoju , w którym zarówno pogłębianie integracji, jak j ewentualne geograficzne rozszerzanie UE stanowi duże wyzwanie. Wynika to z co najmniej kilku ważnych kwestii. Po pierwsze, sytuacja międzynarodowa Unii Europejskiej wymaga sprostania ekonomicznej  konkurencji kilku  najważniejszych potęg gospodarczych świata. Po drugie, duża liczba państw członkowskich wymaga odpowiedniej ich reprezentacji w strukturze instytucjonalnej UE z jednej strony, z drugiej zaś reprezentacja ta nie może zagrażać efektywności funkcjonowania unijnych instytucji. Po trzecie, coraz większe zapotrzebowanie obywateli Unii Europejskiej na uzasadnienie podejmowanych na poziomie europejskim decyzji, wiąże się z konieczności legitymizacji Unii Europej­skiej. Wszystkie powyższe kwestie, choć w największym stopniu ostatnia, wskazują na potrzebę modernizacji Unii Europejskiej na różnych pozio­mach, ponieważ w swoim obecnym kształcie i w oparciu o obecne zasady funkcjonowania, Unia nie jest w stanie sprostać tym wyzwaniom. Dobitnym tego przykładem jest sytuacja w Grecji, której niespodziewane problemy gospodarcze podważyły przekonanie o efektywności działania instytucji europejskich oraz o tym, iż obywatele Europy wspólnie, w imię konkretnych wartości, podejmują wyzwania. Z drugiej strony, właśnie grecki kryzys wskazał na potrzebę wzmocnienia takich wartości jak solidarność czy wzajemne wsparcie w kryzysie państw cztonkowskich.

Wednesday afternoon the European Parliament launched the Article 7 procedure with a surprising majority to determine whether there is a clear risk of serious breach of EU fundamental values of rule of law, civil liberties, and democracy in its long-time enfant terrible member state, Hungary. However, the procedure often labelled as the “nuclear option” of the EU will this time hardly result in any sanctions, as it is questionable whether any final decision can be made prior to the upcoming EP elections in May 2019. Nevertheless, the vote has far-reaching consequences and marks a turning point in the relations of the European Union and Hungary. It enhances the chance of a possible break-off between the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Hungarian governing party Fidesz of Prime Minister Orbán that would expose Hungary to further naming and shaming and possible sanctions due to its uninterrupted authoritarian path since 2010. As a reaction, Orbán might further strengthen his links to Moscow and Beijing and use them increasingly to counterbalance his growing isolation in the EU. However, he needs to reconsider Hungary’s political strategy as his bargaining positions deteriorate and his multi-vectoral foreign policy starts to crumble.

This inquiry analyses the concept of a 'European public sphere' within the European public discourse. In particular, it explores the European Communication Strategy for creating an active European citizenship and European public sphere. The European Commission's Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate failed, because it employed homogeneous and static concepts of public sphere and European values. In this way it reduced deliberation to a mere debate. The European Year of Citizens was not sufficiently successful for the same reason. It involved citizens who debated about EU rights, but it did not produce deliberation. The purpose of this inquiry is to show the dialectical relation between the ideas of European values, European identity and European public sphere. This paper emphasizes the performative nature of a European public sphere, European identity and European values. These concepts may be perceived as grand narratives, which aim to generate universal truths.

The purpose of the article is to try to outline whether the EU is still an attractive actor in international relations, which is conceptualised as a specific soft, normative and the same transformative power and the centre of attraction for states located outside this organisation. The credibility of the European Union on international arena was undermined by global changes taking place in the 21st century, including emergence of new non-European powers, and particularly a series of crises (financial, migration, identity) that have affected the EU recently. In the article the following analysis will be made: the basic components consisting of attractiveness of the EU and evolution of its perception on the international arena, and the main challenges that the EU has to cope with in order to become a significant power again. It is assumed that the European Union certainly lost its attractiveness and prestige as a result of recent transformations that affected it within the system, but also due to the dynamics of the international environment.

[CANCELLED (because of Covid-19)] Wim Weymans (chairholder at UCLouvain) will give a paper on 'European Values in Question' at the Palais des Académies in Brussels, on Thursday 5 November 2020 at 5 pm. This talk is part of the Collège Belgique programme, where researchers are invited to present their research to a wider audience.

On 5 March 2020 the Chair in European Values co-organized an international one-day conference (mainly in French) in Brussels (at Université St. Louis) on “Europe and its Values at the Heart of Contradictory Emotions”, focussing on the emotions that 'European values' elicit in current debates (on migration, history, East-West divide, euroscepticism...). Speakers included Hugues Dumont, Wim Weymans, Jean-Marc Ferry, Anne-Lorraine Bujon de l'Estang, Valérie Rosoux, Constanze Itzel, Olivier Luminet, Bernard Foccroulle, Antoine Arjakovsky, Denis Duez, Martin Deleixhe, Gerard Testard, Jacques Rupnik, Jaroslaw Kuisz and Bernard Snoy.