UN Charter

This article addresses the question whether the European Union defaulted on the ‘strict observance’ of international law and ‘respect’ for the UN Charter, which are now express objectives of the EU following the Lisbon reform, in the course of the famous Kadi cases. With the final appeals judgment having been handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in July 2013, this question can now be conclusively answered in the negative. Despite the general tension these legal challenges created between EU law and international law, the EU managed, in the course of twelve years, to weave a seamless coat of compliance with international law. The article contrasts this finding with the general academic discourse on this case law, which tends to depict Kadi as a ‘sacrifice’ of compliance with international law for the benefit of fundamental rights (as well as the autonomy of the EU legal order). By retracing the entirety of this string of cases, the article demonstrates that, all rhetoric aside and for all practical purposes, the EU courts and other institutions managed to avoid any violations of international legal obligations towards the UN Security Council in this matter. The EU discontinued its own sanctions against Mr Kadi only after he had been delisted by the UN by means of a political decision, not by virtue of judicial intervention.

Elaborating on a newly compiled dataset of all Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII in the thirty years from 1990 to 2019, this Article is the first attempt to survey aggregated Council practice with a view to analyzing the ways in which the Council's non-forcible measures have been transformed as a consequence of the growth in importance of non-state actors in international relations. The data demonstrate that the Council has increasingly adopted resolutions that apply and draw in individuals and other non-governmental actors more than what previous studies merely suggest. Related is the second, and more significant, finding of the Article: in light of the aggregate practice analyzed, the Article argues that, by expanding the preventative use of its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC has inserted itself into a new interface between international lawmaking and peacebuilding. It has operated in the context of both conflict prevention and actions on generalized threats, adopting non-forcible measures that not only address the immediate objective of crisis management, but also increasingly engage in mapping out future regulation and structure of governance. Though the further expansion of these developments remains uncertain, the Article also contends that their normative implications are already significant. To mention the most salient: the establishment of direct international duties on armed groups and individuals by the Council; its growing influence on the external articulations of statehood and the internal dynamics of transitions towards peace; the mediated imposition on associations and corporations established under private law of prophylactic obligations; the creation, via its quasi-legislative resolutions, of a completely regulated international sphere where terrorists and proliferators are starved of means and chances to perpetrate attacks.

This article examines the tendencies to define the scope of application of jus ad bellum negatively in relation to the scope of application of jus in bello and demonstrates their neutralising effect on the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. It argues that individual acts of use of force during an international armed conflict regulated by jus in bello, whether in combat, in restricting the freedom of enemy nationals or in maintaining an occupation, are equally regulated by jus ad bellum. It clarifies the concept of ‘separation’ between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as the insulation between the results of their respective application, not the differentiation between their respective temporal, material and normative scopes of application. It also addresses the practical concerns raised by this conception of ‘separation’ between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The issue of legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention in contemporary international law gives rise to significant difference in opinions among states and scholars. It is primarily due to the fact that the international treaty law contains no rule which explicitly allows or prohibits this kind of intervention. In this legal situation, in order to explore the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, we need to analyze the provisions of relevant international treaties and international customary law. The most important international treaty for assessing the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention is the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat and use of force, except in case of self­defense or upon the Security Council authorization. Given that unilateral humanitarian intervention does not fall into these exceptions, it constitutes a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The fact that the Security Council did not act in cases involving mass or serious human rights violations does not allow states and international organizations to take unilateral military action and breach the aforementioned prohibition of the use of force. Beside the UN Charter, the IHL and human rights treaties are also important for assessing the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Although these treaties envisage many forms of international control over the observance and implementation of human rights, none of treaties allows for the use of armed force in case of human rights’ violation, even in situations involving largescale violations of human rights. For the purpose of assessing the status of unilateral humanitarian intervention in international customary law, it is necessary to analyze relevant practice in this area and opinio iuris sive necessitatis. After analysing these two elements, we may conclude that the right to unilateral humanitarian intervention does not exist in the contemporary customary law. Even if such a right had existed before World War II, it was abolished by the UN Charter peremptory norm on the prohibition of the use of force. It is indisputable that, in the aftermath of World War II, the international community did not establish a new customary rule which would provide for undertaking unilateral humanitarian intervention by amending the provisions of the UN Charter.

Key words: Humanitarian intervention; Use of force; Human rights; UN Charter; International customary law.

States' territorial sovereignty is at the heart of international law, and the ongoing invasion in Ukraine is indeed a blatant breach of its sovereignty under international law. In such instances, Ukraine has remedies under international law, including the right to defend itself either individually or request collective assistance from other sovereign states.

Religious freedom, and the status of religion in the public square, is presently a matter of worldwide debate. However, it is necessary to clarify the terms of the debate. This dissertation will offer a challenging invitation to deepen our understanding of the fundamental meaning of religious freedom by analyzing and challenging the notions of "religion," "freedom," and the "public square" as they have been commonly employed in discussions related to religious freedom and the place of religion in the public square in the works of Richard John Neuhaus, John Rawls, Robert Audi, José Casanovas, Jürgen Habermas, and Charles Taylor. It will also challenge the notion of "religious freedom" employed by international and legal documents, and in the work of David Schlinder, John Courtney Murray, and Martha Nussbaum. Following the work of Rainer Forst, it will also show why religious freedom should not be understood as "tolerance."
The goal of the book, then, is to provide a more effective way of dealing with issues of religious freedom and the place of religion in the public square. My investigation will be centered on Thomas Aquinas' notion of religion as a moral virtue, and Hanna Arendt's notion of political freedom. The novelty of this investigation will be in that the virtue of religion will be analyzed in connection to the proper place for the performance of its acts, namely, the private or the public sphere. The book will also show how Aquinas' notion of religion and its deviations (vices) offers a valuable guideline insofar as the public is concerned.
As a consequence, a new meaning will be offered on the notion of religious freedom, based on Aquinas' view of religion as virtue, and Arendt's notion of political freedom as a stage for virtue, which will help clarify the debate on religious freedom and the place of religion in the public square.

After the end of the World War II, the United Nations (“U.N”) was created in order to prevent any possible future wars that can be much more damaging than the first two wars humanity had witnessed.  Thus, States are prohibited from committing any act of aggression against other states. If any States are about to face an armed attack and equivalent threats, they must approach the United Nations Security Council (“U.N.S.C”), which then has to deal with the situation. Such a State may use armed force, if necessary, in its defense, pending action by the U.N.S.C. 

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (“U.N Charter”)  forbids the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any States.  This article has been explained by the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J”) in 1986 as a preemptory norm for which states cannot find any derogation whatsoever.  Accordingly, civil wars which are seen as essentially domestic matters do not fall under this article’s scope, “except in so far as they might constitute a threat to international peace and security.”   

However, the U.N Charter recognizes two exceptions to this general prohibition. They are: First, under Article 51, which is the individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack by other sovereign States. The article provides that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”. Second, under its Chapter VII powers, where under the Article 42, it provides that when the Security Council has directed or authorized the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

As will be explained further in this paper, by virtue of Article 51, the States right of self-defence only applicable towards defending an external act of armed attack launched by other sovereign States, either by the formal armed military forces or by way of attribution to any sovereign States if the armed attack is done by “armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” , provided the impact of such attack is high enough. As Article 51 of the U.N Charter “is an exception to the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4), and therefore [it] should be narrowly construed.”  The judgment of the I.C.J in the case of Nicaragua v. United States had proven this, which required that self-defence to be invoked only in response to an actual armed attack.

Cyber-attacks are real, so are the effects and threats unto personnel, system and facility security. The attack could affect a single person and it also could affect a nation. This paper will examine whether threats or disturbance to strategic computer system of a nation will fall within the meaning of use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nation Charter and if it does, what remedy is available to the attacked state and what will be the response which can be exhausted by the United Nations.

L'arme nucléaire apparaît aujourd'hui très solidement liée à une doctrine, celle de la dissuasion. Il s'agit ici de l'analyser au prisme des théories de l'ordre juridique. Comme le système issu de la Charte des Nations unies, "l'ordre nucléaire" apparaît comme un système de contrainte qui vise à assurer la sécurité des Etats. Ils apparaissent donc comme potentiellement en concurrence. Comment qualifier la dissuasion dans les termes du droit ? Comment le droit international issu de la Charte des Nations unies et dissuasion s'articulent-ils ? Comment le droit international regarde-t-il cet ordre et dans quelle mesure peut-il le configurer ?

Depuis le début de la vaste offensive militaire russe en Ukraine, les condamnations se sont multipliées pour dénoncer une violation caractérisée de l’interdiction du recours à la force armée entre États consacrée par la Charte des Nations Unies. Pour autant, le Conseil de sécurité est demeuré impuissant. En raison du droit de veto dont la Russie dispose dans cet organe en sa qualité de membre permanent, celui-ci ne peut ni prononcer de sanctions ni exclure la Russie. Toutefois, l’unité de la communauté internationale a permis de contourner cette impuissance en recourant à l’Assemblée générale, qui a condamné à une écrasante majorité l’agression russe dans une résolution dont le poids politique vient en soutien à l’avalanche sans précédent de sanctions décidées par les organisations internationales et les États.

This paper examines Chinese transboundary water cooperation specifically through the prism of the rules of international law that govern the uses of transboundary water resources. China’s state practice will be considered in the light of the principal legal instruments in this field – the UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC)  and the UNECE Transboundary Water Convention (UNECE TWC), each a result of codification and progressive development of the rules in this field.  Increasing transboundary water cooperation is a global theme as the international community seeks new ways to tackle serious water problems, witnessed at the recent UN Security Council meeting that concluded emphasizing this very topic.  As one of the largest players in the international arena, China has an opportunity to build upon and enhance its cooperation on transboundary waters.

The protection of nationals abroad can be defined as a military intervention by one state, into another state in order to protect the lives of its own citizens.[ T. Ruys, The‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 Oxford J. Conflict & Security 233, at 234 (2008).] Throughout the centuries  armed force were used to protect nationals abroad.[ H. Lauterpach (ed), Oppenheim’s , International law, at 309 (1995).] However, the creation of the United Nations (UN) has triggered debate as to whether the right to protect nationals abroad is still applicable under the UN Charter.[ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.] There seems to be two key arguments made in regard to the protection of nationals abroad doctrine’s permissibility. Firstly, it has been argued that use of force to protect nationals abroad is consistent with the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.[ D. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law, at 87 (1958).] Secondly, it has been claimed that protection of nationals abroad is legitimate exercise of a state’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law.[ R. J. Zedalis, Protection of Nationals Abroad: Is consent the basis of legal obligation? 25 Tex. Int'l L. J. 209, at 235 (1990).
]
This thesis will assess the legal validity of the use of force to protect nationals abroad under public international law. The research question for the thesis is: to what extent is use of force to protect nationals abroad permissible under public international law? The thesis will use two approaches to answer the research question, namely analytical and practical. The analytical approach will focus on analysing certain UN Charter provision, mainly Articles 2(4) and 51. The practical approach will focus on analysing relevant state practice regarding use of force to protect nationals abroad. After both of the analyses will be conducted, the findings will be applied to the recent events in Crimea of 2014/2015.  It will be evaluated to what extent the Russian military actions in Crimea in the period of 2014-2015 can be justified using the protection of nationals abroad doctrine.

The first satellite Sputnik came about in 1957, the law regulating activities in outer space came in a decade later. The law was then dynamic and evolved to fulfill the changing needs of the world. Quite unfortunately, it stopped evolving a decade later. The stagnation has cost dearly as the following slides would reveal.

The purpose of present master thesis is to examine in light of world’s recently changing international relations and order the main activities of NATO in coherence with international treaties and international law.The thesis consists of three parts, each of them about the definite core activity ofNATO according to the recent strategic concept of the Alliance.The first part of the thesis is devoted to the collective self-defence of the Alliance. In this part main elements of ‘armed attack’ as a precedent to collective self-defence, the concept of collective  self-defence  and  intended  consequences of  its  application  were  examined.  It  was found that any armedattack which wasacted by the means of conventional or unconventional force with sufficient level of organization and command with an intent to cause serious results in form of death or injuries of individuals or to disrupt national infrastructure until its collapse shall  result  collective  self-defence  maintained  in  form  proportional  to  the  type  and  level  of attack. Also given research showed the legal grounds to application of collective self-defence against  non-state  actors,  e.g.  terrorists  etc.  Generally,  the  legal  framework  of  NATO’s collective self-defence framework is consistent with the international law.The second part of the thesis is related to the NATO’s crisis management. Current part observes  the  peacekeeping  activities  of  the  Alliance  and  analyses  its  peaceful  disputes settlement mechanisms. Provided research showed that despite of having vide experience of peacekeeping, NATO also have effective abilities to resolve disputes in peaceful ways. Third part of the thesis is dedicated to NATO’s policy of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation  of  arms  and  examineshow  this  activity  is  following  the  framework  of international treaties and international law.Provided examination showed that Alliance shows high operated efforts of respect of the international treaties and international humanitarian law as well. As far as disarmament aspirations of the Alliance are outlined as one of the three core tasks of organisation, NATO not only establish the special agencies for realisation its policy, but  deeply  and  rather  effectively  monitorsthe  situation  related to non-proliferation  on  arms outside the Alliance.

Ce Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations a un double but.
En premier lieu, d’assurer l’information la plus complète et la plus à jour possible sur l’ensemble de l’expérience de la SDN, notamment dans ses aspects juridiques. Le Pacte est le texte fondateur du phénomène de l’organisation internationale au XXe siècle.
C’est à ce titre qu’aucune recherche et qu’aucune prise de position approfondies en la matière ne peuvent s’abstraire de ce point de départ de 1919.

En second lieu, la Charte des Nations Unies, texte fondamental de l’organisation politique mondiale actuelle, s’oriente au Pacte de la SDN, tant quand elle en prolonge les linéaments que quand elle cherche au contraire une rupture. Comprendre la Charte, dans son texte de 1945, largement inaltéré à ce jour, suppose dès lors toujours de connaître le Pacte.

Cet ouvrage se destine ainsi à être à la fois un instrument d’information et une invitation à l’exploration des voies du passé dans ce qu’elles ont de fécond pour la compréhension de l’avenir. Pour arriver à ces buts, le présent Commentaire se compose de contributions expliquant les diverses dispositions du Pacte, mais aussi de contributions transversales, s’attachant à tel ou tel aspect de portée plus générale, important dans la vie de la SDN comme dans celle des Nations Unies.

This study analyzes the legal status and the fundamental rights of the so-called Non-Self-Governing Territories, according to the Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter of the United Nations (1945). This paper particularly investigates the responsibilities of the management States regarding the rights of the Non-Self-Governing Territories to not be exploited and to have ensured, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement.

Le sujet de « la santé en tant qu'élément de sécurité collective » n'est rien moins que la passerelle spatio-temporelle entre les deux colloques de la SFDI de Rennes, celui de 1994 sur Le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, et celui de 2018 : Droit international et santé. Aucune trace de la santé n'est pourtant détectable dans les actes de la manifestation du siècle dernier. Sans doute, une communication sur ce thème aurait-elle paru saugrenue ; dans tous les cas, son malheureux auteur aurait vraisemblablement eu toutes les peines du monde à lui donner de la chair. Presqu'un quart de siècle plus tard, le sujet s'impose, maintenant que le Conseil de sécurité a « chapitre-sept-isé » la santé. C'est du moins ce que l'on peut déduire de sa résolution 2177 (2014), dans laquelle il a « jug[é] que l'ampleur extraordinaire de l'épidémie d'Ebola en Afrique constitue une menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationales ». En recourant à la qualification de l'article 39 de la Charte des Nations Unies, celui qui ouvre le chapitre VII, le Conseil a en effet fait rentrer de plain-pied une question sanitaire (la lutte contre une épidémie meurtrière) dans le champ de la sécurité collective.
La place de la santé dans la sécurité collective renseigne davantage sur les évolutions de la sécurité collective que sur la santé elle-même dont le « statut » reste imprécis. C’est ce que la présente contribution montrera en tentant d’abord de découvrir ce que la santé dit de la sécurité collective (I) puis en essayant d’identifier ce que la sécurité collective dit de la santé (II).

The supremacy of the rule of law over the influence of discretionary power has claimed venerable authority as the central tenet of law. One of the fundamental challenges to this principle has been posed by the United Nations Security Council with the expansion of its sphere of activities.  While the Security Council has recently assumed a more active role in promoting the rule of law within states especially in post-conflict territories, the real possibility has emerged that the Security Council itself may well act above the rule of law, raising a fundamental question about the extent to which its actions, particularly under Chapter VII, can be restricted in accordance with the principles and rules of international law. The purposes and principles of the UN Charter set the substantive limits (‘outer limits’) to the Security Council’s general competence including its exercise of Chapter VII powers. Yet ambiguity remains with the more formalistic, jurisdictional limits (‘inner limits’) that relate not to the substance of the decision but rather to the manner in which the decision is reached. This ambiguity may well obscure the legal effects of resolutions, especially where the legality or the
validity is challenged. This article attempts to identify criteria by reference to which we may ascertain the jurisdictional scope of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, relying on the formal conception of the rule of law.

The concept of human rights has developed during the last 60 years mainly through multilateral treaties as a positivist branch of public international law. However, key positivist doctrines such as pacta sunt servanda or state sovereignty pose significant obstacles to the effective realization of a modern human rights regime. The universal, inherent and inalienable nature of fundamental human rights, deriving from their natural law origins, are often set aside by such doctrines and annulled. Through close examination of reservations to human rights treaties, this study sheds new light on the deep interplay of naturalistic and legal positivist doctrines on the progress and implementation of human rights law (CEDAW, HR Committee, ILC). It is argued that the positions of apex human rights bodies regarding reservations reveal that establishing a human rights concept within a legal positivist environment, without a systematic methodological foundation, endangers its basic sustainability.

If international law academics and practitioners ever thought that the law on the use of force was a well-settled topic, it was a long time ago. Over the years, while many jus ad bellum issues seem to have been neglected, others were simply left unresolved. In the Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law, Professor Marc Weller offers an opportunity to explore some of these issues through the lens of the most highly qualified contributors in a collection of 57 topical essays. This magnum opus enquires as to the role of international law as a useful legal regime, and recognises that the question of whether it can effectively prevent war and armed conflicts is often seen as synonymous with the question of whether international law is law.

In the last twenty years the world has witnessed a significant increase in the proliferation of Private Military Firms hired by national governments. My research firstly address the most important international norms which regulate this peculiar State practice. Then I focus on the challenges posed by this new warfare method to the International Law modern order.

Contemporary UN peacekeeping missions often have Chapter VII mandates and wide authorizations to use force, notably to protect civilians. Since 2010, however, the Security Council has created a new generation of stabilization missions to support host governments. Peacekeepers in these missions are expected not only to protect civilians but also to combat armed groups, sometimes jointly with state security forces. While this may seem like just the next step in the UN’s gradual drift from traditional to robust peacekeeping, this article argues that stabilization constitutes a more radical departure from conventional doctrines on the use of force by peacekeepers. In fact, stabilization should be understood as a distinct form of UN-mandated intervention by invitation.

In this paper, Dr Kumar critiques the historical disciplinary narrative accounts of “assassinations” in international law through an excavation of the obscured contingencies produced by particular assassinations upon revolutionary emancipatory projects, imaginaries and futures. She argues that assassination should be understood as “a legal practice of death-making” – one which produces particular kinds of hidden systemic contingencies that have been overlooked in traditional accounts of assassination in international law (i.e. international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict). To illustrate this argument, she will examine the assassination of Thomas Sankara, revolutionary leader of Burkina Faso, and the effect of his death on Burkinabé, African and decolonial emancipatory imaginaries.

Il existe deux principaux points d'éclairs géopolitiques en Asie du Nord-Est, tous deux possèdent des dimensions légales importantes. Le premier est le conflit entre la Chine et le Japon concernant la souveraineté sur les îles Diaoyu / Senkaku. L'autre problème-et beaucoup plus sérieux-est l'acquisition d'armes nucléaires par la Corée du Nord et ses menaces de plus en plus belliqueuses pour les utiliser contre la Corée du Sud et éventuellement d'autres États de la région. La Corée du Nord-connue officiellement comme République populaire démocratique de Corée-est une relique de la guerre froide. Établi en tant que dictature communiste lors de l'occupation par l'armée rouge soviétique en 1948, la Corée du Nord a envahi son voisin du sud en 1950. L'invasion a été repoussée par une force militaire des Nations Unies après trois années de guerre, où plus de 1,2 million de personnes ont été tuées. Les combats ont été interrompus par un accord d'armistice (c.-à-d. Cessez-le-feu) entre les belligérants. Les média de l'Etat nord-coréen ont averti-une attaque nucléaire aux États-Unis sur tout signe d'agression américaine alors qu'un groupe de grève de la marine américaine se dirigeait vers le Pacifique occidental. Cet article suivant traitera les questions du point de vue du jus ad bellum en évaluant les justifications juridiques possibles, y compris l'autorisation du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, le droit à la légitime défense et l'usage de la force.

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention represents an acute tension between two fundamental norms of public international law: (i) the protection of the autonomy of nation states and the safeguarding of their territorial integrity and sovereignty against outside interference, and (ii) the protection of citizens of a state suffering from extreme human rights violations. For decades, the relationship between these two principles has been firmly tilted towards the autonomy of nation-states, with intervention being widely understood as prohibited by the UN Charter’s many provisions on non-intervention and the non-use of force. However, in recent years, several factors may have gone some way in shifting the balance towards the protection of those involved in humanitarian catastrophes. This paper aims to conduct an analysis of recent developments in the law on the use of force, particularly normative changes, to determine whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention can now be considered legal. It will proceed in three parts. First, it will explore the prohibition of force as set down in the UN Charter Article 2(4) and identify when that prohibition can be overcome, specifically noting the distinction between ‘authorised’ humanitarian interventions and unilateral ones. Second, the UN Charter and customary international law will each be considered in turn to determine whether either of them can confer legality on unilateral humanitarian intervention. Third, conclusions will be drawn as to the status of the doctrine.

Good neighbourliness is one of the most important aspirations of international law relating to harmonious interstate relations. Developing out of the ideas of territorial sovereignty and equality of states in international law, good neighbourliness is among the key underpinnings of the peaceful coexistence between states. The exercise of the state rights inherent in full sovereignty is only possible where the idea of good neighbourliness is respected in governing interstate relations. In contrast, the violation of good neighbourliness, particularly between contiguous states, can lead to tensions, if not military conflicts. This contribution goes into meticulous details in providing a multi-faceted assessment of all the crucial aspects of the good neighbourliness principle in both international and EU legal contexts. To achieve this, it splits into two parts. The first part clarifies the legal framework of good neighbourliness in international law, i.e. its legal basis and the corresponding rights and duties of states in international law. The second part analyses good neighbourliness within the EU context. The starting point of such analysis is the acknowledgment of the new legal order of the Union, which exists autonomously from international law, but is bound by an obligation to adhere strictly to the latter’s norms and principles, and, as expressly mentioned, the UN Charter. There is a stark difference in the application of the good neighbourliness principle in international law and EU law. While in the case of the former respect for ‘good fences’ may indeed make good neighbours, in the case of the latter it is not the borders, but precisely the lack thereof in a number of crucial contexts of inter-state inter-connections, which is key for the proper understanding of the principle in question. EU values play a central role in the functioning of the supranational legal order, determining the developmental framework of good neighbourliness principle in the constitutional system of the Union.

How do nation States allocate and re-allocate their shared fresh water resources? What are the rules of international law that determine the lawfulness of watercourse State actions in the development and management of their shared waters? Are the rules different for shared surface water / shared aquifers? This project examines the rules of international water law that apply to upstream (China case study on the Mekong), downstream (Mozambique on the Incomati-Maputo) and shared aquifers (Palestine) and devises a Legal Assessment Model that assists national governments to use in the preparation of their national water policy related to shared international fresh waters.

Modern international law enshrines the value of peace. Nevertheless, the body of law regulating peacemaking is rather poor and ineffective. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter aims to offer states an accessible roadmap to pacific conflict resolution. Disappoint-ingly, Chapter VI has not lived up to expectations: it has produced an unimpressive record and is often referred to as the "neglected stepchild" of the Charter. While traditional criticism of Chapter VI deals with Security Council paralysis attributable to the Permanent Five's veto power, this paper offers an alternative point of view, focusing on states' capacity to resolve their disputes without Security Council intervention. It suggests that article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter, which sets out the first step of pacific conflict resolution under Chapter VI, is deeply problematic because it requires states that are unable to cooperate to make the first move, approach the other party, and agree upon a method of dispute resolution in order to initiate the peacemaking process. However, states with a history of conflict and animosity often struggle to take the first step toward conflict resolution, often because of barriers such as suspicion of the other state's intention, unwillingness to be the initiating party, and concerns

This article deals with economic sanctions enacted in order to create pressure on a government or on definite persons. When the economic sanctions have been enacted by the Security Council of the United Nations (“UN Sanctions”), the Member States are legally obliged to implement these sanctions. However, as of 2008, the Court of Justice of the European Union and, as of 2012, the European Court of Human Rights have judged that in spite of their binding nature, the UN Sanctions do not allow Member States (or the European Union) to breach fundamental rights (procedural rights and, for example, the right to property, which requires respecting the principles of proportionality and equality). These courts have actually cancelled some effects of the UN Sanctions; to this extent, they have solved in favor of human rights the conflict between the international obligation to implement UN sanctions and the fundamental rights. When economic sanctions are decided by a State or a group of States (e.g. the EU) outside an international obligation (“unilateral sanctions”), i.e. when sanctions are not decided by the UN Security Council, there is no conflict between two international obligations. Accordingly, if the persons targeted by unilateral sanctions seize courts to defend their fundamental rights, further (and bold) developments of the legal science may be expected.  [Article published by EurAsian Scientific Editions, Hong Kong/Tallinn 2016 and by Helbing&Lichtenhahn, Basel 2016; also published in Russian in the journal "Scientific Works of the Russian Academy of Advocacy and Notariate", Dec. 2015, pp. 6-13.

Preemption was first articulated by US Secretary of State George P. Shultz during the Reagan administration when a “war on terrorism” was declared in the aftermath of the bombings of U.S. Embassy and Marines barracks in Beirut in 1983. The “Shultz doctrine” subsequently found expression in NSDD-138 that was closely modelled on Israeli counterterrorism doctrine. Following the attacks on 9/11, many of Shultz’s former colleagues in the State Department found themselves in the Pentagon where they would once more try to shape US counterterrorism policy. The counterterrorism model that they would try to shape in NSS-2002 was influenced by their experiences in the Reagan administration and the difficulties they had encountered while implementing NSDD-138. In short, the argument that is being advanced here is that the Bush doctrine that found expression in NSS-2002 is taken from the Shultz doctrine, and that the Shultz doctrine in NSDD-138 is taken from Israeli doctrine. To illustrate how the Shultz doctrine was taken from Israeli doctrine this article revisits the US intervention in the Lebanon following Israel’s 1982 invasion when the US Embassy and Marine’s barracks was bombed. Reference is made to declassified documents from the Reagan Presidential Library on the drafting of NSDD-138 and to early drafts of NSS-2002 that have been published in The Zelikow Papers at the University of Virginia. The article also makes reference to documents from the British National Archives on Israel’s raid on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 when the doctrine of preemption was first articulated at the UN; The Rumsfeld Papers on the Iraq War; contemporary newspaper reports; and the report of the United Kingdom’s Iraq Inquiry. The article has been informed by discussions with senior officials who served in both the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations whom the author met in Washington.

This writing looks at possible changings in the current international legal framework, which would justify a right of humanitarian intervention. The coming of the new Responsibility to Protect concept fuelled the spirit of the supporters of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, under current international law Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits any ‘threat or use of force’ against another state without the previous authorization of the Security Council or for self-defence – lawful exceptions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Despite the existence of this proviso, international law is dynamic and permits changes following certain developments in the practice of states. The emergence of a right of humanitarian intervention might originate from a different interpretation of Article 2(4) or from a new customary international norm. In order to examine the two alternatives, the analysis focuses on state practice and opinion juris demonstrating that the legal bases of both the possibilities are weak and inconsistent under the actual international legal framework. The only state that overtly supports the emergence of a right to use force against another state for humanitarian purposes is the UK. Its government officially asserted that a unilateral military intervention is lawful when three conditions are fulfilled. However, this position is backed up neither by a consistent state practice nor by other states’ official statements. In fact, in the last decades, the only two recourses to force against another state, justified on humanitarian ground, are the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine and both of them were strongly criticized by the international community. The current unlawfulness of humanitarian intervention is also demonstrated by the reticence to use force in the Syrian conflict. It is a particular case because it is an internal conflict, but it has growingly concerned the international community due to the widespread violations of human rights and the use of chemical weapons. However, no precedent has been generated until now and states have opted to act under the UN umbrella, thus, respecting Article 2(4).

After years of negotiation, in April 2013 the European Union (EU) and the member states of the Council of Europe reached consensus on a draft Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR. This event represents a milestone development for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. But what are the effects of accession on the ECHR and its court – the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)? This paper argues that the accession of the EU to the ECHR will represent a formidable boost for the constitutionalization of the ECtHR. By interpreting constitutionalization here as a process of increasing autonomy vis-à-vis international law, the paper explains how the Accession Agreement creates strong institutional pressures for the ECtHR to raise its standards of protection up to the level set by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), or beyond. This race to the top in human rights protection, however, may come at the price of decreased abidance to international law, including the supremacy of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). To exemplify this argument, the paper considers the recent ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment in Nada v. Switzerland concerning the legality of counter-terrorism regime established by the UN Security Council. In its ruling the ECtHR found that Switzerland had violated the ECHR in implementing the UN counter-terrorism sanctions and, albeit without calling into question the action of the UN itself, strongly reaffirmed the primacy of the protection of human rights under the ECHR system. Through a critical discussion of the decision, the paper emphasizes how the ECtHR was squeezed between the willingness to avoid a direct clash with the UN and yet the unwillingness to lose the pace set by the CJEU in its celebrated Kadi decision. We conclude from this that Nada can only be rationalized in light of the looming accession of the EU to the ECHR and the ensuing pull towards the constitutionalization of the ECtHR.