Intentional object

It is often claimed that Brentano’s rediscovery of intentionality has been strongly influenced by Aristotle. Brentano himself stressed repeatedly his affinity to Aristotle and this self-interpretation was by no means restricted to the theory of intentionality. In fact, Brentano seemed to believe that almost all of what he had discovered during his most influential years (1874–1895) has its more or less remote roots in the philosophy of Aristotle. Yet if we carefully compare the picture of intentionality that is to be found in Aristotle’s De Anima with Brentano’s theory of immanent objects, we find more differences than similarities. The truth is that Brentano developed a quite different ontology of intentionality, and his references to Aristotle should be seen as a conventional homage to his master rather than as something of substance that could help us to understand better Brentano’s own theory. What Brentano in fact took from Aristotle was rather his way of doing philosophy and certain isolated ideas, but certainly not theories in their entirety.

Przedstawię kilka najbardziej charakterystycznych rysów sposobu podejścia do analizy fenomenu intencjonalności obecnego w tradycji fenomenologicznej. Zacznę od klasycznej brentanowskiej koncepcji przedmiotu immanentnego, zaprezentowanej w Psychologii z empirycznego punktu widzenia, powszechnie uważanej za „nowy początek” rozważań nad intencjonalnością. Następnie omówię zmiany, jakie nastąpiły w teorii Brentana w okresie po Psychologii. W drugiej części artykułu przejdę do omawiania filozofii Husserla. Pominę okres Filozofii arytmetyki, w którym Husserlowska ogólna teoria intencjonalności nie różni się w zasadzie od koncepcji Brentana, zacznę natomiast od koncepcji z Badań logicznych, gdzie znajdujemy istotną jej krytykę i modyfikacje. Ostatnia część poświęcona będzie teorii noematu rozwijanej przez Husserla w okresie po Badaniach logicznych. Jak zobaczymy, koncepcja ta oznacza, paradoksalnie, rodzaj powrotu do koncepcji Brentana, jednak zawiera również wiele oryginalnych i filozoficznie ciekawych elementów.

Psychognosy (Psychognosie) was the original title of the manuscript of the lectures presented by Franz Brentano in Vienna University in 1890. This manuscript is part of the work entitled Descriptive Psychology (Deskriptive Psychologie). The purpose of this manuscript was divided into two parts: (1) the formulation of psychological categories; (2) to establish the demarcation between psychology and genetic  Psychognosy. Something, however, interested us specifi cally in addition to the demarcation of these two branches of psychology. Our point is the new description of intentional psychical acts, explicit by Brentano from the analysis of consciousness developed in this manuscript. In other words, our research will present the Brentano’s way to describe the unity of consciousness as the whole that is the subject of Psychognosy. Moreover, the fundamental point of our investigation show that, assuming the interpretation inaugurated by Roderick Chisholm (1969), the new description of psychical acts introduced a change in the theory of brentaniana`s intentionality, characterized as abandonment of ontological thesis that supported the intentional in-existence of objects.

RESUMO: Psicognose (Psychognosie)  foi o título original do manuscrito das leituras apresentadas por Franz Brentano na Universidade de Viena, em 1890. Tal manuscrito faz parte da obra intitulada  Psicologia descritiva (Deskriptive Psychologie). O propósito desse manuscrito estava divido em duas partes: (1) formular as categorias psicológicas; (2) estabelecer a demarcação entre a Psicologia genética e a Psicognose. Há algo, porém, que nos interessa especificamente, além da demarcação desses dois ramos da psicologia. Trata-se da nova descrição dos atos psíquicos intencionais, explicitada por Brentano a partir da análise da consciência desenvolvida nesse manuscrito. Em outras palavras, esta investigação apresentará o modo como Brentano descreveu a unidade da consciência como o todo que constitui o objeto da Psicognose. Além disso, o ponto fundamental da nossa investigação mostrará que, assumindo a interpretação inaugurada por Roderick Chisholm (1969), a nova descrição dos atos psíquicos introduziu uma mudança na teoria brentaniana da intencionalidade caracterizada como abandono da tese ontológica que sustentava a in-existência dos objetos intencionais.

W artykule niniejszym omawiam kilka klasycznych sposobów podejścia do problemu intencjonalności. Zaczynam od ogólnego naszkicowania problemu. Następnie przechodzę do konkretnych propozycji. Najpierw omówiona zostanie ogólna postać teorii wprowadzającej byty zapośredniczające typu Fregowskiego, następnie teoria przedmiotów intencjonalnych, tak jak występuje ona u Brentana, Ingardena czy Meinonga, a także w wersji operujących ontologią światów możliwych. Kolejnym podejściem będą „przysłówkowe” teorie treści mentalnych, teorie kauzalne, teorie funkcjonalistyczno-reprezentacjonalistyczne oraz teorie behawiorystyczno-funkcjonalistyczne, głoszące pierwszeństwo intencjonalności językowej. Artykuł pomyślany jest jako wprowadzenie do problematyki, i w związku z tym nie znajdą się w nim ani wszystkie istotne zagadki ani też pełne i precyzyjne wersje argumentacji. Starałem się jednak pokazać podstawowe problemy oraz wewnętrzną logikę preferowania tych czy innych podejść.

Talk given on 26th July on the occasion of the Summer Module Course “Affective Intentionality in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology” (Forschungsfragen der Philosophie II, 06-Ph-B-P6/2-152-m01), University of Würzburg, 26th-30th July 2021 (held online via Zoom)

In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects. Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called “adverbial” theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the theory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or “adverbially specified” mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this “representing relation”. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian.

In a well-known passage in the 'Big Typescript' Wittgenstein suggests that a philosopher’s unwillingness to renounce certain combinations of words as nonsensical arises from her seeing what she wants to see.  He seems to be postulating a combination of two problematic psychological phenomena: self-deception and illusions of meaning.  Accusations of self-deception in philosophy naturally invite counter-accusations of the genetic fallacy but, quite apart from that, there is, I argue, a special problem for Wittgenstein.  In examples of ‘normal’ self-deception someone believes what she wants to believe (sees what she wants to see) but what she believes (sees) has a content.  It makes sense, even though it might be false.  What is the analogue of this when it is nonsense that is in question?  Can the CONTENT OF A BELIEF be nonsensical?

In Marty’s writings one can find two theories of truth making. The first one is deeply rooted in Brentano’s picture of intentionality as put forward in his unpublished lectures and operates with both immanent and transcendent propositional entities. Marty’s second theory was formulated under the influence of Brentano’s late criticism of his own theory of immanent objects. It rejects all immanent entities, but differs significantly from Brentano’s late, “reist” position. I begin this paper with few words about the general idea of truth making. Then, in section 2, I sketch Brentano’s official theory of intentionality and describe a simple theory of truth-making that can be based on it. Section 3 contains an analysis of Marty’s first theory, employing the ontology of intentionality from Brentano’s unpublished lectures, and section 4 concerns Marty’s late theory, in which he rejected all immanent entities, but retained a rich ontology of external states of affairs.

In the famous Appendix to paragraphs 11 and 20 of his 5th Logical Investigation, Husserl criticizes the concept of ‘immanent object’ defended by Brentano and his pupils. Husserl holds that intentional objects, even non-existent ones, are ‘transcendent’. Yet long before Husserl’s criticism, Brentano and his pupils, in their theories of intentionality, besides ‘immanent’ objects also took into account transcendent ones, in a similar way to Husserl, since such transcendent objects were not necessarily objects that exist. The ‘immanent object’ (immanenter Gegenstand) was also called ‘presented-thing as presented’ (Vorgestelltes als Vorgestelltes), whereas the ‘transcendent object’ was called ‘object tout court’ (Gegenstand schlechtweg) or ‘presented-thing tout court’ (Vorgestelltes schlechtweg). Even if it is in Marty that one finds the clearest distinction between these two kinds of objects, other pupils of Brentano, and Brentano himself, made similar distinctions. But despite its importance, this point has been neglected in the Brentanian literature. In the first part of this article, I present the way in which immanent and transcendent objects have been distinguished in the School of Brentano. In the second part of the article, I present some problems linked to the distinction of two objects for every mental act, an immanent and a transcendent one; these problems could explain the abandonment of the notion of ‘immanent object’ by many philosophers of the Brentanian tradition. I conclude with some remarks on the distinction between content and object in the School of Brentano.

In diesem Aufsatz besprechen wir die Ontologie der Sachverhalte, die Carl Stumpf vorgeschlagen hat. Wie viele Vertreter der Brentano-Schule stützt sich hier Stumpf auf die reiche Ontologie der intentionalen Beziehung, die Brentano in seinen Vorlesungen aus der so genannten „mittleren“ Periode vorgeschlagen hat. Stumpf modifiziert jedoch die übernommene Lehre in einer unerwarteten Weise. Brentano sprach nämlich sowohl von immanenten als auch transzendenten propositionalen Entitäten. Stumpf hingegen führt nur die immanenten, aber keine transzendenten Sachverhalte ein, was alle potentiellen Vorteile einer derartigen Erweiterung der Ontologie zunichte zu machen scheint. Wir zeigen jedoch, dass sich die Position Stumpfs erklären lässt, wenn man zwei wichtige Punkte beachtet. Zum einen sind die Brentanoschen Objekte (der nominalen Form) bereits höchst komplizierte Entitäten, die in vielen Aspekten Sachverhalte ersetzen können. Zum anderen verwendet hier Stumpf, wie es scheint, einen konzeptualistischen Erklärungsmuster, den man auch bei dem frühen Brentano oft findet.

This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and some of the main reactions to it. Sections 2 and 3 rebut two main approaches equating bodily pleasures with non- intentional episodes. More precisely, section 2 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be purely non-intentional self-conscious feelings, by relying on Brentano’s objection to Hamilton’s theory of pleasure. Section 3 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be non-intentional sensory qualities by relying on Brentano’s objections to Stumpf’s theory of pleasure. Section 4 develops a brentanian view of the intentionality of bodily pleasures by claiming bodily pleasures are directed at a sui generis class of sensory qualities. Section 5 presents an objection to Brentano’s later theory of pleasure according to which all sensory pleasures are directed at sensing acts.

Roman Ingarden (1893–1970) belonged to those phenomenologists who never accepted Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Beginning with the Bemerkungen zum Problem ‘Idealismus-Realismus’ (1929) he devoted a great part of his intellectual energy to the analytical studies in which he hoped to develop an ontological framework suitable for an ultimate refutation of Husserl’s idealistic doctrine. The most important of his works, like the monumental Controversy over the Existence of the World (Polish edition 1947, German edition 1964/65) or The Literary Work of Art (1931) were explicitly classified by their author as such preparatory studies; and even in his later “personalist” studies, like Über die Verantwortung (1970), he still returned to the old realism / idealism problem.
Nonetheless, it would be a huge mistake to think that a study of Ingarden’s work could be valuable only for those who are fascinated by all the subtleties of the Husserlian tradition or esoteric dialectics of the idealism / realism debate. Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng are perfectly right, when they write about The Controversy over the Existence of the World that “[a] contemporary ontologist may find it more interesting to read this study […] not in connection with the realism / idealism controversy, but as a treasury of numerous ontological distinctions, problem formulations, and detailed analyses” (p. 9 in this volume), and exactly the same holds also for Ingarden’s other “preparatory” works.
Actually, the majority of philosophers who find Ingarden’s work valuable and inspiring belong to the growing community of “naïve” or “straight” realists who typically don’t even consider transcendental idealism as a serious philosophical option. Ironically, the main goal of Ingarden’s philosophical struggle – the refutation of idealism – remained something that very few of his reader are really interested in.
Most of the papers collected in this volume follow this strand of Ingarden’s reception. The first three articles concern the basic ontological categories and distinctions. Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng concentrate on categories of substance, state, process, and event, and compare Ingarden’s solutions with some contemporary developments. Peter Simons investigates several concepts of ontological dependence that are central for the especially Ingardenian branch of ontology that Ingarden called “existential ontology”. Daniel von Wachter proposes “a Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden’s ontology” (p. 55 in this volume).
The next three papers concern the topic of Ingarden’s philosophy that happened to become the best known of his achievements: the philosophy of fiction and of cultural objects. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski sketches the general problematic of intentional objects and argues that they are by no means useless fictions. Amie L. Thomasson presents an Ingardenian ontology of social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags. Finally, Jeff Mitscherling investigates the difficult topic of the “life” of a literary work of art.
The last two papers open a somewhat wider perspective on Ingarden’s work. Edward Swiderski points out an interesting change of perspective that occurred in Ingarden’s late work, which was devoted to the problem of responsibility. He argues that there is a tension between the hypothetical-scientific and phenomenological sides of his philosophy. Andrzej Półtawski tries to answer the question of what Ingarden’s ontology would look like if he developed it according to his deeply personalist picture of the world.

Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent on other entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition”, “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation”. To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being.

The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference-object “beyond being and non being”. This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object-theory of intentionality, as it introduces special “postulated” entities in the target-position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator-theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated “between” the subject and the object of reference and “mediating” the intentional access to the (complete) reference-object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities (objectives). In the paper we attempt to give a set-theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures.

In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer, of the ontological interpretation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality, as formulated by i.a. Roderick Chisholm. I will then outline some apparent inconsistencies of the positions advocated by Antonelli and Sauer with Brentano’s formulations of his theory in several works and lectures. This new evaluation of (unpublished) sources will then lead to a sketch of a new approach to Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it will be argued that the notion of “intentional object” is inherently and un- avoidably ambiguous in every act of external perception, due to the fact that we can only have improper intentions directed at the external world.

Prompted by the emerging scholarship on temporal quality of cinema, in the proposed paper, the aspects of 'temporality' and 'intenionality' as analytical methodology would be applied in the context of some less known Bangla short stories. The exercise would show that when the so-far dominant categories of socio-historical time in literary studies would be put aside in favor of 'imprinted time', 'experiential duration'
based on 'intentionality', a qualitatively different entity of temporal-formal-experiential complex and related synthesis would be found in these so far non-descript stories.

O trabalho que apresentamos neste capítulo expõe a interpretação de Ausiônio Marras (1976) acerca do modo de inexistência intencional do objeto introduzido por Franz Brentano como traço característico da definição dos fenômenos mentais. Esta interpretação de Marras, formulada contra a interpretação de Herbert Spiegelberg (1967), sustentou a existência de uma herança aristotélico-tomista do conceito de intencionalidade reintroduzido na Filosofia por Franz Brentano na obra Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico (1784). Nosso objetivo aqui é apresentá-la de um modo didático.

RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo consiste em analisar algumas considerações de Chisholm sobre as mudanças presentes na definição brentaniana de fenômeno psíquico, tal como foi apresentada na obra Psicologia Descritiva. Para dar conta desta tarefa, exporemos a tese de Chisholm que aponta uma mudança na doutrina da in existência intencional do objeto apresentada na Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico em 1874. A exposição desse ponto consistirá de três etapas. Mostraremos, na primeira etapa, que tal tese encontra essas mudanças na descrição brentaniana dos fenômenos psíquicos e as atribui ao abandono da ontologia aristotélico-tomista que fundamentava a doutrina da in-existência intencional do objeto. Apresentaremos, na segunda etapa, a nova definição brentaniana de fenômeno psíquico formulada na Psicologia descritiva e destacaremos o novo fundamento epistemológico apontado pela tese de Chisholm, ou seja, a relação intencional própria de todo ato psíquico. Finalmente, com o propósito de destacar a virtude da tese chisholmeana, nós utilizaremos seus pressupostos para interpretar um ponto específico da recepção de Descartes na Psicologia descritiva.

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine some considerations about the changes presented by Chisholm in brentanian’s definition of psychic phenomena, as it was presented in the Descriptive psychology works. To realize this task, I shall present the thesis of Chisholm that points out a change in the doctrine of intentional in-existence of the object, displayed in the Psychology of empirical Standpoint in 1874. The exposition of this point will consist of three stage. I will show, in the first stage, that this thesis of Chisholm points out these changes in the brentanian's description of psychic phenomena and assigns them to the abandon of the Aristotelian-thomistic ontology that grounded the doctrine of intentional in-existence of the object. I will present, in the second stage, the brentanian’s new definition of psychic phenomena, formulated in the Descriptive Psychology and I will explicit the epistemological's new thesis pointed out by Chisholm, ie, the intentional relation of every psychic act itself. Finally, aiming to point out the plausibility of chisholm's thesis, I will use their assumptions for interpret a specific point in the reception of Descartes in the Descriptive Psychology.

Alexius Meinong (1853 1920) nimmt in der Geschichte der Ontologie eine ausgezeichnete Stellung ein. Er war der erste Philosoph, der in systematischer Weise eine quasi-ontologische Disziplin entwickelte, die im Vergleich zu der Disziplin, die man traditionell ...

Gdy czytamy prozę Sapkowskiego, możemy zauważyć, że bohaterowie doświadczają dokładnie tego, co przewidział dla nich autor. Mówiąc językiem Ingardena, są oni przedmiotami heteronomicznymi, całkowicie zależnymi od językowo utrwalonych intencji autora. Gdy gramy w Wiedźmina, sprawy mają się inaczej.

This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and some of the main reactions to it. Sections 2 and 3 rebut two main approaches equating bodily pleasures with non- intentional episodes. More precisely, section 2 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be purely non-intentional self-conscious feelings, by relying on Brentano’s objection to Hamilton’s theory of pleasure. Section 3 argues that bodily pleasures cannot be non-intentional sensory qualities by relying on Brentano’s objections to Stumpf’s theory of pleasure. Section 4 develops a brentanian view of the intentionality of bodily pleasures by claiming bodily pleasures are directed at a sui generis class of sensory qualities. Section 5 presents an objection to Brentano’s later theory of pleasure according to which all sensory pleasures are directed at sensing acts.

Uriah Kriegel (2007, 2008, 2011) has recently developed (but not fully endorsed) an adverbial account of intentionality, in part to solve the problem of how we can think of non-existents. The view has real virtues: it endorses a non-relational (internalist) conception of intentionality and is ontologically conservative. Alas, the view ultimately cannot replace the act-object model of intentionality that it seeks to, because it depends on the act-object model for its intelligibility at key points. It thus fails as a revisionistic theory. I argue that the virtues of adverbialism can be had from within the act-object framework, provided we understand intentional objects correctly. I use Tim Crane (2001a, 2001b, 2013) as a guide here, and build on his work on intentional objects. In the end, we can provide a suitable solution to the problem of thinking of non-existents within the act-object framework without adopting implausible ontological or metaphysical views. So, adverbialism is neither a possible stand-alone revisionary option nor a needed modification of the common-sense act-object framework of intentionality.

O livro Psicologia e ética: o desenvolvimento da filosofia do psíquico de Franz Brentano é o resultado de uma minuciosa pesquisa de doutorado. Pioneira em língua portuguesa, essa pesquisa inaugurou os estudos sobre a ética da preferência, a qual foi desenvolvida pelo filósofo alemão Franz Brentano (1838-1917) por meio de sua filosofia do psíquico. Não se trata, apenas, de mais uma discussão sobre os princípios que determinam a ação de modo problemático, assertórico ou categórico. Para além dos fundamentos que instituem a clássica oposição entre a ética deontológica e a ética utilitarista, a ética brentaniana da preferência fundou uma perspectiva meta-ética de análise e, em função dessa nova perspectiva, propôs a superação das teorias éticas baseadas no sentimento moral por uma teoria ética baseada no conhecimento moral. As investigações realizadas pelo pesquisador Evandro O. Brito explicitam, não apenas a estrutura dessa ética cognitiva baseada na descrição brentaniana dos atos psíquicos preferência, mas também apresentam as mudanças e os aprimoramentos fundamentais realizados por Franz Brentano em sua filosofia do psíquico, com o propósito de garantir a plausibilidade de sua teoria. Trata-se, portanto, de uma publicação que preenche uma lacuna dos estudos sobre ética em língua portuguesa. Pois, como afirmou o filósofo inglês George Moore, “esta (a teoria ética de Franz Brentano) é de longe a melhor discussão acerca dos princípios mais fundamentais da ética do que qualquer outra que eu já conheci. O próprio Brentano está plenamente consciente de que fez um grande avanço na teoria da Ética (...) e sua convicção tanto na originalidade, como no valor do seu próprio trabalho, está completamente justificada” (1903, p. 115).

Das Buch bietet die erste systematische esamtdarstellung der Ontologie Brentanos. Es zeigt, daß es in Brentanos ontologischem Denken drei Perioden gibt: die frühe" konzeptualistische"(1862-1874), die mittlere" deskriptiv-psychologische"(1874-1904) und ...

The paper offers an ontological analysis of negative states of affairs in Ingarden’s ontology. The debate about negative states of affairs has revolved around establishing their existential status, in particular whether they are heteronomous or autonomous. On the one hand, Ingarden is often perceived as a reductionist who claims that negative states of affairs enjoy a very weak mode of being: they are purely intentional entities. On the other hand, according to Ingarden, they are ontologically dependent on positive states of affairs, which are autonomous. While Ingarden’s pos¬ition is vague, it is hard to accept the idea that negative states of affairs should have both heteronomous and autonomous aspects. Those problems arise when Ingarden moves from ontological to epistemological domain. I maintain that the understanding of negative states of affairs as purely intentional is simply a result of following the epistemological way of thinking and is in conflict with some of his ontolog...

Presentazione: In this article the author discusses F. Brentano's theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality are compared to the process of semeiosis. Several interesting parallels can be found between fundamental problems in the interpretation of the Brentanian notion of intentionality and issues in semiotics. In particular, the author focuses on the theory of CW Morris and attempts to apply core notions of his ...

The paper offers an ontological analysis of negative states of affairs in Ingarden’s ontology. The debate about negative states of affairs has revolved around establishing their existential status, in particular whether they are heteronomous or autonomous. On the one hand, Ingarden is often perceived as a reductionist who claims that negative states of affairs enjoy a very weak mode of being: they are purely intentional entities. On the other hand, according to Ingarden, they are ontologically dependent on positive states of affairs, which are autonomous. While Ingarden’s pos¬ition is vague, it is hard to accept the idea that negative states of affairs should have both heteronomous and autonomous aspects. Those problems arise when Ingarden moves from ontological to epistemological domain. I maintain that the understanding of negative states of affairs as purely intentional is simply a result of following the epistemological way of thinking and is in conflict with some of his ontological statements.

keywords: ontology, existential moment, state of affairs, negative state of affairs, mode of being, individual object, intentional object, Ingarden, Meinong, Reinach

"Filozofia Nauki" 2014/4

Presentazione: In this article the author discusses F. Brentano's theory of intentionality and the ontological status of the intentional object specifically with respect to symbolic presentations. The role and function of intentionality are compared to the process of semeiosis. Several interesting parallels can be found between fundamental problems in the interpretation of the Brentanian notion of intentionality and issues in semiotics.