Corporate Control

A central tenet of agency theory is that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and managers diverge. In those circumstances, and for a variety of reasons, managers may be able to exact higher rents than are reasonable or than the owners of the firm would otherwise accord them. While that foundational element of agency theory is secure, other elements derived directly from agency theory are far less settled. Indeed, even after some 75 years of conceptualization and empirical research, the three principal approaches that have long been proposed to mitigate the fundamental agency problem remain contentious. Accordingly, we provide a review of the fundamental agency problem and its mitigation through independence, equity, and the market for corporate control.

Il concetto di controllo è al contempo uno dei temi più classici del diritto societario e una delle questioni che maggiormente è stata oggetto di trasformazione, rectius mimetizzazione ed occultamento, negli ultimi anni. Un tema, dunque, caratterizzato da una articolata “babele di linguaggi e nozioni” , qui esaminato con particolare riguardo per il controllo c.d. congiunto, anche alla luce degli International Financial Reporting Standards.
L’analisi si sviluppa primariamente a partire da alcune riflessioni in tema di controllo rispetto all’ordinamento giuridico nazionale, indagando se le altre nozioni di controllo presenti nelle altre province del diritto societario profilino o meno detta distinzione (paragrafo 2). Successivamente, la disamina affronta una questione “classica” del diritto societario, ossia la riconducibilità di un accordo volto alla presentazione di una lista ad un patto parasociale, e considera l’eventuale necessità di applicare le formalità pubblicitarie ex art. 122 TUF tanto per le società quotate quanto per le non quotate. Quindi si discute circa l’ipotesi che det-to accordo implichi la presenza anche di una ipotesi di controllo, singolo o congiunto, alla luce della recente Comunicazione Consob (paragrafo 3).
Considerando quindi l’esplicita differenza compiuta tra controllo , tanto solitario  quando congiunto  nei principi contabili internazionali, lo studio si soffermerà sull’IFRS 11 (paragrafo 4). Invero, la configurabilità di un controllo “congiunto”, lungi dall’essere teorica quanto prima facie potrebbe apparire, presenta invero un riflesso concreto e rilevantissimo nella valutazione degli accordi e, dunque, nella individuazione della disciplina contabile applicabile a ciascun caso (paragrafo 5): in talune circostanze, soprattutto laddove l’impresa sia redditizia, sarebbe preferibile operare un consolidamento integrale, in altre circostanze, invece, risulterebbe più opportuno ricorrere al consolidamento proporzionale oppure al metodo del patrimonio netto, che permetterebbe di evitare l’indebitamento dell’impresa sottoposta a controllo congiunto.  A dimostrazione dell’estrema attualità della questione e della necessità di monitorare l’evoluzione del principio contabile in esame (unitamente all’IFRS 3), si accenna, infine, alle riflessioni attualmente in corso rispetto al con-cetto di “joint operator”.

The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic "super-entity" that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers.

What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of bank-based financial systems (as in Germany and Japan) and market-based financial systems (as in England and the United States). Does financial structure matter? In bank-based systems banks play a leading role in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers, and providing risk management vehicles. In market-based systems securities

On 29th - 30th March 2007, SUERF and the Central Bank of Cyprus jointly organized a Seminar: Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions. The papers in the present publication are based on a sample of the presentations at the Seminar. Together, the papers illuminate a number of key issues in corporate governance in a variety of financial firms. In the first paper based on a keynote address, Spyros G. Stavrinakis, Central Bank of Cyprus gives an overview of the legal framework for corporate governance in financial institutions in Cyprus. According to a Central BankDirective issued in 2006, implementation of corporate governance principles is mandatory for all banks incorporated in Cyprus and their overseas branches and for some Cyprus branches of foreign banks domiciled outside the European Economic Area. Banks are obliged to have a robust internal governance framework, consistent lines of reporting and effective risk identification, management, monitoring and reporting procedures...

La presente labor de investigaciónintenta contribuir con una aproximación a la mirada de losmedios tradicionales y su fase productiva como medio-empresa y su relación medio-poder, al igual que se busca comprender dequé forma el ecosistema digital  y las redes de interconexión social contribuyen a la sobresaturación del espectro comunicativo,contribuyendo en gran medida a una desinformación propia,endógena, de todo proceso de comunicación masiva, por lo que se podría considerar a la desinformación como un estado natural del ecosistema, más que la usual mirada amoral y fuera de contexto de cualquier ética de la comunicación.

This study aimed at establishing the influence of corporate control and ownership structure on corporate values of companies listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. The paper tested the hypothesis that there is no significant moderating impact of ownership structure on the relationship between corporate control and corporate value growth based on Tobin Q and ROA measurements. The theory applied were agency theory, stewardship theory and stakeholder theory with the main anchoring theory being the agency theory. The study applied census survey for sixty four firms listed at the NSE. The time frame of analysis is five years between 2013 and 2017. Out of the 64 listed companies targeted, 58 were analyzed forming 90% of the population. The study applied census survey given that the population of the listed companies at the NSE were not many. Out of the 64 listed companies targeted, 59 were analyzed forming 92% of the population. Corporate control index was developed as a proxy for corporate control and ownership structure index was developed as a proxy for ownership structure. While ROA and Tobin Q were used to measure corporate value. The hypotheses were tested using both correlation and regression analysis. The key study variables of the listed companies were subjected to descriptive statistics and the results revealed a significant positive relationship between the variables. The study findings revealed significant moderating effect on the relationship between the value of the firm and its ownership structure.