Arms Control

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counter-terrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach. This series of WAM Country Insights will help promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. It aims to serve as a reference for donors and international partners providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

The appearance on Russian TV stations Channel One and NTV of the plans for a nuclear torpedo/unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) has prompted much interest among observers.  Among other aspects, its probably salted warhead attracted much attention, the addition of Cobalt-59 ensuring long-lasting radiation designed to render a wide area uninhabitable for years. The July 1948 Baker test in Bikini Atoll illustrated the effects of a shallow underwater explosion. Missile defence experts have noted how, in line with Russian commentary, the system seems to be designed to bypass Western progress in this field. There’s another significant aspect of the possible construction of this weapon: its impact on the international law of the sea.

From this perspective, there are at least three issues that need to be discussed: whether a submarine carrying nuclear torpedoes may carry out innocent passage through another country’s territorial waters, the 1971 treaty banning nuclear weapons on the seabed, and whether a coastal state may restrict the presence of submarines carrying nuclear torpedoes in its EEZ. This paper examines the three.

This article examines the issue of riot control agents as it relates to the subject of chemical weapons arms control at the international level and, more specifically, implications for the United States. The article examines how the issue of riot control agents has complicated efforts for the United States to enter into and ratify chemical weapons-related arms control agreements. The article provides an overview of chemical weapons, examines the relevant arms control agreements, explores why and how riot control agents influence debates over the merits of these treaties, and explains why riot control agents remain a contentious issue in chemical weapons arms control and foreign policy in the United States.

U radu se istražuje kakve su uopšteno mogućnosti i ograničenja multilateralizacije pregovora o kontroli strateškog naoružanja i posebno uključivanja Kine u iste, budući da su SAD tokom 2019. i početkom 2020. godine uslovile produžetak Ugovora između SAD i Ruske Federacije o merama za dalјe smanjenje i ograničenje strateškog ofanzivnog naoružanja (Novi START) uklјučivanjem Kine u trilateralne pregovore o kontrolistrateškog naoružanja. Osnovna hipoteza je da ograničenja i dalje nadilaze mogućnosti u pogledu multilateralizacije kontrole strateškog naoružanja i da su mogućnosti za uključivanje samo Kine minimalne. Osnovna hipoteza je proverena teorijskim razmatranjem pojma strateške stabilnosti i njegove transformacije od Hladnog rata do danas, kao i kroz četiri indikatora ili preduslova kineskog učešća u
kontrolistrateškog naoružanja: 1) kvantitativno smanjenje broja nuklearnog naoružanja SAD i Rusije do nivoa koji ima Kina, 2) umanjenje uloge koju nuklearno oružje ima u vojnim i bezbednosnim strategijama velikih sila, 3) umanjenje uloge nuklearnog naoružanja kao statusnog simbola supersile ili velike sile i 4) postizanje multilateralnog međunarodnog sporazuma (a ne trilateralnog) o ograničavanju upotrebe nuklearnog naoružanja. Autorka koristi pre svega komparativnimetod, analizu sadržaja dokumenata i analizu diskursa. Autorka zaključuje da nepostojanje namere SAD i Rusije da dalje redukuju strateške snage i umanje ulogu nuklearnog naoružanja u svojimodbrambenim strategijama, ne postojanje saglasnosti oko toga ko sve treba da bude uključen u buduće pregovore o kontroli naoružanja i kinesko generalno nepoverenje u transparentnost i delotvornost kontrole naoružanja, utiču na to da Kina i u narednom periodu ostane van bilo kog vida kontrole strateškog, uključujući i nuklearnog naoružanja.
Ključne reči: strateška stabilnost, Novi START, kontrola naoružanja, Kina, SAD, međunarodna bezbednost.

Thе paper focuses on the research of general possibilities and limitations of the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiations and particularly the inclusion of China in these negotiations because, during 2019 and 2020, the US conditioned the extension of the New START Treaty with China’s involvement in the trilateralstrategic arms control negotiations. By doing so,the US recognised China as an
important factor influencing the maintenance of strategic stability and possibilities for furtherreduction ofstrategic arms. Themain hypothesisisthe claimthatthe limitations still overcome the possibilities regarding the multilateralization of the strategic arms control negotiation, and that the prospects of involving China in this kind of negotiation remain minimal. This hypothesis was tested through theoretical deliberation based on the notion of strategic stability, and its transformation during the Cold War until today, as well as on fourindicators or preconditions of China’sinvolvementin the strategic arms control, which are: 1) quantitative reduction of the number of nuclear arms of the US and Russia to China’s level; 2) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons in the national security and defense strategies of the great powers; 3) decrease of the role of nuclear weapons as the status symbol of the great power or superpower and 4) conclusion of
the multilateral international agreement (not trilateral) on limitations on the use of nuclear weapons. The author uses the methods of content and discourse analysis, as well asthe comparativemethod. The author concludesthatthe absence ofthe intention of the US and Russia to further reduce their strategic arms and decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defense strategies, as well as the absence of consent on which parties or actors should be included in the arms control talks and China’s general suspicion about the effectiveness of the arms control agreements, influence China not to take part on any strategic arms control talks at this moment.

Keywords: strategic stability, New START, arms control, the United States, China,
international security.

Armament Research Services (ARES) Special Report 4, Munitions Employing Sensor-fuzed Submunitions: Do they Comply with the Convention on Cluster Munitions?, critically evaluates the definition of "cluster munition" established by the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), in order to assess the convention's applicability to cargo munitions carrying sensor-fuzed submunitions. The report explores the operational rationale behind sensor-fuzed submunitions as well as briefly addressing the unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazard posed by such munitions. It then explains the technical characteristics which distinguish sensor-fuzed submunitions from their conventional counterparts.

Drawing on a range of primary sources, confidential interviews with industry and military personnel, secondary literature, and the perspectives of several prominent ordnance experts, Special Report 4 establishes a methodology for assessing weapons which carry sensor-fuzed submunitions. It then applies the nine-step test described in that methodology to five of the most common weapons which employ sensor-fuzed submunitions that remain in inventory or use today. Special Report 4 finds that only two of the five selected munitions are banned under the CCM, and that the factors which determined CCW compliance are not always directly connected to the stated principles of minimising harm to civilians and civilian objects. The report concludes by considering sometimes overlooked hazards of sensor-fuzed submunitions, as well as the potential for unintended consequences which may arise from an outright ban of these weapons.

The ban on the posession of certain types of  weapons, the control of weapon exports to foreign countries, and even the right to bear arms by citizens are highly topical issues with a long history that goes back to the Bronze Age.
This book studies the problem of arms control from the Pharaonic arsenals through to the naissance of the Modern State in Europe, including the Bronze and Iron Ages in the Mediterranean, the Greek and Roman world, the Byzantine Empire and Feudal societies, drawing on a great variety of documentary, iconographical and archaeological sources.
The right of an individual to keep and bear weapons of war was accepted without discussion by many ancient and medieval societies, such as the classical Greek poleis, or the feudal societies in Western Europe, and was even considered as an inalienable right  of the individual.
This socially sanctioned right is in marked contrast with the attempts by most territorial or imperial states –or even city states ruled by monarchies-  to limit or ban the possession of war weapons, or at least of those high-technology weapons considered as ‘decisive’, or ‘war winning’ assets. This is the case of the Bronze Age war chariot, Hellenistic artillery and siege machines, the byzantine ’Greek Fire’,  or of gunpowder artillery in the Early Modern Era in Europe.
The ban on arms exports go back to the Bronze Age, and the ethical problems presented by the use of some weapons (mostly bows, crosbows and muskets) worried many writers, from Plutarch to Cervantes. 
We show that it is possible to postulate the existence of two ‘models’ on arms control that coexisted in time in Antiquity , the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, because they are linked to different conceptions of power that also coexisted. In what we call ‘archaic  mentality’, each free man considered the right to keep and bear war weapons as a visible symbol of social status, an ideology that has survived in different groups even today.  In the ‘despotic model’, originally typical of monarchies, but now adopted by Western Democracies,  the State tended to keep for itself the right to produce, store and distribute most weapons

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El derecho individual a poseer armas de guerra, aceptado sin mayores problemas por muchos Estados antiguos –e incluso considerado parte inalienable de la libertad individual en ámbitos como la polis griega clásica o el mundo feudal en la Alta Edad
Media de Europa occidental–, contrasta con los intentos de los grandes Estados territoriales o imperiales de todos los períodos por limitar la difusión de esas mismas armas, o al menos su difusión incontrolada de las armas de alta tecnología supuestamente “decisivas”: el carro de guerra de la Edad del
Bronce, las catapultas o torres de asedio helenísticas, el “fuego griego” bizantino, o la primera artillería de pólvora en los reinos de
Europa occidental en el siglo XIV.
Las prohibiciones a la exportación de tecnología militar se remontan a la Edad del Bronce y los problemas éticos asociados al uso de determinadas armas preocuparon tanto a Polibio o Plutarco como a Miguel de Cervantes.

La prohibición de determinados tipos de armas, el control de su exportación a posibles enemigos, e incluso el debate sobre el derecho a poseer y almacenar armas por parte de los ciudadanos
en sus domicilios, son temas de rabiosa actualidad.

Pero estas cuestiones, relacionadas con los intentos del poder para controlar la fabricación, difusión y empleo de las armas de guerra, se plantearon también en la Antigüedad y en la Edad Media.
Es posible apreciar la existencia de modelos diferentes que coexistieron en el tiempo, y que se asocian a concepciones del poder y ejercicio del gobierno muy diferentes. En la mentalidad
“arcaica”, cada hombre libre consideraba la posesión individual de armas como símbolo indiscutible de su estatus social, ideología y simbolismo que ha perdurado en grupos tan distintos
como los sij de la India o los miembros de la National Rifle Association estadounidense.

En el modelo que se puede caracterizar como “despótico”, más  rropio de gobiernos unipersonales, el Estado tendía a reservarse el control de la fabricación, almacenamiento y distribución de las armas: el caso del “fuego griego” sería un buen ejemplo. Este modelo es el que han adoptado la mayoría de los estados democráticos modernos.

Este libro analiza los problemas de la producción y control del armamento desde los arsenales faraónicos hasta el nacimiento de la artillería de pólvora y el desarrollo del Estado absolutista en la Edad Moderna, utilizando una gran variedad de fuentes documentales, iconográficas y arqueológicas.

Elvira Rosert/Una Becker-Jakob/Giorgio Franceschini/Annette Schaper 2013: Arms Control Norms and Technology, in: Müller, Harald/Wunderlich, Carmen (ed.): Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 109-140.

The first satellite Sputnik came about in 1957, the law regulating activities in outer space came in a decade later. The law was then dynamic and evolved to fulfill the changing needs of the world. Quite unfortunately, it stopped evolving a decade later. The stagnation has cost dearly as the following slides would reveal.

As an ongoing American foreign policy 're-balancing " attests, the Asia-Pacific region is subject to uncertain transition manifestations and implications for global peace and economic prosperity. This is reflected in growing tensions and potential flash points, driven by a rising China and other regional powers with divergent interests and collective security concerns. Nearly a century ago, facing a similar global transition, the great powers formed a regional security system at the 1921-22 Washington Conference and subsequent conferences in the 1920s and 1930s. While historically seen as ambitious if ultimately unsuccessful, the Inter-War Naval Control regime created a security system to accommodate competing strategic visions, resolve political differences and address security dilemmas—strikingly similar problems faced today in the Asia-Pacific region. Design of a new regional security system that avoids these historical errors can fulfill the original security objective inspiring the re-balancing effort. Success can be further assured through a new U.S. grand strategy, sustained by a strong, bipartisan national consensus, that aims to reshape a revised liberal world order that does not rely exclusively on American hegemony to function, and is built upon a consensus and convergence among regional states of new norms of behavior for political economy, security, and deterrence of potential conflicts. This study investigates a new regional security system to manage power transition issues without great power conflict by framing a broad politically-based approach to enhance regional political stability and reduce both military and non-military incentives to resort to threats of intimidation or force. Employing lessons learned from the successes and failures of the Inter-War Naval Arms Control agreements, the framework envisions generic security guarantees, new security and economic structures, and norms and procedures for intervention, conflict containment and resolution, while considering underlying political, economic and military differences and obstacles to regional cooperation and existing constraints upon U.S. material resources.

Trade in 'strategic goods' is subject to controls in order to combat illegal trade and to avoid undesirable use . Historically, national control regimes focused on controlling exports by their
own arms producers, so as to prevent the goods from being delivered to (from a national security perspective) undesirable destinations. Because national control regimes by definition
are jurisdictionally limited to their own territory, initiatives have also been taken at international level. These international control regimes mainly focus on the need for export controls, while more attention has been paid lately to brokering. Much less has been done in the field of transit and import controls. The importance of a good transit control regime became clear quite recently, in early 2012, when - despite the EU arms embargo on Syria - a Russian ship loaded with military equipment sailed to Syria through the national waters of various European countries to deliver this equipment to the regime.

The limited attention devoted to transit is striking, given that national control regimes exclusively regulating exports can only be effective if all countries worldwide would impose, apply and enforce uniform export conditions. Uniformity is of prime importance since any variation in terms of the personal and material scope of control, or in the conditions for permitting trade in arms and their interpretation and application, or in the capability of prosecution and imposition of penalties, creates lacunae that dishonest dealers can exploit.

Since control measures are not only aimed at private actors, but certain regimes are also among the forbidden destinations, any such complete and effective global network of national control regimes is utopic. This makes it important to look at the whole cycle of arms trade activities and consider what combination of control measures, for each of the separate activities, will enable the best possible control. Every chain is as strong as its weakest link, and the fact that the chain for foreign arms trade runs across different jurisdictions creates specific risks. In effect, national authorities lose their control over goods once these leave their own territory, they thus rely on information from elsewhere to check whether the requirements they have imposed are respected also after export. In these conditions, it is clear that control of transit is a vital link in achieving a sound and effective export control regime for strategic goods.

As transit is by definition a cross-border issue, it is worthwhile comparing the transit control regimes in different EU Member States. Despite progressive harmonization of EU Member States’ export control policy, policy on transit - mainly for military equipment - is still far from being harmonized. In this report we analyse transit policies in Europe concerning strategic goods. The report focuses on the transit of strategic goods and is thus not limited to transit regulations and policy practice on conventional military goods (such as combat vehicles, military vessels or firearms) and their components. Alongside conventional arms and weapons systems, we also analyse regulatory and policy practice on the transit of a wide range of dual use items. These are civil items that are not specifically designed, intended or as such suitable for military use, but which still have strategic importance due to their potential military
applicationi. The decision to explicitly address the control regimes for both categories of strategic goods in this report is in line with the current international, regional and national
control regimes which, generally speaking, cover approximately the same categories of strategic goods.

This publication contains a detailed description of regulations and administrative practices for controlling the transit of strategic goods in the Flemish Region of Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.ii For the five national regimes investigated, the description of the legal framework at national level is supplemented in each case with relevant aspects of administrative practice. Not all countries, in fact, take an equally formal legal approach. As will be shown in this report, the transit of strategic goods is a complex matter.
Some countries have completely separate systems with distinct competent authorities depending on whether military equipment or dual-use items are involved; in other countries there is a single legal framework and a single competent body.

The objective of this study is to compare these five transit control regimes at national level with a view to drawing lessons about their effectiveness . Only the general control regime for
transit of strategic goods falls within the scope of this investigation. Specific rules of control that apply beyond the general framework are not addressed, such as arms embargoes and other sanctions (for instance, directed against Iran), exceptional measures for transit of NATO forces’ military equipment, or weapons held by armed forces.

This study is based on information obtained on the basis of a literature review, legislation and administrative documents, and of a survey carried out among officials responsible for export control and customs employees. For the survey of competent authorities we worked in three phases corresponding to the Delphi method: an initial survey by telephone or in writing; a
second set of questions during an interview; and feedback to all respondents about the most important findings of the analysis

In early Sep 2017, for two weeks, a mass, outdoor, art event coincided with the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) arms fair in East London.  Artist & activists arrived at the site of the arms fair armed with canvases, clay, and their creativity to Art the Arms Fair. All forms of art and artists were welcomed, from painting to performance, sculptors to satirists. (This article focuses on a distinct element of those satirist: koshare (sacred clowns) while contextualizing the entire event. 

Framing the event was Bansky's Civilian Drone Strike painting which depicts a trio of Predator drones bombing a children’s picture of a house, auctioned at Art The Arms Fair for £205,000.

The exhibition took place in the second half of the two-week protest against the DSEI (the world’s biggest arms fair) which assembled delegations from some of the worst human rights-abusing regimes with 1,600 makers and sellers of weapons and military equipment.

Ultimately more than 150 people were arrested in the first week of protests as they attempted to block exhibitors from delivering their equipment to set up stands at the arms fair, according to the Metropolitan police.

Andrew Smith, of Campaign Against Arms Trade, said the money from the sale of Civilian Drone Strike would help the group to stage more protests against arms companies, and against the next DSEI in two years time.

‘Fragmentation’, ‘pluralism’, ‘constitutionalization’ and ‘global administrative law’ are among the dominant narratives of international legal order at present. Each narrative makes a descriptive claim about the current state of the international legal order, and outlines a normative vision for this order.  Yet we must not lose sight of the conflicts between, and the contingency of these, and other narratives. This article seeks to recover both conflicts and contingency by showing how each may be used to explain a given event: the inauguration of a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation between the United State and India, better known as the ‘India-US nuclear deal’. I explain how the four narratives may be, and were, co-opted at different times to justify or critique the ‘deal’. This exercise serve two purposes: the application of four narratives reveal the various facets of the deal, and by its example the deal  illuminates the stakes attached to each of the four narratives. In a final section, I reflect on why these four narratives enjoy their influential status in international legal scholarship.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the replacement
program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that
also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet
of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to
be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s.1 A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure)
on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035.2 Many have questioned the need for this program, including former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs.3
The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges
from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars),4 while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system
over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion.5 This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one
piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag
projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars).6 Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional
forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in
defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget.7
Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs.
The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading
the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s costeffectiveness
and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering
whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible
benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent
from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with
enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.

This article offers a novel understanding and theorization of humanitarian disarmament regimes and their related prohibition politics. In doing so, it utilizes a power-analytical framework and puts in use four conceptions of power: productive, structural, institutional, and compulsory. Empirically, two potent humanitarian prohibition regimes that have been formed during the last two decades are examined. The ban of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) in 1997 marked a significant shift in humanitarian disarmament. Consequently, a humanitarian disarmament model emerged, consisting in bypassing permanent arms-control fora (''The Ottawa Pro-cess''). The ascent of the model to the arena traditionally dominated by power interests of major powers and ossified lowest-common denominator consensus was confirmed in 2008 when cluster munitions (CMs) were prohibited in a very similar fashion (''The Oslo Process''). The main contribution to the topic is the application of the power-analytical framework specifically developed to suit an analysis of formation and workings of global prohibition regimes, including heterarchy-of-power discussion of the relationship between states and non-state actors. Then, instead of the usual—and flawed at best—heroic discussions of victories of global civil society in relation to the establishment of regimes, rise of moral International Relations, and supposed progressivist teleology, a more complex picture with many contradictions, artefacts, and their layering inside and about those regimes looms large.

In this "blue-sky" effort to rethink humanity's basic challenges, Philip Morrison and Kosta Tsipis—both eminent scientists with deep expertise in arms control issues—sketch the broad outlines for a global approach to the problems of security and development. Their goal is to set priorities for feasible action, and their focus is threefold: war and particularly the continuing dangers of nuclear weapons, population and the promotion of increased levels of human well-being, and the threat of environmental degradation.Although their topics are global, the authors focus on the actions of the United States. In their discussion of nuclear options, for example, they argue that reducing American military expenditures can be a catalyst for lowering the world's nuclear risk, establishing a policy of "common security" in response to conventional war, and freeing resources that will allow substantial steps toward "common development." In their discussion of human needs, the authors emphasize the fact that the rate of annual growth in the world's population peaked between 1967 and 1970 and has declined steadily ever since; we can therefore now project what the near steady-state level might be. This topping off of population growth should give us a new baseline from which to address both development and environmental issues.

This framework article in the legal literature on tactical nuclear weapons analyzes the nuclear arms control regime’s regulation of nuclear forces, argues that the strategic vs. tactical distinction is eroding, and recommends that the nuclear arms control regime should be expanded to include the tactical nuclear arms (also known as non-strategic or “battlefield” nuclear weapons) that are the most at risk of acquisition by terrorists.

The onset of a crisis in US-Russian and global arms control has generated manifold proposals on ways to rejuvenate productive negotiations on weapons cuts and confidence building measures. Yet most of these plans are focused on technical details while failing to capture the central role of politics – both domestic and international – in enabling arms control. More important, many observers overlook the fact that, historically, US-Russian arms control negotiations only yielded concrete results when the sides were clear about their mutual intentions. Those intentions did not need to be cooperative; they could well be adversarial (as was the case during much of the Cold War). But for arms control to work, they had to remain at a stable, tested, and predictable level, which was clearly not the case in the late-2010s. To expect US-Russian arms control to regain its lost momentum by itself and salvage the political relationship would be to misunderstand the sources and context of past achievements in bilateral arms control.

The India–US nuclear deal is primarily discussed in the context of its strategic, developmental and environmental implications. However, for students of international law, it is a salutary reminder of the limits of international law when conceived of as a formal body of rules. In this paper, the optic of treaty conflict is used to demonstrate how a rules-based approach, such as that of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is unable to address the challenges posed by the India–US nuclear deal to instruments of nuclear governance, and, in particular, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The article concludes with some reflections on the promise of a different vision of international law.

The distribution of power at the international level and the intensity of the security rivalry can explain the trajectory of arms control between China and the United States. Washington and Beijing were able to work together during the second half of the Cold War and for much of unipolarity because the system was bipolar and the security competition was mild or non-existent. The advent of multipolarity and the ensuing intense security competition put an end to Sino-American cooperation on arms control. The current circumstances are not conducive to a resumption of exchanges.

On the 22nd November 2019 press releases started circulating on Myanmar social media and news outlets concerning what was defined as one of the largest weapons seizures carried out by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed forces) in the last years. The pictures accompanying the news depicted photojournalists and onlooking security officials immersed in a typical northern Shan State mountain-scape while capturing and recording the various materiel laying on the ground: rocket-propelled grenade launchers, light machine guns, assault rifles, ammunitions, grenades, boxes of ammunition and other military equipment. Amongst the weaponry one object in particular catalysed the attention of observers, what at first glance appeared as a FN-6 man-portable air-defence system (MANPADS). Whereas both international and local media outlets were quick in reacting to the event in the following days, emphasis was placed on different aspects of the event highlighting markedly distinct vantage points in the understanding of that unusual weapon, the significance of the seizure, and broader political issues laying behind and beyond it.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement on October 20 that he intends to have the United States “terminate” the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty took many European policymakers and security experts by surprise. Although European NATO allies now agree with the United States on the alleged Russian material breach of the treaty, the unilateral U.S. withdrawal threat is divisive within NATO. A technical solution is possible, but it does not appear to be politically feasible. Although the ultimate decision belongs to Washington, which has yet to deliver the official withdrawal notification to Russia, its execution will incur serious implications for European security, NATO cohesion, and the future of  arms control.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the demilitarization of eastern Europe, apprehension over the future political shape of the continent, and the need to assimilate the changes in the European security environment have injected great uncertainty into the conventional arms control process. But despite the successes of recent years, not all of the threats to security that conventional arms control can ameliorate (directly or indirectly) have been addressed. As we think beyond the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) ...

Recently there have been calls to change the New Zealand Police firearm policy so that police officers are routinely armed at all times. It is believed that an armed police force interacts in society differently from an unarmed police force and little is known about how the change to an armed force will affect the relationship between the police and the public. The purpose of this study is to identify these issues by studying comparable jurisdictions and to predict how they might alter the strategic relationship between New Zealand society and police. The police of England and Wales, Norway and Sweden were compared. Prominent themes emerged from the study. For the police-public relationship to remain functional, the police must maintain a high level of police legitimacy. Legitimacy can be affected by the manner in which the police use firearms. The use of firearms by police officers is influenced by departmental policy and their independent perception of the degree of risk they face. The main conclusions drawn from this research were that it was not likely that a barrier would emerge between the police and public nor was there likely to be a significant impact on the police’s ability to police by consent if the police become routinely armed. However routinely arming the New Zealand police might lead to a reduction in police safety as officers may be more inclined to engage in dangerous situations."

Die USA haben ihren Ausstieg aus dem Vertrag über das Verbot von Mittelstreckenraketen verkündet. Washington will dies nur zurückziehen, wenn Moskau Vorwurf der Vertragsverletzung entkräftet. Russland wirft jedoch den USA ebenfalls eine Verletzung des Vertrags vor. Die europäischen NATO-Staaten sind zwar von der neuen Lage am meisten betroffen, haben jedoch kaum politisches Gewicht. Zudem setzen Staaten wie Deutschland auf eine Rettung des INF-Vertrags oder ein neues Rüstungskontrollabkommen, andere Staaten, etwa Polen, sehen eine Bedrohung, die nur durch Gegenrüstung abzuwehren sei. Ähnlich machtlos und gespalten sind die postsowjetischen Vertragsstaaten: Belarus und Kasachstan können den großen Verbündeten Russland nicht zu einem Eingehen auf die Forderungen der USA bewegen, die Ukraine ist ohnehin Gegner Moskaus.

Während seiner Mitgliedschaft 2019/2020 im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen will Deutschland Impulse zur Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle geben. Eine besondere Herausforderung in dieser Hinsicht stellt Nordkoreas Nuklearund Raketenrüstung dar. Im Jahr 2017 eskalierten Kim Jong Un und Donald Trump den Konflikt hierüber. Gipfeltreffen zwischen Washington und Pyongyang sowie zwischen den beiden Koreas öffneten dann im Jahr 2018 Fenster für eine zukünftige Kooperation. In der Frage der Denuklearisierung liegen die Positionen der USA und Nordkoreas aber noch weit auseinander.

It is no coincidence that NATO adopted its first dedicated space strategy in June 2019 and is considering to designate space as a domain of its own, equal to land, air, sea and cyberspace.1 The latest reminder that space is turning into a military-operational environment came on 27 March 2019, when India performed a military feat that only the USA, Russia, and China had achieved before: It hit and destroyed a satellite orbiting Earth by means of a missile.2 Meanwhile, the USA is considering to create a space force and, more worryingly, planning to station weapons in space.3 France, again, is aiming to set up a space command as part of its air force in September this year.4 With the growing importance of space assets for military and civilian functions, space is also gaining strategic importance and features ever more prominently in military debates. A high military value of space assets increases the incentive for states to be able to attack an adversary’s space assets and protect t...

Abstract : This paper critiques the Carter Administration's strategy for managing the domestic politics of its arms control efforts. It maintains that the Carter Administration made a series of political misjudgements and mistakes, largely prior to the June 1979 signing of SALT II, which undermined congressional and public confidence in the executive branch's stewardship of strategic issues and significantly hurt the treaty's chances for ratification. The author suggests for the Reagan Administration seven lessons learned from the Carter-SALT II experiences. 1) Persuading the Senate to ratify a new SALT agreement will require the direct, continuous, and active participation of the President. 2) Persuading Congress to approve a new SALT agreement must be viewed early on by the President and his administration as a major political campaign. 3) Future SALT agreements must be positively presented as reducing the level of armaments on both sides, rather than merely capping them at relatively high levels. 4) The administration should have its most trusted political professionals continuously and intimately involved in managing the politics of strategic arms control. 5) One senior official should coordinate the political effort. 6) The administration must be clear about the linkage between strategic arms control and the overall context of U.S.-Soviet relations. 7) The administration will have to plan and implement an effective strategy to deal with the legislative branch.

Il presente studio intende offrire un’analisi comparata della modalità con cui i Governi di Francia, Germania, Regno Unito, Spagna e Svezia informano i rispettivi Parlamenti in merito alle esportazioni nazionali di equipaggiamenti militari. Lo studio analizza poi la situazione attuale in Italia, posta sotto scrutinio, e il percorso con cui vi si è giunti. L’analisi combinata del quadro europeo e delle specificità italiane mira a formulare una serie di raccomandazioni concrete e fattibili per migliorare la comunicazione governativa italiana al Parlamento: l’obiettivo primario è trovare un punto di equilibrio, oggi e nel medio periodo, tra la necessità di fornire al Parlamento gli elementi per una valutazione adeguata e quella di proteggere gli aspetti più delicati della politica estera, di difesa e industriale del Paese.

This book is the result of meetings involving internationally recognized scientists and policymaker to provide an analysis of arms control verification technologies -- such as imaging, optics, infrared, spectroscopy, seismic, and detection of nuclear materials.

The laws of armed conflict as well as arms control and disarmament law are often treated as two distinct fields of public international law. Nevertheless, the laws of armed conflict impact arms control and disarmament. In particular, the weapons review of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions links the laws of armed conflict with arms control and disarmament law and goes even beyond by including other fields of international law. This contribution intends to explore the weapons review and its impact on arms control and disarmament by investigating the drafting history of Art. 36 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions as well as the legal background against which the review is to be conducted.