Arms Trade

O  presente  artigo  analisa  os impactos  das  relacoes  Brasil-Israel  no processo de aquisicao de capacidades  para a  producao  nacional  de  Aeronaves Remotamente Tripuladas (ARPs)  no contexto da Base Industrial de Defesa (BID) brasileira. Desde o lancamento da Estrategia Nacional de Defesa em 2008 a BID se encontra em um processo de  revitalizacao  orientado para o acesso e  desenvolvimento  de  tecnologias  de  ponta.  A cooperacao internacional se torna um instrumento necessario para o conhecimento e compreensao  da  tecnologia  (know why)  e  de  como  desenvolve-la  e  adapta-la  para  suas  especificidades  e necessidades  locais  (know-how) das  Forcas Armadas  brasileiras. Neste sentido, o artigo indaga como a cooperacao Brasil-Israel no setor de ARPs insere a BID noutro patamar da escala de producao militar.  A estrategia de investigacao adotada no artigo foca nas relacoes no  âmbito  de  cooperacao  interempresarial, como a criacao de joint-ventures e o seus spillove...

Abstract

Over the last decade, the European land armament industry developed into a thriving market driven by growing demand from the BRICS, a new wave of emerging countries and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the
2008 financial crisis and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis has put European countries under severe strain, prompting them to take fiscal consolidation measures affecting defense budgets. In this context European armament corporations have looked for buoyant economies outside Europe to maintain their market shares and outlets. As the fragmentation of the industry is proving to be the key challenge faced by these firms, this article explores several scenarios that could allow them to address it.

Résumé

L"industrie européenne d"armements terrestres a profité pendant les années 2000 d"un marché florissant, grâce aux guerres d"Afghanistan et d"Irak ainsi qu"à la croissance des BRICS et d"une nouvelle vague d"émergents. Cependant, depuis 2008 le contexte politico-économique mondial a perdu de son dynamisme. Les pays européens sont soumis à des pressions économiques et budgétaires grandissantes, celles-ci se répercutant sur leurs dépenses de défense. Dans ce contexte, les firmes européennes de défense terrestre se tournent vers les pays hors Europe conservant une croissance plus favorable. La fragmentation de cette industrie s"avère le principal défi auquel ces firmes sont confrontées et l"article explore des scénarios d"évolutions possibles pouvant permettre de le relever.

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counter-terrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach. This series of WAM Country Insights will help promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. It aims to serve as a reference for donors and international partners providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

- Az utolsó akadály is elhárult az elől, hogy az Egyesült Államok kormánya mesterlövészpuskákat és páncéltörő rakétarendszert szállítson Ukrajnának, miután 2018. március 1-jén a külügyminisztérium is jóváhagyta a szállításokról szóló elnöki döntést.
- Az átadott amerikai fegyverek jelentősen növelik majd az ukrán erők ellenálló képességét, csökkentve az orosz/szeparatista erők jelenleg meglévő katonai fölényét.
- Ugyanakkor sem a mesterlövészpuskák, sem a Javelin páncéltörőrakéta-rendszer nem teszik képessé az ukrán haderőt arra, hogy semlegesítse az orosz/szeparatista erők meghatározó fölényét a tüzérség, az elektronikai hadviselés, illetve – drónok révén – a légierő terén. Kijev tehát az amerikai fegyverek beérkezését követően sem válik majd képessé arra, hogy a siker esélyével indítson nagyobb támadó műveleteket Kelet-Ukrajnában.
- Ilyen értelemben a fegyverszállítások nem az eszkaláció esélyét növelik, hanem éppenséggel az eszkaláció ellen hatnak, mivel jelentősen megdrágítják az orosz/szeparatista erők számára, hogy a katonai status quo megváltoztatásával próbálkozzanak.
- A fegyverszállítások valódi fontosságát politikai jelentőségük adja.
- Az amerikai döntés által irritált Moszkva várhatóan nem katonai, hanem aszimmetrikus (politikai, információs, gazdasági stb.) válaszokkal reagál majd.

Outreach constitutes the normative dimension of efforts to enhance export control policies in third countries, while assistance is the practical dimension of such engagements. European Union (EU) Joint Action 2008/230/CFSP and Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP provided funding for the Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) outreach and assistance activities to promote alignment with EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and to strengthen export controls in Eastern and South Eastern Europe during 2008–11. This paper considers the evolution of EU efforts to promote alignment with the EU Code and the EU Common Position and the assistance rendered to strengthen export controls in third countries. It assesses progress towards the stated objectives for COARM outreach and assistance and concludes with some thoughts for the next round of outreach and assistance activities in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and recommendations for improving the prospects for alignment. ABOUT TH...

Written in 1976 for the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers), this volume analyzes the global and Middle East arms trade of that period. It addresses which countries are proviking the arms trade and which companies are making money from it.  It summarizes previous research by International Institute for Strategic Studies, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and concludes that world militarization had reached instance proportions.  It further analyzes the trade in arms amongst the Arab countries and Israel in the mid-1970's.  The volume concludes with an analysis of the economic and social consequences, as well as a summary of learnings from the past (before 1970)

Unpublished Interview of Michael von der Goltz and Alfons Sassen
About international arms trade, his brother Willem Sassen, Ecuador. Bits of the interview were used in 'Nazis to the Core, the Sassen brothers and their anti Bolshevik Crusade in Latin America' (Publisher Aspekt 2015)

The end of the Cold War changed the international order and brought about new security challenges for the conventional arms control field. The field had been shaped by the ideologically driven political and strategic interests of the two superpowers of that time and the continuous rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the Post-Cold War era, arms control expanded into new geographical and political areas. In an era where peace was established within the western world, many conflicts, interstate and intrastate ones, started to emerge – or re-emerge - around the globe, and especially in the developing world, based on ethnic and religious divides. All these conflicts benefited from a deregulated arms market, where commercial forces, civilianization and the internationalization of manufacturing and related technology have made the nature of the conventional arms trade more vigorous than ever before. These factors created new security challenges and prospects for the agenda of conventional arms control field.
In addition, the links between disarmament processes and the economic and human development agenda and the notion of the human security being threatened at a global level by the circulation and accumulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) have revealed new tasks for conventional arms control. Therefore, the old-fashioned arms control agenda must be expanded to include issues like the effective control of arms exports and arms transfers at a global level and combating illicit arms trafficking and arms brokering, especially in the category of SALWs. However, the international community seems too immature, at the moment, to assume a consensual and comprehensive approach to conventional arms control, while all the relevant initiatives concerning the arms transfers regulation produce significant shortcomings and imperfections. Therefore, a holistic approach is necessary and will only be achieved in concert with a global consensus on an international, legally binding arms trade treaty, which will act as the cornerstone of a multifaceted and flexible mechanism for conventional arms control. This must address, in a coherent way, both pre-conflict and post-conflict situations and the different security cultures of the world’s regions and moreover, be linked to the sustainable economic and human development of the developing world.

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic bene ts and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.

In this dissertation I argue for increased regulation of a specific part of most modern international conventional arms deals - an offset agreement. This argument proceeds in multiple steps. First, the pacifist approach to arms deals is rejected. Secondly, the dissertation explains how offsets are potentially morally problematic in theory and inherently morally problematic in practice. Thirdly, a positive argument in favour of increased regulation is made using two prongs. The first prong is to argue that the corruption present in offset agreements stems from a lack of transparency which can be understood as the distributed virtue of honesty. The second prong is to make the further point that transparency on offset agreements is a crucial component of a politically legitimate democracy, where freedom is understood in the republican sense as non-domination. Fourthly, it examines three different case studies in offset policy, the U.S., the E.U. and Australia. It concludes with a set of policy recommendations to address the morally problematic features of offset agreements.

Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 27 September 1955 announcement of his decision to buy a massive amount of weapons from Czechoslovakia sent shockwaves around the world. The
years preceding 1955 had seen a long lull in the arms race between Israel and the Arab states, the result of strenuous efforts by Britain, the US, and France. Now, the quantity and
quality of weapons that Egypt was about to purchase were going to tip the scale in the Arab side’s favor. Furthermore, in the years 1952-55, Egypt received considerable sums of
American aid money for economic development. American diplomats in Cairo had been trying to convince Nasser to sign a military assistance agreement with the US, which
would have allowed Egypt to obtain American arms at low cost. But despite all that effort, it seemed that Egypt was drifting away from the West and into the communist orbit after
the announcement of the arms deal.

Diese Analyse diskutiert zunächst die Parameter für die Aktivitäten der französischen Rüstungsunternehmen, insbesondere die politisch-strategischen Vorgaben des Staates. Außerdem bildet ein kurzer historischer Rückblick die Entwicklung von Rüstungs- und Verteidigungsprogrammen ab, die den nationalen Markt und damit auch die Investitionsbudgets der Unternehmen strukturieren. Anhand von Schlüsselentscheidungen der Unternehmen untersuchen die Autoren die jüngsten Entwicklungen in der französischen Rüstungs- und Verteidigungsindustrie. Schließlich geht es darum, die Auswirkungen der Dynamik in diesem speziellen Industriesektor darzustellen und wichtige Themen zu identifizieren, die in näherer Zukunft von Bedeutung sein werden.

Examines the role Israel played in U S foreign policy in the 1960s - 90s in Central America, particularly in the arms trade, military training and torture training. Also examines Latin American perceptions of Israel which might have contributed to this collaboration between Israeli military and right-wing / pro-military elements in Latin American political structures.

States’ comments on the Arms Trade Treaty this week overwhelmingly welcomed the agreement’s forthcoming entry into force this December, which Estonia’s representative described as “a major achievement for the international community." However, Some developing countries expressed the importance of the ATT’s “application in an equal, transparent and objective manner that respects the sovereign right of all states to guarantee their legitimate defense,” as the CELAC statement put it.

The full text of the Handbook is freely available online: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/publications/by-type/handbooks/weapons-id-handbook.html

Arms and ammunition are evidence. Many weapons carry marks that, combined with their physical characteristics, reveal important information about them, including their manufacturer, age, and origin. This information, in turn, provides vital clues about the sources and flows of weapons in the area in which they were found.

The goal of this Handbook is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of how to identify and analyse small arms and light weapons, and to track their proliferation. The process of identifying arms is complex, and no single guide can provide all of the information required to identify every weapon or round of ammunition that may be encountered at crime scenes or in conflict zones. Instead, this guide explains the process by which weapons and ammunition are identified and arms flows are tracked. Reference material on specific small arms, light weapons, and ammunition is included throughout the guide. This material will help readers to take the steps necessary to identify the make and model of the most commonly encountered weapons and ammunition.

In the last decades, the "business of war" has attracted thousands of civilian transport and logistics companies, especially in the aviation sector. State and non-State actors engaged in armed conflicts or in military operations that require substantial logistic support have increasingly resorted to the services of civilian transport operators to fulfill their transport and logistics needs. For air transport companies the "business of war" has historically included logistic support for the deployment and mobility of troops and military equipment; the establishment of supply chains of arms and ammunition; and the transport of people and goods in and out conflict zones.

Recent work by scholars on the early colonial history of the Congo basin has made reference to the subject of customs and contraband. Their work has focused mainly on how smuggling networks operated across the borders of the Congo Free State (CFS). As a result of this perspective on traffickers, the role of Leopold’s administration has tended to be oversimplified. Illicit trade is usually presented as an issue that the Free State attempted, but failed, to curb. This representation of the colonial attitude towards trafficking is at odds with the general literature on contraband, which paints a rather different picture of the relationship between the state and smugglers. Rather than trying to stop trafficking, states usually tolerated contraband and had no knowledge of the majority of trafficking operations. Smuggling was tolerated because monitoring and taxing cross-border trade effectively was not considered to be cost-effective or was thought to be impossible. State rule also had to be negotiated in border regions with local elites who monopolized most local economic resources: a further reason why trafficking was often tolerated. States were unaware of most trafficking because the same officials that were supposed to monitor cross-border trade were usually involved in smuggling themselves.
By focusing on customs and contraband in the M’Bomu basin this article aims to fill in the gaps in current research on smuggling and border control in the CFS. Firstly, I examine to what extent colonial agents were involved in trafficking. Secondly, the article investigates whether Leopold’s administration was aware of smuggling and how far illicit commerce was tolerated. Finally, the article tries to explain why the Free State dealt with contraband as it did. I explore to what extent customs practices in the M’bomu borderland were based on a cost-benefit analysis and how far the attitude towards contraband might be explained by the negotiation of colonial rule with local elites.
This article demonstrates that the Free State and its agents were involved in trafficking in various ways. The CFS established a system of rule and exploitation that encouraged European officials to smuggle for the benefit of the state. Whether Leopold’s men and their African soldiers also trafficked on their own account is less clear. We do have a lot of information about the contraband activities of the sultans who ruled and exploited the majority of the M’Bomu basin in Leopold’s name. The Free State understood little about the smuggling that went on in the M’Bomu basin. Gradually, however, there was growing awareness amongst colonial officials. Nevertheless, tolerance usually prevailed with only a few futile measures taken to curb contraband. The CFS was convinced that the cost of controlling the uncontrollable M’Bomu border would exceed the benefit. Nevertheless, this cost-benefit analysis only partly explains the colonial attitude towards smuggling. This article argues that the Free State and its agents were involved in trafficking and were either unaware of contraband or tolerated illicit commerce because colonial rule in the M’Bomu basin was organized so as to extract as much revenue as possible, as fast as possible, and at the lowest possible cost. The pressure to maximize revenue led the Free State to establish a system of rule and exploitation that encouraged its local agents to extract a surplus by all means possible, including through trafficking. At the same time the M’Bomu region had to be ruled and exploited at the lowest possible cost. The very limited administration was unable to detect, understand or curb trafficking. Moreover, administering the M’Bomu basin at the lowest possible cost forced the Free State to outsource the rule and exploitation of the majority of the borderland to local rulers. These local rulers, however, had large stakes in cross-border trade and continued to smuggle on a wide scale despite their incorporation into the colonial administration. Because colonial rule was negotiated with the local elite, their smuggling had to be tolerated.

TransArms and IPIS undertook a thorough research of the responsibilities of states and companies involved in the transfer of military equipment by sea under customary international law. The maritime transport is by far the main modality for the transfers of military equipment and commodities.  The report considers cases of irresponsible shipments of arms and military commodities to countries with ongoing armed conflicts and escalating human rights violations. The authors also identify areas for future improvement of the ATT.

The full text of the Handbook is freely available online: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources/publications/by-type/handbooks/weapons-id-handbook.html

Arms and ammunition are evidence. Many weapons carry marks that, combined with their physical characteristics, reveal important information about them, including their manufacturer, age, and origin. This information, in turn, provides vital clues about the sources and flows of weapons in the area in which they were found.

The goal of this Handbook is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of how to identify and analyse small arms and light weapons, and to track their proliferation. The process of identifying arms is complex, and no single guide can provide all of the information required to identify every weapon or round of ammunition that may be encountered at crime scenes or in conflict zones. Instead, this guide explains the process by which weapons and ammunition are identified and arms flows are tracked. Reference material on specific small arms, light weapons, and ammunition is included throughout the guide. This material will help readers to take the steps necessary to identify the make and model of the most commonly encountered weapons and ammunition.

Already at the beginning of independence, a conviction was formed at the top of the military hierarchy of the Second Polish Republic that the equipment of the army should be based on native production. The idea was accepted as a sort of an axiom, and was realized consistently, although with some flexibility. In the second half of the 1930s, negative consequences of such an armament policy were becoming
more and more visible. In many cases, Polish design offices turned out to be incapable of keeping up with world leaders, and the process of implementing foreign licenses and starting up a production on their basis was too slow. In spite of the worsening international situation, the decision of launching an intervention purchase of modern equipment abroad was postponed until the middle of March 1939.
Negotiations concerning armament loans that began in May 1939 in London and Paris turned out to be delayed – the final agreements were signed on 2nd and 18th August 1939. They made it possible to make the most urgent purchases, however, the acquired equipment that was immediately dispatched did not manage to reach Poland before the end of the September Campaign of 1939.
The tragic end demonstrates the dramatic character of the decision with which the constructors of the armament policy of the Second Polish Republic were faced. The strategic conditions in which the policy had to develop did not provide any fully rational solutions to their dilemmas.

Following the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, a combination of financial insolvency, changing priorities in imperial defense and personal preferences led Sultan Abdülhamid II to execute a radical shift in Ottoman naval policy. The battle fleet was mothballed and the revolutionary new naval weapons system, the torpedo boat, was embraced as the new backbone of the imperial navy. This paper aims to analyze both the internal and the international context of the Hamidian naval policies, present an accurate technological panorama of the first Ottoman torpedo flotilla and summarize the operations of these vessels. Full plans of the three different classes of Ottoman torpedo vessels are provided for the first time in historiography, scale drawings of all vessels mentioned and numerous photographs, some published for the first time.

How do states decide where to source arms? Drawing on theories of international relations, we consider the recent fighter aircraft competitions in Brazil and India, and analyze why the U.S.-made aircraft lost to their European rivals. Official statements offered by the Brazilian and Indian governments have cited inferior aircraft performance, technology-sharing issues, and prices. These explanations may be valid, but their main purpose is to direct attention away from the fact that military procurement is, above all, a matter of international politics and policy. Using analytical eclecticism as our guide, we selectively combine constructivist, liberal, and realist theoretical elements to provide a more comprehensive explanation of why Lockheed Martin and Boeing failed to sell fighters to Brazil and India. Related Articles Catalinac, Amy L. 2007. “Theory and Foreign Policy: Explaining Japan's Responses to the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S. War in Iraq.” Politics & Policy 35 (1): 58–100. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00049.x/abstract Quinn, Adam. 2007. “The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism and Realism in Post-Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy.” Politics & Policy 35 (3): 522–547. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00071.x/abstract Rosen, Amanda M. 2015. “The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.” Politics & Policy 43 (1): 30–58. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12105/abstract Related Media So, Vishnu. 2012. “The Story of the Rafale.” NDTV. December 8. Duration: 16 min, 42 sec. http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/bigger-higher-faster/the-story-of-the-rafale/257581 Brazil. 2015. “F-X2 e Gripen NG (Tudo Sobre pt. 1).” Noticias Militares. January 10. Duration: 3 min, 38 sec (in Brazilian Portuguese). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8P12stwG1jA Como es que los estados deciden donde proveer armas? Teniendo en vista las teorias de relaciones internacionales, consideramos que los concursos recientes de aviones de guerra en Brasil y la India y analizamos por que los aviones hechos en los EEUU perdieron ante sus rivales europeos. Las posiciones oficiales ofrecidas por los gobiernos brazileno e indio han citado desempeno inferior de las aeronaves y asuntos de compartimiento de tecnologia asi como precios. Estas explicaciones pueden ser validas, pero su principal proposito es desviar la atencion del hecho que la procuracion militar es, sobre todo, un asunto de politica y politicas internacionales. Utilizando como guia al eclecticismo analitico, combinamos de manera selectiva elementos teoricos constructivistas liberales y realistas para proveer una explicacion mas comprensiva de por que Lockheed Martin y Boeing fracasaron en su intento de vender aeronaves de guerra a Brasil e India.

Although the number of craft-produced small arms and light weapons is difficult to estimate, they are prevalent and range broadly in sophistication and quality.

Improvised and craft-produced firearms remain an important source of firepower for a wide range of actors, including tribal groups, poachers, criminals, insurgent groups, and even some states and quasi-state groups. In various locations, these weapons account for most of the firearms used in crime; in others, their production is institutionalized, providing essential income for local gunsmiths.

Criminals outside of active conflict zones, especially in developing states and territories, appear to hold the highest concentrations of craft-produced small arms. In several countries, such firearms account for a sizable proportion of weapons seized in law enforcement operations.

The vast majority of improvised and craft-produced weapons cannot be easily traced, although certain forensic and investigative techniques show promise in closing this gap.

The years 1933 and 1934 were critical ones for European diplomacy, as statesmen groped to divine precisely what Hitler represented and how best to deal with him and his resurgent Germany.  In the ensuing welter of diplomatic initiatives, one intriguing, and insufficiently studied, response was the Italo-Soviet rapprochement, which peaked with their economic accord of May 1933 and their “Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, and Nonaggression” of September.  The progress of this increasing cordiality can be measured by the extensive military cooperation that developed between the Fascist and Soviet states.  In the ritualized theater of diplomacy, both consciously used military contacts to encourage further cooperative steps and to prove to the world and to themselves that what was happening was important.

Od pierwszych miesięcy swego istnienia odrodzona w roku 1918 Rzeczpospolita nawiązała bliską współpracę z Republiką Francuską. Jedną z płaszczyzn współpracy obu państw stanowiły dostawy sprzętu wojskowego, którymi Francja zasilała największego ze swych wschodnich sojuszników. W połowie lat 30. XX wieku, gdy dobiegała kresu realizacja udzielonego przez Paryż ponad dekadę wcześniej zbrojeniowego kredytu, w Warszawie kiełkować zaczęła koncepcja by środków na rozbudowę i modernizację armii ponownie zacząć szukać nad Sekwaną. Pierwsze sondaże w tej kwestii poczyniono już w jesieni 1935 roku, poważniejsze rozmowy podejmując kilka miesięcy później. Wstrzemięźliwa początkowo postawa Francuzów, niepewnych intencji pomawianego o zbyt bliskie związki z Niemcami alianta, ulegać zaczęła stopniowej zmianie po dokonanej przez te ostatnie 7 III 1936 r. remilitaryzacji strefy nadreńskiej. Przełomowe uzgodnienia poczynione zostały późnym latem, a ich finał nastąpił 6 IX 1936 r., kiedy to w podparyskim zamku Rambouillet podpisano kolejną kredytową umowę. Fiaskiem zakończyła się natomiast podjęta równolegle francuska próba wykorzystania rokowań do osłabienia uznawanych za proniemieckie wpływów polskiego ministra spraw zagranicznych Józefa Becka oraz skłonienia Polaków do ściślejszej współpracy z Czechosłowacją. Doznany w tej kwestii zawód miał znacząco osłabić zainteresowanie władz z Paryża realizacją zaciągniętych w Rambouillet zobowiązań. Strona polska porozumienie przyjęła z zadowoleniem. Uzyskała niezwykle potrzebny zbrojeniowy kredyt oraz pożyczkę gotówkową, których łączną wysokość ustalono ostatecznie na 2,6 mld franków, unikając krępujących jej samodzielność politycznych deklaracji. Jesienią 1936 roku rozpoczęła więc swoisty wyścig z czasem, chcąc wykorzystać przyznane jej sumy przed wybuchem spodziewanego być może już za dwa lata konfliktu z zachodnim sąsiadem.

Armament Research Services (ARES) Special Report 4, Munitions Employing Sensor-fuzed Submunitions: Do they Comply with the Convention on Cluster Munitions?, critically evaluates the definition of "cluster munition" established by the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), in order to assess the convention's applicability to cargo munitions carrying sensor-fuzed submunitions. The report explores the operational rationale behind sensor-fuzed submunitions as well as briefly addressing the unexploded ordnance (UXO) hazard posed by such munitions. It then explains the technical characteristics which distinguish sensor-fuzed submunitions from their conventional counterparts.

Drawing on a range of primary sources, confidential interviews with industry and military personnel, secondary literature, and the perspectives of several prominent ordnance experts, Special Report 4 establishes a methodology for assessing weapons which carry sensor-fuzed submunitions. It then applies the nine-step test described in that methodology to five of the most common weapons which employ sensor-fuzed submunitions that remain in inventory or use today. Special Report 4 finds that only two of the five selected munitions are banned under the CCM, and that the factors which determined CCW compliance are not always directly connected to the stated principles of minimising harm to civilians and civilian objects. The report concludes by considering sometimes overlooked hazards of sensor-fuzed submunitions, as well as the potential for unintended consequences which may arise from an outright ban of these weapons.

Due to a U.S./EU arms embargo that was impo- sed on China in 1989, China remains excluded from tra- ding with any of the leading arms producers except for Russia and Ukraine. The previously existing military-industrial symbiosis between Ukraine and Russia, however, came to an abrupt end in 2014 with Russia‘s invasion and resulting occupation of Crimea. The sudden breaking off of defense-industrial ties between these two closely interwoven military-industrial complexes offers analysts the unusual chance to study the nature of transnational arms production arrangements and their strategic implications under crisis conditions. China is poised to benefit from this, while Western sanctions create incentives for China and Russia to enhance their mutual strategic co-operation.