China's military strategy

China’s security concept is evolving, and its participation in Africa’s Arab countries’ peacekeeping is transforming itself from aloof bystander to active player, and from multilateralism to both multi- and unilateralism. The establishment of China’s logistics base in Djibouti does not signify a sudden change in China’s African foreign policy; instead, change has been gradual and tangible and began with the evolution of China’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and engagement in Africa’s infrastructure projects, in parallel with China’s increasing global presence. The base serves as a logistics and support facility for Chinese peacekeepers, as well as a naval facility to support anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia as part of an international anti-piracy operation. Moreover, the base helps China to ensure its maritime and commercial interests and safeguard Chinese nationals in West Asia and the African continent. However, the United States and the West are concerned with the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of China’s logistics base in Djibouti. The geography of Djibouti has led to the rising of geopolitical rivalries between the great powers, which may intensify in the coming years.

Russian President Vladmir Putin’s recent visit to India (October 15-16, 2016) led to India signing some major defence deals which included the supply of five battalions of Russian S-400 long range surface to air missiles (LR-SAM) at a cost of $5.5 billion (Rupees 39,000 crores) . The Russian President was in India to attend the BRICS Summit at Goa and India-Russia agreements were finalised in bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. S-400 – also known as ‘Triumf’ in Russia and SA-21 ‘Growler’ by NATO – is amongst the most lethal long range surface to air missile systems in the world. S-400 has a tracking range of 600 km and can engage targets up to a range of 400 km at a scorching speed of 13.8 Mach (17000km/h) . Deliveries of the S-400 to India are not likely to start before 2019-2020 as Russian manufacturing plants are busy meeting their own requirements and the demand from China . At a time when Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft strength is down to 33 squadrons  due to retiring of old aircraft and delays in new inductions, the acquisition of S-400 missiles will be a major shot in the arm for the IAF. Its long range and advanced capabilities will be a nightmare for both the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Chinese Air Force (also known as People’s Liberation Army Air Force – PLAAF).

China’s aviation industry is controlled by two major companies – Aviation Industries Corporation of China (AVIC) and Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). AVIC is a large company with about 600,000 employees and manufactures military aircraft, civilian aircraft, helicopters, air to air missiles and some types of anti-ship missiles. COMAC is the only major aviation company not under AVIC. COMAC was set up in 2008 as an independent company to develop China’s first commercial civil airline aircraft, the C-919. COMAC is a much smaller company than AVIC and employs just 6,000 workers. This article covers the development of China’s military aircraft industry and the lessons for India.

The eleventh chapter (The Nine Terrains) has often confounded students of the text. It is by far the longest chapter in the book, and its organization can seem chaotic, with some sections simply corrupted repetitions, and other topics drifting aimlessly into non-sequiturs. Moreover, given the descriptions of various terrains found in chapters 8, 9 and 10, this chapter is often thought of as simply a summary of the information already covered in previous sections of the book. Chapter 11, though, is unique and worthy of more careful analysis. More than any other section of the book, this chapter follows a close approximation of modern operational design. The sequence of terrains outlines Sun Tzu's vision for how an offensive operation should ideally unfold in terms of both time and space, from the initial invasion across the enemy border to the culminating decisive battle that will achieve victory for one's army. There are two main elements to Sun Tzu's operational concept: drive deeply into the enemy's territory and then seek " death ground " for your soldiers before initiating the attack. The following is NOT a translation of the chapter, but simply a short synopsis to allow one to quickly visualize the structure of the text. Verse numbers correspond to those found in the Sun Tzu Translation Database. Note that while " Nine Terrains " is the most appropriate direct translation, " terrain " does not adequately reflect what Sun Tzu is describing. He is not overly concerned with the actual physical properties of the terrains he is listing. His thinking is aligned more with the modern military term of " zone of operation " and since he suggests only conducting offensive operations, I choose to title the chapter " The Nine Zones of Offensive Operations. " The heart of this chapter is Sun Tzu's explanation of these nine zones. In the first half of the chapter (verses 02-19), he provides a short description of each zone, followed by a recommended action for each of the corresponding zones. Later in the text (verses 43-57) Sun Tzu repeats this pattern, but the description portion is

Even before the abrupt end of a relatively liberal regime in Hong Kong, Chinese President Xi Jinping made no secret of his ambition to fix  the "Taiwan problem". Despite the rise of the Chinese military, Taiwan is nevertheless able to resist it, under certain conditions. In the event of aggression from China, the majority of Taiwanese are ready to fight. The capacity they need to cope with it depends on several variables, starting with the attitude of the United States. Given its central position on the Indo-Pacific axis, Taiwan can count on the support of the Americans and their allies, including Japan. This support is all the more strong as the Taiwanese semiconductor industry has made itself an hegemon on the world stage. Moreover, as the island has shown with the Covid-19 pandemic, Taiwan knows how to anticipate bad blows coming from the continent. This capacity to anticipate what comes from China has enabled the country to amplify the good performance of its economy, which in turn gives the island the financial means to strengthen its military capabilities to, if necessary, wage an asymmetric war against China.
甚至在香港相對自由的政權斷然結束之前，中國國家主席習近平就毫不掩飾解決「台灣問題」的野心。儘管中國軍隊崛起，但在某些條件下，台灣還是有能力抵禦中國軍隊。在中國侵略的情況下，大多數的台灣人都準備好迎接戰鬥。台灣人需要應對的能力取決於幾個變項，首先是美國的態度。鑑於台灣在印度-太平洋軸線上的中心位置，可待指望得到美國及其盟友的支持，包括日本在內。再者，由於台灣的半導體產業已經成為世界舞台上的一個不可被取代的要角，得以加強國際支持的力道。此外，正如該島在Covid-19大流行中，防疫成績相當亮眼，台灣知道如何預測來自大陸的打壓與軍事威脅。這種預測能力使該國能更有餘裕擴大經濟上的良好表現，這反過來又使台灣有財力加強其軍事能力，在必要時對中國發動不對稱的作戰。
Après la fin brutale de la parenthèse libérale à Hong Kong, le président chinois Xi Jinping ne fait pas mystère de son ambition d'en finir avec le « problème taïwanais ». Quelle que soit la teneur de cette menace et malgré la montée en gamme de l'armée chinoise, Taïwan est en mesure d'y résister, à certaines conditions. La majorité des Taïwanais sont, en effet, prêts à se battre en cas d'agression de la Chine. Quant aux capacités dont ils ont besoin pour y faire face, elles dépendent de plusieurs variables, à commencer par l'attitude des États-Unis. Compte tenu de sa position centrale sur l'axe indo-pacifique, Taïwan peut compter sur le soutien des Américains et de ses alliés, dont le Japon. Ce soutien est d'autant plus fort que l'industrie taïwanaise des semi-conducteurs s'est rendue incontournable sur la scène mondiale. Enfin, comme elle l'a montré depuis le début de la pandémie de Covid-19, Taïwan sait anticiper les mauvais coups venant du continent, ce qui lui a permis d'amplifier la bonne performance de son économie et lui donne les moyens financiers de renforcer ses capacités militaires pour, le cas échéant, livrer une guerre asymétrique à la Chine.

This thesis assesses the geopolitical structure and dynamic of the regional system East Asia under the framework of offensive realism, and provides a macro- to micro-level analysis of the impact of geography on great power behaviour, defence policy, and military acquisitioning. Assessing military strategy and acquisition under geographical aspects fills a gap in the theoretical body of offensive realism, since the theory does not sufficiently explain the role of landpower and its projection in a maritime environment. Support forces such as the navy and the air force, but also conventional missile and amphibious forces, are upgraded to enabling forces. A closer look on the priorities of Chinese and Japanese armament confirms this. So do reforms pushed by the US Pacific Command that are assessed as well. The states in East Asia, including the two regional great powers China and Japan are heavily dependent on sea lines of communication. The Chinese ambition of creating an anti-access area-denial zone (A2AD) in the Western Pacific that impedes US power projection into East Asia is directly driven by vulnerabilities created by this dependency. Likewise, Japan’s slow abandonment of pacifism is a reaction to China’s emergence as a seapower in this specific geographical context.

In the last ten years Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has made a quantum jump in enhancing its early warning network with the induction of Chinese ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle AWACS (Air borne Warning and Control System) aircraft and the Swedish Saab-2000 AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) aircraft. With AWACS having been inducted in the IAF (Indian Air Force) also, any future India-Pakistan conflict will involve an AWACS versus AWACS scenario. This article briefly discusses the induction of ZDK-03 AWACS in PAF inventory and its implications for India.

Strategic Studies Quarterly (SSQ) is the senior United States Air Force sponsored journal fostering intellectual enrichment for national and international security professionals. SSQ provides a forum for critically examining, informing, and debating, national and international security matters.

Contributions to SSQ will explore strategic issues of current and continuing interest to the USAF, the larger defense community, and our international partners.

We encourage readers to email their comments to us at: strategistudiesquarterly@us.af.mil

[Note I have been updating this report to include comparisons with more strategic texts including Machiavelli, Jomini, Thucydides, Wylie, US. Grant, etc.] Comparison/Contrast of specific verses in both Sun Tzu's "Art of War" and Clausewitz's "On War." I hope to update this periodically (and fix the minor typos).

I have long been skeptical of translating the famous phrase from the Sunzi,不戰而屈人之兵, as "winning without fighting," and thereby interpreting his recommendation as primarily non-violent actions taken prior to the commencement of hostilities. My main issue is that if this is a cornerstone of his theory, almost nothing concrete in the rest of the text seems to support this reading. Just a few verses later Sun Tzu is recommending "attacking" the enemy if one is five times his size. Why wouldn't such an overwhelming numerical advantage allow you to better effect the stated goal of "winning without fighting?" In studying the Zuozhuan and other military texts of that era, though, I find it interesting that they define "battle" [戰] in a rather narrow manner to indicate fighting occurring only after each side has "formed their ranks" [陳]. If this correct, we may be fundamentally misreading this critical verse. What if Sun Tzu is not saying avoid battle at all, but instead is simply recommending that one assault the enemy before he has an opportunity to form his ranks, and therefore is a plea to avoid a "pitched" battle, not an avoidance of fighting writ large.

Still wrestling with whether or not this is a valid interpretation, so would welcome any feedback that anyone has, either for or against.

China's rise to the status of a global power is a very complex phenomenon. Yet students of international relations (IR) are taught that a good theory should be 'parsimonious', meaning that it should explain a lot with a little. In relation to China's rise, the problem with theoretical parsimony may be not what it includes but what it leaves out. This article argues that lack of explanatory breadth and depth in connection with China's IRs demonstrates a shortcoming in mainstream IR theories such as neorealism, offensive realism and constructivism. A candidate for an IR theory which explains more with more is complexity theory (CT), which utilises a conceptual toolkit including non-linearity, feedback effects, emergent properties and complex adaptive systems. CT's toolkit, already used in the natural sciences, seems a good candidate to explain the hard-to-predict phenomena that emerge in the international sphere, but has not yet been developed into a clear theoretical lens in IR. In this article, the rise of China is analysed through the lenses of three mainstream theories and CT in order to assess the strengths and shortcomings of each approach and to suggest how CT's 'conceptual toolkit' might be utilised to flesh out existing IR theories in order to explain China's rise more fully.

Military cooperation between the two countries was re-established in the end of 1980s. Since 1989 this has been the most important component of the bilateral relationship. Until the 2000s, the arms trade and regional and border security issues were the main facets of Russo-Chinese relations. But since then, strengthening economic relations have overtaken military cooperation. However, the latter remains important, especially amid increasing tensions between Russia and the US on the one hand, and China and the US on the other. This research aims to explore reality and perspectives of the military cooperation between two states. It argues that probably at least for the immediate future, military and security cooperation between Russia and China will increase but both sides will keep an eye on each other with the aim of not repeating past mistakes.

Given the scarcity of authoritative writings or clarifying analyses on Sun Tzu’s text, how confident should we be that we have correctly grasped “the Way” of this ancient sage? Of particular importance, one of the core ideas we almost universally believe serves as a bedrock to Sun Tzu’s overall military philosophy—that his ideal strategic objective is “to take the enemy whole and intact” —rests on a problematic and potentially untenable textual foundation. Instead, a stronger case favors an interpretation of Sun Tzu prioritizing self-preservation. Whether or not one’s adversary is destroyed or taken non-violently remains a distant secondary concern.

The paper argues that as an emerging maritime power in the maritime-configured Indo-Pacific region, India would need to make a more pronounced contribution to humanitarian response beyond its sovereign territorial confines, in various contingencies ranging from disaster-relief and UN peacekeeping to civilian evacuation, and from counter-piracy to search and rescue. This is essential for India, not only to ensure the safety of its own citizens, their property and their means of livelihood, but also to meet its normative commitment as a major power, and to project its image as a responsible power and fulfil its broader geopolitical and foreign policy objectives at the regional and global levels.

In this direction, recent trends are encouraging. There seems to be a palpable increase in India’s Out of Area (OOA) humanitarian response, enabled largely by the Indian armed forces, including the Indian Coast Guard. However, India’s approach may need to be driven by more articulate doctrines at various levels of authority. This would lead to a more deliberate national and maritime strategies, and thus a more holistic and synergetic approach.

In this context, the paper undertakes an appraisal of India’s current approach at three levels – national, joint-Service and Service level, and recommends ‘course-corrections’ with regard to the doctrine, organisation and capability aspects. It seeks to endorse its recommendations by examining the case of China, which is contemporary emerging maritime power in the Indo-Pacific region.

This article addresses the question of how China ends wars in a three-stage approach. First, I synthesize the central elements of the extensive literature on war termination and conflict resolution. From this review, I derive three independent variables that impact the likelihood of conflict resolution in a given period: states’ approach to wartime diplomacy, views on escalation, and receptiveness to mediation. I then evaluate the values of these three factors in each of the three major wars the PRC has fought since its founding in 1949: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). Though I use this framework to identify Chinese tendencies, this three-pronged diplomacy, escalation, mediation framework can be applied generally to assess state behavior and the likelihood of war termination in any given period.

This report examines Indian and Chinese strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean and perceptions about their respective roles.  It first discusses China’s vital strategic interests in protecting its sea lanes of communication across the Indian Ocean, particularly the unobstructed flow of energy, and China’s moves to develop a military presence to protect its interests.  It will then consider some fundamental differences in Indian and Chinese views over status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean.  Delhi tends towards what some may see as a somewhat proprietary attitude to the Indian Ocean, perceiving the presence of extra-regional naval powers, particularly China, as being unnecessary and essentially illegitimate.  At the same time, many Indian strategists view China as having particular strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean, which contributes to that theatre having a special importance in the overall relationship.  For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize India’s claims towards great power status or India’s perceived prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region.  Beijing’s refusal to show sensitivity towards Indian concerns contributes even further towards heightened level of threat perceptions in Delhi.

Since the development of its first atomic bomb in 1964, China has claimed that its nuclear strategy is driven by the desire to have the minimum means necessary to deter adversarial aggression. This argument has been widely accepted in the US, and has long been used to justify a modest increase in China's nuclear force over the past half century. This argument makes sense when one considers China's enhanced production of long-range ballistic missiles like the DF-31 and DF-31A. It is a stretch, however, to apply this argument to other areas, such as China's initial development of thermonuclear weapons and its more recent deployment of operational Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles. In these cases, the cost of development seems to outweigh the gains in defensive security when compared to other alternatives. This paper takes an in-depth look at these cases through the lens of primary source documents to explore the underlying motivation behind their development.

This study will examine both the long and short-term goals and intentions of a Chinese government and its critical internal actors specifically in regard to the South China Sea.  It will also reveal the recently securitized Chinese system's advancement of complementary and orchestrated construction of a security framework which is reinforced through the active exercising of hard and soft power options. Applying a mixture of open and axial coding and triangulation, several recurring themes are highlighted allowing for the bridging of Securitization Theory/Threat Framing and specific Chinese actions relatable to the South China Sea. Emergent themes in the literature include the active use and securitization by military services, government entities, academic scholars, and state-operated cooperation’s serving as agents.  Foreign intervention and potential eco-cultural containment are stressed as the required existential threat.  Various hard power and soft power techniques and methods arise time and time again both created from and reinforcing the constructed securitized objects and ideals.

The pursuit of the national interest is closely linked to geography, strategy and contexts specific in foreign policy, anchoring remains significant and spatial to the Nation's production possibility frontier with empirical case studies of China and the United States of America. Foreign policy solutions 'desired outcome' are in 'the continuum' termed poly singularity. Public value theory, Kingdon's multiple streams approach and Baumgartner and Jones's punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) was applied as critical thinking to captures decision constructive process of national interest with focus on value streams for stakeholders with the contexts specific situation illuminated as spatial polysingularity construct in framework. China's 'Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)' Project altercasting as liberalist and realist for global economic and militarily power in East Asia. The United States energy interests drives its 'Globalization Agenda and market economies' globally. A new superpower crucible framework with win-win national interest's scenario termed 'warfare ecosystem' postulated.

Keywords: policy development, spatial polysingularity, national interest, public value theory, globalization 4.0, foreign policy, warfare ecosystem and wicked problems framework.

A few days ago Indian media reported that China’s J-20 stealth fighter aircraft was seen at Daocheng Yading airport in Garze, Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province. Some of the reports had blazing headlines, “China’s Top Secret Fighter Spotted In Tibet Days After it Warned India, ” another one declared, “ Days after warning India, China’s stealth fighter jet spotted in Tibet.” The “warning” which these reports are referring to is in relation to India’s decision, in August 2016, to deploy an advanced version of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile in Arunachal Pradesh. This new missile has steep dive attack capability which is specifically designed to be effective against targets in mountainous terrain like the one on the India-China border. Plans for deploying it in eastern India, adjacent to Tibet, have irked China. The PLA Daily, which is the official publication of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), in an article is reported to have said “India deploying supersonic missiles on the border has exceeded its own needs for self defence and poses a serious threat to China’s Tibet and Yunnan provinces .” The Indian army responded sharply and made it clear to the Chinese that, “Our threat perceptions and security concerns are our own, and how we address these by deploying assets on our territory should be no one else’s concern .” The news reports also says that the J-20 has appeared in Daocheng just days before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China for G-20 summit meeting, thereby implying that China is sending a signal to India of its military might. At first sight these sensational headlines surely make for good copy but the theatrics do not address the real issues. This article counters the hype in the Indian media and discusses issues related to China’s J-20 development programme.

La racionalidad es el lenguaje de comunicación por excelencia entre la inteligencia humana (IH) y la inteligencia artificial (IA). La racionalidad también ayuda a entender la relación entre la inteligencia artificial y la inteligencia humana. Esta relación es muy bonita, al menos al principio de los tiempos de la inteligencia artificial. Esta relación también nos explica en qué terrenos la inteligencia humana es superior a la artificial y viceversa.
El presente ejercicio se llevó a cabo bajo una gran cantidad de supuestos, la situación es hipotética, pero realista en el terreno de las probabilidades. El objetivo central es abrir la mente a toda la serie de posibles combinaciones del uso militar de la inteligencia militar y el papel de los humanos a ese respecto.  De todas maneras, la racionalidad es el lenguaje de comunicación entre la inteligencia artificial y la inteligencia humana y lo será hasta el fin de los tiempos, probablemente más de los tiempos humanos. Finalmente, en la naturaleza, la especie más fuerte tiende a dominar y hasta exterminar a la especie más débil. Los humanos, en el largo plazo, jugamos con las apuestas en contra.

This article attempts to lay out a conceptual framework for
evaluating the actual military value of China’s newly developed weaponry. Its
basic assumption is that technological military progress is not sufficient to
increase military strength. Therefore an alternative approach is adopted that
studies the adaptability of the new technologies to the country’s strategic
situation. To this end, the study assumes that the value of a weapon system is
measured by its suitability to the country’s military, economic and technological
conditions. The country’s ability to meet these requirements depends to a large
extent on the procurement process. Exploring China’s recent military procurement
approach, the study finds that under the prevailing conditions, China’s
military procurement process could reduce the actual military value of the newly
developed weaponry.

Actors in competitive environments are bound to decide and act under conditions of uncertainty because they rarely have accurate foreknowledge of how their opponents will respond and when they will respond. Just as a competitor makes a move to improve their standing on a given variable relative to a target competitor, she should expect the latter to counteract with an iterative lagged asymmetric response, that is, with a sequence of countermoves (iteration) that is very different in kind from its trigger (asymmetry) and that will be launched at some unknown point in the future (time lag). The paper explicates the broad relevance of the newly proposed concept of " iterative lagged asymmetric responses " to the social study of temporality and to fields as diverse as intelligence and counterintelligence studies, strategic management, futures studies, military theory, and long-range planning. By bringing out in the foreground and substantiating the observation that competitive environments place a strategic premium on surprise, the concept of iterative lagged asymmetric responses makes a contribution to the never-ending and many-pronged debate about the extent to which the future can be predicted.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X17752652

1. Recently available high resolution imagery of DF-26 points to the high likelihood of the missile
being based on the DF-16 design with the booster length increased for extended range.
2. There is also a possibility that a better fuel with high burn rate performance is used.
3. The nose geometry and the higher payload capacity indicate that the re-entry vehicle has high
ballistic coefficient and hence will have very high re-entry velocity
4. For terminal control the missile would most likely have reaction control motors rather than
aerodynamic control surfaces.
5. The enhanced re-entry velocity makes the missile unsuitable for anti-ship operation.
6. It is highly likely that the missile is specifically designed for high precision conventional strikes.
7. The likely targets, going by the range, would be air bases in Guam and the vehicle might come
with specifically designed larger cluster type sub-munitions warhead and bunker busting
warheads for HDBT.

In this article the thesis is submitted that there is something fundamentally wrong with Western Sinology, or 'Chinakunde', or 'Zhongguoxue' (as distinct from 'Hanxue', which is a kind of old-fashioned philology aggrandised with quasi- if not pseudo-philosophy). 'China experts' either pretend to be knowledgeable about everything related to China, in which case they cannot be taken seriously, or - eventually - admit not to be scientific all-rounders with respect to the country, in which case they cannot be called China experts. The author, who graduated in Sinology from Leyden University and in economics from Erasmus University Rotterdam, not only believes that the study of China has to be taken to a higher level (a belief, he expects, no tenured professor of Chinese Studies/History will share); he also explains how this long overdue task could be accomplished. The study of China should be neither mile-wide-but-inch-deep nor mile-deep-but-inch-wide; it should (and could!) be mile-wide-and-mile-deep. The heyday of Sinology is yet to come.

For over a decade, with the world’s only superpower bogged down by conflict in the Middle East, domestic political gridlock, and the residuals of a worldwide recession, an emerging China has aggressively developed both strategy and tactics that attempt to elevate the country into a competent, respected, and authoritative regional actor. Harnessing and fueling multiple lines of effort on the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic fronts, the Chinese Communist Party has been able to make a fairly successful bid toward regional hegemony.

India will continue to face the twin challenges; one, the pandemic, Himalayan in its proportion, and second, the unabated standoff with China, its Himalayan neighbor. The enormous task of managing the pandemic that has severely impacted India’s most vulnerable communities can easily spew new and complicate existing economic, social, and political challenges. India’s second towering challenge in the form of the continued military standoff with China may get further complicated due to the pandemic’s direct and indirect effects. For India, the internal and external policy landscape in 2021 would be shaped by its ability to resolve the two strategically interconnected challenges; its ongoing border standoff with China and its ability to limit the economic and social disruption caused by the pandemic.

Chinese naval development have shown great strides in the last decade, largely favorable results of Sino-Russian cooperation and outright Chinese purchase of both hardware and technologies to bring its naval forces out of the Sixties. It is also noteworthy that there is no sign of this cooperation abating soon, although there will be limits in the coming decade likely, initiated by Moscow.

The article  surveys doctrinal motivations, the state of submarine modernization, the new aircraft carrier and associated fighter programs, new destroyer and frigate construction, new fast attack craft (PTG) programs, the amphibious ship expansion program, and concludes with a final assessment.

This article analyses the doctrine development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) coping with the Soviet military threat between 1969 and 1989. In the 1970s, the PLA applied a doctrine of ‘active defence and luring the enemy into depth’ based on its traditional operational art. In 1980, the PLA decided to focus its doctrine on positional defence. In 1986, the PLA introduced ‘integrated operations and prioritised strike’, a generalised doctrine that originated from its war history. Many organisational and intellectual challenges in peacetime doctrine development contributed to the PLA’s operational idealism, including its aging leadership, command structure, attitude towards its previous experience, limited analysis of contemporary military developments, and failure in test and validation of doctrines. In the post-Cold War decade, many of these challenges persisted in spite of military modernization efforts. The ongoing military reform has to address these challenges and improve the PLA doctrine development in peacetime.

Cumhuriyeti'nin (ÇHC) iktisadî alanda güçlenmesinin arakasından, küresel bir güç olmak için bir yola çıktığından itibaren, teorik olarak kendi topağı saydığı Tayvan'ı, bir türlü yönetimi altına alamadığından ötürü, büyük bir rahatsızlık duyduğu elbette malumu ilamdan ibarettir. 1971'den itibaren Tayvan'ı Çin'in bir parçası sayan ABD'nin, ÇHC'ne karşı Tayvan'ı her halükarda desteklemesi bir çelişki olarak görülmekte ve nedeni tartışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Tayvan'ın ABD ile ÇHC arasında bir savaş sebebi olacağını ihsas eden "kilit cephe" ifadesi bile kullanılmaktadır. Ancak şunu belirtelim ki, Tayvan bir "Stratejik Hedef Alanı"nın kilitmekanı da değildir. Zira Tayvan, Çin anakarasını boydan boya kaplayacak bir cebhe niteliğine haiz olmadığı için ancak, bizim tabirimizle, günümüzde ABD'nin ÇHC'ne karşı ördüğü bir Deniz Duvarı'nın parçası konumunda Eğer Tayvan, ABD açısından bir savaş aracı değilse, bunun nedenleri üzerinde düşünmek gerekmektedir. Vardığımız neticeyi bir satırla baştan söylemeliyiz. ABD, ÇHC ile Tayvan üzerinde savaş yapmak niyetinde olmayıp, Tayvan'ı ÇHC'ni dönüştürmek için bir model olarak kullanmak istemektedir. Bu hususu güzel bir şekilde anlatabilmek için, tarihi bir laboratuvar olarak kullanarak, zemin oluşturmak istiyoruz. Zira Tayvan'ın Çin'i denizden çevrelemede kullananlar ile ABD'nin Çin Cumhuriyet ve ÇHC'ne karşı yaklaşımlarındaki farklar, bize ABD'nin stratejisini anlama imkânı da verecektir.

The U.S. military’s 65-year lease of 30,000 acres of Hawaiian land – at the Pōhakuloa Training Area (on the Big Island of Hawai‘i), the Kawailoa/Poamoho Training Area, the Kahuku Training Area, and the Mākua Military Reservation (on O‘ahu) – will end in 2029. On August 10 and 11, the U.S. Army held public scoping hearings for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for Army Training Land Retention. Among the dozens of individuals that testified, there was unanimous agreement that the U.S. military must clean up and leave.

We must not allow Ka Pae ‘Aina to be used by the U.S. war machine. At this moment, we have an opportunity to stand in solidarity with Native Hawaiians and their aspirations for peace and justice. We must work together to heal, protect, and nurture their ancestral lands after decades of war and destruction. Refusing to renew the leases of lands occupied by the U.S. military is a necessary and urgent step toward this goal.

In support of the People's Liberation Army/Air Force (PLAAF) has been attainment of air superiority over the PLA Army battlefield. Beginning in the late-1970s, the PLA's senior leadership had begun to call into question the services ability to carry out that mission.

The article reviews the primary missions of the PLAAF, it's weaknesses (outdated equipment), combat effectiveness, logistic antiquarianism, weaknesses in the high command structure, and the effort to bring more modern technologies to the air force. Included in the article is a list of PLAAF Airfields with characteristics; and, the PLAAF's organizational structure.