Art of War

The texts "About the rhythm in military art", "About the gaze in military art", and "About the attitude of the spirit in military art" by the notorious samurai Miyamoto Musashi, are part of his book, known in English as the "Book of the five rings". This ancient military treatise consists of a work of enormous value, divided into five chapters, and is considered the most accurate record of what was considered by Musashi to be his most valuable legacy, his meticulous and rational way of thinking about military art, and in particular , individual duels.

This important work, although it has an evident focus on kenjutsu, that is, on Japanese swordsmanship, more specifically, the Niten ichi-ryū style, founded by Musashi himself, does not fail to present more reflections on the art of war in a more general way.

War used to be easy to define. Once, we could say with confidence whether we were at war or peace. If the former, we could identify with whom we were fighting and where the front was. Americans, in particular, have for a long time had the good fortune of being able to say that the war—any war—was “over there.”

These concepts have deep roots—in the West, anyway. In ancient Rome, for example, a particular class of priests called fetiales officiated the onset of war by throwing a ceremonial spear into an enemy’s territory and opening the doors of the temple of Janus. Bringing war to an end has traditionally been just as ceremonial—think of Vercingetorix laying his sword at Caesar’s feet, Lee and Grant’s meeting at Appomattox, or Emperor Hirohito’s representatives signing documents of unconditional surrender on board the USS Missouri in 1945.

Things are certainly more complicated today. The United States and its allies have been “at war” for almost two decades, yet it is difficult at times to explain the who, the why, or at times even the where. What happened?

Artistic expression frequently engages with the question of suffering. In so doing, it confronts the gravity and complexity of the human condition. This volume investigates the relationship between art and suffering. In short, the contributors to this volume collectively demonstrate that suffering is an undisputed and shareable motivating experience.

The special authority invested in the war artist and the image had become denuded by the mid-1980s. Although an independent artist working to commission, Peter Howson’s work in the Balkans was considered to have crossed the line that distinguished between impersonal witness and overzealous artist. Unlike William Orpen’s impartial rendition of gross personal violation, Howson was deemed to have become both judge and jury, an advocate not an artist, corrupted by circumstantial evidence rather than remaining vigilant as an uncorruptible viewer. For his part, Howson was clear that the terms of engagement had fundamentally changed since the Great War: it was no longer simply about what could be seen or not seen, but also what was known and could not be denied.

"L'arte della guerra" di Sun Tzu - testo fondamentale del pensiero cinese - ha avuto ampio seguito nella cultura occidentale in diversi ambiti. La presente analisi intende fornire una chiarificazione testuale sufficiente a fornire il quadro concettuale della visione di Sun Tzu.

Unrestricted wargames can build confidence, test mental models, and provide a method to create military experiences outside of live exercises and direct combat operations. By pitting an individual or group against other living beings, these wargames require military professionals to confront the uncertainty of war. The dynamic nature of such wargames helps translate military theory into military practice. This article argues that unrestricted wargaming is a vital component of broadening military officers’ minds. By examining US and Japanese wargaming practices, the article proposes that unrestricted wargaming should be incorporated into Australian Army junior officer training courses to help officers test their biases, frame problems and accept alternative viewpoints.

The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise dating from the Spring and Autumn period in 5th century BC. The work, which is attributed to the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, is composed of 13 chapters. Each one is devoted to a distinct aspect of warfare and how that applies to military strategy and tactics. For almost 1,500 years it was the lead text in an anthology that would be formalised as the Seven Military Classics by Emperor Shenzong of Song in 1080. The Art of War remains the most influential strategy text in East Asia. It has a profound influence on Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond.

There is no discussion that adversaries, past and present, have developed creative uses of the "full-spectrum" of warfare, including the use of regular and irregular tactics across all dimensions of war. In the view of many Western analysts it is the non-military tools, such as information, that are seen as the biggest threat in information society today.

مقایسه دیدگاه های ژومینی و کلازویتس در باب جنگ(حسین اژدر:پارسا
تهران ۱۳۸۴/باشگاه اندیشه جوان
قابل دست رس در
Irthink.com(اندیشه کده روابط بین الملل)
ناپلئون یک نابغه عملی استراتژیک بود .
از اواخر قرن هیجدهم و اوایل قرن نوزدهم به بعد با بروز انقلابها و قیامهای سیاسی و اجتماعی و بروز جنگهای ناپلئون، مفاهیم استراتژی و تاکتیک دچار دگرگونی شد. جنگهای ناپلئون تاکتیکهای نظامی را به کلی تغییر داد . ناپلئون موفقیتش را در جنگها مرهون تدابیر یا حیله های فرمان دهی خود (فرماندهان) و در حقیقت به کار گرفتن تاکتیکهای دقیق و پیروزمند میدانست
بر اساس تجارب ناپلئون استراتژی تعریفی وسیع تر از آنچه در روم و یونان به کار میرفت به خود میگیرد و با عنوان علم حرکات و طرح های نظامی یا علم جنگ و تهیه ی طرحها و خط مشی واحدهای نظامی مطرح میشود .در واقع، خط مشی واحدهای نظامی همان حرکات است که این واحد های نظامی انجام میدهند و امروزه علم “تاکتیک” این حرکات را برای کسب در نبرد بررسی میکند.

The eleventh chapter (The Nine Terrains) has often confounded students of the text. It is by far the longest chapter in the book, and its organization can seem chaotic, with some sections simply corrupted repetitions, and other topics drifting aimlessly into non-sequiturs. Moreover, given the descriptions of various terrains found in chapters 8, 9 and 10, this chapter is often thought of as simply a summary of the information already covered in previous sections of the book. Chapter 11, though, is unique and worthy of more careful analysis. More than any other section of the book, this chapter follows a close approximation of modern operational design. The sequence of terrains outlines Sun Tzu's vision for how an offensive operation should ideally unfold in terms of both time and space, from the initial invasion across the enemy border to the culminating decisive battle that will achieve victory for one's army. There are two main elements to Sun Tzu's operational concept: drive deeply into the enemy's territory and then seek " death ground " for your soldiers before initiating the attack. The following is NOT a translation of the chapter, but simply a short synopsis to allow one to quickly visualize the structure of the text. Verse numbers correspond to those found in the Sun Tzu Translation Database. Note that while " Nine Terrains " is the most appropriate direct translation, " terrain " does not adequately reflect what Sun Tzu is describing. He is not overly concerned with the actual physical properties of the terrains he is listing. His thinking is aligned more with the modern military term of " zone of operation " and since he suggests only conducting offensive operations, I choose to title the chapter " The Nine Zones of Offensive Operations. " The heart of this chapter is Sun Tzu's explanation of these nine zones. In the first half of the chapter (verses 02-19), he provides a short description of each zone, followed by a recommended action for each of the corresponding zones. Later in the text (verses 43-57) Sun Tzu repeats this pattern, but the description portion is

Zhuge Liang, commonly known by his style, Kongming, was born around the year 180, the son of a
provincial official in the later days of the Han dynasty. At that time, the dynasty was thoroughly
decrepit, nearly four hundred years old and on the verge of collapse. For most of his adult life,
Zhuge Liang was to play a major role in the power struggles and civil wars that followed the demise
of the ancient Han.
Orphaned at an early age, he and his younger brother were taken in by an uncle, a local governor
in southern China. When this uncle was replace with another officer, he and his charges went to
join an old family friend, a member of the powerful Liu clan who was currently a governor in central China. The imperial house of Han was a branch of the greater Liu clan, which as a whole
retained considerable wealth, prestige, and influence even after the passing of the Han dynasty
itself.
Zhuge Liang’s uncle died during his sojourn in central China.  Then in his twenties, Zhuge
stayed there, supporting himself by farming. According to Record of the Three Kingdoms, at this
early age Zhuge Liang was aware of his own genius, but few took him seriously; he was, after all,
an orphan and subsistence farmer. His fortunes took a turn, however, when the great warrior Liu
Bei, founder of the kingdom of Shu in western China, garrisoned in the area where Zhuge Liang
was living.
Zhuge was recommended to the warrior chief by a member of the influential Xu clan, which
produced many outstanding Taoists of the early churches.  According to Record of the Three
Kingdoms, Zhuge’s friend said to Liu Bei, “Zhuge Kongming is a dragon in repose - would you
want to meet him?” Liu Bei said, “You come with him.” The friend said, “It is possible to go see
this man, but you cannot make him come to you. You, General, should go out of your way to look
in on him.”
The record states that Liu Bei finally went to see Zhuge Liang, adding that he had to go no
fewer than three times before the young genius agreed to meet the warrior chieftain. When at
length they were together, the record continues, Liu Bei dismissed everyone else so that he could
be alone with Zhuge Liang. Then he said, ”The house of Han is collapsing; treacherous officials
are usurping authority; the emperor is blinded by the dust.” The warrior lord went on to solicit
Zhuge’s advice

Sun Tzu adalah seorang filsuf praktis yang menulis The Art of War yang terdiri dari 7000 aksara
pada kira-kira tahun 500 sebelum Masehi.
The Art of War mungkin salah satu buku yang ditulis pada bilah-bilah bambu, karya yang diakui
ini telah meraih reputasi internasional sebagai intisari strategi meraih kemenangan.
Selama berabad-abad, The Art of War dijunjung tinggi oleh para ahli strategi Tiongkok maupun Jepang.
Banyak pernyataan Mao diambil dari filosofi Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu adalah pendahuluan singkat terbaik
untuk studi tentang perang, The Art of War memang naskah mendasar yang mantap tentang strategi.
STRATEGI TIMUR VERSUS STRATEGI BARAT
The Art of War adalah landasan dari strategi Timur. Tesis sentral Sun Tzu adalah bahwa anda bisa
menghindari pertempuran kalau anda merencanakan strategi yang tepat sebelum pertempuran.
On War karya Carl von clausewitz, seorang pejabatJerman yang menulis di zaman Napoleon, adalah
landasan dari sebagian besar strategi Barat. Teori menurut Clausewitz berkonsentrasi pada pertempuran
besar sebagai cara meraih kemenangan.
The Art of War merupakan maha karya kesederhanaan. Ketika membandingkan Clausewitz dengan Sun
Tzu, ahli strategi Liddel Hart berkomentar: “Sun Tzu memiliki visi yang jelas, wawasan yang lebih
mendalam, kesegaran yang kekal”. Karya Sun Tzu umumnya tidak dianggap sebagai kontributor
terhadap strategi militer Barat. Karya Sun Tzu adalah rahasia-rahasia bagi sukses bisnis maupun pribadi.
Studi dan analisa yang berkesinambungan terhadap Sun Tzu menghasilkan wawasan-wawasan baru
untuk membuka konsep-konsep meraih kemenangan.
PANDUAN STRATEGIS UNTUK PEMIMPIN
Menggunakan strategi Sun Tzu dalam bisnis bukanlah barang baru. Ada banyak bukti bahwa The Art of
War memberikan kontribusi terhadap cara berpikir pemimpin-pemimpin modern.
The Art of War merupakan bacaan wajib untuk mengikuti kursus tentang kewirausahaan di Columbia
University. Banyak pesanan The Art of War telah dilakukan oleh organisasi-organisasi bisnis, serikat
dagang, dan aparat-aparat penegak hukum.
The Art of War merupakan karya klasik bukan saja tentang strategi melainkan juga tentang kesederhanaan.
Kesederhanaan The Art of War menjadikan pelajaran-pelajaran Sun Tzu langsung dapat dijabarkan
menjadi strategi bisnis. Prinsip-prinsip Sun Tzu memantapkan landasan yang kokoh untuk memahami
aturan-aturan strategi bisnis di milenium baru.
Pelajaran-pelajaran Sun Tzu sudah ribuan usianya, dan ujian waktulah yang menjadikannya berharga bagi
manajer bisnis.
STRATEGI DAN TAKTIK
Prinsip mendasar strategi itu sama bagi semua manajer, bagi segala waktu, bagi segala situasi. Hanya
taktik yang berubah dan taktik dimodifikasi sesuai berjalannya waktu.
Strategi paling baik didefinisikan sebagai “melakukan hal yang benar”. Sementara taktik adalah
“melakukan segalanya dengan benar”.
Strategi berhenti di perbatasan dalam perang dan di kantor-kantor pusat dalam bisnis; taktik dimulai
dengan kontak dengan pelanggan. The Art of War nya Sun Tzu memberikan pelajaran-pelajaran yang
mendasar untuk pemikiran strategis modern dan menjadi sumber ide-ide yang subur untuk taktik.

Fabrizio says in Machiavelli’s Art of War that he has “[…] never used war as an art, because [his] art is to govern [his] subjects and to defend them, and, so as to be able to defend them, to love peace and know how to make war.” What is the “art of war” for Machiavelli and how is this concept depicted in his three major political works —The Prince, Discourses on Livy, and Art of War—?

The argument of this essay is that this “art” —which Machiavelli thinks crucial for the ruling politician– is the ability in the use of political force. As politics is a continuous struggle, in order to keep dominion over his state, the ruler has to be prepared to face internal and external threats from political enemies; the ruler has to be at the same time a commander and a politician —a “fox” and a “lion,” Machiavelli would say. In Art of War and the Discourses on Livy, this idea is depicted in a subtle way; while, in The Prince, it is openly stated as fundamental true of politics; nonetheless, the conception of the art of war —as fundamental for every ruler, regardless the regime, as the way to face internal and external rivals— stands as a core idea for Machiavelli’s political thought in the three of them.

https://auctoritasnonveritas.org/2017/01/03/to-peace-through-war-machiavelli-and-the-survival-of-the-state/

Cet article s'intéresse aux expéditions guerrières menées à l'époque pré-européenne par l'atoll de Tatakoto contre plusieurs atolls du centre de l'archipel, correspondant à l'aire dialectale Tapuhoe. Ces récits, issus de la tradition orale de différents atolls, sont peu connus (en rapport à ceux concernant les guerriers de Anaa par exemple), l'un des objectifs était donc de les faire découvrir et par là d'enrichir les connaissances que nous avons sur les modalités de la guerre aux Tuamotu.
D'un point de vue plus théorique, cet article était également l'occasion d'évoquer les divisions de l'archipel, des divisions qui dans le cadre des Tuamotu prennent la forme d'aires dialectales. Ce sujet a été jusque-là essentiellement traité sous l'angle de la linguistique. Il s'agissait ainsi pour nous d'amorcer une réflexion visant à déterminer si les alliances et les antagonismes qui existaient entre certains atolls pouvaient avoir participé à l'apparition et à la pérennisation de ces aires dans le temps, en d'autres termes voir si ces aires pouvaient être définies par des critères autres que linguistiques.

My admittedly subjective recommendation of the best Sun Tzu translations, but based off my first hand experience from typing out 42 complete translations of the text into a database. I use a simple five step classification system: TOP 5, GOOD, DECENT, PROBLEMATIC and AVOID.

The Conquest of Tunis in 1535, a relatively limited military victory in the power balance of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century, became through art both a historic and a legendary milestone that marked the backbone of Charles V’s reign. The war to secure the reinstatement of the king of Tunis, Muley Hassan, who had been expelled from his states by Barbarossa —acting on behalf of the Turk— was a brief event that was more reactive than subordinate to a systematic plan of conquest. Nonetheless, it was perpetuated in the European imaginary as a symbol of the first ‘modern war’ by historiography and, above all, by visual propaganda, as many of the chronicles of the African expedition generated during those years lived on for posterity in manuscript form. So far attempts at analysing the imagery associated with the imperial expedition have centred chiefly on its best known and most brilliant consequence, the famous tapestry set woven at the Brussels workshops that served Willem de Pannemaker and held by Patrimonio Nacional. In contrast, this essay marks a first approach to provide an overall and politically contextualised interpretation of the artistic expressions linked to the campaign and executed during the emperor’s lifetime (1500-1558), arranged in accordance with a narrative discourse.

Since Sun Tzu is traditionally thought to have supported King Helu of Wu (r. 514 - 496 BCE) during his invasion of Chu in 506 BCE, it is important to understand the trajectory of the dramatic rise and fall of the State of Wu in Chinese history. This timeline is derived from information found in the Zuozhuan. I will supplement this timeline with the verses found in both the Zuozhuan and Sima Qian's Shiji in the near future.

Although the Giles translation of Sun Tzu is in some ways outdated, there is one aspect of his scholarship that has yet to be surpassed by contemporary efforts; the unparalleled collection of footnotes that accompany the original translation. Totaling 585 in number, they reveal the then 35-year old to also be a military historian of impressive breadth and depth, covering topics both ancient and modern, Eastern and Western. Detailing the exploits of commanders as diverse as Tian Dan, Li Guangbi, Hannibal, Cromwell, Napoleon, and Stonewall Jackson, there was no corner of the martial pantheon too distant for Giles not to draw a parallel between their actions and Sun Tzu’s writings. To this day, Giles’s footnotes alone would provide a solid foundation for the literature review section of a dissertation on military leadership.

Sun Tzu's The Art of War deals with the economic aspects of military operations as well as some more general economic principles. This article studies several of its economic ideas in turn: on war and the state, the effect of war on economic affairs, and the role of incentives in promoting desired behavior within military organizations. It also discusses how the text treats ideal military strategy as a matter of opportunity discovery, analogous to entrepreneurship in the work of Israel Kirzner.

The notion that Sun Tzu represents the multifaceted brilliance and timeless appeal of Amadeus to Clausewitz’s dour and overwrought Salieri maintains a powerful grip over our collective imagination. But does this accurately reflect the state of contemporary Sun Tzu analysis? Have we truly figured this text out to the point where we have reached consensus over its relevance? Dissenting from the majority opinion, which seems to effortlessly commune with this enigmatic founding father of military strategic thought, I argue that we haven’t yet come close to fully cataloguing the good, the bad, and just plain ugly within this endlessly fascinating, but ultimately flawed document.

In the introduction to his 1963 translation of the text, Samuel Griffith notes that “Sun Tzu’s chapter on secret operations, [is] as pertinent today as when he composed it [and] requires little elaboration.” We should take a fresh look at this claim. A careful analysis of the chapter reveals an outdated and problematic espionage system that should be viewed today more as a historical curiosity than a ready guide to contemporary spycraft. Despite popular sentiment, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is ultimately a product of the period and place in which it was composed, not a timeless recipe for universally applicable strategic wisdom.

The Art of War repeats verbatim a verse in both Chapters 7 and 11.  One way of assessing the quality of English translations of Sun Tzu is to analyze whether or not translators recognize this repetition and see how they choose to translate two identical passages in separate sections of the text.

Foreword

This book is an oddity enough, but after all I want to push the envelope. This book is ultimately about Tao (yin and yang) and Qi (the combination of which is Te), as applied to the art of war... as applied to playing chess. All of its topics relate to these concepts at their core. The resulting purpose therefore is to convince you of, first, the brilliance of the Chinese sciences, and second, the ultimate reality of their supremacy beyond the veil of what you physically see, both on the board, and in life.

Qi, for example, has often been translated as energy. But it also has been translated as air or breath. Its properties are not entirely unlike dark matter, either. So we know, as the Chinese and Indians (with prajna) say, it is a substance. It is not something you can inject or bottle, but there is a science of finding, attracting, capturing, holding (as in a capacitor), and using or releasing. Qi must move, or it becomes stagnant, as if it expires. More likely it simply converts as the yang is subsumed by the yin.  Humans, being a yang species, require fresh Qi (from ripe foods, cooked but not ruined, and from fresh water and air); or too much stagnant Qi and disease will follow, whether of the mind, spirit, or body.

Yin and Yang themselves are also things, but not substances - although all substances are divided into each classification to varying isotopic percentages of each - they are forces as well as processes. Their mutual, inexorable interactions, transformations, and regulations become the very source of the conversion of old/stagnant Qi into fresh, powerful Qi. Tao is merely this constant process and change, whether microscopic or macroscopic.

This is an important point, and something most especially difficult for westerners to understand, and embrace. Many of even the most knowledgeable in the west, even scholars, cannot help but frame these terms in the rote, standard, boxed-in ideas that were inherited from Victorian sinology, and therefore affected by the arrogant period of western post “Enlightenment” sciences which came to conclusions in a vain effort to eliminate mystery. Rather, we now see in western quantum-relativity that we have more mysteries for every ‘conclusion’ reached… however the effect upon other studies such as sinology, which then informed the media, has become near permanent. Qi equals energy is not accurate, but it is a pervasive and reasonable belief; however it is limited and ultimately: wrong.

One must come to understand that true, deep, understanding of the Art of War is directly related to these topics. Even very established bingfa experts, such as Ralph D. Sawyer, have made the mistake of missing this truth. For example, translating Qi as “spirit” (as in being ‘spirited’ or having exaltation/excitement) leads to all sorts of misunderstandings. They aren’t the “end of the world” type, but just enough. For example, when a commander should ascertain the Qi of a city before deciding whether or not to siege it, the text literally means sense the presence of Qi (an amalgamation of supplies, morale, wholesomeness, wariness, etc…). If it meant only “does the city have spirit,” that implies only either some kind of jubilation (as Troy had had just before burning, therefore disproving the concept), or will to fight. Many cities have had the will to fight but lost in a siege. The Qi is not this way. More to reality it is “is the Force with them?” to paraphrase Star Wars. Understood this way, in terms of having something, or not having it, anyone can understand the idea. In the same way that even a child can discern the difference between a bug that is alive (with Qi), and dead (without Qi). And a child, let alone a supposedly more advanced adult, can determine how much Qi they have versus that of an opponent (like a bug). A child knows an ant is no threat, but a spider, which has a nasty bite and even poison, is a threat, one that must be approached carefully.

The other related concepts in the book, most especially Shi, are directly related to having or not having Qi (and therefore Te, “inner power”). So, the difficulty of strategists, especially American ones, and scholars in understanding Shi is directly related to whether or not they understand this exact point about Qi. It is real. It is not merely nerves that are flowing with energy, nor just air in the lungs, nor endorphins. It is an invisible, semi-fluid, semi gaseous, substance, which can be gathered, and can be dispersed. All bingfa (arts of war) techniques were, like acupuncture, nothing more than ways to modify, moderate, and modulate the energy levels of the opponent and one’s own armies.

What does this mean in the higher reality found while playing chess? It means that from the moment one wishes to play (or is made to play by another), till the end of the game, one must become aware of the various levels of Qi within the pieces, the board, the environment, and the opponent. And anything that affects the Qi - even the lighting in the room, but most especially willpower, energetic feeling, and mental focus - will be important.It is sometimes, more important than the actual skill or techniques. Qi may actually lead to timing changes therefore enabling the weaker (normally) to triumph, or the average to appear mystically experienced.

More than anything I hope to impart this Chinese (and Indian) wisdom upon the reader, for they can use it for healing, career, self-defense, and raising a family. This is the most important outcome of coming to full wisdom of the Art of War and, in this case, as received through consistent play of chess. Therefore I say “Understanding Chess” is less about moves, techniques, and checkmates, as it is about mastering life’s moves. A ‘self-help-guru’ of the 20th century once remarked that all situations were like cards: two sided. Solutions and problems. And that life was about “playing the right side of the card” at all times. That is a full mastery of chess.

~Shifu R. Careaga

Most translators simply gloss over this verse, likely due to a perception that the force ratios it recommends are simply an anachronistic feature of the manner of fighting at the time of its writing, and therefore a moot point in its modern rendition. Conversely, I believe this verse deserves more careful scrutiny.

This concise but spiritually rich text the Training of Humanity Against the Traits of Satan was composed in 1827 after Shaykh Abdullahi had retired from active rule of the Gwandu Province of the western Sokoto Caliphate. Shaykh Abdullahi being a master military strategists and statesman composed this entirely spiritual treaties couched in military and political vocabulary. In this amazing work the Professor, as he was called by his colleagues, equates the human being as a government or state, the human heart as its ruler, human reason as the chief minister, the limbs and senses as civil servants and government officials, the corrupt passions as plebian slaves and Satan as the external avowed enemy of the state. This work can be compared to similar works composed in China during the Warring States era and in Japan during the Shogunate era where scholar warriors composed purely esoteric, spiritual and ethical works couched in the language of the Art of War.
Shaykh Abdullahi divided the work into an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion:
Introduction: On the States of the Heart (Ahwaal ‘l-Qalb)
Chapter One: On  the Entrances of Satan Into the Hearts of Humanity
Chapter Two: On the Subtypes of the Heart
Chapter Three: On Disciplining the Soul and Protecting It From Its Illnesses
Conclusion: On the Disciplining of Children

I recently published an article at (thestrategybridge.org) titled, "Rethinking Sun Tzu: POWs and the Captured Chariot Incentive Program" in which I analyze Sun Tzu's reference to treating captive soldiers humanely. In the article I reference the Roger Ames version of the verse found in Chapter 2, but this report outlays how 35 English translators have chosen to render this same verse.

This thesis examines Kanokogi Takeshirō’s (1874-1941) painting, Triumphal Entry into
Nanjing (1940), as a visual representation and witness of Pan-Asianism at its critical
transformation in wartime Japan. A tribute to the Japanese army and the Yasukuni Shrine, the
painting depicts the scene in which the army, after taking over China’s capital on December 13th,
1937, held an official ceremony of the city entry on the 17th. Nanjing invites a new way of
looking at wartime record paintings produced in the 1930s and 40s, most of the existing research
on which focuses only on the representation of either the establishment or disintegration of the
human figures. This thesis argues that Nanjing shifts the visual emphasis from the representation
of human figures to the identified landscape elements, thus inverting the pictorial construction by
giving both visual and ideological primacy to the compositional background instead of the
foreground. It successfully overcomes the circumscriptions of both objectivity and a mere record
of war. Instead, the painting actively witnesses the historical event by involving its viewers into a
nationalistic participation, through which the notion of a communal body is given form.
This thesis, while providing a detailed visual examination of Nanjing and its comparison
with photographs and architecture, combines different types of media and literature—including
news reports, memoirs, and travelogues—in order to demonstrate Nanjing’s capacity as an
ideologically charged symbolism that uses the landscape to generate a specific interpretation—of
the occupied territory and its national icons—that fits with Japan’s own Pan-Asian and colonial
ideals. In general, this thesis intends to shed light on the art historical understanding of the
subtlety and ambiguity of Japan’s wartime ideology, one that consists of both violence and a
(re)imagination of Asia that overcomes borderlines and modernity.

[Note I have been updating this report to include comparisons with more strategic texts including Machiavelli, Jomini, Thucydides, Wylie, US. Grant, etc.] Comparison/Contrast of specific verses in both Sun Tzu's "Art of War" and Clausewitz's "On War." I hope to update this periodically (and fix the minor typos).

Dieser Text stellt eine gemäß dem "SHIn-Ken"-Prinzip erstellte Zusammenfassung über Moritz von Sachsens „Reveries Upon the Art of War“dar.
Daher enthält diese Zusammenfassung nicht nur die Lehre des Moritz von Sachsen, sondern wird im Sinne der japanischen vergleichenden Geisteswissenschaft „SHIn-Ken“ mit geballtem Führungswissen sowohl der östlichen als auch der westlichen Welt der vergangenen 2.500 Jahre kombiniert, da eine einzelne „reine“ Lehre wie eine rohe Kartoffel ist, zu der man Wasser, Salz, Pfeffer, Petersilie und Hitze hinzufügen muss, um daraus etwas nützliches zu kreieren, damit beim Leser kein neunmalkluges Kopfwissen, sondern eigenes Verstehen entsteht.

This will link to an upcoming article arguing that we misinterpret Sun Tzu's advice of "Know the Enemy and Know Yourself" The original text purposefully avoids using the term "enemy" (敵) and instead renders it as "other" (彼). Yet we rarely ask why this deliberate choice was made. I will argue that the distinction is significant, and the key to its interpretation can be found in the verses preceding it as well as a plausible historical record which supports the revised interpretation.

I have long been skeptical of translating the famous phrase from the Sunzi,不戰而屈人之兵, as "winning without fighting," and thereby interpreting his recommendation as primarily non-violent actions taken prior to the commencement of hostilities. My main issue is that if this is a cornerstone of his theory, almost nothing concrete in the rest of the text seems to support this reading. Just a few verses later Sun Tzu is recommending "attacking" the enemy if one is five times his size. Why wouldn't such an overwhelming numerical advantage allow you to better effect the stated goal of "winning without fighting?" In studying the Zuozhuan and other military texts of that era, though, I find it interesting that they define "battle" [戰] in a rather narrow manner to indicate fighting occurring only after each side has "formed their ranks" [陳]. If this correct, we may be fundamentally misreading this critical verse. What if Sun Tzu is not saying avoid battle at all, but instead is simply recommending that one assault the enemy before he has an opportunity to form his ranks, and therefore is a plea to avoid a "pitched" battle, not an avoidance of fighting writ large.

Still wrestling with whether or not this is a valid interpretation, so would welcome any feedback that anyone has, either for or against.

Comparison of word counts of various English translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War. With an average word count of approximately 10,000, the length of The Art of War is comparable to one of the longer profile articles found in the The New Yorker magazine.

مقایسه دیدگاه های سان تزو و لیدل هارت درباره جنگ غیر مستقیم(حسین اژدر:پارسا)
اولین انتشار ۱۳۸۷/باشگاه اندیشه جوان و قابل دست رس در پایگاه اندیشه کده روابط بین الملل
///////
قدیمی ترین استراتژی پرداز شناخته شده در طول تاریخ ،شاید «سان تزو» بوده که حدود 500 سال قبل از میلاد مسیح در چین می‌زیست. وی صاحب کتابی در باب مسائل نظامی و استراتژیک با عنوان “هنر جنگ” است که در دوران معاصر از اقبال فراوانی برخوردار است.
به باور سان تزو جنگ تنها یک مسئله نظامی صرف نیست ، بلکه جوانب مختلف اطلاعاتی روانی، اقتصادی و سیاسی را در برمی‌گیرد. (سان تزو؛هنر جنگ؛ترجمه حسن حبیبی؛تهران:قلم،1359،ص 8)
ازاین‌رو دیدگاه او به آنچه ما امروز به نام استراتژی می‌خوانیم بسیار نزدیک است. وی به عنوان یک نظامی و استراتژی شناس می‌کوشید تا برنامه‌ریزی و رهبری عملیات نظامی را بر بنیادی عقلایی استوار سازد. وی بر خلاف نویسندگان رومی و یونانی به تنظیم و تدوین شیوه‌های پیچیده علاقه‌ای نشان نمی‌داد. در واقع هدف و افق دید وی تنظیم برنامه‌ای است مبتنی بر روشی درست و خردمندانه به‌منظور استفاده‌ی سرداران و فرماندهان تا بتوان با آن روش، در پی جنگی ظفرمندانه باشند.

The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise dating from the Spring and Autumn period in 5th century BC. The work, which is attributed to the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, is composed of 13 chapters. Each one is devoted to a distinct aspect of warfare and how that applies to military strategy and tactics. For almost 1,500 years it was the lead text in an anthology that would be formalised as the Seven Military Classics by Emperor Shenzong of Song in 1080. The Art of War remains the most influential strategy text in East Asia. It has a profound influence on Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond.

This report outlines the evolution of the translation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War into English from the first four major translations completed. These include the very first English translation conducted by Captain E.F. Calthrop in 1905, his revised edition in 1908, Lionel Giles' 1910 translation (as well as his criticism of Calthrop's effort) and the 1963 translation conducted by Samuel B. Griffith.