Ballistic Missile Defence

Over the last three decades, the Israeli missile defense concept has evolved significantly along with the emerging threats. As a result of the long-term strategy implemented in the 1990s, contemporary missile defense of Israel has been developed into a complex, multi-tiered system aimed to match the country's unique security needs. The purpose of this study is to determine the main directions in the development of the Israeli missile defense concept that have led to its current form. The study identifies key elements of the multi-layered missile defense architecture, as well as their role in Israel's overall defense strategy. With the use of theoretical research methods, the period of 1991-2020 was examined in order to trace the development of new missile defense systems and the evolution of Israel's position on the subject in relation to the changing international situation. The author concludes that the comprehensive anti-missile shield, consisting of the Arrow-3, Arrow-2, David's Sling and Iron Dome systems, provides Israel with solid defense against short, medium and long range missile threats, and presents potential to be developed into one of the most advanced missile defense systems in the world.

More than 50 years ago, pioneering scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union and the United States searched for a technical means of defense against deadly ballistic missiles. In Intercept 1961 Mike Gruntman tells the story, little-known even to experts, of the earliest breakthroughs which paved the way for the emergence of a powerful missile defense complex in the Soviet Union, a major factor in the Cold War. On March 4, 1961, a Soviet guided missile performed the first nonnuclear intercept of an intermediate range ballistic missile at the Saryshagan test site in the Kazakhstan desert when it destroyed an approaching warhead. This spectacular achievement followed earlier intercepts by the United States Army of several shorter range missiles. Mike Gruntman describes the birth of Soviet air and missile defense systems and their technical challenges. The new field also led to the emergence of monitoring space objects in orbit, ballistic missile early warning, and antisatellite weapons. Ten years later, the first operational missile defense system was deployed to protect Moscow, its successor system remaining active today. Intercept 1961 is especially relevant today as the United States and other countries continue facing the eternal protect-or-avenge dilemma when balancing offensive capabilities against defensive protection. In an age of unstable governments, spreading weapons of mass destruction, and radical ideologies and terrorism, this historical background is critical for informed policy formulation, threat evaluation, defense planning, and counteracting the proliferation of weapons and sensitive technologies. It is a must read for students of history, scientists and engineers, analysts, and specialists in international relations and national security.

Pivdenmash (Yuzhmash), the Ukrainian Dnipropetrovsk industrial giant, one of the World leaders in space and missile industry during Soviet times is on the verge of bankruptcy. In August 2015, all accounts of Pivdenmash could be frozen. If this happens, this means no orders or contracts, not a single hope for survival

In the 1980s the National Park Service conducted a survey for the establishment of a National Historic Landmark district. However, they missed the facility located adjacent to historic Launch Complex 5/6 where US manned space flight began. This report assesses the spin test facility and the structures associated with it.

This book, produced within the framework of the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, has been written by leading Russian and foreign experts in the field of missile defense. In examining this complex issue, the authors address its historical evolution and its military technical, strategic, political, and legal aspects. The book will be of interest to experts in international relations and security, as will as to a broader readership.
The fifteenth chapter (Natalia Romashkina and Petr Topychkanov) analyzes regional missile defense programs in third countries (the Middle East and Asia-Pacific region).

Hypersonic weapons have recently become a very popular leitmotif of the debates concerning national security of many nation-states and international security as a whole. Hypersonics technology gets attention mainly because it is often supposed to alter the existing strategic balance. Therefore, on the one hand, the new weapons systems have been loudly advertised by Russia which claims to have achieved a virtual invincibility thanks to this wunderwaffe. On the other hand, in the U.S., and to a lesser extent in the other Western countries, there is a chorus of alarming voices calling for higher funding and quicker pace of research and development (R&D) efforts to develop their own hypersonic weapons and to create capabilities to counter the enemy’s systems of that sort. In addition, China has its own vast and secretive weapons development program, hypersonic missiles included. It is, therefore, worth to review this issue and try to grasp a real impact of the new but steadily maturing technologies on international security.
You will find FULL TEXT .pdf under the link zbn.inp.uj.edu.pl below.

During recent years tensions between Russia and Western states have risen, undermining the stability that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this research is to study Russia’s behavior and external actions during this time, and determine the driving factors that led its leadership to adopt them. The analysis is made principally through Structural Realism, using in addition the Perception and Misperception Theory to explain state behavior and threat perception. Initially the thesis examines Russia’s geopolitical position and the post-Cold War international system, as well as the alternative strategies of A2/AD and Hybrid Warfare that characterize Russian actions.
Then, the post-Cold War Western foreign policy actions in Europe and the Middle East are discussed. The main issues examined are the NATO and EU enlargement to the East, the development of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense and Western global interventions after 1990. Emphasis is placed on Russia’s perception of these actions as threatening to its perceived sphere of influence, its Near Abroad, and its initial reaction to this emerging security dilemma. Subsequently, analysis focuses on Russian aggressive actions and external behavior. Beginning with Putin’s ascent to power, Russia recovered from its decline and rebuilt its military, using it as a central tool to promote its foreign policy objectives. This became obvious in the interventions that started with the invasion in Georgia in 2008 and its engagement in Ukraine in 2014. The latest intervention in Syria, in 2015, marked Russia’s first step beyond its Near Abroad, aiming to extend its influence on global scale.
The research concludes that the current Russian assertive behavior in its Near Abroad resulted as a reaction to external threats, as Russian leadership perceived the West’s strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period. In order to confront these threats and reclaim Russia’s Great Power status, Moscow chose a hard power approach that led to a confrontation with the West. This ongoing antagonism has a serious impact on the security balance on a regional and global scale.

Over the last years, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) recognized nuclear powers (P5) have substantially invested in modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Even considering the need for replacement of some of the nuclear platforms, analysis demonstrates that the development and deployment of new military systems – like the missile shield or hypersonic systems – has created a strategic domino effect on other nuclear powers, namely Russia and China. This article intends not only to describe some of the nuclear modernizations programs currently being implemented by the P5 but also the strategic
motivations behind the latter.

While this monograph was being researched
and written, Russian actions in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine brought U.S.-Russian relations to a new
low in the post-Cold War era. Normal relations and
conversations between the United States and Russia
were apparently on hold during an unprecedented,
and apparently intractable, crisis of European security.
But the longer view of relations between the two former
superpowers shows precedents that suggest relations
stand a strong chance of early recovery, despite
Russia’s hard line and unpalatable actions. With or
without this recovery, some persistent challenges to
the relationship will remain; the state of relations will
affect how these challenges are presented, rather than
the underlying contradictions themselves.
One of these challenges is ballistic missile defense
(BMD), and its implications for nuclear deterrence.
For the past 7 years, plans for BMD capability in
Europe have been a consistent sticking point in
relations between the United States and Russia. In
brief, Russia’s strenuous opposition to these plans is
based on claims, not all of them disingenuous, that
this capability is intended to compromise Russia’s
nuclear deterrent capability. Yet all discussion of
the subject highlights the U.S. current and proposed
deployments and entirely ignores Russia’s own
missile interception systems, which are claimed to
have comparable capability. While Moscow continues
to strengthen its armed forces and seeks to reduce the
capability gap with the United States, the perception
of vulnerability leads Russia to invest heavily in
strategic weapons and aerospace defense, including
both defense against nuclear missiles and precision
guided munitions. Russia protests that U.S. SM-3
missiles pose a potential threat to strategic stability,
and has made belligerent threats of direct military
action to prevent their deployment. But no mention
at all is made of the strategic implications of Russia’s
own S-400 and S-500 systems, despite the fact that,
if the performance and capabilities claimed for them
by Russian sources are accurate, they pose at least as
great a threat to deterrence as do SM-3s.
This monograph therefore aims to describe
Russia’s claims for its missile defense systems and,
where possible, to assess the likelihood that these
claims are true. This will form a basis for considering
whether discussion of Russian capabilities should be
an integral part of future conversations with Russia on
the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets.
An assessment of this kind requires an essential
caveat. Research for this monograph has been
conducted from open sources in Russian and English,
and unclassified discussion with knowledgeable
individuals on both sides of the debate. As such, it
has obvious limitations, especially in a field where the
fine detail of capabilities and deployments is highly
classified. In addition, the proliferation of designations
used by Russia for systems still in development,
and the confused and contradictory reporting of
them in open source media, adds a further layer of
obfuscation. In the words of one assessment—tellingly
entitled, “Experts Baffled by Profusion of Russian
Missile Projects”—the resulting linguistic labyrinth
has been further confused, perhaps deliberately, by a
proliferation of new names in Russian reports.
The descriptions in this monograph of specific
Russian projects are therefore a synthesis of public
declarations by Russia as carried in open sources,
Executive Summary
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press
rather than an authoritative and verified systems
handbook. Nonetheless, they have value since
responses to Russian claims for their missile
defense systems must necessarily rely on public
pronouncements.

The essential parts a guided missile need stopper form properly are: 1. Air frame and control surfaces. 2. Propulsion system. 3. War head system. 4. Guidance and control system. In addition in this article the basic fire control problem, how some of the forces of nature affect the trajectory of a guided missile as it flies to its intended target. How wings and finssteera missile and keep it pointed along its flight path.The use of interior control devices by missiles without exterior control surfaces (or limited ones) was described briefly. The different types of guidance systems used in missiles are inertial, command, beam-rider, and homing guidance. In this article the basic functional components of a guidance system.Some of the mare with in the missile, and some are on the launching ship. Then we will discuss briefly some of the parts in the missile's guidance and control equipment and how they work.Finally, we will cover the way specific missiles (the ones you will Work with) are divided into sections or compartments. INTRODUCTION GUIDANCE AND CONTROL Before we go on to discuss any particular type of guidance system, it is necessary to consider first the overall operation of an entire missile guidance and control system; to divide it into convenient groups of units; and to indicate the general function of each major group so that the operation of the particular units may be understood in relation to the operation of the guidance and control system as a whole.Also, in the interest of terminology standardization and to assist common understanding, we shall call the complete system with in a missile that steers and stabilizes it a guidance and control system. Depending on your experience with missiles, you may take exception to this designation.And if you do,there is good reason for it.Thereas on is shown in figure4-1.For example, if you have worked on the Tartaror Terrier missiles you will consider the system that guides and controls a missile to be its steering system.On the other hand, aTalosGMM would call it a guidance and control system.We will stick with the latter designation –not because we favor Talos but because most manuals,and many Navy publications, use this term.

The Recording Optical Tracking Instrument (ROTI) building at the Melbourne Beach Optical Tracking Annex (MOTA) was slated for demolition. In response to this, the Civil Engineering Squadron/Environmental Planning Division (CES/CEVP), 45th Space Wing (45 SW) submitted a Determination of Adverse Effect package to Compliance Review, Florida Division of Historical Resources in November 2007. As a result of this submittal it was agreed to conduct a historic properties survey of the ROTI Building. The project was conducted in December 2007 through January 2008.

This work aimed to do a preliminary assessment about the weight of Europe as being a determinant to Russian's Foreign and Security Policy, with emphasis on the role played by the missile shield (NMD) in Europe. Therefore, we tried to do a briefly review of Russia's relations with Europe in the post-Cold War: the Kosovo's War (1999), the Georgia's War (2008) and the situation in Ukraine and the Black Sea Region (2011). In turn, the cooperation projects between European countries and Russia are examined more carefully. And, on the other hand, we analyze the missile shield in its current state and its implementation schedule pursuant announced in 2012. It has been found that in fact Europe has considerable weight in the development of Russia's foreign policy as a whole, that the critical aspect of the relationship with Europe is the missile defense, that the main point of cooperation beyond energy infrastructure is the Skolkovo's Center of Innovation and Technology. We conclude that the general lines of external politics in the pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR are followed in the post-Cold War, which is described as the landmark-Reactive-Defensive Utility (RDU) In addition, the main priority of the Russia's Foreign and Security Policy is the maintenance of it's great power status (hence the importance of retaining nuclear second strike capability); prioritize multilateral forums and be engage in building a multipolar balance. These findings served to validate the perception about the role of Europe as a condition of Russia's foreign policy: whether to maintain itself as a great power, to take the weight of the decisions multilateral forums, or to consolidate multipolarity, it matters to Russia an Europe free from extra continental interference.

Hava savunma sistemlerinin hedefi, yüksek değere sahip bölge, tesis ve birliklerin Hava Soluyan Hedeflere (HSH) ve Balistik Füzelere (BF) karşı savunmasını sağlamaktır.
HSH'lere karşı kullanılan hava savunma sistemleri tüm dünya ülkelerinin sahip olduğu ortak bir yetenek olmasına rağmen BF'lere karşı kullanılan hava savunma sistemleri sadece bir kaç ülkenin sahip olduğu yüksek teknolojiye dayalı bir yetenektir. Bu hali ile BF'lere karşı hava savunma yeteneği kazanmak oldukça zor, maliyetli ve çok iyi bir planlama gerektiren faaliyettir.
Bu makalenin amacı tehdit balistik füzelere karşı milli bir füze savunma mimarisinin nasıl oluşturulması gerektiği hakkında fikir sunmaktır.

North Korea’s strategic assertiveness driven by its enduring aspirations to own a more sophisticated and survivable nuclear ICBM capability has recently generated a great deal of concern, particularly in civilian circles. However, despite Pyongyang’s presumed desire to possess a less theoretical capability to strike strategic targets as appealing as the District of Columbia, Yellowstone National Park, and the San Andreas Fault, for now the possibility of a surprise North Korean nuclear attack remains extremely remote, not to say unimaginable. The reason is fairly evident: a mix of defensive rationality, technological constraints, and regional geopolitics. Based on these three cardinal and largely verifiable factors, the Pentagon and its U.S. interagency counterparts should come up with a well-tailored, case-adaptive deterrence and containment strategy against the North, founded on indispensable hard-power countermeasures.

With the induction of new weapon systems in South Asia, notably BMDs, the region would gradually become prone to risk of war especially due to unresolved disputes, notably Kashmir. The sporadic events of violence and state terrorism in Indian Held Kashmir, as have been witnessed in past few months, pose serious threat to a major chuck of the entire world population. Due to mutual hostility and suspicion, role of international community, especially the major powers, would remain critical in facilitating the bilateral peace between the South Asian nuclear rivals or else possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would keep the populace of this region hostage to the nuclear radiation effects around the globe.

URL https://idsa.in/jds/13-4-2019-china-df-41-ballistic-missile-ms-prathibha Please Scroll down for Article Full terms and conditions of use: https://www.idsa.in/termsofuse This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling , loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.

Ronald Reagan's Star Wars and cyberspace as envisioned by Californian Ideology seen as revivalist projects in the tradition of the Great Awakenings and drawing on the myth of the latest frontier. The common roots of counterculture, high-tech enthusiasm and evangelicalism become visible.

S-350E "Hero"/ "Vityaz" Anti-Aircraft Missile System with dual role features of area air defense as well as medium range anti-aircraft engagement capabilities was first unveiled during MAKS 2013 Air show which was held in Moscow.

The S-350E project developer is the Russian Almaz corporation (government owned,  "KB-1") which is currently a part of "Almaz-Antei" Air Defence Concern under the guidance of Chief Designer – Ilya Isakov.

In this conference presentation that was delivered during my absence in a panel of the 15th annual conference of the European Society of Criminology on September 3rd 2015, I underline the importance of reseaching WMD and delivery systems. I draw on my North Korean research to argue wherefore also nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation has to become subject of criminoligical research.

At some point during 2013, Turkey’s political authority began to treat the incountry development and production of long-range air and missile defense systems as a priority. Soon after, they announced their decision to favor a Chinese offer that came complete with licensed production and the pr omise of technology transfer. Yet, with this decision came NATO’s objection and challenges around integration and information security. The 2015 decision to rollback the pro-China decision, and opt instead for the indigenous development of air and missile defense systems (in close conjunction with a foreign technological and industrial partner) was triggered by Turkey’s disillusion with the content of China’s technology transfer package. Subsequently, this new partner became a team comprising France and Italy; Turkish industry tied itself to this team in developing Europe’s next-generation missile defense capability. Then came the Turkish government’s 2017 decision to purchase off-the-shelf,
standalone S-400 systems from Russia. This decision was an anomaly, and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Turkey’s political figures have justified the S-400 order by citing the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, not to mention the West’s refusal to sell comparable systems; but these justifications have been refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves.

This analysis examines the disharmony in American–Canadian relations in the period from 2001 to 2005. Canada and the United States co-operated in the early days after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, managing their mutual border and fighting the war in Afghanistan. Yet they soon came into conflict over American plans to invade Iraq and create a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system for North America. President George W. Bush and Paul Cellucci, his ambassador in Ottawa, were insensitive to Canadian concerns. Canadian leaders sent mixed messages to Washington, hinting that they would support a war in Iraq and participate in the BMD system, but ultimately deciding against each. The article examines the limitations of the tolerant ally interpretation of the Canadian–American relationship and illuminates the role of leadership in the rupture that took place between the two countries.

1. Recently available high resolution imagery of DF-26 points to the high likelihood of the missile
being based on the DF-16 design with the booster length increased for extended range.
2. There is also a possibility that a better fuel with high burn rate performance is used.
3. The nose geometry and the higher payload capacity indicate that the re-entry vehicle has high
ballistic coefficient and hence will have very high re-entry velocity
4. For terminal control the missile would most likely have reaction control motors rather than
aerodynamic control surfaces.
5. The enhanced re-entry velocity makes the missile unsuitable for anti-ship operation.
6. It is highly likely that the missile is specifically designed for high precision conventional strikes.
7. The likely targets, going by the range, would be air bases in Guam and the vehicle might come
with specifically designed larger cluster type sub-munitions warhead and bunker busting
warheads for HDBT.

This paper will build on ballistic missile defense in Europe. In the first part, a brief historical overview will place the current public management issue into light. This is followed by a discussion of the main actors in the international debate, the problems that arise and the available options and recommendations to address missile defense. In the second part, differences between George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama will analyze under the title “Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe: Evolving Problems during Change in Presidential Administration"

Radar of this specific configuration will be suitable for ballistic missile defence. One specific capability in this regard is that it can detect and track a 50x50 cm object at a distance of 1000 km and a 30x30 cm object at a distance of 800 km. This will enable the radar to track ballistic missiles with a range of 4000 to 5000 km. The frequency band used by the radar has not been declared publicly. But it can be deduced to some extent. Given that the T/R modules were sourced from Astra Microwave Products Ltd (the company provides components for the indigenously produced Akash SAM system), which manufactures T/R modules that can operate in the UHF, L, S, C, X and Ku band for active apertures
and considering the declared range and resolution of the radar the frequency band is likely to be L-band or maybe S-band.

Distributed Weighted Engagement Scheme (DWES) that is being incorporated in the Aegis system, has been successfully
tested. The DWES is an algorithm that helps in the coordinated engagement decision making involving multiple
Aegis equipped Destroyers deployed in a theatre. The algorithm decides, based on the geometry of the BMD nodes and the target position at any  given time, on the node that could have the best shot against the incoming warhead.

During recent years tensions between Russia and Western states have risen, undermining the stability that Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this research is to study Russia’s behavior and external actions during this time, and determine the driving factors that led its leadership to adopt them. The analysis is made principally through Structural Realism, using in addition the Perception and Misperception Theory to explain state behavior and threat perception. Initially the thesis examines Russia’s geopolitical position and the post-Cold War international system, as well as the alternative strategies of A2/AD and Hybrid Warfare that characterize Russian actions. Then, the post-Cold War Western foreign policy actions in Europe and the Middle East are discussed. The main issues examined are the NATO and EU enlargement to the East, the development of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense and Western global interventions after 1990. Emphasis is placed on Russia’s perception of these actions as threatening to its perceived sphere of influence, its Near Abroad, and its initial reaction to this emerging security dilemma. Subsequently, analysis focuses on Russian aggressive actions and external behavior. Beginning with Putin’s ascent to power, Russia recovered from its decline and rebuilt its military, using it as a central tool to promote its foreign policy objectives. This became obvious in the interventions that started with the invasion in Georgia in 2008 and its engagement in Ukraine in 2014. The latest intervention in Syria, in 2015, marked Russia’s first step beyond its Near Abroad, aiming to extend its influence on global scale. The research concludes that the current Russian assertive behavior in its Near Abroad resulted as a reaction to external threats, as Russian leadership perceived the West’s strategic behavior in the post-Cold War period. In order to confront these threats and reclaim Russia’s Great Power status, Moscow chose a hard power approach that led to a confrontation with the West. This ongoing antagonism has a serious impact on the security balance on a regional and global scale.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the replacement
program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that
also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet
of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to
be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s.1 A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure)
on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035.2 Many have questioned the need for this program, including former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs.3
The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges
from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars),4 while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system
over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion.5 This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one
piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag
projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars).6 Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional
forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in
defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget.7
Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs.
The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading
the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s costeffectiveness
and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering
whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible
benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent
from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with
enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.

Integrating defense against air and missile threats require more than technical integration - it requires entities confer on how these systems fit in a strategic context, and a blend of policy, planning and supporting efforts.  This piece, published in DefenseOne, advocates integration be treated holistically and the utility of using a third neutral party to facilitate discussions in order to mitigate biases in finding solutions and maintain a long term perspective.

A look at China's anti-satellite program reveals how high technology makes it possible to gain the highest ground, as recommended by ancient treatises like 'The Art of War'. The text then examines the reasons why Beijing is interested in pursuing an ASAT program, and its impact on Taiwan and the South China Sea, among others. At the same time, the consequences of Russia's and Japan's work on missile defence are examined.

Auf dem Lissabon-Gipfel 2010 haben die Nato-Verbündeten beschlossen, ein gemeinsames Raketenabwehrsystem als wichtiges Element kollektiver Verteidigung zu entwickeln. Seitdem hat sich das sicherheitspolitische Umfeld grundlegend verändert. Die Hoffnung, mit Moskau bei der Raketenabwehr zu kooperieren, hat sich zerschlagen. Das Atomabkommen mit Iran reduziert die Bedrohung aus dem Süden und relativiert damit eine der wesentlichen Begründungen für den Aufbau des Nato-Systems. Zugleich hat die Allianz Fortschritte bei ihren Bemühungen erzielt, das Bündnisgebiet, ihre Truppen und die Bevölkerung vor einem Angriff mit Raketen zu schützen. Die Grundsatzentscheidung für den Aufbau des Raketenabwehrsystems dürfte Bestand haben. Ungeachtet dessen sollte der Bundestag die außen-, sicherheits-, industrie-, rüstungskontrollund finanzpolitischen Auswirkungen der Raketenabwehrpläne abwägen, bevor er über zusätzliche deutsche Beiträge zu dem System befindet.

Iron Dome has the potential to perpetuate or even escalate the Israel-Palestinian conflict. As the Iron Dome reduces the ability to impose human costs on Israel, adversaries would seek other ways to circumvent the protective shield. The least expensive is to quantitatively increase its rocket arsenal as Hamas can add thousands of crude Qassam rockets to its inventory.  Besides arming itself, Hamas may resort to other means to harm Israel. One may possibly see the revival of suicide attacks of the 1990s and 2000s. Though Hamas would undoubtedly want to refrain from directly sponsoring such attacks, its vast network gives it the ability to inspire such attacks. Iron Dome provides freedom to Israel to resort to coercive political action like the recent one in Jerusalem. Iron Dome has relieved Israel of the human costs concern and thus granted freedom of action against Hamas. It may also ease political pressure on Israeli political leadership to seek genuine resolution of the conflict. With a very low-threat perception of adversarial action, Iron Dome raises serious concerns for the future of the conflict.

Die NATO-Raketenabwehr beeinträchtigt das auf dem strategischen Gleichgewicht basierende Kalkül, welches bisher ermöglichte, die Nuklearwaffenarsenale der USA und Russlands zu begrenzen bzw. zu reduzieren. Da sie mittlerweile jedoch einen festen Platz im westlichen Sicherheitsdenken eingenommen zu haben scheint, sollte nachgedacht werden, wie trotzdem weitere Rüstungskontroll- und Abrüstungsschritte zwischen Moskau und Washington möglich sein könnten.

This work aimed to do a preliminary assessment about the weight of Europe as being a determinant to Russian's Foreign and Security Policy, with emphasis on the role played by the missile shield (NMD) in Europe. Therefore, we tried to do a briefly review of Russia's relations with Europe in the post-Cold War: the Kosovo's War (1999), the Georgia's War (2008) and the situation in Ukraine and the Black Sea Region (2011). In turn, the cooperation projects between European countries and Russia are examined more carefully. And, on the other hand, we analyze the missile shield in its current state and its implementation schedule pursuant announced in 2012. It has been found that in fact Europe has considerable weight in the development of Russia's foreign policy as a whole, that the critical aspect of the relationship with Europe is the missile defense, that the main point of cooperation beyond energy infrastructure is the Skolkovo's Center of Innovation and Technology. We conclude that the general lines of external politics in the pre-revolutionary Russia and the USSR are followed in the post-Cold War, which is described as the landmark-Reactive-Defensive Utility (RDU) In addition, the main priority of the Russia's Foreign and Security Policy is the maintenance of it's great power status (hence the importance of retaining nuclear second strike capability); prioritize multilateral forums and be engage in building a multipolar balance. These findings served to validate the perception about the role of Europe as a condition of Russia's foreign policy: whether to maintain itself as a great power, to take the weight of the decisions multilateral forums, or to consolidate multipolarity, it matters to Russia an Europe free from extra continental interference.