LIMEN Journal of the Hungarian Migration Research Institute 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) Immigration and Antisemitic Incidents: An Overview of West and North Europe László Bernát Veszprémy Abstract Our study analyses the extent of antisemitic incidents in West and North Europe and their links to immigration, covering France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. According to the majority of media analyses and statistics concerning the countries covered in the study, the extent of antisemitism and the number of antisemitic incident are on the rise. The number of incidents has been increasing in the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark since the outbreak of the migration crisis, while the Netherlands – following several moderations – witnessed a relatively high number in 2017 compared to previous years. As regards to the background of perpetrators, a significant part of them come from the immigrant community. It can be assumed that the actual number of such incidents is somewhat or much higher in practically all countries. 1. Introduction A debate seems to be emerging today as to whether there is any connection between modern-day migration to Europe and antisemitism and antisemitic incidents witnessed in West Europe. The international Jewish and Israeli press paying special attention to the issue regularly reports antisemitic incidents committed against Jews and Jewish communities in West Europe, and warnings made in this regard by western European Jewish leaders.1 In the following we discover: (1) the scope of data used in media reports on antisemitism in West and North European countries highly affected by immigration by assessing the surveys of known governmental and non-governmental organisations working with such data; (2) whether one can talk about rising antisemitism in the countries concerned since the outbreak of the migration crisis; (3) whether perpetrators with immigrant background are overrepresented among the perpetrators of antisemitic incidents; and (4) how the Jewish communities of the specific countries see the potential connection between immigration and such incidents. We analyse the situation of France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 1 Some articles from major Jewish journals, only from this year: Phillips 2018a; Sitbon 2018; Esman 2018. 134 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy 2. Methodological notes According to German historian and sociologist Günther Jikeli: “while most researchers accept antisemitism prevailing among Muslims as a relevant factor in today’s European antisemitism, some kind of gap can be experienced in the researches in connection with the Muslims”.2 However, the lack of data is only one difficulty out of the many underlying researches in the topic. In the course of our research we had to face the fact that many European countries – supposedly for cosmetic purpose – distort the statistical number of antisemitic incidents with specific methods. For instance, German and Swedish government data associate the majority of incidents with far-right perpetrators, while opinion surveys conducted among the members of local Jewish communities indicate that farright people represent a minority in this regard.3 For example, the German police treats nearly all attacks on Jews as right-wing inspired, while it does not record a part of anti-Israeli attacks among antisemitic incidents, but simply collect them in a column named “anti-Israelism”.4 Interestingly, however, a survey by the German police also classified an arson attempt against a German synagogue in the latter category.5 A similar methodological problem arises in connection with a 2018 survey covering five countries (conducted with German-British funding), which completely separated anti-Israelism and antisemitism.6 Our study relies on the data of government and non-governmental organisations monitoring antisemitic incidents in the given countries. However, we must stress that official data were subject to criticism by the literature, while in other cases no such data were available at all. For this reason, we followed a study by Due Enstad published by the University of Oslo in 20177, and analysed the opinion of the Jewish community and the media on the background and identity of antisemitic perpetrators as a reference. Where such data are not available, we put forward a qualitative approach following the methodological notes8 by Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International Affairs at the American Jewish Congress. 2 Jikeli 2014, 32. See footnote 69 of this study. 4 See footnote 59 of this study. 5 Ibid. 6 For this methodological problem see Enstad 2017, p 18–2. For the methodological critique of the 2018 University of London-EVZ survey see Baker 2018. 7 Enstad 2017, p 20–21. 8 Baker 2018. 3 135 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) 3. Number of antisemitic attacks after 2015 Growing antisemitism in West and North Europe is seen by several media outlets as an issue subject to political debates.9 The ongoing media discourse shows that a number of significant newspapers, portals and organisations claim that the extent of antisemitism has increased after 2015 in all countries covered herein – or at least it raises concern. This holds for France,10 the United Kingdom,11 Germany,12 the Netherlands,13 Sweden,14 Norway15 and Denmark.16 In many cases we also get to similar findings by examining quantitative analyses. Nevertheless, it is necessary to test this popular statement in light of statistical data. An appropriate interpretation of data requires first information on the Jewish population in the individual countries. Jewish population of the analysed countries in 201617 France United Kingdom Germany Netherlands Sweden Norway Denmark 460,000 290,000 117,000 29,900 15,000 1,300 6,400 3.1 France In France the records of antisemitic incidents are kept by the Jewish Community Protection Service (Service de la Communauté Juive – SPCJ). The organisation registered 311 cases of this type in 2017, and 335 in 2016. The corresponding numbers were 851 and 808 in 2014 and 2015, respectively. In the 2000’s the highest number was recorded in 2004 (974).18 It is also a known fact that the number of violent incidents grew in 2017. The number of such attacks was 92, which means 9 For some up-to-date and important articles see Phillips 2018b; von der Brelie 2018; France24 2018; for the Hungarian context: Hidas 2018. 10 DW 2014. 11 Khomami 2018. 12 Snyder 2018. 13 The Digital Ambassador Club 2018. 14 Carlbom 2017. 15 Gerstenfeld 2017. 16 Bergman 2016. 17 Based on data from the Berman Jewish Data Bank of November 2016. 18 See the data of 2016 along with previous figures: Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive 2016, 20. Data of 2017 cited by (though by referring to data of the ministry of interior, in conformity with SPCJ data all along): European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2018a. 136 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy 28% jump compared to the data of 2016.19 Beyond these data, attention should be paid to the opinion provided by an organisation established by former French police officers (Bureau National de Vigilance Contre l’Antisémitisme – BNVCA), which states that such incidents are often not recorded by the authorities as antisemitic attacks.20 This is relevant for us since SPCJ also uses statistics from the ministry of interior. BNVCA criticised the corresponding data collection practice of French authorities many times, for instance in connection with the murder of Sarah Halimi in April 2017.21 3.2 United Kingdom In the United Kingdom the Community Security Trust (CST) collects the number of antisemitic incidents, and then analyses them. While an all-time high number of 1,168 incidents was recorded in 2014 (explained by CST with the then ongoing conflict in Gaza), the corresponding number was 924 in 2015. The number of attacks was 1,309 in 2016, and 1,382 in 2017.22 The chief executive of the Trust says “hatred is rising and Jewish people are suffering as a result”.23 According to the Trust’s data, violent incidents showed the most significant increase: the figure grew by 34% compared to 2016 (108 incidents vs. 145 in 2017). Though the H1 report of 2018 presented a more moderate number compared to the last year (727 vs. 786 cases in the first six months of 2017, which latter had been a record high number until then), it still means the second highest figure in the Trust’s history,24 while in the meantime the CST neglected several hundred reported cases which it did not regard as antisemitic crimes. 3.3 Germany The records of antisemitic attacks in Germany are kept by the competent office of the German police (Kriminalpolizeiliche Meldedienst in Fällen Politisch motivierter Kriminalität – KPMD-PMK). The number of antisemitic incidents developed as follows in Germany: 1,596 in 2014, 1,366 in 2015,25 1,468 in 2016, and 1,504 in 2017,26 respectively. As already mentioned in the methodological part, several experts consider the police’s classification as unreliable. (According to the reports 19 Sitbon 2018. Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 The Times of Israel 2017. 23 See the annual reports by CST on antisemitic attacks: Community Security Trust 2015a; Community Security Trust 2016; Community Security Trust 2017; Community Security Trust 2018a; Community Security Trust 2018b. 24 Khomami 2018. 25 Community Security Trust 2018b. 26 For the data of 2014 and 2015 see Bundesministerium des Innern 2015. For the data of 2016 and 2017 see Bundesministerium des Innern 2018b. 20 137 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) referred to herein, practically all antisemitic incidents can be associated with the far-right). 3.4 The Netherlands The records of antisemitic incidents in the Netherlands are kept by the Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël (CIDI). According to the Centre’s data, the totals of incidents were as follows: 171 in 2014, 126 in 2015, 109 in 2016, and27 137 in 2017,28 respectively. Some members of the CIDI expressed their critique that Dutch Jews “are tired of reporting”.29 3.5 Sweden In Sweden the crime prevention organisation named Brottsförebyggande rådet (Brå) is responsible for recording antisemitic incidents. Statistics disclosed by Brå are compiled from criminal cases which the police considers to be motivated by antisemitism. Brå publishes a survey in every two years from 2016, thus its data for 2017 were not public upon the preparation of this study. The number of antisemitic attacks in Sweden was 182 in 2016, 277 in 2015, and 267 in 2014, respectively.30 3.6 Norway The country is home to a smaller Jewish community, and lacks any organisation which would publish regular reports on antisemitic incidents. Enstad’s report covering the period up to 2015 overviewed the development of antisemitic incidents in Norway based on media sources and data from the Norwegian police.31 It is particularly visible that according to the report no such cases were recorded in the country in the period concerned. Beyond these, it should mentioned that the small Jewish community suffered a synagogue arson and a machine gun attack in 2006, meaning that extremely violent incidents are not unprecedented in the northern country’s post-millennial history either. A survey delivered for the municipality of Oslo in 2011 claims that every third student of Jewish schools reported 2-3 “negative incidents” per month, suffered as a result of their Jewish origin.32 A similarly telling example was when a Jewish-Muslim dialogue group was set up 27 For these and previous data see Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel 2017. Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel 2018. 29 Veszprémy 2017. 30 Brå 2018a; Brå 2018b. 31 Enstad 2017. 32 For all supplementary data on Norway see the action plan of the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation for 2016–2020: Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation 2016. 28 138 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy in the country in 2015 in response to the “harassments and attacks”.33 Though Enstad’s data were used in this study unchanged, we must particularly stress that the specific attacks were not reported, attacks still happened. 3.7 Denmark The report of November 2018 by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) contains the official statistics of the Danish police on antisemitic incidents. According to these the following can be stated: no data is available for 2014, while 13 attacks were reported for 2015, 21 for 2016, and 38 for 2017, respectively.34 Though it is not an official data source, the report of a Danish Jewish organisation mentions 54 antisemitic incidents committed in 2014, 26 in 2015, 22 in 2016, and 30 in 2017, respectively.35 For Denmark, we regarded official figures as authoritative. Number of reported antisemitic incidents in West and North Europe since the outbreak of the migration crisis36 France United Kingdom Germany Netherlands Sweden Norway Denmark 2014 851 1,168 1,596 171 267 0 n/a 2015 808 924 1,366 126 277 0 13 2016 335 1,309 1,468 109 182 n/a 21 2017 311 1,382 1,504 137 n/a n/a 38 2015–2017 (total) murders, 2015–2017 1,143 537 3,615 0 4,338 0 372 0 726* 0 0** 0 72*** 138 * Without data for 2017. ** Without data for 2016 and 2017. *** Without data for 2014. Overall, we can conclude that among the countries with full data availability the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark have witnessed a continuous growth in the number of antisemitic incidents since the outbreak of the migration crisis in 2015. All the three countries showed a rise in the numbers during the Gaza conflict in 2014, followed by a drop in 2015. Later, the number of antisemitic incidents started to go up again in the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark (with a slight difference of some dozen cases in 2016 and 2017), while the Netherlands 33 Ibid. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2018a, p 34. 35 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2018a, p 35. 36 The table includes data for 2014 as well, in order to enable comparison. 37 In January 2015 Muslim attackers killed 4 Jews in a kosher store in Paris, while in April 2017 a Parisian Jewish lady was thrown out of her upstairs apartment by a Muslim attacker. Outside our period under analysis, another French Jewish person was murdered in March 2018. 38 In February 2015 a Jewish guard was shot dead by a Muslim attacker in a Copenhagen synagogue. See BBC 2015. 34 139 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) faced a moderation in 2016, to be followed by a growing number of such cases in 2017, including extremely violent incidents (stabbing, fight in the downtown). France witnesses a continuous downtrend in the number of incidents. In Sweden one cannot talk about a continuous downtrend seeing a rise in 2015 and lacking most recent data. No sufficient data for analysis is available for Norway, while Denmark suffered the only fatalincident in 2015 in addition to France. Naturally, it can be assumed for all countries – and in the case of the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Netherlands, there are reasonable grounds for assuming – that the actual number of incidents is somewhat or even significantly higher.39 4. Share of immigrants within the perpetrators of antisemitic attacks 4.1 France The French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme – CNCDH) examined the origin of perpetrators of antisemitic on a percentage bases between 1994 and 2007. The share of “Arab-Muslim” perpetrators developed well beyond 30% in this period. Their share had been extremely low in 1997–1998 (10% share of Arabs and/or Muslims among the perpetrators concerned), whereas it reached an extreme height (80% of the antisemitic attacks were associated with them).40 From 2008 and 2012 CNCDH disclosed the “origin” of the perpetrators of individual incidents, differentiating between right-wing, Arab-Muslim and unknown perpetrators. Background of perpetrators of antisemitic attacks in France41 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 39 Right-wing 33 20 31 19 0 Arab-Muslim 11 14 20 15 10 Unknown 56 138 80 95 167 As already mentioned in the main text, CST processed less incidents than the total reported ones; in Germany researchers, in France alternative Jewish organisations claim that official data should be viewed critically, while associates from the Dutch CIDI believe that Jews are simply “tired of reporting” such incidents. 40 Cited by Jikeli 2014, p 35. 41 Cited by Jikeli 2014, p 36. For the latest reports see Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L’homme 2015; Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L’homme 2016.; Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L’homme 2017; Commission Nationale Consultative Des Droits De L’homme 2018. These documents do not provide information on the identity of antisemitic attackers. 140 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy Unfortunately, we have no recent data, though these statistics help in analysing how the share of perpetrators with various background developed. Looking at the full available data series (1997–2012) it is visible that Muslims had not committed any attack in the very first years, then took a firm position among the perpetrators. Following their effective dominance in the early 2000’s, the number attackers with right-wing background fell back to a few dozens, and in 2012 no such person was recorded among the perpetrators. Data practically show the swapping of the communities’ positions, though one should not forget about the significant differences between individual years, and the fact that the number of unknown perpetrators doubled in the period of 2010 and 2012. Marc Knobel, researcher of the Conseil représentatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF) also drew the conclusion in his own research that “Muslims played a key role” in antisemitic incidents in France between 2000 and 2012.42 It is typical that the French government agency stopped collecting data on the background of antisemitic attackers during the refugee crisis. 4.2 United Kingdom Statistics from previous years indicate that immigrants are overrepresented among antisemitic attackers in Great Britain, members of the majority society still represent more than half of the perpetrators. A survey prepared by Paul Iganski, Vicky Kielinger and Susan Paterson for the British Institute for Jewish Policy Research analysing police data from the period between 2001 and 2004 found that “Arabic Egyptian”, “African Caribbean” and “dark European” perpetrators were highly “disproportionately” represented behind antisemitic attacks. However, white Europeans still made up 56.9% of all attackers.43 Recent data from CST indicate the strengthening of these trends. CST summarises the ethnic background of attackers where such information is known. Background of antisemitic attackers in the United Kingdom between 2014 and 201744 2014 2015 2016 2017 White White (North (South Black European) European) 148 5 26 192 15 46 274 21 75 225 13 77 South Asian 127 77 96 74 Far-Eastern or South East Asian not available45 3 2 1 Arab or North African 34 27 31 30 Unknown In total 828 564 810 962 1,168 924 1,309 1,382 42 Knobel 2013, p 37. Iganski − Kielinger − Paterson 2005. 44 The table includes data for 2014 as well, in order to enable comparison. See the annual reports by CST on antisemitic attacks: Community Security Trust 2015a; Community Security Trust 2016; Community Security Trust 2017; Community Security Trust 2018a. 45 This category was introduced by CST from 2015. 43 141 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) These figures reflect an underrepresentation of white British (North Europeans) relative to their share in the whole population between 2015 and 2017 (53%, 55% and 54%, respectively), and though South European whites are also represented to some extent, overall, individuals from Muslim countries are by far overrepresented. Although the text does not mention any religious background, CST’s annual overview of 2014 (which is not identical to the annual report on antisemitic incidents) states that “where a perpetrator’s description was given, around half appear to have been from sections of Muslim communities around the country”.46 CST highlighted in its 2014 report on antisemitic incidents that during the Gaza conflict the number of attackers with immigrant background had gone up, while that of whites had dropped.47 4.3 Germany In their research delivered for the Berlin-based Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung in 2002, Werner Bergman and Juliane Wetzel state that “the physical attacks against Jews, and the desecration and destruction of synagogues [sic] were predominantly committed by young Muslims, mainly of Arabic origin”.48 The German KMPD-PMK publishes the background of attackers by classifying them into the following four categories: right-wing, left-wing, foreign and “other”. The literature criticises this categorisation methodology, because “classical” farright acts may also be popular among Muslims.49 German and Dutch media also reported, for instance, that young Muslims and refugees had praised the leaders of the Nazi Germany or the Holocaust.50 According to the own categories of the German police, right-wing acts can include any “racist” ideology,51 which can also naturally hold true for Palestinian or pan-Arab nationalism. Background of antisemitic attackers in Germany, 2014-201752 2014 2015 2016 2017 46 Right-wing 1,342 1,246 1,381 1,412 Left-wing 7 5 2 1 Foreign ideology 176 78 48 41 Other53 71 37 37 20 In total 1,596 1,366 1,468 1,474 Community Security Trust 2015b. Community Security Trust 2015a, p 7. 48 Cited by Jikeli 2014, p 33. 49 Enstad 2017, p 18–19. 50 Stanley-Becker − Rojkov 2017. 51 Based on the police’s description of definitions, perpetrators fall into this category who cannot be classified by other criteria. See Bundeskriminalamt 2016, p 9. 52 The table includes data for 2014 as well, in order to enable comparison. For data of 2014 and 2015 see Bundesministerium des Innern 2016. For the full data series of 2016 see Bundesministerium des Innern 2017. For data of 2017 see Bundesministerium des Innern 2018a. For the data including 30 further antisemitic incidents see Bundesministerium des Innern 2018b. 53 Based on the police’s description of definitions, perpetrators fall into this category who cannot be classified by other criteria. See Bundeskriminalamt 2016, 10. 47 142 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy Several specific factors make the interpretation of data difficult. Two separate reports by the ministry of interior provide to different for the final number of antisemitic attacks in 2017 (1,474 and 1,504, respectively). In the case of politically motivated criminal cases, the German police usually treats the religious extremisms as an independent category, though this category was not indicated in this case.54 “Foreign ideology” is not listed here, but it covers non-religious foreign ideologies by the police’s definition, and the nationality of perpetrators is irrelevant in these cases..55 It is similarly problematic that anti-Israeli incidents are classified by the German police into a separate category, sometimes including synagogue arsons, as well.56 Nevertheless, German police statistics indicate that while the number of attacks committed by left-wing and foreign persons continuously decreased between 2015 and 2017, the number of those committed by right-wing perpetrators – except for the year 2014 preceding the outbreak of the migration crisis – continuously rose. Indeed, it can happen that Muslims are underrepresented in specific crime types. According to the data of the German ministry of interior for 2001–2010, Jewish grave vandalism can nearly exclusively be associated with right-wing perpetrators.57 However, also bearing in mind the poor quality of data, Jikeli claims that Muslims are clearly overrepresented in the incidents relative to their share in the total population.58 The practice of the German police to keep separate records of anti-Israeli attacks should be addressed here. In a lecture held at the Stanford University in 2004, French-Iranian sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar stressed the presence of the Israeli-Arab conflict in the European context. Although his researches refer to Arab and Muslim people imprisoned in France, his words are also relevant in a wider European context: “Since they [the prisoners] identify Palestinians with “Arabs” (including French Arabs), French Jews are practically the same as Israeli Jews, which therefore justifies attacking French Jews, harassing people wearing kippahs, and damaging Jewish cemeteries or synagogues and setting them on fire”. Thus, according to Khosrokhavar, “for many Muslim prisoners Palestine is not a issue far away”, they believe “Jews can be attacked anywhere”.59 Accordingly, Khosrokhavar claims that an attack alleged to be anti-Israeli can also easily be an antisemitic one. 54 Ibid. Ibid. pp 9–10. 56 Enstad 2017, pp 18–19. 57 Cited by Jikeli 2014, p 38. 58 Jikeli 2014, p 38. 59 Khosrokhavar. 55 143 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) 4.4 The Netherlands In the assessed period CIDI did not register the background of perpetrators of antisemitic incidents,60 but a 2009 report by the organisation was quoted by Israeli Haaretz as follows: “antisemitic physical harassments, intimidations and attacks were mostly committed by perpetrators of North African origin”.61 An analyst of the organisation shared the following telling thoughts in a 2017 interview for Hungarian Jewish journal Szombat: the difference between the low number of antisemitic incidents in Hungary and the high figure in the Netherlands is associated with the “composition of the population”.62 4.5 Sweden Previous reports by the Swedish Brå included specific attacker categories for antisemitic incidents, but this practice was rather selective already then. For instance, its report for 2004–2005 contained the information that 32.4% of the antisemitic attacks were committed by followers of the “white power” (vit makt),63 but this categorisation was not included in its reports for the years subject to our overview. Furthermore, this document lacks any information on the background of the remaining attacks, meaning that they could be committed even by Muslim persons. 4.6 Norway In Norway no records are kept on the background of perpetrators of antisemitic attacks. In previous years falling outside the scope of our overview, numerous violent attacks were committed by Muslims in the country.64 4.7 Denmark Similarly, no records are kept on the background of perpetrators of antisemitic attacks either. However, it is a known fact that the person who committed the antisemitic murder in 2015 was a radical Muslim.65 60 CIDI’s reports can be downloaded at the following link: CIDI 2010a. Liphshiz 2009. The full 43-page 2009 report is no longer available on the organisation’s website, only a 2-page summary is accessible: CIDI 2010b. 62 Veszprémy 2017. 63 Brå 2006. 64 Enstad 2017, pp 18–19. 65 BBC 2015. 61 144 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy 5. Share of immigrants within attackers as perceived by the Jewish community 5.1 France, United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark For the above countries we can use the data of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for 2018, which examined the presence of immigrant among antisemitic attackers by surveying local Jewish communities. Please note that the data on attacks analysed here are reported by the communities, and not figures from official statistics. Background of antisemitic attackers as perceived by the victims66 * France(n = 65) United Kingdom (n = 61) Germany (n = 72) Netherlands (n = 64) Sweden (n = 88) Denmark (n = 72) Progressive left-wing Radical Islam 21 33 25 22 16 41 18 35 27 40 27 34 Radical Christianity 4 3 5 5 3 1 Far-right 7 11 20 6 18 10 * The following question was asked: “Still thinking about that incident: where somebody attacked or threatened you because you are Jewish, who did this to you?” The above data reflecting the opinion of Jewish communities differ from the data on antisemitic incidents in every respective country. In Germany and France farright attackers should be in a majority also in the victims’ opinion. By contrast, they name Muslim attackers as the majority in every case. In the United Kingdom black people and/or Muslims should be overrepresented according to the above statistics, but surprisingly progressive left-wing perpetrators were named in most cases. Though we have no information whether the attackers in Sweden not specified by the Brå were from the far-left or Muslims, the numbers indicated here are not coherent the above cited 32.4% share of white nationalists, since the Jewish community named even progressive left-wing people more frequently than farright ones. One should notice that the opinion of victims completely differ from the data supplied by state authorities in two countries (Germany and France), while in Sweden the survey conducted among attacked Jews indicated a higher number of incidents associated with Muslim or Muslim and far-left perpetrators than suggested by known data. With the exception of the United Kingdom, a majority of the Jewish community of every country analysed in this study associate the attacks with the followers of radical Islam. It is also worth noting that victims in every country examined herein (except for Germany) believe that the number of extremist left-wing attackers exceeded that of right-wing ones. 66 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2018b. 145 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) 5.2 Norway In contrast to the countries involved in the FRA survey, we have very little data on what the victims think about the background of their antisemitic attackers. Accordingly, in the following we will basically rely on the qualitative approach. In 2004 Christine Mohn, head of the Norwegian Association against Antisemitism believed that “[antisemitic] harassment largely comes from Muslims and far-left people”.67 In 2010 the Norwegian public media broadcasted a report on schools in Oslo, where teachers and Jewish parents shared the Jewish students’ experiences of verbal – and sometimes physical – insultations from the side of Muslim students.68 According to a work titled Det som er jødisk and authored by Norwegian Holocaust researchers Cora Alexa Døving and Vibeke Moe, 10 out of 21 Norwegian Jews reported personal experience of antisemitism from Muslims, and nearly half of them also claimed to be victim of violent acts.69 6. Summary The above presented media analysis well reflects the strengthening of antisemitism in all countries concerned. In specific cases this is supported by statistics on antisemitic incidents, as well. Nevertheless, a continuous uptrend could only be observed in the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark since the outbreak of the migration crisis, while in the Netherlands – following a several-year downtrend – 2017 witnessed a relatively high number of attacks. In the meantime, France saw a continuously decreasing number of attacks, whereas Sweden was the country where the number of attacks hiked right in the year of the outbreak of the migration crisis. Aside from the number of general attacks, a sudden growth in the number of violent incidents is clearly visible in France and the Netherlands. With the exception of Sweden, all countries saw an all-time high number of antisemitic incidents in the year of the 2014 Gaza conflict, exceeding all levels both up to and after that year. Data from the British CST indicate that the number of attacks committed by people with immigrant background showed the most significant rise in that year. This makes the conclusion quite logical that the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East was accompanied by the radicalisation of people with immigrant background identifying with the Palestinian issue and the hatred extrapolated to the local Jewish community. Although no direct connection can be experienced between the migration crisis and the growth of antisemitism, the above presented correlation itself also supports the significant role of immigrant communities in committing antisemitic incidents. 67 Cited by Enstad 2017, pp 20–21. Ibid. 69 Ibid. 68 146 Limen 1 (2020/1) László Bernát Veszprémy We have no recent and comprehensive data with regard to the perpetrators’ background in the specific cases, but the developments evolving over the past years – along with media reports – suggest that a substantial part of attackers came from immigrant communities. Examples of this include France, Norway and Denmark. A similar situation is taking shape in the Netherlands according to the analyses by CIDI and statements by its associates. We have detailed and up-to-date data from the United Kingdom, which indicate a strong overrepresentation of attackers from immigrant communities. Though no detailed conclusions can be drawn for Germany and Sweden due to the weak reliability and incompleteness of data, the outstanding share of right-wing perpetrators is well visible. Fortunately, the 2018 FRA survey reflecting the perception and opinion of the Jewish community provides a rather up-to-date database, and sheds light on a substantial difference between the opinion of attacked Jews and the data of various government and non-governmental organisations as to the involvement of people with immigrant background in antisemitic attacks. Attacked Jews named extremist Muslims as the group responsible for the largest number of attacks in all countries assessed by FRA and mentioned herein (except for the United Kingdom). According to less representative Norwegian surveys, the local Muslim community plays an important role in antisemitic attacks and harassments. The small size of the local Jewish population and the low number of recorded incidents do not necessarily relate to the lack of violent incidents. Though Denmark and Norway witnessed relatively few incidents, they were often rather violent (in Denmark even a murder occurred). It can be assumed that the actual number of such incidents is somewhat or much higher in practically all countries. 147 László Bernát Veszprémy Limen 1 (2020/1) 7. Bibliography Baker, Andrew (2018). “A recent study into rising antisemitism in Europe ignores the role of Muslim migrants.” 24 May 2018. 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