Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia: The Postwar Era to the Present Author(s): Nina Paulovičová Source: Antisemitism Studies , Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2018), pp. 4-34 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/antistud.2.1.02 REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/antistud.2.1.02?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Antisemitism Studies This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia The Postwar Era to the Present NINA PAULOVIČOVÁ Antisemitism in Slovakia was influenced by socio-economic concerns and frustration over domestic, regional, and international developments during the postwar and post-communist eras. Current antisemitism feeds on powerful ethno-nationalist views rooted in the hatred of non-Slovak and non-Christian others, which, in effect, helps to empower extremism in all forms. This study offers insight into the history of antisemitism in Slovakia from the postwar era to the present with a focus on troubling developments over the past ten years. It weaves together the history of antisemitism, the memory of the Holocaust, current extremism, and the new discourse on refugees from the Middle East and Africa. INTRODUCTION Before the cataclysm of World War II, Slovaks were accustomed to seeing vibrant Jewish life in major Slovakian towns: Christian and Jewish children played soccer on the streets, made trips to the mountains, and went cross-country skiing together;1 Slovaks and Jews gossiped casually in the market, and Christian priests and Jewish 4 Antisemitism Studies Vol. 2, No. 1 • DOI 10.2979/antistud.2.1.02 Copyright © Canadian Institute for the Study of Antisemitism This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia rabbis had friendly chats over cups of tea.2 These were the scenes of peaceful life prior to the war as depicted in the memoirs and testimonies of Holocaust survivors. Such scenes of multicultural cohabitation became increasingly rare, however, as fascist and Nazi ideals spread in the late 1930s, especially in areas marked by ethnic strife.3 The outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939, dramatically changed the map of Central Europe. The ethno-nationalist agenda of the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (HSPP) gained strength and confidence as the position of Czechoslovakia—the only remaining island of democracy in Central Europe—weakened. Czechoslovakia suffered a major blow when the HSPP declared the autonomy of Slovakia on October 6, 1938. Five months later, on March 14, 1939, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist. The elderly Czechoslovak president, Emil Hácha, succumbed to Hitler’s pressure, and that of the Slovak nationalists, and Czechoslovakia was separated into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, occupied and controlled by Nazi Germany, and the Slovak Republic, a vassal state of Nazi Germany that introduced the widespread persecution of Jews. Through the principle of homogenous ethnicity, by which statehood was identified with nationhood, the Slovaks saw danger in the heterogeneous population of Czechs, Hungarians, Jews, and Roma, who were all seen as a destructive influence in the new Slovak Republic and were pushed to the margins of society. With respect to the Jewish minority, in 1941 Slovakia introduced the infamous Jewish Code consisting of 270 antisemitic laws that initiated a systematic and radical elimination of Jews from economic, cultural, and public life.4 These antisemitic policies resulted in severe pauperization of Jews—a problem the Slovak government resolved by offering Slovakian Jews to Hitler along with a so-called colonization payment of five hundred Reichsmarks for every deported Jew.5 Two waves of deportations in 1942 and 1944 removed more than 70,000 Jewish citizens from Slovakia.6 Today, there are only about 3,000 Jews dispersed through major Slovak cities such as Košice, Prešov, Piešťany, Nové Zámky, Dunajská Streda, Galanta, Nitra, Žilina, Lučenec, Trenčín, Komárno, Banská Bystrica, and Humenné.7 In an effort to find 5 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová employment opportunities, many Jews moved from the Slovak countryside to the main cities and gave up traditional ways of life and religious observance. Today, the Jewish community in Slovakia is tiny. There is only one Jewish kindergarten in Bratislava, two kosher kitchens in Bratislava and Košice (the cities with the largest number of Jews), and the Summer and Winter Maccabi Games are attended by about 200 Jews every year.8 HOLOCAUST MEMORY AND DENIAL IN SLOVAKIA During the first years after the war, few survivors wrote of their experiences. The gruesome and horrifying nature of their suffering was hard to comprehend, the general public showed a lack of interest, and survivors tried to distance themselves from their own traumatic past. In Slovakia, however, the first memoirs, novels, and reflections on the persecution and extermination of Jews were published in the late 1940s. Novels by Dominik Tatarka (Farská Republika [The Parish Republic], 1948), Hela Volanská (Stretnutia v lesoch [Meetings in the Forests], 1949), and Katarína Lazarová (Kamaráti [Friends], 1949) allowed readers to learn about the participation and experiences of Jews in the 1944 Slovak National Uprising.9 In the early postwar era, the Holocaust as a historical event was not silenced in Slovakia and this was for political reasons. The clerico-fascist nature of the first Slovak Republic allowed the new communist leadership to permit discussion about the suffering of persecuted groups and the existing societal trauma by decisively distancing themselves from fascist and Nazi crimes. By doing so, the groups on the far-left embraced an identity that was fiercely anti-fascist and anti-clerical.10 It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the communists appropriated the history of the Holocaust to demonstrate their repudiation of Nazi barbarism. In particular, the communists constructed their identity as a heroic, enlightened vanguard and as a progressive force in history. Despite condemning the criminal fascist Slovak past, the communists did not sympathize equally with all victims of the 6 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia Holocaust. Differences were drawn between Holocaust victims as a consequence of the class paradigm at the heart of communist ideology, which identified affluent Jews as representatives of the bourgeoisie and capitalist exploiters who were to be condemned. On the other hand, Jews from the proletariat, the workers exploited by the bourgeoisie, were to be protected and praised. Therefore, the communists could justify the deaths of middle and upper-class Jews during the Holocaust and condemn the murder of Jews from the lower social strata simultaneously. Although the immediate postwar era brought some aspects of the Holocaust experience to public attention, Holocaust memory was silenced in the 1950s as a result of deteriorating international relations between the Soviet Union and Israel. Under direct pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak communist leadership persistently erased Jewish victims from the postwar anti-fascist narrative. Resisters and anti-fascist fighters, for example, became the primary heroes of the new anti-fascist discourse. Similarly, when the exhibit in Auschwitz-Birkenau opened to commemorate the death of victims from Czechoslovakia, the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters in Czechoslovakia objected to the commemoration of “such groups that passively and without any resistance went into gas chambers.”11 As a result of this complaint, the exhibit eventually omitted the names of the Czechoslovak Jews deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Memorial plaques or monuments to victims of the Second World War routinely omitted the names of the murdered Jews, though Jewish victims were sometimes vaguely mentioned as “victims of racial oppression.”12 It was only in the 1960s that the effort to promote “socialism with a human face” gave way to the publication of Holocaust scholarship, which had to follow certain rules. First, when the topic of the Holocaust was addressed, anti-fascist rhetoric was framed as class struggle. In this line of thinking, the Slovak bourgeoisie incited ethnic hatred to weaken the Slovak proletariat. So, for example, the policy of Aryanization (confiscation of Jewish property) was blamed solely on Slovak capitalists and Nazi Germany, while the Slovak leadership’s responsibility for the persecution of Jews was downplayed 7 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová and the problematic topic of Slovak nationalism was passed over in silence.13 In reality, antisemitism represented an indelible part of the HSPP policial program beginning in Autumn 1938 when the autonomy of Slovakia was first declared.14 Slovaks were in the process of nation-building during the wartime period of 1939– 1945. Politically, there was both a sense of collective agency and empowerment (Slovaks were introducing “order” into their own society) and a sense of collective subjugation to Germany. During this period of Slovak autonomy, several government decrees concerning the “Jewish Question” were issued.15 After the declaration of Slovak independence on March 14, 1939, Slovak politicians turned antisemitism into a handy tool of mass mobilization to support the Slovak ethno-nationalist project of building an independent state, as well as a valuable tool for negotiating SlovakGerman relations. The period of “socialism with a human face” was forcefully put to an end with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Warsaw Pact on August 20–21, 1968. What followed was a period of normalization, which suppressed the “Prague Spring” and resurrected old communist dogmas. The directive, “Poučení z krízového vývoje ve straně a společnosti po XIII. Sjezdu KSČ” (“Lessons from Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the XIII-th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia”), outlining how the Second World War and postwar period were to be interpreted and understood in communist Czechoslovakia, was the result of the 1969–1970 purge of the Communist Party there, which deprived 474,000 communists of party membership.16 This directive was imposed on book publishers, the movie industry, cultural institutions, the education sector, and the media.17 By cautiously and consistently refusing to address the painful past, including the Holocaust, the Communist Party silenced problematic topics for more than two decades. The process of Europeanization in the 1990s had a farreaching impact on the reception of the Holocaust in Europe. The Holocaust became a tool of unification between diverse European 8 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia milieus: the effort to come to terms with the problematic past of individual countries ran parallel with efforts to integrate European states into the European Union. Whereas the Holocaust was associated with racism, and ethnic and religious intolerance, the identity of the European Union was based on ethnic and religious tolerance and therefore presented an antithesis to the past. However, the Holocaust as a master narrative informing the values of the European Union was problematic. On one hand, the communists suppressed the Holocaust narrative for decades, and on the other, the EU requirement to come to terms with the Holocaust was imposed from the top down, like the directives of the communist era.18 Indeed, the European Union’s pressure on post-communist states to come to terms with the Holocaust was one of the conditions for admission to the EU community. In the 1990s, Slovakia was transformed from an authoritarian communist state to a liberal democratic government and society. As I have explained elsewhere,19 in comparison to other Central European states, Slovakia needed more time to democratize its society mainly because of the instability of the party system. Surprisingly though, as soon as Vladimír Mečiar and his nationalist HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) were replaced by Mikuláš Dzurinda’s democratic cabinet in 2002, the speed of the Europeanization of Slovakia shocked foreign observers.20 Following the ascension of Dzurinda’s cabinet to power, Slovakia established democratic institutions by May 2004 at which time it also became a member of the European Union. Although the speed of the Europeanization of Slovakia was exceptional, it was not without problems: the party system remained fragmented, Dzurinda’s center-right coalition lacked cohesion, the public was reluctant to participate politically, and Slovaks directed ethnic hatred and prejudice toward the Hungarian and Roma minority communities.21 In the 1990s Slovaks also faced a threefold identity challenge: Slovaks had to define who they were as a nation, they had to trace their historical roots, and articulate their common values. There was no consensus on these subjects—identity politics was a contested terrain and the efforts to appropriate the memory of the 9 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová nation came from all sides. A state-run cultural institution, Matica Slovenská, supported by aging émigré historians such as Milan Ďurica and František Vnuk, as well as the newly established Nation’s Memory Institute, traced the roots of the 1993 Slovak Republic back to March 14, 1939, when the first Slovak Republic was established. The fact that the 1939 Slovak Republic owed its existence to Hitler’s geopolitical calculations—and hence was a satellite state of Nazi Germany—and that more than 70,000 Jews were deported from Slovakia to the death camps, was often bypassed in silence. The émigré historians’ discourse that relativizes the Holocaust is built on two arguments: first, that deportation was just an “evacuation;” and, second, that Slovakia deported its Jews under the direct pressure of Hitler. These are apologetic statements made to cleanse Slovakia of its responsibility for the Jewish Holocaust. Slovakia’s Matica Slovenská, for example, attempts to whitewash the problematic past with its plausible version of history that downplays the crimes of the Slovaks and emphasizes their role as victims. Matica also supported the 2011 unveiling of a statue in the village of Rajec honoring Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Slovakian Foreign Minister of the antisemitic wartime Slovak Republic.22 One recent example of Matica’s efforts was the video titled “Without March 14”—a reference to the date when the first Slovak Republic was established. This five-minute video, posted on YouTube in mid-February 2017, argued that Slovak Jews would have been exterminated even if the first Slovak Republic had not been formed, thereby relativizing the responsibility of the Slovak Republic for the Jewish Holocaust in Slovakia. The short documentary was pulled from the Internet after protests by anti-fascist and Jewish organizations.23 The Catholic Church has always played a crucial role in the process of Slovak nation-building. The Slovak national narrative was directly linked with the Catholic Church in Slovakia, which promoted an interpretation of the past with the help of ultra-nationalist institutions like Matica Slovenská and Kresťansko Demokratické Hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement). The Slovak NationalCatholic narrative was disseminated by the Slovak World Congress, founded in Canada in 1970, by the pro-Tiso wartime Slovak state 10 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia émigrés who supported Slovak nationalist aspirations financially and symbolically. This organization awarded their National Prize to Ján Chryzostom Korec,24 the bishop who defended the wartime Slovak state and its president Jozef Tiso, who stressed the need to “solve the Jewish Question” in his first radio address on March 15, 1939, one day after the establishment of Slovak Republic.25 The Catholic Church and the Slovak World Congress worked together to defend Jozef Tiso, a priest and politician with a gift for diplomacy who was also an opportunist with an ability to maneuver in challenging situations and a charismatic speaker who strived to avoid major conflicts.26 After the establishment of the Slovak state in 1939, the highest state and political functions were concentrated in Tiso’s hands. He served as Prime Minister during the first seven months of the existence of Slovak state and was elected president on October 26, 1939, which also made him Chief Commander of the Hlinka Guard and the Slovak army—allied with Nazi Germany during World War II.27 Interestingly, during his presidency Tiso’s only official foreign visit was to Germany.28 In the end, Tiso’s victory over the radicals in the Slovak government (Vojtech Tuka and Alexander Mach) came with a heavy price—he defeated them by strengthening the leadership principle and authoritarianism in Slovakia, promoting active collaboration with Nazi Germany, and most importantly—implementing a radical solution to the “Jewish Question.”29 Public praise of Jozef Tiso by Roman Catholic priests is not unusual. Slovakia is a country with a strong Catholic tradition, and after the proclamation of Czechoslovakia on October 28, 1918, Catholic priests remained strong advocates of Slovak autonomy. Not surprisingly, the clerical party headed by the priest Andrej Hlinka aimed to establish an autonomous Slovakia to prevent the process of centralization in Czechoslovakia. Ethno-nationalism, of which antisemitism was an indelible part, thus continued to define the politics of the clerical Slovak People’s Party. Even several decades later, after the cataclysm of the Holocaust in Slovakia, the Roman Catholic Church never publicly condemned the antisemitic regime of wartime Slovakia under Jozef Tiso’s presidency. From 11 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová the perspective of the Catholic priests, the celebration of the first Slovak state rather than the tragedy of the Holocaust was to be remembered. As a result, Roman Catholic priests do not hide their admiration for the wartime regime and Tiso. In 2006, Ján Sokol, the archbishop of Bratislava-Trnava, boasted that under Tiso’s presidency Slovakia “enjoyed a period of well-being,” which Sokol embraced as a positive impact on his childhood.30 Four months later, in April 2007, Cardinal Ján Chryzostom Korec admitted in a television program V politike that during the wartime Slovak republic “things happened that should not have happened,” but also defended Tiso by claiming he had “good relations with Jews.”31 Regrettably, ethno-nationalist interpretations of the past have also found support among some young historians of the Nation’s Memory Institute (NMI), established in 2002 to document the totalitarian past in Slovakia. Some of NMI’s historians such as Ivan Petranský and Martin Lacko often resort to “selective memory” approaches highlighting positive aspects of the first Slovak state and downplaying the republic’s Holocaust past. Although none of these historians can be classified as Holocaust deniers, their selective approach to the past offends the Jewish minority and Holocaust survivors in Slovakia. The attempts to rehabilitate and glorify controversial figures such as Jozef Tiso, Bishop Ján Vojtaššák,32 or the minister of home and foreign affairs, Ferdinand Ďurčanský, are unacceptable in a democratic pluralistic society since they justify anti-Jewish policies and the genocide of European Jewry. In fact, Martin Lacko was fired from the NMI in 2016 for his problematic views. While he does not deny that thousands of Jews were pauperized, deprived of their human rights, and eventually murdered, Lacko still celebrates the wartime Slovak state.33 Although right-wing ethno-nationalist politicians have attempted to relativize the past, Slovakia has successfully shaped a national Holocaust remembrance culture. In 1990, only one year after the non-violent November 1989 Velvet Revolution that resulted in the fall of communism and the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a parliamentary republic, the new Slovak parliament apologized for the past crimes committed against the 12 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia Jewish community in Slovakia. Slovak representatives expressed their sympathy toward Jewish victims in a document entitled “The Declaration on the Deportation of Jews from Slovakia to Concentration Camps in 1942 and 1944.” Following the declaration, more than 100 memorials and plaques were dedicated to the victims of the Holocaust. The most notable is the Central Memorial to the Holocaust of Jews in Slovakia unveiled in Bratislava in 1997 on the site of the former Neological Synagogue.34 In 2001, the Slovak Parliament declared September 9 to be “Memorial Day to the Victims of the Holocaust and Racial Violence,”35 in memory of the infamous 1941 “Jewish Codex” introduced by the wartime Slovak government. Every year on September 9, seminars, conferences, and public lectures are scheduled, and students have the opportunity to meet with Holocaust survivors.36 Today, the Holocaust Documentation Centre in Bratislava promotes Holocaust education, supports Holocaust survivors, and fights extremism in Slovakia.37 The Museum of Jewish Culture in Bratislava, established in 1994, organizes public memorial events, educational programs, concerts, exhibitions, and theatre performances including activities for children and students.38 ANTISEMITISM IN SLOVAKIA The wave of antisemitism that erupted in Slovakia immediately after the war was closely linked to the wartime Aryanization of Jewish businesses and property. The transfer of Jewish businesses and property into the hands of Slovak Christians was designed to strengthen the Slovak middle class. Although the profits of the Aryanization process amounted to 1.1 billion Ks (Koruna slovenská; 40 million US dollars in 1940), the administrative expenses reached 900 million Ks (31 million US dollars in 1940).39 While the Aryanization process resulted in a dramatic devaluation of Jewish property, the only financial profit gained was from the confiscation of bank accounts, securities, and the public sale of furniture in 1944.40 At the end of the war, Slovaks who benefitted from Aryanized Jewish 13 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová property or businesses were concerned that they might lose what they stole from their Jewish neighbors with the help of the regime.41 Although Jewish leaders declared that Czechoslovak restitution laws were “fair,” the government was not eager to implement these laws. On the one hand, the government sympathized with former Aryanizers of Jewish businesses and property and the newly appointed national managers of former Jewish property. On the other hand, the government was concerned that restitution of Jewish property would unleash another wave of antisemitism and pogroms on the ground.42 In fact, the fear that surviving Jews would recoup their property and businesses, alongside a sharp deterioration of living standards, failures in food distribution, and a general lack of basic food supplies, exacerbated the antisemitic mood in the early postwar period. In the summer of 1945, the monthly reports of almost all districts in Eastern Slovakia revealed animosity from the Slovak and Rusyn populations toward the Jews.43 Despite the presence of Jews in the Communist Party, antisemitism was an accepted norm among communists. Jews were condemned as “capitalists,” “imperialists,” “Freemasons,” “cosmopolitans,” “nationalists” or “Zionists,” whose efforts to establish a state of their own was seen as a direct threat to proletarian internationalism. For example, in March 1947 the Minister of Information, Václav Kopecký, labeled Jews “bearded Solomons,” and many of the regime’s bureaucrats shared the view that the country’s 3,000 Jews of German and Hungarian origin should be deported to curb the wave of antisemitism in postwar Czechoslovakia, while the rest of the Jewish population would be assimilated into mainstream society.44 The first postwar wave of antisemitism peaked in the summer of 1945 in Košice, Prešov, Michalovce, and Humenné. In September, Topoľčany Jews faced another pogrom, which the Slovak press described as an organized crime perpetrated by “fascists.” There was a general perception that returning Jews were economically better off than Slovaks, and the political representatives in Topoľčany pointed to “unjust distribution of the most necessary supplies, favoring one stratum while harming the rest 14 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia of society.”45 To curb these views, Jewish representatives had to publicly assure the community in Topoľčany that Jews did not have any special privileges over Slovaks. Despite such efforts, subsequent waves of antisemitic violence occurred in the summer of 1946, in the spring of 1947 as a result of Tiso’s trial, and again in the summer of 1948.46 The precise number of those who died is unknown due to fragmentary sources. Anna Cichopek-Gajraj speculates that at least 36 people were killed and about a hundred were wounded during the waves of postwar antisemitic violence from 1945 to 1948.47 Although Cichopek-Gajraj does not specify if all of these casualties were Jewish victims, we can assume that most of them, if not all of them, were certainly Jews. Keenly aware of insecure living conditions and bleak prospects for the future, 17,270 Jews left Czechoslovakia by 1950.48 Those who decided to stay slovakized their surnames, turned to secularism, and tried to build postwar society as members of the middle class and as intellectuals.49 Whereas domestic factors played a major role in the rise of antisemitism in the immediate postwar years, the new wave of antisemitism unleashed in the 1950s was the result of changes to the geopolitical chessboard after the Soviet Union lost its influence over the newly established State of Israel. Not only did relations between the Soviet Union and Israel rapidly deteriorate but the new political constellation also had a significant impact on CzechSlovak-Jewish relations. External pressure from the Soviet Union, along with the deteriorating economy and sudden increase in prices, further fueled popular antisemitism. Czechoslovakia’s president, Klement Gottwald, crumbled under Stalin’s pressure and orchestrated a purge of high-ranking communists of Jewish origin. Hardline Stalinist Rudolf Slánsky, General Secretary of the Communist Party and its leading strategist who organized the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, was accused of high treason and espionage, along with 13 other high-ranking party members, mostly of Jewish origin.50 Slánsky was accused of being “one of the organizers of Zionist anti-state activity in Czechoslovakia and the most significant agent of the Israeli secret service.”51 Slánsky’s purported link 15 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová to the Israeli Secret Service was seen as proof that Czechoslovak Zionists plotted to overthrow the regime in Czechoslovakia.52 Since 11 accused men were of Jewish origin, they were all charged with plotting a Zionist conspiracy, which at that time was identified with Western imperialism. Jews were also accused of being “Jewish Gestapo agents,”53 “Zionist conspirators,” “Western imperialists” or “cosmopolitan capitalists”—a new label for fascists in the 1950s.54 With the fall of communism and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, the official antisemitism of the communist era was soon replaced by the “privatization” of antisemitism by emerging extreme-right parties. The persecution of Jews under communism, along with the post-communist emergence of ethnic nationalism, motivated Jewish intellectuals to be heavily engaged in postNovember 1989 events. Indeed, Jewish intellectuals were among the leadership of the influential movement “Verejnosť proti násiliu” (The Public Against Violence). Whenever this movement failed, however, Jews were seen as being responsible.55 Indeed, Slovak ethno-nationalists defined themselves against Jewish cosmopolitans accused of having no national consciousness, who were political careerists in the service of Prague, betrayers of the Revolution, and enemies of a socially just state.56 The Slovak neoludaks (1990s admirers of the wartime antisemitic Hlinka Slovak People’s Party) were increasingly concerned about the influence of Western culture and its economy, which reflected the supposed expansionism of “international Jewry” and their efforts to rule the world. For decades, antisemitic discourse in Slovakia was versatile and easily adjusted to the immediate needs of the socio-political context. Beginning with the establishment of the Slovak Republic in 1993, antisemitism has been used yet again by the extreme right as a means to establish the historical rootedness of the Slovak Republic, creating a continuity between wartime fascist Slovakia and post-communist Slovakia. According to Marina Cattaruzza, “[i]n Eastern Europe, anti-Semitism was linked to the more general trend of ethno-national exclusiveness and hostility against ethnic minorities, yet Jews were almost invariably singled out as 16 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia the epitome of the alien intrusion in the body of the nation.”57 Although there are only 3,000 Jews currently living in Slovakia, the extreme right utilizes antisemitic rhetoric as a means to protect Slovakia from the encroachment of foreign, non-Slovak interests. On March 14, 2004, in his public speech to commemorate the establishment of the 1939 Slovak state, Marian Kotleba, the leader of the extreme PP-OS (People’s Party Our Slovakia), mocked efforts to come to terms with the Holocaust past and marked out Jews as “devils in human skin.”58 Kotleba further promoted the view of Ľudovít Štúr—the leading representative of Slovak national revival in the nineteenth century—that Jews have no historical, cultural, or social ties with Slovaks.59 When the Jewish community expressed outrage against the demonstration of Kotleba supporters in Komárno in 2005, Kotleba defended the extremists by accusing Jews of plotting “against the Slovak nation, statehood, and Christian traditions” often with the help of the “Magyar chauvinists and domestic traitors.”60 In Kotleba’s eyes, every political skirmish in Slovakia is a “very well prepared performance” directed by Z. O. G. (the “Zionist Occupation Government”).61 According to Grigorij Mesežnikov, the increase of extremism in Slovakia is a result of multiple long-term situational factors. Disillusionment and economic hardship caused by the transformation to a liberal society and the transition to capitalism is one significant factor.62 Unable to cope with the ensuing economic pressure, many Slovaks felt bitter and disillusioned about the new socio-political environment. Not surprisingly, socially vulnerable groups have not been impressed by political promises to solve their existing problems. Those who failed to cope with the transformation from a centrally directed economy to capitalism were more likely to applaud the populists who pledged quick change and fast solutions promising a future of prosperity.63 Indeed, many Slovaks believe that politicians and ordinary citizens have divergent interests, and they feel abandoned and ignored by the government. Equally important are the following factors behind the rise of extremism: “the power of ethnic nationalism, anti-Roma racism, [an] ideological heritage of [the] collaborationist 17 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová fascist World War II Slovak state” as well as “anti-Americanism, EU-phobia, and [a general] anti-Western mood.”64 These longterm factors in combination with new situational factors such as the refugee crisis in Europe and the impact of social media on public awareness have strengthened populism and extremism in Slovakia.65 In his comparative analysis of right-wing radicalism in Slovakia and Hungary, Iľia Tarasov also adds the influence of the “constitutional priority of ethnic majority interests; parliamentary status of rightwing parties; [and the] condoning [of] activities of right-wing radicals by the ruling elite, the courts and the police.”66 The stagnation of the educational system also provides extremists with opportunities to expand their ranks. The educational system in Slovakia is desperate for major reform, yet change occurs at a sluggish pace, and the government seems to lack the desire to introduce major school reforms. Old-fashioned methods of teaching, like rote memorization, are prevalent, and critical thinking is not actively encouraged in high schools and universities. Additionally, pauperized and disillusioned teachers and other academic staff are underpaid and pushed to the margins of society. Furthermore, just like in all countries of the former Soviet Bloc, subjects such as history and social science have been ignored for decades, and historically sensitive topics such as the Holocaust, have not been adequately addressed in textbooks until recently.67 Following the demise of Czechoslovakia, right-wing Slovak extremism emerged in the 1990s in the form of a skinhead subculture, which experienced an upsurge during the periods 1990–1992 and 1997–2000. Although skinhead public appearances were routinely marked by violence against Roma, foreigners, and alternative youth movements, their actual political influence was minimal.68 Often merging with hooligans in the main Slovak cities, skinhead culture is rooted in racism, antisemitism, Holocaust denial and revisionism, and the uncritical celebration of the Slovak wartime Republic. However, while skinhead culture has been weakening in recent years, its influence has not completely disappeared. For example, the soccer team Slovan Bratislava displayed the banner 18 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia “Alles Gute Adi,” (“All the best Adi”) along with Hitler’s image to celebrate the dictator’s birthday on April 20, 2007.69 In 2003, the extremists articulated their political goals and improved their organization. Benefitting from the disillusionment and frustration of certain segments of the social spectrum,70 they redoubled their efforts to empower their ranks. The most significant force within the extremist stream is Slovak Togetherness (ST: Slovenska Pospolitost). Established in May 1995, ST presented itself as the defender of Slovak national interests. Their policies were marked by radical nationalism, virulent antisemitism, anti-Hungarian feeling, and a hatred of parliamentary democracy. After the ambitious former teacher Marián Kotleba, joined its ranks in 2003 ST’s activism and radicalization significantly increased.71 Kotleba and his supporters had political aspirations to run in the parliamentary elections and in January 2005 ST was registered as the Slovak Togetherness-National Party (ST-NP: Slovenská PospolitosťNárodna Strana). Due to its anti-establishment ideology, which aimed to undermine democratic society in Slovakia, ST-NP was banned in 2006. However, ST-NP as an embodiment of extremism, developed its activities regardless of the ban. Moreover, since the Ministry of Interior’s efforts to uphold the ban were problematic, some members of Kotleba’s party were able to run in the 2006 parliamentary elections after the far-right Slovak People’s Party (SPP: Slovenská Ľudová Strana) included them as leading candidates on its ticket.72 The 2006 parliamentary elections were a fiasco for the ST extremists, and this resulted in a dramatic drop in their membership. This failure, however, mobilized ST and encouraged them to modify their strategy— instead of focusing on nostalgia for wartime fascist Slovakia, they turned their attention to more virulent anti-Roma activities. In the summer of 2009 Kotleba’s supporters organized a series of antiRoma actions that immediately increased his popularity. The major success came when Kotleba, the leader of the People’s Party-Our Slovakia (PP-OS: Ľudová Strana-Naše Slovensko) won regional elections and became the regional councillor of the self-governing Banská Bystrica region. Kotleba was elected with the largest level of 19 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová support in the whole country,73 even though the PP-OS’s program, with its mostly populist slogans, failed to offer a sophisticated political agenda. Populist slogans refering to anti-Roma activism, paternalism, calls for law and order, the reduction of MPs in Parliament, and efforts to establish a home guard were on the party’s agenda in 2010. Two years later PP-OS’s goal was to leave the European Monetary Union and NATO, prevent immigrants from entering Slovakia, and reject registered same-sex marriages.74 However, Kotleba‘s bigger victory was yet to come. His followers wanted to build their strength on the personal cult of Kotleba, which became more apparent in November 2015 when Kotleba’s party was registered as Kotleba-People’s Party Our Slovakia (Kotleba-Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko). In the 2016 parliamentary elections, Kotleba’s PP-OS won eight percent of the vote and 14 seats in parliament. What explains the Kotleba party’s success? First, extremists feed on the failure of the current government to resolve the biggest issue facing Slovak society: corruption. Take, for example, the events of 2012, a crucial year in the history of Slovakia. The Gorilla Scandal (Kauza Gorila) was sparked after a secret service file containing sensitive information on the corruption of rightwing politicians was leaked. These politicians, the file revealed, had implemented severe economic reforms that benefited a small group of elite businessman, often former well-situated communists who quickly adapted to the post-communist market economy. Public demonstrations had an impact on the political scene, and the SDKÚ-DS (Prime Minister Dzurinda’s right-wing party) lost the 2012 parliamentary elections as a result of the scandal.75 Although the protests led to the removal of criminal immunity for MPs, the protesters failed to accomplish their major goal—to prosecute those mentioned in the “Gorilla” files. The general public slipped into a mood of apathy, helplessness, and resignation, and this disillusionment empowered the extremists on both the left and right. Whereas the resurrection of the left was very brief, the right-wing extremists and ultra-nationalists offered disillusioned society an alternative to political deadlock.76 20 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia Despite the increase of Slovakia’s GDP by 1,210 EUR since 2000 and a decrease in the unemployment rate by 2.5%, there were other socio-economic factors that continued to empower extremism in Slovakia.77 For example, the ineffective health care system offering poor services to patients results in widespread bribing of staff to assure quality services in health care institutions, and this problem eventually helped Kotleba to broaden PP-OS’s electorate.78 In particular, PP-OS’s program promised to make healthcare free of charge and to establish a common insurance company.79 Kotleba also promised his voters that he would deal with corruption in health care and introduce reforms in hospitals.80 The success of the extremists is also linked to media coverage. In particular, 2013 was marked by an upsurge of “alternative media” that has since successfully disseminated extremist views.81 The “World Zionist Conspiracy,” the continuing attacks on Roma citizens whom extremists blame for the failures of the Slovak economy, the fierce attacks on LGBT groups, and the vilification of NGOs and human rights activists as agents of America, are the main subjects covered by the alternative media.82 By publicly supporting the Putin regime, these extremists emphasize their anti-American stance and demonstrate their resistance to the values associated with the EU, NATO, and the West. An example of the alternative media includes Slobodný Vysielač (Free Broadcaster), an extremist Internet radio station that appropriated the same name of the radio station used by the anti-fascist insurgents during the Slovak National Uprising (SNP). The present-day Slobodný Vysielač was instrumental in supporting the rise of Marián Kotleba. Another example is Zem & Vek (Earth & Age), a monthly magazine edited by Tibor Rostas, a virulent antisemite who calls for the “CREATION [the capital letters are Rostas] of a new political platform.”83 Rostas is known for relativizing the Slovak past and for circulating neo-Nazi versions of wartime events.84 Although nostalgia for the wartime Slovak state was not the primary motivation behind the activism of Kotleba’s supporters, revising the past and participating in public discourse about the 21 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová country’s dark chapters of history helped party members develop a sense of “togetherness.” The extremists desperately searched for their historical roots in the hope that they would ultimately become the source of much-needed national self-respect, confidence, and empowerment. Their enormous effort to trace “Slovakness” back in time, for example, resulted in the Great Moravian Empire being marked as the “Slovak Kingdom” and Svätopluk as “the King of the Old Slovaks.” This mythologization of the Slovak past culminated in 2010 when Jan Kulich’s statue of Svätopluk, along with insignia of the wartime clerico-fascist Slovak state, was installed at Bratislava’s Castle. Kulich, the sculptor of the statue, was also the creator of many communist era monuments, but this did not bother Marián Kotleba’s Slovenská Pospolitosť supporters, who were pleased by the sight of the statue.85 Art historian Zuzana Bartošová described Svätopluk’s statue as “retarded kitch,” but this, of course, did not stop Kotleba’s followers from turning this location at Bratislava’s Castle into their favorite meeting point.86 The neoludak groups have taken an active part in public discourse on wartime Slovakia and its president Jozef Tiso. To demonstrate his support of this heritage, for example, Kotleba proudly wore a uniform resembling that of the Hlinka Guard—the paramilitary organization that took an active part in the deportation of Jews from Slovakia. To evoke (and provoke) antisemitic sentiments of the past, Kotleba’s party newspaper reprinted a Nazi cartoon of a Jewish moneylender that mocked Western European values and institutions. By doing so, Kotleba accused the West of being a nest of “dangerous sects and sexual deviations.”87 To further promote his anti-Western views, Kotleba praised Vladimir Putin for the annexation of Crimea.88 The first major attack on a politician since the 1990s, when antisemites frequently targeted intellectuals, occurred in 2012. The attack on the Ministry of Interior’s Daniel Lipšic was seen as unprecedented because it was the first antisemitic attack on a high-ranking politician since the establishment of the Slovak Republic in 1993.89 Responsible for handling corruption cases against prominent public officials, Lipšic was discredited when an anonymous source 22 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia posted information online that pointed to a connection between the politician and an Israeli secret agent. What followed was an outburst of antisemitic and anti-Israeli comments in the media.90 Antisemitism in Slovakia has permeable boundaries that allow it to co-exist with parallel ideological streams supporting ethnonationalism, racism, and fear of the “other.” In the past seven years, however, a new feature has developed—antisemitism is now aligned with anti-Muslim sentiment resulting from the 2015 European migrant crisis when scores of refugees arrived in the EU either from across the Mediterranean Sea or through South Eastern Europe. These immigrants and refugees were largely seen as a threat to the ethno-nationalist state, and even as evidence of an “upcoming postnational society.”91 In 2015 foreigners represented 1.56% of the population in Slovakia. Most of the immigrants in Slovakia are economic immigrants. Middle Eastern and African refugees have never represented a large number of immigrants, and this was true even after the outbreak of the refugee crisis in Europe.92 Despite the minuscule number of refugees in Slovakia, however, the public is still subjected to security discourses that aim to “protect” Slovak society from foreign migrants and refugees. For example, the 2011 strategic document of the parliament of Slovakia—the National Council of the Slovak Republic (NCSR: Národna Rada Slovenskej Republiky)—talks about protecting society from increased migration. Another strategy paper published in 2011,“Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic: Perspectives Until 2020,” outlined criteria for the admission of foreigners that highlighted benefits for the Slovak economy rather than humanitarian concerns, stating that there is a “preference for the admission of migrants who have the necessary skills and competencies to cover the sustained demand in the national labour market for scarce professions, with an emphasis on culturally related countries.”93 Whereas security discourse gripped public attention, human rights discourse that involved calls for solidarity with refugees and global migration discourse concerned with the integration of Slovakia into the EU soon complicated public debates. While security fears were the most dominant concern, fear of refugees and anti-refugee 23 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová sentiment were effectively built without their actual presence. In fact, the majority of Slovaks had never met a refugee in person. The fear of refugees was politicized as a result of the 2015 elections. The reluctance to welcome these refugees into Slovakia stems from violent radical Muslim terrorist acts in Western Europe: Paris (2015), Belgium (2016) and London (2017). The terrorist acts in Paris and Belgium resulted in a wave of anti-Muslim rhetoric and acts of vandalism against Muslim property as well as bullying at schools in Slovakia.94 In July 2016, when Slovakia held the presidency of the Council of the EU, the refugee crisis was an agenda priority. Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia all voted against the EU scheme for refugee distribution that aimed to reduce pressure on Italy and Greece resulting from hundreds of thousands of incoming migrants. According to the plan, Slovakia would have had to take 2,600 Syrian refugees but Robert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister, fiercely opposed the idea. Emphasizing the importance of protecting the ConstantineMethodist tradition in Slovakia,95 he stated: “[w]hen I say something now, maybe it will seem strange, but I am sorry, Islam has no place in Slovakia.” Fico insisted that “it is the duty of politicians to talk about these things very clearly and openly.” Finally, Fico publicly expressed his fear of refugees when he claimed that he does not wish to see tens of thousands of Muslims in Slovakia.96 Just a few weeks before Slovakia’s EU presidency, and before the March 2016 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Fico made it clear that he would not accept “a single Muslim” migrant.97 Just as Jews have been victims of religiously-driven hatred, Muslims are now facing similar discrimination and exclusion following the refugee crisis in Europe. The 2015 and 2016 polls conducted by the Sociological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences confirm that the fear of the “other” in Slovak society fluctuates in relation to political developments. In December 2015, 70 percent of respondents were concerned about the arrival of refugees in Slovakia. The same question asked a few months again after the March 2016 elections (from mid-September to the end of October 2016) showed that 47.7 percent of respondents expressed fears over the presence 24 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia of refugees in Slovakia.98 This indicates that there is a correlation between the fear of refugees and political goals dictated by elections. Eurobarometer’s polls have shown that Slovakia is one of the least tolerant nations in Europe with respect to other religions and nationalities. In fact, Slovakia, along with Hungary, fiercely and extensively disputed the legality of the EU refugee distribution scheme, questioned its effectiveness, and expressed concerns over the impact of such a decision on the sovereignty of the EU states. Both countries approached the court with ten arguments explaining the illegality of the EU’s distribution plan.99 The 2015 Eurobarometer also shows that due to the refugee crisis, antiMuslim sentiment in Slovakia is much stronger than antisemitism. When one of Eurobarometer’s questions asked, “[w]ould you feel comfortable if one of your children was in a relationship with a Jew?” 36% of Slovakians answered in the affirmative (the average for EU respondents was 69%).100 When the same question was asked about relationships between Slovaks and Muslims, Slovaks were even less comfortable, with only 16% of Slovak respondents answering positively.101 Antisemitism in Slovakia was much stronger in the past; however, despite its decline from the 1990s onward, Slovaks are still highly prejudiced compared to other Europeans. One can draw some parallels between antisemitism and Islamophobia in Slovakia. Both are expressions of cultural and religious bigotry.102 As such, they represent an effective tool of political maneuvering, especially before parliamentary elections. In Slovakia, antisemitism is integrated with different phenomena such as anti-Hungarian sentiment, anti-Czechoslovak feeling, and anti-Zionism. Antisemitism, like Islamophobia, can be directed against both an internal and external enemy. Antisemites target Jews alongside other internal enemies such as “Magyarophiles” and “Czechoslovakists,” and also see Jews as an external threat of “world conspirators” who lead the institutions of Western Europe and want to rule the world. Anti-Muslim prejudice feeds on the fear of unknown Muslim religion and culture and is further exacerbated by the false perception that all Muslims are external aggressors. Scholarship on antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe points 25 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová to a combination of “the potential theoretical proximity of the terrorist, fanatic, violent, and intolerant Muslim with the dreadful, conspirator, outrageous Jew.”103 The proximity of these two images can be detected in several pernicious myths about Jews causing the refugee crisis, and Jews as the master manipulators of power politics plotting to attack the “white race.”104 The combination of images of violent Muslims and conspiratorial Jews thus points to an effort to simplify political complexities into a comprehensible narrative pattern of ethno-national othering: “us”(victims) and “them”(eternal enemies). Such practices clearly aim to defend and further embrace a separate ethnic identity for Slovaks. One last significant parallel between antisemitism and antiMuslim prejudice is the elasticity of the categories for targeted victims. Whereas antisemitism in Slovakia also stigmatizes non-Jews— usually public figures, influential politicians, Hungarians, Czechs, or Roma—anti-Muslim prejudice stigmatizes Roma, Blacks, Jews, and Asians.105 The urge to stigmatize outsiders is deeply rooted in the ethno-nationalist worldview. In particular, the difficult process of state-making in Slovakia along with “the mobility of capital [which] lends force to nationalist voices that seek to restrict the operations of foreign capital and that vow . . . not to ‘sell the country’” created fertile ground for the growth of prejudice against minorities.106 CONCLUSION Over the past 70 years, Slovak Holocaust memory was molded by the political cast of any given era. The political elites either appropriated some aspects of the Holocaust to articulate their core ideology or suppressed the commemoration of the Holocaust at times when sensitive topics were abandoned in an effort to avoid controversy. Immediately after the war, the communist elites appropriated the Holocaust to project their anti-clericalist and anti-fascist ideology. Communists tailored the Holocaust into a class paradigm to condemn the bourgeoisie and highlight the suffering, victimhood, and heroism of the proletariat. The fall of communism introduced 26 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia a new socio-political context. In particular, the transformation from communism to a capitalist liberal society unleashed a wave of ethnonationalism, which on the one hand celebrated the wartime Slovak republic and on the other overlooked the regime’s atrocities committed against its Jewish and Roma citizens. Continuing efforts to democratize Slovakia, however, also introduced a culture of Holocaust commemoration challenging these same ethno-nationalist narratives. Antisemitism in Slovakia represents a multilayered ideology with permeable boundaries. The waves of antisemitism in Slovakia during the postwar and post-communist eras reflected public concerns and frustration over domestic, regional, and international developments. Antisemitism targets Jews, but non-Jews can also come under its umbrella of prejudice when their policies and views undermine the canons of ethno-nationalist discourse. Since antisemitism feeds on other powerful ethno-nationalist views rooted in the hatred of non-Slovak and non-Christian others, it also helps to empower extremism in all forms. NOTES 1. Joseph Tomasov, From Loss to Liberation (Montreal: Azrieli Foundation, forthcoming) 2. Židovské muzeum v Praze, sbírka Rozhovory s pamětníky, č.kazety 712; Židovské muzeum v Praze, sbírka Rozhovory s pamětníky, č.kazety 198. 3. Ivan Kamenec, Po stopách tragédie (Bratislava: Archa, 1991), 20–21. Some Holocaust survivor testimonies consistently refer to 1938–1939 as a turning point in the public mood toward Jews as a result of antisemitic propaganda spread by the media. See for example, Joseph Tomasov, From Loss to Liberation (Montreal: Azrieli Foundation, 2017), 26–27; Židovské muzeum v Praze, sbírka Rozhovory s pamětníky, č.kazety 852; Židovské muzeum v Praze, sbírka Rozhovory s pamětníky, č.kazety 943; Židovské muzeum v Praze, sbírka Rozhovory s pamětníky, č. kazety 155; Židovské muzeum v Praze, sbírka Rozhovory s pamětníky, č.kazety 712. 4. Ivan Kamenec, Po stopách tragédie (Bratislava: Archa, 1991), 125. 27 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová 5. See more details in Eduard Nižňanský, ed., Holokaust na Slovensku 6. Deportácie v roku 1942 (Bratislava: Nadácia Milana Šimečku, 2005), 15. 6. Ivan Kamenec, On the Trail of Tragedy: The Holocaust in Slovakia (Bratislava: Hajko & Hajková, 2007), 19. 7. “The Jewish Community of Slovakia. A History,” European Jewish Congress, accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.eurojewcong.org/communities /slovakia.html 8. Ibid. 9. Nina Paulovičová, “The ‘Unmasterable Past’? Slovaks and the Holocaust. The Reception of the Holocaust in Post-Communist Slovakia,” Joanna Beata Michlic and John-Paul Himka, eds., Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Post-Communist Europe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 557. 10. Livia Rothkirchen, “Czechoslovakia,” in The World Reacts to the Holocaust, ed., David S. Wyman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 177. 11. Tomas Sniegon, Vanished History: The Holocaust in Czech and Slovak Historical Culture (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 62. 12. Ibid., 58. 13. Paulovičová, “Unmasterable Past,” 558. 14. Kamenec, On the Trail of Tragedy, 346. 15. Ibid., 49. 16. “Poučení z krizového vývoje,“ Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, accessed August 8, 2017, https://www.ustrcr.cz/uvod/antologie -ideologickych-textu/pouceni-z-krizoveho-vyvoje/ 17. Sniegon, 50. 18. Ibid., 17. 19. Paulovičová, “Unmasterable Past,” 549–590. 20. Ibid., 550. 21. Ibid., 550–551. 22. “Ďurčanského sa zastala aj Matica Slovenská,“ MY naša Žilina, July 12, 2011, accessed August 8, 2017, https://myzilina.sme.sk/c/5974510 /durcanskeho-sa-zastala-aj-matica-slovenska.html 23. “Fan of Nazi Collaborator to Represent Ukraine at Paris Holocaust Symposium. Ukrainian Jews Protest Attendance of State Historian Volodymyr Vyatrovych, who has Hailed WWII-Era Leader,” The Times of Israel, March 7, 2017, accessed August 9, 2017, http://www.timesofisrael 28 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia .com/fan-of-nazi-collaborator-to-represent-ukraine-at-paris-holocaust -symposium/ 24. Sniegon, 49. 25. Kamenec, On the Trail of Tragedy, 47. 26. Ivan Kamenec, Tragédia politika, kňaza a človeka. Dr. Jozef Tiso, 1887–1947 (Bratislava: Premedia Group, 2013), 31, 102. 27. Ibid., 95. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Paulovičová, 561. 31. Ibid. 32. The bishop Ján Vojtaššák was also the deputy of the State Council. His diocese benefited from the Aryanization of Jewish property and businesses. 33. “18 zaujímavých odpovedí historikov Lacka, Sokoloviča a ÚPN na otázky o Matici a jej videu i polemických slovenských dejinách,” Konzervatívny Denník, accessed March, 5, 2017, http://www.hlavnespravy .sk/18-zaujimavych-odpovedi-historikov-lacka-sokolovica-upn-na-otazky -o-matici-jej-videu-polemickych-slovenskych-dejinach/913381 The phrase “vsjo jasno” (everything is clear) is from the communist era when no discussion was allowed. 34. “Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research in Slovakia. An Overview,” International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, accessed August, 7, 2017, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/member -countries/holocaust-education-remembrance-and-research-slovakia 35. Paulovičová, 575. 36. “Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research in Slovakia.” 37. Ústredný Zväz Židovských náboženských obcí v Slovenskej Republike, “O nás,” accessed August 5, 2017, https://www.uzzno.sk/o-nas 38. Ibid. The Milan Šimečka Foundation also teaches about the Roma Porrajmos and the current persecution of Roma citizens in Slovakia. See “Nadácia Milana Šimečku,” Nadácia Milana Šimečku, accessed August 5, 2017, http://www.nadaciamilanasimecku.sk/sk/o-nas/o-nad%C3%A1cii .html 39. Eduard Nižňanský and Jean-Marc Dreyfus, “Jews and NonJews in the Aryanization Process: Comparison of France and the Slovak State, 1939–1945” (unpublished article); Eduard Nižňanský, “Arizácie a problémy rmajetku Židov na Slovensku v hláseniach predstaviteľov nacistického Nemecka (1939–1943),” in Arizácie, Eduard Nižňanský and 29 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová Ján Hlavinka, eds. (Bratislava: Katedra všeobecných dejín, Dokumentačné stredisko holokaustu, 2010), 142–192. 40. Ibid. 41. Hana Kubátová, “Teraz alebo nikdy. Povojnové protižidovské násilie a väčšinová spoločnosť na Slovensku,“ (unpublished paper), accessed August 10, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/34253061/Teraz_alebo _nikdy_Povojnov%C3%A9_proti%C5%BEidovsk%C3%A9_n%C3%A1silie _a_v%C3%A4%C4%8D%C5%A1inov%C3%A1_spolo%C4%8Dnos %C5%A5_na_Slovensku 42. Anna Cichopek-Gajraj, Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia, 1944–48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 103. 43. Kubátová. 44. Ibid., 12. 45. Cichopek-Gajraj, 60. 46. Ibid., 117. 47. Ibid. 48. Pavol Mešťan, “Antisemitizmus v politickom vývoji Slovenska, 1948–1992,” (Bratislava: Slovenské národné múzeum, Múzeum židovskej kultúry, 1999), 13. 49. Ibid., 15. 50. Igor Lukes, “Rudolf Slansky–His Trial and Trials,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed August 4, 2017, https://www .academia.edu/17277224/Rudolf_Slansky_His_Trials_and_Trial 51. Mešťan, 22. 52. Ibid. 53. Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman, “The Longest Hatred,” New Statesman (May 9, 2016), accessed August 5, 2017, http://www .newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/05/longest-hatred 54. Sniegon, 63. 55. Mešťan, 39. 56. Ibid. 57. Marina Cattaruzza and Constantin Iordachi, “Introduction to Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in East-Central Europe: New Research, Trends and Perspectives,” East Central Europe 39 (2012), 3. 58. “My sme národnosti slovenskej, nie židovskej. Čo všetko už Kotleba povedal o Slovenskom štáte,” Denník N (March 13, 2016), accessed October 1, 2017, https://dennikn.sk/404134/zidovska-otazka-nas 30 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia -zaujimat-nemusi-co-vsetko-uz-kotleba-povedal-snp-zidoch-slovenskom -state/ 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “Súčasný pravicový extrémizmus a ultranacionalizmus na Slovensku. Stav, trendy, podpora,” (Bratislava: Inštitút pre verejné otázky, Hans Seidel Stiftung, 2016), 9. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Il’ia N. Tarasov, “Right-Wing Radicalism and Factors of Xenophobic Social Practice in Hungary and Slovakia: Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Politics Russia (January 2017). 67. Eduard Nižňanský, “Holocaust Education in Slovakia,” Learning from History, accessed September 9, 2017, http://learning-from-history .de/International/content/7499 68. Tomáš Nociar, “Right-Wing Extremism in Slovakia,” International Policy Analysis. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (December 2012), accessed August 15, 2017, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09567.pdf 69. Ibid. 70. Kotleba was the top candidate among first time voters (18–21 years old). Kotleba’s PP-OS received the majority of votes from individuals with high school diplomas and manual laborers. His voters were mostly from the central region of Slovakia. 71. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová. 72. Nociar. 73. Beata Balogová, “Far-Right Leader Kotleba Wins in Banská Bystrica,” The Slovak Spectator (November 24, 2013), accessed September 4, 2017, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20048980/far-right-leader-kotleba -wins-in-banska-bystrica.html 74. Nociar. 75. Peter Weisenbacher, “The New Face of Right-Wing Extremism in Slovakia,” Krytyka Polityczna & European Alternatives (January 27, 2016), accessed August 5, 2017, http://politicalcritique.org/cee/slovakia /2016/new-face-of-right-wing-extremism-in-slovakia/ 76. Ibid. 77. Petra Čekmeová, “Determinants of Growth of Extremism & Populism in the Time of Economic Crisis: A Rise of Populism in the Slovak 31 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová Parliament” (March 7, 2016), accessed October 1, 2017, http://www .populism.cz/news/a-rise-of-populism-in-the-slovak-parliament 78. Ibid. 79. Volebný program politickej strany Kotleba Ľudivá strana-Naše Slovensko, accessed October 1, 2017, http://www.naseslovensko.net /wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Volebn%C3%BD-program-2016.pdf 80. Čekmeová. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Tibor Eliot Rostas, “Nový prezident by mal presadiť referendum a širší integračný potenciál,” Zem a Vek, accessed August, 24, 2017, http:// zemavek.sk/novy-prezident-mal-presadit-referendum-sirsi-integracny -potencial/ 84. Weisenbacher. 85. Grigorij Mesežnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová. 86. See “Svätopluk je nezvládnutá socha,” SME Domov, accessed August, 16, 2017, https://domov.sme.sk/c/5411933/svatopluk-je-nezvladnuta -socha.html 87. Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman, “The Longest Hatred.” 88. Ibid. 89. Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti, “Hating Thy Imaginary Neighbor: An Analysis of Antisemitism in Slovakia,” Journal for the Study of Antisemitism 4: 469, 485. 90. Bustikova and Guasti, 485–486. 91. Jarmila Androvičová, “Immigration and Refugee Crisis in Political Discourse in Slovakia and European Union,” Current Politics & Economics of Europe 27, no. 3/4: 333–373. 92. Ibid., 352. 93. Ibid., 353. 94. “Reactions to the Paris Attacks in the EU: Fundamental Rights Considerations.” FRA PAPER, January 2015. 95. The “brothers from Thessalonica,” Cyril and Methodius, came from Constantinople to the territory of Great Moravia in July 863 at the request of Rastislav of Great Moravia to spread Christianity. Cyril and Methodius invented the Slavic alphabet and translated the Holy Scriptures into Old Church Slavonic. 96. Hardeep Matharu, “Slovakian Prime Minister Says ‘Islam Has No Place in This Country,’ Weeks Before it Takes Over EU Presidency,” 32 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Holocaust Memory and Antisemitism in Slovakia Independent (May 27, 2016), accessed August 4, 2017, http://www .independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/islam-has-no-place-in-this -countr y-says-slovakian-prime-minister-weeks-before-it-takes-over -eu-a7052506.html 97. Ibid. 98. S. Sčepán, “Aktuality. Utečenecká kríza a Slovensko,” Slovenská Akadémia Vied (December 22, 2016), accessed August 15, 2017, http://www.sav.sk/index.php?doc=services-news&source_no=20&news _no=6671 99. “Hungary and Slovakia Take EU Refugee Quota Scheme to Court,” Deutsche Welle (May 10, 2017), accessed July 29, 2017, http:// www.dw.com/en/hungary-and-slovakia-take-eu-refugee-quota-scheme -to-court/a-38781422 100. “Diskriminácia vo vzťahu na základe ethnického pôvodu a vierovyznania,“ accessed August 25, 2017, http://hnonline.sk/galeria /7921-diskriminacia-vo-vztahu-na-zaklade-etnickeho-povodu-a-vierovyznan ia/038ad7d7bc6757680781768fc064a5d3?back_url=http://hnonline.sk/ 101. Ibid. 102. Alfreddo Alietty and Dario Padovan, “Religious Racism: Islamophobia and Antisemitism in Italian Society,” Religions 4 (2013). 103. Ibid., 587. 104. For example, in January 2016, an anonymous blogger “durino” published a video showing a viciously antisemitic cartoon depicting Jews as the ultimate manipulators on the political chessboard, and responsible for the current refugee crisis. Here, refugees from the Middle East and Africa were depicted as a threat to white Europe, but so was the Jew. Following the 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels, the same anonymous blogger brought to the fore the “true joy” over the gruesome act of violence in Brussels on “Hebrew social media accounts.” Here, doubts were shed that ISIS was behind the Brussels attacks and instead the blogger clearly points the finger at the Jews. See “Útok na biele národy,” Preklady od lesa (blog), January 17, 2016, accessed October 2, 2017, http://www.auria.sk /blog/utok-na-biele-narody; and, “Úprimná radosť rasovo nadradených človiečikov z útokov v Európe,” Preklady od lesa (blog), April 3, 2016, accessed October 2, 2017, http://www.auria.sk/blog/uprimna-radost -rasovo-nadradenych-cloviecikov-z-utokov-v-europe. 105. Alietty and Padovan, 587. 33 This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Nina Paulovičová 106. Katherine Verdery, “Nationalism, Postsocialism and Space in Eastern Europe,” Social Research 63: 1 (Spring 1996), 81. NINA PAULOVIČOVÁ is Assistant Professor in the Center for Humanities at Athabasca University in Canada. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Alberta in 2012. In 2009, she published a monograph on the Holocaust in the Hlohovec region of Slovakia, entitled, “Židovská komunita v dejinách mesta Hlohovec, 1938–1945: Príbeh, ktorý prešiel tmou (“The Jewish Community in the History of Hlohovec, 1938–1945: The Story Through Darkness”). Her research interests include twentieth-century Central and Eastern Europe, the Holocaust, nationalism, and gender studies. 34 Antisemitism Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 2018) This content downloaded from 141.211.172.84 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:31:58 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms