Magda Borkowska

This article explores the relationship between ethnic structure of local areas, anti-immigrant sentiment and Brexit vote among White British in England. We focus on two indicators of ethnic structure: ethnic minority outgroup share and minority-majority segregation. Our findings suggest that local minority share plays a key role in shaping anti-immigrant sentiment and Brexit support. However, how it affects these outcomes is conditional on levels of local residential segregation. It is only residents living in high minority share areas that are residentially segregated who report higher anti-immigrant sentiment and Brexit support. In fact, living in high minority share areas that are residentially integrated appears to improve attitudes and reduce Brexit support.

Various activities are undertaken worldwide in order to counteract the visible climate changes. One of them is promotion of renewable energy sources. Aims established by the European Commission with respect to increasing the share of energy obtained from RES assume an average increase of up to 20% by the year 2020. Poland, as an EU member state has been obliged to increase the share of energy from RES to 15%. Promoting renewable energy sources contributes to diversification of supplies, thus providing conditions for the development of energetics at a local level. Taking into account Polish conditionings it is believed that biomass, including forest biomass, can be an important renewable energy source. The present study focuses on the problem of efficiency of energy wood chip production from forest biomass utilizing a Bandit 2090 wood chipper. Chipping efficiency, depending on the condition of particular tree stands, ranged from 14 to 17 m·h.

This paper explores the relationship between neighbourhood level density of civil society organisations (CSOs), diversity, and deprivation. We compare the UK and Sweden, two countries with different civil society traditions and welfare state regimes. We use data on formal civil society organisations to examine whether diverse neighbourhoods have lower levels of civil society infrastructure. In the UK, contrary to what could be expected from Putnam's assertion that diversity has a negative effect on trust, thus limiting civil society activities at the neighbourhood level, we observe a positive relationship between the density of CSOs and diversity. In Sweden, we find different patterns. First, we observe a negative correlation between CSO density and diversity. Second, we find lower density of formal CSOs in areas with high diversity and high economic disadvantage and higher density in areas characterised by low diversity and high disadvantage.

Despite experiencing adversities, ethnic minority people report relatively high levels of political trust and continue to have high levels of political engagement indicated by interest in politics and political party affiliation. • In relation to pandemic management, people across all ethnic backgrounds are more likely to trust the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and local mayors than the UK Parliament. • Among ethnic minority people, the lowest levels of trust in the UK Parliament are reported by those from the Black Caribbean group, and the highest by those from Black African, Arab and Chinese groups. • Most ethnic minority groups (with the exception of Roma, Gypsy/ Traveller and White Eastern European groups) report higher levels of political interest than the White British group. • People from the Roma group are the least likely to report having a political party preference, while the White Irish group has the highest proportion of people who identify with a political party. • The distribution of political party preferences varies considerably across groups. Among ethnic minority people, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Caribbean people report the highest support for Labour. Conservatives gain the highest share of Jewish and the lowest share of Black Caribbean votes. Highest levels of support for the Liberal Democrats are found for White Eastern European, Chinese, White Irish and White other groups. • The highest support for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is reported by Black Caribbean, Black African, and Arab groups; people from Roma, Gypsy/ Traveller and White Eastern European groups are the least likely to support BLM.

In this article, we examine the political socialization process in immigrant families based on the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS). We find that international migration disrupts the intergenerational transmission of political engagement: associations between voting, political interest, and parent and child socioeconomic status are weaker in immigrant families than in families without a migration background. In particular, the voting behavior of immigrants and their children in particular is only partially explained by standard models of political socialization. In contrast, characteristics specific to the international migration process, including sending country experiences, characteristics of the migration journey, and the pathway to citizenship are critical determinants of voting for immigrant parents, and through political socialization, for their UK-raised children.

The representativeness of the Understanding Society sample is assessed by means of both external and internal comparisons. External comparisons involve comparing the initially interviewed sample with the most chronologically proximate Population Censuses. Internal comparisons involve assessing attrition over time from the initial sample. Analysis is restricted to the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) sample, designed to represent Great Britain in 1991, and the Understanding Society General Population Sample (GPS), designed to represent the United Kingdom in 2009-10. Attrition is assessed over 24 years for the former, and 6 years for the latter. Results are mainly reassuring, though some differential attrition is detected.

Explanatory theories of electoral fraud are usually developed for new and failing democracies. However, while rarer, electoral fraud does happen in advanced democracies. Because data on fraud in advanced democracies are scarce, single instances of fraud are studied in isolation and offer very little generalisability. This study uses a unique comparative dataset of 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews from eight locations, only half of which experienced allegations of fraud. We show that theories of why and how fraud happens in developing democracies can be extended to an advanced democracy. We also provide a detailed description of two micro-mechanisms, which facilitate fraud taking place and thus provide a causal link between the structural vulnerability to fraud and the direct opportunities for fraud to take place. The case study of Britain focuses mostly on the biraderi structures within the British South Asian communities, but we offer ways in which these structures generalis...

Explanatory theories of electoral fraud are usually developed for new and failing democracies. However, while rarer, electoral fraud does happen in advanced democracies. Because data on fraud in advanced democracies are scarce, single instances of fraud are studied in isolation and offer very little generalisability. This study uses a unique comparative dataset of 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews from eight locations, only half of which experienced allegations of fraud. We show that theories of why and how fraud happens in developing democracies can be extended to an advanced democracy. We also provide a detailed description of two micro-mechanisms, which facilitate fraud taking place and thus provide a causal link between the structural vulnerability to fraud and the direct opportunities for fraud to take place. The case study of Britain focuses mostly on the biraderi structures within the British South Asian communities, but we offer ways in which these structures generalis...

Despite experiencing adversities, ethnic minority people report relatively high levels of political trust and continue to have high levels of political engagement indicated by interest in politics and political party affiliation. • In relation to pandemic management, people across all ethnic backgrounds are more likely to trust the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and local mayors than the UK Parliament. • Among ethnic minority people, the lowest levels of trust in the UK Parliament are reported by those from the Black Caribbean group, and the highest by those from Black African, Arab and Chinese groups. • Most ethnic minority groups (with the exception of Roma, Gypsy/ Traveller and White Eastern European groups) report higher levels of political interest than the White British group. • People from the Roma group are the least likely to report having a political party preference, while the White Irish group has the highest proportion of people who identify with a political party. • The distribution of political party preferences varies considerably across groups. Among ethnic minority people, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Caribbean people report the highest support for Labour. Conservatives gain the highest share of Jewish and the lowest share of Black Caribbean votes. Highest levels of support for the Liberal Democrats are found for White Eastern European, Chinese, White Irish and White other groups. • The highest support for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is reported by Black Caribbean, Black African, and Arab groups; people from Roma, Gypsy/ Traveller and White Eastern European groups are the least likely to support BLM.

Ethnic identity is important to people alongside a strong sense of belonging to British society but standardised measures of ethnicity do not fully capture the complex ways that people describe their ethnicity. • The free-text ethnic identity responses demonstrate that the standardised ethnic categories do not allow people to accurately express complex ethnic origins and migration experiences; they exclude identities from certain parts of the world and subnational, place-based identities. • Ethnic identity is important for most people from minority backgrounds. This is especially true for those from Black African, Black Caribbean, Pakistani, White Irish and Jewish backgrounds. Ethnic identity is the least important for White British people, followed by people from White Eastern European, White Other, and Mixed White and Asian backgrounds. • Religious belonging varies considerably across ethnic groups. People from Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Black African, Arab and Indian backgrounds most frequently report having a religion. Those from White British, Mixed White and Asian, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean backgrounds most frequently declare having no religious affiliation. • Strong religious attachment is more common when people identify with minority religions and when there tends to be a consistency between ethnic identity and religious affiliation. • Most people from ethnic minority backgrounds participate in practices linked to their ethnicity or religion. White British are the least likely to report participation in such practices, followed by White Irish and White Eastern Europeans. Eating food associated with one's ethnic or religious background is the most popular practice across ethnic groups. • A sense of belonging to British society is very high across all groups. A particularly high sense of belonging is reported by those from Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, Black African, Black Other, Arab, Jewish and White British backgrounds. A strong sense of belonging to English, Scottish and Welsh societies is somewhat less common among people from ethnic minority backgrounds compared to those from a White British background.