- Dept of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva
UniMail, 40 bd. du Pont d'Arve, CH-1211 Genève 4, Switzerland - +41 22 379 83 74
- University of Pavia, Dipartimento di Studi Politici e Sociali, Faculty Memberadd
- Conflict Management, Procedural Justice, Democracy, Conscientious Objection/Draft Resistance, Conflict of Values, Political Legitimacy, and 42 moreEquality, Moral and Political Philosophy, Pluralism, Political Obligation, Ethics, Personal and Moral Autonomy, Civil disobedience, Social and Political Philosophy, Liberalism and Toleration, Political Philosophy, Peace and Conflict Studies, Conflict Resolution, Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, Political Participation, Minority Studies, Equality and Diversity, Conflict Transformation, Conscience, Value pluralism, Multiculturalism, Applied Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Conscientious Objectors, Philosophy, Political Theory, Philosophy Of Law, Social Justice, Bioethics, Citizenship, Moral Philosophy, Democratic Theory, Normative Ethics, Legitimacy and Authority, John Rawls, Theories of Justice, Distributive Justice, Analytic Philosophy, Medical Ethics, Argumentation, Compromise, and Social Philosophyedit
- I am a Professor of Political Theory at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Univer... moreI am a Professor of Political Theory at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Geneva, Switzerland.
Before taking up the Chair in Political Theory at Geneva in 2019, I was an Associate Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Pavia, Italy. Since 2005, I have held fellowships and visiting positions at various institutions worldwide, including: the Center for Human Values of the Princeton University; Nuffield College and the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford; University of Jordan; Hitotsubashi University of Tokyo; University of Darmstadt; Ural Federal University; University of St Andrews; Centre de Recherche en Étique de l’Université de Montréal; University of Kent; KU Leuven; University of Brighton.In 2016, I held the "John Stuart Mill Visiting Chair in Social Philosophy" at the University of Hamburg and, in 2018, I was Fulbright Scholar at the Edmund J Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University.
I have directed and participated in many international research projects. I am currently Principal Investigator of the 4-year project EnTrust-Endogenous Institutional Trustworthiness funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and of a 5-year SNSF Advanced Grant on The Margins of Corruption.
My research interests are broadly within the normative theory of institutions, with a special focus on issues of justice and conflict, democracy, political corruption, and the political role of emotions. My articles have appeared in such journals as the American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Political Philosophy, Philosophy Compass, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, European Journal of Philosophy, Social Theory and Practice, and the Journal of Social Philosophy. I am the author of the book Interactive Justice (Routledge 2016) and co-author of Is Whistleblowing a Duty? (Polity 2018). My most recent book (co-written with Maria Paola Ferretti) is Political corruption. The internal enemy of public instituions (Oxford University Press 2021).
I am Editor-in-Chief of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Associate Editor for Political Theory of the Journal of Politics, and a founding member of the Swiss Political Theory Network.edit
This book makes political corruption an object of public ethics by demonstrating how it is an internal enemy-a Trojan horse-of public institutions. To understand political corruption, Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti argue, we must... more
This book makes political corruption an object of public ethics by demonstrating how it is an internal enemy-a Trojan horse-of public institutions. To understand political corruption, Emanuela Ceva and Maria Paola Ferretti argue, we must adopt an internal point of view and look at how officeholders' interrelated conduct may fail the functioning of their institution because of their
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This book discusses political corruption and anticorruption as a matter of public ethics. It develops a normative account of political corruption as a relationally wrongful practice that consists in an unaccountable use of the power of... more
This book discusses political corruption and anticorruption as a matter of public ethics. It develops a normative account of political corruption as a relationally wrongful practice that consists in an unaccountable use of the power of office. Most current discussions of what political corruption is and why it is wrong have concentrated either on explaining and assessing it as a matter of an individual’s corrupt character and motives or as a dysfunction of institutional procedures. However, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been devoted to discussing the relation between these two dimensions of political corruption. This book fills this gap by showing how appreciating the specificity of this phenomenon and the depth and breadth of its wrongness requires understanding the way political corruption is a failure of the role-based interactions between the occupants of institutional roles. Political corruption is thus a matter of public ethics because it is a problem inherent to the functioning of public institutions, understood as a system of interrelated embodied roles, and the conduct of the officeholders occupying those roles. By showing the common root of the corruption of public officials and institutional practices, the book points to the need for developing and maintaining an interactively just institutional system by upholding a public ethics of office accountability
Research Interests: Public Administration, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Whistleblowing, and 15 moreAccountability, Social Justice, Institutional Theory, Political Legitimacy, Political Corruption, Public Ethics, Responsibility, Anti-Corruption, Corruption, Moral Responsibility, Bribery, Normative Political Theory, Nepotism, Political Clientelism, and Public Institutions
Recent years have seen a number of whistleblowers risk their liberty to expose illegal and corrupt behaviour. Some have heralded their bravery, others see them as traitors. Can there be a moral duty to emulate their example and blow the... more
Recent years have seen a number of whistleblowers risk their liberty to expose illegal and corrupt behaviour. Some have heralded their bravery, others see them as traitors. Can there be a moral duty to emulate their example and blow the whistle?In this book, leading political philosophers Emanuela Ceva and Michele Bocchiola offer a crisp discussion of this question from the perspective of political theory. They draw on well-known cases, such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, to probe the difference between permissible and dutiful whistleblowing. They examine the problems of whistleblowing and analyse the potential burdensome consequences whistleblowers face. They argue that insofar as whistleblowing is understood as an individual act of dissent, it falls short of constituting a duty, although it can be praiseworthy as an act of heroism. Whistleblowing should, they contend, be seen as an institutional duty, embedded within the organizational practices of public accountability.This concise book is an invaluable guide to this complex topic for students and scholars of applied political theory, as well as political, business and organizational ethics.
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Contemporary societies are riddled with moral disputes caused by conflicts between value claims competing for the regulation of matters of public concern. This familiar state of affairs is relevant for one of the most important debates... more
Contemporary societies are riddled with moral disputes caused by conflicts between value claims competing for the regulation of matters of public concern. This familiar state of affairs is relevant for one of the most important debates within liberal political thought: should institutions seek to realize justice or peace? Justice-driven philosophers characterize the normative conditions for the resolution of value conflicts through the establishment of a moral consensus on an order of priority between competing value claims. Peace-driven philosophers have concentrated, perhaps more modestly, on the characterization of the ways in which competing value claims should be balanced, with a view to establishing a modus vivendi aimed at containing the conflict.
Interactive Justice addresses an important question related to this debate: on what terms should the parties interact during their conflict for their interaction to be morally acceptable to them? Although largely unexplored by political philosophers, this is a main area of concern in conflict management. Building on a proceduralist interpretation of "relational" concerns of justice, the author develops a liberal normative theory of interactive justice for the management of value conflict in politics grounded in the fundamental values of fair hearing and procedural equality. This book innovatively builds a bridge between works in political philosophy and peace studies to propose a fresh lens through which to view the normative responses liberal institutions ought to give to value conflict in politics, and moves beyond the apparent dichotomy between pursuing end-state justice through conflict resolution or peace through conflict containment.
Interactive Justice addresses an important question related to this debate: on what terms should the parties interact during their conflict for their interaction to be morally acceptable to them? Although largely unexplored by political philosophers, this is a main area of concern in conflict management. Building on a proceduralist interpretation of "relational" concerns of justice, the author develops a liberal normative theory of interactive justice for the management of value conflict in politics grounded in the fundamental values of fair hearing and procedural equality. This book innovatively builds a bridge between works in political philosophy and peace studies to propose a fresh lens through which to view the normative responses liberal institutions ought to give to value conflict in politics, and moves beyond the apparent dichotomy between pursuing end-state justice through conflict resolution or peace through conflict containment.
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Contributors: Emanuela Ceva, Gerald F. Gaus, John Horton, Simon Cabulea May, Sebastiano Mafettone, Glen Newey, Valeria Ottonelli, Enzo Rossi. The essays in this collection consider (i) the extent to which it is plausible to separate the... more
Contributors: Emanuela Ceva, Gerald F. Gaus, John Horton, Simon Cabulea May, Sebastiano Mafettone, Glen Newey, Valeria Ottonelli, Enzo Rossi.
The essays in this collection consider (i) the extent to which it is plausible to separate the legitimacy and justice of a polity, in the twofold sense that unjust institutions may still exercise legitimate political authority, and illegitimate institutions may issue just commands and (ii) the ways in which the challenge of ethical diversity affects the normative standing and the proper exercise of political authority, depending on whether such authority is understood primarily in terms of justice or in terms of legitimacy.
The essays in this collection consider (i) the extent to which it is plausible to separate the legitimacy and justice of a polity, in the twofold sense that unjust institutions may still exercise legitimate political authority, and illegitimate institutions may issue just commands and (ii) the ways in which the challenge of ethical diversity affects the normative standing and the proper exercise of political authority, depending on whether such authority is understood primarily in terms of justice or in terms of legitimacy.
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Il volume affronta le questioni filosoficamente rilevanti poste alle istituzioni di società caratterizzate dal “pluralismo alimentare”; dalla presenza, cioè, di diverse abitudini, requisiti e convinzioni concernenti la produzione, la... more
Il volume affronta le questioni filosoficamente rilevanti poste alle istituzioni di società caratterizzate dal “pluralismo alimentare”; dalla presenza, cioè, di diverse abitudini, requisiti e convinzioni concernenti la produzione, la distribuzione e il consumo del cibo, che informano richieste di riconciliazione attraverso la formulazione di interventi legislativi e di politiche pubbliche.
Lo scopo degli autori è offrire un contributo, sia teorico sia applicato, allo studio del tema. Secondo il primo aspetto, i contributi presentati propongono uno studio analitico degli ideali di rispetto, giustificazione pubblica e neutralità quali basi per lo sviluppo di politiche e previsioni legali mirate alla conciliazione delle istanze minoritarie e al chiarimento dei modi di applicazione di tali ideali, politiche e previsioni alla questione del pluralismo alimentare. Dalla prospettiva applicata, questo studio mira a contribuire alla formulazione di raccomandazioni di policy, all’interno di un quadro giuridico e concettuale ben definito, al fine di sviluppare linee di intervento informate da una migliore comprensione degli ideali normativi e dei problemi filosofici di sfondo.
Lo scopo degli autori è offrire un contributo, sia teorico sia applicato, allo studio del tema. Secondo il primo aspetto, i contributi presentati propongono uno studio analitico degli ideali di rispetto, giustificazione pubblica e neutralità quali basi per lo sviluppo di politiche e previsioni legali mirate alla conciliazione delle istanze minoritarie e al chiarimento dei modi di applicazione di tali ideali, politiche e previsioni alla questione del pluralismo alimentare. Dalla prospettiva applicata, questo studio mira a contribuire alla formulazione di raccomandazioni di policy, all’interno di un quadro giuridico e concettuale ben definito, al fine di sviluppare linee di intervento informate da una migliore comprensione degli ideali normativi e dei problemi filosofici di sfondo.
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Viene fatto spesso riferimento alle idee di tolleranza e di rispetto in modo quasi intercambiabile quali basi per stabilire il tipo di trattamento che le minoranze dovrebbero ricevere da parte della maggioranza in una democrazia liberale.... more
Viene fatto spesso riferimento alle idee di tolleranza e di rispetto in modo quasi intercambiabile quali basi per stabilire il tipo di trattamento che le minoranze dovrebbero ricevere da parte della maggioranza in una democrazia liberale. Tuttavia si tratta davvero di ideali intercambiabili o, perlomeno, compatibili? Il ricorso a quale interpretazione di questi ideali è più adeguato per formulare politiche di integrazione capaci di incoraggiare una cultura egualitaria coerente con le ambizioni proprie di un assetto democratico? L’ipotesi teorica che attraversa e unisce i contributi raccolti in questo volume è che il riferimento alla sola tolleranza non è in grado di offrire le basi normative per rispondere alle sfide relative al trattamento delle minoranze in democrazia. Tali risposte sono, invece, raggiungibili adottando l’ideale dell’eguale rispetto per le persone a complemento del riferimento alla tolleranza. Gli autori sviluppano questa ipotesi riferendosi al problema dell’integrazione delle minoranze nello spazio pubblico urbano quale terreno sul quale maggiormente si gioca la realizzazione di una società democratica coesa e inclusiva.
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"Most contemporary political philosophers take justice—rather than legitimacy—to be the fundamental virtue of political institutions vis-à-vis the challenges of ethical diversity. Justice-driven theorists are primarily concerned with... more
"Most contemporary political philosophers take justice—rather than legitimacy—to be the fundamental virtue of political institutions vis-à-vis the challenges of ethical diversity. Justice-driven theorists are primarily concerned with finding mutually acceptable terms to arbitrate the claims of conflicting individuals and groups. Legitimacy-driven theorists, instead, focus on the conditions under which those exercising political authority on an ethically heterogeneous polity are entitled to do so. But what difference would it make to the management of ethical diversity in liberal democratic societies if legitimacy were prior to or independent from justice?
This question identifies a widely underexplored issue whose theoretical salience shows how the understanding of what constitutes the primary question of political philosophy has a deep impact on how practical political questions are interpreted and addressed. What difference would it make, for example, whether the alleged democratic deficit of the European Union were couched in terms of the justice or legitimacy of its institutions? How should the issue of the integration of minorities be addressed whether one assigned priority to the justice or legitimacy of a liberal polity? Addressing these and other topical questions, the book offers a new theoretical angle from which to consider a number of pressing social and political issues.
This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy."
This question identifies a widely underexplored issue whose theoretical salience shows how the understanding of what constitutes the primary question of political philosophy has a deep impact on how practical political questions are interpreted and addressed. What difference would it make, for example, whether the alleged democratic deficit of the European Union were couched in terms of the justice or legitimacy of its institutions? How should the issue of the integration of minorities be addressed whether one assigned priority to the justice or legitimacy of a liberal polity? Addressing these and other topical questions, the book offers a new theoretical angle from which to consider a number of pressing social and political issues.
This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy."
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"From bans on religious symbols in public spaces, to the provision of abortion by doctors, recent cases across Europe have highlighted acute dilemmas about how best to respond to the claims of individuals or groups feeling that their... more
"From bans on religious symbols in public spaces, to the provision of abortion by doctors, recent cases across Europe have highlighted acute dilemmas about how best to respond to the claims of individuals or groups feeling that their values or beliefs are not treated fairly by the law.
Diversity in Europe uses the resources of political theory alongside comparative analysis of contemporary practices in different countries (Germany, Italy, Turkey, Spain and the UK) to explore the challenges diversity poses for European democracies. Crucial throughout is whether the democratic commitment to equality entails uniformity in the law, or is compatible with saying 'yes' to some requests from citizens that they be treated differently, to accommodate their ethical, cultural and religious particularity. Such differential treatment may take several forms, e.g. group or individual rights, either to legal exemptions or to conscientious objection. Exploring these from various angles, the book gives a sense of the tools democracies need to address the challenges of diversity more generally.
Making an important contribution to our understanding of the political implications of ethical, cultural and religious diversity, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of political and social philosophy, European studies, political science, social policy, applied ethics, law, and socio-legal studies."
Diversity in Europe uses the resources of political theory alongside comparative analysis of contemporary practices in different countries (Germany, Italy, Turkey, Spain and the UK) to explore the challenges diversity poses for European democracies. Crucial throughout is whether the democratic commitment to equality entails uniformity in the law, or is compatible with saying 'yes' to some requests from citizens that they be treated differently, to accommodate their ethical, cultural and religious particularity. Such differential treatment may take several forms, e.g. group or individual rights, either to legal exemptions or to conscientious objection. Exploring these from various angles, the book gives a sense of the tools democracies need to address the challenges of diversity more generally.
Making an important contribution to our understanding of the political implications of ethical, cultural and religious diversity, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of political and social philosophy, European studies, political science, social policy, applied ethics, law, and socio-legal studies."
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What makes public institutions normatively distinctive, if anything? Is there a sense in which the privatisation of the public function corrupts such distinctiveness? If such a sense is there, what exactly makes it worth opposing? The... more
What makes public institutions normatively distinctive, if anything? Is there a sense in which the privatisation of the public function corrupts such distinctiveness? If such a sense is there, what exactly makes it worth opposing? The articles discusses these questions building on the book by Chiara Cordelli, The Privatized State.
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This article distinguishes between two types of responses that a political theory of justice can give to value conflicts, aimed respectively to their resolution or management. Whilst the former aims to establish an order of priority... more
This article distinguishes between two types of responses that a political theory of justice can give to value conflicts, aimed respectively to their resolution or management. Whilst the former aims to establish an order of priority between conflicting values, the latter ...
Issues of international legitimacy have been the object of a lively debate in the fields of international law and political science. Political philosophers have paid much less attention to these issues. This is rather surprising,... more
Issues of international legitimacy have been the object of a lively debate in the fields of international law and political science. Political philosophers have paid much less attention to these issues. This is rather surprising, especially if one considers the vivid interest that germane issues of global justice have sparked among them, especially within liberal political thought. An explanation may be found by considering the general tendency of political philosophers to conflate the domain of legitimacy with that of justice (or, at least, to make the former dependent on the latter). We think that this conflation is a mistake in at least one popular liberal interpretation of legitimacy as a component of the liberal project of public justification. This mistake has important consequences for the normative issues that political philosophers are capable of identifying when they engage with the international arena and its institutions. In the paper, we show the importance of identifying discrete issues of international legitimacy by reference to the illustrative case of the supranational regulation of local systems of food production
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The existence of diverse and often competing food standards is one of the most ordinary and yet theoretically underexplored facts of contemporary societies. Such standards concern what it is permissible to eat and how food should be... more
The existence of diverse and often competing food standards is one of the most ordinary and yet theoretically underexplored facts of contemporary societies. Such standards concern what it is permissible to eat and how food should be produced and prepared. Vegetarianism illustrates the former, religious ritual animal slaughter exemplifies the latter. The normative implications of this sort of pluralism – call it “dietary pluralism” (henceforth DP) – have rarely been the subject of philosophical discussion. This is quite surprising given the centrality of certain dietary claims to a person’s integrity. Eating is, arguably, one of the most ordinary and yet intimate actions, in relation to which individual evaluative standards, cultural habits, and legal regulations are very often inextricably interwoven in constituting a person’s sense of her own self. By referring to illustrative cases of ritual slaughter and the request for a vegetarian option in public canteens, in this paper we aim to show the philosophical importance of DP by identifying its main features and the challenges it raises for political institutions.
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On a proceduralist account of democracy, collective decisions derive their justification—at least in part—from the qualities of the process through which they have been made. To fulfil its justificatory function, this process should... more
On a proceduralist account of democracy, collective decisions derive their justification—at least in part—from the qualities of the process through which they have been made. To fulfil its justificatory function, this process should ensure that citizens have an equal right to political participation as a respectful response to their equal status as agents capable of self-legislation. How should democratic participation be understood if it is to offer such a procedural justification for democratic decisions? I suggest that, in order to overcome the structural procedural disadvantages affecting the actual, effective opportunities that citizens who hold nonmainstream views have to exercise their right to political participation, the enhancement of such opportunities requires securing space for contestation. Against this background, I vindicate the (currently underestimated) role of conscientious objection as a form of political participation.
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Alcuni tra i dibattiti filosofici più vivaci nell’ambito della teoria democratica contemporanea si articolano lungo due questioni: (1) Perché la democrazia è desiderabile? (2) Quali istituzioni sono necessarie per realizzare l’ideale... more
Alcuni tra i dibattiti filosofici più vivaci nell’ambito della teoria democratica contemporanea si articolano lungo due questioni: (1) Perché la democrazia è desiderabile? (2) Quali istituzioni sono necessarie per realizzare l’ideale democratico? In risposta alla prima questione, gli strumentalisti sostengono che la democrazia è giustificata esclusivamente se produce buoni risultati; i non-strumentalisti considerano anche i valori che le procedure democratiche realizzano in sé. Quanto alla seconda questione, il dibattito riguarda la forma che le istituzioni democratiche dovrebbero avere – maggioritaria, deliberativa o contestataria – per realizzare l’ideale democratico. Lo scopo di questo contributo è di offrire una presentazione critica di questi dibattiti.
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This article contributes to the debate concerning the identification of politically relevant cases of corruption in a democracy by sketching the basic traits of an original liberal theory of institutional corruption. We define this form... more
This article contributes to the debate concerning the identification of politically relevant cases of corruption in a democracy by sketching the basic traits of an original liberal theory of institutional corruption. We define this form of corruption as a deviation with respect to the role entrusted to people occupying certain institutional positions, which are crucial for the implementation of public rules, for private gain. In order to illustrate the damages that corrupt behaviour makes to liberal democratic institutions, we discuss the case of health care professionals’ abuse of their right to conscientious objection to abortion services. We show that the conscience clause can be instrumentally abused to sabotage democratically established public rules and thus exert undue private influence on their implementation. In this sense, from a liberal democratic perspective, institutional corruption is problematic because it is disruptive of such fundamental liberal ideals as the impartiality of public institutions and citizens’ political equality.
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This paper contributes to establishing the scope for toleration in a liberal, multicultural democracy. It builds on a specific interpretation of respect (opacity respect: OR) and addresses a specific practice of toleration (the cultural... more
This paper contributes to establishing the scope for toleration in a liberal, multicultural democracy. It builds on a specific interpretation of respect (opacity respect: OR) and addresses a specific practice of toleration (the cultural defense: CD). To treat a person with respect entails considering her responsible for her beliefs and actions, and OR commands that this treatment be extended to all persons equally, without making it dependent on the judgment of their actual agential capacities. However, treatment in accordance with the assessment of such capacities is required by the CD. Can OR be used to deny the CD?
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For many liberal democrats toleration has become a sort of pet-concept, to which appeal is made in the face of a myriad issues related to the treatment of minorities. Against the inflationary use of toleration, whether understood... more
For many liberal democrats toleration has become a sort of pet-concept, to which appeal is made in the face of a myriad issues related to the treatment of minorities. Against the inflationary use of toleration, whether understood positively as recognition or negatively as forbearance, I argue that toleration may not provide the conceptual and normative tools to understand and address the claims for accommodation raised by at least one kind of significant minority: democratic dissenting minorities. These are individuals, or aggregates of them, who oppose, on principled grounds, the outcomes of the majoritarian decision-making process. I argue that democratic dissenting minorities’ claims are better understood as calls for respect for a person’s capacity for self-legislation. I view respect as the cornerstone of justice in a liberal democracy: all norms resulting in a constraint on a person’s conduct should be appropriately justified to her. I argue that the reconciliation of democratic dissenting minorities’ claims requires an enhancement of the justificatory strategies of democratic decisions by enhancing in turn citizens’ rights to political participation. This should be done both during decision making and after a provision is enacted by also securing space for contestation through such forms of illegal protest as civil disobedience and conscientious objection.
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In this paper, we engage critically with the understanding of majority-minority relations in a liberal democracy as relations of toleration. We make two main claims: first, that appeals to toleration are unable to capture the procedural... more
In this paper, we engage critically with the understanding of majority-minority relations in a liberal democracy as relations of toleration. We make two main claims: first, that appeals to toleration are unable to capture the procedural problems concerning the unequal socio-political participation of minorities, and, second, that they do not offer any critical tool to establish what judgements the majority is entitled to consider valid reasons for action with respect to some minority. We suggest supplementing the reference to toleration with a specific interpretation of respect for persons: all persons should be treated equally as self-legislators and as if they were opaque to our judgement as regards their agential abilities, on which their capacity for self-legislation supervenes. Minorities are disrespected in this sense whenever are treated merely as the addressees of the rules constraining the formulation and pursuit of their lifeplans, rather than as their co-authors on an equal footing with the majority, and whenever their treatment in politics and society is considered as legitimately influenced by the majority’s judgement of their agential abilities, either directly or by indirect inference from the evaluation of the content of their beliefs and practices.
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In Italy, Emergency Hormonal Contraception (EHC) is a prescription drug, available only in pharmacies. Evidence suggests that a number of doctors and pharmacists refuse to provide EHC, on grounds of conscience, although the exact... more
In Italy, Emergency Hormonal Contraception (EHC) is a prescription drug, available only in pharmacies. Evidence suggests that a number of doctors and pharmacists refuse to provide EHC, on grounds of conscience, although the exact frequency of this phenomenon is unknown. This creates a barrier to access to EHC for women, thus risking undermining their right to reproductive self-determination. In this article, we aim to offer a clearer empirical and theoretical understanding of the situation and to assess the force of doctors’ and pharmacists’ claims against providing EHC. Unlike standard discussions of the issue, we argue that the category of conscientious objection is not the most appropriate one for making sense of these claims, because they are not grounded in a conflict between two contrasting moral duties. The seemingly forced choice between protecting doctors’ and pharmacists’ professional self-determination and women’s reproductive self-determination could be prevented by distributing EHC without medical prescription and in a number of outlets (including supermarkets), thus relieving doctors and pharmacists from the legal duty to provide it.
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This paper challenges the claim that proceduralism can say something relevant about the legitimacy, but not the justice of a polity. It is often argued that whilst legitimacy has to do with the mechanisms through which political coercive... more
This paper challenges the claim that proceduralism can say something relevant about the legitimacy, but not the justice of a polity. It is often argued that whilst legitimacy has to do with the mechanisms through which political coercive decisions are made (who exercises authority and how it is exercised), justice is more a substantial matter concerning the terms of social cooperation, against which the qualities of the decisions made by those who are entitled to make them are to be evaluated. Accordingly, the argument goes, an approach focusing on the qualities of procedures seems to be more appropriate for legitimacy than for justice. I contend that this characterization is inaccurate for it mixes three different issues which require, instead, separate theorizing: (i) who is entitled to make politically binding decisions? (ii) How should political decision making processes be structured? And (iii) how should political decisions be evaluated? I argue that considerations of legitimacy apply to level (i), whereas considerations of justice apply to levels (ii) and (iii). Although the appropriateness of a procedural approach to the justice-related question in (iii) is debatable, proceduralism seems well-equipped to provide a sound answer to the, equally justice-related, question in (ii). It does so by focusing on the way in which persons should be treated by the procedures through which they interact, once all issues of entitlement are set (i) and independently of the outcomes of the interaction (iii).
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This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea... more
This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s efforts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts have failed to provide normatively cogent foundations for it. I suggest deriving such foundations from a basic idea of procedural equality (all parties in a conflict should be granted an equal chance to have a say) which all conflicting parties could be thought to endorse. But what happens once all parties have been heard if no agreement is reached? Borrowing a distinction well known to scholars of peace studies, but surprisingly neglected by justice-driven political philosophers, I claim that although the AAP might be inconclusive with regard to resolving a conflict, it is a promising principle for managing value conflicts justly. The AAP is thus considered anew through the lens of conflict management: as a principle of justice to characterize normatively the way conflicting parties should interact for their interaction to be morally justifiable to such parties with a view to changing antagonistic conflict dynamics into cooperative ones.
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It is a widely supported claim that liberal democratic institutions should treat citizens with equal respect. I neither dispute nor champion this claim, but investigate how it could be fulfilled. I do this by asking, as a sort of litmus... more
It is a widely supported claim that liberal democratic institutions should treat citizens with equal respect. I neither dispute nor champion this claim, but investigate how it could be fulfilled. I do this by asking, as a sort of litmus test, how liberal democratic institutions should treat with respect citizens holding minority convictions, and thereby dissenting from a deliberative output. The first step of my argument consists in clarifying the sense in which liberal democracies have a primary concern for the respectful treatment of citizens qua self-legislating persons. Taking the second step, I address critically the common tendency in the literature to concentrate on what I have termed the ex ante legem phase, focusing solely on the structure of institutionalized decision-making processes. I submit, rather, that the principle of equal respect for persons demands more of liberal democratic institutions to enhance citizens' chances to give voice to their consciences and influence, on that ground, the formulation of the rules to which they should conform. Fulfilling this commitment requires democratic theorizing to go beyond the ex ante legem phase and regard forms of ex post legem contestation as an extension of citizens' right to political participation. Against this backdrop, I take the third and last step and argue that a promising way forward consists in the adoption of an ex post legem version of conscientious exemptionism, granting citizens a conditional moral right to request exemptions on the grounds of conscience from certain controversial legal and political provisions.
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The reconciliation of minority issues is one of the most pressing challenges with which contemporary democracies are confronted. It has been addressed in at least two distinct ways. The first, ex ante legem, focuses on the deliberative... more
The reconciliation of minority issues is one of the most pressing challenges with which contemporary democracies are confronted. It has been addressed in at least two distinct ways. The first, ex ante legem, focuses on the deliberative phase and establishes criteria ...
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The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) has been the object of many studies in politics, law, and economics focusing on institutional design problems. This paper contributes to such studies by accounting for the argumentative nature and... more
The WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) has been the object of many studies in politics, law, and economics focusing on institutional design problems. This paper contributes to such studies by accounting for the argumentative nature and sophisticated features of the DSS through a philosophical analysis of the procedures through which it is articulated. Jürgen Habermas's discourse theory is used as a hermeneutic device to disentangle the types of ‘orientations’ (compromise, consensus, and mutual understanding) pertaining to DSS procedures. We show that these latter are oriented primarily to put the parties in a position to reach mutual understanding. Such an orientation is no mere idiosyncrasy of the DSS but is the only one consistently conducive to the WTO's general aims, in response to the various types of disputes that may arise between its Members. Before closing, we bring our procedural considerations to bear on the reform proposals of the DSS.
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Acts of civil disobedience and conscientious objection provide valuable indications of the congruence of political outcomes with citizens’ conceptions of justice and the good. As their primary concern is substantive, their logic seems... more
Acts of civil disobedience and conscientious objection provide valuable indications of the congruence of political outcomes with citizens’ conceptions of justice and the good. As their primary concern is substantive, their logic seems extraneous to procedural approaches to justice. Accordingly, it has often been argued that these latter condemn citizens to a ‘deaf-and-blind’ acceptance of the outcomes of agreed procedures. A closer analysis of such acts of contestation shall reveal that although, for proceduralism, the outcomes of just procedures cannot be contested as unjust, they may be contested on the ground of values other than justice, such as someone’s religious/ethical allegiances. Proceduralism about justice will be thus shown to be consistent with the commitment to realising certain outcome-oriented values.
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Liberal theories of justice typically claim that political institutions should be justifiable to those who live under them – whatever their values. The more such values diverge, the greater the challenge of justifiability. Diversity of... more
Liberal theories of justice typically claim that political institutions should be justifiable to those who live under them – whatever their values. The more such values diverge, the greater the challenge of justifiability. Diversity of this kind becomes especially pronounced when the institutions in question are supranational. Focusing on the case of the European Union, this article aims to address a basic question: what kinds of values should inform the justification of political institutions facing a plurality of value systems? One route to an answer is provided by John Rawls, who famously distinguishes between comprehensive and political values, and defends the exclusion of the former from the foundations of a political theory of justice. This article questions the tenability of the Rawlsian solution, and draws attention to an alternative twofold conceptual distinction: that between minimal and non-minimal and between substantive and procedural values. Minimal values are meant to be as independent as possible of controversial conceptions of the good and views of the world, regardless of whether these are comprehensive or purely political. It will be argued that their endorsement may thus further specify the nature of what should be shared in order to justify political institutions in conditions of pluralism. In order to refine further the account of such a basis of justification, two variants of minimalism will be presented according to whether they invest substantive or procedural values. Substantive values qualify the property of an outcome; procedural values qualify the property of a procedure. The latter part of the article consists of a ‘face-off’ between minimal proceduralism and minimal substantivism, considering reasons in favour of the adoption of each. The result, we suggest, is a helpful reorientation of the political dimension of the value debates to which the multiplicity of values amid contemporary European horizons give rise.
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This article aims to investigate the way in which a political theory of justice should respond to the endorsement of pluralism. After offering reasons in support of the necessity for such a theory to take pluralism seriously, an argument... more
This article aims to investigate the way in which a political theory of justice should respond to the endorsement of pluralism. After offering reasons in support of the necessity for such a theory to take pluralism seriously, an argument is put forward for its characterization in minimal and procedural terms. However, taking issue with the straightforward relationship of implication identified by a number of scholars between pluralism and procedural justice, this article contends that a direct relation can only be established between pluralism and the need to define a minimal theory of justice, i.e. a theory that assumes as little as possible in terms of values and views of the world. Its procedural formulation is seen, instead, as a consequence of the limited predictive power of theory facing the heterogeneous situations with which it is expected to deal.
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Quest'anno (2011) Una teoria della giustizia di John Rawls compie quarant'anni. Si tratta di un'opera di fondamentale importanza perché ha fornito un modo di pensare alla società che è venuto progressivamente ad affermarsi quale paradigma... more
Quest'anno (2011) Una teoria della giustizia di John Rawls compie quarant'anni. Si tratta di un'opera di fondamentale importanza perché ha fornito un modo di pensare alla società che è venuto progressivamente ad affermarsi quale paradigma di giustizia liberale. Al centro vi è l'idea che per essere giusto il sistema sociale non deve rispondere a un qualche ordine morale indipendente, ma deve essere fondato su istituzioni i cui principi ispiratori sono accettabili dal punto di vista di tutti coloro che sono in esso coinvolti. Tali principi hanno a che vedere, secondo Rawls, con la tutela di eguali libertà fondamentali per tutti e con un sistema che garantisca eguaglianza di opportunità, e riconosca come giustificate solo quelle diseguaglianze che avvantaggiano i membri della società più svantaggiati. Che Una teoria della giustizia rappresenti un classico per la sinistra liberal contemporanea è cosa poco controversa. Ma il capolavoro di Rawls ha cambiato davvero il nostro modo di pensare alla giustizia sociale? E se sì in quali termini possiamo considerarlo ancora oggi come linea guida per lo sviluppo di una società giusta? Ne discutiamo con Salvatore Veca, professore di Filosojia politica e vicedirettore dell'Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori di Pavia, uno dei massimi esperti di Rawls in Italia, nonché tra i principali attori della diffusione della sua opera nel nostro paese.
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Corruption is arguably one of the most ominous threats to the democratic public order. Recent work in normative political theory (Ceva & Ferretti 2021) has characterized corruption as an internal enemy of public institutions in the form... more
Corruption is arguably one of the most ominous threats to the democratic public order. Recent work in normative political theory (Ceva & Ferretti 2021) has characterized corruption as an internal enemy of public institutions in the form of a deficit of office accountability. The core of corruption is, in this view, about officeholders’ exercise of the public power entrusted to their institutional roles. What happens to the core of corruption when the officeholders’ power is either not purely public or not entrusted according to democratic standards? To address this question, the study of corruption in the field of political theory must move from its core to its margins. The project explores corruption at the margins of democracies by looking at the forms this institutional dysfunction takes in hybrid regimes. It also studies the manifestations of corruption at the margins of the public sector by looking at the dysfunctions of nonprofit organizations and business corporations. In so doing, the project aims at testing whether the idea of a deficit of office accountability can seize the special character of corruption across a large spectrum of institutional set ups and uses of power of office. This inquiry has also far-reaching methodological implications. The project will employ a mixed theoretical and empirical methodology to enhance the awareness of the limits of analytical and normative methodologies when approaching nonideal matters in political theory. It will thus re-draw disciplinary boundaries by fostering crosscultural and transdisciplinary dialogue through the launch of a new Research Center for Corruption Studies at the University of Geneva.
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Respect for persons, for their beliefs, and for their culturally, ethically, and religiously derived practices has been frequently invoked as the inspiring ideal of many social policies both at a national and at a European level. In... more
Respect for persons, for their beliefs, and for their culturally, ethically, and religiously derived practices has been frequently invoked as the inspiring ideal of many social policies both at a national and at a European level. In particular, references to respect are often associated with those to toleration vis-à-vis the need to accommodate minority claims within multicultural societies. Minority claims for accommodation are put forward in connection with many aspects of a person’s life, including dress-codes (see the (in)famous case of the Islamic hijab), days of rest from work (see the case of Jews refusing to work on a Shabbath), and dietary habits (see hàlal and koshèr slaughtering or vegetarianism).
Although dietary habits can be thought to be constituent of a person’s cultural, ethical, and religious identity, few studies have been entirely devoted to analysing this aspect as a source of possible requests for differential treatment (e.g. through the concession of legal exemptions). As emphasised in the themes proposed on occasion of the Expo 2015 (subtheme 7: “Food in the world’s cultures and ethnic groups”), dietary habits are thought to play an important role in the way in which a person sees herself in relation to one of the most fundamental activities of her daily life: her nourishment. A study devoted to such themes looks crucial to the development of policies respectful of a plurality of personal choices, cultural practices, and religious prescriptions.
It should be noted also that most of the studies related to ‘dietary pluralism’ have been mainly carried out from within the fields of jurisprudence, sociology, and cultural anthropology. Political philosophers have scarcely made their voices heard. However, the innovative contribution of political philosophers, with the hindsight of the better established contributions already offered by legal philosophers, has a significant, both theoretical and practical, role to play. On the one hand, political philosophers can contribute to the study of the ideals of toleration and respect, both in their historical roots and contemporary developments, as bases for the development of social policies and legal provisions aimed at the accommodation of minority claims, and to the clarification of the ways in which such ideals, policies, and provisions may be applied to the issue of dietary pluralism. On the other hand, they may contribute to the formulation of policy recommendations, within a well-structured and historically grounded conceptual and legal framework, with a view to developing lines of action informed by a better understanding of normative ideals and relevant social problems.
Combining the expertise of political and legal philosophers and historians of political thought the present project aims to fill this lacuna by carrying out a theoretical and applied study aimed at understanding the issues raised by dietary pluralism in terms of the accommodation of minorities in multicultural societies.
Although dietary habits can be thought to be constituent of a person’s cultural, ethical, and religious identity, few studies have been entirely devoted to analysing this aspect as a source of possible requests for differential treatment (e.g. through the concession of legal exemptions). As emphasised in the themes proposed on occasion of the Expo 2015 (subtheme 7: “Food in the world’s cultures and ethnic groups”), dietary habits are thought to play an important role in the way in which a person sees herself in relation to one of the most fundamental activities of her daily life: her nourishment. A study devoted to such themes looks crucial to the development of policies respectful of a plurality of personal choices, cultural practices, and religious prescriptions.
It should be noted also that most of the studies related to ‘dietary pluralism’ have been mainly carried out from within the fields of jurisprudence, sociology, and cultural anthropology. Political philosophers have scarcely made their voices heard. However, the innovative contribution of political philosophers, with the hindsight of the better established contributions already offered by legal philosophers, has a significant, both theoretical and practical, role to play. On the one hand, political philosophers can contribute to the study of the ideals of toleration and respect, both in their historical roots and contemporary developments, as bases for the development of social policies and legal provisions aimed at the accommodation of minority claims, and to the clarification of the ways in which such ideals, policies, and provisions may be applied to the issue of dietary pluralism. On the other hand, they may contribute to the formulation of policy recommendations, within a well-structured and historically grounded conceptual and legal framework, with a view to developing lines of action informed by a better understanding of normative ideals and relevant social problems.
Combining the expertise of political and legal philosophers and historians of political thought the present project aims to fill this lacuna by carrying out a theoretical and applied study aimed at understanding the issues raised by dietary pluralism in terms of the accommodation of minorities in multicultural societies.
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Tolerance has been increasingly invoked as the inspiring ideal of a number of social policies in European democracies. Appeals to tolerance have animated especially the political debates on those policies addressed to accommodate... more
Tolerance has been increasingly invoked as the inspiring ideal of a number of social policies in European democracies. Appeals to tolerance have animated especially the political debates on those policies addressed to accommodate minorities' requests. Among such requests those for the allocation of public spaces have recently acquired pride of place in the political agendas of many European and extra-European countries (e.g. the allocation of space for Roma sites; Muslims' requests to build places of worship and housing policies for migrants). Despite such a generalized political and societal relevance of the notion of tolerance, some problems may occur when policies inspired by it are implemented. In particular, the implementation of tolerance-inspired spatial policies may result in the marginalisation of differences and thus risk undermining social cohesion. What conception of tolerance may be invoked to limit such a risk? To answer this question, we test the hypothesis that grounding tolerance on equal respect for persons may contribute to the development of spatial policies capable of resolving the tensions between tolerance and social cohesion in culturally diverse societies.
Research Interests: International Relations, Multiculturalism, International Law, Human Rights, International organizations, and 13 moreConflict, Security, Nationalism, Urban Studies, Diplomacy, Liberalism and Toleration, Ethnicity, Theory and Practice of Toleration, Minority Rights, Religious Toleration, Peace, Respect, and Freedom
The politics of handling cultural diversity is one of the major issues in the construction of Europe, especially in light of the enlargement of the EU. The EuroEthos project aims to explore the possible scope for a shared European ethos... more
The politics of handling cultural diversity is one of the major issues in the construction of Europe, especially in light of the enlargement of the EU. The EuroEthos project aims to explore the possible scope for a shared European ethos through the analysis of political and legal questions concerning issues of religious and secular ethics-based requests for exemption from the law, in the belief that the study of such issues provides precious indications on how societies try to handle a plurality of values.
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Institutional operability refers to the normative conditions governing the exercise of power of office that makes an institution work. Because institutional action occurs by the interrelated actions of the officeholders, a focus on... more
Institutional operability refers to the normative conditions governing the exercise of power of office that makes an institution work. Because institutional action occurs by the interrelated actions of the officeholders, a focus on institutional operability requires the analysis and assessment of the officeholders’ conduct in their institutional capacity. This article distinguishes two perspectives on operability: ‘outward’ and ‘inward.’ The outward view emphasizes predefined instructions for efficient execution, focusing on rule-following to achieve institutional purposes. The inward perspective highlights role-playing and reflective engagement among officeholders to uphold an institution’s raison d’être. The inward perspective brings to the fore the relational aspect of institutional life and officeholders’ interrelated responsibility for guiding institutional action.
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This article offers a conceptual framework for discussing the role of envy within processes of transitional justice. Transitional justice importantly includes the transformation of intergroup dynamics of interaction in the aftermath of... more
This article offers a conceptual framework for discussing the role of envy within processes of transitional justice. Transitional justice importantly includes the transformation of intergroup dynamics of interaction in the aftermath of societal conflicts and upheavals. Such transformation aims to realise "interactive" justice in transitional justice by reshaping belief and value systems, and by moulding emotional responses between the involved parties. A nuanced understanding of the emotions at play in intergroup antagonistic dynamics of interaction is thus essential to transitional justice. Among the many emotions that we could address in such scenarios, we target envy. Envy, in its various forms, features prominently in many societal conflicts and upheavals, and has, therefore, the potential to undermine or, conversely, support just intergroup interactions. However, the ambivalent role of this emotion has been scantly analysed in the philosophical literature on transitional justice. We make a start on filling this lacuna by developing a conceptual framework which is necessary to appreciate how envy and its varieties are epistemically and practically relevant to realising interactive justice in transitional justice processes.
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Recent attempts at making sense of toleration as an ideal of political morality have focused on how liberal democratic institutions generate political arrangements that protect people’s freedom to “live their life as they see fit.” We... more
Recent attempts at making sense of toleration as an ideal of political morality have focused on how liberal democratic institutions generate political arrangements that protect people’s freedom to “live their life as they see fit.” We show how these views rely on a one-dimensional interpretation of the liberal democratic political project. In so doing, they underestimate an important “interactive” dimension. This dimension concerns what it means for liberal democracies to realize toleration as a property inherent to their constitutive political processes. We illustrate this claim with reference to the liberal democratic decision-making process. Such a process realizes toleration as forbearance in itself. It does so because it establishes the participants in the process as political agents who recognize their mutual standing to share the political authority to make collectively binding decisions, despite their grounds for reciprocal objection
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This entry offers an essential critical survey of philosophical theories of institutional corruption as developing teleological, substrate, discontinuity, continuity, impartiality, and democratic explanations of this dysfunction of public... more
This entry offers an essential critical survey of philosophical theories of institutional corruption as developing teleological, substrate, discontinuity, continuity, impartiality, and democratic explanations of this dysfunction of public institutions.
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The paper explores some normative challenges concerning the integration of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms into anticorruption in public institutions. The challenges emerge from the tensions between an approach treating ML algorithms as... more
The paper explores some normative challenges concerning the integration of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms into anticorruption in public institutions. The challenges emerge from the tensions between an approach treating ML algorithms as allies to an exclusively legalistic conception of anticorruption and an approach seeing them within an institutional ethics of office accountability. We explore two main challenges. One concerns the variable opacity of some ML algorithms, which may affect public officeholders' capacity to account for institutional processes relying upon ML techniques. The other pinpoints the risk that automating certain institutional processes may weaken officeholders' direct engagement to take forward-looking responsibility for the working of their institution. We discuss why both challenges matter to see how ML algorithms may enhance (and not hinder) institutional answerability practices.
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The article discusses the resort to whistleblowing as a form of resistance to institutional wrongdoing that comes from within an institution. The resort to whistleblowing can take either an individual or an institutional form. As an... more
The article discusses the resort to whistleblowing as a form of resistance to institutional wrongdoing that comes from within an institution. The resort to whistleblowing can take either an individual or an institutional form. As an individual act of resistance, whistleblowing has often been presented as a last resort against institutional wrongdoing whose justification draws on normative arguments for civil disobedience. The institutional form we present in this article shows a nontrivial sense in which a “normalized resort” to whistleblowing can be morally justified as an ordinary practice to resist institutional wrongdoing. Whistleblowing is thus a component of an institutional ethics of office that calls on officeholders’ responsibility to engage in practices of self-scrutiny and self-correction of institutional dysfunctions. The integration of the justification of the resort to whistleblowing within this framework emphasizes the importance of entrusting the oversight of institutional action primarily to institutional members.
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La giustificabilità di un sistema politico a tutti coloro che vi dovranno aderire rappresenta un requisito di base per le teorie della giustizia liberali1. Rispettare tale requisito diventa difficile in particolar modo quando gli agenti... more
La giustificabilità di un sistema politico a tutti coloro che vi dovranno aderire rappresenta un requisito di base per le teorie della giustizia liberali1. Rispettare tale requisito diventa difficile in particolar modo quando gli agenti verso i quali la giustificazione dovrebbe essere ...
Lo scopo di questo contributo è di studiare il modo in cui una teoria politica della giustizia dovrebbe rispondere all'adozione di una prospettiva pluralista su questioni di natura etica e religiosa. Il primo passo consisterà nella... more
Lo scopo di questo contributo è di studiare il modo in cui una teoria politica della giustizia dovrebbe rispondere all'adozione di una prospettiva pluralista su questioni di natura etica e religiosa. Il primo passo consisterà nella presentazione delle ragioni per le quali la presenza di una ...
È un fatto difficilmente contestabile che la maggior parte delle società occidentali contemporanee sia caratterizzata da un numero crescente di conflitti di natura cultura-le, etica e religiosa. La condizione sottostante ad un tale... more
È un fatto difficilmente contestabile che la maggior parte delle società occidentali contemporanee sia caratterizzata da un numero crescente di conflitti di natura cultura-le, etica e religiosa. La condizione sottostante ad un tale fenomeno può essere identi-ficata con la presenza di ...
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Does the state have a duty to tolerate religion? Among those who have addressed this question, Brian Leiter (2013) has recently argued that the general presumption in favour of religious toleration, the idea that the state should not... more
Does the state have a duty to tolerate religion? Among those who have addressed this question, Brian Leiter (2013) has recently argued that the general presumption in favour of religious toleration, the idea that the state should not disfavour religion, is an entailment of the consideration that religious beliefs belong to the sphere of someone’s conscience, the free exercise of which the state has a general and quite uncontroversial moral duty to protect. This approach is interesting because it allows a further set of important questions to surface: What sorts of constraint on the state’s action does the commitment to protecting conscience pose? Does such a commitment require that the state refrain from disfavouring the outcomes of the exercise of freedom of conscience (including religion), or does it require something more/different?
In this chapter, I engage with Leiter’s recent discussion of this issue as an illustration of the widespread tendency in political and legal philosophy to make the institutional protection of conscience dependent on the idea of toleration. This idea is typically presented as a feature of social, political, and legal arrangements that establish what citizens are allowed or not allowed to do—and, more specifically, whether they should be allowed to live in accordance with their conscientiously held beliefs also in those circumstances in which such beliefs are the object of others’ disapproval. This tendency strikes me as problematic insofar as it is associated with the downplaying of the distinctive contribution that may come from another liberal normative ideal: the ideal of respect for persons.
Interestingly, within the philosophical literature on this topic, the ideal of respect for persons has been either reduced to that of toleration (as Leiter suggests) or treated as providing a normative foundation for it (as in recent works by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti and Rainer Forst). I argue that either move has the unpalatable implication of making us blind to an important dimension of the state’s protection of conscience. This dimension becomes apparent as a consequence of the interpretation of the demands of respect as deriving from the recognition of persons as agents.
In a popular interpretation of this idea, human agency consists in a person’s capacity for self-legislation—that is, the capacity of acting in accordance with rules of which one can regard herself both as the author and as the addressee. In this basic sense, self-legislators are capable of acting in keeping with the demands of their conscience. What many current discussions of the state’s protection of conscience fail to see is that the demands of respect for persons—so understood—may not be reduced to those of toleration because they have a procedural dimension that the latter do not possess. While matters of toleration concern social, political, and legal outcomes (whether citizens are allowed or not allowed to live by the demands of their conscience), the realisation of the principle of respect in politics, society, and the law requires that we ask whether citizens are treated in a manner appropriate to their status as self-legislators during the processes though which such outcomes will eventually be reached. Differently put, making respect the guiding idea of our philosophical inquiries means asking ourselves whether the terms and conditions of people’s participation in politics, society, and the making of laws are appropriate to their status as agents (not just as mere patients at the receiving end of collective decisions)—whether they are reckoned with in their capacity as self-legislating beings who ought to have a say in the first person during those processes through which the rules that regulate their actions are established. These demands are not necessarily weightier or more exigent than those of toleration; nevertheless, they are different in a way that makes, pace Leiter and others, the demands of respect irreducible to those of toleration.
In this chapter, I engage with Leiter’s recent discussion of this issue as an illustration of the widespread tendency in political and legal philosophy to make the institutional protection of conscience dependent on the idea of toleration. This idea is typically presented as a feature of social, political, and legal arrangements that establish what citizens are allowed or not allowed to do—and, more specifically, whether they should be allowed to live in accordance with their conscientiously held beliefs also in those circumstances in which such beliefs are the object of others’ disapproval. This tendency strikes me as problematic insofar as it is associated with the downplaying of the distinctive contribution that may come from another liberal normative ideal: the ideal of respect for persons.
Interestingly, within the philosophical literature on this topic, the ideal of respect for persons has been either reduced to that of toleration (as Leiter suggests) or treated as providing a normative foundation for it (as in recent works by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti and Rainer Forst). I argue that either move has the unpalatable implication of making us blind to an important dimension of the state’s protection of conscience. This dimension becomes apparent as a consequence of the interpretation of the demands of respect as deriving from the recognition of persons as agents.
In a popular interpretation of this idea, human agency consists in a person’s capacity for self-legislation—that is, the capacity of acting in accordance with rules of which one can regard herself both as the author and as the addressee. In this basic sense, self-legislators are capable of acting in keeping with the demands of their conscience. What many current discussions of the state’s protection of conscience fail to see is that the demands of respect for persons—so understood—may not be reduced to those of toleration because they have a procedural dimension that the latter do not possess. While matters of toleration concern social, political, and legal outcomes (whether citizens are allowed or not allowed to live by the demands of their conscience), the realisation of the principle of respect in politics, society, and the law requires that we ask whether citizens are treated in a manner appropriate to their status as self-legislators during the processes though which such outcomes will eventually be reached. Differently put, making respect the guiding idea of our philosophical inquiries means asking ourselves whether the terms and conditions of people’s participation in politics, society, and the making of laws are appropriate to their status as agents (not just as mere patients at the receiving end of collective decisions)—whether they are reckoned with in their capacity as self-legislating beings who ought to have a say in the first person during those processes through which the rules that regulate their actions are established. These demands are not necessarily weightier or more exigent than those of toleration; nevertheless, they are different in a way that makes, pace Leiter and others, the demands of respect irreducible to those of toleration.
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Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which... more
Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted with the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy. Although not necessarily unlawful, their behaviour is politically wrong qua corrupt when it contradicts surreptitiously the requirement of public justification that undergirds the public order. Then, we distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience.
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The corruption of public officials and institutions is one of the most obvious problems that affects developed and developing countries alike. Because this view is largely shared, most current studies of this phenomenon—‘political... more
The corruption of public officials and institutions is one of the most obvious problems that affects developed and developing countries alike. Because this view is largely shared, most current studies of this phenomenon—‘political corruption’—have been dedicated either to measuring or counteracting the negative political, social, and economic effects that this form of corruption may have in society. Albeit significant and urgent, these studies have distracted the attention of commentators from a somewhat more basic analysis of the nature and wrongness of this phenomenon. This lacuna has resulted in the formulation of a multiplicity of actions that address a very heterogeneous set of issues, including such diverse phenomena as bribery, embezzlement, institutional malfunctioning, the inadequacy of political leaders, and clientelism. This situation is unsatisfactory because it muddles important distinctions between different pathologies that may affect the public order. But it matters also for the design of anti-corruption strategies that risk to either misfire or be too vague by lacking a clear target and an account of the exact kind of wrong these strategies are meant to prevent and/or correct. In our research on this topic, we have addressed this issue by offering a normative analysis of political corruption as surreptitious public action. Our account explains the distinguishing traits of political corruption and makes sense of its inherent wrongness as a contradiction of the logic of publicity that undergirds political interactions in a rights-based system. In this chapter, we draw on this research and expand it with a view to enhancing the identification of relevant instances of political corruption and the design of policies to counteract them.
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Research Interests: Jurisprudence, Ethics, Applied Ethics, Bioethics, Human Rights, and 15 moreContraception, Behavior, Gender and Sexuality, Conscience, Health, Legal Sociology, Abortion, Italy, Humans, Female, Attitudes, Conscientious Objection, Developed Countries, Conscientious Objectors, and Health Services Accessibility
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This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea... more
This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s efforts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts have
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Should officeholders be held individually responsible for submitting to systemically corrupt institutional practices? We draw a structural analogy between individual action under coercive threat and individual participation in systemic... more
Should officeholders be held individually responsible for submitting to systemically corrupt institutional practices? We draw a structural analogy between individual action under coercive threat and individual participation in systemic corruption; and we argue that officeholders who submit to corrupt institutional practices are not excused by the existence of a systemic coercive threat. Even when they have good personal reasons to accept the threat, they remain individually morally assessable and, in the circumstances, they are also individually blameworthy for actions performed in their institutional capacity.
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What makes democracy a particular mode of social and political organization? This seemingly basic question is often sidelined across current debates in political theory. Contemporary political theorists variably point at recurrent but... more
What makes democracy a particular mode of social and political organization? This seemingly basic question is often sidelined across current debates in political theory. Contemporary political theorists variably point at recurrent but unsettled, composite sets of elements including specific forms of decision-making, deliberation, and participation, while they focus on challenges of democratic institutional design, (e.g., Goodin, 2008; Kuper, 2004; Lopez-Guerra, 2014; Schwartzberg, 2014), or fundamental normative issues (e.g., democracy's value, see Christiano, 2008; Kolodny, 2014a, 2014b; Viehoff, 2014).
However, to be able to see how these elements are democratic, it is important to identify what distinguishing feature they share that qualifies them as components of the same particular social and political practice, that is the practice of democracy. In this article, we argue that the particularity of democracy consists in the logic that characterizes the form of authority this practice constitutes between its participants. This is a logic of mutuality and second-personality, which can be best understood by looking at the relations between democratic decision makers as democratic voting primitively illustrates.
However, to be able to see how these elements are democratic, it is important to identify what distinguishing feature they share that qualifies them as components of the same particular social and political practice, that is the practice of democracy. In this article, we argue that the particularity of democracy consists in the logic that characterizes the form of authority this practice constitutes between its participants. This is a logic of mutuality and second-personality, which can be best understood by looking at the relations between democratic decision makers as democratic voting primitively illustrates.
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Scholars and international organizations engaged in institutional reconstruction converge in recognizing political corruption as a cause or a consequence of conflicts. Anticorruption is thus generally considered a centerpiece of... more
Scholars and international organizations engaged in institutional reconstruction converge in recognizing political corruption as a cause or a consequence of conflicts. Anticorruption is thus generally considered a centerpiece of institutional reconstruction programs. A common approach to anticorruption within this context aims primarily to counter the negative political, social, and economic effects of political corruption, or implement legal anticorruption standards and punitive measures. We offer a normative critical discussion of this approach particularly when it is initiated and sustained by external entities. We recast the focus from an outward to an inward perspective on institutional action and failure centered on the institutional interactions between officeholders. In so doing, we offer the normative tools to reconceptualize anticorruption in terms of an institutional ethics of "office accountability" that draws on an institution's internal resources of self-correction as per the officeholders' interrelated work.
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Should officeholders be held individually responsible for submitting to systemically corrupt institutional practices? We draw a structural analogy between individual action under coercive threat and individual participation in systemic... more
Should officeholders be held individually responsible for submitting to systemically corrupt institutional practices? We draw a structural analogy between individual action under coercive threat and individual participation in systemic corruption; and we argue that officeholders who submit to corrupt institutional practices are not excused by the existence of a systemic coercive threat. Even when they have good personal reasons to accept the threat, they remain individually morally assessable and, in the circumstances, they are also individually blameworthy for actions performed in their institutional capacity
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What makes democracy a particular mode of social and political organization? We argue that the particularity of democracy consists in the logic that characterizes the form of authority this practice constitutes between its participants.... more
What makes democracy a particular mode of social and political organization? We argue that the particularity of democracy consists in the logic that characterizes the form of authority this practice constitutes between its participants. This is a logic of mutuality and second-personality, which can be best understood by looking at the relations between democratic decision-makers as democratic voting primitively illustrates.
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L’article présente le lancement d’alerte contre la corruption politique comme une composante fondamentale d’une éthique publique de l’anticorruption axée sur l’idée normative de « responsabilité de fonction ». La responsabilité de... more
L’article présente le lancement d’alerte contre la corruption politique comme une composante fondamentale d’une éthique publique de l’anticorruption axée sur l’idée normative de « responsabilité de fonction ». La responsabilité de fonction indique la logique qui devrait réguler les interactions institutionnelles par lesquelles les pouvoirs de fonction doivent être exercés pour qu’une institution fonctionne bien. La corruption politique est l’utilisation des pouvoirs de fonction pour poursuivre un agenda dont la logique n’est pas cohérente avec les termes du mandat de ces pouvoirs. Cette utilisation est injuste en soi du point de vue de la justice interactive parce qu’elle constitue un déficit de responsabilité de fonction. La pratique de lancer l’alerte contre la corruption est essentiel pour identifier les interactions institutionnelles corrompues et pour restaurer la responsabilité de fonction. En conséquence, l’état doit réglementer la pratique de lancer l’alerte en tant que contribution vers le progrès de la justice dans des conditions non idéales
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L’article présente le lancement d’alerte contre la corruption politique comme une composante fondamentale d’une éthique publique de l’anticorruption axée sur l’idée normative de « responsabilité de fonction ». La responsabilité de... more
L’article présente le lancement d’alerte contre la corruption politique comme une composante fondamentale d’une éthique publique de l’anticorruption axée sur l’idée normative de « responsabilité de fonction ». La responsabilité de fonction indique la logique qui devrait réguler les interactions institutionnelles par lesquelles les pouvoirs de fonction doivent être exercés pour qu’une institution fonctionne bien. La corruption politique est l’utilisation des pouvoirs de fonction pour poursuivre un agenda dont la logique n’est pas cohérente avec les termes du mandat de ce pouvoir. Cette utilisation est injuste en soi du point de vue de la justice interactive parce qu’elle constitue un déficit de responsabilité de fonction. La pratique de lancer l’alerte contre la corruption est essentiel pour identifier les interactions institutionnelles corrompues et pour restaurer la responsabilité de fonction. En conséquence, l’état doit réglementer la pratique de l’alerte en tant que contribution vers le progrès de la justice dans des conditions non idéales
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The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on exercises of agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how agents rationalise their actions, we... more
The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on exercises of agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how agents rationalise their actions, we identify a distinctive but underexplored space for assessing individual responsibility within collective actions. As a case in point, we concentrate on individuals' necessarily less-than-successful rationalisations of their involvement in systemic corruption. We characterize systemic corruption in terms of its public 'unavowability' and concentrate on the redescriptions to which corrupt agents typically resort to vindicate their actions (e.g., when they present bribes as tokens of appreciation for services rendered). We show that these redescriptions indicate the agents' rationalisations constitutive of systemic corruption through a multidimensional approach to reason-giving. We concentrate on less-than-successful reason-giving, when different categories of reasons involved in making sense of one's own conduct are misaligned. Then, we show the necessarily less-than-successful character of individual rationalisations in systemic corruption and qualify the kind of tainted reasoning (at the interface between epistemic vice and epistemic disadvantage) thus produced with reference to such test cases as self-deception, wilful ignorance, and actions on 'autopilot'. On this ground, we expound a new view of responsibility centred on reason-giving as the epistemic core which responsibility assessments track. To demonstrate the interest of this view, we compare it with existing alternatives revolving around the ideas of accountability and attributability. We conclude by showing how our understanding of responsibility can shed new light on the analysis and normative assessment of an agent's responsible ignorance.
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Whistleblowing (WB) is the practice of reporting immoral or illegal behavior by members of a legitimate organization with privileged access to information concerning an alleged wrongdoing within that organization. A common critique of WB... more
Whistleblowing (WB) is the practice of reporting immoral or illegal behavior by members of a legitimate organization with privileged access to information concerning an alleged wrongdoing within that organization. A common critique of WB draws on its supposed consequence of generating a climate of mutual distrust. This wariness is heightened in the case of external WB, which may lead to weakening public trust in an organization by diminishing its credibility. Accordingly, even the defenders of WB have presented it as an individual conscientious extrema ratio; the justification of WB as a dutiful practice has lost plausibility. Contrary to this view, we present WB as a specific instance of institutional and individual moral duties of public accountability in nonideal conditions. WB is thus justified as a dutiful corrective practice within a general normative theory of institutions because it qualifies the individual and institutional moral demands attached to rule-governed institutional roles.
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Sommario: 1. Introduzione. – 2. Il metodo dell’etica pubblica. – 3. Le teorie repubblicane della corruzione. – 4. Le teorie liberali della corruzione. – 5. Le strategie anticorruzione. – Bibliografia.
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In the non-ideal circumstances of concrete public institutional action, public institutions may fail, and philanthropic initiatives might inject valuable skills and resources thus compensating for some institutional failures. Insofar as... more
In the non-ideal circumstances of concrete public institutional action, public institutions may fail, and philanthropic initiatives might inject valuable skills and resources thus compensating for some institutional failures. Insofar as philanthropy can play this remedial function, the state seems to be justified to incentivise it in non-ideal conditions. But when these incentives occur through taxation, they may have the adverse effect of draining resources from the state, thus further undercutting its action. An institutional short-circuit may thus occur by which public institutional action risks being entangled in a vicious and self-defeating circularity. This paper discusses such institutional short-circuits within the normative framework of a public ethics of institutional action grounded in the idea of “office accountability.” This framework serves as a basis for exploring the boundaries of the justification of tax incentives for philanthropy as a means to uphold public institutional action from the outside an institution when the interrelated action of officeholders fails to sustaining it from the inside