- Department of Philosophy
151 Dodd Hall
Florida State University
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1500
Simon Căbulea May
Florida State University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Rhodes University, Philosophy, AlumnusStanford University, Philosophy, AlumnusTulane University, Center for Ethics and Public Affairs, Faculty Memberadd
- I work in moral and political philosophy, especially on conflicts of moral conviction in liberal democratic politics. (Please cite as "May, Simon Căbulea" or "May, S. C.")edit
Rowan Cruft offers an addressive account of directed duties and claim-rights. He claims that the direction of a duty is constituted by two requirements of address between the parties: the right holder must conceive of the action as `to be... more
Rowan Cruft offers an addressive account of directed duties and claim-rights. He claims that the direction of a duty is constituted by two requirements of address between the parties: the right holder must conceive of the action as `to be done to me’ and the duty bearer must conceive of it as to be ‘done to you’. Cruft also argues against accounts of direction and claim-rights that reduce the relation between the parties to nonrelational facts. One such reductive account is the justificatory interest theory. Cruft argues that social authorities can create conventional claim-rights freely, without any constraint imposed by the right holder’s interests. I raise an antecedence objection against the addressive theory as an account of direction. I then argue against Cruft’s claim that conventional claim-rights can be created independently of the right holder’s interests. I conclude that scepticism about the viability of a nonreductive theory of direction is warranted.
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I present an interpretation of ideal theory that is grounded in the idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, which Rawls describes as the most fundamental idea of justice as fairness. A key element of the Rawlsian idea of... more
I present an interpretation of ideal theory that is grounded in the idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation, which Rawls describes as the most fundamental idea of justice as fairness. A key element of the Rawlsian idea of cooperation, I claim, is that the individual participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme—whatever its scale—are morally accountable to each other for complying with the scheme’s rules. This means that each participant has the moral standing to demand of the others that they comply with the rules. I argue that the logic of these moral demands requires that the scheme’s rules be worked out on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. In justice as fairness, society as a whole is a grand scheme of cooperation. The principles of justice constitute the moral terms of association for this cooperative scheme, and hence define the moral demands that citizens, as such, may make of one another. Thus, these principles of justice must likewise be worked out on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. I contrast this interpretation with the standard telic alternative, which grounds the strict compliance assumption in its role as part of the theory of a realistic utopia, and argue for the possibility of non-utopian ideal theories.
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I raise two critical points about Emanuela Ceva’s theory of interactive justice. First, I argue the value of individual dignity is insufficient in itself to establish principles of interactive justice, but that the lacuna can be filled by... more
I raise two critical points about Emanuela Ceva’s theory of interactive justice. First, I argue the value of individual dignity is insufficient in itself to establish principles of interactive justice, but that the lacuna can be filled by an account of democratic authority. Second, I argue that realising interactive justice in political conflict management is better understood as a form of quasi-pure proceduralism rather than intrinsic proceduralism. This is because the moral quality of a decision procedure can be an essential part of the explanation for why political decisions can possess moral authority.
Research Interests:
Using Fisher and Ury’s model of principled negotiation as an example, I argue that negotiation theory is not challenged by the various types of moral reasons that parties often have to forge compromise agreements in the resolution of... more
Using Fisher and Ury’s model of principled negotiation as an example, I argue that negotiation theory is not challenged by the various types of moral reasons that parties often have to forge compromise agreements in the resolution of their disputes, as long as certain crude assumptions about practical rationality are avoided. But this step precludes using the model as a generic conception of negotiation ethics and hence as a source of cooperative reasons for moral compromise regardless of social domain. What counts as genuine cooperation in negotiation differs from one social context to another.
Exemptions from laws of general application are sometimes granted on the basis of an individual’s unwillingness to comply with the law. Most such volitional exemptions involve a conflict between the law and the demands of an individual’s... more
Exemptions from laws of general application are sometimes granted on the basis of an individual’s unwillingness to comply with the law. Most such volitional exemptions involve a conflict between the law and the demands of an individual’s religious or secular moral convictions. I argue here that a limited number of volitional exemptions can be justified on the basis of a futility principle. When otherwise morally permissible penalties for violating the law cannot be expected to induce the compliance of an intransigent minority, the penalties are futile, and the state has some principled reason to exempt the minority from the law’s requirements. Since the futility principle only applies to some cases of conscientious objection, it differs in important ways from justifications grounded in a general entitlement to religious or moral exemptions.
Leif Wenar’s kind-desire theory states that an individual holds a claim-right against an agent only because she has reason to desire, as a member of a particular social or natural kind, that the agent fulfil his duty. He argues that the... more
Leif Wenar’s kind-desire theory states that an individual holds a claim-right against an agent only because she has reason to desire, as a member of a particular social or natural kind, that the agent fulfil his duty. He argues that the kind-desire theory is superior to the interest theory of claim-rights, which states that an individual holds a claim-right against an agent only because his duty is in some manner beneficial to her. I compare the merits of the kind-desire theory and a justificatory interest theory, and argue that the kind-desire theory does not satisfy two conditions for a satisfactory analysis of claim-rights as well as this justificatory interest theory.
I use the example of racial equality to examine the relationship between the ideal of political legitimacy and the idea that there are moral limits to political compromise. I defend a principle that rules out certain compromises of racial... more
I use the example of racial equality to examine the relationship between the ideal of political legitimacy and the idea that there are moral limits to political compromise. I defend a principle that rules out certain compromises of racial equality as impermissible violations of legitimacy but that also provides democratic activists with significant moral latitude in undemocratic contexts.
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I argue that there is no principled moral reason to recognise a defeasible entitlement to exemptions for moral conscience that is not an equally good reason to recognise a defeasible entitlement to exemptions for non-moral projects. Moral... more
I argue that there is no principled moral reason to recognise a defeasible entitlement to exemptions for moral conscience that is not an equally good reason to recognise a defeasible entitlement to exemptions for non-moral projects. Moral conscience isn't special. Since individuals are not generally entitled to exemptions for non-moral projects, I advocate scepticism about conscience-based exemptions.
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A powerful objection to civil marriage claims that the institution violates the principle of liberal neutrality because it implies state endorsement of matrimony as an ideal type of personal relationship. I argue that this neutrality... more
A powerful objection to civil marriage claims that the institution violates the principle of liberal neutrality because it implies state endorsement of matrimony as an ideal type of personal relationship. I argue that this neutrality objection is cogent only if certain empirical conditions fail to be met. In certain circumstances, the presumptively permanent nature of marital relationships supports a cogent justification of civil marriage without any implication of state endorsement of the matrimonial ideal.
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Directed duties are duties that an agent owes to some party. But what is it about a duty in virtue of which it is directed toward one party, if any, rather than another? I discuss three competing accounts of moral directed duties: control... more
Directed duties are duties that an agent owes to some party. But what is it about a duty in virtue of which it is directed toward one party, if any, rather than another? I discuss three competing accounts of moral directed duties: control theories, demand theories, and interest theories.
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In this critical notice of Gerald Gaus's The Order of Public Reason, I reject two arguments Gaus advances for the claim that social moral rules must be publicly justified.
Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests... more
Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a reformulated plain theory can also avoid an insufficiency objection. The hybrid approach consequently has no clear advantage over the plain approach.
I distinguish two ways that a cultural practice may be inherently objectionable. I reject the claim that polygamy is inherently "vicious" because asymmetric marriages are inevitably inegalitarian. I argue that there is good reason to... more
I distinguish two ways that a cultural practice may be inherently objectionable. I reject the claim that polygamy is inherently "vicious" because asymmetric marriages are inevitably inegalitarian. I argue that there is good reason to think polygamy is inherently "bankrupt" insofar as a cultural ideal of asymmetric marriage presupposes stereotypical gender roles.
I defend the claim that some instances of religious constitutional establishment can be consistent with an expressivist interpretation of democratic political legitimacy, although this does not undermine O'Connor's endorsement test for... more
I defend the claim that some instances of religious constitutional establishment can be consistent with an expressivist interpretation of democratic political legitimacy, although this does not undermine O'Connor's endorsement test for Establishment Clause violations.
I argue that an instrumentalist approach to the justification of moral compromise in politics is compatible with both the existence of principled or non-instrumental reasons for moral compromise in personal friendships and a robust... more
I argue that an instrumentalist approach to the justification of moral compromise in politics is compatible with both the existence of principled or non-instrumental reasons for moral compromise in personal friendships and a robust conception of civic friendship. I use the idea of political reconciliation and the example of compromise on amnesty during transitional politics to illustrate the argument.
I argue against Rawls's claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy would be selected in the original position in addition to a democratic principle. The latter allows the possibility of a fully legitimate religious democracy.
I argue that the only reasons for political leaders to forge moral compromises with opponents are pragmatic, even in the context of reasonable moral disagreements such as the abortion controversy.
Compromise is a ubiquitous and inescapable feature of social life, but raises both conceptual and ethical puzzles. I distinguish compromise from closely related social concepts, such as consensus and bargaining. I then explain how there... more
Compromise is a ubiquitous and inescapable feature of social life, but raises both conceptual and ethical puzzles. I distinguish compromise from closely related social concepts, such as consensus and bargaining. I then explain how there could be moral reasons for moral compromise, discuss what these reasons may be, and set out some senses in which there can be moral limits to compromise.
Recent advocates of moral fictionalism have proposed it as a revisionary doc-trine. For example, Richard Joyce argues for an error theory about morality and then suggests that it would be useful to retain moral talk as a fiction.1 In... more
Recent advocates of moral fictionalism have proposed it as a revisionary doc-trine. For example, Richard Joyce argues for an error theory about morality and then suggests that it would be useful to retain moral talk as a fiction.1 In Moral Fictionalism, Mark Kalderon argues ...
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James Bohman proposes a republican conception of epistemic injustice as an alternative to Miranda Fricker’s virtue theoretical account. The key element in Bohman’s approach is the concept of domination, one of the central concepts in... more
James Bohman proposes a republican conception of epistemic injustice as an alternative to Miranda Fricker’s virtue theoretical account. The key element in Bohman’s approach is the concept of domination, one of the central concepts in republican political theory more generally. He claims that all cases of epistemic injustice involve forms of domination, and that institutional mechanisms of non-domination are accordingly necessary to remedy epistemic injustice. I agree with Bohman that there are important connections between domination and epistemic injustice. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded by his characterisation of these connections. I briefly set out Bohman’s account of domination and then critically discuss three interpretations of the relationship between domination and epistemic injustice suggested by his discussion.