- https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burhanuddin_Muhtadiedit
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This article investigates differences in health precautions taken during the pandemic and the degree to which individuals had faith in the government’s response to Covid-19 in the early stages of the pandemic. Using a sample designed to... more
This article investigates differences in health precautions taken during the pandemic and the degree to which individuals had faith in the government’s response to Covid-19 in the early stages of the pandemic. Using a sample designed to be nationally representative as well as representative of three lockdown zones, we find that local social-distancing policies, social class, religion, and political partisanship all influenced how Indonesians experienced the pandemic and their perceptions of the government’s response. We found that fear levels and pandemic behavior are associated with religion as well as economic status. Fear levels are much higher among lowest-paid Indonesians and among Muslims outside of the capital city Jakarta, while non-Muslims reported greater levels of precaution-taking measures. Though among Islamic parties’ voters, the difference is less pronounced, there are notable partisan differences as stronger predictors of attitude and behavior during the pandemic whe...
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Using pre- and post-election survey data, I find that, for most presidential elections between 2004 and 2019, being a supporter of the losing presidential candidates significantly increased the likelihood of disillusionment with the way... more
Using pre- and post-election survey data, I find that, for most presidential elections between 2004 and 2019, being a supporter of the losing presidential candidates significantly increased the likelihood of disillusionment with the way democracy works. However, in 2019 specifically, democratic satisfaction decreased dramatically for all voters. The results of post-election surveys in 2019 indicated a change from previous post-election surveys, which had typically found that the successful conduct of elections produced increased satisfaction with democratic performance.
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Buku bunga rampai ini mengelaborasi tentang berbagai fenomena pembiayaan pemilu di Indonesia dalam kurun waktu 2014-2018. Buku ini merupakan salah satu kontribusi penting dalam ilmu politik dan khususnya pemilu di Indonesia karena... more
Buku bunga rampai ini mengelaborasi tentang berbagai fenomena pembiayaan pemilu di Indonesia dalam kurun waktu 2014-2018. Buku ini merupakan salah satu kontribusi penting dalam ilmu politik dan khususnya pemilu di Indonesia karena membicarakan tentang dana pemilu yang dikeluarkan dan dikelola oleh para peserta dan juga penyelenggara pemilu. This edited volume book elaborates on electoral financing phenomena in Indonesia from 2014-2018. This book contributes to contemporary Indonesian politics, especially on electoral studies because writers in this book discuss about electoral funds from candidates, party politics and also electoral management bodies.
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Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068821992488 for Why democrats abandon democracy: Evidence from four survey experiments by Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Eve Warburton in Party Politics
Penelittian yang dilakukan oleh INCIS terkait masalah reformasi pelayan publik di Jakarta merupakan salah satu langkah untuk memperbaiki pelaksanaan fungsi negara sebagai pelayan masyarakat. Dalam tataran praktis dan akademik, buku ini... more
Penelittian yang dilakukan oleh INCIS terkait masalah reformasi pelayan publik di Jakarta merupakan salah satu langkah untuk memperbaiki pelaksanaan fungsi negara sebagai pelayan masyarakat. Dalam tataran praktis dan akademik, buku ini akan melengkapi kajian-kajian yang sudah dilakukan oleh berbagai kalangan dalam rangka menganalisis berbagai permasalahan dalam pelayanan publik di Indoensia. Karen itu saya sangat menyambut baik terhadap hasil penelitian ini.
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In the wake of the U.S. 2016 Presidential Election, concerns about misinformation traversing on social media have heightened. Since then, much of the public discourse has been on developing effective strategies to combat the spread of... more
In the wake of the U.S. 2016 Presidential Election, concerns about misinformation traversing on social media have heightened. Since then, much of the public discourse has been on developing effective strategies to combat the spread of misinformation online. While several studies have focused on the effects of a mixed/hybrid regime of information channels on political participation and campaigns, we know little about how the existence of a hybrid media system exposes people to misinformation during an election cycle. Using a nationally representative survey administered during the 2019 Indonesian election (N=1,820), we find evidence for the prominence of traditional media as well as face-to-face discussions: political use of traditional media such as newspapers and TV as well as sharing of political information through face-to-face discussions are found to be positively associated with at least one measure of misinformation exposure. As for the social media communicative pathways, on...
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How does economic hardship during a crisis affect people’s evaluation of the political leadership? In this paper, we investigate how the negative impact of an exogenous event like COVID-19 interacts with other important phenomena which... more
How does economic hardship during a crisis affect people’s evaluation of the political leadership? In this paper, we investigate how the negative impact of an exogenous event like COVID-19 interacts with other important phenomena which influence leadership approval, such as partisanship, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. Using a nationally representative survey in Indonesia (N = 1,200), we show that economic hardship does not uniformly undermine leadership approval; rather, this effect is moderated by partisanship and by satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Of the people who voted for President Jokowi in the 2019 election, those who faced economic hardship gave him lower levels of approval than those who were better-off. At the same time, those satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country reported higher approval even if they faced economic hardship. We discuss the policy implications of our findings and provide a theoretical framework for th...
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Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppq-10.1177_1354068821992488 for Why democrats abandon democracy: Evidence from four survey experiments by Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Eve Warburton in Party Politics
Perilaku memilih merupakan gejala yang kompleks. Keputusan memilih ditentukan oleh banyak faktor. Seorang calon yang berasal dari kelompok identitas primordial tertentu belum tentu dapat menarik suara mayoritas di kelompoknya sendiri. Hal... more
Perilaku memilih merupakan gejala yang kompleks. Keputusan memilih ditentukan oleh banyak faktor. Seorang calon yang berasal dari kelompok identitas primordial tertentu belum tentu dapat menarik suara mayoritas di kelompoknya sendiri. Hal ini bisa terjadi karena, selain faktor identitas, pemilih juga mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor lain, terutama kualitas personal calon. Intinya, dinamika politik lokal seringkali membuka ruang mobilisasi politik identitas. Secara umum, penelitian ini telah menemukan bukti empiris bahwa agama dan etnis yang menjadi bahan bakar politik identitas merupakan faktor yang penting dalam pemilihan kepala daerah.
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Does endorsing an Islamist agenda protect a candidate involved in corruption from negative voter evaluations? The corruption literature suggests that voter reactions to corruption are not unbiased and as such Islamist agendas could... more
Does endorsing an Islamist agenda protect a candidate involved in corruption from negative voter evaluations? The corruption literature suggests that voter reactions to corruption are not unbiased and as such Islamist agendas could potentially mitigate the negative effects of a corruption scandal, especially in religious societies. The political Islam literature suggests that endorsing an Islamist agenda would not shield corrupt politicians from negative reactions of the voters. We directly answer this question through 2 nationally representative survey experiments in the world’s most populous Muslim democracy Indonesia. Our findings are 2-fold. First, Islamist agendas, in general, have only little effects on voter support for a candidate. Second, voters punish corrupt candidates equally, regardless whether or not they endorse an Islamist agenda.
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In much of the scholarly literature, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is recognized as a defender of religious tolerance and pluralism. This is to no small extent the result of how NU has portrayed... more
In much of the scholarly literature, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is recognized as a defender of religious tolerance and pluralism. This is to no small extent the result of how NU has portrayed itself and its actions-including during the 2019 presidential elections, when it professed to have aligned with incumbent president Joko Widodo in order to keep Islamist groups from power. In this article, we analyse the attitudes of NU followers towards religious tolerance and pluralism, and find a significant mismatch between the self-perception of the NU leadership and the actual views held by the NU grassroots. Based on original survey data, we show that NU followers are generally as intolerant of religious minorities as the rest of Indonesian Muslim population, and in some cases, even more intolerant. We argue that this is the result of NU's long-standing prioritization of battling rival Muslim organizations (which it views as threats to its interests) over advancing substantive tolerance campaigns that could change the religio-political attitudes of its constituency.
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In several world regions, democracy is in retreat. This retreat is taking place amid growing polarization in many countries, and analysts are increasingly concerned with the role that deepening political divisions play in processes of... more
In several world regions, democracy is in retreat. This retreat is taking place amid growing polarization in many countries, and analysts are increasingly concerned with the role that deepening political divisions play in processes of democratic decline. This article investigates the relationship between partisan polarization and deteriorating public support for democratic institutions. It leverages the case of Indonesia, a major third-wave democracy now in the midst of a democratic regression. Indonesia’s political landscape has become more ideologically polarized in recent years, despite the strength of clientelist networks and low levels of party identification. Using four survey experiments, we find that Indonesians embrace illiberal interventions and abandon democratic institutions when exposed to party and leadership cues. These results suggest that political polarization may prompt citizens to abandon democratic norms even in democracies without strong partisan identities.
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Results from a nationally representative telephone panel survey of 2,000 adult Indonesians conducted from 19 to 22 May by Indikator indicate that local social-distancing policies, social class, and political partisanship affect how... more
Results from a nationally representative telephone panel survey of 2,000 adult Indonesians conducted from 19 to 22 May by Indikator indicate that local social-distancing policies, social class, and political partisanship affect how Indonesians experience the COVID-19 pandemic and what they believe about the government’s response. In particular: 1. Economic disruptions are hitting low-paid workers most. Better-paid Indonesians are experiencing few employment changes, while the worst-paid are seeing their incomes dry up. 2. Fear levels are much higher among the lowest-paid Indonesians. They report higher rates of life disruption and greater health precautions. Most respondents report taking health precautions, but there are important partisan differences. 3. The potential “work from home” population is negligible. Higher-income workers are the most likely to report not staying at home more, a result driven by their continued employment. 4. Evaluations of provincial and presidential pandemic response are generally favorable, with some partisan differences. The health ministry scores poorly. 5. Where there have been conflicts between local and national health authorities, partisanship is a much stronger predictor of respondents’ evaluations. Greater compliance may be achieved by giving popular governors more freedom to set restrictive local lockdown policies.
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Indonesia is a country of significant inequalities, but we know little about how Indonesians feel about the gap between rich and poor. Comparative research suggests that negative perceptions of inequality can erode public support for... more
Indonesia is a country of significant inequalities, but we know little about how Indonesians feel about the gap between rich and poor. Comparative research suggests that negative perceptions of inequality can erode public support for democratic institutions. Using survey data, we explore the relationship between inequality and support for democracy in Indonesia. We find Indonesians are divided in their beliefs about income distribution. But this variation is not determined by actual levels of inequality around the country, nor by people's own economic situation; instead, political preferences and partisan biases are what matter most. Beliefs about inequality in Indonesia have become increasingly partisan over the course of the Jokowi presidency: supporters of the political opposition are far more likely to view the income gap as unfair, while supporters of the incumbent president tend to disagree—but they disagree much more when prompted by partisan cues. We also find that Indon...
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Economy, South Asian Studies, Political Science, Indonesian Studies, and 12 moreDemocratization, Politics, Ideology, Indonesia, Democracy, Economic Inequality, Inequality, Language Culture and Communication, Polarization, Presidency, Opposition Politics, and World Values Survey
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This article describes the nature of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in the post-Suharto era and its views on the resurrection of the global Islamic caliphate, its opposition to the notions of democracy and nation-state. In the aftermath of... more
This article describes the nature of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in the post-Suharto era and its views on the resurrection of the global Islamic caliphate, its opposition to the notions of democracy and nation-state. In the aftermath of Suharto's fall in 1998, HTI has seized the opportunity to promise the establishment of a fair society under a global Islamic caliphate. The rapid rise of HTI has, more so than most other Islamist groups, been accentuated by the growing public dissatisfaction with the post-Suharto or reformasi period. There is an increasing perception in larger society that political, economic, and law reforms introduced in the reformasi era has had no significant impact to improve people's daily lives. This deteriorating condition under post-Suharto regimes has successfully justified the HTI's claims that Indonesia needs a radical and comprehensive system, or what HTI coined as al-khalifah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic caliphate). Looking at HTI's grand na...
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Studies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote buying and allow brokers to... more
Studies of electoral clientelism—the contingent exchange of material benefits for electoral support—frequently presume the presence of strong parties. Parties facilitate monitoring and enforcement of vote buying and allow brokers to identify core voters for turnout buying. Where money fuels campaigns but elections center around candidates, not parties, how do candidates pitch electoral handouts? The authors analyze candidates’ distribution of cash during an Indonesian election. Drawing upon varied data, including surveys of voters and brokers, candidates’ cash-distribution lists, and focus-group discussions, they find heavy spending but little evidence of vote buying or turnout buying. Instead, candidates buy brokers. With little loyalty or party brand to draw on, candidates seek to establish credibility with well-networked brokers, who then protect their turf with token payments for their own presumed bloc of voters. TThe authors find little evidence of monitoring of either voter or broker behavior, which is consistent with their argument that these payments are noncontingent.
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This chapter addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of Islamism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the public support for Islamist radical groups and the typical characteristics of their core supporters. Using... more
This chapter addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of Islamism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the public support for Islamist radical groups and the typical characteristics of their core supporters. Using extensive empirical data drawn from a series of nationwide surveys conducted by our polling institute, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) from 2006 to 2017, we can assess how large is the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia overtime, and why some Muslims become radicalised and engage in such groups and others do not. In our 2017 October survey, we found that 27.2% of Indonesian Muslims profess to support Islamist radical groups, or equals to 44.6 million Muslims. Contrary to prior expectations, our study found that socio-economic factors such as individuals’ income level and education as well as profession have little correlation with the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia. Instead, among a large number of variables generally believed to be the determinants of support for Islamism examined in this study, the most consistent and significant factor that influenced the level of support for such groups was socio-psychological explanations (i.e. religious identity and Islamist collective deprivation). We conclude that Islamist radicalism in Indonesia can be best explained in terms of socio-psychological perspectives rather than the socio-economic factors.
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This chapter addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of Islamism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the public support for Islamist radical groups and the typical characteristics of their core supporters. Using... more
This chapter addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of Islamism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the public support for Islamist radical groups and the typical characteristics of their core supporters. Using extensive empirical data drawn from a series of nationwide surveys conducted by our polling institute, the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) from 2006 to 2017, we can assess how large is the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia overtime, and why some Muslims become radicalised and engage in such groups and others do not. In our 2017 October survey, we found that 27.2% of Indonesian Muslims profess to support Islamist radical groups, or equals to 44.6 million Muslims. Contrary to prior expectations, our study found that socio-economic factors such as individuals’ income level and education as well as profession have little correlation with the support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia. Instead, among a large number of variables generally believed to be the determinants of support for Islamism examined in this study, the most consistent and significant factor that influenced the level of support for such groups was socio-psychological explanations (i.e. religious identity and Islamist collective deprivation). We conclude that Islamist radicalism in Indonesia can be best explained in terms of socio-psychological perspectives rather than the socio-economic factors.
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Using pre- and post-election survey data, I find that, for most presidential elections between 2004 and 2019, being a supporter of the losing presidential candidates significantly increased the likelihood of disillusionment with the way... more
Using pre- and post-election survey data, I find that, for most presidential elections between 2004 and 2019, being a supporter of the losing presidential candidates significantly increased the likelihood of disillusionment with the way democracy works. However, in 2019 specifically, democratic satisfaction decreased dramatically for all
voters. The results of post-election surveys in 2019 indicated a change
from previous post-election surveys, which had typically found that
the successful conduct of elections produced increased satisfaction with democratic performance.
voters. The results of post-election surveys in 2019 indicated a change
from previous post-election surveys, which had typically found that
the successful conduct of elections produced increased satisfaction with democratic performance.
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Istilah ekstremisme yang berbau kekerasan (violent extremism) sebenarnya sangat problematik. Jika kita percaya ada violent extremism, berarti kita dengan sendirinya mengakui ada kelompok ekstremis yang tidak memakai kekerasan (non-violent... more
Istilah ekstremisme yang berbau kekerasan (violent extremism) sebenarnya sangat problematik. Jika kita percaya ada violent extremism, berarti kita dengan sendirinya mengakui ada kelompok ekstremis yang tidak memakai kekerasan (non-violent extremism). Lantas, di luar masalah pemakaian instrumen kekerasan dalam mencapai tujuan, seberapa jauh perbedaan di antara kedua kelompok ekstremis tersebut? Apakah mereka memiliki pandangan dan ideologi yang sama?
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The political demise of the former Christian-Chinese governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (or "Ahok"), has attracted much political commentary, both in Indonesia itself and from abroad. Accused of blasphemy, Ahok faced... more
The political demise of the former Christian-Chinese governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (or "Ahok"), has attracted much political commentary, both in Indonesia itself and from abroad. Accused of blasphemy, Ahok faced unprecedented Islamist mass protests amidst his re-election campaign in late 2016 and early 2017. Following his electoral defeat and subsequent imprisonment, debates about the relationship between Indonesia's ethno-religious minorities and the Muslim majority intensified (Setijadi 2017). These discussions have been complex, but centered on a number of key questions. For instance, were the anti-Ahok protesters-often middle class Muslims accompanied by their children-representative of religiously and racially prejudiced views held by the majority of Indonesian Muslims (Assyaukanie 2017), or where they part of a pious movement in the defense of the Islamic faith (Weng 2016; Fealy 2017)? What was the relationship between Islamist world views and the protests-did the former cause the latter (Lindsey 2016), or have the demonstrations hardened exclusivist attitudes (Scherpen 2016)? And finally, what are the socioeconomic profiles of those who hold such views (Chaplin 2016)? These questions have since dominated the scholarly and broader discourse on Indonesian politics and society, with passionate disagreements among its participants over how to best research the problem and how to interpret possible findings. In our own work on the subject (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018; Mietzner, Muhtadi and Halida 2018), we have taken the view that in order to explore the attitudes of Indonesian Muslims, there is no better way than conducting scientifically solid opinion surveys. We believe that such an approach is, in this specific case, superior to ethnographic or other qualitative approaches that necessarily focus on a much smaller number of observed actors in limited locations. By contrast, nationwide surveys based on multistage random sampling (Marsden and Wright 2010) can provide a reliable snapshot of Indonesian Muslim attitudes. Moreover, as we have access to a data base containing multi-year data series, we are able to track changes in attitudes with much more precision than exclusively qualitative research could. In this contribution, we thus address the questions mentioned above based on a recent survey we conducted in August 2018, and identify long-term trends by comparing its data to similar surveys we and other researchers carried out in the past.
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The political demise of the former Christian-Chinese governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok), has attracted much political commentary, both in Indonesia and abroad. Accused of blasphemy, Ahok faced unprecedented mass... more
The political demise of the former Christian-Chinese governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok), has attracted much political commentary, both in Indonesia and abroad. Accused of blasphemy, Ahok faced unprecedented mass protests by Islamists during his re-election campaign in late 2016 and early 2017. Following his electoral defeat and subsequent imprisonment, debate about the relationship between Indonesia’s ethno-religious minorities and the Muslim majority intensified (Setijadi 2017). These complex discussions centred on a number of key questions. For instance, were the sentiments of the anti-Ahok protesters—often middle-class Muslims accompanied by their children—representative of religiously and racially prejudiced views held by the majority of Indonesian Muslims (Assyaukanie 2017), or were they part of a pious movement in defence of Islam (Fealy 2016; Weng 2016)? What was the relationship between Islamist world views and the protests? Did the former cause the latter (Lindsey 2016), or have the demonstrations hardened exclusivist attitudes (Scherpen 2017)? And finally, what are the socio-economic profiles of those who hold such views (Chaplin 2016)? These questions have since dominated the scholarly and broader discourse on Indonesian politics and society, with passionate disagreements among participants about how best to research the problem and how to interpret the findings.
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August Mellaz, hal. 73
“Personal Vote, Candidate-Centered Politics, dan Pembiayaan Pileg 2014”.
Buku ini merupakan bunga rampai pemikiran tentang pembiayaan pemilu di Indonesia
“Personal Vote, Candidate-Centered Politics, dan Pembiayaan Pileg 2014”.
Buku ini merupakan bunga rampai pemikiran tentang pembiayaan pemilu di Indonesia
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This book investigates the impact of vote buying on the accountability of democratic institutions and policy representation in newly democratic countries, with a focus on Indonesia. In doing so, the book presents a wide-ranging study of... more
This book investigates the impact of vote buying on the accountability of democratic institutions and policy representation in newly democratic countries, with a focus on Indonesia. In doing so, the book presents a wide-ranging study of the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia’s young democracy, exploring the nature, extent, determinants, targeting and effectiveness of this practice. It addresses these central issues in the context of comparative studies of vote buying, arguing that although party loyalists are disproportionately targeted in vote buying efforts, in total numbers —given the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia— vote buying hits more uncommitted voters. It also demonstrates that the effectiveness of vote buying on vote choice is in the 10 percent range, which is sufficient for many candidates to secure a seat and thus explains why they still engage in vote buying despite high levels of leakage.
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How many voters sell their votes in Indonesia? My PhD research starts with this question that has haunted scholars for the last 15 years. Using data from a nationally representative survey, which included an experimental survey, my study... more
How many voters sell their votes in Indonesia? My PhD research starts with this question that has haunted scholars for the last 15 years. Using data from a nationally representative survey, which included an experimental survey, my study demonstrates that vote buying has become central to electoral mobilisation in Indonesia. If we use the highest estimate, one out of three Indonesians was personally exposed to vote buying in Indonesia’s most recent national election, making the country the site of the third-largest reported sum of exchange of money for votes in the world, as indicated by voter surveys taken over the last decade. My nationwide survey and massive dataset of local election surveys also show that, among other things, partisanship is a significant predictor of vote buying. The closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely that voter is to receive offers of vote buying (or to be accepting of the practice). Puzzlingly, however, the number of partisan voters in Indonesia is comparatively small. Only 15 percent of my national survey respondents admitted being close to any political party and this limited number of party loyalist are highly contested among candidates from the same party in the context of Indonesia’s open-list proportional systems. When we connect partisanship and distributive politics, we arrive at the centre of a lively scholarly debate that involves two competing camps: the so-called core versus swing-voter models. The former says vote buying when parties or candidates try to mobilise their core supporters, viewing the practice as being above all about increasing turnout. The latter interprets vote buying as an electoral strategy to sway uncommitted voters. What types of voters do Indonesian politicians target? At first glance, the data I collected from low-level candidates and brokers provide more proof in support of the core-voter strategy than in support of the swing-voter strategy. My in-depth interviews with high-level politicians also reinforce the notion that they prefer to target partisan voters in their vote buying operations. Yet my voter surveys clearly showed that although in relative terms such voters are more likely to be targeted, in absolute numbers vote buying mostly happens among non-partisans. How do we explain this combination of features —actors’ insistence that they are targeting partisan voters with the reality that they are mostly providing cash and gifts to non-partisans? This study proposes an addition to the scholarly debate between the core- versus swing voter models by combining an emphasis on the core-voter strategy and reliance on personal networks. It argues that in Indonesia, candidates and brokers actually intend to target partisan voters, but in reality they mostly distribute benefits to voters who are politically rather indifferent, but who are embedded in personal networks through which they are connected to the candidate and their brokers. This study offers the concept of ‘personal loyalist’ strategy, which targets people identified through personal networks. While the personal loyalist model still recognises the importance of partisan voters, it highlights that candidates seek voters who are not only loyal to the party, but who are also, or instead, loyal to the individual candidate within that party. However, given that partisan voters are not only limited in number but also highly contested among competing co-partisan candidates in the context of the open list system, politicians seek to expand their electoral base by making use of personal connections mediated by non-party brokers. Given their reliance on personal networks, most candidates and brokers typically misidentify non-partisans as loyalists because they misinterpret personal connections as partisan leanings. In addition, many of the people who are identified through personal networks mediated by brokers are in fact not even loyal to the candidate. Indeed, some of the brokers are themselves not particularly loyal. These two factors–confusion of personal connections with loyalty, and agency loss– in combination contribute to another element of vote buying in Indonesia which I identify in this study: the provision of payments to large numbers of uncommitted voters who receive benefits yet do not reciprocate with their votes. If vote buying is tremendously inefficient, how can vote buying have an effect on electoral behaviour? Why do candidates still do it? Utilising multiple data sources and various methods, I provide strong empirical evidence that gifts of money ‘only’ influenced the vote choice of roughly 10 percent to 11 percent of the total electorate. In these seemingly low numbers, however, lie the key to understanding vote buying’s attractiveness. Across Indonesia, the average margin of victory for successful candidates in legislative elections when defeating their party peers (i.e. candidates who were on the same party list) was only 1.65 percent. In this context of such highly competitive elections, candidates therefore enthusiastically pursued vote buying because they see that it can be critical for determining electoral outcomes. By showing that vote buying helps generate narrow but sufficient victory margins, my study explains how and why vote buying is so prevalent in Indonesia.
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Over the last five years, there is evidence of an emerging interest in the application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic movements in a broad sense. Such emerging research has mostly been undertaken... more
Over the last five years, there is evidence of an emerging interest in the application of theories and approaches from social movement perspectives to Islamic movements in a broad sense. Such emerging research has mostly been undertaken in the Middle East and North Africa, but not in Southeast Asia. By applying the fundamentals of social movement theory i.e., political opportunity structure (POS), resource mobilisation theory and collective action frames, I will examine the emergence and the rise of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesian politics. PKS emerged from quiet conversations among students in secular universities who subsequently transformed their activism into a political movement. PKS attracted public and scholarly attention since its success in increasing vote in by six hundred percent, from 1.4 percent in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004.
I demonstrate that social movement approach can shed important light on the dynamics of PKS. Results of this study suggest that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of tumultuous social and political conditions that gave rise a favourable political opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of expanding political opportunities by enhancing its resource mobilisation, including its organisational structures, cadres and recruitment, financial assets, and communication networks; and (3) consciously responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its organisational capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.
In addition, I argue that PKS cannot be seen as merely a political party which only articulates its political agenda within the framework of institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a SMO, which vigorously engages in collective action. No other party is so active in mobilising their supporters on the streets. In this sub-thesis, I will examine the behaviour of PKS by employing protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the tradition of social movement research. My study captured 225 PKS collective events as reported by Kompas, Republika, and the results suggest that PKS' collective actions have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues. It is true that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in Indonesian Muslim circles. Unlike PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions.
By using timing and sequence indicators, I found that during election time in 1999 and 2004, the number of PKS’ predecessor, PK and PKS collective actions declined significantly. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election process, this decrease of PKS actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic.
I demonstrate that social movement approach can shed important light on the dynamics of PKS. Results of this study suggest that PKS: (1) emerged from an array of tumultuous social and political conditions that gave rise a favourable political opportunity structure; (2) took advantage of expanding political opportunities by enhancing its resource mobilisation, including its organisational structures, cadres and recruitment, financial assets, and communication networks; and (3) consciously responded to the significant increase in political opportunities and its organisational capacities to mobilise supporters with shared ideas, beliefs and values.
In addition, I argue that PKS cannot be seen as merely a political party which only articulates its political agenda within the framework of institutionalised politics, but it also acts as a SMO, which vigorously engages in collective action. No other party is so active in mobilising their supporters on the streets. In this sub-thesis, I will examine the behaviour of PKS by employing protest-event analysis, which is commonly used in the tradition of social movement research. My study captured 225 PKS collective events as reported by Kompas, Republika, and the results suggest that PKS' collective actions have been driven by a strong sense of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism as well as support for the Palestine cause. This indicates PKS' preoccupation with distant but religiously charged issues. It is true that anti-Israeli and America sentiments are widespread in Indonesian Muslim circles. Unlike PKS, however, other Muslim organisations' anti Israeli and America stance does not manifest in direct actions.
By using timing and sequence indicators, I found that during election time in 1999 and 2004, the number of PKS’ predecessor, PK and PKS collective actions declined significantly. Aside from the increasing participation of PKS in election process, this decrease of PKS actions at election time can be seen as a wish to avoid alienating voters by appearing militantly Islamic.
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How does economic hardship during a crisis affect people’s evaluation of the political leadership? In this paper, we investigate how the negative impact of an exogenous event like COVID-19 interacts with other important phenomena which... more
How does economic hardship during a crisis affect people’s evaluation of the political leadership? In this paper, we investigate how the negative impact of an exogenous event like COVID-19 interacts with other important phenomena which influence leadership approval, such as partisanship, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy. Using a nationally representative survey in Indonesia (N=1,200), we show that economic hardship does not uniformly undermine leadership approval; rather, this effect is moderated by partisanship and by satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. Of the people who voted for President Jokowi in the 2019 election, those who faced economic hardship gave him lower levels of approval than those who were better-off. At the same time, those satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country reported higher approval even if they faced economic hardship. We discuss the policy implications of our findings and provide a theoretical framework for the mechanisms that affect leadership approval during a crisis.
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Does endorsing an Islamist agenda protect a candidate involved in corruption from negative voter evaluations? The corruption literature suggests that voter reactions to corruption are not unbiased and as such Islamist agendas could... more
Does endorsing an Islamist agenda protect a candidate involved in corruption from negative voter evaluations? The corruption literature suggests that voter reactions to corruption are not unbiased and as such Islamist agendas could potentially mitigate the negative effects of a corruption scandal, especially in religious societies. The political Islam literature suggests that endorsing an Islamist agenda would not shield corrupt politicians from negative reactions of the voters. We directly answer this question through 2 nationally representative survey experiments in the world's most populous Muslim democracy Indonesia. Our findings are 2-fold. First, Islamist agendas, in general, have only little effects on voter support for a candidate. Second, voters punish corrupt candidates equally, regardless whether or not they endorse an Islamist agenda.
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In recent years, the global populist surge driven by religio-political sentiments has taken root in various developing democracies exploiting pre-existing religio-political cleavages within society. India with its ruling Hindu-centric... more
In recent years, the global populist surge driven by religio-political sentiments has taken root in various developing democracies exploiting pre-existing religio-political cleavages within society. India with its ruling Hindu-centric nationalist right-wing party BJP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Turkey under the "new Islamic sultan" Recep Tayyip Erdogan are two of the most prominent examples of illiberal populist rulers employing religious rhetoric in rallying their supporters and in the process severely undermining the pluralist-secularist nature of the state. Indonesia is another such case. Although the "left-right" ideological spectrum is inadequate in deciphering the landscape of Indonesia's electoral system, a comparable "left-right" religio-political cleavage can nevertheless be identified within the "pluralist-Islamist" voting bloc spectrum found in this country. This paper uses quantitative survey analysis to empirically determine the percentage of Indonesian voters classified as Islamic populists. Pro-Islamic populists comprised 16.3%, while 33.9% identified with the anti-Islamic populists. A strong correlation is found between former presidential candidate and current Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto's supporters and their propensity for displaying a high level of pro-Islamic populist attitudes. Vice versa, President Jokowi's supporters display a consistent tendency of being anti-Islamic populists.
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Public support for relocating the Indonesian capital to East Kalimantan is divided. In a national survey conducted in February 2022, 48.5% of respondents support the plan while 44% disagree with it. Although a slight majority of... more
Public support for relocating the Indonesian capital to East Kalimantan is divided. In a national survey conducted in February 2022, 48.5% of respondents support the plan while 44% disagree with it. Although a slight majority of respondents support the new capital city (IKN) initiative, the level of support in 2022 reflects a decrease of nearly 5 percentage points compared to a similar survey carried out two years ago. This decline in support may be due to the perception that managing the Covid-19 pandemic should be a higher priority. Support for the IKN plan varies by demographics and region, but political affiliation seems to be the most salient factor in shaping public attitudes towards the plan. Jokowi’s base in the 2019 presidential election continues to support the IKN plan while Prabowo supporters in that election tend not to. Support for the IKN plan is higher among those who understand the various technocratic reasons for moving the capital city, such as the water crisis and overcrowding in Jakarta and creating more balanced economic development between Java and the outer provinces. This suggests that the government must do a better job in explaining the rationale for a new capital. The majority of respondents in Jakarta oppose the relocation of the capital, even though they directly bear the brunt of overcrowding and infrastructural problems in the city. They probably prefer the government to focus on fixing the problems in Jakarta rather than relocating the capital. Failure to arrest the downward slide in public support for the IKN initiative may jeopardise the prospects for a successful move altogether.
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Results from a nationally representative telephone panel survey of 2,000 adult Indonesians conducted from 19 to 22 May by Indikator indicate that local social distancing policies, social class, and political partisanship affect how... more
Results from a nationally representative telephone panel survey of 2,000 adult Indonesians conducted from 19 to 22 May by Indikator indicate that local social distancing policies, social class, and political partisanship affect how Indonesians experience the Covid-19 pandemic and what they believe about the government’s response.
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Indonesia is indeed a deeply unequal country. Since the early 2000s, inequality has grown faster here than in any other country in Southeast Asia. Such stark socio-economic disparities have become fodder for populists in recent elections,... more
Indonesia is indeed a deeply unequal country. Since the early 2000s, inequality has grown faster here than in any other country in Southeast Asia. Such stark socio-economic disparities have become fodder for populists in recent elections, including this year’s presidential election. Divisive, and often sectarianized, political narratives about inequality have polarized public opinion and contributed to Indonesia’s current moment of democratic decline.
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Indonesia is a country of significant inequalities, but we know little about how Indonesians feel about the gap between rich and poor. Comparative research suggests that negative perceptions of inequality can erode public support for... more
Indonesia is a country of significant inequalities, but we know little about how Indonesians feel about the gap between rich and poor. Comparative research suggests that negative perceptions of inequality can erode public support for democratic institutions. Using survey data, we explore the relationship between inequality and support for democracy in Indonesia. We find Indonesians are divided in their beliefs about income distribution. But this variation is not determined by actual levels of inequality around the country, nor by people's own economic situation; instead, political preferences and partisan biases are what matter most. Beliefs about inequality in Indonesia have become increasingly partisan over the course of the Jokowi presidency: supporters of the political opposition are far more likely to view the income gap as unfair, while supporters of the incumbent president tend to disagree—but they disagree much more when prompted by partisan cues. We also find that Indonesians who believe socio-economic inequality is unjust are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward democracy. We trace both trends back to populist campaigns and the increasingly polarized ideological competition that marked the country's recent elections. The shift toward more partisan politics in contemporary Indonesia has, we argue, consequences for how voters perceive inequality and how they feel about the democratic status quo.
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Vote buying is becoming an epidemic in Indonesia: somewhere between 25 and 33 per cent of voters engage in the practice. In the 2014 legislative election, Indonesia had 187 million registered voters. This means that politicians targeted... more
Vote buying is becoming an epidemic in Indonesia: somewhere between 25 and 33 per cent of voters engage in the practice. In the 2014 legislative election, Indonesia had 187 million registered voters. This means that politicians targeted an estimated 47 million to 62 million voters nationwide for vote buying. But does vote buying actually help politicians win? And if not, why do they still do it? Indonesia’s open-list proportional voting system plays a crucial role in explaining the ubiquity of vote buying. Under this system, candidates must compete against their party peers for personal votes, and they only need to win a small slice of the votes to defeat their internal rivals. The average winning margin by which the victorious candidates edged out rival candidates from their party’s list in Indonesia’s 2014 legislative election was only 1.65 per cent.
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We explore whether an individuals’ support for either Jokowi or Prabowo might shape their policy preferences when exposed to cues from their preferred political leader. Prior to conducting our study, our hypothesis was that partisan... more
We explore whether an individuals’ support for either Jokowi or Prabowo might shape their policy preferences when exposed to cues from their preferred political leader. Prior to conducting our study, our hypothesis was that partisan biases are more powerful in Indonesia than the existing scholarship suggests, and that such biases have implications for how Indonesians think about policy problems—just like in other democracies around the world.
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Perilaku memilih merupakan gejala yang kompleks. Keputusan memilih ditentukan oleh banyak faktor. Seorang calon yang berasal dari kelompok identitas primordial tertentu belum tentu dapat menarik suara mayoritas di kelompoknya sendiri.... more
Perilaku memilih merupakan gejala yang kompleks. Keputusan memilih ditentukan oleh banyak faktor. Seorang calon yang berasal dari kelompok identitas primordial tertentu belum tentu dapat menarik suara mayoritas di kelompoknya sendiri. Hal ini bisa terjadi karena, selain faktor identitas, pemilih juga mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor lain, terutama kualitas personal calon. Intinya, dinamika politik lokal seringkali membuka ruang mobilisasi politik identitas. Secara umum, penelitian ini telah menemukan bukti empiris bahwa agama dan etnis yang menjadi bahan bakar politik identitas merupakan faktor yang penting dalam pemilihan kepala daerah.
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How many voters sell their votes in Indonesia, and how effective is it? Elaborated from a wide range of survey methods-whether individual, observational, or derived from the list-experiment, the proportion of voters participating in... more
How many voters sell their votes in Indonesia, and how effective is it? Elaborated from a wide range of survey methods-whether individual, observational, or derived from the list-experiment, the proportion of voters participating in vote-buying in the 2019 election was between 19,4% and 33,1%. This range is comparatively high by international standards, with Indonesia's level of vote buying being the third largest in the world. Given that the list-experiment and the straightforward survey questions result inconsistent findings, it can be concluded that vote buying is less likely to be stigmatized, and such practice has become a new normal during the election. This study also finds that Indonesia's open-list proportional system shapes the supply-side of vote buying. Under such an electoral system, candidates are forced to compete against co-partisans for personal votes. And because, according to the open-list system, a seat (or seats) secured by a party must be allocated to that party's candidates who obtained the most individual votes, candidates only need to win a small slice of the votes to defeat their co-partisans. To do so, they need to differentiate themselves from their party peers, including by buying votes.
Seberapa banyak politik uang di Indonesia, dan seberapa efektif mempengaruhi pilihan? Tulisan ini coba menjawab dua pertanyaan penting yang selama ini menghantui para ahli tentang Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan banyak metode, baik individual, observasional dan teknik eksperimental, proporsi pemilih yang terlibat politik uang dalam Pemilu 2019 di kisaran 19,4% hingga 33,1%. Kisaran politik uang ini sangat tinggi menurut standar internasional, dan menempatkan Indonesia sebagai negara dengan peringkat politik uang terbesar nomor tiga sedunia. Desain eksperimen juga menghasilkan temuan yang konsisten dengan pertanyaan langsung, sehingga bisa disimpulkan bahwa politik uang telah menjadi praktik normal baru dalam pemilu kita. Studi ini menegaskan bahwa sistem proporsional terbuka berkontribusi atas maraknya politik uang karena caleg dipaksa bertarung antarsesama caleg dalam satu partai untuk mengejar personal vote. Kemudian karena kursi yang diperoleh partai diberikan kepada kandidat dengan suara terbanyak, maka mereka hanya memerlukan "sedikit" suara untuk mengalahkan rival separtainya. Politik uang merupakan mekanisme diferensiasi seorang caleg dalam rangka memberi nilai lebih di mata pemilih dibanding pesaing internal.
Seberapa banyak politik uang di Indonesia, dan seberapa efektif mempengaruhi pilihan? Tulisan ini coba menjawab dua pertanyaan penting yang selama ini menghantui para ahli tentang Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan banyak metode, baik individual, observasional dan teknik eksperimental, proporsi pemilih yang terlibat politik uang dalam Pemilu 2019 di kisaran 19,4% hingga 33,1%. Kisaran politik uang ini sangat tinggi menurut standar internasional, dan menempatkan Indonesia sebagai negara dengan peringkat politik uang terbesar nomor tiga sedunia. Desain eksperimen juga menghasilkan temuan yang konsisten dengan pertanyaan langsung, sehingga bisa disimpulkan bahwa politik uang telah menjadi praktik normal baru dalam pemilu kita. Studi ini menegaskan bahwa sistem proporsional terbuka berkontribusi atas maraknya politik uang karena caleg dipaksa bertarung antarsesama caleg dalam satu partai untuk mengejar personal vote. Kemudian karena kursi yang diperoleh partai diberikan kepada kandidat dengan suara terbanyak, maka mereka hanya memerlukan "sedikit" suara untuk mengalahkan rival separtainya. Politik uang merupakan mekanisme diferensiasi seorang caleg dalam rangka memberi nilai lebih di mata pemilih dibanding pesaing internal.
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In much of the scholarly literature, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is recognized as a defender of religious tolerance and pluralism. This is to no small extent the result of how NU has portrayed... more
In much of the scholarly literature, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, is recognized as a defender of religious tolerance and pluralism. This is to no small extent the result of how NU has portrayed itself and its actions-including during the 2019 presidential elections, when it professed to have aligned with incumbent president Joko Widodo in order to keep Islamist groups from power. In this article, we analyse the attitudes of NU followers towards religious tolerance and pluralism, and find a significant mismatch between the self-perception of the NU leadership and the actual views held by the NU grassroots. Based on original survey data, we show that NU followers are generally as intolerant of religious minorities as the rest of Indonesian Muslim population, and in some cases, even more intolerant. We argue that this is the result of NU's long-standing prioritization of battling rival Muslim organizations (which it views as threats to its interests) over advancing substantive tolerance campaigns that could change the religio-political attitudes of its constituency.
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The current worldwide democratic regression has prompted debate about the drivers of democratic decline. One country experiencing decline is Indonesia, where most analysts blame the shift on actions of illiberal elites, casting the public... more
The current worldwide democratic regression has prompted debate about the drivers of democratic decline. One country experiencing decline is Indonesia, where most analysts blame the shift on actions of illiberal elites, casting the public as a democratic bulwark. Yet, as in other fragile democracies, regression in Indonesia has come at the hands of politicians enjoying popular support. To investigate drivers of democratic decline we ask: How democratic are Indonesian citizens when compared to the politicians they elect? We answer this question using an original, representative survey of provincial legislators, which we compare to a general survey of the Indonesian population. While both populations express overwhelming support for democratic government, we find significant differences between how elites and masses conceive of democracy, and in their commitment to liberal norms. Though neither group is a bulwark of liberal values, we find the legislators are systematically more liberal than voters. These findings challenge widely held assumptions about Indonesia’s political class, and suggest a public that is either indifferent to, or supportive of, an increasingly illiberal democratic order. Our study demonstrates that comparing elite and mass attitudes to democracy and liberalism is one fruitful technique for investigating sources of democratic resilience and fragility.
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Socio-economic inequality is a contentious issue in Indonesia, one that gets mobilised in election campaigns. Yet we know very little about how Indonesians actually feel about income and wealth distribution. This paper draws upon data... more
Socio-economic inequality is a contentious issue in Indonesia, one that gets mobilised in election campaigns. Yet we know very little about how Indonesians actually feel about income and wealth distribution. This paper draws upon data from an original, nationally representative survey to understand Indonesians' perceptions of income inequality. We find that Indonesians generally feel better about inequality now than they did five years ago at the end of President Yudhoyono's decade in office. However, we also find that people's perceptions of inequality are closely associated with their political preferences and are divided along partisan lines.
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Jokowi must make a difficult choice between keeping the political elites happy to pass his economic agenda, or keep the public happy with democratic and institutional reform.
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More than two decades after the end of the authoritarian era in 1998, what has actually changed in Indonesia's transitional trajectory into a fully consolidated democracy? The perennial issue of how its journey has been hobbled by the... more
More than two decades after the end of the authoritarian era in 1998, what has actually changed in Indonesia's transitional trajectory into a fully consolidated democracy? The perennial issue of how its journey has been hobbled by the grip of the old nexus of political and business elites has sparked lively debates in academia. To date, Indonesianists have differed sharply in their views on Indonesia's achievements after more than twenty years of reform. Some experts have highlighted the dark face of a reform hijacked by the old nefarious political forces, while others provide a more optimistic picture of the achievements since the Reformasi era. It is against this backdrop that Jemma Purdey, Antje Missbach, and Dave McRae provide us with analyses that are much more comprehensive and nuanced on the trajectory of Indonesian democracy.
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The book unpacks the intriguing practice of Vote Buying in Indonesia. Since the end of the Suharto period, Vote Buying in Indonesia has been an effective way to produce higher turnout and vote share in tight competition among the peer... more
The book unpacks the intriguing practice of Vote Buying in Indonesia. Since the end of the Suharto period, Vote Buying in Indonesia has been an effective way to produce higher turnout and vote share in tight competition among the peer candidates in the same political party. As of 2004, Indonesia has successfully organized an election four times using an open-list proportional voting system. This system encourages a candidate-centered rather than party-centered campaign since personal closeness is the main method to gain votes.