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David Altman
  • Av.Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul
    Santiago de Chile. Código Postal 782-0436, Chile
  • +(56-2) 2354-7819
  • David Altman is professor of political science at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. He received his Ph.D.... moreedit
  • Michael Coppedge, Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnelledit
La obra consta de tres secciones, con siete capítulos, en los que se explica qué es la democracia directa y se presentan sus principales modalidades: plebiscito, referéndum, iniciativa popular. Altman recorre más de cien años de historia... more
La obra consta de tres secciones, con siete capítulos, en los que se explica qué es la democracia directa y se presentan sus principales modalidades: plebiscito, referéndum, iniciativa popular. Altman recorre más de cien años de historia para mostrar los orígenes, el desempeño y las posibles reformas al modo actual de poner en práctica esta forma de democracia, muy en boga en diversas regiones del mundo. Es un libro un tanto técnico –aunque para aligerarlo se llevó buena parte del material a un anexo estadístico que estará disponible en línea–, con numerosos ejemplos y anécdotas, e incluso algunos toques de humor.
Standing out from all other books on direct democracy, Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy connects the study of direct democracy to the broader field of comparative democratization and to an important strand in normative... more
Standing out from all other books on direct democracy, Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy connects the study of direct democracy to the broader field of comparative democratization and to an important strand in normative democratic theory. Analyzing the relationship between direct democracy and representative government, this book is organized around three main sections: the origins of contemporary direct democracy, its functioning, and the ways to improve the use of direct democracy and its abuse. David Altman argues that citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy constitute an important and viable way to re-invigorate current representative regimes by strengthening democracies' normative foundations - freedom and equity among citizens - which are particularly fragile in the context of unequal societies. Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy demonstrates how citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy empowers citizens, channels social demands, defuses violence, re-enchants citizens with politics, and breaks through some of the institutionalized barriers to accountability that arise in representative systems.

Reviews & Endorsements

Advance praise: 'Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy offers a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the origins and effects of popular initiatives, referenda, and other forms of direct democracy. Altman makes a compelling case, and shows that the impact of popular initiatives extends well beyond the often attention-grabbing election outcomes. Those of us who care about the fate of liberal democracy should pay close attention.' Steven Levitsky, Harvard University

Advance praise: 'Deftly combining historical case studies and broad cross-national statistical overviews, author David Altman challenges misperceptions about direct democracy and shows that it can augment representative democracy by cultivating consensus-building and increasing citizen engagement. Citizenship and Contemporary Direct Democracy combines depth and breadth to tackle an important issue of our time and should be read by anyone interested in improving the quality of democracy around the world today.' Pamela Paxton, Linda K. George and John Wilson Professor of Sociology, University of Texas at Austin

Advance praise: 'David Altman’s new book on direct democracy blends theoretical insights with descriptive facility, presenting a thorough analysis of the remedial properties and potentials of direct democratic institutions within the institutional framework of representative democracy. I cannot think of another scholar as well qualified as David Altman to write a book of this kind, and I cannot recommend it highly enough.' Adrian Vatter, Chair of Swiss Politics, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern

Advance praise: 'This precisely theorized, empirically sophisticated, and normatively attentive book is required reading for anyone interested in how and whether mechanisms of direct democracy might deepen democracy within representative political systems. Timely and important for an era in which mechanisms of direct democracy are an increasingly popular response to disillusionment with representative democracy.' Mark E. Warren, Merilees Chair for the Study of Democracy, University of British Columbia
Challenging the common assumption that models of direct democracy and representative democracy are necessarily at odds, Direct Democracy Worldwide demonstrates how practices of direct and representative democracy interact under different... more
Challenging the common assumption that models of direct democracy and representative democracy are necessarily at odds, Direct Democracy Worldwide demonstrates how practices of direct and representative democracy interact under different institutional settings and uncovers the conditions that allow them to coexist in a mutually reinforcing manner. Whereas citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy can spur productive relationships between citizens and political parties, other mechanisms of direct democracy often help leaders bypass other representative institutions, undermining republican checks and balances. The book also demonstrates that the embrace of direct democracy is costly, may generate uncertainties and inconsistencies, and in some cases is easily manipulated. Nonetheless, the promise of direct democracy should not be dismissed. Direct democracy is much more than a simple, pragmatic second choice when representative democracy seems not to be working as expected. Properly designed, it can empower citizens, breaking through some of the institutionalized barriers to accountability that arise in representative systems.
[In Catalan]
Only five countries have extended universal voting rights to noncitizen residents for all political spheres (local, intermediate and national): Uruguay in 1934, New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, Malawi in 1994, and Ecuador in 2008.... more
Only five countries have extended universal voting rights to noncitizen
residents for all political spheres (local, intermediate and national): Uruguay in 1934, New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, Malawi in 1994, and Ecuador in 2008. These cases constitute a unique intercontinental medley and an opportunity to study the conditions behind such revolutionary change. Through a calibrated comparative strategy based on most similar system designs (inspired by Mill’s method of difference) using QCA, this
paper finds that the extension of national voting rights to noncitizen
residents transpired in two distinct scenarios. The first setting (Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay) took place within unitary states with already-existing local voting rights for noncitizen residents and settler trajectories, but that were not undergoing a liberalisation process. On the other hand, the second configuration (Ecuador and Malawi) developed within
unitary states that recognised nationality by ius soli and were going through a process of liberalisation, but without previous local voting rights for non-citizen residents or a settler trajectory. To our best knowledge, this paper offers the first cross-national explanation that involves all cases that have broadened their respective political communities (demoi) to include national voting rights to all non-citizen residents.
A strong oscillation of electoral preferences took place in Chile between the election of the members of the Constitutional Convention in May 2021 and the election of the members of the Constitutional Council in May 2023. This is... more
A strong oscillation of electoral preferences took place in Chile between the election of the members of the Constitutional Convention in May 2021 and the election of the members of the Constitutional Council in May 2023. This is surprising because, until the national-scale social uprising in 2019, there was a broad consensus that Chile was a highly institutionalised party system where political preferences tended to be stable. In this research note, we study how the electoral choices made by citizens shifted between both elections, using the ecological inference approach based on a Bayesian hierarchical model developed elsewhere. We find that a vast majority of the new voters that resulted from the compulsory voting policy implemented between both elections opted for centre-right to right-wing candidates. However, this evidence is insufficient to determine whether these new voters predominantly align with rightleaning ideologies or hold anti-systemic viewpoints.
Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focused on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the complexity of the... more
Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focused on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the complexity of the Dahlian dimension of inclusiveness, a sine qua non for defining a polyarchy. This measurement paper proposes a new index of inclusiveness: Electoral Residential Inclusiveness. This measure, an alternative to the most frequently used ethnonational ones, assesses the size of the overlap between those who make the law and those who are subject to it. It is shown how some regimes—including some typically considered strong democracies—exhibit such a considerable gap between these two groups that their democratic credentials could be questioned. Regardless of the new metric's efficacy, one implication of this research is that measures of democracy need to be explicit about the complex normative decisions on how we conceptualize, measure, and aggregate the inclusiveness dimension of polyarchy.
There is suggestive evidence that the growth of democracy has stagnated, and even some signs indicate that democracy is in retreat. In such a context, one might have expected to witness an increase in experimentation with democratic... more
There is suggestive evidence that the growth of democracy has stagnated, and even some signs indicate that democracy is in retreat. In such a context, one might have expected to witness an increase in experimentation with democratic innovations such as direct democracy. This is not the case. While there is a spectacular and statistically significant increase in the uses of mechanisms of direct democracy (MDDs) since the early 1990s, 2020 remained notably similar to the previous years in terms of the level of direct democracy worldwide. In 2019, we witnessed less than half of the MDDs we saw in 2018 (eighteen vs. fifty), but, in 2020, the count bounced back to thirty. The COVID-19 pandemic did not halt the march of direct democracy, although it delayed some of its events. Beyond the specific number of popular votes in 2020, direct democracy still tracks almost perfectly with global electoral democracy trends. When all was said and done, however, thirty MDDs were held in 2020: fourteen obligatory referendums (eight in Liberia, two in Chile, and one in Algeria, Italy, Palau, and Northern Cyprus, respectively), six plebiscites (two in New Zealand, two in Liechtenstein, one in Russia, and one in Guinea), five popular initiatives (four in Switzerland and one in Liechtenstein), and five rejective referendums (all in Switzerland).
The world is facing a tide of "cult-of-personality" governments that threaten liberal democracy (e.g., Trump, Duterte, Bolsonaro, Orbán). Collegial executives are a long-established institutional alternative, predicated upon disarming... more
The world is facing a tide of "cult-of-personality" governments that threaten liberal democracy (e.g., Trump, Duterte, Bolsonaro, Orbán). Collegial executives are a long-established institutional alternative, predicated upon disarming this very shortcoming in the practice of democracy. These are regimes in which multiple people share power, limiting executive excess. Historiographic accounts regard the collegial executive as inimical to resolute decision-making and responsible for democratic deterioration. Despite being used since antiquity, there is no empirical research on how collegial executives influence democracy. This paper tests, for the first time, whether collegial executives are substantially worse for democracy than single-leader executives. The focus is on the only robust polyarchy to have alternated twice between single-person and collegial-executive governments: Uruguay. Using the Synthetic Control Method, the paper creates a fictional Uruguay to compare with the country's real experience. The results show that multiple-executive governments have had no impact on Uruguay's level of democracy.
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. Although this axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations, this statement is much more complex than it appears in part because it is highly... more
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. Although this axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations, this statement is much more complex than it appears in part because it is highly contingent on the definitions and operationalizations of both democracy and conflict. This article revisits democratic peace theory, combining both institutional constraints and similarity-based arguments. Interactions between the democratic level of the dyad (the average democratic level of its members) and its democratic spread (difference between the democratic scores of its members) create a dyadic triangle that encompasses all possible combinations of cases, revisiting which dyads are more prone to conflict. The findings partially confirm and partially refute both the institutional constraints and the similarity-based arguments, leading to a nuanced alternative theory: the Interactive Model of Democratic Peace. Akin to democratic peace theory, our evidence shows that the higher a dyad's level of democracy is, the lower the probability of fatal militarized interstate disputes between that pair of states. However, contrary to democratic peace theory, we find that dissimilar-regime dyads can still be peaceful as long as they have a high mean of democracy. Following the theory of regime similarity, we consider the democratic spread of each dyad, but we find that being similar is not a sufficient condition for peace between the members of a dyad. From the empirical evidence, the article derives three heuristic zones of conflict, filling much of the gray area that has been left unexplained by previous models.
The fact that equitable social policy expanded drastically in Latin America during the left turn and during a time of prosperity does not necessarily mean that the ideological color of governing parties and economic growth are the engines... more
The fact that equitable social policy expanded drastically in Latin America during the left turn and during a time of prosperity does not necessarily mean that the ideological color of governing parties and economic growth are the engines behind changes in social policy, as is usually claimed by part of the literature. Using panel data from Latin American countries for 1990‒2013, this paper offers an alternative explanation, derived from previous qualitative research, that the level of political competition, the strength of civil society, and wealth are the key factors behind the expansion of equitable social policy. Once these explanations are included in our models, the ideological leaning of governments and economic growth lose statistical significance. Thus, this paper challenges dominant approaches that consider social policy change in Latin America a consequence of the ideological leaning of the government and economic growth.
Successive multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are associated with incremental democratization. Yet tests in other regions are less than encouraging. Non-significant findings on Latin America and post-communist Eurasia, as well as... more
Successive multiparty elections in sub-Saharan Africa are associated with incremental democratization. Yet tests in other regions are less than encouraging. Non-significant findings on Latin America and post-communist Eurasia, as well as conceptual criticism regarding the theory’s application in the contemporary Middle East, suggest that this may be a case of African exceptionalism. This article moves these debates forward by posing a comprehensive, global set of tests on the democratizing effect of elections. We seek to establish the scope conditions of the argument geographically, temporally, and substantively. Although we find a correlation between reiterated multiparty elections and improvements in the liberal-democratic components of electoral regimes globally since 1900, the relationship is only substantial in the period since the onset of the third wave of democracy. Experiences with iterated multiparty elections have substantive importance for democratization in subSaharan Africa, the post-communist region, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. For the Middle East and North Africa, the relationship is weaker and less robust. Finally, the results suggest that reiterated sequences of multiparty elections are associated with improvements to liberal and deliberative components of democracy more so than egalitarian components.
To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy Practice Potential, which is applied to 200 polities worldwide. This index results from the aggregation of the... more
To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy Practice Potential, which is applied to 200 polities worldwide. This index results from the aggregation of the scores of four types of mechanisms of direct democracy: popular initiatives, popular referendums, obligatory referendums, and authorities' plebiscites. This index measures: (1) how easy it is to initiate and approve each type of popular vote, and (2) how consequential that vote is (if approved). Ease of initiation is measured by: (a) the existence of a direct democracy process, (b) the number of signatures needed, and (c) time limits to collect signatures. Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to: (a) participation, (b) approval, (c) su-permajority, and (d) district majority. Regarding how consequential the vote is, it considers its decisiveness (whether the decision is binding), and the threat capability of citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy as measured by the frequency with which direct popular votes have been used and approved in the past. Finally, the study tests the validity of the new measure, discussing its strengths and limitations.
Five features distinguish V-Dem from previous endeavors to measure democracy: First, because no consensus exists regarding how to conceptualize and measure democracy, we approach democracy as multidimensional. Instead of imposing a... more
Five features distinguish V-Dem from previous endeavors to measure democracy: First, because no consensus exists regarding how to conceptualize and measure democracy, we approach democracy as multidimensional. Instead of imposing a definition that would necessarily omit features of democracy that matter to some users, we measure multiple varieties of democracy and allow users to choose the one that reflects their own understanding of the concept. Second, we collect information on indicators relevant to democracy at a highly disaggregated level and make both aggregated and disaggregated data freely available. Third, we enlist multiple experts to code each subjective indicator, permitting intercoder reliability tests (for nonfactual questions). Fourth, we extend indicators for each country back through modern history to 1900 whenever possible. Finally, we offer not only point scores measuring various dimensions of democracy, but also confidence bounds for every point estimate. While other projects that attempt to measure democracy may contain one or several of these features, none combines them all.
Most procedural definitions and measurements of democracy are missing one crucial component: direct popular decision-making. This is an important gap that does not allow users of data to ascertain some important variation among... more
Most procedural definitions and measurements of democracy are missing one crucial component: direct popular decision-making. This is an important gap that does not allow users of data to ascertain some important variation among democracies. Thus, I propose a new measure that is strongly anchored in a procedural definition of democracy but includes this missing dimension. The proposed measure is well rooted in the literature and introduces a dimension whereby citizens may become the masters of their political fate at any time and without the consent of elected authorities, while avoiding the inclusion of extraneous attributes that are not highlighted in democratic theory. Tests of the validity of the new indicator, using Latin American cases, show that there is enough room for its inclusion without the typical collinearity problems this literature faces. This indicator is not only sound, but it is empirically appealing as it performs better than others when testing relevant hypotheses.
This article investigates the consequences that frequent uses of mechanisms of direct democracy have on electoral turnout, contrasting evidence from the Swiss cantons and states in the United States. It contributes to the existing... more
This article investigates the consequences that frequent uses of mechanisms of direct democracy have on electoral turnout, contrasting evidence from the Swiss cantons and states in the United States. It contributes to the existing literature in two senses. First, it constitutes the very first cross-national comparative study on the topic and, therefore, it allows for examination of hypotheses the literature previously advanced for single cases (mostly, but not confined, to the U.S. and Switzerland). Second, in contrast to previous research, it delves into the world of direct democracy and shows that not all MDDs are the same, nor do they have the same political effects in terms of electoral participation. I demonstrate that the previous U.S.-based knowledge does not resist empirical testing when contrasted with Swiss evidence: active use of citizen-driven initiatives have no statistically significant effects on turnout. Nonetheless, voter turnout rates are significantly lower in states and cantons with more top-down measures on the ballot.
En lo que resta de esta introducción, intentamos identificar las principales tensiones y problemáticas señaladas por los distintos autores, así como aquellas que sugiere el análisis de la bibliografía disponible. En primer lugar,... more
En lo que resta de esta introducción, intentamos identificar las principales tensiones y problemáticas señaladas por los distintos autores, así como aquellas que sugiere el análisis de la bibliografía disponible. En primer lugar, analizamos las características de distintas definiciones de Estado y capacidad estatal. En segundo lugar, identificamos y evaluamos distintas estrategias de operacionalización y medición, tanto aquellas presentes en la bibliografía como las propuestas en la conferencia. Finalmente, en tono más especulativo, presentamos una serie de reflexiones respecto a las dinámicas causales que parecen determinar, según distintos trabajos, la presencia de estados más fuertes (débiles) en la región.
Clear rules that encourage meritocracy, and that include the evaluation of scholarly productivity, are slowly and unevenly taking hold in academic life in Latin America. While some countries have official rankings of political science... more
Clear rules that encourage meritocracy, and that include the evaluation of scholarly productivity, are slowly and unevenly taking hold in academic life in Latin America. While some countries have official rankings of political science departments, others rely only on informal assessments. In a third set of countries, we cannot even consider the competition because the market is dominated by a state monopoly. This article provides a first, systematic study of scientific productivity and concomitant impact in more than twenty departments of Political Science and International Relations in the region. I show that scholars’ productivity is intimately related to where they pursued graduate studies, what subfield of research they work on, and the explicit adoption of rules that encourage meritocracy and academic careerism.
In the wake of the ColdWar, democracy has gained the status of a mantra. Yet there is no consensus about how to conceptualize and measure regimes such that meaningful comparisons can be made through time and across countries. In this... more
In the wake of the ColdWar, democracy has gained the status of a mantra. Yet there is no consensus about how to conceptualize and measure regimes such that meaningful comparisons can be made through time and across countries. In this prescriptive article, we argue for a new approach to conceptualization and measurement. We first review some of the weaknesses among traditional approaches. We then lay out our approach, which may be characterized as historical, multidimensional, disaggregated, and transparent.We end by reviewing some of the payoffs such an approach might bring to the study of democracy.
Mainwaring and Scully’s concept of party system institutionalization (PSI) has greatly influenced the literature on parties and party systems. This article contributes to the “revisionist” literature on PSI by exploring the recent... more
Mainwaring and Scully’s concept of party system institutionalization (PSI) has greatly influenced the literature on parties and party systems. This article contributes to the “revisionist” literature on PSI by exploring the recent evolution of the concept’s four dimensions in Chile. It finds that the Chilean party system is not homogenously institutionalized (as conventionally argued) but is simultaneously frozen at the elite level and increasingly disconnected from civil society. In this regard, it approaches some recent descriptions of the Brazilian party system, a prototypical example of an “inchoate” party system that has gained stability over time without developing roots in society. This article argues that the current operationalization of the concept of PSI is problematic. Not only should all four dimensions of the concept be simultaneously measured, probably through multiple indicators for each one, but their trends across time and space should also be better integrated into the concept’s theoretical structure.
En este artículo se estudian y ordenan las diferentes formas con que la ciudadanía decide directamente en las urnas sobre temas de su incumbencia. La apelación directa a la ciudadanía parece cada día más de moda en la región, cuestión que... more
En este artículo se estudian y ordenan las diferentes formas con que la ciudadanía decide directamente en las urnas sobre temas de su incumbencia. La apelación directa a la ciudadanía parece cada día más de moda en la región, cuestión que muchos autores ven como la utilización de recursos institucionales por parte de las autoridades para avanzar en una determinada agenda política. Sin embargo, la democracia directa es más heterogénea de lo que estos autores conceden. Los mismos resultados de las votaciones populares son, en términos generales, más ajustados de lo que se presupondría. La evidencia muestra que cuando los movimientos de democracia directa son utilizados por los ejecutivos, en América Latina, la tasa de aprobación no supera el 55%, incluso menor a la tasa de aprobación de cuando los inicia la ciudadanía (56%). Esto no significa que, en algunas oportunidades, las autoridades no los usen como ejercicios de movilización popular o que sean una búsqueda de legitimización popular de los deseos de las elites políticas en turno.

Abstract
This study examines the different ways in which citizens decide directly at the polls on topics of their concern. The direct appeal to the citizenry seems to be increasingly popular in the region and many authors do not see in it more than the use of institutional resources by the authorities to advance a particular political agenda. However, direct democracy is a much more heterogeneous phenomenon than
these authors usually grant. In fact, the results of popular votes are generally much tighter than one might assume. Surprisingly, the evidence shows that when used by government agents in Latin America, the rate acceptance does not exceed 55%, even lower than the rate of approval when they are initiated by citizens (56%). This does not mean that, on occasions, authorities use them as exercises of popular mobilization or as tools seeking popular legitimization of the desires of political elites.
Uruguay, defining itself as the “Switzerland of Latin America”, took the Swiss model (collegial executives and direct democracy) as an example when building its own political institutions. Despite the similarities of these institutions,... more
Uruguay, defining itself as the “Switzerland of Latin America”, took the Swiss model (collegial executives and direct democracy) as an example when building its own political institutions. Despite the similarities of these institutions, the results were quite different due to the different context. The comparison between the institutions in these two isolated countries highlights the ways in which the same institutions may produce different results and evolve in distinctive ways. This is important to recognize as foreign models and experiences continue to inspire policies. Contrary to common arguments presented in the literature, even in such a “most likely case”, institutions cannot
simply be copied. Institutional effects are context-dependent and we need to pay attention to this interaction. This article provides new evidence showing that universalist institutional arguments can be misleading.
Little research has been devoted to the analysis of how different characteristics of the executives affect structural reforms. This article analyzes the impact of cabinet fragmentation and the presidential ideological position on the... more
Little research has been devoted to the analysis of how different characteristics of the executives affect structural reforms. This article analyzes the impact of cabinet fragmentation and the presidential ideological position on the scope of structural reforms in nine Latin American presidential democracies of the postauthoritarian period. In so doing, it treats cabinets as conglomerates of actors that are accountable both to the president and to their parties, with nonpartisan ministers being only accountable to the president. It shows that the higher the percentage of nonpartisan ministers, the lesser the costs associated with bargaining a reform within the executive. When presidents build governing coalitions, they limit their capacity of acting unilaterally. However, they are better able to advance their structural reform proposals than single-party governments are. Data on cabinet composition were collected by the authors and data on the dependent variable structural reform comes from Lora (2001).
El año 2006 América Latina estuvo dominada por una inusual actividad electoral a lo largo y ancho del continente. A nivel de relaciones internacionales, este año se caracterizó por mostrar un nivel infrecuente de conflictividad entre los... more
El año 2006 América Latina estuvo dominada por una inusual actividad electoral a lo largo y ancho del continente. A nivel de relaciones internacionales, este año se caracterizó por mostrar un nivel infrecuente de conflictividad entre los países, llegando inclusive a manifestarse en roces diplomáticos serios. Al interior de cada país, también resultaron evidentes problemas transversales: déficits persistentes de desarrollo humano
a contramano de la expansión económica, la exclusión casi sistemática de importantes grupos sociales del juego político, la persistencia de discriminación social y política por razones de género y/o étnicas, y la presencia de un creciente nivel de desafección política. En algunos países, además, han existido roces entre los ejecutivos y los legislativos y, en un sentido más amplio, se han observado múltiples deficiencias a nivel de “gobernabilidad democrática”. Si bien la democracia ha logrado instalarse en la gran mayoría del continente y las elecciones son el principal vehículo de selección de gobiernos, hoy resultan evidentes problemas a los que en un momento de transición, y por razones entendibles, la disciplina no otorgó suficiente
importancia. La realidad política de la región se ha vuelto tan dinámica y “fluida” y los nuevos desafíos de nuestras democracias son actualmente tan variados y significativos, que una crónica comparativa anual sobre los procesos políticos vividos por cada país constituye, a nuestro entender, una herramienta de investigación tan fundamental como necesaria. Este trabajo ofrece una introducción a este anuario.
Durante diciembre de 2005 y enero del 2006 la ciudadanía chilena eligió a su nueva mandataria, Michelle Bachelet, y renovó su congreso para el periodo 2006- 2009. Las elecciones transcurrieron sin disrupciones y le otorgaron a la... more
Durante diciembre de 2005 y enero del 2006 la ciudadanía chilena eligió a su
nueva mandataria, Michelle Bachelet, y renovó su congreso para el periodo 2006-
2009. Las elecciones transcurrieron sin disrupciones y le otorgaron a la coalición
gobernante “Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia” (CPD) su cuarto
mandato ininterrumpido desde la transición a la democracia en 1990. Esta cuarta
administración de la CPD cuenta con las mayorías más holgadas desde 1990, ya que
la reforma constitucional del 2005 eliminó varios de los conocidos enclaves
autoritarios (Garretón 1988), entre los que destacan los senadores “designados” que
evitaban las mayorías concertacionistas en el Senado.Aunque uno tendería a pensar
en un gobierno inmerso en un contexto situación de estabilidad, caracterizado por
cierta holgura en el ámbito legislativo y una posición internacional envidiable para
los productos chilenos que están haciendo rebosar las arcas fiscales, este escenario
puede, paradójicamente, constituirse en una situación de estrés social que, de no
contemplarse con seriedad, complicará la agenda de la Presidenta Bachelet y su
coalición de gobierno.
Esta introducción no pretende ser más que una primera aproximación sobre el estado del arte de la ciencia política en el continente. Aquí se argumenta que el reforzamiento institucional de la ciencia política latinoamericana debe pasar... more
Esta introducción no pretende ser más que una primera aproximación sobre el estado del arte de la ciencia política en el continente. Aquí se argumenta que el reforzamiento institucional de la ciencia política latinoamericana debe pasar por la construcción de instituciones universitarias que funcionen a través de reglas claras que fomenten la meritocracia y que para que ésta exista deben forzosamente existir criterios claros
y definidos de cómo ponderar la productividad de la investigación y docencia. Evidentemente, el establecimiento de estos criterios es fundamental a la hora de las evaluaciones. El escenario continental ofrece enormes variaciones en los ámbitos mínimamente necesarios para la institucionalización de la disciplina. En algunos países ni siquiera se puede conseguir un título de pre o postgrado en ciencia política. En otros,existe menos de una decena de doctores en ciencia política trabajando en el ámbito universitario. La imperiosa necesidad de la profesionalización continúa siendo un tema importante a considerar.

This introduction does not try to be more than a first approach on the state–of–the–art of political science in the continent. It is argued that Latin American political science must build university institutions that emphasize clear rules and defined criteria that stimulate meritocracy as their leit motif. For meritocracy to exist, criteria are necessarily to account for research and teaching productivity. Evidently, the establishment of these criteria is fundamental at the time of the evaluations. Currently, the continent shows enormous variations in the minimally necessary conditions for the institutionalization of the discipline. In some countries not even a degree in political science at undergraduate or graduated can be obtained. In others, less than
five doctors in political science are currently working at the university realm. The urgent necessity of professionalization continues being an important subject to consider.
Given the presumed marginal – or at best the ‘rubber-stamp legitimising’ – character of Latin American legislatures, they ‘have escaped careful scrutiny’. Even in cases where legislatures are supposed to play a much more significant role... more
Given the presumed marginal – or at best the ‘rubber-stamp legitimising’ – character of Latin American legislatures, they ‘have escaped careful scrutiny’. Even in cases where legislatures are supposed to play a much more significant role than the continental average, such as Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, knowledge of legislative politics is still far from conclusive. This article studies re-election patterns of legislators in Uruguay during the four post-authoritarian elections. During these elections in Uruguay, we observed a decreasing but still high rate of turnover of legislators. These high rates of legislative turnover are affected by a significant number of legislators who do not seek re-election. While inter-party electoral volatility strongly influences the rates of incumbent re-election, intra-party volatility does not seem to have an impact on this phenomenon. Lastly, the closed and blocked lists in conjunction with the Uruguayan multiple simultaneous vote, and the fact that a legislator belongs to the Senate, are additional institutional features that help to explain the turnover and incumbent re-election in the legislature.
En este artículo se estudian y ordenan las diferentes formas con que la ciudadanía decide directamente en las urnas sobre temas de su incumbencia. La apelación directa a la ciudadanía parece cada día más de moda en la región, cuestión que... more
En este artículo se estudian y ordenan las diferentes formas con que la ciudadanía decide directamente en las urnas sobre temas de su incumbencia. La apelación directa a la ciudadanía parece cada día más de moda en la región, cuestión que muchos autores ven como la utilización de recursos institucionales por parte de las autoridades para avanzar en una determinada agenda política. Sin embargo, la democracia directa es más heterogénea de lo que estos autores conceden. Los mismos resultados de las votaciones populares son, en términos generales, más ajustados de lo que se presupondría. La evidencia muestra
que cuando los movimientos de democracia directa son utilizados por los ejecutivos, en América Latina, la tasa de aprobación no supera el 55%, incluso menor a la tasa de aprobación de cuando los inicia la ciudadanía (56%). Esto no significa que, en algunas oportunidades, las autoridades no los usen como ejercicios de movilización popular o que sean una búsqueda de legitimización popular de los deseos de las elites políticas en turno.
Este artículo estudia el cambio de clivajes en el Chile post autoritario usando evidencia electoral y socio–económica que va más allá de elecciones presidenciales y datos de opinión pública. Esta investigación determina que las... more
Este artículo estudia el cambio de clivajes en el Chile post autoritario usando evidencia electoral y socio–económica que va más allá de elecciones presidenciales y datos de opinión pública. Esta investigación determina que las condiciones socio económicas (medidas a través del Índice de Desarrollo Humano) tienen los efectos esperados en cuanto al porcentaje de votos recibidos por las dos coaliciones mayoritarias del país (la coalición gubernamental Concertación y el bloque opositor Alianza). En términos generales, la Concertación obtiene mejores resultados en las comunas de mayor índice de desarrollo humano y la Alianza en comunas con niveles más bajos de desarrollo humano. Si consideramos los efectos curvilíneos, la Alianza por Chile vota mejor en las comunas con valores extremos de IDH y la Concertación dentro de las comunas con valores medios. En otras palabras, la Concertación presenta una distribución con forma de U invertida (∩) y la Alianza lo opuesto (∪). Respecto al voto de la mujer, se puede afirmar que, si bien tiende a favorecer a los partidos de la Alianza por Chile, simultáneamente tiende significativamente a votar más a las mujeres que a los hombres, dándose así una suerte de solidaridad de género.
This article explores the problem of conceptualizing and measuring the quality of democracy in Latin America. The first part discusses the use of the concept and the need for an operational measure. It explores three dimensions of the... more
This article explores the problem of conceptualizing and measuring the quality of democracy in Latin America. The first part discusses the use of the concept and the need for an operational measure. It explores three dimensions of the quality of democracy: civil rights, participation and effective competition. The second part develops an indicator of effective competition, one of the key dimensions of the concept. The third part analyses the empirical relationship between all three dimensions in 18 Latin American countries between 1978 and 1996. The study constructs summary measures of the quality of democracy in several ways, and show that the ranking of the cases is highly consistent no matter the procedure applied. The final section tests the validity of the measure and discusses its limitations.
Este artículo analiza cómo ha variado la polarización del sistema de partidos uruguayo desde la restauración democrática hasta 1997. El trabajo se divide en cuatro partes. La primera responde a la pregunta ¿en qué medida ha habido un... more
Este artículo analiza cómo ha variado la polarización del sistema de partidos uruguayo desde la restauración democrática hasta 1997. El trabajo se divide en cuatro partes. La primera responde a la pregunta ¿en qué medida ha habido un cambio en la polarización del sistema de partidos uruguayo entre 1986 y 1997? Esta pregunta será abordada a partir de una comparación del continuo izquierda-derecha en estos dos momentos. La segunda sección examina en qué medida los lemas perciben diferencias en el sistema de partidos uruguayo. Intenta, además,
generar posibles hipótesis que expliquen los desplazamientos que ha habido en el sistema de partidos. Luego, en la tercera parte se determina la necesidad de complementar, y así enriquecer, el continuo ideológico izquierda-derecha con
otra dimensión. Con este cometido, se propone utilizar un eje liberal-conservador. A partir de esta complementación se desarrolla un primer mapa ideológico del sistema de partidos y fracciones del Uruguay. Este nos permitirá apreciar, no
sólo la ubicación relativa de los partidos y fracciones, sino también la dispersión ideológica de los lemas. Por último, en la última sección, se escruta en qué sentido ha cambiado el sistema de partidos uruguayo en estos once años y propone
pistas para continuar abordando el tema.
Among stable democracies, Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of direct democratic devices at the national level. If we analyze the relationship between the share of “yes” votes received by any popular initiative and the share of... more
Among stable democracies, Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of direct democratic devices at the national level. If we analyze the relationship between the share of “yes” votes received by any popular initiative and the share of votes received by politicians who politically supported it, we observe a strikingly high positive correlation of 0.9. Explaining this correlation is the central objective of this paper. Three alternative hypotheses are plausible: First, such a correlation could be a spurious association due to aggregation bias. Second, PI results could be reflections of economic conditions. And third, Uruguayans are extremely consistent in following their political parties’ advice. This paper finds that when Uruguayans go to the polls to vote on a popular initiative, their vote choice is primarily the result of their party loyalty, rather than their reaction to economic conditions. In testing my hypotheses I rely on the following statistical methods: King’s ‘Ecological Inference,’ multivariate regression, and path analysis. The data come from seven popular initiatives in Uruguay since 1985 (133 observations).
The study of coalition formation has primarily focused on the analysis of parliamentary regimes. This article examines the dynamics of coalition formation and breakdown under presidential regimes using evidence from Uruguay (1989-99).... more
The study of coalition formation has primarily focused on the analysis of parliamentary regimes. This article examines the dynamics of coalition formation and breakdown under presidential regimes using evidence from Uruguay (1989-99). Using logistic regression I show that while coalitions are more likely to form immediately after a presidential election, the probability of a political group remaining in an executive coalition decreases as the presidential term elapses. As a result, cycles of cooperation and stalemate among political actors are likely to occur. I also conclude that not only the prospects for political cooperation, but also the likelihood of a given fraction leaving a governing coalition, are explained by the following variables: ideological affinity between the president’s fraction and another political group; presidential approval ratings; affiliation of a fraction with the president’s party; proximity of the coming election; and the fairness of the coalition agreement
Altman, David. 2016. “Comisiones Cívicas para ampliar la oferta política: Articulando la democracia directa y representativa a través de la deliberación democrática” In Partidos políticos y elecciones: Representación Política en América... more
Altman, David. 2016. “Comisiones Cívicas para ampliar la oferta política: Articulando la democracia directa y representativa a través de la deliberación democrática” In Partidos políticos y elecciones: Representación Política en América Latina, ed. Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla. Lima: JNE, PUCP, PNUD. Pp. 121-141. [ISBN: 978-612-4150-62-3].
In the academic literature concerning the Chilean transition, we find that some questions have not been answered satisfactorily: What was the international impact on the Chilean transition to democracy? How much influence was there from... more
In the academic literature concerning the Chilean transition, we find that some questions have not been answered satisfactorily: What was the international impact on the Chilean transition to democracy? How much influence was there from international aid both from countries themselves as well as from organizations outside Chile? Where was this aid coming from, how was it manifesting itself, and what was its goal and to whom did it go? How significant was the organizational power of the opposition groups in enabling the cooperation to become efficient and important? The bias toward internal phenomena due to the influential lead roles played by local actors, has caused interest to wane in regards to the international impact.
This chapter seeks to fill this gap by focusing of how the interaction between international factors and the political strategies of local actors influenced the success of the Chilean transition. In terms of the international context, we argue that the transition process was mainly conditioned by changes in international politics of the U.S. government and its relations with the military regime, and by the strong international economic crisis that hit Chile - as most of the region - in the early eighties. Both events contributed to a political opening and the articulation of a democratic opposition; a process that during the early years of Pinochet's regime was fraught with difficulty, mainly due to the fact that political and civil liberties were drastically restricted.
Ha existido una lluvia de ideas sobre el futuro de Chile y como estaba previsto, cada agrupación y cada colectivo se encuentra pujando por su combinación institucional preferida. Bajo la suposición que es ahora o nunca, cada quien... more
Ha existido una lluvia de ideas sobre el futuro de Chile y como estaba previsto, cada agrupación y cada colectivo se encuentra pujando por su combinación institucional preferida. Bajo la suposición que es ahora o nunca, cada quien defiende su propuesta como si estuviésemos en el minuto 90 del partido. Creo que es un grave error...
En esta brevísima nota, a menos de 24hrs de cerradas las urnas de las elecciones del domingo, intentaré señalar algunos aspectos que hasta el momento no han sido apuntalados como creo que ameritan. Toda reforma electoral tiene sus... more
En esta brevísima nota, a menos de 24hrs de cerradas las urnas de las elecciones del domingo, intentaré señalar algunos aspectos que hasta el momento no han sido apuntalados como creo que ameritan. Toda reforma electoral tiene sus aspectos positivos y los negativos. Dentro de lo virtuoso que vimos ayer, el nuevo sistema electoral logró mejoras substanciales en cuanto a la representación de mujeres y parcialmente en relación a la representación de los pueblos originarios (aunque esto último tan solo simbólicamente). Más aun, a la representación de mujeres se le suma otro aspecto no menos importante: nos dio a los ciudadanos y ciudadanas una mayor libertad en las urnas (aunque no por eso logró que, para usar palabras de la Presidenta de la República, " reflejara justamente lo que somos "). Me explico. El motor detrás de la gran reforma electoral del 2015 (hecha a través del Mensaje Presidencial 076-362 de 2014), fue la gran esperanza de generar un sistema más proporcional y más justo. Sin embargo, como se leerá mas abajo, estimo que se puede afirmar que no logró ni lo uno ni lo otro. El nuevo sistema resulto ser menos proporcional que el anterior y encima permitió que un número significativamente más grande de legisladores sean electos por efecto de arrastre. (Que no se me mal interprete: lo que digo no desconoce el hecho que el binominalismo, como sistema electoral, estaba agotado y que si o si, necesitaba un cambio substancial).
Nuevamente el movimiento BDS intenta que una universidad chilena, en este caso la PUC se sume al boicot contra universidades israelíes. Una vez más, debo decir " no ". Eliminar de un plumazo una potencial conversación e intercambio entre... more
Nuevamente el movimiento BDS intenta que una universidad chilena, en este caso la PUC se sume al boicot contra universidades israelíes. Una vez más, debo decir " no ". Eliminar de un plumazo una potencial conversación e intercambio entre personas que piensan un mismo tema por el simple hecho de pertenecer a una universidad en particular, tiene-como argumenté en otra oportunidad—tintes fascistoides, es antidemocrático, particularmente absurdo, y muy especialmente, contraproducente.
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En estas líneas me detengo en la pregunta que próximamente la ciudadanía de Colombia deberá responder en las urnas. Esta pregunta constituye un eslabón fundamental de todo un ciclo político cuya potencialidad es inconmensurable para país... more
En estas líneas me detengo en la pregunta que próximamente la ciudadanía de Colombia deberá responder en las urnas. Esta pregunta constituye un eslabón fundamental de todo un ciclo político cuya potencialidad es inconmensurable para país (y consecuentemente, para toda América Latina). Mi afán aquí no es ni criticar al gobierno, ni debilitar el proceso plebiscitario, sino que, muy por el contrario, mi punto es simplemente contextualizar y señalar algunos errores de procedimiento que se podrían haber evitado. Así como percibo que se podría haber apelado a mayores cuotas de republicanismo en el proceso de redacción de la pregunta y explico el por qué, no dejo de subrayar mi optimismo frente la terminación del conflicto y el encuentro de soluciones institucionales ampliamente consensuadas.
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(El País, Madrid, Febrero 18, 2015)
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¿Se podrá llegar algún día a una buena proporcionalidad, sin aumentar un solo diputado, sin tocar los distritos, favoreciendo el encuentro de grandes mayorías? Es muy difícil. Sin embargo, aquí argumento que se puede pensar en otros... more
¿Se podrá llegar algún día a una buena proporcionalidad, sin aumentar un solo diputado, sin tocar los distritos, favoreciendo el encuentro de grandes mayorías? Es muy difícil. Sin embargo, aquí argumento que se puede pensar en otros sistemas que no aumentan los legisladores, no redistritan, y sin embargo pueden llegar a una proporcionalidad casi perfecta, dándole aún más libertad al votante alterando únicamente la papeleta del voto y la fórmula de asignación de bancas. Efectivamente hay que cambiar el binominal pero creo que no por un sistema de distritos pequeños y medianos como se ha venido proponiendo últimamente.
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Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focusing their attention on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the... more
Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focusing their attention on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the complexity of the Dahlian dimension of inclusiveness, a sine-qua-non condition for defining a polyarchy. Firmly anchored in the literature and democratic theory, this measurement paper proposes a new index of inclusiveness: Electoral Residential Inclusiveness. This measure assesses how large the overlap between those who make the law and those who are subject to it is. It is shown how some regimes—including some of those that have been systematically considered strong democracies—exhibit such a considerable gap between these two groups that their democratic credentials should be questioned. This index has a clear impact on the way we measure and, most important, understand democracies. Unpacking this forgotten dimension, this work helps to fine tune the efforts to measure democracies.
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. This axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations. As previous research has shown, however, the truth of this statement is highly contingent on the... more
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. This axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations. As previous research has shown, however, the truth of this statement is highly contingent on the definitions of both democracy and conflict. Based on this fact, this project has two aims: one empirical and one theoretical. Empirically, it revises this literature, making three substantial improvements: 1) it uses a more robust and transparent measure of democracy (V-DEM); 2) it does not rely on arbitrary cut points between democratic and non-democratic regimes; and 3) it combines the theoretical perspectives of similarity-based and normative views on the reasons behind the peace among regimes. These methodological improvements allow us to generate a new theory of democratic peace, which complements both similarity-based and institutional arguments. We find robust evidence that the higher a dyad’s level of democracy, and the smaller the difference between the democratic scores of its members (‘democratic spread’), the lower the probability of war (and also militarized interstate disputes, MID) between that pair of states. Thus, not only is the core principle of the democratic peace revealed to be strong enough to withstand different measures of democracy, but it also offers an alternative explanation of conflict.
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Economic growth has become one of the leitmotivs academicians and pundits ask once and again to assess democratic endurance over time. While large portion of the literature posits that economic growth is positive for democracy (eg.... more
Economic growth has become one of the leitmotivs academicians and pundits ask once and again to assess democratic endurance over time. While large portion of the literature posits that economic growth is positive for democracy (eg. Przeworski et al. 2000), for other scholars it is a profoundly destabilizing force (eg. Olson 1963; Huntington 1968). This paper fills these contrasting views asking whether economic growth can undermine democratic competition. We hypothesize that the relation between economic growth and party competition is mediated by the strength of political institutions and free expression. Economic growth promotes incumbency advantage. Rulers can artificially extend this advantage by narrowing the space for negative coverage and dissident voices as long as they have political room for maneuvering. We leverage exogenously-driven growth in Latin America to test this argument. Over the past two decades, the region experienced accelerated growth as a result of a global commodity boom. Using data for 18 Latin American countries during this period, we show that faster economic growth led to significant increases in incumbency advantage in the legislature only where free speech was under attack. Our findings have important implications for literatures on democratization, natural resources, and economic voting.
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To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP), which is applied to 200 polities worldwide. This index results from the aggregation... more
To what extent is direct democracy achieved in current polities? To answer this question, I develop an index, Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP), which is applied to 200 polities worldwide.  This index results from the aggregation of the scores of four types of mechanisms of direct democracy: popular initiatives, popular referendums, obligatory referendums, and authorities’ plebiscites.  This index measures: (1) how easy it is to initiate and approve each type of popular vote and (2) how consequential that vote is (if approved).  Ease of initiation is measured by: (a) the existence of a direct democracy process, (b) the number of signatures needed, and (c) time limits to collect signatures.  Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to: (a) participation, (b) approval, (c) supermajority, and (d) district majority.  Consequences are measured by: (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or consultative), and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been used and approved in the past.
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Acknowledging that mechanisms of direct democracy can fall prey to narrow and egoistic interests (regardless of how legitimate they may be) and that legislatures do not always have the incentives to articulate responses to those narrow... more
Acknowledging that mechanisms of direct democracy can fall prey to narrow and egoistic interests (regardless of how legitimate they may be) and that legislatures do not always have the incentives to articulate responses to those narrow interests, I propose a hypothetical reform: any time a popular vote (i.e., initiative, referendum, or authorities’ referendum) is held, representative and direct institutions should be supplied with a stratified random sample of eligible voters convened to advance citizens’ counterproposals. This original institution—which does not exist even in the places where direct democracy is most developed—would discuss, deliberate, and offer an alternative or an improvement to a policy question that is to be decided in the near future; it would refine and enlarge public views on a contentious topic, providing meaningful political choices, and thus strengthening democratic quality. In arguing for this, my research takes insights from two real-world situations—Uruguay’s two 2009 initiatives for constitutional reform—in which citizens’ counterproposals could have played a crucial role in informing public views on a contentious topic and offered an alternative to both sides of the debate.
Only five countries have extended universal voting rights to noncitizen residents for all political spheres (local, intermediate and national): Uruguay in 1934, New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, Malawi in 1994, and Ecuador in 2008.... more
Only five countries have extended universal voting rights to noncitizen residents for all political spheres (local, intermediate and national): Uruguay in 1934, New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, Malawi in 1994, and Ecuador in 2008. These cases constitute a unique intercontinental medley and an opportunity to study the conditions behind such revolutionary change. Through a calibrated comparative strategy based on most similar system designs (inspired by Mill’s method of difference) using QCA, this paper finds that the extension of national voting rights to noncitizen residents transpired in two distinct scenarios. The first setting (Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay) took place within unitary states with already-existing local voting rights for noncitizen residents and settler trajectories, but that were not undergoing a liberalisation process. On the other hand, the second configuration (Ecuador and Malawi) developed within unitary states that recognised nationality by ius soli and were going through a process of liberalisation, but without previous local voting rights for non-citizen residents or a settler trajectory. To our best knowledge, this paper offers the first cross-national explanation that involves all cases that have broadened their respective political communities (demoi) to include national voting rights to all non-citizen residents.
Scholars have paid little attention to the Uruguayan armed forces, an institution that has never been fully entrusted with the country’s external security. This is explained by Uruguay’s geographical condition as a buffer state,... more
Scholars have paid little attention to the Uruguayan armed forces, an institution that has never been fully entrusted with the country’s external security. This is explained by Uruguay’s geographical condition as a buffer state, sandwiched between South America’s biggest countries, Brazil and Argentina. The power differential with either one of them has rendered the prospect of a viable defense futile. Accordingly, those who have studied the Uruguayan military concur that it has traditionally had difficulties finding a place and recognition within the state and society. Throughout its history, the military has been a rather weak institution mostly subordinate to democratic control. After the creation of Uruguay in 1828, it took several decades until a truly national military was established. The late 19th and early 20th century represent an exception in the country’s history as the armed forces underwent a modernization process backed by government resources. Military professionaliz...
There is suggestive evidence that the growth of democracy has stagnated, and even some signs indicate that democracy is in retreat. In such a context, one might have expected to witness an increase in experimentation with democratic... more
There is suggestive evidence that the growth of democracy has stagnated, and even some signs indicate that democracy is in retreat. In such a context, one might have expected to witness an increase in experimentation with democratic innovations such as direct democracy. This is not the case. While there is a spectacular and statistically significant increase in the uses of mechanisms of direct democracy (MDDs) since the early 1990s, 2020 remained notably similar to the previous years in terms of the level of direct democracy worldwide. In 2019, we witnessed less than half of the MDDs we saw in 2018 (eighteen vs. fifty), but, in 2020, the count bounced back to thirty. The COVID-19 pandemic did not halt the march of direct democracy, although it delayed some of its events. Beyond the specific number of popular votes in 2020, direct democracy still tracks almost perfectly with global electoral democracy trends. When all was said and done, however, thirty MDDs were held in 2020: fourteen obligatory referendums (eight in Liberia, two in Chile, and one in Algeria, Italy, Palau, and Northern Cyprus, respectively), six plebiscites (two in New Zealand, two in Liechtenstein, one in Russia, and one in Guinea), five popular initiatives (four in Switzerland and one in Liechtenstein), and five rejective referendums (all in Switzerland).
Candidate recruitment and selection is a complex and opaque process that drives political outcomes and processes. Further, the process of candidate selection is notoriously difficult to study because of its informal nature, the... more
Candidate recruitment and selection is a complex and opaque process that drives political outcomes and processes. Further, the process of candidate selection is notoriously difficult to study because of its informal nature, the multiplicity of actors involved, and because politicians may prefer to obfuscate their motives when asked about their decisions. Still, the literature has made advances in understanding recruitment and selection (R&S) and this article explores this crucial and understudied topic with respect to Latin America. Much literature has considered the importance of political institutions to candidate selection, but these explanations alone are insufficient. Analyses of political institutions have significantly advanced in the region, but in isolation, their explanatory power can fall short, as evident in examples where similar institutional frameworks yield different outcomes . This suggests the need to include informal processes when analyzing candidate recruitment ...
This paper attempts to achieve two goals: first to find under which circumstances coalitions are more likely to form, and second how do they survive once formation is achieved. Because this paper wants to deal with these two major... more
This paper attempts to achieve two goals: first to find under which circumstances coalitions are more likely to form, and second how do they survive once formation is achieved. Because this paper wants to deal with these two major questions, it has two sets of working hypotheses and two different databases. The first part of the analysis, is centered on executive coalition formation; the second, is about who are the actors likely to join an executive coalition and if there is certain pattern of coalition evolution. For the first question a datab ase composed of 129 observation (countryyears) was built. For the second question I utilized a database composed of 1326 cases. Each observation corresponded to a party per year per country and a dummy indicated whether a party belonged to the executive coalition that respective year. Although the paper uses GLS and OLS, the methods were essentially logistic regressions with dummy variables. The findings suggest that governing coalitions are...
Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focusing their attention on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the... more
Contemporary migration flows affect virtually all aspects of the social fabric, democracy included. Focusing their attention on the competitiveness aspects of the regime, comparative measurements of democracy have underestimated the complexity of the Dahlian dimension of inclusiveness, a sine-qua-non condition for defining a polyarchy. Firmly anchored in the literature and democratic theory, this measurement paper proposes a new index of inclusiveness: Electoral Residential Inclusiveness. This measure assesses how large the overlap between those who make the law and those who are subject to it is. It is shown how some regimes—including some of those that have been systematically considered strong democracies—exhibit such a considerable gap between these two groups that their democratic credentials should be questioned. This index has a clear impact on the way we measure and, most important, understand democracies. Unpacking this forgotten dimension, this work helps to fine tune the efforts to measure democracies.
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. Although this axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations, this statement is much more complex than it appears, in part because it is highly... more
Democracies do not take up arms against each other. Although this axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations, this statement is much more complex than it appears, in part because it is highly contingent on the definitions and operationalizations of both democracy and conflict. This article revisits democratic peace theory, combining both institutional constraints and similarity-based arguments. Interactions between the democratic level of the dyad (the average democratic level of its members) and its democratic spread (difference between the democratic scores of its members) create a dyadic triangle that encompasses all possible combinations of cases, revisiting which dyads are more prone to conflict. The findings partially confirm and partially refute both the institutional constraints and the similarity-based arguments, leading to a nuanced alternative theory: the Interactive Model of Democratic Peace. Akin to democratic peace theory, our evi...
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This article helps fill the void in U.S. political science's approach to Latin American political science and its institutionalization. One example of that void is that PS: Political Science & Politics has recently published several... more
This article helps fill the void in U.S. political science's approach to Latin American political science and its institutionalization. One example of that void is that PS: Political Science & Politics has recently published several pieces on the state of the discipline in diverse regions of the world but, despite its relative importance, none on the state of the discipline in Latin America (see, for example, Bogaç and Turan 2004; Rizayev 2004; and Sharapova 2005). This omission is remarkable because this continent has both nourished U.S. political science by providing several outstanding colleagues, many of whom have generated controversial and important arguments against the dominant paradigms in the discipline, and because, for better or worse, Latin America has been considered the “backyard” of the United States. Arguably, because of its economic, social, and political ties with the U.S., any major change in Latin America would have greater and more immediate implications fo...
Mainwaring and Scully's concept of party system institutionalization (PSI) has greatly influenced the literature on parties and party systems. This article contributes to the “revisionist” literature on PSI by exploring the recent... more
Mainwaring and Scully's concept of party system institutionalization (PSI) has greatly influenced the literature on parties and party systems. This article contributes to the “revisionist” literature on PSI by exploring the recent evolution of the concept's four dimensions in Chile. It finds that the Chilean party system is not homogenously institutionalized (as conventionally argued) but is simultaneously frozen at the elite level and increasingly disconnected from civil society. In this regard, it approaches some recent descriptions of the Brazilian party system, a prototypical example of an “inchoate” party system that has gained stability over time without developing roots in society. This article argues that the current operationalization of the concept of PSI is problematic. Not only should all four dimensions of the concept be simultaneously measured, probably through multiple indicators for each one, but their trends across time and space should also be better integr...
Only five countries have extended universal voting rights to noncitizen residents for all political spheres (local, intermediate and national): Uruguay in 1934, New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, Malawi in 1994, and Ecuador in 2008.... more
Only five countries have extended universal voting rights to noncitizen residents for all political spheres (local, intermediate and national): Uruguay in 1934, New Zealand in 1975, Chile in 1980, Malawi in 1994, and Ecuador in 2008. These cases constitute a unique intercontinental medley and an opportunity to study the conditions behind such revolutionary change. Through a calibrated comparative strategy based on most similar system designs (inspired by Mill’s method of difference) using QCA, this paper finds that the extension of national voting rights to noncitizen residents transpired in two distinct scenarios. The first setting (Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay) took place within unitary states with already-existing local voting rights for noncitizen residents and settler trajectories, but that were not undergoing a liberalisation process. On the other hand, the second configuration (Ecuador and Malawi) developed within unitary states that recognised nationality by ius soli and were going through a process of liberalisation, but without previous local voting rights for non-citizen residents or a settler trajectory. To our best knowledge, this paper offers the first cross-national explanation that involves all cases that have broadened their respective political communities (demoi) to include national voting rights to all non-citizen residents.
The fact that equitable social policy expanded drastically in Latin America during the left turn and during a time of prosperity does not necessarily mean that the ideological color of governing parties and economic growth are the engines... more
The fact that equitable social policy expanded drastically in Latin America during the left turn and during a time of prosperity does not necessarily mean that the ideological color of governing parties and economic growth are the engines behind changes in social policy, as is usually claimed by part of the literature. Using panel data from Latin American countries for 1990–2013, this paper offers an alternative explanation, derived from previous qualitative research, that the level of political competition, the strength of civil society, and wealth are the key factors behind the expansion of equitable social policy. Once these explanations are included in our models, the ideological leaning of governments and economic growth lose statistical significance. Thus, this paper challenges dominant approaches that consider social policy change in Latin America a consequence of the ideological leaning of the government and economic growth.
... 489 “While my candidacy held fast, I was visiting France and Switzerland where I stud-ied closely the thousand aspects of their democratic political life, and compared the political forms of the European States with the archaic and... more
... 489 “While my candidacy held fast, I was visiting France and Switzerland where I stud-ied closely the thousand aspects of their democratic political life, and compared the political forms of the European States with the archaic and very old Constitution of my country. ...
... de las Telecomunicaciones (Workers' Union of the National Telecommunications Company), Uruguay ... may be agonizingly long for citizens whose preferences are system-atically unheard ... contemporary democracies face different... more
... de las Telecomunicaciones (Workers' Union of the National Telecommunications Company), Uruguay ... may be agonizingly long for citizens whose preferences are system-atically unheard ... contemporary democracies face different challenges, such as transparency, access, and ...
This introduction does not try to be more than a first approach on the state-of-the-art of political science in the continent. It is argued that Latin American political science must build university institutions that emphasize clear... more
This introduction does not try to be more than a first approach on the state-of-the-art of political science in the continent. It is argued that Latin American political science must build university institutions that emphasize clear rules and defined criteria that stimulate meritocracy as their leit motif. For meritocracy to exist, criteria are necessarily to account for research and teaching productivity. Evidently, the establish- ment of these criteria is fundamental at the time of the evaluations. Currently, the continent shows enormous variations in the minimally necessary conditions for the institutionalization of the discipline. In some countries not even a degree in political science at undergraduate or graduated can be obtained. In others, less than five doctors in political science are currently working at the university realm. The urgent necessity of professionalization continues being an important subject to consider.
The study of coalition formation has primarily focused on the analysis of parliamentary regimes. This article examines the dynamics of coalition formation and breakdown under presidential regimes using evidence from Uruguay (1989-99).... more
The study of coalition formation has primarily focused on the analysis of parliamentary regimes. This article examines the dynamics of coalition formation and breakdown under presidential regimes using evidence from Uruguay (1989-99). Using logistic regression I show that while coalitions are more likely to form immediately after a presidential election, the probability of a political group remaining in an executive coalition decreases as the presidential term elapses. As a result, cycles of cooperation and stalemate among political actors are likely to occur. I also conclude that not only the prospects for political cooperation but also the likelihood of a given fraction leaving a governing coalition are explained by the following variables: ideological affinity between the president's fraction and another political group; presidential approval ratings; affiliation of a fraction with the president's party; proximity of the coming election; and the fairness of the coalition ...
ABSTRACT Most procedural definitions and measurements of democracy are missing one crucial component: direct popular decision-making. This is an important gap that does not allow users of data to ascertain some important variation among... more
ABSTRACT Most procedural definitions and measurements of democracy are missing one crucial component: direct popular decision-making. This is an important gap that does not allow users of data to ascertain some important variation among democracies. Thus, I propose a new measure that is strongly anchored in a procedural definition of democracy but includes this missing dimension. The proposed measure is well rooted in the literature and introduces a dimension whereby citizens may become the masters of their political fate at any time and without the consent of elected authorities, while avoiding the inclusion of extraneous attributes that are not highlighted in democratic theory. Tests of the validity of the new indicator, using Latin American cases, show that there is enough room for its inclusion without the typical collinearity problems this literature faces. This indicator is not only sound, but it is empirically appealing as it performs better than others when testing relevant hypotheses. Introduction As the standards of our societies evolve, those of our democracies do so as well, and Dahl's maxim that 'whatever form it takes, the democracy of our successors will not and cannot be the democracy of our predecessors' seems more current than ever. 1 This constant flux makes the mentioned endeavour a never-ending process, because democracy is almost certainly one of the most complex concepts in political science and 'it has not been and may never be measured in all its many-faceted, multidimensional glory'. 2 Despite the imprecisions of the concept of democracy, there are some attributes that need to be present to justify labelling a contemporary regime as democratic. # 2013 Taylor & Francis
... Democracy creates the potential for citizen participation and opposition to elected officials, but in many countries citizen apathy or weak party competition, among other possible reasons, hinder the development of this potential. ...

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