Tami Yaguri

Individuals who know meaning in their lives understand why they wake up in the morning. They believe their waking hours are not wasted, and go to sleep with a sense of wholeness. A meaningful life is a creation––our life-creation. It brings together the unique way we live (a personal identity), and the things we believe in and are committed to (a worldview). A meaningful life does not guarantee happiness in the sense of pleasure and enjoyment. It could be quite the opposite. Some meaningful lives are fraught with painful struggle. If we must choose between the two, better choose meaning. Happiness is transient, whereas meaning lasts till the end of one's life.

Happiness is fleeting, but meaning endures—even through terrible unhappiness. This book helps to unravel the riddle of how to bring meaning to one’s life. It outlines a disciplined technique for uncovering meaning in life. This meaning becomes a north star for navigation and appears in the overlap between self-identity and worldview.

The existential challenge of attaining and preserving faith is as difficult today as ever before, and perhaps even more so in a rational, scientifically-oriented culture. Yet the means by which a believer can defy or betray his or her authentic faith have not changed much since Kierkegaard’s era. This book aims to present Kierkegaardian notions of a believer’s answers to the existentially haunting questions of faith and authenticity.
Why was Abraham not concerned that he might be mad when he heard the voices that ordered him to sacrifice his son? How does a believer handle the possibility that he might err? How does one tackle self-doubt, the possibility that one’s faith is merely a form of self-deception?

The existential challenge of attaining and preserving faith is as difficult today as ever before, and perhaps even more so in a rational, scientifically-oriented culture. Yet the means by which a believer can defy or betray his or her authentic faith have not changed much since Kierkegaard’s era. This book aims to present Kierkegaardian notions of a believer’s answers to the existentially haunting questions of faith and authenticity. Why was Abraham not concerned that he might be mad when he heard the voices that ordered him to sacrifice his son? How does a believer handle the possibility that he might err? How does one tackle self-doubt, the possibility that one’s faith is merely a form of self-deception?

While the role of the comic in Søren Kierkegaard’s thought has been thoroughly studied by diverse scholars, in this paper I will ask whether humor in Kierkegaard’s religious sphere amounts to seduction or to temptation. By “seduction” I will mean a luring that can be viewed as positive or neutral, whereas by “temptation” I mean a negative seduction that takes advantage of the tempted fool, leaving him empty-handed. Irony, comic jest and humor are existential categories in Kierkegaard’s three spheres of existence. Irony and comic jest play a seductive role and can be regarded as neutral or even positive. In the religious sphere, humor can be assessed as temptation. Kierkegaard humorously lures the one who wishes to believe. With humor, one is readying oneself for a leap of faith. The leap may fail; one can fall, crash, and be left empty-handed.

Faith and well-being are the main concern of this paper. The connection between the two is discussed in three lessons that Søren Kierkegaard provides in his religious discourses "What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the Air." The importance of the connection between faith and well-being, especially within Kierkegaard's authorship, derives from his definition of a human being as "a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." It is important to note that this synthesis is not yet a self, not yet an authentic human being. In order to become a self a deviation is needed, a split within this elementary synthesis. Only upon achieving such split a new synthesis is reconstructed, the synthesis that amounts to an authentic selfhood. The believer who has stopped worrying over his/her mundane concerns, by shifting its existential gravity towards God, will then have to reconstruct a new synthesis. This new synthesis will resemble the fundamental one in almost every aspect. But the difference would lie in choosing God, in the believer's hidden inwardness. Faith's fruits of eternal happiness are attained strictly through the journey undertaken by the believer's inner self.

The I-You dialogue of mutually reciprocal engagement makes a difference of heaven and hell. In the first out of four suggested types of I-You dialogue discussed in this article, all the I’s—of the primary word I-You—own a dialogical perspective. In the other three, it is the I who has an experience of creating and engaging in a dialogue that shortly achieves some kind of mutuality with You. Epistemologically, the four suggested types differ by the qualities of the I who engages in dialogue. The second stance is an I-You dialogue of sympathy. A third possibility is an I-You dialogue of empathy. A fourth possibility aims higher to a dialogue that transcends human mutuality by compassion and reaches a heavenly dialogue.

This paper identifies four positions that represent the views of both philosophical practitioners and existential psychotherapists on their disciplines and the nature of the relationship existing between them. These positions are the antagonistic one, claiming that the two disciplines are radically different and should follow different criteria in choosing their clients and methods. The second position is the ancillary one, suggesting that the therapist can also be a philosopher, but the philosophical component of his or her practice is limited to the therapist’s theoretical background and the role of the therapist is distinct from that of a philosophical practitioner. The “family resemblance” position suggests that the two disciplines can and should increase the exchanges in terms of methodologies and ideas, since the similarities between them outnumber the differences. The majority of the authors that share this view consider the philosophical practitioners as therapists and vice ...

The aim of this paper is to define what is qualitative about qualitative dialectic. Its main point is to differentiate between qualitative and quantitative dialectic. I characterize three forms of dialectic to be able to distinguish qualitative dialectic from what it is not. Qualitative dialectic is defined by Kierkegaard as the method by which philosophical discourse should engage with an individual. Kierkegaard clarifies that in relation to individual existence it is impossible to acquire genuine knowledge from a mere speculative vantage point. Only qualitative dialectic should be engaged in existential matters. Kierkegaard s view of stages on life s way, known as the esthetic, the ethical and the religious, also entails a development in his dialectical method, by which the different stages are conceived. Whereas it is possible to find texts in which each stage is distinctively characterized, the main concern in this article is to elucidate the specific dialectical method employed by Kierkegaard in the religious stage, a method which is not directly applied in the two others. The process of becoming religious culminates in Kierkegaard s philosophy with the adoption of the pseudonym Johannes Climacus at the point at which the believer attains an absolute relation to the absolute. The dialectical method at this religious stage is characterized by Climacus as qualitative dialectic. This dialectic consists of manifold thought processes through which the believer reflects on his own existential purpose (that is, becoming a Christian) and then rethinks it vis-vis his feelings and will, and other specific thoughts, proper to his own existence. The complexity inherent in this existential thinking process of qualitative dialectic renders it difficult to understand, and, more significantly, to implement and master. In order to understand what qualitative dialectic is, it seems essential to differentiate it from other dialectical methods. Hence, the question I shall ask in this paper is what is qual1 Climacus makes explicit references to this terminology in his writings. See, for example, SKS 7, 354, 364, 397, 469, 511, 551 / CUP1, 388, 399, 436, 517, 562, 606. itative about qualitative dialectic? What makes qualitative dialectic qualitative? In his journals, Kierkegaard attributes great importance to qualitative dialectic: “Everything turns upon the distinction absolute between quantitative dialectic and qualitative dialectic. All logic is quantitative dialectic or modal dialectic, for everything is and the whole is one and the same. Qualitative dialectic belongs to existence [Tilvœrelsen].” Understanding qualitative dialectic is not an easy task for Kierkegaard s scholars, since the question is not answered directly and explicitly in his writings, including those of the religious pseudonyms. Though featuring in his religious philosophical texts (such as Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript) this dialectic is neither defined nor methodologically characterized. Perhaps this very abstruseness reflects Kierkegaard s belief that qualitative dialectic cannot be directly defined, since it first and foremost belongs to existence, which eludes any definition. Whether or not this obscurity is intentional, I believe that in order to understand the essence of qualitative dialectic, some significant, if indirect distinctions are required. The main point is to differentiate between qualitative and quantitative dialectic. To that end, I will first characterize three forms of dialectic, then I will distinguish qualitative dialectic from what it is not, through a consideration of Kierkegaard s esthetic and ethical texts (in which it does not feature). Both the esthetic and the ethical spheres are addressed here only in regards to their contribution to the understanding of qualitative dialectic. I. Three Forms of Dialectic Dialectic is both the art of debate and a method of thinking. Dialectical thinking employs abstract thought and imagination, by which it strives to approximate a processing of actual events. It makes claims about human 2 SKS 18, 303, JJ:492 / JP 1, 759. 3 Imagination is relevant also in viewing dialectic as a trial-and-error method which maintains that “human thought develops in a way characterized by what is called the dialectical triad: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.” Karl Popper emphasizes that “the synthesis will, in every case, embody some new idea which cannot be reduced to earlier stages of the development. In other words, the synthesis will usually be much more than a construction out of material supplied by thesis and antithesis”; moreover, “dialectic is not applicable without exceptions...dialectic has no special affinity to logic.” Karl Popper, Conjectures and Tamar Aylat-Yaguri 264

Faith and well-being are the main concern of this paper. The connection between the two is discussed in three lessons that Søren Kierkegaard provides in his religious discourses "What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the Air." The importance of the connection between faith and well-being, especially within Kierkegaard's authorship, derives from his definition of a human being as "a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." It is important to note that this synthesis is not yet a self, not yet an authentic human being. In order to become a self a deviation is needed, a split within this elementary synthesis. Only upon achieving such split a new synthesis is reconstructed, the synthesis that amounts to an authentic selfhood. The believer who has stopped worrying over his/her mundane concerns, by shifting its existential gravity towards God, will then have to reconstruct a new synthesis. This new synthesis will resemble the fundamental one in almost every aspect. But the difference would lie in choosing God, in the believer's hidden inwardness. Faith's fruits of eternal happiness are attained strictly through the journey undertaken by the believer's inner self.

Kierkegaard’s interest in Judaism is derived from his interest in Christianity, and he seems to be asking himself: which is the true religion? In this, he also seems to be asking: who is an authentic believer? A believer’s authenticity entails singular uniqueness, whereas, “For the Christian who now looks at Judaism it is apparent that Judaism was merely a point of transition; but who vouches for its not being the same with Christianity”?  Here are two readings of the final phrase of the quotation: it could ask, a) “who vouches for Judaism being the same as Christianity” or b) “who vouches for Christianity, like Judaism, being a transition to The Truth.” Both readings are valid.

in T. Aylat-Yaguri and J. Stewart (edt.). The Authenticity of Faith in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, pp. 68-76.

Kierkegaard writes on "Jewishness," “Judaism” and "Jews" in many of his books, and the concept is mentioned directly or indirectly in most of his published works. Kierkegaard's interest in Judaism is derived from his interest in Christianity. Which is the true religion?

The purpose of this article is to detect an impact of Kierkegaard’s philosophy on Kook’s thought. After a short introduction of Kook (in section I), I shall review the ways and sources by which he may have become acquainted with Kierkegaard’s philosophy (in section II). Finally, in section III, I will compare, using leading Kierkegaardian concepts, Kook’s view on faith, through Abraham in the binding of Isaac.

The “Art of Meaning” aims to uncover personal meaning through dialogue. There is an art to drawing out personal meaning (Yaguri, 2018). Meaning in life links to psychological wellbeing (Frankl, 2014). It appears at the overlap of self-identity and worldview. The art of dialogue with an interviewee aims to express a mutually satisfying formulation, a simple but powerful phrase that encapsulates the interviewee’s meaning. Once formulated, this radiant kernel contributes to clarity of thought, and connects fundamental life decisions and values.

Meaningful life is tightly connected with psychological well-being (Frankl, 2014; Stegera, Oishib & Kashdanc, 2009). Meaningfulness is present in strong connections with self, others and the world (Debats, Drost & Hansen, 1995). Formulating meaning in one's life is an art. The "art of meaning" is an approach of focusing and formulating meaning in dialogical exchange, with a semi-structured interview, developed to draw out meaning in a person's life (Yaguri, 2018). Meaning appears at the overlap of self-identity and worldview. Through dialogue with an interviewee, a mutually satisfying formulation emerges. Once formulated, it contributes to clarity of thought, and sketches a line connecting fundamental life decisions.

The aim of this paper is to define what is qualitative about qualitative dialectic. Its main point is to differentiate between qualitative and quantitative dialectic: To that end, I characterize three forms of dialectic, to be able to distinguish qualitative dialectic from what it is not.
          Qualitative dialectic is defined by Kierkegaard as the method by which philosophical discourse should engage with an individual. Kierkegaard clarify that in relation to individual existence it is impossible to acquire genuine knowledge from a mere speculative vantage point. Only qualitative dialectic should be engaged in existential matters.

The self as an entity of being and becoming, is revealed as a dynamic process of constant change. The nature of this process as well as the structure of the self in Kierkegaard’s philosophy takes more than one shape as his thought evolves. This may be somewhat surprising. Isnʼt the self’s structure and its lineation essentially constant, while the content alone is the changing ingredient? This is not the case in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, where the very formation of the self changes (along with its content). In this paper I elaborate on Kierkegaard’s early view of the self’s structure. I, then emphasize the dramatic change we find in Sickness unto Death, where the self is changed in both structure and content.

J. Golomb on T. Aylat-Yaguri's Human Dialogue with the Absolute: Kierkegaard’s Ladder to the Climax of Spiritual Existence in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources. Volume 18, Tome V. Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre. UK: Ashgate, 2016, pp. 21-23.

Aylat-Yaguri. on Prof. Edward F. Mooney's “Selves in Discord and Resolve”. in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources. Vol. 18 Tome III. Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Denmark. London and New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 97-100.

Aylat-Yaguri. on Prof. Edward F. Mooney's “On Søren Kierkegaard: Dialogue, Polemics, Lost Intimacy and Time”. in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources. Vol. 18 Tome III. Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Denmark. London and New York: Routledge, 2016, pp. 101-104.