Serhun Al

Patterns of Nationhood and Saving the State in Turkey tackles a  theoretical puzzle in understanding the state policy changes toward minorities and  nationhood, first by placing the state in the historical context of the international system and second by unpacking the state through analysis of intra-elite competition in relation to the counter-discourses by minority groups within the context of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
What explains the persistence and change in state policies toward  minorities and nationhood? Under what conditions do states change their policies toward minorities? Why do the state elites reconsider the state- minority relations and change government policies toward nationhood? Adopting a comparative-historical analysis, the book unpacks these  research questions and builds a theoretical framework by looking at three paradigmatic policy changes: Ottomanism in the mid-19th century, Turkish nationalism in the early 1920s, and multiculturalism in Turkey in the early 2000s. While the book reveals the role of international context, intrastate elite competition, and non-state actors in such policy changes, it argues that state elites adopt either exclusionary or inclusionary policies based on the idea of “survival of the state.”

This is a short analysis of Mehmet Ali Birand's interview with Ocalan in 1988 in Bekaa Valley. It is interesting that after more than 35 years many topics in the interview remain relevant today with regards to the Kurdish question in the Middle East.

Modern Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East was largely driven by
defensive Realpolitik until the end of the twentieth century. This is why scholars have been puzzled with the increasing militarization and offensiveness of Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, as well as severing ties with the US-led Western alliance in the 21st century. The debates have been centered on the ideological choices (neo-Ottoman and Islamist) of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) since 2002 in the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This chapter will
broadly outline Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East since the early Republic and discuss the main continuities and ruptures until today.

This chapter emphasizes the human security concerns of the Kurds and how it shapes their threat perception in the Middle East. The security dimension of nationalism has been mostly understudied as many studies on nationalism have focused on the political and social dimensions. However, both for state nationalisms and minority nationalisms, security aspect remains an important dimension in the emergence and path dependency of nationalist discourses. Yet, what these nationalisms understand from security differ to a great extent. While state nationalism prioritizes the security of the state in the sense of its territorial integrity and the interests of “national security” defined by state actors, minority nationalisms tend to define security in broader terms which is beyond the state-centric approach. The security understanding of minority nationalisms tend to be closer to what the United Nations Development Programme framed as “human security.” This chapter attempts to examine the function of nationalism as an instrument of security which is understood differently by state and minority group actors through an analysis of the emergence and historical evolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question. Recent events such as the so-called Kurdish Opening, peace process with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), renewed violence and Turkey’s ambiguous approach to the Kurds under the Islamic State threat in Syria, and the rising popularity of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) will be discussed within the theoretical framework of competing security understandings of state and non-state actors.

How did the First World War (1914-1918) and its aftermath shape and transform the Kurdish political activism and Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East? How did the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and its clauses offering the Kurds an opportunity for self-determination influence the Turkish nationalism and the worldview of the founding fathers of the Republic? In the light of these questions, this article seeks to understand and explain the inter-dependent relationship between the Kurdish aspirations for self-determination and the making of the modern Turkish state and the Republican mindset in the early twentieth century. In so doing, the global market of ideas and the transnational historical context (e.g. debates over Wilsonian self-determination and nationhood, centralization vs. decentralization) will be taken into account as well as the ruptures and continuities in the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition against the state-seeking nationalisms. Understanding this historical context influenced by the transnational and local societal and political forces would shed light to unpacking the state-minority relations in Turkey in general and the modern Kurdish question in the Middle East in particular.

Kurds are considered to be one of the largest ethnic groups in the world-with a population of more than 30 million people-who do not have their own independent state. In the Middle East, they are the fourth largest ethnic group after Arabs, Persians, and Turks. The statelessness of such a major group with an increasing ethnic and national consciousness in the post-Ottoman world led to their traumatic insecurities in the hands of majority-led nation states that used modern technologies of social engineering including displacement, dehumanization, assimilation, and genocidal acts throughout the 20th century. With the memory of such traumatic insecurities, the driving force of contemporary Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East has primarily been the question of state or state-like entities. Yet, Kurds are not a homogeneous group with a collective understanding of security and self-government. Rather, there are political-organizational rivalries within Kurds across Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Thus, it is important to understand the multifaceted Kurdish politics in the Middle East within a global-historical perspective where global power rivalries, regional geopolitics, and intra-Kurdish organizational competition are interwoven together. While the opportunities for Kurdish self-determination were missed in the early 20th century, resilient Kurdish political organizations emerged within the bipolar international context of the Cold War. The American hegemony in the post-Cold War era transformed the Kurdish political status in the geopolitics of the Middle East, where the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War, and the broader war on terror provided the Kurds with many political opportunities. Finally, the shifting regional and global alliances in the post-Arab Spring era-where the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become the global nemesis-created new political opportunities as well as significant threats for the Kurds.

25 Eylül 2017’de Irak Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi (IKBY) başkanı Mesud Barzani önderliğinde gerçekleştirilen bağımsızlık referandumuna açık destek veren tek ülke İsrail oldu. Özellikle Barzani yönetiminin yakın müttefiki olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) Irak toprak bütünlüğünün Ortadoğu’nun istikrarı için önemli olduğunu vurgulayarak Barzani’nin bağımsızlık referandumunu ertelemesi çağrısında bulundu. Bölgesel güçler Türkiye ve İran da referanduma sert tepki verdiler. Uluslararası
kamuoyunun, büyük devletlerin ve bölgesel güçlerin yalnızlaştırdığı Barzani yönetiminin bağımsızlık referandumuna bir tek İsrail açıktan destek verdi. Başbakan Benjamin Netanyahu ve diğer hükümet yetkilileri yaptıkları açıklamalarda İsrail devletinin Irak Kürtlerinin devlet kurmak için çabalarını desteklediğini beyan ettiler. Neden İsrail, ABD ve Batılı birçok devletin destek vermediği referanduma açıktan destek beyanında bulundu? Bu davranış Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri bağlamında nasıl açıklanabilir? Bu makale devletlerin kaygı ve varoluşsal tehditleri önlemek için öz-kimlikleri etrafında oluşturduğu söylemlerin ve davranışların sürekliliğine dikkat çeken Ontolojik Güvenlik Teorisi (OGT) üzerinden İsrail’in Irak Kürdistanı’na desteğini açıklıyor. Bu makalede
tartışılacağı üzere Realist teorinin fiziksel güvenlik ve hayatta kalma çerçevesinin ötesine geçen OGT yaklaşımına göre İsrail bu desteği vermeseydi kendi ontolojik güvenliğini tehlikeye atacaktı. Referandum sürecinde İsrail, Kürdistan ve uluslararası basında çıkan demeç ve görüşlere dayanarak İsrail’in desteği irdelenecektir.

20. yüzyılın ilk çeyreğinde imparatorlukların ulus-devletlere evrimi sona yaklaşırken, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu içerisinden birçok topluluk kendi kaderini tayin etme imkânı bularak devletleşti. Bu devletleşme süreci uluslaşma süreci ile iç içe ilerledi ve homojen ulus yaratma adına ‘öteki’ sayılanlar çoğunlukla asimilasyon, dışlanma ve etnik temizlik politikalarına maruz kaldılar. Kürtler, hem tarihsel anlamda hem de
Osmanlı sonrası Ortadoğu siyasal coğrafyasının Irak, Suriye, Türkiye ve ayrıca İran’ın kesiştiği alanda yoğunlaşmalarına rağmen devletleşen topluluklar içerisinde yer alamadılar ve çoğunlukla ‘öteki’ konumuna düştüler. Bu bağlamda, 20. yüzyılın büyük bir bölümü merkezi devlet otoriterileri ile farklı Kürt grupları arasında siyasal ve kültürel
mücadeleler ile geçti. Buna parallel olarak akademik ve entellektüel anlamda da Kürtler ve Kürt Çalışmaları Ortadoğu Çalışmaları içerisinde çoğunlukla ‘öteki’ konumunda kaldı. Kürtler üzerine kısıtlı olan akademik çalışmalar ancak 20. yüzyıl sonu ve 21. yüzyıl başında Kürtlerin hem Ortadoğu’da hem de küresel anlamda daha fazla ‘görünür’ hale
gelmesi ile birlikte özellikle Avrupa ve Kuzey Amerika üniversitelerinde yaygınlaşmaya başladı. Siyaset bilimi, uluslararası ilişkiler, tarih, sosyoloji, iktisat ve antropoloji gibi farklı disiplinler ve farklı metodolojik yaklaşımlar üzerinden Kürtler ve Kürt coğrafyası daha da fazla araştırılmaya başlandı. Bu çalışma da son yıllarda ivme kazanan Kürt
Çalışmaları’nı Ortadoğu Çalışmaları içerisinde bazı kuramsal, metodolojik ve tematik konular içerisinde değerlendirmektedir. Oryantalizm ve post-kolonyal paradigmalar bağlamında Ortadoğu ve Kürt Çalışmaları karşılaştırılırken, metodoloji ve veri konusunda
Kürt Çalışmaları ele alınmaktadır. Kürt Çalışmaları’nın teritoryal sınırları ve Kürdoloji gibi kavramsal tanımlamalar ayrıca tartışılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte Ortadoğu Çalışmaları içerisinde çokça tartışılan milliyetçilik, İslam, demokratikleşme ve otoriterlik gibi konular Kürt Çalışmaları ekseninde karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Genel
olarak, Kürt Çalışmaları’nın Ortadoğu Çalışmaları içerisinde Kürtlerin Ortadoğu’daki siyasal statüsüzlük ve güvenlikleştirme politikaları nedeniyle akademik kurumsallaşma bakımından geriden geldiği fakat hızla gelişmekte olan bir araştırma alanı olduğu ortaya
konmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, Kürt Çalışmaları’nın bu makalede tartışılan temaların ötesinde çok daha farklı temalar içerisinde de tartışılması gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır.

The pro-Kurdish nationalist mobilization in Turkey was mostly built on the right to self-determination aligned with the Marxist-Leninist ideology for the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the early 1980s and ethnic minority rights for the secular-leftist pro-Kurdish legal parties in the 1990s. The Turkish state mostly framed the legal and illegal pro-Kurdish mobilization as ‘the enemy of the state’ and ‘the enemy of Islam’ in its counter-insurgency efforts. However, in the 2000s, the PKK and the pro-Kurdish legal parties became more tolerant and inclusive toward Islamic Kurdish identity by mobilizing their sympathizers in events such as ‘Civic Friday Prayers’ and a ‘Democratic Islamic Congress’. This move aimed to function as an antidote to the rising popularity of the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Kurdish Hizbullah in the early 2000s. In other words, Islam and pious Muslim identity has increasingly become contested among Turkish Islamists, Kurdish Islamists, and the secular Kurdish nationalists. This article seeks to unpack why, how, and under what conditions such competing actors and mechanisms shape the discursive and power relationships in the Kurdish-Turkish public sphere.

By a comparative case analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, this article aims to make a contribution to the (de)securitisation literature. It raises two interrelated questions. First, under what conditions are states more likely to desecuritise minority identities? Second, what does desecuritisation entail? The conventional wisdom about desecuritisation, especially among the Copenhagen School scholars, is that it is the shift from emergency politics to normal politics within which the security speech act becomes absent. In turn, desecuritisation is assumed to be an agency-driven process. This article underlines some of the problems and insufficiencies of this approach and pushes forward an interpretation based on structure-driven processes along with agency-driven acts in the desecuritisation of minority identities. While we unpack the concept of desecuritisation further, as opposed to taking it at its face value (i.e. the absence of the security speech act), we place the process of desecuritisation into a specific historical context. We argue that states are more likely to desecuritise minority identities in three interrelated processes: first, when status-quo security discourses lose their legitimacy; second, when there is an elite change; and third, when there is an external pressure.

Bu rapor çözüm sürecinin 2015 Temmuz’dan sonra bozulması ile Güneydoğu’da başlayan PKK ve Türkiye arasında ki yoğun şehir çatışmalarına, bizzat çatışmaların ortasında kalan bölge insanının nasıl yaklaştığı ve algıladığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Bu soruya cevap ararken Ortadoğu’da ki Kürt dünyasını da (özellikle Irak ve Suriye) dikkate alarak bölgede yaşanan gelişmeleri daha geniş perspektiften ele almaya çalışmaktadır. Bu kapsamda Şubat-Mayıs 2016 tarihleri arasında Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, Ankara ve Erbil’e saha araştırması sebebiyle çeşitli seyahatler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Farklı toplumsal ve siyasal kesimlerin temsilcilerinden yaklaşık 55 kişi ile derinlemesine mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Yerel halktan insanlarla yapılan serbest görüşmelerde eklendiğinde toplamda 100’e yakın kişi ile görüşülmüştür. Çözüm sürecinde ki siyasi, ekonomik ve fiziksel şartlar ciddi şekilde bölge halkı tarafından aranır ve özlemle anılırken, eski yanlışlardan ders çıkarılarak yeni bir çözüm sürecinin talebi farklı toplumsal kesimler tarafından dile getirildiği gözlemlendi. PKK’nın şehir savaşlarına girmesi halk tarafından onay bulmazken, devletin sert cevabı da sivil halkı zarara uğratabilecek derecede orantısız güç kullanımı olarak algılanmaktadır.

Is Turkish nationality one singular identity that does not permit ethnic modifiers? Or can it be understood as pluralistic, with identities nested – “hyphenated” – with Turkishness? Then, are Turkish and Kurdish identities necessarily mutually exclusive? Such questions over the boundaries of Turkishness have long been framed in the civic versus ethnic dichotomy – an approach that does not ask whether Turkish nationhood is monolithic or pluralistic. In response, this article aims to advance the public and scholarly debates over nationhood in Turkey by turning to the question of ways in which Turkishness can be hyphenated with other identity categories in Turkey, most particularly Kurdishness. First, we reframe the debate over identity by using the combinatorial approach to ethnicity to outline how Turkishness and Kurdishness can be overlapping and nested, or a hyphenated identity. Second, we draw on public opinion data to show that such a hyphenated identity is both theoretically possible and potentially salient in Turkey today. Together, these steps deconstruct the primordialist understandings of Turkishness and Kurdishness, on the one hand, and the taken-for-granted civic claims of Turkishness, on the other.

Scholars have primarily debated the anatomy of Turkishness within the framework of an ethnic versus civic dichotomy. Arguing that such an approach would be inconclusive and less explanatory, this article approaches Turkishness from a singularity/plurality framework. First, the article emphasizes the singular nature of Turkishness – defined as monolithic nationhood – in the early Republican years that rejected any alternative identity approaches other than the definition of the state elites. Second, the article argues that the homogenization of the nation by the new state targeted those who considered themselves Turks as well, especially those who did not fit the ‘ideal’ or ‘imagined’ Turk (i.e. Muslim but secular, urban, and Western). The final section analyses the persistence and change in the monolithic nationhood in Turkey throughout the twentieth century and considers the implications of the state's recent identity policies on the meaning of Turkishness (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sena.12121/abstract).

The purpose of this article is to explore why and how some local armed uprisings are able to go global with a transnational image of ‘social justice’ while others fail to build such image despite becoming transnational. The cases to be analyzed in the article are the pro-Kurdish mobilization in the leadership of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)  in Turkey and the pro-Mayan Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) movement in Mexico. In explaining the relative success of the latter, the study seeks to make connections with the globalization literature in general and the transnational social movement literature in particular. Particularly, the article focuses on the ability of social movements to market their causes in international arena with a good image. Overall, this study lays out several key strategic differences between the two movements such as the holding and the use of arms, duration of armed resistance, and the leadership and organizational structure to unpack why some social movements are more successful to market their causes as a just cause within ‘global civil society’ and why others fail to do so ending with being listed as a terrorist organization.

El propósito del presente artículo es explorar porqué y cómo algunos de los recientes levantamientos armados locales tienen la capacidad de convertirse en globales con una imagen transnacional de ‘justicia social’ mientras que otros fallan en la construcción de tal imagen a pesar de llegar a ser transnacionales. Los casos materia de análisis en este artículo son la movilización pro-Kurda bajo el liderazgo del Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán (PKK por sus siglas en inglés) en Turquía y el movimiento del ejército Zapatista de Liberación pro-Maya (EZLN por sus siglas en inglés) de México. Al explicar el relativo éxito de este último, el estudio busca establecer conexiones con la literatura de la globalización, en términos generales) y en particular con la literatura del movimiento social transnacional. Particularmente el artículo se enfoca en la habilidad de los movimientos sociales para mercadear sus causas con buena imagen en la arena internacional. Como un todo, el artículo presenta varias diferencias estratégicas clave entre los dos movimientos tales como la posesión y el uso de armas, la duración de la resistencia armada y la estructura de liderazgo y organización para desempacar el por qué algunos movimientos sociales tienen más éxito en el mercadeo de sus causas como causas justas dentro de la ‘Sociedad civil global’ y porqué otros fallan en su intento de hacerlo y terminan siendo listados como organizaciones terroristas.

Scholars of nationalism and ethnicity have long studied when and how nationalist discourses on the one hand and national and ethnic identities on the other are often socially constructed along with their outcomes of ethnic disputes and nationalist polarizations. However, studies on the deconstruction processes of the nationalist discourses, their evolution over time and degrees of ethnic peace and moderation have mostly been limited. By taking the case of Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms in Turkey, this article argues that two competing elite discourses of nationalism have moderated rather than aggravated each other. The article explores the dialectical relationship between the nationalist discourses of the Turkish and Kurdish political elites, especially since the 1980s. Theoretically framing Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms in Michael Hechter's typology of state-building nationalism versus peripheral nationalism, respectively, it is argued that while the Turkish state has become distant from forced assimilation and homogenization goals, pro-Kurdish political mobilization, particularly the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), has become distant from claims to independent statehood and ethnic autonomy along with respect for Turkey's territorial integrity. These evolving agendas are discussed within the interdependent relationship of both nationalist discourses.

Two years after the event, the collection Turkey’s July 15 Coup: What Happened and Why, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Bayram Balci, brings together contributors to unpack the historical, political, religious and ideological dimensions of the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. The volume offers insightful historical insight into the deteriorating relationship between AKP leader and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Gülen movement and its ultimate impact on the events of 15 July 2016, writes Serhun Al.

The 40-year Kurdish conflict has intoxicated every political institution, traumatized all segments of society, and cost the lives of more than 50,000 people. It awaits an imminent peaceful resolution. Once Erdoğan was bold enough to initiate peace talks with the Kurdish insurgents. The opposition should be ready too. Beyond important institutional and judicial reconfigurations (such as going back to the parliamentary system) after Erdoğan, the opposition should also prepare to lead a conflict-resolution process and establish a long-lasting peace. This is the first litmus test for a genuine process of democratization in the post-Erdoğan era.

Was Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to turn Hagia Sophia into a mosque about short-term electoral interests? Certainly, he needs to boost his popularity, fast waning due to a declining economy, perceptions of corruption and highly contested authoritarian rule. At the same time, a historical reading of Erdogan’s decision shows how competing narratives and culture wars between pro-West modernising elites and counter-elites imbued with Ottoman nostalgia have played out in the symbolic attribution of Hagia Sophia.

24 Haziran seçimleri yaklaşırken partilerin milletvekili adaylıkları son şeklini aldı ve belirlendi. Aday listeleri ile beraber çoğu parti yöneticileri kendi iç tartışmasını yaşarken, seçmenlerin kendi parti adaylarının beklentilerini ne ölçüde karşıladığı konusu da tabanda tartışılmaya başlandı. Bu noktada HDP seçmeninin farklı beklentileri de halk tarafından masaya yatırılıyor. HDP'nin parti olarak dayandığı maya genel olarak üç katmana ayrılıyor: Kürtlük, Muhafazakarlık ve Solculuk.

Bazı etnik gruplarla veya o etnik grupları temsil iddiasındaki oluşumlarla belirli devletlerin yaşadıkları çatışma süreçlerinde özerklik ve bağımsızlık konuları ciddi tartışma konusu olmuştur. Örneğin, çeşitli kültürel ve dilsel haklarından uzun süre mahrum bırakılmış etnik gruplar ve o grupları temsil etmek isteyen siyasi-militer hareketler özerklik veya âdem-i merkeziyetçilik yolu ile tarihsel mağduriyetlerini telafi edebileceklerini düşünürler. Öte yandan, bu grupların mensubu olduğu merkezi devletler özerkliğin bağımsızlığa gidebilecek bir yol olabileceği düşüncesiyle âdem-i merkeziyetçilik politikalarından uzak durmaya çalışırlar. Baskı ve ufak taviz mekanizmaları ile hak taleplerini ve buna bağlı olan siyasi hareketleri minimize etmeye çalışırlar. Bugün Ortadoğu’da ki ana gövdesi 4 ülkeye ayrılmış olan (İran, Irak, Türkiye, Suriye) Kürd Dünyası da bu tartışmaların tam ortasındadır.

Violence once again transforms identities and sense of belongings both in Turkish Kurdistan and throughout Turkey. Consequently, conflict and violence between the PKK and Turkey creates and crystalises Kurdish and Turkish identity boundaries, not the other way around.

In the late 1990s, when a Turkish police chief named Gaffar Okkan was appointed to the major Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in southeastern Turkey, no one would imagine that he would win the hearts and minds of many Kurds in the city as well as the whole Kurdish region where police meant brutality and oppression. When he was assassinated in 2001, tens of thousands Kurds attended his funeral to pay their respect. This people’s man gained the sympathy and affection of the Kurds with his efforts to learn and speak the Kurdish language with local people, by opening the doors of the police station to those in need, and investing into the success of the city’s popular soccer team, Diyarbakirspor. What Okkan symbolized was that Turkey could become a state of the Kurds or in fact a Kurdish state as well. After more than a decade, Turkey once again is about to lose another opportunity to truly become the state of the Kurds due to recent escalation of violence with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)...

Kürt Tarihi’nin bu sayısı “Küresel Siyasette Kürtler” özel dosyası ile Kürtlerin uluslararası ilişkilerdeki konumunu, küresel-bölgesel eksendeki ideolojik ve jeopolitik değişim ve dönüşümlerin çerçevesinde ele almaya çalışıyor. Özellikle 20. yüzyıldan 21. yüzyıla büyük küresel güçlerin şekillendirdiği ve etki ettiği normlar, ideolojiler ve jeopolitik konumlanmalar çoğu milletlerin ve devletlerin yönünü belirlediği gibi Ortadoğu’da Kürtlerin de hem kendi içlerindeki ilişkilerine hem de dış dünya ile kurdukları ilişkilere yön verdi. Bu sayıdaki yazılar da Kürtlerin hem küresel ilişkilerine hem de küresel bağlamın Kürtleri nasıl etkilediğine ışık tutmaya çalışıyor.