Sinem Adar
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Center for Applied Turkey Studies, Department Member
- Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Early Career Fellow (Oct 2015-July 2017) at Human Rights, Constitutional Politics and Religious Diversity Research Group, Post-DocHumboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin Institute for Empirical Research on Integration and Migration (BIM), Department MemberStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, IPC-Mercator Stitftung Fellow, Post-Docadd
- Historical and Comparative Sociology, Cultural Sociology, Nationalism And State Building, Belonging and Citizenship, Politics of belonging, Sociology of Religion, and 23 moreBoundaries, Politics of Solidarity, Ethnography, Symbolic Boundaries, Symbolic boundaries and social boundaries, Affect/Emotion, Pierre Bourdieu, Empire, Sociology, Historical Sociology, State Theory, Postcolonial Theory, Critical Realism, Minorities in Turkey, Turkey, Turkish and Middle East Studies, Pluralism, Ottoman History, Modern Turkey, Comparative History, Egypt, Ottoman Studies, and Global Historyedit
Undermining the foundational pillars of the post–Cold War security order, Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is a watershed event for Europe and the wider world, Turkey included. While Ankara is trying to protect its economy and... more
Undermining the foundational pillars of the post–Cold War security order, Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is a watershed event for Europe and the wider world, Turkey included. While Ankara is trying to protect its economy and security interests, anti-Western narratives dominate the public debate. The war has indeed accentuated anti-Westernism as one of the main fault lines of political competition. Given the geopolitical imperatives that February 24 brought to the fore, it is highly likely that, in the short-term, Turkey’s NATO membership and its Association Agreement with the EU will – geopolitically and economically – continue to anchor it to the West. Whether or not a full strategic alignment with the EU will accompany such an anchoring is far from certain, however, mainly due to Turkey’s domestic political dynamics, but also due to the unclarity about how far the EU is willing to move beyond a transactional approach.
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Against the backdrop of the increasingly marginalized role that the EU accession frame- work and democratic conditionality play in EU–Turkey relations, the Biden adminis- tration’s pronounced focus on “defending” and “revitalizing”... more
Against the backdrop of the increasingly marginalized role that the EU accession frame- work and democratic conditionality play in EU–Turkey relations, the Biden adminis- tration’s pronounced focus on “defending” and “revitalizing” democracy “at home and abroad”1 offers an opportunity for coordination between the U.S. and the European Union (EU) to effectively respond to Turkey’s democratic backsliding. The contours and content of such coordination will inevitably be shaped partly by existing EU and U.S. instruments and partly by the extent of prospective EU and U.S. security cooperation with Turkey.
The deterioration of the rule of law and violations of human rights in Turkey — as well
as the country’s departure from its multilateral commitments — are closely connected. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the EU and the U.S. distinguish between the two to better coordinate their Turkey policies. Neither the EU nor the U.S. can force Turkey into democratic reforms, but together they can help protect the already “shrinking democratic spaces”2 in the country. When it comes to the violation of international law and multi- lateral commitments, the EU and the U.S. should set clear red lines and raise the costs of unilateralism. While at the same time, they should also jointly work toward deepening multilateral ties with Turkey.
The deterioration of the rule of law and violations of human rights in Turkey — as well
as the country’s departure from its multilateral commitments — are closely connected. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the EU and the U.S. distinguish between the two to better coordinate their Turkey policies. Neither the EU nor the U.S. can force Turkey into democratic reforms, but together they can help protect the already “shrinking democratic spaces”2 in the country. When it comes to the violation of international law and multi- lateral commitments, the EU and the U.S. should set clear red lines and raise the costs of unilateralism. While at the same time, they should also jointly work toward deepening multilateral ties with Turkey.
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This chapter looks at the variation in the governance of religion in Turkey since the establishment of the republic in 1923. Turkey has long been seen as a paragon of secularist representative democracy with a unified secular law among... more
This chapter looks at the variation in the governance of religion in Turkey since the establishment of the republic in 1923. Turkey has long been seen as a paragon of secularist representative democracy with a unified secular law among the majority Muslim countries of the Middle East. (Kuru 2009:4) Especially the first two decades of AKP rule was regarded by many observers, both in the policy world and among scholars, as a showcase for the compatibility of Islam and democracy. As the AKP government turned increasingly authoritarian since the Gezi demonstrations in 2013, this view changed. Especially after the Constitutional Referendum in April 2017, many outside Turkey declared the Kemalist Republic and the model of a secular and modern Turkey dead.
Such proclamations are based upon a rather shallow understanding of the relation between politics and religion in the history of Turkey. Despite a growing critical literature on Turkish secularism, what ‘Turkish secularism’ actually means still needs to be qualified in order to explain the recent transformations in religion-politics nexus. How did the relationship between the religious and non-religious fields, historically change? Can a supposedly ‘secular’ country become “non-secular” overnight? In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter argues that the Turkish state has not only governed religion but it has also long governed an ethnically and religiously highly diverse population through religion, a fact that is often overlooked in the literature. Religion has been used by state elites as a tool for categorizing peoples, for mobilizing constituencies, for containing political Islam and ethnic conflict. What is new especially since the early 2010s, is the breadth and depth of religion’s expansion into social life with the backing of the state, particularly in the realms of education, family and law.
Such proclamations are based upon a rather shallow understanding of the relation between politics and religion in the history of Turkey. Despite a growing critical literature on Turkish secularism, what ‘Turkish secularism’ actually means still needs to be qualified in order to explain the recent transformations in religion-politics nexus. How did the relationship between the religious and non-religious fields, historically change? Can a supposedly ‘secular’ country become “non-secular” overnight? In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter argues that the Turkish state has not only governed religion but it has also long governed an ethnically and religiously highly diverse population through religion, a fact that is often overlooked in the literature. Religion has been used by state elites as a tool for categorizing peoples, for mobilizing constituencies, for containing political Islam and ethnic conflict. What is new especially since the early 2010s, is the breadth and depth of religion’s expansion into social life with the backing of the state, particularly in the realms of education, family and law.
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How does Turkey's presidential system look after two and a half years of its implementation? Through a thorough analysis of changes in institutions and politics under the new governance system, this research paper sheds light on how... more
How does Turkey's presidential system look after two and a half years of its implementation? Through a thorough analysis of changes in institutions and politics under the new governance system, this research paper sheds light on how likely a democratic repair is in the short run.
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In this special issue, we focus on the relationship between populism and ethnic and religious diversity beyond Western Europe and the Americas. We are particularly interested in the following questions: What is the role of cultural and... more
In this special issue, we focus on the relationship between populism and ethnic and religious diversity beyond Western Europe and the Americas. We are particularly interested in the following questions: What is the role of cultural and social grievances in the emergence and spread of populist discourses and vice versa? What differences, if any, are there between the form populism takes in historically diverse societies and the form it takes in societies where diversity is a fairly recent phenomenon related to immigration? How does populism relate to social, political, and affective polariza- tion in post-imperial societies with multi-cultural populations?
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This article explores the relationship between religious difference, nationhood and secular citizenship in Turkey. Turkey is the only country in the Middle East which applies a non-religious and unified law to matters related to the... more
This article explores the relationship between religious difference, nationhood and secular citizenship in Turkey. Turkey is the only country in the Middle East which applies a non-religious and unified law to matters related to the family. The legislation of a secular civil law in 1926 has made interreligious marriages legally possible, removing institutional barriers to religious mixing in the private and intimate sphere of family. At the same time, religious difference remained central to the definition of who is included in, and excluded from, the nation. Against the backdrop of these seemingly competing understandings of religious difference, this article explores the arguments that ordinary citizens made in favor of or opposed to the second marriage in 1962 of Ülkü Adatape, the spiritual daughter of Atatürk, to Yeshua Bensusen, a Jewish citizen of Turkey. Drawing on the notes and proceedings of the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1922/23, parliamentary depositories and newspaper reviews, it demonstrates that a paradox stemming from an ethnoreligious formation of Turkish nationhood, which has denied non-Muslim citizens recognition as full members of the nation, and the secular understanding of the private realm, which has in principle made religious difference inconsequential to the governance of family, simultaneously produced resistance to and justification for interreligious marriages. If the first decades of the republic laid the foundations of this paradox, the period between the transition into electoral democracy in 1946 and the military coup in 1960 intensified it making the link between ethnicity and religion stronger.
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Since the presidential elections in 2014, Turkish voters abroad have cast their votes in three parliamentary elections, one presidential election, and one referendum. The relatively higher vote share that the Justice and Devel-opment... more
Since the presidential elections in 2014, Turkish voters abroad have cast their votes in three parliamentary elections, one presidential election, and one referendum. The relatively higher vote share that the Justice and Devel-opment Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan garnered in Ger-many and other European states with large Turkish immigration levels, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, has remained a cause for concern to politicians and the public in these countries. Especially in Germany, the dominant premise in the public debate has been that voting in favor of the AKP and Erdoğan is a sign of “loyalty to Turkey” and an absence of a com-mitment to democratic values and norms.
The broad appeal that the AKP and Erdoğan have among migrants from Turkey and their children has both a material and an emotional basis. Socio-economic changes and perceived improvements in the quality of state institutions, both within Turkey and Germany, seem to have created a positive image of the party. In addition, a strong sense of pride arising out of the perception of a “strong Turkey” under the leadership of President Erdoğan seems to drive electoral support. Finally, a fear of losing social and political gains also facilitates electoral support for the AKP.
Given that the interest of the Turkish government in the migrant popula-tion is driven by its foreign- and domestic-policy ambitions, it is likely to continue in the future with a strong identitarian focus. Moreover, Turkey’s deepening economic crisis is also likely to accentuate the need for economic remittances. It is vitally important to differentiate between the Turkish government’s systematic efforts to instrumentalize migrants and their foreign-born children toward its domestic- and foreign-policy ends and the demands of migrants for political representation and equal recognition.
The broad appeal that the AKP and Erdoğan have among migrants from Turkey and their children has both a material and an emotional basis. Socio-economic changes and perceived improvements in the quality of state institutions, both within Turkey and Germany, seem to have created a positive image of the party. In addition, a strong sense of pride arising out of the perception of a “strong Turkey” under the leadership of President Erdoğan seems to drive electoral support. Finally, a fear of losing social and political gains also facilitates electoral support for the AKP.
Given that the interest of the Turkish government in the migrant popula-tion is driven by its foreign- and domestic-policy ambitions, it is likely to continue in the future with a strong identitarian focus. Moreover, Turkey’s deepening economic crisis is also likely to accentuate the need for economic remittances. It is vitally important to differentiate between the Turkish government’s systematic efforts to instrumentalize migrants and their foreign-born children toward its domestic- and foreign-policy ends and the demands of migrants for political representation and equal recognition.
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Until recently, sociologists have paid surprisingly little attention to the relationship between emotions and nationalism. Existing accounts remain homogeneous, linear and nonrelational. To remedy this gap, this article compares public... more
Until recently, sociologists have paid surprisingly little attention to the relationship between emotions and nationalism. Existing accounts remain homogeneous, linear and nonrelational. To remedy this gap, this article
compares public controversies in Turkey over the Armenian genocide at two historical moments: its semi-centennial anniversary in 1965, and the publication of an article in 2004 by the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant
Dink that led to his assassination in 2007. It demonstrates that the genocide, and the conflicting epistemic structures that it incites, is a source of anxiety for Armenians due to their actual displacement within the
nation. It is also a source of anxiety for Turks due to the perceived threat of displacement within the nation. These relational anxieties over the nation played an important role, during these two events, in reproducing
hierarchical and exclusionary configurations, experiences, and representations of nationhood. During the 1965 semi-centennial, Armenians reacted to the mainstream Turkish public’s anxieties by pledging their loyalty to the state. Dink’s assassination in 2007, on the other hand, showcases how an attempt by the excluded to redefine the what and who of the nation united otherwise separate social sections around a nationalist front.
compares public controversies in Turkey over the Armenian genocide at two historical moments: its semi-centennial anniversary in 1965, and the publication of an article in 2004 by the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant
Dink that led to his assassination in 2007. It demonstrates that the genocide, and the conflicting epistemic structures that it incites, is a source of anxiety for Armenians due to their actual displacement within the
nation. It is also a source of anxiety for Turks due to the perceived threat of displacement within the nation. These relational anxieties over the nation played an important role, during these two events, in reproducing
hierarchical and exclusionary configurations, experiences, and representations of nationhood. During the 1965 semi-centennial, Armenians reacted to the mainstream Turkish public’s anxieties by pledging their loyalty to the state. Dink’s assassination in 2007, on the other hand, showcases how an attempt by the excluded to redefine the what and who of the nation united otherwise separate social sections around a nationalist front.
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Persistent school segregation does not only mean that children of different racial and ethnic backgrounds attend different schools, but their schools are also unequal in their performance. This study documents nationally the extent of... more
Persistent school segregation does not only mean that children of different racial and ethnic backgrounds attend different schools, but their schools are also unequal in their performance. This study documents nationally the extent of disparities in school performance between schools attended by whites and Asians compared to blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans. It further examines the geography of school inequality in two ways. First it analyzes the segregation of students between different types of school profiles based on racial composition, poverty and metropolitan location. Second it estimates the independent effects of these and other school and school district characteristics on school performance, identifying which aspects of school segregation are the most important sources of disadvantage. A focus on schools at the bottom of the distribution as in No Schools Left Behind would not ameliorate wide disparities between groups that are found run across the whole spectrum of school performance.
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The social security system in Turkey was radically transformed in 2006 with the enactment of the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law and the Social Security Institution Law. This briefing paper analyses the main changes... more
The social security system in Turkey was radically transformed in 2006 with the enactment of the Social Security and General Health Insurance Law and the Social Security Institution Law. This briefing paper analyses the main changes brought about, the positions of interest groups, and some of the current implications.
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The Eastern Mediterranean crisis reflects two overlapping developments. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of Turkey’s increasingly assertive posturing in the international arena. At the same time, it shows the intensity of the... more
The Eastern Mediterranean crisis reflects two overlapping developments. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of Turkey’s increasingly assertive posturing in the international arena. At the same time, it shows the intensity of the geopolitical competition between Turkey and its adversaries, such as Egypt and the UAE. The EU Member
States’ different levels and forms of engagement with Turkey obstruct a consensus on how to coherently respond to these developments. With accession negotiations stalled and discussions focused on areas of conflict rather than cooperation, EUTurkey relations are mired in stalemate, while the militarization of foreign policy is becoming increasingly prevalent in the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
States’ different levels and forms of engagement with Turkey obstruct a consensus on how to coherently respond to these developments. With accession negotiations stalled and discussions focused on areas of conflict rather than cooperation, EUTurkey relations are mired in stalemate, while the militarization of foreign policy is becoming increasingly prevalent in the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
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Since the early 2010s, Turkey has been on a political roller-coaster ride that has left many observers, both internal and external, bewildered and dismayed. The ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) determination, under the... more
Since the early 2010s, Turkey has been on a political roller-coaster ride that has left many observers, both internal and external, bewildered and dismayed. The ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) determination, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his changing political alliances, to remake Turkey into a regionally and globally influential actor has overwhelmingly marked this decade's political landscape. In nowhere other than the deployment of religion in foreign policy has this calamitous tenacity become more salient. Recent soaring academic and public interest in the topic validates this assertion. The debate has so far mostly focused on those who are now seen as the "usual suspects": the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and its European extension DITIB, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and humanitarian NGOs with close ties to AKP officials. For sure, such a focus on government institutions and related organizations implementing this new religion-foreign policy nexus is timely and important. Yet, it overlooks the wide of range of soft-power strategies that Ankara deploys in accordance with the main premise of its new foreign policy outlook, that is, public diplomacy.
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Following the US decision to withdraw troops from Northeast Syria and upon sepa-rate agreements with the US and Russia, Ankara established what it calls a safe zone in the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Even if spanning a smaller... more
Following the US decision to withdraw troops from Northeast Syria and upon sepa-rate agreements with the US and Russia, Ankara established what it calls a safe zone in the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Even if spanning a smaller territory than envisaged, Turkey aims with its safe zone to impede Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria, on the one hand, and to return refugees who have increasingly become a domestic policy challenge for the ruling Justice and Development Party(AKP there-after), on the other hand. Turkey’s plan for repatriation signals that its interests align with European interests in refugee return. Given concerns about the safety of refugees, voluntary nature of return, and Ankara’s attempts at demographic engineering, Europeans should not support a Turkey-led repatriation to Syriawithout conditions.
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Since the early 2010s, Turkey has been on a political roller-coaster ride that has left many observers, both internal and external, bewildered and dismayed. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) determination, under the... more
Since the early 2010s, Turkey has been on a political roller-coaster ride that has left many observers, both internal and external, bewildered and dismayed. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) determination, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his changing political alliances, to remake Turkey into a regionally and globally influential actor has overwhelmingly marked this decade’s political landscape. In nowhere other than the deployment of religion in foreign policy has this calamitous tenacity become more salient.
Recent soaring academic and public interest in the topic validates this assertion. The debate has so far mostly focused on those who are now seen as the "usual suspects": the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and its European extension DITIB, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and humanitarian NGOs with close ties to AKP officials. For sure, such a focus on government institutions and related organizations implementing this new religion–foreign policy nexus is timely and important. Yet, it overlooks the wide of range of soft-power strategies that Ankara deploys in accordance with the main premise of its new foreign policy outlook, that is, public diplomacy.
It is our contention that these strategies systematically target gaining global recognition and validation for Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world and patron of the Muslim masses worldwide. Since the early 2010s, the AKP has been deploying numerous tactics including mobilization within diaspora communities–Turkish and non-Turkish alike, network-building among pro-Erdoğan intellectuals in different Muslim communities, and “counter-hegemonic” knowledge production. If a cunning rhetoric of combatting Islamophobia constitutes the discursive backbone of these multiple tactics, the Arab Spring and the de facto disintegration of Saudi Arabia’s decades-long coalition with Sunni Islamists through the Muslim World League (MWL) initiative (est. 1962) has provided Turkey with the opportunity structure to claim a hegemonic position within the Muslim world.
Recent soaring academic and public interest in the topic validates this assertion. The debate has so far mostly focused on those who are now seen as the "usual suspects": the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and its European extension DITIB, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), and humanitarian NGOs with close ties to AKP officials. For sure, such a focus on government institutions and related organizations implementing this new religion–foreign policy nexus is timely and important. Yet, it overlooks the wide of range of soft-power strategies that Ankara deploys in accordance with the main premise of its new foreign policy outlook, that is, public diplomacy.
It is our contention that these strategies systematically target gaining global recognition and validation for Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world and patron of the Muslim masses worldwide. Since the early 2010s, the AKP has been deploying numerous tactics including mobilization within diaspora communities–Turkish and non-Turkish alike, network-building among pro-Erdoğan intellectuals in different Muslim communities, and “counter-hegemonic” knowledge production. If a cunning rhetoric of combatting Islamophobia constitutes the discursive backbone of these multiple tactics, the Arab Spring and the de facto disintegration of Saudi Arabia’s decades-long coalition with Sunni Islamists through the Muslim World League (MWL) initiative (est. 1962) has provided Turkey with the opportunity structure to claim a hegemonic position within the Muslim world.
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The paralyzing deadlock over the İstanbul Metropolitan elections has pundits at home and abroad perturbed about the predicament facing elections in Turkey – namely, the sole legitimacy of the ballot as determinative of who assumes office... more
The paralyzing deadlock over the İstanbul Metropolitan elections has pundits at home and abroad perturbed about the predicament facing elections in Turkey – namely, the sole legitimacy of the ballot as determinative of who assumes office after elections. It is our contention, however, that far from being the cause, the İstanbul “controversy” is symptomatic of a country-wide shift of attitude – accelerating since at least the putsch of July 15, 2016 – over whether elections ought to be the defining source of political legitimacy.
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"The increasing distance between voting results and governing “outcomes” began in the wake of the June 7, 2015 elections — a critical juncture in the path towards institutional disintegration and authoritarian consolidation of power. This... more
"The increasing distance between voting results and governing “outcomes” began in the wake of the June 7, 2015 elections — a critical juncture in the path towards institutional disintegration and authoritarian consolidation of power. This path was sealed at the elections of June 24, 2018. As we reflect on the March 31 elections, we will likely remember them as a second critical juncture making the path difficult to reverse."
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Hosting the highest number of refugees from Syria, around 3.5 million, Turkey’s refugee and foreign policy have been increasingly intertwined in recent years, especially since 2015 which was a year of crisis for both the EU and Turkey. By... more
Hosting the highest number of refugees from Syria, around 3.5 million, Turkey’s refugee and foreign policy have been increasingly intertwined in recent years, especially since 2015 which was a year of crisis for both the EU and Turkey. By providing a chronology of the domestic and regional events occurring since then, I suggest that the EU-Turkey Statement on refugees, and the preceding Joint Action Plan unintentionally but inextricably intertwined Turkey’s national security concerns on its Syrian border with EU border control management policies.
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This essay is a response to this emerging narrative, which is undergirded by a normatively secular panic. There are some clear reasons for dismay in the face of the increasing authoritarianism, militarism and social polarization in Turkey... more
This essay is a response to this emerging narrative, which is undergirded by a normatively secular panic. There are some clear reasons for dismay in the face of the increasing authoritarianism, militarism and social polarization in Turkey today. Yet, the “secular versus religious” binary falls short of making sense of the changes that Turkey has been going through in the last fifteen years. It is vital to historicize these changes in order to understand what is new and what is not concerning the role of religion in state-society relations.
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In this workshop, we plan to explore the complex interactions between social policy choices and types of political regimes around the world, with a focus on putting the case of Turkey in a comparative perspective. In particular, we aim to... more
In this workshop, we plan to explore the complex interactions between social policy choices and types of political regimes around the world, with a focus on putting the case of Turkey in a comparative perspective. In particular, we aim to concentrate on the changing political sociology and/or political economy of social rights in countries that experience democratic backsliding. We welcome empirically grounded and theoretically informed papers focusing on these intricate interactions addressing the following themes: i) Social Policy and Political Regime, ii) Social Policy, Social Rights and Constitutionalism, and iii) Interaction of Social, Civil and Political Rights