Dale Matthew

This paper argues that the concept and role of 'institutional racism' in contemporary discussions of race should be reconsidered. It starts by distinguishing between 'intrinsic institutional racism,' which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their constitutive features, and 'extrinsic institutional racism,' which holds that institutions are racist in virtue of their negative effects. It accepts intrinsic institutional racism, but argues that a 'disparate impact' conception of extrinsic conception faces a number of objections, the most serious being that it has no plausible account of what it is that makes extrinsically racist institutions racist. It also argues that claims about the explanatory indispensability of institutional racism are overstated (individual racism is at least as important), critiques structural approaches to racial inequality, and suggests that there is reason to doubt whether institutional reform can provide us with all that morality may require in the racial domain.

This article argues that blacks should reject integration on self-protective and solidarity grounds. It distinguishes two aspects of black devaluation: a ‘stigmatization’ aspect that has to do with the fact that blacks are subject to various forms of discrimination, and an aesthetic aspect (‘phenotypic devaluation’) that concerns the aesthetic devaluation of characteristically black phenotypic traits. It identifies four self-worth harms that integration may inflict, and suggests that these may outweigh the benefits of integration. Further, it argues that, while the integrating process may reduce stigmatization, there is less reason to think that it can do the same for phenotypic devaluation.

In recent work in political philosophy there has been much discussion of two approaches to theorizing about justice that have come to be called 'ideal theory' and 'non-ideal theory.' The distinction was originally articulated by Rawls, who defended his focus on ideal theory in terms of a supposed 'priority' of the latter over non-ideal theory. Many critics have rejected this claim of priority and in general have questioned the usefulness of ideal theory. In diagnosing the problem with ideal theory, they have frequently fingered for blame the idealization it involves. In this paper I focus on one particular, much-discussed idealization – full compliance – in order to defend it. Focusing on the assumption, I argue that Rawls's work is not ideal in the way that it is usually thought to be, is less ideal than is widely recognized, and became less ideal over time. I also argue that critics who in effect claim that it is not realistic enough simply fail to understand Rawls's central motivation. Finally, I defend the assumption by arguing that there is an important sense in which all theories of justice must assume full compliance. Such an assumption, I argue, is needed if we are to have a plausible basis on which to judge the normative attractiveness of a theory.

Current thinking and talk about race uses 'racist' for virtually everything that goes wrong in the domain of race. This paper examines the relationship between racial justice, racial discrimination and racism to argue for a more pluralistic approach to race-related ills. Such an approach provides the tools we need to understand an important if relatively neglected source of racial injustice – non-racist racial discrimination – and does much to illuminate some race-related disputes. It starts by arguing that racial justice is a surprisingly limited ideal, and then suggests understanding 'racial discrimination' in a minimal way. From there it is argued that while racial discrimination is necessary for racial injustice, the same is not true for racism.

In counterfactual cases of discrimination an agent would have treated someone worse had circumstances been different such that instead of being a member of her actual group, she was a member of some other group. The case for considering such cases to be genuine cases of discrimination is bolstered by the fact that we are inclined to say that cases where an agent would have treated someone better had she been a member of another group are discriminatory. But I argue that the cases are relevantly different: in one kind of case, but not the other, a person is harmed. I then consider and reject a number of objections to this suggestion.

This paper discusses the adequacy Rawls' theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate the both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The paper has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the paper centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity (FEO) principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all.

In this paper I respond to Robert Taylor's argument that a Rawlsian framework does not support strong affirmative action (AA) programs. It makes three main arguments. The first disputes Taylor's claim that strong AA would not be needed in ideal conditions. Private racial discrimination, I suggest, might still exist in such conditions, so strong AA might be needed there. The second challenges Taylor's claims that pure procedural justice constrains Rawlsian nonideal theory. I argue that this rests on a fetishizing of pure procedural justice that is absent from Rawls’s work. I also show that a revised formulation of Taylor's concern here also fails. My third argument makes a positive Rawlsian case for strong AA in nonideal conditions that builds on a Taylor concession. Taylor suggests that the goal of nonideal theory is to create a world in which ideal theory can be applied. My argument begins by showing that another permissible goal of Rawlsian nonideal theory is to ameliorate injustice. I then argue that Rawls’ contractualist framework supports the strongest forms of AA (categories 4–5 interventions) when category 3 interventions are blocked.

This is the introduction and second chapter of my Masters' thesis, which was completed well over a decade ago. I still think that it is on the right track, though I am not sure if I'll ever take up the issue again. (I do, however, plan on returning to Epistemology eventually.) I omit the first chapter because I believe that the main claim I defend there -- that knowledge is not epistemically better than mere true belief -- is untenable, and probably not needed (contrary to what I then thought) to defend the position defended here.


Abstract:

Considering the relation between epistemic justification and truth, I argue, first, that knowledge is not epistemically better than mere true belief, and second, that to epistemically justified a belief must be likely to be true given the ground it is based on. I also consider at length one main argument – based on evil demon counterexamples – that has the effect of denying this second claim (that to be justified a belief must be likely to be true). I argue that the beliefs of evil demon victims are epistemically rational but not epistemically justified because their beliefs are not likely to be true.